1 00:00:00,480 --> 00:00:03,040 Speaker 1: Hi everyone, This is Brad. We're hard at work on 2 00:00:03,080 --> 00:00:05,560 Speaker 1: a series of new episodes for the fall, and so 3 00:00:05,640 --> 00:00:08,000 Speaker 1: this week will be re airing a shortened version of 4 00:00:08,039 --> 00:00:10,600 Speaker 1: a very topical episode we first ran almost a year 5 00:00:10,600 --> 00:00:13,800 Speaker 1: ago in October two thousand and sixteen. At the end 6 00:00:13,960 --> 00:00:26,400 Speaker 1: will update you with everything that's happened since then. On Friday, 7 00:00:26,400 --> 00:00:29,720 Speaker 1: October seven, the U S. Department of Homeland Security in 8 00:00:29,760 --> 00:00:32,680 Speaker 1: the Office of the Director of National Intelligence released a 9 00:00:32,720 --> 00:00:36,160 Speaker 1: statement and it was a pretty stunning announcement. Barely two 10 00:00:36,200 --> 00:00:38,680 Speaker 1: and a half months after a cyber attack was revealed 11 00:00:38,720 --> 00:00:42,360 Speaker 1: on the Democratic National Committee, the Obama administration laid the 12 00:00:42,400 --> 00:00:45,640 Speaker 1: blame at the feet of Russia's President Vladimir Putin with 13 00:00:45,720 --> 00:00:49,200 Speaker 1: a strongly the US government publicly blaming a foreign country 14 00:00:49,240 --> 00:00:52,280 Speaker 1: for attacking a U S entity. That's an incredibly rare thing. 15 00:00:52,520 --> 00:00:54,440 Speaker 1: I was surprised when I saw this statement come out, 16 00:00:54,960 --> 00:00:57,600 Speaker 1: even though it's something that the private cybersecurity experts have 17 00:00:57,680 --> 00:01:00,600 Speaker 1: been talking about for a while. Uh, the government formally 18 00:01:00,600 --> 00:01:03,120 Speaker 1: blaming a foreign entities only happened a handful of times, 19 00:01:03,600 --> 00:01:07,000 Speaker 1: and specifically here, the US was accusing Russia of hacking 20 00:01:07,080 --> 00:01:10,840 Speaker 1: the Democratic Party right as voters prepared to go to 21 00:01:10,880 --> 00:01:13,959 Speaker 1: the polls on November eight. It's a scary prospect. Could 22 00:01:13,959 --> 00:01:17,360 Speaker 1: hackers tamper with or even obliterate our votes. So here's 23 00:01:17,360 --> 00:01:21,000 Speaker 1: my question. We are so close now to election day, 24 00:01:21,040 --> 00:01:23,319 Speaker 1: and you can tell because that's really all you see 25 00:01:23,400 --> 00:01:26,600 Speaker 1: on TV right now. So how do we know for 26 00:01:26,640 --> 00:01:30,160 Speaker 1: sure what we think we know about these hacks? This 27 00:01:30,240 --> 00:01:33,399 Speaker 1: is a perpetual problem in cybersecurity, and it reminds me 28 00:01:33,440 --> 00:01:36,480 Speaker 1: of the famous New Yorker cartoon that goes on the internet. 29 00:01:36,560 --> 00:01:39,280 Speaker 1: Nobody knows you're a dog, But when you're investigating a 30 00:01:39,319 --> 00:01:43,520 Speaker 1: cybersecurity breach, uh, nobody knows whether you're a Russian hacker 31 00:01:44,080 --> 00:01:46,840 Speaker 1: or a Chinese hacker pretending to be a Russian hacker, 32 00:01:47,400 --> 00:01:50,040 Speaker 1: or even a US hacker pretending to be a Chinese 33 00:01:50,080 --> 00:01:53,520 Speaker 1: hacker pretending to be a Russian hacker. Or, as Donald 34 00:01:53,520 --> 00:01:56,600 Speaker 1: Trump put it so delicately, I don't think anybody knows 35 00:01:56,600 --> 00:01:58,640 Speaker 1: it was Russia that broke into the d n C. 36 00:01:58,800 --> 00:02:01,320 Speaker 1: She's saying Russia, Russia, Russia, but I don't know. Maybe 37 00:02:01,320 --> 00:02:03,040 Speaker 1: it was. I mean, it could be Russia, but it 38 00:02:03,080 --> 00:02:05,559 Speaker 1: could also be China, could also be lots of other people. 39 00:02:05,600 --> 00:02:07,640 Speaker 1: It also could be somebody sitting on their bed that 40 00:02:07,760 --> 00:02:11,840 Speaker 1: weighs four hundred pounds, Okay, And how is the US 41 00:02:12,080 --> 00:02:15,160 Speaker 1: or anyone else for that matter, so certain that the 42 00:02:15,240 --> 00:02:18,560 Speaker 1: Russians are trying to hijack our elections? What should an 43 00:02:18,680 --> 00:02:31,239 Speaker 1: ordinary voter do? And should we even care? Hi, am Akito, 44 00:02:31,639 --> 00:02:34,880 Speaker 1: and I'm George Robertson, and this week on Decrypted, we're 45 00:02:34,880 --> 00:02:37,360 Speaker 1: going to take you inside the hunt for the people 46 00:02:37,440 --> 00:02:40,919 Speaker 1: who have the Democratic National Committee. It's a sort of 47 00:02:41,040 --> 00:02:43,480 Speaker 1: tale of how two of the world's great superpowers have 48 00:02:43,520 --> 00:02:47,200 Speaker 1: found themselves locked in an escalating information war just weeks 49 00:02:47,200 --> 00:02:49,760 Speaker 1: before millions of Americans go to the polls, and the 50 00:02:49,800 --> 00:02:53,000 Speaker 1: stakes they really couldn't be any higher. Not only is 51 00:02:53,040 --> 00:02:55,960 Speaker 1: this the most divisive election we've seen in recent memory, 52 00:02:56,480 --> 00:03:00,200 Speaker 1: with Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump advocating for completely print 53 00:03:00,280 --> 00:03:03,240 Speaker 1: visions of America, but also hanging in the balance is 54 00:03:03,520 --> 00:03:08,240 Speaker 1: the democratic process itself. What happens to a country's sovereignty 55 00:03:08,240 --> 00:03:12,320 Speaker 1: in the age of the Internet. Our story today starts 56 00:03:12,320 --> 00:03:15,079 Speaker 1: in April when the I T staff at the Democratic 57 00:03:15,200 --> 00:03:18,720 Speaker 1: National Committee noticed something a little weird going on in 58 00:03:18,760 --> 00:03:22,160 Speaker 1: their network. For our non American listeners, this is the 59 00:03:22,280 --> 00:03:25,480 Speaker 1: official organization behind the Democratic Party, the d n C, 60 00:03:26,200 --> 00:03:29,560 Speaker 1: and the i T staff there, they escalated their concerns 61 00:03:29,560 --> 00:03:33,519 Speaker 1: to their executives and a cyber security firm called CrowdStrike 62 00:03:33,720 --> 00:03:39,440 Speaker 1: was called in to investigate. So CrowdStrike is one of 63 00:03:39,480 --> 00:03:43,640 Speaker 1: a small group of digital forensics firms that really all 64 00:03:43,680 --> 00:03:46,680 Speaker 1: they do is investigate data breaches. And they went in. 65 00:03:47,200 --> 00:03:50,440 