1 00:00:00,280 --> 00:00:07,200 Speaker 1: Bloomberg Audio Studios, podcasts, radio news. 2 00:00:08,440 --> 00:00:11,639 Speaker 2: Ever since Lloyd Blankfine retired as the CEO of Goldman 3 00:00:11,720 --> 00:00:15,560 Speaker 2: Sachs back in twenty eighteen, life has been pretty different. 4 00:00:15,880 --> 00:00:17,639 Speaker 1: Every day I get up and I kind of do 5 00:00:17,720 --> 00:00:20,200 Speaker 1: what I want to do that day. I swim every day, 6 00:00:20,640 --> 00:00:24,520 Speaker 1: I watch podcasts. I don't get calls that require me 7 00:00:24,600 --> 00:00:26,639 Speaker 1: to jump on a plane and fly to riod on 8 00:00:26,760 --> 00:00:29,560 Speaker 1: four hours notice so that I could so they could 9 00:00:29,640 --> 00:00:32,040 Speaker 1: raise by a few percentage points the odds of getting 10 00:00:32,040 --> 00:00:33,680 Speaker 1: a transaction that we're competing for. 11 00:00:34,040 --> 00:00:36,479 Speaker 2: Still, it's hard for blank Fine to turn off the 12 00:00:36,520 --> 00:00:38,440 Speaker 2: part of his brain that was running one of the 13 00:00:38,440 --> 00:00:41,120 Speaker 2: country's biggest banks for over a decade. 14 00:00:41,240 --> 00:00:43,680 Speaker 1: I still have the occupational hazard. I still have the 15 00:00:43,720 --> 00:00:48,560 Speaker 1: background noise of following markets. I still know the price 16 00:00:48,560 --> 00:00:51,800 Speaker 1: of everything all the time. I overtrade the markets all day. 17 00:00:52,240 --> 00:00:54,840 Speaker 1: For myself. I'm a busy body, and I'm nosy, and 18 00:00:54,880 --> 00:00:57,880 Speaker 1: I look at what's going on, and if I see 19 00:00:57,880 --> 00:01:00,240 Speaker 1: a transaction, if if I read about a transaction action 20 00:01:00,920 --> 00:01:04,760 Speaker 1: and I wonder, gee, is you know who's doing this transaction? 21 00:01:04,840 --> 00:01:06,560 Speaker 1: So I pick up, you know, one of my grandkids 22 00:01:06,680 --> 00:01:10,200 Speaker 1: toy telephones, and I bark into it and say are 23 00:01:10,200 --> 00:01:12,440 Speaker 1: we in this? Why not? And there's nothing nobody at 24 00:01:12,480 --> 00:01:12,959 Speaker 1: the other end. 25 00:01:13,040 --> 00:01:16,320 Speaker 2: So blank Fine just wrote a book reflecting on how 26 00:01:16,319 --> 00:01:18,600 Speaker 2: he got where he is today, and he's also been 27 00:01:18,640 --> 00:01:21,840 Speaker 2: thinking about what he sees as warning signs in the markets. 28 00:01:21,920 --> 00:01:22,319 Speaker 2: Right now. 29 00:01:22,640 --> 00:01:27,320 Speaker 1: You have market problems and crashes and problems simply because 30 00:01:28,240 --> 00:01:31,080 Speaker 1: a lack of discipline builds up over time. It's human nature. 31 00:01:31,120 --> 00:01:34,040 Speaker 1: There's an inevitability about it. We're kind of I don't 32 00:01:34,040 --> 00:01:35,840 Speaker 1: know if we're in the absolute end of the cycle, 33 00:01:35,920 --> 00:01:38,000 Speaker 1: but we're getting close to the end of you know, 34 00:01:38,120 --> 00:01:41,840 Speaker 1: late stages of cycles on this, and we do for 35 00:01:42,040 --> 00:01:43,080 Speaker 1: a kind of a reckoning. 36 00:01:48,360 --> 00:01:50,200 Speaker 2: I'm David Gera, and this is the Big Take from 37 00:01:50,240 --> 00:01:53,000 Speaker 2: Bloomberg News Today. On the show, I sit down with 38 00:01:53,080 --> 00:01:56,920 Speaker 2: Goldman Sachs's former CEO, Lloyd Blankfine. We talk about the 39 00:01:57,000 --> 00:01:59,640 Speaker 2: risks of private credit, what he learned running the bank 40 00:01:59,720 --> 00:02:02,320 Speaker 2: during the global financial crisis, and how do you thinks 41 00:02:02,360 --> 00:02:11,920 Speaker 2: companies and executives should and shouldn't engage with politics. You're 42 00:02:11,919 --> 00:02:13,760 Speaker 2: writ in the book about this transition that took place 43 00:02:13,760 --> 00:02:16,600 Speaker 2: in the nineties away from kind of narrative driven investing 44 00:02:16,720 --> 00:02:20,520 Speaker 2: or trading into more algorithmic trading. It does strike me. 45 00:02:20,520 --> 00:02:23,360 Speaker 2: We're in a moment where there is a prevailing narrative, 46 00:02:23,360 --> 00:02:26,520 Speaker 2: that's the AI narrative. How is it going to revolutionize 47 00:02:26,520 --> 00:02:29,040 Speaker 2: the world? Is it going to revolutionize the world? How 48 00:02:29,120 --> 00:02:32,000 Speaker 2: long would that take? Are you an AI user an 49 00:02:32,040 --> 00:02:33,119 Speaker 2: AI skeptic? 