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Speaker 1: If you have your own story of being in a

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Speaker 1: cult or a high control group, or.

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Speaker 2: If you've had experience with manipulation or abusive power that

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Speaker 2: you'd like to share.

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Speaker 1: Leave us a message on our hotline number at three

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Speaker 1: four seven eight six trust.

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Speaker 2: That's three four seven eight six eight seven eight seven eight, or.

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Speaker 1: Shoot us an email at trust Me pod at gmail

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Speaker 1: dot com.

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Speaker 3: Trust me, Trust trust me.

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Speaker 4: I'm like a swat person.

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Speaker 5: I've never lied to you.

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Speaker 2: And if you think that one person has all the answers,

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Speaker 2: don't welcome. Welcome to trust Me, the podcast about cults,

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Speaker 2: extreme belief, and manipulation from two investigative journalists who've actually

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Speaker 2: experienced it.

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Speaker 6: I'm Lola Blanc.

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Speaker 3: And I'm Megan Elizabeth.

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Speaker 6: We're not investigative journal I mean, we're not not We're not.

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Speaker 2: We also aren't really okay.

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Speaker 6: We're podcasters, you guys.

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Speaker 2: Today in our first episode of Conspiracy Month. We are

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Speaker 2: focusing this month. Every week we're talking to a different

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Speaker 2: person about concer sspiracy theories and how they happen and

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Speaker 2: who they happen.

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Speaker 6: To, et cetera, et cetera.

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Speaker 2: For this first week of Conspiracy Month, we're going to

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Speaker 2: talk to Lisa Fozzio.

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Speaker 5: So.

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Speaker 2: She is an associate professor of psychology at Vanderbilt University,

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Speaker 2: and she researches learning memory and how we come to

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Speaker 2: believe falsehoods, because, after all, conspiracy theorists believe in a

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Speaker 2: whole lot of things that have no evidence. Lisa's going

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Speaker 2: to talk to us about why none of us are

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Speaker 2: the experts in discerning fact from fiction that we think

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Speaker 2: we are, and how therefore we're all vulnerable to made

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Speaker 2: up stories, and how hearing something multiple times makes it

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Speaker 2: seem more true even if we know it isn't and

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Speaker 2: no matter who's saying it scary.

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Speaker 4: She'll talk to us about why misinformation spread so easily

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Speaker 4: on the internet, how falsehoods stick in our memory even

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Speaker 4: after we learn that they're not true, and the ways

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Speaker 4: we can protect ourselves from falling prey to bad information

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Speaker 4: that might lead us into conspiracy theory territory.

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Speaker 2: So much to get into you, guys, I'm really excited

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Speaker 2: about this month. Oh me too, So instead of doing

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Speaker 2: a cultiest thing this week, we are just going to.

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Speaker 6: Talk about a very culty thing that is happening in

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Speaker 6: the news.

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Speaker 2: Maybe y'all have read about it, so maybe y'all have

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Speaker 2: seen this story that has started to come up in

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Speaker 2: the news about a polygamoust leader who claimed twenty wives,

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Speaker 2: including minors. Right, so there's this big story that's coming

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Speaker 2: out now. This man, Samuel Bateman in southern Utah in

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Speaker 2: Arizona on the border, took underage wives and it is very,

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Speaker 2: very terrible the things that he's done. So if you

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Speaker 2: look in the court documents, if you look in the

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Speaker 2: affidavit and some of the articles referenced this, most of

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Speaker 2: the evidence is coming from two people and it only

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Speaker 2: says their initials, it's CM and it's TK, And it

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Speaker 2: says that most of the recordings, their audio recordings, their

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Speaker 2: video recordings come from these two people who got close

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Speaker 2: to this cult leader. The two people in question are

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Speaker 2: my mom and my stepdad.

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Speaker 6: I mean, I didn't know the specifics.

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Speaker 2: I did not know the details, but I have known

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Speaker 2: that my mom has been secretly taking down a cult

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Speaker 2: leader from the inside for the past I mean over

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Speaker 2: a year.

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Speaker 4: And you guys, I mean just to say, Christine was

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Speaker 4: our first untrust me. She was in a cult of

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Speaker 4: her own, so this is dear to her heart and

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Speaker 4: these women are important to her, and many other ways

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Speaker 4: she's been a friend to them, and yeah, yeah.

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Speaker 6: Yeah, I mean it is.

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Speaker 2: It's stressful for me even talk about because I care

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Speaker 2: so much about like just how this is all going

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Speaker 2: to go down, and like my mom has put herself

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Speaker 2: in a lot of danger to take this person down.

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Speaker 2: She's like, I mean, it's just been a very emotionally

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Speaker 2: challenging year for her because, like you know, her focus

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Speaker 2: is on harm reduction in the community, and therefore she's

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Speaker 2: built up a lot of trust with a lot of

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Speaker 2: people in this area and this group, these women, these girls,

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Speaker 2: they trusted her, and what makes I know? I know,

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Speaker 2: And she's like, you know, she's called me like crying

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Speaker 2: because she's like, they love me so much, Like they

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Speaker 2: love me so much, and they don't know. They don't

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Speaker 2: know that what's happening to them is abuse, and they

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Speaker 2: don't know that I'm about to betray their trust, but

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Speaker 2: I have to do it because there's some very serious

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Speaker 2: abuse happening.

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Speaker 3: Yes, it's the law also.

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Speaker 2: Yeah yeah, but so so again, like whatever, some of

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Speaker 2: the details have come out now and you guys can

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Speaker 2: read about them on your own. We're not going to

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Speaker 2: talk about them today because we're going to do a

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Speaker 2: whole episode on it later on.

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Speaker 6: But there were some really really just.

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Speaker 2: Like disgusting, vile sex acts that were happening with underage girls,

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Speaker 2: very young girls. Family members like really just like horrible shit,

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Speaker 2: and having to hear about that stuff, I just like

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Speaker 2: can't imagine how you keep going and have to like

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Speaker 2: keep putting on a smile.

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Speaker 6: And because you know.

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Speaker 2: She first reports she first talked to authorities about it

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Speaker 2: two years ago, and basically it took months, took so

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Speaker 2: long to like actually get enough concrete evidence, and and

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Speaker 2: I want to just like mention really fast. There's a

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Speaker 2: group of women online. Uh oh, We've talked about them before.

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Speaker 2: They drive me crazy. So there's this group of women.

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Speaker 2: I'm going to say that they are they consider themselves

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Speaker 2: like cult fighters or something, and they will talk about,

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Speaker 2: you know, all of the why polygamy is wrong and

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Speaker 2: helping polygamists is wrong, and therefore my mom has become

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Speaker 2: sort of the object of their hatred. So they knew

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Speaker 2: that my mom was in this community, they did not

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Speaker 2: know that my mom was like secretly gathering evidence with

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Speaker 2: the authorities for many months. They basically have been saying

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Speaker 2: my mom is an enigbler and she should be in

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Speaker 2: jail herself. And I just would like to kindly say

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Speaker 2: to these women, suck my dick. Suck my dick, to me,

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Speaker 2: talk to me when you are secretly fucking recording four

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Speaker 2: months and putting yourself in danger and also just like

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Speaker 2: exposing yourself emotionally to so much difficult shit when you're

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Speaker 2: actually on the front line literally fighting colts, literally taking

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Speaker 2: a man down.

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Speaker 4: Your computer, right, you know, I mean, everything that we

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Speaker 4: talk about here, it's so it's so nuanced. It's not

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Speaker 4: as easy as you can just type it out at

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Speaker 4: a computer. It's a complicated subject with people who aren't

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Speaker 4: it's so hard because I want to say, with people

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Speaker 4: who aren't thinking rationally, but then I feel like I'm

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Speaker 4: taking away their empowerment.

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Speaker 3: It's just so complicated.

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Speaker 2: I mean, I understand the instinct, like we all have

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Speaker 2: this instinct to like want to see find the.

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Speaker 6: Good people and the bad people and pick the good.

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Speaker 2: People and then fight, you know, fight the bad people.

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Speaker 6: And it's but sometimes we get it wrong.

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Speaker 2: We get it wrong, and in this case, these women

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Speaker 2: got it wrong, and as evidenced by lots of court

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Speaker 2: documents at this point, and so you know, it brings

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Speaker 2: me great joy to like be able to talk about

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Speaker 2: it now. I mean, we will talk about it more

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Speaker 2: in death. My mom does not. She's not doing interviews.

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Speaker 2: She has like a court case to deal with and

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Speaker 2: the aftermath to deal with. It's been very difficult and

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Speaker 2: so she's not talking about it right now. But I'm

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Speaker 2: talking about it because I love my mom. I love

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Speaker 2: my mommy, and you love the women that she's hoping.

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Speaker 2: I do, and I have met a couple of the

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Speaker 2: people who are named in the court documents and.

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Speaker 6: This has been hell for them.

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Speaker 2: This whole process has been hell for them, and like, yeah,

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Speaker 2: I want to really speak to the bravery of them

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Speaker 2: to like be able to come forward. For now, I'll

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Speaker 2: just say, my mom rules and.

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Speaker 3: We love you, Christine.

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Speaker 2: We're taking So basically, this man is in jail largely

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Speaker 2: because of my mom and my stepdad, and I think

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Speaker 2: that's freaking awesome. And we will see what happens in court.

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Speaker 2: But that's my cultiest thing. Who that aside? Yeah, that

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Speaker 2: likes pretty important thing aside. Should we talk to Lisa

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Speaker 2: Faso Now let's get into it. Welcome Lisa Fazzio to

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Speaker 2: trust me.

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Speaker 5: Thanks for having me thank you for being here.

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Speaker 6: We're so excited, are we, Meghan.

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Speaker 3: It's kind of crazy. I'm like, yeah, I'm very excited

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Speaker 3: to know so many things.

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Speaker 6: Yeah.

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Speaker 2: So you focus on the process of learning and memory

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Speaker 2: and specifically how we come to believe things that are

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Speaker 2: not true. That's one of your areas of emphasis. So

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Speaker 2: what drew you to research these topics in particular?

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Speaker 5: Yeah, so I've been researching these topics for a long time.