Speaker 1: They installed sophtware in the DNC servers, essentially allowing them 66 00:03:50,440 --> 00:03:52,960 Speaker 1: to spy on the spies, and it didn't take them 67 00:03:52,960 --> 00:03:55,400 Speaker 1: long to pin the attacks on two groups of hackers 68 00:03:55,440 --> 00:03:58,720 Speaker 1: associated with the Russian government. They called these groups Cozy 69 00:03:58,760 --> 00:04:02,520 Speaker 1: Bear and Fancy Bear. Cozy Bear and Fancy Bear. Is 70 00:04:02,560 --> 00:04:06,680 Speaker 1: this some kind of industry inside joke? Yeah, the hypersecurity 71 00:04:06,720 --> 00:04:09,400 Speaker 1: industry has a lot of kind of goofy, funny names 72 00:04:09,400 --> 00:04:13,320 Speaker 1: for groups. They're thematic, often associated with a region. Uh. 73 00:04:13,440 --> 00:04:16,080 Speaker 1: Some others are called deep Panda and things like that. 74 00:04:16,720 --> 00:04:20,520 Speaker 1: I love that. Then CrowdStrike closed all the security holes 75 00:04:20,520 --> 00:04:23,080 Speaker 1: that had allowed the attackers to breach the DNC servers, 76 00:04:23,640 --> 00:04:25,280 Speaker 1: and so the hackers wouldn't be able to read the 77 00:04:25,279 --> 00:04:29,240 Speaker 1: staff emails anymore. Now, normally you don't really disclose this 78 00:04:29,360 --> 00:04:32,760 Speaker 1: kind of thing unless you absolutely have to. It's certainly 79 00:04:32,800 --> 00:04:36,400 Speaker 1: embarrassing for the d n C, especially when, as we 80 00:04:36,600 --> 00:04:40,200 Speaker 1: learned later, they were warned about their networks vulnerabilities and 81 00:04:40,400 --> 00:04:44,040 Speaker 1: ended up ignoring those early warnings. But the DNC may 82 00:04:44,080 --> 00:04:46,120 Speaker 1: have had a hint that some of this information was 83 00:04:46,120 --> 00:04:48,520 Speaker 1: about to be leaked on the internet, so they dropped 84 00:04:48,520 --> 00:04:51,920 Speaker 1: this bomb show. But first, the Democratic National Committee said 85 00:04:51,960 --> 00:04:56,839 Speaker 1: today Russian government hackers have penetrated its computer network. Breaches 86 00:04:56,880 --> 00:05:01,560 Speaker 1: by two separate groups allowed hackers to access emails, internal chats, 87 00:05:01,720 --> 00:05:06,839 Speaker 1: and the opposition Research Democrats have compiled unpresumptive Republican nominee 88 00:05:06,880 --> 00:05:10,440 Speaker 1: Donald Trump. That's PPS News Hour reporting the hack on 89 00:05:10,600 --> 00:05:14,240 Speaker 1: June four, the day this all became public, and it 90 00:05:14,320 --> 00:05:17,400 Speaker 1: hit the US political system like a bolt of lightning. 91 00:05:17,760 --> 00:05:20,960 Speaker 1: People were furious, how dare Russia try to mess with 92 00:05:21,000 --> 00:05:25,640 Speaker 1: America that type of thing. And then one day after 93 00:05:25,680 --> 00:05:29,000 Speaker 1: the DNC announcement, someone or a group of people who 94 00:05:29,000 --> 00:05:31,720 Speaker 1: go by the name Goose Offer too Dato came out 95 00:05:31,720 --> 00:05:33,720 Speaker 1: in a blog post and basically laughed in the d 96 00:05:33,800 --> 00:05:36,480 Speaker 1: n c's face. This person was like, no, you idiots, 97 00:05:36,480 --> 00:05:38,600 Speaker 1: I am the lone hacker that infiltrated the d n C. 98 00:05:39,120 --> 00:05:41,359 Speaker 1: And this had nothing to do with the Russians and 99 00:05:41,400 --> 00:05:44,080 Speaker 1: Goosefer too. Dato released a bunch of documents that he 100 00:05:44,160 --> 00:05:46,480 Speaker 1: claimed he had stolen from the d n C as 101 00:05:46,520 --> 00:05:50,360 Speaker 1: evidence that he was behind it, and from there it 102 00:05:50,400 --> 00:05:54,039 Speaker 1: was chaos. Was it the Russians with some lunar kid 103 00:05:54,080 --> 00:05:57,159 Speaker 1: who had too much time on his hands, And that's 104 00:05:57,160 --> 00:06:02,560 Speaker 1: when crowd Strike called in this guy for help. My 105 00:06:02,640 --> 00:06:04,880 Speaker 1: name is Mike Burtaski. I'm the senior vice president of 106 00:06:04,920 --> 00:06:11,080 Speaker 1: cybersecurity Services at Fidela Cybersecurity here in Maryland. I lead 107 00:06:11,200 --> 00:06:16,039 Speaker 1: a incident response team of about thirty individuals and we've 108 00:06:16,080 --> 00:06:19,039 Speaker 1: handled some of the largest breaches that have have occurred 109 00:06:19,040 --> 00:06:22,760 Speaker 1: over the past decade or so. So I've known Mike 110 00:06:22,800 --> 00:06:24,760 Speaker 1: for several years now, and he's a really interesting guy. 111 00:06:24,960 --> 00:06:27,239 Speaker 1: Used to be a cop with the Montgomery County Police 112 00:06:27,240 --> 00:06:30,160 Speaker 1: Department in Maryland, and he looks like at X cop. 113 00:06:30,240 --> 00:06:33,880 Speaker 1: He's got the short cropped haircut, solidly built guy at 114 00:06:34,120 --> 00:06:37,440 Speaker 1: very friendly and uh, you know, very genial. Even before 115 00:06:37,440 --> 00:06:39,720 Speaker 1: his time in the private sector, he had this long 116 00:06:39,760 --> 00:06:43,760 Speaker 1: experience of tracking down criminals. Mike's now an incident responder 117 00:06:43,960 --> 00:06:46,640 Speaker 1: in cybersecurity speak, that means he flies out at the 118 00:06:46,680 --> 00:06:49,239 Speaker 1: drop of a hat two companies that believe they've been breached, 119 00:06:49,560 --> 00:06:52,440 Speaker 1: and he helps investigate and fix their networks. So like 120 00:06:52,560 --> 00:06:55,560 Speaker 1: the computer nerd version of c s I or Law 121 00:06:55,600 --> 00:06:58,720 Speaker 1: and Order right, and Mike and Fideli's his job was 122 00:06:58,760 --> 00:07:01,600 Speaker 1: too independently VERI by the group of people who attack 123 00:07:01,640 --> 00:07:05,680 Speaker 1: the DNC, and this cybersecurity version of the who done 124 00:07:05,680 --> 00:07:11,000 Speaker 1: it investigation. It's called attribution in the industry, and CrowdStrike 125 00:07:11,040 --> 00:07:13,560 Speaker 1: had asked Fidelis and to other firms to check their work. 126 00:07:14,320 --> 00:07:16,880 Speaker 1: So so we had, um, you know, we got five 127 00:07:16,880 --> 00:07:19,160 Speaker 1: pieces of mal where we had a team of four 128 00:07:19,160 --> 00:07:21,800 Speaker 1: reverse engineers. That's all they do is reverse engineering, so 129 00:07:21,840 --> 00:07:25,120 Speaker 1: we had them bang on it. Jordan, I