50 00:02:33,360 --> 00:02:35,600 Speaker 1: Look, I think it's a continue. We were always when 51 00:02:35,639 --> 00:02:38,919 Speaker 1: you have to say algorithmic trading, there were always there 52 00:02:38,919 --> 00:02:44,080 Speaker 1: were always people who used analysis, technical analysis. As technology advanced, 53 00:02:44,080 --> 00:02:48,040 Speaker 1: you'd have machines looking for the technical points and follow that. 54 00:02:48,520 --> 00:02:51,960 Speaker 1: And the point of algorithmic traders or technical trading is 55 00:02:52,000 --> 00:02:54,440 Speaker 1: to take the human emotion out of it, because, as 56 00:02:54,520 --> 00:02:56,920 Speaker 1: you know, there's a school that says, oh my god, 57 00:02:56,960 --> 00:02:58,880 Speaker 1: you'll sit there and say, gee, when X, Y and 58 00:02:59,000 --> 00:03:03,160 Speaker 1: Z happens, I'm going to do it. But when X, 59 00:03:03,280 --> 00:03:05,160 Speaker 1: Y and Z happens, people don't do it. You know, 60 00:03:05,240 --> 00:03:07,880 Speaker 1: let me make an analogy. In the real world, everyone says, 61 00:03:08,160 --> 00:03:10,360 Speaker 1: you know, I just can't wait to buy waterfront property 62 00:03:10,360 --> 00:03:12,079 Speaker 1: when it gets cheaper. I'm going to buy it right 63 00:03:12,120 --> 00:03:15,520 Speaker 1: after the next hurricane. And of course, the next hurricane happens, 64 00:03:15,720 --> 00:03:19,679 Speaker 1: property values along waterfront get lower, and guess what, when 65 00:03:19,680 --> 00:03:23,000 Speaker 1: everybody else is scared and wants to sell at a 66 00:03:23,000 --> 00:03:24,800 Speaker 1: lower price. You don't want to buy at the lower 67 00:03:24,800 --> 00:03:28,000 Speaker 1: price because you're scared too. So this is something that 68 00:03:28,000 --> 00:03:30,080 Speaker 1: would take the emotion out of it and just force 69 00:03:30,160 --> 00:03:32,920 Speaker 1: you into doing things based on signals and you know 70 00:03:33,040 --> 00:03:36,720 Speaker 1: it was working then it's working now, just better technology, 71 00:03:36,760 --> 00:03:38,960 Speaker 1: faster and more variables. 72 00:03:39,280 --> 00:03:41,200 Speaker 2: Is AI something that you're playing around. 73 00:03:40,920 --> 00:03:44,880 Speaker 1: With right now? Mostly it's a parlor trick because I'm 74 00:03:44,920 --> 00:03:46,920 Speaker 1: asking it for questions that I could get the answer to, 75 00:03:47,000 --> 00:03:49,520 Speaker 1: but not as quickly and not as delightfully. When it 76 00:03:49,560 --> 00:03:52,760 Speaker 1: gives me something that's coherent, I would say, when I 77 00:03:52,840 --> 00:03:56,760 Speaker 1: use Google, I get a bibliography. When I use Chat 78 00:03:56,880 --> 00:03:58,960 Speaker 1: or one or the other AI, I get an essay 79 00:03:59,200 --> 00:04:01,800 Speaker 1: that purports to be the answer. Sometimes I want a 80 00:04:01,800 --> 00:04:04,760 Speaker 1: bibliography because I want to do the background stuff myself 81 00:04:04,800 --> 00:04:08,160 Speaker 1: and look through it, and sometimes I just want an answer. 82 00:04:08,600 --> 00:04:11,080 Speaker 1: The better. The thing also about a bibliography is you 83 00:04:11,160 --> 00:04:13,960 Speaker 1: kind of kind of check sources. When you just get 84 00:04:13,960 --> 00:04:16,320 Speaker 1: an answer, you kind of wonder whether it's right or not. 85 00:04:16,839 --> 00:04:20,400 Speaker 1: I'm not running a company now, so I can't tell 86 00:04:20,440 --> 00:04:24,400 Speaker 1: you which parts of our operations and technology and other 87 00:04:24,480 --> 00:04:28,880 Speaker 1: things are being displaced by AI, such that we can 88 00:04:29,080 --> 00:04:31,760 Speaker 1: have a much smaller head count in that I do 89 00:04:31,920 --> 00:04:35,239 Speaker 1: know based upon other cycles, that in the short term 90 00:04:35,640 --> 00:04:38,640 Speaker 1: you won't lose head count. You'll have to add a 91 00:04:38,680 --> 00:04:42,760 Speaker 1: headcount to use the new technology while having the old 92 00:04:43,480 --> 00:04:45,880 Speaker 1: while having the old systems in place, because you need 93 00:04:45,880 --> 00:04:48,280 Speaker 1: a reliable system and you can't switch on a dime, 94 00:04:48,680 --> 00:04:51,120 Speaker 1: so you'll have to run them both parallel for a while. 