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Speaker 5: I first got interested when I was an undergraduate at

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Speaker 5: Washington University in Saint Louis, and I started learning from

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Speaker 5: these professors who were researching memory and specifically all the

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Speaker 5: ways that our memories can be wrong. So how we

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Speaker 5: can come to have false beliefs of events that never

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Speaker 5: happened that we think actually did happen, and how our

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Speaker 5: memories get twisted as we start retelling stories. And so

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Speaker 5: I thought that was fascinating, and then it shifted from

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Speaker 5: work on these kind of memories for events in our

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Speaker 5: lives to our knowledge about real world events and people.

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Speaker 2: Ah, it makes me want to do a whole other

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Speaker 2: branch off episode on false memories and the Satanic panic

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Speaker 2: because I'm so interested in that stuff. But for today,

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Speaker 2: we're going to focus on our current landscape. So most

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Speaker 2: of us see ourselves as experts in discerning fact from fiction,

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Speaker 2: and I would love to know why we are wrong.

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Speaker 5: That's a great way of framing it. So it actually

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Speaker 5: turns out that it's really hard for humans to determine

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Speaker 5: what's true or false, especially if the information is kind

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Speaker 5: of close enough or good enough. If something's blatantly wrong,

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Speaker 5: you'll normally notice the error and realize it's false. But

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Speaker 5: the things that are more plausible, it can be really tough.

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Speaker 5: So I'll give you, guys, my favorite example. I'm going

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Speaker 5: to ask you two questions. Just answer them both out loud.

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Speaker 5: In the Biblical story, what was Jonah swallowed by?

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Speaker 7: Oh?

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Speaker 4: Well?

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Speaker 6: Oh well, good job?

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Speaker 5: How many animals of each kind? Did Moses take on

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Speaker 5: the arc?

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Speaker 3: Too? But Moses?

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Speaker 5: Was it?

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Speaker 2: Moses read I read this example in advance. I feel

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Speaker 2: like it's not fair for.

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Speaker 6: Me to answer.

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Speaker 2: I was reading it was too yeah, but.

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Speaker 5: Then you started to realize that, yeah, it was actually

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Speaker 5: Noah and not Moses.

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Speaker 3: Oh shit, Thanks parents for really thumping the Bible into

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Speaker 3: my brain. Okay, right, I hear you, I get it. Okay, cool.

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Speaker 5: So if I had just asked you kind of who

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Speaker 5: was it who took the animals on the arc? You

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Speaker 5: probably could have come up with Noah. If I'd given

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Speaker 5: you a multiple choice question, you definitely would have come

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Speaker 5: up with Noah. But in that moment when I say Moses,

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Speaker 5: nothing registers is wrong, you just kind of go on

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Speaker 5: comprehending the sentence as if it's perfectly normal.

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Speaker 2: Right, So it's like it sounds close enough to the

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Speaker 2: thing that there's no reason for our brains to like

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Speaker 2: kind of flag it to stop and notice that.

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Speaker 5: One hundred percent. And so if you do it with

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Speaker 5: things that are blatantly false. So in the original study

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Speaker 5: back in the eighties, they asked how many animals of

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Speaker 5: each kind did Reagan take on the arc? Everyone notices

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Speaker 5: the error there, they don't answer the question. But if

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Speaker 5: it's close enough, if it's in this same general kind

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Speaker 5: of plausible frame, we tend not to notice it. And

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Speaker 5: we think part of that is when we're communicating with people,

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Speaker 5: we make.

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Speaker 7: All sorts of errors. I'm sure you guys have noticed this.

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Speaker 5: From popcas me transcript. Yes, if you actually transcribe speech,

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Speaker 5: there's all sorts of errors and missing information in there,

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Speaker 5: and we just kind of fill it in and go

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Speaker 5: along with the flow, because our goal isn't to be

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Speaker 5: one hundred percent accurate. Our goal is to exchange information,

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Speaker 5: form community, learn from each other.

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Speaker 2: Right, So, mental shortcuts heuristics, what are those?

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Speaker 5: Like?

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Speaker 2: Why do our brains pick the path of least resistance?

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Speaker 5: Yeah, so our brains are designed to be efficient. It

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Speaker 5: takes a lot of glucose, a lot of energy to

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Speaker 5: kind of have all these neurons firing, have all these

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Speaker 5: connections going, And so when we can take shortcuts, we

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Speaker 5: tend to do so. And these shortcuts exist because they

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Speaker 5: normally work because ninety nine percent of the time the

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Speaker 5: shortcut's going to get you what you need without disastrous consequences.

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Speaker 5: But you get these interesting problems when sometimes these shortcuts

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Speaker 5: don't work. And so that's what we find with a

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Speaker 5: lot of this stuff on false information, where it would

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Speaker 5: be really really time consuming and resource heavy to check

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Speaker 5: everything that you hear against your prior knowledge and do

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Speaker 5: this kind of exact check. So instead we just check

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Speaker 5: is it good enough, close enough?

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Speaker 4: Right?

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Speaker 2: And so if we see ourselves as the exception and like,

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Speaker 2: don't really recognize that we are all engaging in these

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Speaker 2: mental shortcuts all the time. Does that put us more

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Speaker 2: at risk of believing in false things?

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Speaker 5: Oh, it's a really good question. I will say that

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Speaker 5: there is variation. So some people are better at distinguishing

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Speaker 5: what's true and false than other people. Some people are

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Speaker 5: more likely to use these shortcuts than other people. But

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Speaker 5: what we have found is that groups that tend to

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Speaker 5: think they'll be protected, So people with more education in

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Speaker 5: the US right now, where so much of the misinformation

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Speaker 5: is targeting Republicans and conservatives liberals tend to think that

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Speaker 5: they're not vulnerable to it, and we've shown over and

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Speaker 5: over again that that's not true. Right, These factors don't

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Speaker 5: fully protect you against these.

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Speaker 6: Effects, right right, right?

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Speaker 2: I mean it makes sense if you think that your

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Speaker 2: thinking is better than other people's thinking, you're going to

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Speaker 2: be less likely to stop and like actually ponder the

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Speaker 2: information that you're getting because you're like, oh, well, I'm

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Speaker 2: a good thinker, so I've got the education or whatever.

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Speaker 6: You know.

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Speaker 2: So fine, let's start talking about repetition. What is the

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Speaker 2: illusory truth effect?

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Speaker 5: Yeah, so the illusory truth effect is our fancy name

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Speaker 5: for this basic finding that is, if you repeat something,

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Speaker 5: people are more likely to think that it's true. So

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Speaker 5: the second time you've heard this a statement, the third

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Speaker 5: time you've heard a statement, you're a little more likely

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Speaker 5: to think that it's true than the first time that

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Speaker 5: you've heard something.

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Speaker 6: And why is that?

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Speaker 5: Partially? It's again one of these heuristics that in the

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Speaker 5: real world, things that you've heard lots of times are

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Speaker 5: more likely to be true. There is this natural correlation

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Speaker 5: in the real world between repetition and truth, and so

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Speaker 5: what we think is happening is that our brains are

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Speaker 5: realizing this correlation exists and then starting to use kind

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Speaker 5: of cues from repetition to make judgments about truth. In

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Speaker 5: the lab, we normally study this by having people see

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Speaker 5: a list of trivia statements and then repeating some of them,

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Speaker 5: not repeating others, and seeing if they rate it on

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Speaker 5: a scale kind of definitely false to definitely true. How

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Speaker 5: do those ratings change with repetition?

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Speaker 3: What if it's something that you're inherently like no to.

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Speaker 3: I don't believe that. Does the repetition change anything there

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Speaker 3: or does your no to it just get stronger over time?

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Speaker 5: So I wish it worked the way that you suggested

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Speaker 5: at the end, where like your no would just get stronger.

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Speaker 5: But it seems to actually work the other way. So

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Speaker 5: we found even for statements that contradict your prior knowledge.

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Speaker 5: So two weeks earlier you were able to tell us

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Speaker 5: that the giant is like Cyclops in Greek mythology. If

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Speaker 5: you then hear the statement the one eyed giant in

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Speaker 5: Greek mythology is called a minotaur twice, you're still more

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Speaker 5: likely to think it's true as compared to the first

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Speaker 5: time you hear it.

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Speaker 2: That is.

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Speaker 5: That you've got that information in your head.

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Speaker 2: You know, I feel like I noticed this in practice

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Speaker 2: in real life with like I've you know, there will

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Speaker 2: be certain conspiracy theories going around, and you know, most

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Speaker 2: of my friends are not really that into conspiracy theories.

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Speaker 2: It's not really the kind of crew I hang with.

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Speaker 2: But every once in a while, if something gets like

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Speaker 2: goes around on TikTok enough, there will start to be

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Speaker 2: this like, well, there's a little bit of truth to

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Speaker 2: that that like I'll notice happening. And I mean I've

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Speaker 2: even done it in myself when I've I've experienced some

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Speaker 2: skepticism about something I see on the Internet, and then

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Speaker 2: when I see enough people like talking about it, I'm

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Speaker 2: like Is that true? Am I did I miss something?

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Speaker 2: Was there like a you know, am I just was

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Speaker 2: I just being the knee jerk liberal who's like not responding,

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Speaker 2: not taking in information well or something.

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Speaker 6: So yeah, so that is interesting.

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Speaker 2: I mean, we had another we had another guest on

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Speaker 2: our show a couple months ago, Chris Baale. He's the

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Speaker 2: director of the Polarization Lab at Duke. So he was

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Speaker 2: talking about how like we can be in our social

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Speaker 2: media bubbles online. He posits basically that an echo chamber

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Speaker 2: has less to do with your environment and more about

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Speaker 2: playing into your like existing beliefs. I wonder if you

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Speaker 2: have any thoughts or know of any research or have

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Speaker 2: conducted any research on like if somebody is in your

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Speaker 2: out group, for example, and is it kind of the

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Speaker 2: same thing.

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Speaker 5: Yeah. So there's not a ton of research yet looking

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Speaker 5: at kind of political information, but there's a little bit.

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Speaker 5: So my colleagues David rand and Mit and Gordon Pennycook

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Speaker 5: soon to be at Cornell, they did a study where

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Speaker 5: people saw true and false political news headlines and these

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Speaker 5: were either new or repeated during the experiment, and then

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Speaker 5: they compared how kind of pro Democrat and pro Republican

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Speaker 5: headlines were judged by both Democrats and Republicans. So you

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Speaker 5: might think that repetition is going to increase your belief

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Speaker 5: in the things that kind of your prime to agree with.

