1 00:00:00,280 --> 00:00:04,640 Speaker 1: Now here's a highlight from coast to coast AM on iHeartRadio. 2 00:00:04,920 --> 00:00:07,560 Speaker 2: You know, we can go out on these live investigations 3 00:00:08,080 --> 00:00:12,120 Speaker 2: and there's fifteen foot tall creatures around and other things 4 00:00:12,119 --> 00:00:14,720 Speaker 2: that are flying around you and you don't even know 5 00:00:14,760 --> 00:00:18,040 Speaker 2: how tall some of those are or how creepy and 6 00:00:18,120 --> 00:00:20,400 Speaker 2: tiny they might be too. They're not. They're not all 7 00:00:20,480 --> 00:00:23,000 Speaker 2: friendly and happy, and I know a lot of people 8 00:00:23,040 --> 00:00:27,720 Speaker 2: think they are there. They're not, And that's just that's 9 00:00:27,920 --> 00:00:31,840 Speaker 2: that's from my research. But it's interesting how you can 10 00:00:31,880 --> 00:00:37,040 Speaker 2: go out and do that, and it's intimidating, takes the courage, 11 00:00:37,080 --> 00:00:41,080 Speaker 2: all that kind of thing. But what's scarier is the 12 00:00:41,159 --> 00:00:45,960 Speaker 2: cybersecurity and what happens when when somebody tries to fool 13 00:00:46,000 --> 00:00:49,520 Speaker 2: you to get your money and they're so darn good 14 00:00:50,000 --> 00:00:52,199 Speaker 2: and you had said it, Malick, who was with us 15 00:00:52,200 --> 00:00:55,360 Speaker 2: tonight to talk about that, you had said it. Where 16 00:00:55,400 --> 00:00:59,160 Speaker 2: with the AI, it's going to get even more it's 17 00:00:59,200 --> 00:01:02,120 Speaker 2: going to be even harder to know the difference because 18 00:01:02,160 --> 00:01:04,959 Speaker 2: these people, now, I mean they just lie right to 19 00:01:05,240 --> 00:01:09,680 Speaker 2: you when they actually have the guts enough to do 20 00:01:09,760 --> 00:01:13,360 Speaker 2: it on a phone call. Uh, but when they even 21 00:01:13,400 --> 00:01:16,160 Speaker 2: put it together in an email it's just it's just 22 00:01:16,240 --> 00:01:20,800 Speaker 2: so hard to tell it apart. So so I'm trusting 23 00:01:20,880 --> 00:01:24,560 Speaker 2: you in this journey because of conversation, because I don't 24 00:01:24,600 --> 00:01:26,200 Speaker 2: even know what to ask when it comes to this. 25 00:01:26,360 --> 00:01:30,119 Speaker 2: It's just awful when it happens. And I know when 26 00:01:30,160 --> 00:01:33,600 Speaker 2: I catch it, you know, it just happens that I 27 00:01:33,680 --> 00:01:36,280 Speaker 2: catch it doesn't mean I catch it all the time. 28 00:01:36,319 --> 00:01:38,280 Speaker 2: I have to make some phone calls to see what's 29 00:01:38,319 --> 00:01:40,200 Speaker 2: going on. And of course now I'm always going to 30 00:01:40,240 --> 00:01:44,199 Speaker 2: be going, Malick, take a look at this. Connie's waking 31 00:01:44,240 --> 00:01:48,120 Speaker 2: me up again. So thank your wife for that. But 32 00:01:50,200 --> 00:01:52,040 Speaker 2: what do you think where do we start the basic 33 00:01:52,120 --> 00:01:54,400 Speaker 2: principles of security? 