95 00:04:51,400 --> 00:04:55,599 Speaker 1: Are we over investing in it? Maybe even if it's 96 00:04:55,800 --> 00:04:59,400 Speaker 1: perfect and right in every way, not every company doing 97 00:04:59,440 --> 00:05:03,719 Speaker 1: it will will be a winner. So undoubtedly in hindsight 98 00:05:03,800 --> 00:05:06,320 Speaker 1: will wish we hadn't made some investments, or we hadn't 99 00:05:06,360 --> 00:05:08,479 Speaker 1: invested in companies that are involved in it. We just 100 00:05:08,480 --> 00:05:12,360 Speaker 1: don't know which. But one other thing, the hyper scale, 101 00:05:12,480 --> 00:05:15,400 Speaker 1: I mean really companies investing close to and in some 102 00:05:15,440 --> 00:05:17,440 Speaker 1: cases over one hundred billion dollars a year. How many 103 00:05:17,480 --> 00:05:21,279 Speaker 1: countries couldn't invest in R and D for over one 104 00:05:21,360 --> 00:05:23,800 Speaker 1: hundred million dollars a year. But I have to say 105 00:05:23,839 --> 00:05:27,120 Speaker 1: that people who are doing it, these companies, most of 106 00:05:27,160 --> 00:05:29,280 Speaker 1: them are run by their founders, who have most of 107 00:05:29,320 --> 00:05:32,560 Speaker 1: their wealth tied up in those companies, So they're playing 108 00:05:32,560 --> 00:05:34,960 Speaker 1: with their own money and they're risking their own wealth 109 00:05:34,960 --> 00:05:37,480 Speaker 1: in this, and I would say, I don't know if 110 00:05:37,480 --> 00:05:41,280 Speaker 1: they're right, but they are at least as likely to 111 00:05:41,279 --> 00:05:43,800 Speaker 1: be right as anybody else who's doing it. And it's 112 00:05:43,839 --> 00:05:45,640 Speaker 1: their money. They're putting their money where their mouth is. 113 00:05:46,000 --> 00:05:48,520 Speaker 2: Let me ask you about something complimentary to this. There 114 00:05:48,560 --> 00:05:51,320 Speaker 2: is a growing chorus warning about what AI is going 115 00:05:51,360 --> 00:05:54,040 Speaker 2: to mean for private credit. So yeah, Jamie diamond saying, 116 00:05:54,560 --> 00:05:57,520 Speaker 2: I see a couple people doing some dumb things. Marathon's 117 00:05:57,520 --> 00:05:59,520 Speaker 2: Bruce Richards predicting the default rate and direct lending is 118 00:05:59,520 --> 00:06:01,400 Speaker 2: going to rise the next few years because of software's 119 00:06:01,440 --> 00:06:04,799 Speaker 2: exposure to all of this. Are you worried about private credit? 120 00:06:04,839 --> 00:06:08,440 Speaker 2: You with your banking background, how much it's grown, and. 121 00:06:09,360 --> 00:06:13,560 Speaker 1: One has to worry about opaque assets with illiquidity. So 122 00:06:13,600 --> 00:06:15,520 Speaker 1: it's very hard to mark to mark, and you're marking 123 00:06:15,560 --> 00:06:17,960 Speaker 1: it by analogy to other companies, so it's not there's 124 00:06:17,960 --> 00:06:21,159 Speaker 1: no there's no precision. There very hard to test in 125 00:06:21,200 --> 00:06:24,400 Speaker 1: the market whether your marks are correct, because the only 126 00:06:24,440 --> 00:06:26,360 Speaker 1: way to really test is to sell some and it's 127 00:06:26,440 --> 00:06:30,680 Speaker 1: very hard to sell to a knowledgeable buyer because any 128 00:06:30,720 --> 00:06:33,120 Speaker 1: knowledgeable buyer would have to do the work and the 129 00:06:33,160 --> 00:06:35,320 Speaker 1: credit analysis and who's going to do the credit analysis 130 00:06:35,320 --> 00:06:37,440 Speaker 1: to buy a little smidge and little piece of something. 131 00:06:38,000 --> 00:06:40,640 Speaker 1: And another phenomenon that's gone on is we haven't and 132 00:06:40,760 --> 00:06:42,680 Speaker 1: and this is just taking it away from credit for 133 00:06:42,680 --> 00:06:46,360 Speaker 1: a second and just talking generically about opaque assets. The 134 00:06:46,400 --> 00:06:49,119 Speaker 1: markets have been very good for a very long time. 135 00:06:50,160 --> 00:06:53,080 Speaker 1: The one thing that imposes a lot of discipline people 136 00:06:53,720 --> 00:06:57,600 Speaker 1: are problems and losses and disasters and something like that happens, 137 00:06:57,880 --> 00:07:00,279 Speaker 1: and then everybody is you know, goes into shop and 138 00:07:00,279 --> 00:07:03,120 Speaker 1: then all of a sudden, everyone gets very careful about 139 00:07:03,160 --> 00:07:06,680 Speaker 1: how they allocate capital, at least for a while. And 140 00:07:07,400 --> 00:07:11,680 Speaker 1: like any other commodity investing dollars is if everything is 141 00:07:11,720 --> 00:07:15,920 Speaker 1: always good and there's