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Speaker 5: So maybe a false headline about Hillary Clinton if you're

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Speaker 5: a Republican, but maybe it won't increase your belief in

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Speaker 5: statements that you don't want to believe in. But that's

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Speaker 5: not what they found. What they found was a really

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Speaker 5: similar increase for both these headlines that kind of confirmed

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Speaker 5: your existing prior beliefs and the ones that went against it.

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Speaker 6: Wow.

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Speaker 5: I know, at baseline you're more likely to believe false

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Speaker 5: headlines about your opponent than about your in group, but

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Speaker 5: with repetition, both of those groups increased equally.

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Speaker 2: So if I'm Q of qan on fame and I'm like, okay,

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Speaker 2: I want to convince my followers of like XYZ crazy things.

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Speaker 2: The strategy for doing that would be to like just

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Speaker 2: get a lot of people to say it over and

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Speaker 2: over and over again, get a lot of famous people

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Speaker 2: to say it, get it on the news, and eventually

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Speaker 2: I will like cultivate a growing following, like maybe not

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Speaker 2: only but like largely or at least in great part

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Speaker 2: due to the repetition.

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Speaker 5: Yeah, and in that cycle that you just mentioned, what

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Speaker 5: you really see is all of these forces intersecting where

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Speaker 5: you do commonly see this pattern where a new rumor

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Speaker 5: conspiracy will bubble up from kind of dark corners of

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Speaker 5: the internet eight chan or something like that, and their

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Speaker 5: goal is really to get the narrative out of that

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Speaker 5: bubble and into more mainstream places. So can we get

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Speaker 5: this now on Twitter? Once it's on Twitter, can we

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Speaker 5: get someone with a high following to talk about it?

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Speaker 5: When someone with a high following is talking about it? Well,

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Speaker 5: now major newspapers are covering it, right, and now you've

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Speaker 5: gotten something that was nothing that thirty people were talking

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Speaker 5: about in a forum to something that now there's mainstream coverage.

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Speaker 3: Of the Internet needs to be illegal.

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Speaker 6: Just I do find that terrifying though.

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Speaker 3: It is so scary. I mean, all of these things,

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Speaker 3: these processing shortcuts worked great, I'm sure forty years ago even,

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Speaker 3: but now there's so much, there's infinite information that we're

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Speaker 3: just like la da dad. Just it's so wild how

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Speaker 3: much our brain is processing and the weird shortcuts we

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Speaker 3: don't even know that we're taking.

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Speaker 2: I think TikTok is a great app there's so much

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Speaker 2: great stuff on it, but I do find it to

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Speaker 2: be very scary in terms of how much and how

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Speaker 2: quickly misinformation is spreading on there. Like you know, there's

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Speaker 2: this Balenciaga like panic. It is crazy, how like one

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Speaker 2: thing that is true kind of like sets a wildfire

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Speaker 2: and turns into all of these other things and these

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Speaker 2: like all of this bias is just like spreading like wildfire.

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Speaker 2: And when you actually like pause and look at like

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Speaker 2: what evidence is there, it's like, well, there's there's not

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Speaker 2: evidence of that much. There's evidence of like this one thing,

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Speaker 2: but like not these other twenty things that you guys

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Speaker 2: took it to scares me a lot interesting.

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Speaker 5: I was just gonna say one of the scary things

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Speaker 5: about TikTok, and kind of one of the things about

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Speaker 5: how it exists as a platform, is that when you

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Speaker 5: see information on there, it's stripped of almost any information

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Speaker 5: about its source or its credibility, right exactly, So when

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Speaker 5: you see someone talking on TikTok, you don't typically know

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Speaker 5: if they are an expert in that field or if

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Speaker 5: they're just bounding out nonsense off the top of their head.

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Speaker 5: Kind Of both of those are going to be presented

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Speaker 5: equivalently to you.

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Speaker 4: Right the app.

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Speaker 2: I just want to touch on why familiarity, why repetition

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Speaker 2: works in this way, and so can you define processing fluency?

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Speaker 5: Yeah, so processing fluency is the psychology term we use

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Speaker 5: for kind of how easy a statement is to process.

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Speaker 5: So if you've heard something before, the second time you

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Speaker 5: hear it, it's just a little easier to process. You

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Speaker 5: get this sense of fluency as you're encountering it. And

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Speaker 5: we've got some evidence that this sense of fluency, this

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Speaker 5: sense of ease, is what you're using to make those

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Speaker 5: truth judgments. So when things are easier to process, you're

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Speaker 5: more likely to think they're true. So there's a cool

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Speaker 5: study that looked at kind of rhyming afromisms, So like

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Speaker 5: little sayings that either do or don't rhyme, people tend

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Speaker 5: to think the rhyming ones are a little more likely

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Speaker 5: to be treated.

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Speaker 3: Amanda Knox.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, we had Amanda Knox on our show to talk

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Speaker 2: about different biases and heuristics, and that was Megan's favorite one.

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Speaker 3: I'm as rey guilty, guilty as charged.

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Speaker 6: Yeah, except not, she's she's not.

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Speaker 7: Let's lay it up.

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Speaker 5: Yeah. The other one is that if you present statements

444
00:23:20,960 --> 00:23:23,800
Speaker 5: in kind of easy to read fonts, you will think

445
00:23:23,840 --> 00:23:25,800
Speaker 5: they're more likely to be true than if they're in

446
00:23:25,920 --> 00:23:29,600
Speaker 5: like a hard to read, like yellow font. Right.

447
00:23:29,760 --> 00:23:32,240
Speaker 2: So so this makes me think of like all of

448
00:23:32,280 --> 00:23:36,760
Speaker 2: our grandparents on Facebook. So they are getting these memes

449
00:23:36,760 --> 00:23:40,520
Speaker 2: are getting shared that have these like kind of flashy

450
00:23:40,560 --> 00:23:44,240
Speaker 2: looking images that may are making some exaggerated claim usually

451
00:23:44,359 --> 00:23:46,639
Speaker 2: and the really big font it's like really easy to

452
00:23:46,720 --> 00:23:50,840
Speaker 2: read and it like it like captures your attention right away.

453
00:23:51,520 --> 00:23:55,080
Speaker 2: Is that part of why misinformation spread so much? Because

454
00:23:55,080 --> 00:23:56,800
Speaker 2: it's just like so easy to like see it and

455
00:23:57,040 --> 00:23:58,879
Speaker 2: know what their the message is supposed to be.

456
00:23:59,680 --> 00:24:02,200
Speaker 5: Yeah, I mean one of the tricks is that when

457
00:24:02,200 --> 00:24:05,119
Speaker 5: you're lying, you can make up the simplest story you

458
00:24:05,200 --> 00:24:09,560
Speaker 5: want and make it super real, easy to understand, super catchy.

459
00:24:10,200 --> 00:24:12,399
Speaker 5: When you're trying to deal with the truth, there tends

460
00:24:12,440 --> 00:24:16,879
Speaker 5: to be caveats and exceptions and all of this complication

461
00:24:17,840 --> 00:24:22,040
Speaker 5: that really doesn't make for this like short catchy catchphrase.

462
00:24:22,280 --> 00:24:22,480
Speaker 4: Right.

463
00:24:23,080 --> 00:24:27,040
Speaker 3: Yeah, you said somewhere that fake news spreads some insane

464
00:24:27,160 --> 00:24:29,920
Speaker 3: amount faster than real news. Is that correct?

465
00:24:30,200 --> 00:24:34,560
Speaker 5: There's some studies, they're not my favorite studies. There's small

466
00:24:34,600 --> 00:24:38,960
Speaker 5: issues there but in general, it's definitely true that false

467
00:24:38,960 --> 00:24:43,439
Speaker 5: information spreads really quickly, really far on social media.

468
00:24:44,080 --> 00:24:45,000
Speaker 6: It is interesting.

469
00:24:45,040 --> 00:24:47,200
Speaker 2: It's like we and this is one of the things

470
00:24:47,200 --> 00:24:49,840
Speaker 2: that I get like really depressed about and like to

471
00:24:49,840 --> 00:24:52,680
Speaker 2: a really dark place with because I'm like, no one

472
00:24:52,720 --> 00:24:57,400
Speaker 2: cares about truth. But the truth is like complicated usually

473
00:24:57,520 --> 00:25:00,000
Speaker 2: and nuance, and it requires a lot of brain power

474
00:25:00,240 --> 00:25:03,840
Speaker 2: to like really understand how complex an issue is, and

475
00:25:04,000 --> 00:25:08,240
Speaker 2: most of us most of the time, are not in

476
00:25:08,280 --> 00:25:12,280
Speaker 2: a space to want to do that mental work. It's difficult,

477
00:25:12,680 --> 00:25:15,000
Speaker 2: and it's like, bro, I just got home from work,

478
00:25:15,040 --> 00:25:17,080
Speaker 2: Like I'm not trying to like get to the bottom

479
00:25:17,119 --> 00:25:19,240
Speaker 2: of who is right about this complicated issue?

480
00:25:19,280 --> 00:25:22,320
Speaker 6: Like just tell me who's right? What is it? Is

481
00:25:22,359 --> 00:25:23,399
Speaker 6: the world black and white?

482
00:25:23,480 --> 00:25:27,560
Speaker 2: Like because that's easier and also more exciting because you know,

483
00:25:27,640 --> 00:25:32,080
Speaker 2: if there's like an evil cabal controlling everything, well that's

484
00:25:32,200 --> 00:25:34,919
Speaker 2: a more exciting life, you know, to like get to

485
00:25:34,920 --> 00:25:37,320
Speaker 2: the bottom of that mystery than just like, well, actually,

486
00:25:37,359 --> 00:25:42,560
Speaker 2: it's a bunch of disparate people who have conflicting ideas

487
00:25:42,560 --> 00:25:46,879
Speaker 2: and beliefs and they're all there's a confluence of events.

488
00:25:46,680 --> 00:25:49,760
Speaker 2: It's like it's just not as interesting, but also not

489
00:25:49,800 --> 00:25:51,119
Speaker 2: as easy to understand well.