think we 130 00:07:25,120 --> 00:07:29,520 Speaker 1: should explain this to our listeners. Sure, So CrowdStrike sent 131 00:07:29,640 --> 00:07:33,080 Speaker 1: Mike's team five files of the computer code that was 132 00:07:33,200 --> 00:07:36,520 Speaker 1: on the DNC servers and was responsible for stealing information 133 00:07:36,560 --> 00:07:39,240 Speaker 1: from the emails. And the job of Fidelis and these 134 00:07:39,240 --> 00:07:41,560 Speaker 1: two other firms was to look at this code in 135 00:07:41,600 --> 00:07:45,960 Speaker 1: what's called a virtual environment, like a parallel universe. Right, 136 00:07:46,280 --> 00:07:48,840 Speaker 1: It's a simulated computer system where the code can't do 137 00:07:48,920 --> 00:07:52,120 Speaker 1: any damage on the real servers. Hackers used all kinds 138 00:07:52,120 --> 00:07:55,480 Speaker 1: of tricks to prevent their malware from even opening in 139 00:07:55,600 --> 00:07:58,160 Speaker 1: that kind of hall of mirrors. So a key job 140 00:07:58,240 --> 00:08:01,320 Speaker 1: of an investigator is decoding all of those techniques to 141 00:08:01,400 --> 00:08:04,840 Speaker 1: see how the attack code actually behaves. Okay, and then 142 00:08:05,200 --> 00:08:09,680 Speaker 1: Mike's team they compared that behavior to documented quode in 143 00:08:09,680 --> 00:08:12,320 Speaker 1: the past that was linked to the two hacker groups 144 00:08:12,360 --> 00:08:16,400 Speaker 1: associated with the Russian government and crowd Strait called these 145 00:08:16,440 --> 00:08:19,760 Speaker 1: two groups Cozy Bear and Fancy Bear, and the clues 146 00:08:19,760 --> 00:08:23,320 Speaker 1: surface immediately. You know, really there were a couple of 147 00:08:23,360 --> 00:08:25,360 Speaker 1: things that that we looked at, So you look at 148 00:08:25,400 --> 00:08:28,240 Speaker 1: the complexity of of what the malware was able to do. 149 00:08:28,640 --> 00:08:32,320 Speaker 1: The fact that it had the ability to m basically 150 00:08:33,559 --> 00:08:37,560 Speaker 1: terminate itself and wipe its its tracks, hide its tracks. 151 00:08:37,600 --> 00:08:40,600 Speaker 1: You know, that's not stuff you see in commoditized malware. Really, 152 00:08:40,840 --> 00:08:43,120 Speaker 1: it kills itself. It kills itself. Yeah, And actually one 153 00:08:43,120 --> 00:08:45,560 Speaker 1: of the functions within the one of the pieces of malware, 154 00:08:46,040 --> 00:08:51,160 Speaker 1: UM had had a terminology for essentially Harry Carey UM 155 00:08:51,400 --> 00:08:55,640 Speaker 1: to kill itself. So this automatic suicide switch, this is 156 00:08:55,679 --> 00:08:59,360 Speaker 1: something that's incredibly sophisticated, right, I mean, this is one 157 00:08:59,400 --> 00:09:02,640 Speaker 1: of the reason that Fidelist and CrowdStrike and the other 158 00:09:02,800 --> 00:09:07,320 Speaker 1: forensics researchers were so taken aback by this malware. You know, 159 00:09:07,320 --> 00:09:10,080 Speaker 1: there's a there's a black market for pre built malware 160 00:09:10,840 --> 00:09:14,240 Speaker 1: on the Internet that even somebody like me can piece together, 161 00:09:14,440 --> 00:09:17,520 Speaker 1: so like malware can be like legos. But this feature 162 00:09:17,520 --> 00:09:21,080 Speaker 1: of killing yourself to avoid getting detected, that's really complicated stuff. 163 00:09:21,600 --> 00:09:23,560 Speaker 1: And that's when Mike's team knew they were dealing with 164 00:09:23,640 --> 00:09:25,680 Speaker 1: real pros here. You know, there aren't a ton of 165 00:09:25,679 --> 00:09:28,319 Speaker 1: people around the world who have this level of sophistication, 166 00:09:28,800 --> 00:09:30,400 Speaker 1: and there were a bunch of other things that backed 167 00:09:30,440 --> 00:09:34,520 Speaker 1: up this conclusion. To the level of access that the 168 00:09:34,520 --> 00:09:40,280 Speaker 1: malware gave the malicious user UM was pretty astonishing. Uh. 169 00:09:40,320 --> 00:09:44,800 Speaker 1: It was also written very very um well, I I 170 00:09:44,800 --> 00:09:47,800 Speaker 1: guess elegant is probably a good way to to say it. 171 00:09:47,800 --> 00:09:51,080 Speaker 1: It was not sloppy by any stretch of the imagination. UM. 172 00:09:51,160 --> 00:09:53,600 Speaker 1: And again, so you start looking at, Okay, who would 173 00:09:53,600 --> 00:09:55,520 Speaker 1: have had the capability to do that? And you know 174 00:09:55,559 --> 00:09:58,640 Speaker 1: we talked earlier how you know, yeah, you can have 175 00:09:58,679 --> 00:10:01,280 Speaker 1: somebody on the inside do something, but they may not 176 00:10:01,400 --> 00:10:04,319 Speaker 1: be the best at it. So you have, uh, you've 177 00:10:04,320 --> 00:10:06,600 Speaker 1: got to have people who are a lot of experience 178 00:10:06,600 --> 00:10:08,200 Speaker 1: doing it, or a lot of training to do it, 179 00:10:08,240 --> 00:10:12,280 Speaker 1: and um, it was. It was a very complex piece 180 00:10:12,320 --> 00:10:15,640 Speaker 1: of malware that the average person probably couldn't use. Uh. 181 00:10:15,679 --> 00:10:19,360 Speaker 1: It's also not something that we've seen out in the 182 00:10:19,400 --> 00:10:24,480 Speaker 1: wild necessarily. It's very targeted pieces of malware, very limited. 183 00:10:24,600 --> 00:10:26,360 Speaker 1: Can't buy it on the black market. You can't buy 184 00:10:26,360 --> 00:10:33,000 Speaker 1: these components. Not that. No, not that we've come across. Okay, okay, 185 00:10:33,000 --> 00:10:36,319 Speaker 1: So so far we know that this attack was orchestrated 186 00:10:36,360 --> 00:10:40,920 Speaker 1: by someone really really good, someone really really experienced, and 187 00:10:41,240 --> 00:10:44,440 Speaker 1: that immediately limited the pool of people who could be 188 00:10:44,520 --> 00:10:47,360 Speaker 1: responsible for this. It really limited the pool of people 189 00:10:47,960 --> 00:10:51,520 Speaker 1: to someone with the kind of resources, with backing from 190 00:10:51,520 --> 00:10:54,200 Speaker 1: an entire government. And on top of that, there were 191 00:10:54,200 --> 00:10:56,079 Speaker 1: a bunch of things that pointed to the code being 192 00:10:56,120 --> 00:10:59,280 Speaker 1: written in Russia. Yeah, some of these details are really interesting. 