no no adverse consequences, you start 142 00:07:15,960 --> 00:07:18,160 Speaker 1: to lose a discipline over time. By the way, this 143 00:07:18,240 --> 00:07:21,520 Speaker 1: is why there are cycles to everything. Business cycles, history cycles, 144 00:07:21,600 --> 00:07:26,240 Speaker 1: market cycles. And so it's been a long time since 145 00:07:26,280 --> 00:07:29,960 Speaker 1: we have had to, you know, redress things. You know, 146 00:07:30,040 --> 00:07:32,520 Speaker 1: you have this bad habit of quoting movies sometimes. Remember 147 00:07:32,520 --> 00:07:35,360 Speaker 1: in the movie, you know, the Godfather, when they're going 148 00:07:35,400 --> 00:07:37,240 Speaker 1: to the mattresses and the guy says, you know, we 149 00:07:37,320 --> 00:07:39,840 Speaker 1: have to have these things every ten years to get 150 00:07:39,960 --> 00:07:41,920 Speaker 1: rid of all the bad blood that's built up over 151 00:07:41,960 --> 00:07:46,560 Speaker 1: that ten years. So generally, I'd be very very I'm 152 00:07:46,600 --> 00:07:49,680 Speaker 1: always very cautious. I'm in the risk management business, but 153 00:07:49,880 --> 00:07:54,320 Speaker 1: especially cautious at this time. You can point to several reasons, 154 00:07:54,520 --> 00:07:57,000 Speaker 1: but if for no other reason, just because we haven't 155 00:07:57,000 --> 00:08:01,320 Speaker 1: had a problem for such a long time, outly, we've 156 00:08:01,360 --> 00:08:04,080 Speaker 1: put money in places where right ALFs are going to 157 00:08:04,120 --> 00:08:08,440 Speaker 1: need to happen. And when you're dealing with opaque, illiquid 158 00:08:08,480 --> 00:08:12,520 Speaker 1: assets like credit, that's a place that one would clearly 159 00:08:12,560 --> 00:08:13,120 Speaker 1: have to look. 160 00:08:13,840 --> 00:08:19,360 Speaker 2: You've spoken out against people putting private equity and credit 161 00:08:19,440 --> 00:08:22,280 Speaker 2: and retirement portfolios. This is something that the an arm 162 00:08:22,320 --> 00:08:25,080 Speaker 2: of Golden's Access is doing encouraging people to do. If 163 00:08:25,080 --> 00:08:26,400 Speaker 2: you were still running the firm, is that something you 164 00:08:26,440 --> 00:08:28,440 Speaker 2: would be encouraging as well, Given the opacity of this 165 00:08:28,520 --> 00:08:31,200 Speaker 2: asset classes, It's something that on top of the arrest 166 00:08:31,240 --> 00:08:31,560 Speaker 2: should have. 167 00:08:31,840 --> 00:08:34,320 Speaker 1: Again, specific firms there firms that are really good and 168 00:08:34,360 --> 00:08:36,520 Speaker 1: care about but this thousand, hundreds of firms doing this, 169 00:08:36,559 --> 00:08:38,480 Speaker 1: and not everybody has a you know, not everybody has 170 00:08:38,520 --> 00:08:40,839 Speaker 1: been around for one hundred and fifty years or more 171 00:08:40,880 --> 00:08:42,360 Speaker 1: and wants to be around for another one hundred and 172 00:08:42,360 --> 00:08:45,800 Speaker 1: fifty years or more. So I would say, just generically, 173 00:08:46,640 --> 00:08:51,280 Speaker 1: putting the relative riskiness aside, I would say, the consequences 174 00:08:51,880 --> 00:08:56,160 Speaker 1: of being wrong or having a problem in the account 175 00:08:56,280 --> 00:09:04,199 Speaker 1: of retirees, ie, real people, citizens, taxpayers, voters is much 176 00:09:04,240 --> 00:09:09,960 Speaker 1: more highly consequential. The political sector. The government sector really cares, 177 00:09:10,160 --> 00:09:15,160 Speaker 1: but not that much. If institutional investors lose money, they're smart, 178 00:09:15,160 --> 00:09:17,720 Speaker 1: they can afford it, even very very very high net 179 00:09:17,760 --> 00:09:20,880 Speaker 1: worth individuals. They must be smart because they have money, 180 00:09:21,040 --> 00:09:23,839 Speaker 1: and even if they're not smart, they can afford it. 181 00:09:24,360 --> 00:09:31,240 Speaker 1: But when you lose money for individuals, for consumers, taxpayers, 182 00:09:31,480 --> 00:09:36,360 Speaker 1: and citizens, people in government get very very upset. Regulators 183 00:09:36,360 --> 00:09:39,599 Speaker 1: get very very upset. So my point in that you 184 00:09:39,600 --> 00:09:43,440 Speaker 1: should approach when you're dealing with with that segment with 185 00:09:43,559 --> 00:09:46,440 Speaker 1: a lot more trepidation, not because the odds of this 186 00:09:46,520 --> 00:09:49,520 Speaker 1: security will be worse in their account of someone else, 187 00:09:49,760 --> 00:09:52,560 Speaker 1: just the consequence of a bad outcome is much more 188 00:09:52,679 --> 00:09:55,600 Speaker 1: dramatic to the people who do that. We're an institutional firm, 189 00:09:55,880 --> 00:09:58,040 Speaker 1: so we never really had that, but I understand the 190 00:09:58,080 --> 00:10:02,440 Speaker 1: consequences of that in the financial crisis, and so I 191 00:10:02,640 --> 00:10:05,720 Speaker 1: just cautioned now I would say that as at all 192 00:10:05,760 --> 00:10:09,160 Speaker 1: times but here we are at laked cycle in these markets. 