34 00:01:55,520 --> 00:01:58,040 Speaker 3: I think so, you know, before I was getting ready 35 00:01:58,080 --> 00:01:59,720 Speaker 3: to call on your show, obviously being a little a 36 00:01:59,760 --> 00:02:02,840 Speaker 3: bit nervous this Coast to Coach, right, I I was 37 00:02:02,880 --> 00:02:07,120 Speaker 3: listening to a song from my younger days, just like 38 00:02:07,200 --> 00:02:08,920 Speaker 3: some of the bumper music you know on the Coast 39 00:02:08,960 --> 00:02:12,280 Speaker 3: to Coast. It was love is the Answer about England, 40 00:02:12,320 --> 00:02:15,519 Speaker 3: Dan and John Portcoli, and it's like, yes, this is 41 00:02:15,600 --> 00:02:19,040 Speaker 3: true now when that song came out. But there's just 42 00:02:19,360 --> 00:02:22,440 Speaker 3: it seems like there's less love right, And I think 43 00:02:22,480 --> 00:02:28,480 Speaker 3: what we've got that's replacing the love is greed. It's 44 00:02:28,040 --> 00:02:35,200 Speaker 3: just this incredible yeah, uh, pashion for money and regardless 45 00:02:35,240 --> 00:02:37,240 Speaker 3: of where it comes from or what they have to 46 00:02:37,280 --> 00:02:41,760 Speaker 3: do to get it right. And but we don't want 47 00:02:41,760 --> 00:02:44,400 Speaker 3: to operate from a standpoint of fear right, we don't 48 00:02:44,440 --> 00:02:46,640 Speaker 3: and we don't even want to operate from the standpoint 49 00:02:46,639 --> 00:02:48,720 Speaker 3: of patriot. We don't want to hate anyone, don't want 50 00:02:48,760 --> 00:02:51,160 Speaker 3: to hate these people that are that are coming after us. 51 00:02:52,480 --> 00:02:55,280 Speaker 3: It's it's sad, but it's true. A lot of this 52 00:02:55,440 --> 00:02:58,080 Speaker 3: cyber crime and I can't I couldn't tay the percentages, 53 00:02:58,880 --> 00:03:01,320 Speaker 3: but a significant amount of it is coming from people 54 00:03:01,320 --> 00:03:05,960 Speaker 3: who feel they have no choice to make money wherever 55 00:03:06,000 --> 00:03:10,080 Speaker 3: they are in the world. They can't find legitleman employment 56 00:03:10,360 --> 00:03:11,840 Speaker 3: to make the money they need to take care of 57 00:03:11,880 --> 00:03:16,200 Speaker 3: their families. You know John, Colonel John Alexander, I've gotten 58 00:03:16,240 --> 00:03:18,400 Speaker 3: to know, and he's a guest on the Coast to 59 00:03:18,480 --> 00:03:21,560 Speaker 3: Coast quite a bit. I remember he shared a presentation 60 00:03:21,680 --> 00:03:26,040 Speaker 3: with me years ago that said, like and this was 61 00:03:26,160 --> 00:03:29,480 Speaker 3: years ago, like fifteen years ago probably, and it said 62 00:03:29,480 --> 00:03:34,000 Speaker 3: that a billion people in the world do not have consistent, 63 00:03:34,120 --> 00:03:40,240 Speaker 3: reliable access to potable water to drink now when you 64 00:03:40,520 --> 00:03:43,600 Speaker 3: think about that, this is as basic as it gets, 65 00:03:43,680 --> 00:03:47,360 Speaker 3: is just being able to reliably access drinking water. You've 66 00:03:47,400 --> 00:03:49,720 Speaker 3: got people who can potentially get in some you know, 67 00:03:49,960 --> 00:03:53,040 Speaker 3: do some desperate things. But I told you earlier. I 68 00:03:53,120 --> 00:03:55,960 Speaker 3: got scammed a number, probably a year or so ago, 69 00:03:56,280 --> 00:03:58,000 Speaker 3: and I just it just I don't know it just 70 00:03:58,240 --> 00:04:00,240 Speaker 3: they hit me later it's like why in the world, 71 00:04:00,320 --> 00:04:03,800 Speaker 3: And I see, you know, the indications of it, right, 72 00:04:04,600 --> 00:04:07,080 Speaker 3: And then sure enough someone else tries to reach out 73 00:04:07,120 --> 00:04:09,120 Speaker 3: to me and do a similar thing. And I remember 74 00:04:09,280 --> 00:04:14,560 Speaker 3: kind of scolding this person, right, and they said, you know, 75 00:04:14,680 --> 00:04:17,279 Speaker 3: you're right. I am ashamed, but I don't have a choice. 