193 00:11:00,080 --> 00:11:03,320 Speaker 1: So one of the most fascinating for me is, you know, 194 00:11:03,360 --> 00:11:05,960 Speaker 1: from the way the code was written, it was clear 195 00:11:06,120 --> 00:11:09,040 Speaker 1: that it was written on a Russian language keyboard, and 196 00:11:09,080 --> 00:11:12,160 Speaker 1: the dates and times that the code was compiled was 197 00:11:12,240 --> 00:11:15,360 Speaker 1: during normal business hours in Russia, and that's consistent with 198 00:11:15,400 --> 00:11:17,800 Speaker 1: the code that's already been traced back to the Russian 199 00:11:17,800 --> 00:11:21,000 Speaker 1: government backed hackers in the past, and that's not something 200 00:11:21,040 --> 00:11:24,360 Speaker 1: that you can easily fake, right, like change the time 201 00:11:24,400 --> 00:11:27,120 Speaker 1: stamps or something. Yeah, that was my question too, But 202 00:11:27,160 --> 00:11:29,240 Speaker 1: Mike said, there's so many different things that you'd have 203 00:11:29,320 --> 00:11:34,000 Speaker 1: to consistently change to successfully pull off that spoof. You're 204 00:11:34,000 --> 00:11:36,079 Speaker 1: dealing with a situation that if it was a one 205 00:11:36,120 --> 00:11:38,800 Speaker 1: off easier to change. You know, same same thing with 206 00:11:39,080 --> 00:11:40,520 Speaker 1: you know, you can change the date and time on 207 00:11:40,559 --> 00:11:42,720 Speaker 1: your computer. Absolutely, you can do that, and it would 208 00:11:42,800 --> 00:11:46,079 Speaker 1: potentially throw an investigator off consistently across five pieces of 209 00:11:46,200 --> 00:11:49,600 Speaker 1: mour Okay, you know, probably a little more difficult across 210 00:11:49,920 --> 00:11:52,520 Speaker 1: x number of pieces of hour across how many incidents 211 00:11:52,600 --> 00:11:54,800 Speaker 1: and to all have them point to the same place. 212 00:11:57,040 --> 00:11:59,240 Speaker 1: And that's why Mike doesn't buy Trump's theory of this 213 00:11:59,280 --> 00:12:03,720 Speaker 1: four man sitting on the bed orchestrating this incredibly sophisticated attack. 214 00:12:04,160 --> 00:12:06,719 Speaker 1: And while he doesn't buy goose offer Toodato's claim that 215 00:12:06,760 --> 00:12:09,560 Speaker 1: he was a lone hacker. Okay, is it a script, kiddiers, 216 00:12:09,600 --> 00:12:11,640 Speaker 1: it's somebody who bought a piece of malware, or is 217 00:12:11,679 --> 00:12:14,440 Speaker 1: it you know, somebody drinking mountain doing it in twinkies 218 00:12:14,480 --> 00:12:18,959 Speaker 1: and mom's basement. No, it really needs a level of 219 00:12:19,160 --> 00:12:24,000 Speaker 1: operational discipline that you don't see really in the wild. 220 00:12:24,400 --> 00:12:27,120 Speaker 1: And you're right, the number of people who could pull 221 00:12:27,160 --> 00:12:31,880 Speaker 1: it off, it becomes dramatically narrower. So Icky, are you convinced? 222 00:12:32,679 --> 00:12:35,959 Speaker 1: I mean I think so. I don't know. I keep 223 00:12:36,000 --> 00:12:39,120 Speaker 1: on expecting a twist, like you're you're tricking me, Like 224 00:12:39,200 --> 00:12:41,679 Speaker 1: in Law and Order when the guy who seems really 225 00:12:41,720 --> 00:12:44,640 Speaker 1: suspicious turns out to be innocent in the end. I 226 00:12:44,720 --> 00:12:48,040 Speaker 1: like that. Well, here's maybe the most important part. Then 227 00:12:48,200 --> 00:12:50,040 Speaker 1: you need to look at the target, the victim of 228 00:12:50,040 --> 00:12:52,240 Speaker 1: this hack, which was the d n C, and it 229 00:12:52,320 --> 00:12:54,440 Speaker 1: later turned out a broad cross section of the U. 230 00:12:54,520 --> 00:12:58,440 Speaker 1: S political system, everyone from lobbyists to lawyers to Hillary 231 00:12:58,440 --> 00:13:01,839 Speaker 1: Clinton's campaign. Going back to Mike's background of working in 232 00:13:01,920 --> 00:13:04,840 Speaker 1: law enforcement, you have to ask who would have had 233 00:13:04,840 --> 00:13:07,680 Speaker 1: the motive to pour this kind of effort into spying 234 00:13:07,679 --> 00:13:15,280 Speaker 1: on key members of American politics. Sure, an opportunistic hacker, 235 00:13:15,559 --> 00:13:17,800 Speaker 1: you know, putting a feather in their caps, saying hey, 236 00:13:17,800 --> 00:13:21,480 Speaker 1: we you know we broke into the d n C. Okay, yeah, 237 00:13:21,559 --> 00:13:24,720 Speaker 1: I mean that that could potentially happen um, But then 238 00:13:24,960 --> 00:13:30,000 Speaker 1: releasing the emails the evening before the convention started. Well 239 00:13:30,480 --> 00:13:32,960 Speaker 1: then again, now you now you're looking at it, okay, Well, 240 00:13:33,240 --> 00:13:38,640 Speaker 1: you know that really smacks like an information operation. And 241 00:13:38,760 --> 00:13:41,240 Speaker 1: here I think we should remind our listeners of the 242 00:13:41,440 --> 00:13:44,600 Speaker 1: chronology of the events that took place just a few 243 00:13:44,679 --> 00:13:47,000 Speaker 1: weeks after the d n C announced the hack in 244 00:13:47,040 --> 00:13:50,040 Speaker 1: mid June. I mean, this was a time when the 245 00:13:50,080 --> 00:13:54,319 Speaker 1: Republican Party was still in complete disarray, but things were 246 00:13:54,320 --> 00:13:56,280 Speaker 1: looking pretty good for the Democrats. This was a time 247 00:13:56,320 --> 00:13:59,480 Speaker 1: when Hillary Clinton UM was trying to solidify her support 248 00:14:00,440 --> 00:14:02,760 Speaker 1: and you have this forest fire raging on the internet 249 00:14:02,800 --> 00:14:05,319 Speaker 1: about this issue. You have Wiki leaks and Goosea for 250 00:14:05,400 --> 00:14:08,680 Speaker 1: Todato publishing a stream of emails that turned out to 251 00:14:08,679 --> 00:14:10,800 Speaker 1: be really embarrassing for the d n C. At you 252 00:14:10,800 --> 00:14:14,040 Speaker 1: know what couldn't have been a worse time for them, Yeah, 253 00:14:14,120 --> 00:14:17,080 Speaker 1: like that one from when Bernie Sanders was still in 254 00:14:17,120 --> 00:14:21,040 Speaker 1: the primary race with Hillary Clinton and a senior staff 255 00:14:21,080 --> 00:14:23,440 Speaker 1: were at the DNC talked about how they should try 256 00:14:23,440 --> 00:14:26,800 Speaker 1: to paint Sanders as an atheist, try to question his 257 00:14:26,880 --> 00:14:29,520 Speaker 1: Jewish faith and the party itself is supposed to be neutral, 258 00:14:29,880 --> 00:14:32,840 Speaker 1: and that led to a lot of turmoil within the party. 