193 00:10:09,240 --> 00:10:11,600 Speaker 1: Is at the absolute end of the cycle. I don't know, 194 00:10:11,960 --> 00:10:14,720 Speaker 1: But after so many years of a bull market and 195 00:10:14,800 --> 00:10:17,839 Speaker 1: a bull run in all these assets, we're getting close. 196 00:10:17,960 --> 00:10:19,880 Speaker 1: You know, you know we're in the later part of 197 00:10:19,920 --> 00:10:22,920 Speaker 1: the cycle. I'm sure so, wouldn't you know it? So 198 00:10:23,000 --> 00:10:28,199 Speaker 1: this is the time when firms are lobbying to give individuals, 199 00:10:29,360 --> 00:10:33,240 Speaker 1: you know, to bestow on them the opportunity of investing 200 00:10:33,240 --> 00:10:36,440 Speaker 1: in these assets, these relatively ill equid assets, at this 201 00:10:36,520 --> 00:10:39,400 Speaker 1: particular time of the cycle. I think the people who 202 00:10:39,400 --> 00:10:41,720 Speaker 1: are doing this should think about that very very hard, 203 00:10:41,840 --> 00:10:43,960 Speaker 1: and if they're going to do it, exercise a much 204 00:10:43,960 --> 00:10:48,040 Speaker 1: greater degree of caution and just be aware of the calculus. 205 00:10:48,800 --> 00:10:50,760 Speaker 1: Is it worth it? In other words, if your business 206 00:10:50,800 --> 00:10:53,360 Speaker 1: is really terrific, if you're growing, you're doing very very well, 207 00:10:53,400 --> 00:10:56,559 Speaker 1: do you really need to extend your franchise that much 208 00:10:56,600 --> 00:10:58,520 Speaker 1: by going to this much more dangerous sector. 209 00:10:58,880 --> 00:11:02,520 Speaker 2: You've called yourself a worry more than a warrior. Something 210 00:11:02,679 --> 00:11:05,400 Speaker 2: Jamie Diamonds clearly is worried about is that we're back 211 00:11:05,520 --> 00:11:07,360 Speaker 2: in a period that's like five oh six of some 212 00:11:07,440 --> 00:11:09,680 Speaker 2: run the run up to the crisis. How Does that 213 00:11:09,720 --> 00:11:12,200 Speaker 2: strike you when you hear that? Do you see the 214 00:11:12,240 --> 00:11:14,320 Speaker 2: historical analogy that he does this moment to that? 215 00:11:14,760 --> 00:11:16,839 Speaker 1: Yeah, No, I can't speak. I mean, he's smart, he 216 00:11:16,880 --> 00:11:20,439 Speaker 1: sees a lot of stuff. I can't comment on what 217 00:11:20,520 --> 00:11:24,000 Speaker 1: he's seeing. But I'd say the best analogy would be 218 00:11:24,040 --> 00:11:26,920 Speaker 1: to say, you know, kind of late psycho, you know, 219 00:11:27,280 --> 00:11:29,480 Speaker 1: you know, the crisis that we had was really, you know, 220 00:11:29,720 --> 00:11:32,720 Speaker 1: in different forms. It was basically a real estate collapse, 221 00:11:32,800 --> 00:11:35,400 Speaker 1: and it took the form of mortgages, you know, loans 222 00:11:35,400 --> 00:11:37,760 Speaker 1: on real estate, real estate on real estate. That was 223 00:11:37,840 --> 00:11:42,840 Speaker 1: really what it was, and in one form or another, 224 00:11:43,320 --> 00:11:46,680 Speaker 1: and that was kind of late stage when individuals started 225 00:11:46,679 --> 00:11:48,160 Speaker 1: to get involved in it, and of course that was 226 00:11:48,160 --> 00:11:50,960 Speaker 1: what you know on the you know, inflamed the politics 227 00:11:50,960 --> 00:11:53,079 Speaker 1: at the time and really cause you know, it was 228 00:11:53,160 --> 00:11:56,160 Speaker 1: dramatic and of course banks were very, very complicated. We 229 00:11:56,200 --> 00:12:00,079 Speaker 1: can talk about that, but what's in analogy. Maybe you 230 00:12:00,120 --> 00:12:03,440 Speaker 1: couldn't find an analogy in that. In companies that are 231 00:12:03,760 --> 00:12:10,480 Speaker 1: historically institutional companies transacting institutional oriented products, who are you know, 232 00:12:10,559 --> 00:12:14,600 Speaker 1: trying to have