76 00:04:17,279 --> 00:04:19,280 Speaker 3: I've got to make money for my family. And I 77 00:04:19,360 --> 00:04:22,200 Speaker 3: was like, well, this ain't the way to do it. 78 00:04:22,240 --> 00:04:25,800 Speaker 3: But I'm but I wanted to understand where they're coming from, right, 79 00:04:26,960 --> 00:04:29,520 Speaker 3: some of them, Some of them it is just crime syndicates, 80 00:04:29,560 --> 00:04:32,320 Speaker 3: you know, some of them are. It's nation states that 81 00:04:32,440 --> 00:04:36,839 Speaker 3: are I don't think national states are necessarily targeting US individuals, 82 00:04:36,960 --> 00:04:40,000 Speaker 3: right unless there's a specific reason why we're targetable, And 83 00:04:40,040 --> 00:04:43,640 Speaker 3: for the most part that's not us. But the cyber 84 00:04:43,760 --> 00:04:50,240 Speaker 3: crime games, the electronic crime, they are absolutely targeting anyone, right, 85 00:04:51,360 --> 00:04:55,400 Speaker 3: And so I think from a standpoint again, making sure 86 00:04:55,400 --> 00:04:59,000 Speaker 3: we're not operating out of fear hatred is just being 87 00:04:59,080 --> 00:05:02,160 Speaker 3: the first thing. I think being vigilant the most important 88 00:05:02,200 --> 00:05:07,040 Speaker 3: aspect of security, whether it's physical security, cybersecurity, privacy is 89 00:05:07,040 --> 00:05:10,560 Speaker 3: the human it's us, no one. I'm the biggest threat 90 00:05:10,600 --> 00:05:14,239 Speaker 3: to my own security. Generally speaking, I'm the biggest threat 91 00:05:14,279 --> 00:05:18,720 Speaker 3: to my computer security. If I'm not practicing this proper 92 00:05:18,839 --> 00:05:24,680 Speaker 3: cyber hygiene, then it doesn't matter what any virus I'm using, 93 00:05:25,520 --> 00:05:28,919 Speaker 3: or any other tools or techniques I'm using. If I'm 94 00:05:28,960 --> 00:05:32,920 Speaker 3: not doing I'm supposed to do, then then I'm opening 95 00:05:32,960 --> 00:05:35,000 Speaker 3: myself up and I'm opening my computer up. 96 00:05:35,080 --> 00:05:39,080 Speaker 2: Right, So how do we prevent it? What is it 97 00:05:39,120 --> 00:05:42,480 Speaker 2: that we do, maybe even daily to make sure nothing happens? 98 00:05:42,480 --> 00:05:43,880 Speaker 2: How do we keep ourselves safe? 99 00:05:45,040 --> 00:05:47,800 Speaker 3: Well, I think vigilance. Number one thing is vigilance, right, 100 00:05:48,120 --> 00:05:50,520 Speaker 3: And this is even crosses over into the cyber into 101 00:05:50,520 --> 00:05:53,680 Speaker 3: the physical security world, because one thing, you can't separate 102 00:05:53,920 --> 00:05:59,120 Speaker 3: physical security from cybersecurity. Years ago, companies focused exclusively on 103 00:05:59,200 --> 00:06:02,760 Speaker 3: physical security access control, trying to keep the wrong people 104 00:06:02,760 --> 00:06:06,159 Speaker 3: out of their facilities and their buildings. And then and 105 00:06:06,240 --> 