490
00:25:51,160 --> 00:25:53,879
Speaker 5: And I think that gets an important factor that people

491
00:25:53,920 --> 00:25:58,320
Speaker 5: often forget about conspiracy theories. They're really fun. Yeah, like

492
00:25:58,840 --> 00:26:02,159
Speaker 5: they tend to be citing. You're in the know, you

493
00:26:02,320 --> 00:26:05,920
Speaker 5: know something other people don't. You're doing this active investigation

494
00:26:06,119 --> 00:26:09,080
Speaker 5: to try and figure out what's going on. It's an

495
00:26:09,240 --> 00:26:10,720
Speaker 5: enjoyable activity.

496
00:26:11,119 --> 00:26:13,320
Speaker 6: Yeah, yeah, totally.

497
00:26:13,480 --> 00:26:18,080
Speaker 2: So if I'm a politician or a cut leader, how

498
00:26:18,320 --> 00:26:20,760
Speaker 2: might I use this to my advantage?

499
00:26:21,440 --> 00:26:25,159
Speaker 5: Yeah? So, I mean the repetition affects mean that you

500
00:26:25,240 --> 00:26:27,440
Speaker 5: want to come up with kind of a simple message

501
00:26:28,320 --> 00:26:30,440
Speaker 5: and repeat that message a lot.

502
00:26:30,760 --> 00:26:31,000
Speaker 7: Yeah.

503
00:26:31,960 --> 00:26:33,320
Speaker 5: I've been trying to tell.

504
00:26:33,160 --> 00:26:36,200
Speaker 7: People that you can use this for good as well,

505
00:26:37,240 --> 00:26:41,200
Speaker 7: So public interest communicators, nonprofits, you don't have to see

506
00:26:41,240 --> 00:26:43,720
Speaker 7: the space to disinformers.

507
00:26:44,320 --> 00:26:47,760
Speaker 5: You can also come up with kind of short, easy

508
00:26:47,800 --> 00:26:52,160
Speaker 5: to understand messages that you can repeat over and over again.

509
00:26:53,640 --> 00:26:56,520
Speaker 5: Part of what we're seeing is you don't want to

510
00:26:56,560 --> 00:26:59,280
Speaker 5: always be the one having to react to what someone

511
00:26:59,320 --> 00:27:01,680
Speaker 5: else is saying. You want to push out your own

512
00:27:01,800 --> 00:27:06,840
Speaker 5: messaging as well, rather than just constantly saying no, that's wrong, No,

513
00:27:06,920 --> 00:27:07,440
Speaker 5: that's wrong.

514
00:27:07,840 --> 00:27:10,680
Speaker 3: What's a good example of like a good message that's

515
00:27:10,760 --> 00:27:13,359
Speaker 3: just concisely. What have you seen that you're like, you,

516
00:27:13,600 --> 00:27:16,480
Speaker 3: that's good, that's a good question.

517
00:27:18,200 --> 00:27:21,359
Speaker 5: One that I've seen a fair amount recently is just

518
00:27:21,760 --> 00:27:23,320
Speaker 5: vaccines are safe and effective.

519
00:27:25,040 --> 00:27:26,960
Speaker 2: But even that, it's like, it does feel like that

520
00:27:27,080 --> 00:27:29,679
Speaker 2: is a reaction to everyone else being like they're not

521
00:27:29,720 --> 00:27:31,320
Speaker 2: safe and they're not effected exactly.

522
00:27:31,560 --> 00:27:34,080
Speaker 3: No, it's so complicated.

523
00:27:34,520 --> 00:27:38,639
Speaker 2: Yeah, it reinforces my thing where I'm like, oh, we

524
00:27:38,640 --> 00:27:41,640
Speaker 2: are all just like constantly living in an information war,

525
00:27:41,760 --> 00:27:44,280
Speaker 2: and we are like we have to like try to

526
00:27:45,040 --> 00:27:48,120
Speaker 2: find the truth in this war of information. Everything is marketing,

527
00:27:48,160 --> 00:27:51,960
Speaker 2: everything is branding, you know, everything is like whose message

528
00:27:51,960 --> 00:27:54,920
Speaker 2: is getting out there the most because we are, unfortunately

529
00:27:55,600 --> 00:27:58,880
Speaker 2: all susceptible to it no matter what. Yeah, so tell

530
00:27:58,960 --> 00:28:01,480
Speaker 2: us about the continued influence effect.

531
00:28:01,480 --> 00:28:01,840
Speaker 3: What is that?

532
00:28:02,280 --> 00:28:05,919
Speaker 5: Yeah? So, this is the finding that even when you

533
00:28:06,000 --> 00:28:10,840
Speaker 5: correct misinformation, it still has some subtle influences on your

534
00:28:10,920 --> 00:28:14,360
Speaker 5: belief So the famous studies that have looked at this.

535
00:28:14,600 --> 00:28:17,639
Speaker 5: You tend to read a story about a fire in

536
00:28:17,720 --> 00:28:23,359
Speaker 5: a warehouse, and in the original story that you're told

537
00:28:23,600 --> 00:28:28,120
Speaker 5: that kind of there were these canisters of gas and

538
00:28:28,280 --> 00:28:31,119
Speaker 5: that it was a suspected arson, and then later on

539
00:28:31,359 --> 00:28:34,879
Speaker 5: you're told oh wait, there was no arson. Actually the

540
00:28:34,920 --> 00:28:39,800
Speaker 5: fire occurred for some other reason whatever. And then later

541
00:28:39,840 --> 00:28:42,720
Speaker 5: on you can look at kind of what do people

542
00:28:42,760 --> 00:28:46,760
Speaker 5: believe happened, and they might believe you that kind of oh,

543
00:28:46,920 --> 00:28:50,600
Speaker 5: all right, those canisters of gas weren't actually there because

544
00:28:50,640 --> 00:28:53,360
Speaker 5: you told me they weren't, But they still might kind

545
00:28:53,400 --> 00:28:55,840
Speaker 5: of believe that there was more that it was likely

546
00:28:55,880 --> 00:28:58,880
Speaker 5: to be arson, at least more likely than someone who

547
00:28:58,920 --> 00:29:02,280
Speaker 5: didn't read this story to begin with. So the continued

548
00:29:02,320 --> 00:29:06,920
Speaker 5: influence effect is really this finding that while misinformation debunks

549
00:29:06,960 --> 00:29:10,000
Speaker 5: and fact checks are really effective, they don't get you

550
00:29:10,080 --> 00:29:12,960
Speaker 5: all the way back down to kind of baseline or

551
00:29:13,000 --> 00:29:15,440
Speaker 5: before you had seen the false information.

552
00:29:15,960 --> 00:29:20,320
Speaker 2: Right, So it's it sounds almost the same as the

553
00:29:20,400 --> 00:29:21,320
Speaker 2: primacy effect.

554
00:29:21,480 --> 00:29:22,520
Speaker 6: Is that kind of the same thing.

555
00:29:22,560 --> 00:29:24,960
Speaker 2: We're the first piece of information you hear is the

556
00:29:24,960 --> 00:29:25,920
Speaker 2: one likely to stick.

557
00:29:26,160 --> 00:29:28,720
Speaker 5: Yeah, it's similar in some ways to that.

558
00:29:29,120 --> 00:29:30,080
Speaker 3: How is it different?

559
00:29:30,400 --> 00:29:32,800
Speaker 5: I think it could be different. I think it's slightly

560
00:29:32,840 --> 00:29:35,720
Speaker 5: different in that you could get a continued influence effect

561
00:29:35,840 --> 00:29:38,800
Speaker 5: even if like someone saw the true information I see,

562
00:29:38,920 --> 00:29:42,400
Speaker 5: then you saw the false information, then you debunked them,

563
00:29:42,760 --> 00:29:45,080
Speaker 5: you still see a continued influence effect.

564
00:29:45,800 --> 00:29:47,640
Speaker 6: So, given this effect.

565
00:29:47,680 --> 00:29:49,880
Speaker 2: Given both of these effects, the continued influence effect the

566
00:29:49,920 --> 00:29:54,840
Speaker 2: primacy effect, how do we free ourselves from false information

567
00:29:55,080 --> 00:29:57,240
Speaker 2: once we've learned it if it has this tendency to

568
00:29:57,320 --> 00:29:57,920
Speaker 2: kind of stick.

569
00:29:58,080 --> 00:30:00,920
Speaker 5: So one of the ways we've found that useful is

570
00:30:00,960 --> 00:30:05,120
Speaker 5: to replace the original false narrative with a new kind

571
00:30:05,160 --> 00:30:10,440
Speaker 5: of causal chain of events. So it's more effective if

572
00:30:10,480 --> 00:30:14,680
Speaker 5: I say, you know what it wasn't Arson, Instead it

573
00:30:14,760 --> 00:30:20,400
Speaker 5: was an electrical fire caused by a faulty electrician. Well,

574
00:30:20,440 --> 00:30:23,640
Speaker 5: now you've been able to kind of replace your mental model,

575
00:30:23,760 --> 00:30:27,520
Speaker 5: your understanding of what the event was, and it's more memorable.

576
00:30:27,880 --> 00:30:30,800
Speaker 5: And that's a lot more memorable than just going no,

577
00:30:31,160 --> 00:30:31,760
Speaker 5: not Arson.

578
00:30:32,280 --> 00:30:34,680
Speaker 6: Oh, that is so interesting. I feel like that.

579
00:30:34,760 --> 00:30:36,280
Speaker 2: This is something I think about a lot in terms

580
00:30:36,360 --> 00:30:41,040
Speaker 2: of like this might be a weird analogy, but like

581
00:30:41,200 --> 00:30:44,760
Speaker 2: in communication with the partner, it's not useful at all

582
00:30:44,840 --> 00:30:46,840
Speaker 2: to tell them what not to do. It's like our

583
00:30:46,840 --> 00:30:50,280
Speaker 2: brain doesn't process the absence of things. It's not that

584
00:30:50,720 --> 00:30:53,160
Speaker 2: or don't do that. It's like we the only the

585
00:30:53,320 --> 00:30:56,400
Speaker 2: most effective way to like get behaviors to change, and

586
00:30:56,440 --> 00:30:58,320
Speaker 2: it sounds like to get information to stick is to

587
00:30:58,360 --> 00:31:00,560
Speaker 2: be like, no, this is what happened and have like

588
00:31:00,640 --> 00:31:04,080
Speaker 2: something more active to kind of remember.