very small sized transactions put into mutual 233 00:12:14,640 --> 00:12:17,120 Speaker 1: funds or four one case, oh, by the way, into 234 00:12:17,120 --> 00:12:20,480 Speaker 1: affiliated insurance companies, which is kind of one step away 235 00:12:20,480 --> 00:12:25,960 Speaker 1: for individuals, because remember, insurance companies take your premium and 236 00:12:26,040 --> 00:12:28,600 Speaker 1: will pay you back. They have the one they're really 237 00:12:29,280 --> 00:12:31,679 Speaker 1: it's really individuals that are counting on you know, in 238 00:12:31,720 --> 00:12:34,520 Speaker 1: a lot of cases, individuals that are counted on those 239 00:12:34,679 --> 00:12:38,080 Speaker 1: companies having you know, having a good portfolio that's solved 240 00:12:38,320 --> 00:12:40,840 Speaker 1: and so that they could pay back their debts with 241 00:12:40,880 --> 00:12:43,520 Speaker 1: you know, their obligations in their own there's when certain 242 00:12:43,559 --> 00:12:46,840 Speaker 1: contingencies happen years and years forward. Kind of a kind 243 00:12:46,880 --> 00:12:50,840 Speaker 1: of a consumer oriented business also, So maybe that's an 244 00:12:50,880 --> 00:12:54,280 Speaker 1: analogy because they both feel kind of late stage with 245 00:12:54,440 --> 00:12:57,000 Speaker 1: assets and opportunities that normally wouldn't you know, wouldn't go 246 00:12:57,040 --> 00:13:00,280 Speaker 1: to individuals. That's what I see. But you know, these 247 00:13:00,280 --> 00:13:03,600 Speaker 1: crises don't have to you know, be the same. But 248 00:13:03,679 --> 00:13:06,320 Speaker 1: you know, in some way or another, they rhyme and 249 00:13:06,360 --> 00:13:08,640 Speaker 1: they always come from you. They'll come from a different things. Look, 250 00:13:08,640 --> 00:13:10,760 Speaker 1: if we're sitting here, one of the things I always thought, 251 00:13:10,800 --> 00:13:14,920 Speaker 1: if we're sitting here fretting about a specific thing, that's 252 00:13:14,960 --> 00:13:17,719 Speaker 1: the thing that's less likely to happen because they were 253 00:13:17,720 --> 00:13:19,920 Speaker 1: fretting about it. That means we're all going home, talking 254 00:13:19,920 --> 00:13:22,760 Speaker 1: to our people, trying to moderate the risks associated with it, 255 00:13:23,120 --> 00:13:27,040 Speaker 1: and that's usually a good thing. Usually what you get 256 00:13:27,160 --> 00:13:30,120 Speaker 1: is usually when the war, you know, when the world 257 00:13:30,160 --> 00:13:33,760 Speaker 1: blows up, it's something you thought was triple A. It's 258 00:13:33,760 --> 00:13:36,760 Speaker 1: inevitably going to be something, and the question is you 259 00:13:36,760 --> 00:13:39,000 Speaker 1: know what is it? And who has you know, who 260 00:13:39,120 --> 00:13:44,000 Speaker 1: has contingency planned well enough, who's looked around corners and 261 00:13:44,040 --> 00:13:46,839 Speaker 1: seen that possibility that they may have thought was a 262 00:13:46,920 --> 00:13:50,280 Speaker 1: very remote possibility, but it was a contingency that happened, 263 00:13:50,280 --> 00:13:54,520 Speaker 1: and so they contingency planned and did something, got closer 264 00:13:54,520 --> 00:13:56,800 Speaker 1: to home at the right place, and reduced their risks. 265 00:14:00,840 --> 00:14:03,840 Speaker 2: Coming up, how Lloyd blank find managed Goldman Sachs during 266 00:14:03,920 --> 00:14:07,079 Speaker 2: a challenging year and how the bank changed when it 267 00:14:07,120 --> 00:14:18,959 Speaker 2: went public. I'd like to talk about your appetite for 268 00:14:19,040 --> 00:14:20,720 Speaker 2: risk taking, how that's evolved. We could go back to 269 00:14:20,960 --> 00:14:23,240 Speaker 2: nineteen ninety four, which was a bad year for Goldman, 270 00:14:23,800 --> 00:14:25,480 Speaker 2: and you write in the book about how there was 271 00:14:25,520 --> 00:14:28,400 Speaker 2: this kind of pendulum shift. There was excessive risk taking 272 00:14:29,160 --> 00:14:31,560 Speaker 2: and then there was kind of excessive caution that followed. 