00:06:08,840 Speaker 3: they didn't. They just didn't pay attention to cybersecurity. It 106 00:06:08,880 --> 00:06:12,279 Speaker 3: wasn't an issue. Now it's swung the other way and 107 00:06:12,400 --> 00:06:15,719 Speaker 3: cybersecurity is the buzzword. Everybody's worried about it, and they're 108 00:06:15,720 --> 00:06:19,640 Speaker 3: starting if I'm not careful the neglect physical security you 109 00:06:19,760 --> 00:06:22,720 Speaker 3: have to have. You have to have both, right, I 110 00:06:23,160 --> 00:06:26,000 Speaker 3: tend to think of you can kind of put this 111 00:06:26,080 --> 00:06:30,640 Speaker 3: analogy for both domains, physical and cyber. Think of your 112 00:06:30,680 --> 00:06:33,800 Speaker 3: home or your apartment, wherever it is that you live. 113 00:06:34,560 --> 00:06:37,320 Speaker 3: Whatever's valuable to you is in that is in that 114 00:06:37,640 --> 00:06:41,640 Speaker 3: is in that building, is in that domocile yourself, maybe 115 00:06:41,680 --> 00:06:46,880 Speaker 3: your loved ones, your your treasure possessions, maybe your data, 116 00:06:47,640 --> 00:06:52,200 Speaker 3: your important documents, important photographs, you know, things like that. 117 00:06:52,880 --> 00:06:55,679 Speaker 3: How do you keep people from How do you protect 118 00:06:55,680 --> 00:06:57,320 Speaker 3: the things that are important to you, because again, you 119 00:06:57,360 --> 00:07:00,920 Speaker 3: can't protect everything. You have to prioritize and if you're 120 00:07:00,920 --> 00:07:04,720 Speaker 3: looking at from a physical security standpoint, we had a 121 00:07:04,760 --> 00:07:07,240 Speaker 3: point in my neighborhood where we had regular break in. 122 00:07:07,279 --> 00:07:09,080 Speaker 3: It's like three nights in a row. People were in 123 00:07:09,120 --> 00:07:11,840 Speaker 3: our neighborhood breaking in and I was like, all this 124 00:07:11,880 --> 00:07:14,720 Speaker 3: is crazy. And I have a friend who is a 125 00:07:14,720 --> 00:07:19,840 Speaker 3: physical security expert and we talked and he said, look, 126 00:07:21,040 --> 00:07:24,120 Speaker 3: you can't again again, you can't have perfect physical security, 127 00:07:24,120 --> 00:07:27,640 Speaker 3: but you want to be a hard at target, right. 128 00:07:28,160 --> 00:07:30,320 Speaker 3: You want to be that one that they're like, this 129 00:07:30,400 --> 00:07:32,120 Speaker 3: is not the point if I'm going to break into 130 00:07:32,120 --> 00:07:34,440 Speaker 3: a house, it's not gonna be this one. This one 131 00:07:34,480 --> 00:07:37,560 Speaker 3: looks too difficult. Right. So you've got your lights on, 132 00:07:37,720 --> 00:07:40,320 Speaker 3: you've got your cameras, you've got signed that says you 133 00:07:40,400 --> 00:07:43,720 Speaker 3: have an alarm system, and maybe you keep your portslight 134 00:07:43,840 --> 00:07:46,240 Speaker 3: on at night. That sends a message to whoever may 135 00:07:46,240 --> 00:07:50,360 Speaker 3: be coming through your neighborhood that hey, I'm here, right, 136 00:07:50,520 --> 00:07:52,840 Speaker 3: and I'm I'm and I want you to know I'm 137 00:07:52,840 --> 00:07:55,160 Speaker 3: thinking of you. You may be thinking to me, but 138 00:07:55,240 --> 00:07:58,480 Speaker 3: I'm thinking of you, right. It's like a communication with 