259 00:14:32,880 --> 00:14:35,480 Speaker 1: I mean, the Democratic Convention that took place at the 260 00:14:35,560 --> 00:14:38,240 Speaker 1: end of July. That was kind of a mess, at 261 00:14:38,320 --> 00:14:41,760 Speaker 1: least at the beginning. All these Bernie supporters were protesting 262 00:14:42,000 --> 00:14:45,120 Speaker 1: and booing down speakers on stage, and ultimately d n 263 00:14:45,160 --> 00:14:48,280 Speaker 1: C Chairwoman Debbie Wasserman Schultz, who was a rising young 264 00:14:48,360 --> 00:14:52,160 Speaker 1: star in the party, she resigned. And bringing this back 265 00:14:52,240 --> 00:14:54,920 Speaker 1: to our story today, like you said, Jordan's, this really 266 00:14:55,000 --> 00:14:58,440 Speaker 1: does point to motive. I mean, who would really want 267 00:14:58,480 --> 00:15:01,359 Speaker 1: to introduce this kind of termal well to the democratic 268 00:15:01,440 --> 00:15:04,200 Speaker 1: process itself in America, which is, you know, really the 269 00:15:04,240 --> 00:15:07,320 Speaker 1: sacristanc thing. Who would want to do this thing that 270 00:15:07,360 --> 00:15:10,600 Speaker 1: would make you question the fairness of the system that 271 00:15:10,600 --> 00:15:13,520 Speaker 1: we've developed over the years. Yeah, this project has been 272 00:15:13,520 --> 00:15:15,880 Speaker 1: interesting to me because I consider myself, you know, a 273 00:15:15,880 --> 00:15:18,120 Speaker 1: pretty serious skeptic on a lot of these claims. It's 274 00:15:18,160 --> 00:15:20,360 Speaker 1: it's just way too easy for a hacked entity to 275 00:15:20,400 --> 00:15:22,720 Speaker 1: throw out, oh the Russians did this and the Chinese 276 00:15:22,720 --> 00:15:26,000 Speaker 1: did that or whatever. Yeah, kind of like this get 277 00:15:26,000 --> 00:15:29,040 Speaker 1: at a jail free card when your company has been hacked? Right, 278 00:15:29,400 --> 00:15:34,080 Speaker 1: these really sophisticated organized hackers backed by a whole government. 279 00:15:34,160 --> 00:15:36,920 Speaker 1: If if someone like that tries to target you, what 280 00:15:37,040 --> 00:15:40,120 Speaker 1: could you have possibly done. It's like when we reported 281 00:15:40,120 --> 00:15:43,000 Speaker 1: about Yahoo's breach, which was this massive, you know, more 282 00:15:43,040 --> 00:15:46,960 Speaker 1: than five million customer accounts getting hacked. We reported that 283 00:15:47,000 --> 00:15:50,240 Speaker 1: the company's claim of the attack being state sponsored, you know, 284 00:15:50,400 --> 00:15:53,560 Speaker 1: isn't so iron clad. But this one with the d 285 00:15:53,680 --> 00:15:56,520 Speaker 1: n C. After talking to Mike, after talking to all 286 00:15:56,520 --> 00:16:01,680 Speaker 1: these other experts, Jordan, are you convinced. Yeah, I'm pretty convinced. 287 00:16:01,680 --> 00:16:03,720 Speaker 1: I mean, it takes a lot to clear that hurdle 288 00:16:03,840 --> 00:16:06,720 Speaker 1: of you've got this piece of malware and this is 289 00:16:06,760 --> 00:16:09,600 Speaker 1: evidence that the Russians did it. Uh, you know, but 290 00:16:10,040 --> 00:16:12,400 Speaker 1: Mike will be the first to tell you this. Well, 291 00:16:12,440 --> 00:16:14,840 Speaker 1: it's it's always risky. I mean, you know, when you're 292 00:16:15,000 --> 00:16:18,360 Speaker 1: when you're you're doing attribution, you're really never saying a 293 00:16:18,400 --> 00:16:23,160 Speaker 1: hundred percent that it's this person, because, you know, barring 294 00:16:23,560 --> 00:16:26,760 Speaker 1: seeing somebody at the keyboard and actually doing it or 295 00:16:26,800 --> 00:16:32,360 Speaker 1: a confession, you're you're relying on that circumstantial evidence. This 296 00:16:32,440 --> 00:16:34,720 Speaker 1: all comes down to Mike's days as a cop. Can 297 00:16:34,760 --> 00:16:37,760 Speaker 1: you prove to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt that 298 00:16:37,800 --> 00:16:41,320 Speaker 1: the Russians did this? And his answer was yes. And 299 00:16:41,360 --> 00:16:44,920 Speaker 1: now the US government has come out and officially blame 300 00:16:45,000 --> 00:16:50,280 Speaker 1: the Russian government, and there are lots of reasons potentially 301 00:16:50,320 --> 00:16:52,960 Speaker 1: for that happening. There are ways that the government can 302 00:16:53,000 --> 00:16:56,640 Speaker 1: really know what's going on, intercepted phone calls, intercepted emails, 303 00:16:57,080 --> 00:17:00,720 Speaker 1: human and signals intelligence sources in a way that no 304 00:17:00,880 --> 00:17:04,920 Speaker 1: private cybersecurity could ever match. Sounds a little sinister. Well, 305 00:17:04,960 --> 00:17:07,159 Speaker 1: we don't know for sure, but here's what Rob Owens, 306 00:17:07,160 --> 00:17:09,919 Speaker 1: who's an industry analyst at Pacific Press Securities, told me. 307 00:17:10,320 --> 00:17:13,959 Speaker 1: Nation States do hack. I think the US government hacks 308 00:17:13,960 --> 00:17:19,040 Speaker 1: as well. It's a well known fact within the industry that, uh, 309 00:17:19,800 --> 00:17:24,600 Speaker 1: everybody's hacking everybody to some degree. So maybe the US 310 00:17:24,680 --> 00:17:28,240 Speaker 1: government was spying on Russia while Russia was spying on 311 00:17:28,280 --> 00:17:31,439 Speaker 1: the d n C. Well, we know that both countries 312 00:17:31,480 --> 00:17:33,320 Speaker 1: spied each other all the time, but in this case, 313 00:17:33,359 --> 00:17:35,600 Speaker 1: we don't know exactly what the evidence is. But it's 314 00:17:35,600 --> 00:17:37,800 Speaker 1: fair to assume that that's the case. And that's why 315 00:17:37,800 --> 00:17:39,679 Speaker 1: at the top of the show today you called it 316 00:17:39,760 --> 00:17:46,080 Speaker 1: an information war like the Cold War of our generation exactly. So, 317 00:17:46,119 --> 00:17:48,440 Speaker 1: if we've managed to keep our listeners till now through 318 00:17:48,480 --> 00:17:51,880 Speaker 1: this complicated journey inside the d n C hack, first 319 00:17:51,880 --> 00:17:55,840 Speaker 1: of all, thanks for sticking with us and second of all, 320 00:17:55,880 --> 00:17:59,720 Speaker 1: I think the burning question everyone has now is what's 321 00:17:59,760 --> 00:18:11,480 Speaker 1: not next? Okay, so Jordan's you and I are now 322 00:18:11,520 --> 00:18:14,919 Speaker 1: in the present day. It's