273 00:14:31,560 --> 00:14:34,440 Speaker 2: That is the kind of found its feet again. Talk 274 00:14:34,480 --> 00:14:36,680 Speaker 2: if you would, just about finding that balt. 275 00:14:36,480 --> 00:14:38,600 Speaker 1: And nineteen ninety four was a really bad year for 276 00:14:38,680 --> 00:14:42,000 Speaker 1: Goldman because we were kind of there by ourselves. You know, 277 00:14:42,040 --> 00:14:43,320 Speaker 1: if you're going to have a bad year, you'd like 278 00:14:43,320 --> 00:14:45,120 Speaker 1: everybody around you to have a bad year. You like 279 00:14:45,160 --> 00:14:46,800 Speaker 1: it to be a generic problem. You'd like to be 280 00:14:46,840 --> 00:14:49,680 Speaker 1: the best of a bad group, or even in the 281 00:14:49,680 --> 00:14:51,560 Speaker 1: middle of a bad group. But you know, we were 282 00:14:51,600 --> 00:14:53,040 Speaker 1: miserable and we didn't have a lot of company in 283 00:14:53,120 --> 00:14:56,040 Speaker 1: ninety four. We made the firm maide. You know, we 284 00:14:56,080 --> 00:15:01,720 Speaker 1: had very big positions that were conditioned on rates not 285 00:15:02,040 --> 00:15:04,560 Speaker 1: coming down or at least not coming up, especially European. 286 00:15:04,600 --> 00:15:06,560 Speaker 1: This was a time of a crisis and a lot 287 00:15:06,560 --> 00:15:09,960 Speaker 1: of pressure around economies in Europe, and we thought, they 288 00:15:10,040 --> 00:15:12,880 Speaker 1: surely won't want to emserate their people by taking interest 289 00:15:12,960 --> 00:15:15,640 Speaker 1: rates in a slow growth environment. And guess what, they 290 00:15:15,760 --> 00:15:18,720 Speaker 1: miserated their people in the slow rate environment. So we 291 00:15:18,800 --> 00:15:21,960 Speaker 1: did poorly. We lost money. That was a moment in 292 00:15:22,000 --> 00:15:26,000 Speaker 1: time also where the firm was a private partnership, and 293 00:15:26,200 --> 00:15:28,280 Speaker 1: in a private partnership, and by the way, a private 294 00:15:28,320 --> 00:15:31,640 Speaker 1: partnership with unlimited liability for the partners, so you could 295 00:15:31,680 --> 00:15:33,680 Speaker 1: not only lose all the money you had in your 296 00:15:33,680 --> 00:15:37,320 Speaker 1: firm in the firm, but they'll come around and take out, 297 00:15:37,360 --> 00:15:40,360 Speaker 1: take away your home and and so that really makes 298 00:15:40,400 --> 00:15:43,640 Speaker 1: you really focused. And in our business, if you're afraid 299 00:15:43,640 --> 00:15:45,840 Speaker 1: to lose money, it's very hard to make money, not 300 00:15:45,920 --> 00:15:49,440 Speaker 1: because people are betting wildly, but we intermediate the other 301 00:15:49,520 --> 00:15:51,160 Speaker 1: side of what people want to do. People want to 302 00:15:51,200 --> 00:15:54,480 Speaker 1: sell blocks of something, people want to hedge big positions 303 00:15:54,840 --> 00:15:57,200 Speaker 1: where there's no other side where we would have to 304 00:15:57,240 --> 00:15:59,760 Speaker 1: position that risk until we could cut it into a 305 00:15:59,760 --> 00:16:02,320 Speaker 1: little pieces and sell it off. But that's a lot 306 00:16:02,400 --> 00:16:05,120 Speaker 1: of risk, and so people were very very loathe. So 307 00:16:05,200 --> 00:16:10,200 Speaker 1: it's not just what you lose in the moment, it's 308 00:16:10,280 --> 00:16:13,680 Speaker 1: all the opportunities that you inevitably let go by that 309 00:16:13,720 --> 00:16:16,280 Speaker 1: you otherwise would have taken advantage on, and that could 310 00:16:16,320 --> 00:16:18,920 Speaker 1: go for a long time. And what they're what you 311 00:16:18,960 --> 00:16:21,920 Speaker 1: have to do there is leadership has to be, you know, 312 00:16:22,320 --> 00:16:26,160 Speaker 1: kind of sober about the fact that you really don't 313 00:16:26,160 --> 00:16:27,840 Speaker 1: want to lose more money, but at the same time 314 00:16:28,040 --> 00:16:30,680 Speaker 1: encourage people to go ahead. And you have to have 315 00:16:30,720 --> 00:16:35,480 Speaker 1: the discipline your own organization to let people know by 316 00:16:35,520 --> 00:16:38,320 Speaker 1: your behavior that you're not going to punish or kill 317 00:16:38,360 --> 00:16:42,920 Speaker 1: people for having legitimate losses that were that were you know, 318 00:16:42,960 --> 00:16:46,040 Speaker 1: people are You're not supposed to be stupid, but even 319 00:16:46,120 --> 00:16:48,720 Speaker 1: smart people are wrong a good percentage of the time. 320 00:16:48,760 --> 00:16:51,800 Speaker 1: If you punish people for being wrong as if they 321 00:16:51,800 --> 00:16:54,920 Speaker 1: were stupid, you'll lose them. You'll even if they don't 322 00:16:55,200 --> 00:16:58,240 Speaker 1: walk away, you'll lose their mind and you lose their ambition. 