139 00:07:58,600 --> 00:08:01,280 Speaker 3: these folks, right. And that's on the physical security side, 140 00:08:01,880 --> 00:08:05,920 Speaker 3: but from cybersecurity side again, taking a look at yourself 141 00:08:06,400 --> 00:08:11,480 Speaker 3: from a digital standpoint, I mean, what do you look 142 00:08:11,600 --> 00:08:13,600 Speaker 3: like on the internet if you're looking at yourself as 143 00:08:13,640 --> 00:08:15,960 Speaker 3: a person, and it doesn't hurt to take a look. 144 00:08:16,200 --> 00:08:18,880 Speaker 3: And we talked about how Tonny, how people can mind 145 00:08:18,920 --> 00:08:22,120 Speaker 3: you and they can start targeting you, maybe even a 146 00:08:22,160 --> 00:08:25,000 Speaker 3: little bit specifically and a lot of think, well I'm 147 00:08:25,040 --> 00:08:29,440 Speaker 3: not that important why I'm being targeted, Well, these things are. 148 00:08:30,200 --> 00:08:33,360 Speaker 3: These things are run I think in campaigns and if 149 00:08:33,360 --> 00:08:35,560 Speaker 3: you take a look at and see what is out 150 00:08:35,600 --> 00:08:38,800 Speaker 3: there about you and maybe your family members on the internet, 151 00:08:39,280 --> 00:08:42,080 Speaker 3: and what happens sometimes is people focused exclusive though I'm 152 00:08:42,080 --> 00:08:45,800 Speaker 3: going to make myself a hard target. And what is 153 00:08:45,840 --> 00:08:48,480 Speaker 3: found out in the corporate world is you've got your CEOs, 154 00:08:48,520 --> 00:08:52,920 Speaker 3: your c spee. Folks, they practice excellent security at their work, 155 00:08:53,000 --> 00:08:57,200 Speaker 3: they practice excellence security maybe for themselves online. But the 156 00:08:57,320 --> 00:09:01,360 Speaker 3: vulnerability is the children, right, or maybe their spouse is 157 00:09:01,440 --> 00:09:04,240 Speaker 3: out there posting all kinds of pictures and things like that. 158 00:09:04,840 --> 00:09:07,280 Speaker 3: Case in point, I was asked to take a look 159 00:09:07,320 --> 00:09:10,640 Speaker 3: from an open source intelligence side. Had a person who 160 00:09:10,760 --> 00:09:14,959 Speaker 3: was starting to become a rioting star in the agricultural business, 161 00:09:15,440 --> 00:09:17,120 Speaker 3: and we're like, let's just take a look at this 162 00:09:17,200 --> 00:09:21,120 Speaker 3: person from a standpoint of vulnerability. Well, just a nice 163 00:09:21,480 --> 00:09:25,400 Speaker 3: general person, probably in their late thirties. But within a 164 00:09:25,440 --> 00:09:29,560 Speaker 3: fairly short order I found this individual's complete full name data, birth, 165 00:09:30,080 --> 00:09:32,720 Speaker 3: same for their spouse, same for all of their children, 166 00:09:33,320 --> 00:09:36,760 Speaker 3: got the address of their home, got their other Malian address. 167 00:09:37,120 --> 00:09:39,440 Speaker 3: I was able to find a blueprint to their home. 168 00:09:39,960 --> 00:09:42,480 Speaker 3: I was able to find this person's I think had 169 00:09:42,520 --> 00:09:45,360 Speaker 3: a direct relative that died. I was able to find 170 00:09:45,400 --> 00:09:50,480 Speaker 3: that person's Social Security number and date of death. I 171 00:09:50,559 --> 00:09:52,800 Speaker 3: was able to find the schools that their kids went to, 172 00:09:53,040 --> 00:09:57,600 Speaker 3: pictures of their kids, and I'm like, this is this 173 00:09:57,679 --> 00:10:01,240 Speaker 3: is all out there and it was completely easy to find. Right. 