September two thousand seventeen, and 323 00:18:15,000 --> 00:18:17,600 Speaker 1: this story has evolved in ways we never could have 324 00:18:17,640 --> 00:18:21,520 Speaker 1: imagined over the last eleven months. Well since then, Donald 325 00:18:21,560 --> 00:18:25,520 Speaker 1: Trump got elected. Yes, I do recall that happening, and 326 00:18:25,600 --> 00:18:27,600 Speaker 1: Facebook took a lot of heat for not doing enough 327 00:18:27,640 --> 00:18:29,800 Speaker 1: to stop the spread of fake news on its platform, 328 00:18:30,119 --> 00:18:32,719 Speaker 1: the subject of another great episode of Decrypted. We ran 329 00:18:32,760 --> 00:18:35,800 Speaker 1: in November last year, and there were quite a few 330 00:18:35,800 --> 00:18:40,440 Speaker 1: reports connecting these fake news stories to Russian state funded organizations. Right, 331 00:18:40,800 --> 00:18:43,320 Speaker 1: and then the CIA, FBI, and n s A came 332 00:18:43,320 --> 00:18:45,960 Speaker 1: out and reported that Russia's meddling was meant to help 333 00:18:46,040 --> 00:18:49,600 Speaker 1: Donald Trump and undermine Hillary Clinton, And of course Special 334 00:18:49,640 --> 00:18:52,880 Speaker 1: Counsel Robert Mueller is now leading an investigation into Russia's 335 00:18:52,960 --> 00:18:57,080 Speaker 1: tampering and possible ties to Donald Trump's campaign. It also 336 00:18:57,160 --> 00:19:00,560 Speaker 1: turns out that Russia's attack went beyond an information in campaign. 337 00:19:00,640 --> 00:19:03,520 Speaker 1: To my colleague Mike Riley and I report in June 338 00:19:03,840 --> 00:19:06,919 Speaker 1: that Russia's hackers actually breached the voting systems in thirty 339 00:19:07,000 --> 00:19:10,960 Speaker 1: nine states, for example, in Illinois, intruders tried to delete 340 00:19:11,080 --> 00:19:13,879 Speaker 1: or alter voter data. And the most recent twist to 341 00:19:13,920 --> 00:19:16,880 Speaker 1: hauld this is this Facebook announced that it found one 342 00:19:16,960 --> 00:19:20,520 Speaker 1: hundred thousand dollars in ad spending connected to fake accounts 343 00:19:20,520 --> 00:19:23,200 Speaker 1: that were probably run from Russia that aimed to stir 344 00:19:23,359 --> 00:19:27,200 Speaker 1: political controversy in the election. Which is to say, this 345 00:19:27,359 --> 00:19:30,320 Speaker 1: Jordan is a story that never ends. Just when you 346 00:19:30,359 --> 00:19:32,960 Speaker 1: think you've got your arms around the entire story, there's 347 00:19:33,080 --> 00:19:35,560 Speaker 1: yet another development. So what do you make of the 348 00:19:35,600 --> 00:19:38,800 Speaker 1: most recent announcement from Facebook on that one grand in 349 00:19:39,080 --> 00:19:41,879 Speaker 1: an ad spending? It just goes to show that, you know, 350 00:19:41,960 --> 00:19:46,960 Speaker 1: this Russian information operation went further than really anybody understood, 351 00:19:47,119 --> 00:19:50,840 Speaker 1: and in ways that subverted, you know, the very coin 352 00:19:50,880 --> 00:19:54,760 Speaker 1: of the realm of silicon value, which is targeted digital ads. 353 00:19:54,840 --> 00:19:57,639 Speaker 1: And you know, how do you disentangle yourself from that 354 00:19:57,680 --> 00:20:00,760 Speaker 1: system if your Facebook or Google or you know, anybody 355 00:20:00,760 --> 00:20:02,920 Speaker 1: else that relies on them. But hang on, because a 356 00:20:03,000 --> 00:20:05,399 Speaker 1: lot of people when this news came out said a 357 00:20:05,480 --> 00:20:08,520 Speaker 1: hundred thousands of small potatoes. I mean, do you think 358 00:20:08,520 --> 00:20:10,359 Speaker 1: it's a small amount or do you think that there's 359 00:20:10,400 --> 00:20:12,480 Speaker 1: more that we just don't know of yet? There definitely 360 00:20:12,520 --> 00:20:14,440 Speaker 1: could be more that we don't know about yet, because 361 00:20:14,480 --> 00:20:17,000 Speaker 1: the way that these things are tracked are you know, 362 00:20:17,040 --> 00:20:19,199 Speaker 1: you go from known accounts that have been identified to 363 00:20:19,200 --> 00:20:21,480 Speaker 1: you either by the company or the U. S. Government, 364 00:20:21,720 --> 00:20:23,640 Speaker 1: and you work backwards from there. But these networks are 365 00:20:23,680 --> 00:20:26,639 Speaker 1: so vast, these ad networks, you know that knowing really 366 00:20:26,680 --> 00:20:29,720 Speaker 1: who is pumping money into these systems is uh is, 367 00:20:29,760 --> 00:20:32,399 Speaker 1: you know, a pretty challenging test. But the hundred thousand 368 00:20:32,520 --> 00:20:35,399 Speaker 1: signified something different to me. It's that one of my 369 00:20:35,520 --> 00:20:39,760 Speaker 1: key takeaways from this information operation was that the Russians 370 00:20:39,760 --> 00:20:42,040 Speaker 1: are learning, the hackers are learning. It's not that they've 371 00:20:42,480 --> 00:20:45,920 Speaker 1: entered like a state of perfect execution. All of these 372 00:20:45,960 --> 00:20:49,600 Speaker 1: things were tests, were trial runs, and that's the really 373 00:20:49,640 --> 00:20:52,719 Speaker 1: concerning things. So in that context, a hundred thousand dollars 374 00:20:52,720 --> 00:20:54,960 Speaker 1: may have gotten them what they needed, which was, you know, 375 00:20:55,000 --> 00:20:56,679 Speaker 1: just a set of principles to operate on for the 376 00:20:56,720 --> 00:21:00,280 Speaker 1: next time. What I found partly remarkable was that the 377 00:21:00,600 --> 00:21:04,120 Speaker 1: culprit and all this was a shadowy organization based out 378 00:21:04,119 --> 00:21:07,720 Speaker 1: of St. Petersburg called the Internet Research Agency, which is 379 00:21:07,800 --> 00:21:11,320 Speaker 1: known for pushing Kremlin propaganda. And this was not this 380 00:21:11,359 --> 00:21:14,080 Speaker 1: is actually not all that secretive and organization like these 381 00:21:14,080 --> 00:21:17,440 Speaker 1: are known guys. There have been profiles in major media 382 00:21:17,800 --> 00:21:21,040 Speaker 1: organizations about about this agency. Had you heard of them 383 00:21:21,080 --> 00:21:23,679 Speaker 1: and what do you make of their involvement? Yeah? I have? 384 00:21:23,920 --> 00:21:25,760 Speaker 1: Then you know, I mean there are there are armies 385 00:21:25,760 --> 00:21:30,000 Speaker 1: of these kind of professional trolls, kind of quasi spammers 386 00:21:30,000 --> 00:21:33,399 Speaker 1: that are not necessarily breaking the law, but are certainly 387 00:21:33,440 --> 00:21:35,840 Speaker 1: acting in many ways as hackers, even if they're not 388 00:21:35,880 --> 00:21:38,280 Speaker 1: breaking into accounts. And you know, one thing that we 389 00:21:38,320 --> 00:21:42,480 Speaker 1: can't forget is that in this current information ecosystem, it's 390 00:21:42,480 --> 00:21:46,520 Speaker 1: all about headlines. And even if they're promoting fake headlines 391 00:21:46,560 --> 00:21:48,520 Speaker 1: and half of your news feed or fake headlines that 392 00:21:48,800 --> 00:21:51,200 Speaker 1: if you clicked on any any individual one of them 393 00:21:51,400 --> 00:21:54,560 Speaker 1: you would recognize as bogus, it's the aggregate is the effect. 