589
00:31:03,960 --> 00:31:07,280
Speaker 5: Yep, exactly. And so we find that kind of simple

590
00:31:07,440 --> 00:31:12,200
Speaker 5: true false labels and kind of little debunks can be effective.

591
00:31:12,720 --> 00:31:16,880
Speaker 5: They're definitely better than nothing. But the most effective debunks

592
00:31:17,000 --> 00:31:20,120
Speaker 5: come when you can replace it with a new narrative.

593
00:31:20,440 --> 00:31:23,600
Speaker 3: Yeah, it's a fighting story with story. We need that story.

594
00:31:23,800 --> 00:31:26,719
Speaker 2: And so if I'm a social media platform, how would

595
00:31:26,760 --> 00:31:29,400
Speaker 2: I combat that because right now we have like this

596
00:31:29,520 --> 00:31:32,360
Speaker 2: might be false, but right that's not going to be effective.

597
00:31:32,480 --> 00:31:33,520
Speaker 6: So what is effective?

598
00:31:33,920 --> 00:31:37,479
Speaker 5: Yeah, so these kind of meally this might be false

599
00:31:37,600 --> 00:31:40,600
Speaker 5: or again better than nothing. Okay, I wouldn't want people

600
00:31:40,640 --> 00:31:43,240
Speaker 5: to stop doing them. They are better than having nothing

601
00:31:43,320 --> 00:31:47,080
Speaker 5: them there, but they're not as effective as these more

602
00:31:47,200 --> 00:31:52,200
Speaker 5: kind of full throated, clear statements. Here's what's true, this

603
00:31:52,360 --> 00:31:55,280
Speaker 5: is false, this is why it's false. Here's a better

604
00:31:55,320 --> 00:31:58,520
Speaker 5: source of information. Those types of debunks. The problem is,

605
00:31:58,560 --> 00:32:01,440
Speaker 5: of course, that those are really hard to do. They

606
00:32:01,440 --> 00:32:05,640
Speaker 5: take time, they take some kind of message crafting. As

607
00:32:05,680 --> 00:32:10,080
Speaker 5: we talked about, truth is complicated in ways that lies aren't.

608
00:32:10,920 --> 00:32:14,480
Speaker 5: So I think this can be a part of our interventions,

609
00:32:14,600 --> 00:32:17,160
Speaker 5: but it can't be the only thing that we're doing.

610
00:32:18,080 --> 00:32:20,120
Speaker 5: And I think one of the more promising things is

611
00:32:20,160 --> 00:32:23,280
Speaker 5: to reduce the spread of misinformation at the front end,

612
00:32:23,680 --> 00:32:26,760
Speaker 5: so that less people are exposed to the false information.

613
00:32:27,640 --> 00:32:30,560
Speaker 3: Is that like a bots situation or how do we

614
00:32:30,720 --> 00:32:31,680
Speaker 3: where do we start on that?

615
00:32:32,160 --> 00:32:36,719
Speaker 5: Yeah, So one thing that platforms can do is actually

616
00:32:36,760 --> 00:32:39,640
Speaker 5: pay more attention to the behavior of their biggest users.

617
00:32:40,240 --> 00:32:44,200
Speaker 5: So who has the biggest following, and maybe with big

618
00:32:44,240 --> 00:32:49,600
Speaker 5: followings comes more responsibility. We're going to be more We're

619
00:32:49,600 --> 00:32:52,080
Speaker 5: going to pay more attention to what you're sharing, sharing

620
00:32:52,360 --> 00:32:56,480
Speaker 5: and whether or not it's reliable information. So right now,

621
00:32:56,520 --> 00:33:01,440
Speaker 5: it's often easier for platforms to kick off people without

622
00:33:01,480 --> 00:33:07,840
Speaker 5: many followers because there's no big pushback or to reduce

623
00:33:07,920 --> 00:33:10,920
Speaker 5: the spread of what they're sharing. It's much more difficult

624
00:33:11,200 --> 00:33:14,360
Speaker 5: for them to handle people with many millions of followers.

625
00:33:14,880 --> 00:33:17,760
Speaker 5: But those are the very people who can cause the

626
00:33:17,800 --> 00:33:18,719
Speaker 5: most damage.

627
00:33:19,160 --> 00:33:21,520
Speaker 2: I mean, I just keep thinking about Elon Musk and

628
00:33:21,520 --> 00:33:25,440
Speaker 2: how Elon Musk is the like seems to have been

629
00:33:25,680 --> 00:33:29,120
Speaker 2: black pilled a little bit, but also like owns Twitter now,

630
00:33:29,640 --> 00:33:32,480
Speaker 2: so Twitter just seems like it's become a vastly more

631
00:33:32,560 --> 00:33:34,320
Speaker 2: dangerous place all of a sudden.

632
00:33:34,440 --> 00:33:36,120
Speaker 6: I mean, and I mean you know, dangerous in terms

633
00:33:36,120 --> 00:33:36,680
Speaker 6: of ideas.

634
00:33:36,800 --> 00:33:39,520
Speaker 3: It also just it's really confusing because who holds that

635
00:33:39,600 --> 00:33:42,840
Speaker 3: power of like this is misinformation? Can it be you?

636
00:33:43,000 --> 00:33:48,040
Speaker 3: Because you seem like a very rational person, but you know.

637
00:33:47,080 --> 00:33:48,560
Speaker 5: This is one of the big issues.

638
00:33:48,680 --> 00:33:48,920
Speaker 1: Yeah.

639
00:33:48,960 --> 00:33:53,080
Speaker 5: Yeah, So we don't want the government, right because.

640
00:33:52,760 --> 00:33:56,000
Speaker 3: We had that misinformation board Mary Poppins girl who was

641
00:33:56,040 --> 00:33:59,480
Speaker 3: like singing about stuff that wasn't like it was misinformation

642
00:33:59,520 --> 00:34:03,040
Speaker 3: too sometimes so it's like who does it? I don't know, right.

643
00:34:03,520 --> 00:34:06,960
Speaker 5: Right, So most people don't want the government involved in

644
00:34:07,000 --> 00:34:12,640
Speaker 5: that because it's icky. We don't want private companies to

645
00:34:12,719 --> 00:34:16,160
Speaker 5: be in charge of it because their incentives aren't aligned

646
00:34:16,560 --> 00:34:21,239
Speaker 5: with kind of public good. So there's some thoughts of

647
00:34:21,680 --> 00:34:26,040
Speaker 5: kind of we need to add regulations to the industry.

648
00:34:26,120 --> 00:34:29,000
Speaker 5: So maybe private companies are doing it, but doing it

649
00:34:29,280 --> 00:34:35,560
Speaker 5: under guidelines that have been created. It's a tricky problem.

650
00:34:35,760 --> 00:34:37,840
Speaker 3: It needs to be a robot, It needs to be

651
00:34:37,880 --> 00:34:40,560
Speaker 3: an ethically programmed robot probably.

652
00:34:40,600 --> 00:34:43,920
Speaker 5: I mean, so most of the platforms are currently using

653
00:34:44,040 --> 00:34:50,319
Speaker 5: AI to identify misinformation. How well trained those ais are

654
00:34:50,960 --> 00:34:54,280
Speaker 5: and how much they're doing good versus harm or kind

655
00:34:54,280 --> 00:34:57,839
Speaker 5: of open aspects of research, and it's hard to get

656
00:34:57,880 --> 00:35:01,960
Speaker 5: that data because platforms don't want share that type of information.

657
00:35:02,520 --> 00:35:03,920
Speaker 6: I don't trust in it.

658
00:35:03,960 --> 00:35:08,280
Speaker 2: I feel like you could just develop a misinformation farm.

659
00:35:08,680 --> 00:35:11,480
Speaker 3: But just like sci fi evades the am sci fi

660
00:35:11,640 --> 00:35:15,840
Speaker 3: movie Heaven, you get like the fifty smartest people from

661
00:35:15,920 --> 00:35:18,320
Speaker 3: all different parts of the world and all different things,

662
00:35:18,320 --> 00:35:21,480
Speaker 3: and they all program this way to be like ethically whatever,

663
00:35:21,600 --> 00:35:23,120
Speaker 3: and then I don't know.

664
00:35:23,200 --> 00:35:25,759
Speaker 2: No, no, for sure, for sure, it's yeah, it is

665
00:35:25,800 --> 00:35:30,240
Speaker 2: such a complicated issue. And I mean, obviously we as individuals,

666
00:35:30,360 --> 00:35:32,560
Speaker 2: we don't really there's not a lot of power that

667
00:35:32,600 --> 00:35:36,200
Speaker 2: we hold. But in terms of just like protecting ourselves

668
00:35:36,840 --> 00:35:40,520
Speaker 2: from falling prey to misinformation in general, like maybe before

669
00:35:40,600 --> 00:35:44,080
Speaker 2: we've you know, seen it, whether we're on the right

670
00:35:44,239 --> 00:35:47,600
Speaker 2: or the left or nowhere or neither, Like what what

671
00:35:47,640 --> 00:35:49,160
Speaker 2: can we do to protect ourselves?

672
00:35:49,239 --> 00:35:52,040
Speaker 5: Yeah, So I think there's a few things. One is,

673
00:35:52,160 --> 00:35:55,879
Speaker 5: you can protect the information environment as a whole by

674
00:35:55,920 --> 00:36:01,279
Speaker 5: being careful about what you share. So every time you like,

675
00:36:01,480 --> 00:36:04,520
Speaker 5: interact or share with a piece of content, you're telling

676
00:36:04,520 --> 00:36:07,719
Speaker 5: the algorithm this is something people should see more of.

677
00:36:09,440 --> 00:36:13,319
Speaker 5: And so you're in some ways in control of what

678
00:36:13,800 --> 00:36:17,200
Speaker 5: other users see. And so I think that comes with

679
00:36:17,239 --> 00:36:20,839
Speaker 5: some responsibility to be careful of what you're amplifying, what

680
00:36:20,880 --> 00:36:23,520
Speaker 5: you're sharing. The other thing that can help is just

681
00:36:23,560 --> 00:36:27,960
Speaker 5: to slow down and actually think about accuracy and think

682
00:36:28,000 --> 00:36:30,640
Speaker 5: about if what you're reading is likely to be true

683
00:36:30,719 --> 00:36:34,799
Speaker 5: or false. So a lot of these shortcuts and heuristics

684
00:36:34,960 --> 00:36:38,880
Speaker 5: become less powerful if you just take a moment to pause.