174 00:10:02,800 --> 00:10:04,520 Speaker 3: It may not matter if you're not if you're not 175 00:10:04,640 --> 00:10:07,240 Speaker 3: that well known, but once you become a well known person, 176 00:10:07,800 --> 00:10:10,880 Speaker 3: that stuff becomes very important. So taking a look again, 177 00:10:12,120 --> 00:10:13,760 Speaker 3: not saying that you know some of us are we 178 00:10:13,840 --> 00:10:16,600 Speaker 3: think that we're a low profile. And that's another part. 179 00:10:16,679 --> 00:10:19,400 Speaker 3: This is maintaining a little profile. But for some people 180 00:10:19,800 --> 00:10:21,959 Speaker 3: you can't help the fact that you're that you're well known, 181 00:10:21,960 --> 00:10:24,400 Speaker 3: at least on some level. But take a look and 182 00:10:24,440 --> 00:10:27,599 Speaker 3: see what is out there about you. Connie, you and 183 00:10:27,679 --> 00:10:30,400 Speaker 3: I talked about an E two emails that I recently 184 00:10:30,480 --> 00:10:35,240 Speaker 3: received that I felt a little bit targeted. The email 185 00:10:35,280 --> 00:10:39,240 Speaker 3: had my name, and it had my my phone number, my 186 00:10:40,320 --> 00:10:43,880 Speaker 3: obviously had my email address, and it had my residential address, 187 00:10:43,920 --> 00:10:46,600 Speaker 3: and then there was an attachment that had my name 188 00:10:46,720 --> 00:10:49,960 Speaker 3: dot pdf. I wonder the world is this? So I 189 00:10:50,040 --> 00:10:53,000 Speaker 3: take a look at this thing. Now, I didn't. My 190 00:10:53,200 --> 00:10:55,360 Speaker 3: first thought was they want me to click on this 191 00:10:55,480 --> 00:10:58,240 Speaker 3: attachment open it up so they can infect my computer 192 00:10:58,320 --> 00:11:04,520 Speaker 3: with malware. But I took that I and I would 193 00:11:04,520 --> 00:11:06,560 Speaker 3: recommend anybody be careful if they're going to try this. 194 00:11:06,679 --> 00:11:10,280 Speaker 3: But I right clicked on that attachment. I saved it 195 00:11:10,280 --> 00:11:13,080 Speaker 3: to my desktop, and then I uploaded it to a 196 00:11:13,120 --> 00:11:15,599 Speaker 3: psyche called virus Total, which is free to anyone. You 197 00:11:15,640 --> 00:11:17,320 Speaker 3: don't have to pay, you don't even have to sign 198 00:11:17,400 --> 00:11:22,720 Speaker 3: up for it. And I let that site run a 199 00:11:22,720 --> 00:11:27,000 Speaker 3: a scan like like about sixty some different security vendors 200 00:11:27,520 --> 00:11:29,920 Speaker 3: of this PDF file or whatever it was. It's called 201 00:11:29,920 --> 00:11:32,079 Speaker 3: the sayd pdf does not mean it's a PDF, right, 202 00:11:32,400 --> 00:11:36,880 Speaker 3: anyone can spoof the file extension on an attachment. But 203 00:11:37,000 --> 00:11:38,600 Speaker 3: I saw that, Oh that's good to know. 204 00:11:38,840 --> 00:11:40,960 Speaker 2: Se No, that's good to know. I didn't know that, 205 00:11:41,040 --> 00:11:41,880 Speaker 2: so that's good to know. 206 00:11:42,679 --> 00:11:45,280 Speaker 3: Okay, Well they could they could label a dot PDF 207 00:11:45,320 --> 00:11:48,480 Speaker 3: and it's actually a dot exe, which is an executable 208 00:11:48,520 --> 00:11:52,160 Speaker 3: which we when you put on it, it actually executes. 