394 00:21:54,640 --> 00:21:56,879 Speaker 1: So if you see enough of these things, you know, 395 00:21:57,040 --> 00:22:01,800 Speaker 1: fake news, slanted news, propaganda, it actually psychologically can have 396 00:22:01,840 --> 00:22:03,800 Speaker 1: an effect over time if you see enough of it. 397 00:22:04,320 --> 00:22:06,520 Speaker 1: And that's that's the disturbing part. Is you're not breaking 398 00:22:06,520 --> 00:22:09,280 Speaker 1: a law, but they're influencing the way you think about things, 399 00:22:09,359 --> 00:22:11,920 Speaker 1: and happens on a subliminal level. Right, Well, so we're 400 00:22:11,960 --> 00:22:15,119 Speaker 1: talking about changing people's minds but what about actually changing 401 00:22:15,119 --> 00:22:18,160 Speaker 1: people's vote. So you mentioned tampering with the actual voting 402 00:22:18,200 --> 00:22:21,840 Speaker 1: systems before. Is there any progress in the investigation into 403 00:22:21,960 --> 00:22:24,480 Speaker 1: into this aspect of it and whether Russia might be 404 00:22:24,520 --> 00:22:26,560 Speaker 1: trying to do that as well? You know, one of 405 00:22:26,600 --> 00:22:29,080 Speaker 1: the most depressing parts about all this is the short 406 00:22:29,080 --> 00:22:32,199 Speaker 1: answer is yes there. You know, the congressional committees are investigating. 407 00:22:32,520 --> 00:22:35,560 Speaker 1: There's obviously a law enforcement investigation. The FBI is you know, 408 00:22:35,600 --> 00:22:40,240 Speaker 1: investigating the hacks, and you know, potential collusion with you know, 409 00:22:40,280 --> 00:22:43,080 Speaker 1: the Trump campaign, and then of course there's a special prosecutor. 410 00:22:43,320 --> 00:22:45,120 Speaker 1: But one of the most depressing aspects is you talk 411 00:22:45,200 --> 00:22:48,280 Speaker 1: to folks in and around the administration and you get 412 00:22:48,320 --> 00:22:51,359 Speaker 1: the sense that this is this is something that is 413 00:22:51,400 --> 00:22:54,240 Speaker 1: simply not addressed. You know that that our current president 414 00:22:54,680 --> 00:22:58,280 Speaker 1: refuses to acknowledge this issue to a degree that at 415 00:22:58,280 --> 00:23:01,439 Speaker 1: the administration level this is really not being discussed. It 416 00:23:01,520 --> 00:23:05,040 Speaker 1: poses such a problem because hacking, hacking really isn't a 417 00:23:05,040 --> 00:23:08,679 Speaker 1: partisan issue. Hacking effects everybody. It just happened to be 418 00:23:08,720 --> 00:23:11,960 Speaker 1: targeted against Democrats, and it's not bringing it up here. 419 00:23:12,160 --> 00:23:14,359 Speaker 1: It probably means it's not a factor in the diplomatic 420 00:23:14,400 --> 00:23:18,600 Speaker 1: relationship with Russia and and their behavior won't change, absolutely not. 421 00:23:18,800 --> 00:23:20,879 Speaker 1: And when it comes to to rigging votes, you know, 422 00:23:20,920 --> 00:23:23,520 Speaker 1: everybody we talked to you says the same thing. They're like, actually, 423 00:23:23,560 --> 00:23:26,560 Speaker 1: flipping votes is really hard. It requires a lot of work, 424 00:23:26,600 --> 00:23:29,480 Speaker 1: a lot of hacking, a lot of precision in the endeavor. 425 00:23:29,760 --> 00:23:33,160 Speaker 1: Changing people's voter registration is not hard and can cause 426 00:23:33,200 --> 00:23:35,720 Speaker 1: extreme chaos. And you have the lesson again I keep 427 00:23:35,760 --> 00:23:38,080 Speaker 1: coming back to, is all the data points that I've 428 00:23:38,119 --> 00:23:41,440 Speaker 1: seen point to being literally a trial run. Is the 429 00:23:41,480 --> 00:23:45,359 Speaker 1: most effective successful trial run and hacking history. But it 430 00:23:45,440 --> 00:23:48,560 Speaker 1: was also a trial run. Like those thirty nine states 431 00:23:48,600 --> 00:23:51,280 Speaker 1: that we talked about, those were not all super breaches. 432 00:23:51,320 --> 00:23:54,840 Speaker 1: Those were like probes and tests and can we change addresses? 433 00:23:54,880 --> 00:23:57,440 Speaker 1: Can we change people's voter retch just there were tests. 434 00:23:57,760 --> 00:24:00,920 Speaker 1: And that's the thing I think has really gone really 435 00:24:01,000 --> 00:24:04,120 Speaker 1: under disgust is that we've got these investigations. Everybody knows 436 00:24:04,119 --> 00:24:06,360 Speaker 1: there was a big hack, uh, you know, but in 437 00:24:06,440 --> 00:24:09,840 Speaker 1: terms of understanding the level to which this was not 438 00:24:09,960 --> 00:24:13,119 Speaker 1: the best Russia has to offer, Russia is at our level, uh, 439 00:24:13,280 --> 00:24:15,679 Speaker 1: when it comes to state sponsored hacking, And this was 440 00:24:15,720 --> 00:24:17,960 Speaker 1: kind of a trial run. And that's the scary part. Okay, 441 00:24:17,960 --> 00:24:19,800 Speaker 1: so what do you expect to see and say, Germany 442 00:24:19,840 --> 00:24:21,800 Speaker 1: and the elections later this month or even in the 443 00:24:21,920 --> 00:24:24,560 Speaker 1: U S midterms in two thousan eighteen. Well, Germany is 444 00:24:24,560 --> 00:24:27,080 Speaker 1: a great subject because they're experiencing the same thing that 445 00:24:27,119 --> 00:24:30,000 Speaker 1: we do, and obviously their electoral system is different. But 446 00:24:30,080 --> 00:24:32,320 Speaker 1: Russia is getting better at this and there's no doubt, 447 00:24:32,359 --> 00:24:34,720 Speaker 1: I mean, there's no doubt that this was Russia. Everybody 448 00:24:34,720 --> 00:24:37,199 Speaker 1: agrees that that's who it was. And the thing