685
00:36:39,400 --> 00:36:41,400
Speaker 5: So I like to tell people whenever you see a

686
00:36:41,440 --> 00:36:44,359
Speaker 5: post that makes you feel a really strong emotion, either

687
00:36:44,400 --> 00:36:48,280
Speaker 5: really excited or really mad, or really happy or really angry,

688
00:36:48,480 --> 00:36:51,280
Speaker 5: that's the time to take a step back and pause

689
00:36:51,560 --> 00:36:53,920
Speaker 5: and think about if what you're seeing is true.

690
00:36:54,200 --> 00:36:56,520
Speaker 6: Right, unless it's dogs, in which case share.

691
00:36:56,640 --> 00:36:58,440
Speaker 5: Unless it's dogs, always share the.

692
00:36:58,400 --> 00:37:01,719
Speaker 6: Dogs, or cats or cats or cats guests do?

693
00:37:03,760 --> 00:37:07,319
Speaker 2: I think about Daniel Kahneman's book and this idea of

694
00:37:07,360 --> 00:37:09,560
Speaker 2: system one versus system too thinking.

695
00:37:09,239 --> 00:37:11,200
Speaker 6: And how like we are able.

696
00:37:11,360 --> 00:37:13,719
Speaker 2: Although I did read some of your research, it still

697
00:37:13,719 --> 00:37:15,640
Speaker 2: doesn't get us, you know, where we want to be

698
00:37:15,760 --> 00:37:19,320
Speaker 2: necessarily in terms of being able to identify falsehoods or whatever.

699
00:37:19,640 --> 00:37:23,080
Speaker 2: But stopping and pausing and engaging in that slower form

700
00:37:23,120 --> 00:37:26,680
Speaker 2: of thinking can do a great deal in terms of,

701
00:37:27,200 --> 00:37:32,160
Speaker 2: you know, helping us not spread bad information. Definitely like,

702
00:37:32,239 --> 00:37:34,680
Speaker 2: where did this come from? Who do I know that

703
00:37:34,760 --> 00:37:36,799
Speaker 2: this is true? Do I you know is this a

704
00:37:36,840 --> 00:37:38,640
Speaker 2: reliable source that that sort of thing?

705
00:37:38,719 --> 00:37:38,879
Speaker 5: Right?

706
00:37:38,920 --> 00:37:40,760
Speaker 6: I mean, yeah, what kind of questions exactly?

707
00:37:41,800 --> 00:37:43,600
Speaker 5: I think trying to figure out the source is a

708
00:37:43,640 --> 00:37:48,440
Speaker 5: great one. There's interesting research on media literacy showing that

709
00:37:48,520 --> 00:37:52,280
Speaker 5: if you ask kind of college students or US adults

710
00:37:52,360 --> 00:37:57,040
Speaker 5: or even teenagers kind of look at this website, determine

711
00:37:57,040 --> 00:38:00,480
Speaker 5: if it's a reliable source, like should you trust information

712
00:38:00,520 --> 00:38:02,799
Speaker 5: from this website? What most people have been taught to

713
00:38:02,840 --> 00:38:05,560
Speaker 5: do is to like scroll through the website, find an

714
00:38:05,560 --> 00:38:08,759
Speaker 5: about page, check to see if it's a dot org

715
00:38:08,920 --> 00:38:12,240
Speaker 5: or a dot com. Does it look kind of nicely

716
00:38:12,320 --> 00:38:16,359
Speaker 5: put together? All of these that were decent queues for

717
00:38:16,560 --> 00:38:22,040
Speaker 5: source trustworthiness twenty years ago and no longer are right. Instead,

718
00:38:22,080 --> 00:38:24,000
Speaker 5: if you're a fact checker, what you do is you

719
00:38:24,040 --> 00:38:27,520
Speaker 5: immediately leave the page and you go look up information

720
00:38:27,600 --> 00:38:30,880
Speaker 5: on that source from other places. So you might throw

721
00:38:30,960 --> 00:38:34,880
Speaker 5: the name of the news organization into Wikipedia, right, is

722
00:38:34,920 --> 00:38:38,120
Speaker 5: it a real news organization? Does it pop up same

723
00:38:38,160 --> 00:38:40,960
Speaker 5: thing with the name of the organization? Is it a

724
00:38:40,960 --> 00:38:44,840
Speaker 5: actually non biased nonprofit or is it a shell company

725
00:38:45,239 --> 00:38:47,560
Speaker 5: run by the oil industry, right.

726
00:38:47,960 --> 00:38:50,600
Speaker 3: I started noticing in the pandemic. I would like, look

727
00:38:50,680 --> 00:38:53,040
Speaker 3: up who wrote an article, and they would have written

728
00:38:53,400 --> 00:38:56,120
Speaker 3: no articles before that, and I was like, this is

729
00:38:56,760 --> 00:39:01,560
Speaker 3: so weird. Like everyone I don't understand. It was really strange.

730
00:39:01,640 --> 00:39:04,600
Speaker 2: So you've written about out of context photos and why

731
00:39:04,640 --> 00:39:07,960
Speaker 2: they are such a spreader of misinformation on the Internet.

732
00:39:08,040 --> 00:39:09,200
Speaker 6: Can you just tell us more about that?

733
00:39:09,560 --> 00:39:13,600
Speaker 5: Yeah. So, you often hear people worrying about deep fakes

734
00:39:14,160 --> 00:39:18,000
Speaker 5: and these kind of complicated video algorithms. They'll allow you

735
00:39:18,040 --> 00:39:20,759
Speaker 5: to put someone else's face on someone else's body, or

736
00:39:21,080 --> 00:39:24,360
Speaker 5: make a politician say something that they never said, and

737
00:39:24,400 --> 00:39:28,560
Speaker 5: there are definitely dangers there. But I make the argument

738
00:39:28,760 --> 00:39:32,920
Speaker 5: that these cheap fakes and out of context photos can

739
00:39:32,960 --> 00:39:37,040
Speaker 5: actually be way easier to spread and just just dangerous.

740
00:39:37,880 --> 00:39:42,280
Speaker 5: So you see things like during the Ukraine War, footage

741
00:39:42,280 --> 00:39:46,760
Speaker 5: from video games being posted as evidence of a missile attack.

742
00:39:46,920 --> 00:39:51,480
Speaker 7: Oh wow, Yeah, you'll get there's a photo of a

743
00:39:51,600 --> 00:39:55,239
Speaker 7: park with like lots of trash after some sort of

744
00:39:55,280 --> 00:39:59,680
Speaker 7: event that will often get posted as evidence after like

745
00:39:59,760 --> 00:40:02,440
Speaker 7: an environmental protest, and they'll be like.

746
00:40:02,560 --> 00:40:05,960
Speaker 5: Wow, look they didn't even clean up the park, those

747
00:40:06,000 --> 00:40:09,799
Speaker 5: silly environmentalists. Wow. And it's really a photo from like

748
00:40:09,840 --> 00:40:13,560
Speaker 5: a concert ten years ago that's just getting reused in

749
00:40:13,680 --> 00:40:14,240
Speaker 5: this new.

750
00:40:14,160 --> 00:40:15,000
Speaker 6: Context, right.

751
00:40:15,040 --> 00:40:17,600
Speaker 3: I think we should mention the most important one, which

752
00:40:17,680 --> 00:40:20,680
Speaker 3: was Miley Cyrus twenty fifteen, when they put a fake

753
00:40:20,719 --> 00:40:24,960
Speaker 3: pregnancy test in her clear bag and then she released

754
00:40:24,960 --> 00:40:27,759
Speaker 3: pictures of herself with the same bag being like there's

755
00:40:27,760 --> 00:40:31,160
Speaker 3: no pregnancy whatever. Very scandalous for me at the time.

756
00:40:34,440 --> 00:40:37,279
Speaker 2: Yeah, so we see basically like we shouldn't get our

757
00:40:37,320 --> 00:40:40,839
Speaker 2: information from memes. I feel like that's a pretty good guyline.

758
00:40:41,520 --> 00:40:43,520
Speaker 3: That's so fun exactly.

759
00:40:43,600 --> 00:40:46,600
Speaker 5: That's the problem. Like, memes, when done well, can be

760
00:40:46,640 --> 00:40:50,480
Speaker 5: an excellent source of good information because they're so easy

761
00:40:50,520 --> 00:40:55,920
Speaker 5: to digest and clear and memorable and fake, but those

762
00:40:55,960 --> 00:40:57,520
Speaker 5: same things can also backfire.

763
00:40:57,840 --> 00:41:01,399
Speaker 2: Right, I want to know more about your research as

764
00:41:01,440 --> 00:41:05,560
Speaker 2: far as like false memories. I actually didn't look up

765
00:41:05,560 --> 00:41:07,720
Speaker 2: any of this, really. I just like it's an area

766
00:41:07,760 --> 00:41:09,600
Speaker 2: that I find. It's a topic I find very interesting,

767
00:41:10,760 --> 00:41:13,040
Speaker 2: especially given like the Satanic Panic, and now we're kind

768
00:41:13,080 --> 00:41:16,399
Speaker 2: of experiencing another Satanic panic where people sort of claim

769
00:41:16,480 --> 00:41:18,839
Speaker 2: that they had experiences as a child that they most

770
00:41:18,880 --> 00:41:20,879
Speaker 2: likely didn't have because they're wildly unrealistic.

771
00:41:21,840 --> 00:41:23,520
Speaker 3: Did did you till Swan?

772
00:41:23,640 --> 00:41:24,960
Speaker 6: Is that till Swan is one of them?

773
00:41:25,040 --> 00:41:28,279
Speaker 3: Yes, she was. She was, I'm sewn inside of a

774
00:41:28,320 --> 00:41:29,279
Speaker 3: dead body.

775
00:41:29,200 --> 00:41:29,719
Speaker 6: Yeah she was.