209 00:11:52,200 --> 00:11:54,880 Speaker 3: That is, if your whatever your your an a virus 210 00:11:54,920 --> 00:11:59,480 Speaker 3: solution doesn't stop it. So I looked opened up this 211 00:11:59,480 --> 00:12:02,200 Speaker 3: this PDF up and basically it was it was an 212 00:12:02,200 --> 00:12:07,280 Speaker 3: extortion note to me, and they had a picture of 213 00:12:07,320 --> 00:12:09,600 Speaker 3: my well, it wasn't a picture of my house, they 214 00:12:09,640 --> 00:12:11,560 Speaker 3: messed that part up, but it was a picture in 215 00:12:11,640 --> 00:12:16,400 Speaker 3: my street. They accused me of looking at inappropriate sites. 216 00:12:17,080 --> 00:12:19,679 Speaker 3: They said they had access to my camera, maybe on 217 00:12:19,760 --> 00:12:23,720 Speaker 3: my computer, maybe on my phone, not likely, right, And 218 00:12:23,840 --> 00:12:26,600 Speaker 3: they said he said they were using Pegasus software because 219 00:12:26,600 --> 00:12:29,520 Speaker 3: that's in the news right nation states are using that 220 00:12:29,600 --> 00:12:33,840 Speaker 3: to spyle dissidents and political rivals. And they threatened to 221 00:12:34,160 --> 00:12:36,880 Speaker 3: expose all of this to all my social media. They 222 00:12:36,920 --> 00:12:38,920 Speaker 3: said they had all my contact It was just it 223 00:12:39,000 --> 00:12:41,200 Speaker 3: was over the top, right, and they want me to 224 00:12:41,200 --> 00:12:43,640 Speaker 3: pay them two thousand dollars or something. And then I 225 00:12:43,640 --> 00:12:45,800 Speaker 3: got another one not long after that, And then we 226 00:12:45,840 --> 00:12:48,720 Speaker 3: found out later that they seemed to be targeting some 227 00:12:48,760 --> 00:12:51,280 Speaker 3: folks in the area. Came out on the news, but 228 00:12:51,360 --> 00:12:53,720 Speaker 3: that was targeted. From the standpoint, someone did a little 229 00:12:53,720 --> 00:12:55,840 Speaker 3: bit of research on me, and I don't think they 230 00:12:55,840 --> 00:12:59,480 Speaker 3: were targeting me specifically, but I think that some company 231 00:12:59,679 --> 00:13:02,360 Speaker 3: was was being hired as a service to go out 232 00:13:02,400 --> 00:13:06,400 Speaker 3: and do this and create these lists that probably had 233 00:13:06,440 --> 00:13:10,640 Speaker 3: an email that had the name, phone number, address. Maybe 234 00:13:10,679 --> 00:13:16,280 Speaker 3: this semi customized extortion note to send out the folks 235 00:13:16,360 --> 00:13:19,800 Speaker 3: right to get someone's attention, right, because when you see 236 00:13:19,840 --> 00:13:22,920 Speaker 3: all this information, you're like, wait a minute, if somebody 237 00:13:23,240 --> 00:13:26,040 Speaker 3: they been spying on me, or they going around my house, 238 00:13:26,960 --> 00:13:28,920 Speaker 3: well none of that's really the case, but it was 239 00:13:29,200 --> 00:13:31,000 Speaker 3: just to try to scare me. 240 00:13:33,280 --> 00:13:36,560 Speaker 1: Listen to more Coast to Coast AM every weeknight at 241 00:13:36,559 --> 00:13:39,839 Speaker 1: one am Eastern and go to Coast to coastam dot 242 00:13:39,840 --> 00:13:40,640 Speaker 1: com for more