that 449 00:24:37,240 --> 00:24:39,040 Speaker 1: I really fear and I'm not one to fear monger 450 00:24:39,040 --> 00:24:41,480 Speaker 1: when it comes to cybersecurity, even though it's an industry 451 00:24:41,560 --> 00:24:44,800 Speaker 1: replete with it, is when it comes to you know, 452 00:24:44,840 --> 00:24:46,639 Speaker 1: a lot of these breaches have not been cleaned up. 453 00:24:46,680 --> 00:24:48,880 Speaker 1: The thirty nine states that we wrote about. It would 454 00:24:48,880 --> 00:24:51,240 Speaker 1: be naive to assume that those states just cleaned up 455 00:24:51,240 --> 00:24:53,960 Speaker 1: their act and the infections are gone. I think the 456 00:24:54,040 --> 00:24:56,960 Speaker 1: attackers are going to take the footholds that they created 457 00:24:57,280 --> 00:25:01,320 Speaker 1: in and learn more and expand tinker more. And I 458 00:25:01,320 --> 00:25:03,720 Speaker 1: mean they didn't just get away with it. They were successful. 459 00:25:03,760 --> 00:25:06,639 Speaker 1: They're rewarded, you know, with the biggest prize maybe in 460 00:25:06,720 --> 00:25:09,520 Speaker 1: hacking history, you know, the presidency of the United States. 461 00:25:09,720 --> 00:25:12,000 Speaker 1: You know it was at stake. Uh So I suspect 462 00:25:12,000 --> 00:25:13,520 Speaker 1: we're gonna not just see more of it, We're going 463 00:25:13,560 --> 00:25:17,440 Speaker 1: to see more sophisticated tampering if if you know, the 464 00:25:17,520 --> 00:25:20,639 Speaker 1: Russian state services feel it's needed, if that's you know, 465 00:25:20,760 --> 00:25:22,080 Speaker 1: and it could be turned. This is a weapon that 466 00:25:22,119 --> 00:25:25,240 Speaker 1: could be turned in any direction on any political party. 467 00:25:25,520 --> 00:25:26,960 Speaker 1: And that's the thing I think a lot of folks 468 00:25:27,040 --> 00:25:29,960 Speaker 1: missed right now. Well, Jordan, you certainly haven't made me 469 00:25:30,000 --> 00:25:32,240 Speaker 1: feel better about all this, So let's try to end 470 00:25:32,280 --> 00:25:35,560 Speaker 1: on a high note here. What what can ordinary voters 471 00:25:35,640 --> 00:25:39,040 Speaker 1: do to prevent hackers from either altering their votes, their 472 00:25:39,040 --> 00:25:43,480 Speaker 1: registration records, or just to inoculate themselves from these disinformation 473 00:25:43,600 --> 00:25:46,800 Speaker 1: campaigns that are now so prevalent on social media. Sure, 474 00:25:46,960 --> 00:25:49,040 Speaker 1: you know this is actually it's a really good question, 475 00:25:49,080 --> 00:25:51,439 Speaker 1: because there's a really simple answer to a lot of 476 00:25:51,440 --> 00:25:54,000 Speaker 1: this stuff. You know. The thing that concerns national security 477 00:25:54,040 --> 00:25:56,959 Speaker 1: officials the most and concerned them the most in twenty sixteen, 478 00:25:57,320 --> 00:25:59,600 Speaker 1: again was not that votes would be flipped. That's really hard. 479 00:26:00,000 --> 00:26:02,600 Speaker 1: It is that voter registration records would be changed in 480 00:26:02,760 --> 00:26:05,040 Speaker 1: mass so people didn't know where they were going on 481 00:26:05,080 --> 00:26:06,879 Speaker 1: election day or they were going to the wrong place, 482 00:26:07,200 --> 00:26:09,080 Speaker 1: or they did their names didn't appear on the roles 483 00:26:09,119 --> 00:26:11,720 Speaker 1: when they showed up. Uh, you know, it's really simple. 484 00:26:11,760 --> 00:26:14,640 Speaker 1: The same the same reason that these voter registration systems 485 00:26:14,640 --> 00:26:17,879 Speaker 1: can be hacked is because they're online, and that means 486 00:26:17,920 --> 00:26:20,639 Speaker 1: it's really easy for us to check, like literally a 487 00:26:20,640 --> 00:26:22,920 Speaker 1: week or two before the election or on election day, 488 00:26:23,520 --> 00:26:26,160 Speaker 1: you know, but if there's some lead time going into 489 00:26:26,200 --> 00:26:28,199 Speaker 1: the election, let's call it a week or two, you 490 00:26:28,280 --> 00:26:31,440 Speaker 1: go online, you check your voter registration information. As long 491 00:26:31,480 --> 00:26:33,760 Speaker 1: as it's your same name, your same address, and a 492 00:26:33,800 --> 00:26:36,520 Speaker 1: reasonable enough polling place, whether it's one you've you've voted 493 00:26:36,520 --> 00:26:39,280 Speaker 1: at before or something in your neighborhood, as long as 494 00:26:39,320 --> 00:26:42,119 Speaker 1: that looks fine. Like that's literally the best defense against 495 00:26:42,119 --> 00:26:44,480 Speaker 1: this stuff, because if people go to the right places, 496 00:26:44,800 --> 00:26:46,879 Speaker 1: it's really hard to manipulate the votes. As long as 497 00:26:46,880 --> 00:26:50,400 Speaker 1: you're on the rolls, it's hard to tamper with these elections. 498 00:26:50,440 --> 00:26:52,800 Speaker 1: But that that's a level of kind of you know, 499 00:26:52,920 --> 00:26:55,119 Speaker 1: diligence that you know, not not a lot of folks 500 00:26:55,400 --> 00:26:57,399 Speaker 1: you know might might be willing to employ. But that's 501 00:26:57,240 --> 00:27:02,800 Speaker 1: the single best inoculation against that, and it's super easy 502 00:27:05,560 --> 00:27:08,200 Speaker 1: and that's it for this week's episode of Decrypted. Thanks 503 00:27:08,280 --> 00:27:10,640 Speaker 1: for listening. We always want to know what you think 504 00:27:10,640 --> 00:27:13,920 Speaker 1: of the show. Get in touch at Decrypted at Bloomberg 505 00:27:13,960 --> 00:27:17,120 Speaker 1: dot net or I'm on Twitter at Jordan's are one 506 00:27:17,160 --> 00:27:20,160 Speaker 1: thousand and I'm at brad Stone. If you haven't already, 507 00:27:20,280 --> 00:27:23,040 Speaker 1: subscribe to our show wherever you get your podcast, and 508 00:27:23,040 --> 00:27:25,639 Speaker 1: while you're there, please leave us a rating in the review. 509 00:27:26,040 --> 00:27:27,720 Speaker 1: This goes a long way to get this show in 510 00:27:27,720 --> 00:27:30,960 Speaker 1: front of more listeners. The original episode we aired in 511 00:27:31,960 --> 00:27:35,879 Speaker 1: was produced by Pia Gtkari, Liz Smith, and Magnus Hendrickson. 512 00:27:36,240 --> 00:27:40,639 Speaker 1: Today's edition was produced also by Akuto and Sarah Patterson. 513 00:27:40,840 --> 00:27:41,760 Speaker 1: We'll see you next week.