776
00:41:29,840 --> 00:41:33,200
Speaker 2: She claims she was sewn into it a human body

777
00:41:33,280 --> 00:41:36,479
Speaker 2: as a part of her satanic ritual abuse childhood, which

778
00:41:36,520 --> 00:41:40,280
Speaker 2: a therapist who was a sort of chronic satanic ritual

779
00:41:40,280 --> 00:41:44,600
Speaker 2: abuse uncoverer kind of led her to that conclusion. So

780
00:41:44,680 --> 00:41:47,319
Speaker 2: do you do you have any did you.

781
00:41:47,280 --> 00:41:48,120
Speaker 6: Look at that stuff at all?

782
00:41:48,280 --> 00:41:51,480
Speaker 5: So, I haven't personally done any of the research on it.

783
00:41:51,520 --> 00:41:54,280
Speaker 5: I was trained in grad school by someone who's done

784
00:41:54,560 --> 00:41:58,560
Speaker 5: research on it. I do research on kind of kids'

785
00:41:58,640 --> 00:42:02,600
Speaker 5: memories and things like that, so I also find the

786
00:42:02,640 --> 00:42:08,960
Speaker 5: topic fascinating. And yeah, you find that young children are

787
00:42:09,000 --> 00:42:14,720
Speaker 5: particularly susceptible to creating these false memories, particularly when they're

788
00:42:14,920 --> 00:42:18,480
Speaker 5: interviewed by people who have power over them or people

789
00:42:18,480 --> 00:42:23,800
Speaker 5: who they view as authorities. So there's a great study

790
00:42:24,360 --> 00:42:29,960
Speaker 5: that Steven CC did years ago where every day they

791
00:42:29,960 --> 00:42:33,560
Speaker 5: have a kid come into the lab and they ask

792
00:42:33,680 --> 00:42:36,160
Speaker 5: him tell us about the time that your finger got

793
00:42:36,200 --> 00:42:38,200
Speaker 5: caught in a mouse trap and you had to go

794
00:42:38,239 --> 00:42:42,640
Speaker 5: to the hospital, and they just keep asking him about

795
00:42:42,680 --> 00:42:46,640
Speaker 5: this event, and eventually he starts telling a story about it,

796
00:42:47,160 --> 00:42:50,799
Speaker 5: and eventually he comes to believe this story to the

797
00:42:50,840 --> 00:42:53,960
Speaker 5: point that when he is home outside of the lab,

798
00:42:54,120 --> 00:42:57,640
Speaker 5: he'll tell the story to his parents, Wow, and kind

799
00:42:57,680 --> 00:43:01,320
Speaker 5: of details about where his brother was and exactly what happened,

800
00:43:01,320 --> 00:43:05,640
Speaker 5: what it felt like, and none of it is actually true,

801
00:43:06,400 --> 00:43:11,359
Speaker 5: even in the clip. In when clip they show the

802
00:43:11,440 --> 00:43:14,920
Speaker 5: experimenters had told him, Oh, this never happened to you,

803
00:43:15,719 --> 00:43:17,680
Speaker 5: and a few weeks later he was like, no, no,

804
00:43:17,800 --> 00:43:20,840
Speaker 5: this is a real memory that I had.

805
00:43:22,600 --> 00:43:24,239
Speaker 1: Wow, and yeah, I mean.

806
00:43:24,280 --> 00:43:28,360
Speaker 5: I think the Satanic panics of the daycares in the

807
00:43:28,480 --> 00:43:33,840
Speaker 5: nineteen eighties really spurred a lot of research on children's

808
00:43:33,880 --> 00:43:38,959
Speaker 5: memories and when they can be effective witnesses, because when

809
00:43:39,239 --> 00:43:45,480
Speaker 5: interviewed properly, kids can be an important witness, especially in

810
00:43:45,480 --> 00:43:47,960
Speaker 5: sexual abuse cases. We don't want to go too far

811
00:43:48,000 --> 00:43:52,080
Speaker 5: the other way and say totally it should never be witnesses,

812
00:43:52,719 --> 00:43:57,319
Speaker 5: but just like adults, kids are easily susceptible to this

813
00:43:57,440 --> 00:44:01,560
Speaker 5: type of manipulation. One of the things that I find

814
00:44:01,680 --> 00:44:06,280
Speaker 5: most heartbreaking about these cases is you have kids who,

815
00:44:06,680 --> 00:44:11,200
Speaker 5: even if they were never abused, do have memories of

816
00:44:11,239 --> 00:44:11,960
Speaker 5: that abuse.

817
00:44:12,320 --> 00:44:17,240
Speaker 7: Right be abused, Right, they have children in many ways psychologically,

818
00:44:17,400 --> 00:44:19,200
Speaker 7: it's still a form of trauma.

819
00:44:19,680 --> 00:44:19,960
Speaker 4: Right.

820
00:44:20,920 --> 00:44:24,680
Speaker 2: That is so sad, and it is such a complicated

821
00:44:24,719 --> 00:44:27,120
Speaker 2: situation because we obviously want to believe survivors.

822
00:44:27,200 --> 00:44:29,799
Speaker 6: That's like, that's that should be the go to.

823
00:44:30,440 --> 00:44:33,280
Speaker 2: But then there are instances every once in a while

824
00:44:33,520 --> 00:44:36,320
Speaker 2: of someone who was maybe manipulated at the wrong moment

825
00:44:36,480 --> 00:44:40,000
Speaker 2: in time and believes the thing that you know, we

826
00:44:40,040 --> 00:44:41,040
Speaker 2: know didn't happen.

827
00:44:41,160 --> 00:44:42,759
Speaker 6: I mean again, much more rare.

828
00:44:43,120 --> 00:44:45,920
Speaker 2: But that is why it is so important if you

829
00:44:46,000 --> 00:44:47,840
Speaker 2: are in a position of power, if you're interviewing a

830
00:44:47,920 --> 00:44:50,359
Speaker 2: child or a victim of any kind, to not ask

831
00:44:50,440 --> 00:44:55,400
Speaker 2: leading questions and to be educated in the processes of memory. Right, So,

832
00:44:55,440 --> 00:44:57,600
Speaker 2: how do we know when to trust our memory if

833
00:44:57,640 --> 00:45:01,560
Speaker 2: it's so malleable and every time we remember something, we're

834
00:45:01,600 --> 00:45:03,560
Speaker 2: calling it up all over again, Like how do we know?

835
00:45:03,880 --> 00:45:04,080
Speaker 3: You know?

836
00:45:04,640 --> 00:45:08,719
Speaker 5: Basically you don't. I think you should actually have the

837
00:45:08,719 --> 00:45:13,360
Speaker 5: default that probably every memory you have is slightly different

838
00:45:13,960 --> 00:45:16,880
Speaker 5: than how the event actually happens in reality.

839
00:45:16,880 --> 00:45:19,560
Speaker 3: This is a question. Every time we think of a memory,

840
00:45:19,560 --> 00:45:21,240
Speaker 3: do we change it a little bit? Is that true?

841
00:45:21,880 --> 00:45:22,319
Speaker 5: I think?

842
00:45:22,360 --> 00:45:26,840
Speaker 3: So every time we remember something, we're changing that experience

843
00:45:26,960 --> 00:45:28,840
Speaker 3: a little bit, and then the next time we remember it,

844
00:45:28,840 --> 00:45:32,319
Speaker 3: it's a little bit different, and now we're just it's

845
00:45:32,360 --> 00:45:34,399
Speaker 3: such a like narrative therapy thing.

846
00:45:34,440 --> 00:45:36,040
Speaker 2: I don't know, but yeah, it makes me think about

847
00:45:36,080 --> 00:45:38,799
Speaker 2: emdr Like you call up your memories and then you

848
00:45:38,920 --> 00:45:43,000
Speaker 2: like edit them almost to make them easier to process,

849
00:45:43,120 --> 00:45:46,200
Speaker 2: which is freaking mind blowing you.

850
00:45:46,840 --> 00:45:48,919
Speaker 3: Because you've been just as a child, you were doing

851
00:45:48,960 --> 00:45:51,799
Speaker 3: even crazier processing shortcuts where you were just like, well

852
00:45:51,800 --> 00:45:54,440
Speaker 3: that's because I'm bad, Like, oh, that's because I'm stupid,

853
00:45:54,480 --> 00:45:56,399
Speaker 3: And then now you're just like a human being who

854
00:45:56,440 --> 00:46:00,480
Speaker 3: believes that it's so interesting that we really don't know

855
00:46:00,760 --> 00:46:01,799
Speaker 3: ourselves that well.

856
00:46:01,840 --> 00:46:05,080
Speaker 5: Maybe, yeah, I think memories that we retell a lot

857
00:46:05,400 --> 00:46:09,759
Speaker 5: tend to kind of stabilize into a form that is

858
00:46:09,800 --> 00:46:13,440
Speaker 5: pretty similar every time that we recall it. And there

859
00:46:13,600 --> 00:46:15,880
Speaker 5: what you find is that kind of the more often

860
00:46:15,920 --> 00:46:19,359
Speaker 5: you recall it, the more memorable it is. We've got

861
00:46:19,360 --> 00:46:22,040
Speaker 5: this general finding. We call it retrieval practice. The things

862
00:46:22,080 --> 00:46:24,480
Speaker 5: that you practice retrieving or the things that you're going

863
00:46:24,560 --> 00:46:28,279
Speaker 5: to remember more often. We typically use it as like

864
00:46:28,800 --> 00:46:33,160
Speaker 5: studying advice for students, like don't reread your notes, test

865
00:46:33,200 --> 00:46:36,080
Speaker 5: yourself on the material, try and retrieve it from memory.

866
00:46:36,480 --> 00:46:40,600
Speaker 5: But it also happens with our autobiographical memories, the things

867
00:46:40,680 --> 00:46:43,000
Speaker 5: that you spend the most time remembering or the things

868
00:46:43,000 --> 00:46:45,000
Speaker 5: that are going to be more memorable later on.

869
00:46:45,640 --> 00:46:49,360
Speaker 2: So could in theory, just like hypothesis here and maybe

870
00:46:49,440 --> 00:46:53,920
Speaker 2: this is a thing already, but practicing retrieving like positive

871
00:46:54,239 --> 00:46:57,880
Speaker 2: memories are like affirming memories instead of the traumatic memories

872
00:46:57,920 --> 00:47:01,839
Speaker 2: like And could that theoretically be like a useful therapeutic tool.

873
00:47:02,080 --> 00:47:05,960
Speaker 5: Yeah, theoretically that makes sense given what we know about

874
00:47:05,960 --> 00:47:06,920
Speaker 5: memory processing.

875
00:47:07,080 --> 00:47:10,360
Speaker 2: All right, let's do it, Megan, you and me, let's

876
00:47:10,520 --> 00:47:12,040
Speaker 2: do it invent of a therapy.

877
00:47:13,440 --> 00:47:13,800
Speaker 6: Awesome.

878
00:47:13,840 --> 00:47:16,279
Speaker 2: Well, is there anything that you would like people to

879
00:47:17,080 --> 00:47:21,880
Speaker 2: know just about truth and memory and repetition in general

880
00:47:21,880 --> 00:47:22,719
Speaker 2: that we haven't touched on.

881
00:47:23,080 --> 00:47:25,600
Speaker 5: I think we've touched on most of it. It's kind

882
00:47:25,640 --> 00:47:28,480
Speaker 5: of don't believe you're above it. Everyone can get fooled

883
00:47:28,480 --> 00:47:32,560
Speaker 5: by misinformation when it's the right piece of misinformation. These

884
00:47:32,600 --> 00:47:36,400
Speaker 5: are just basic processes. The way that our brain works

885
00:47:36,880 --> 00:47:40,279
Speaker 5: makes us vulnerable to it. When you see something that

886
00:47:40,560 --> 00:47:44,240
Speaker 5: causes a big emotional reaction, slow down, try and figure

887
00:47:44,280 --> 00:47:47,160
Speaker 5: out if it's true or false, and don't be so

888
00:47:47,320 --> 00:47:50,520
Speaker 5: quick to share or interact with things that might not

889
00:47:50,600 --> 00:47:51,040
Speaker 5: be true.

890
00:47:51,400 --> 00:47:51,799
Speaker 6: Love it.

891
00:47:52,160 --> 00:47:54,880
Speaker 3: Do you ever fall prey to misinformation? Oh yeah, all

892
00:47:54,920 --> 00:47:57,200
Speaker 3: the time, every time, all the time.

893
00:47:57,239 --> 00:47:59,360
Speaker 5: But I definitely get still sometimes.

894
00:47:59,360 --> 00:48:02,279
Speaker 3: Amazing. Okay, good, that's because we all do.

895
00:48:02,400 --> 00:48:02,920
Speaker 6: We all do.

896
00:48:03,080 --> 00:48:07,200
Speaker 3: I know, we all do. But man, even research job

897
00:48:07,320 --> 00:48:10,400
Speaker 3: and it still just flies through there. I speak a

898
00:48:10,440 --> 00:48:12,920
Speaker 3: little bit better. Cool, Thank you so much.

899
00:48:12,760 --> 00:48:14,719
Speaker 2: Thank you so much. Are you on social media? Do

900
00:48:14,760 --> 00:48:17,000
Speaker 2: you want to share any place on the internet where

901
00:48:17,000 --> 00:48:17,279
Speaker 2: you are?

902
00:48:17,360 --> 00:48:19,640
Speaker 5: I'm on Twitter at lk Fazio.

903
00:48:20,080 --> 00:48:22,799
Speaker 6: Awesome, perfect, thanks so much for joining us.

904
00:48:23,239 --> 00:48:24,560
Speaker 5: Wonderful, take care of you.

905
00:48:24,880 --> 00:48:28,799
Speaker 2: Okay, Well that was Lisa, and now it's time for

906
00:48:28,880 --> 00:48:32,919
Speaker 2: Megan yes to tell me. Okay, so do you can

907
00:48:32,960 --> 00:48:35,359
Speaker 2: you think of any examples of times that you have

908
00:48:35,560 --> 00:48:38,400
Speaker 2: like heard something enough times that it starts to have

909
00:48:38,440 --> 00:48:39,520
Speaker 2: an impact on your thinking.

910
00:48:39,840 --> 00:48:44,080
Speaker 4: I mean, she is so wonderful and great. It's interesting

911
00:48:44,160 --> 00:48:48,160
Speaker 4: to me because I tend to stick to my first

912
00:48:48,200 --> 00:48:50,520
Speaker 4: opinion in a way that's pretty insane.

913
00:48:50,560 --> 00:48:51,360
Speaker 3: I'm not proud of that.

914
00:48:51,840 --> 00:48:54,880
Speaker 4: So I feel like if I think something, no matter

915
00:48:54,880 --> 00:48:56,800
Speaker 4: what I hear, how often I hear it.

916
00:48:56,719 --> 00:48:57,920
Speaker 3: I just dig in deeper.

917
00:48:58,080 --> 00:48:58,759
Speaker 6: Well, that makes sense.

918
00:48:58,800 --> 00:49:00,920
Speaker 2: Because the I mean, we also talked about the like

919
00:49:00,960 --> 00:49:01,840
Speaker 2: the primacy effect.

920
00:49:01,880 --> 00:49:03,239
Speaker 3: I believe it was cold.

921
00:49:03,320 --> 00:49:04,040
Speaker 6: Am I getting that right?

922
00:49:04,520 --> 00:49:05,960
Speaker 2: Which is that the first thing you hear is the

923
00:49:05,960 --> 00:49:08,120
Speaker 2: thing that sticks, so it makes it Maybe it's like

924
00:49:08,640 --> 00:49:11,879
Speaker 2: before you formed an official opinion on that thing.

925
00:49:12,360 --> 00:49:14,680
Speaker 4: I mean, she said, though, one, even if you think

926
00:49:14,719 --> 00:49:16,920
Speaker 4: it's really true and you're really passionate about it, if

927
00:49:16,960 --> 00:49:19,879
Speaker 4: you hear it a bunch something different, it will start

928
00:49:19,880 --> 00:49:23,040
Speaker 4: to think in And I believe her, I just consciously

929
00:49:23,200 --> 00:49:25,040
Speaker 4: haven't connected to that.

930
00:49:25,320 --> 00:49:25,720
Speaker 6: Yeah.

931
00:49:25,880 --> 00:49:28,560
Speaker 2: Yeah, well she did also say, I mean, these are

932
00:49:28,680 --> 00:49:30,640
Speaker 2: it's interesting. I mean I wonder I wonder like how

933
00:49:30,680 --> 00:49:32,799
Speaker 2: far it extends in either direction, because she did also

934
00:49:32,800 --> 00:49:36,000
Speaker 2: say that like, once you have the bad information stuck

935
00:49:36,000 --> 00:49:37,239
Speaker 2: in your head, it's like really, it's like.

936
00:49:37,239 --> 00:49:40,719
Speaker 4: Hard, that's yeah, that's where I get stuck in where

937
00:49:40,719 --> 00:49:41,640
Speaker 4: I'm like nope.

938
00:49:41,880 --> 00:49:45,680
Speaker 2: I also wonder like how like maybe it still has

939
00:49:45,719 --> 00:49:48,760
Speaker 2: some effect because it's easier for your brain to process

940
00:49:48,840 --> 00:49:51,080
Speaker 2: if it's coming from your out group. But I would

941
00:49:51,080 --> 00:49:54,760
Speaker 2: imagine it's got to be a smaller effect, right it feel.

942
00:49:54,680 --> 00:49:55,319
Speaker 3: It feels that way.

943
00:49:55,400 --> 00:49:57,840
Speaker 2: But because that like that was sort of what what

944
00:49:58,000 --> 00:50:00,239
Speaker 2: Chris Bale's research spoke to, which is that like people

945
00:50:00,239 --> 00:50:02,879
Speaker 2: would kind of if it came from their out group

946
00:50:02,960 --> 00:50:04,600
Speaker 2: or whatever, people would kind of dig their heels in.

947
00:50:04,560 --> 00:50:06,360
Speaker 6: Deeper with the in group belief.

948
00:50:07,520 --> 00:50:10,280
Speaker 2: So I don't know, I don't know social scientists interest classes.

949
00:50:10,360 --> 00:50:12,080
Speaker 3: Yeah, it's all very interesting, but.

950
00:50:12,239 --> 00:50:15,640
Speaker 2: I'm sure we'll be learning more very soon later this

951
00:50:15,760 --> 00:50:17,640
Speaker 2: month for the rest of Conspiracy Month.

952
00:50:17,840 --> 00:50:20,440
Speaker 4: Oh, I can't wait. Thank you guys so much for

953
00:50:20,520 --> 00:50:23,200
Speaker 4: being here. We can't wait to see you again next week.

954
00:50:23,400 --> 00:50:26,160
Speaker 4: And as always, remember to follow your gut, watch out

955
00:50:26,160 --> 00:50:29,480
Speaker 4: for red flags, and never ever trust me.

956
00:50:29,880 --> 00:50:37,240
Speaker 2: Bye bye. Trust Me as produced by Kirsten Woodward, Gabby

957
00:50:37,320 --> 00:50:39,200
Speaker 2: Rapp and Steve Delemator.

958
00:50:38,680 --> 00:50:40,640
Speaker 1: With special thanks to Stacy Para.

959
00:50:40,560 --> 00:50:43,000
Speaker 2: And our theme song was composed by Holly amber Church.

960
00:50:43,200 --> 00:50:46,080
Speaker 1: You can find us on Instagram at trust Me Podcast,

961
00:50:46,280 --> 00:50:49,600
Speaker 1: Twitter at trust Me Cult Pod, or on TikTok at

962
00:50:49,680 --> 00:50:51,360
Speaker 1: trust Me Cult Podcast.

963
00:50:51,520 --> 00:50:54,879
Speaker 2: I'm Ula Lola on Instagram and Ola Lola on Twitter.

964
00:50:54,600 --> 00:50:58,160
Speaker 1: And I am Megan Elizabeth eleven on Instagram and Debraham

965
00:50:58,320 --> 00:50:59,360
Speaker 1: Hicks on Twitter.

966
00:50:59,520 --> 00:51:01,839
Speaker 2: Remember to rate and review and spread the word

967
00:51:07,719 --> 00:51:08,080
Speaker 3: MHM.