323 00:16:58,720 --> 00:17:01,440 Speaker 1: So that's a very very delicate get management problem. After 324 00:17:01,520 --> 00:17:03,760 Speaker 1: Christ's like that to get people up on front and 325 00:17:03,840 --> 00:17:07,560 Speaker 1: front of foot again. And by the way, what they're feeling, 326 00:17:07,760 --> 00:17:10,000 Speaker 1: you're feeling too. You know, you're a little bit about 327 00:17:10,080 --> 00:17:13,119 Speaker 1: You're a little like the flight attendant going through turbulence, 328 00:17:14,080 --> 00:17:16,560 Speaker 1: you know, and the engine may sound a little bit different, 329 00:17:16,560 --> 00:17:18,359 Speaker 1: and you kind of wonder is it supposed to sound 330 00:17:18,440 --> 00:17:20,880 Speaker 1: like that? And if you're the flight attend you better 331 00:17:20,920 --> 00:17:23,160 Speaker 1: have a you better have a big fat smile. Paste 332 00:17:23,200 --> 00:17:26,240 Speaker 1: it on your face because if you look like you're terrified, 333 00:17:26,280 --> 00:17:28,560 Speaker 1: guess what the passengers. Guess how the passengers are going 334 00:17:28,600 --> 00:17:32,720 Speaker 1: to respond. So I would say, you know, in a crisis, 335 00:17:33,920 --> 00:17:36,160 Speaker 1: put the oxygen mask on you first before you put 336 00:17:36,160 --> 00:17:38,000 Speaker 1: it on your kids, because you're not doing your kids 337 00:17:38,000 --> 00:17:40,880 Speaker 1: any favors if you pass out. And the other thing 338 00:17:41,000 --> 00:17:43,400 Speaker 1: is try to look like you're not scared to death. 339 00:17:43,840 --> 00:17:46,360 Speaker 2: Goldman's special sauce, as you put it, is that heritage. 340 00:17:46,359 --> 00:17:48,080 Speaker 2: You're talking about the fact that it was a partnership 341 00:17:48,080 --> 00:17:50,760 Speaker 2: for as long as as it was. How has it 342 00:17:51,080 --> 00:17:53,879 Speaker 2: post IPO been able to retain a lot of that. 343 00:17:53,920 --> 00:17:56,399 Speaker 2: Maybe the special sauce isn't as strong as it was before, 344 00:17:56,840 --> 00:17:58,320 Speaker 2: but it does have a unique flag. 345 00:17:58,480 --> 00:18:00,560 Speaker 1: I think that's the most unbelievable thing that we would 346 00:18:00,600 --> 00:18:04,280 Speaker 1: have least predicted that we were the most nervous about that. 347 00:18:04,400 --> 00:18:06,520 Speaker 1: Most came up into the debates about whether we should 348 00:18:06,520 --> 00:18:07,960 Speaker 1: go public or not, which by the way, I thought 349 00:18:08,000 --> 00:18:10,720 Speaker 1: was inevitable given we needed a balance sheet and stable capital. 350 00:18:11,400 --> 00:18:14,240 Speaker 1: But the thing that was that I would thought would 351 00:18:14,240 --> 00:18:17,920 Speaker 1: have been the biggest surprise if I could look forward 352 00:18:17,960 --> 00:18:21,960 Speaker 1: to where we are today, is how well Goldman Sachs 353 00:18:22,000 --> 00:18:26,280 Speaker 1: preserved the partnership culture twenty five years, more than twenty 354 00:18:26,320 --> 00:18:29,320 Speaker 1: five years after we've been a public company. Now, what 355 00:18:29,359 --> 00:18:32,280 Speaker 1: does that mean a partnership culture. It's you know, people 356 00:18:32,359 --> 00:18:35,760 Speaker 1: don't necessarily understand it. You know. When I and by 357 00:18:35,800 --> 00:18:37,720 Speaker 1: the way, I spend half my tenure in the private firm, 358 00:18:37,760 --> 00:18:41,760 Speaker 1: half my tenure in the public company. In a private company, 359 00:18:42,560 --> 00:18:45,399 Speaker 1: the people that report to you are your co owners 360 00:18:45,400 --> 00:18:49,159 Speaker 1: of the business. They have a set of expectations. They 361 00:18:49,240 --> 00:18:51,919 Speaker 1: act like owners. They expect to know everything that's going on. 362 00:18:52,000 --> 00:18:55,880 Speaker 1: A Japanese bond salesman wants to know what's going on 363 00:18:56,080 --> 00:18:59,920 Speaker 1: in investment banking in London. If somebody screws up someone 364 00:19:00,119 --> 00:19:02,600 Speaker 1: in the world, it affects everybody around the firm. They're 365 00:19:02,640 --> 00:19:06,320 Speaker 1: not just in their own cylinder. It's not considered rude 366 00:19:07,000 --> 00:19:08,880 Speaker 1: to be a busy body and look around and see 367 00:19:08,880 --> 00:19:11,040 Speaker 1: what's going around the whole firm. It's their expectations, their 368 00:19:11,119 --> 00:19:14,159 Speaker 1: sense of entitlement to have that. People expect to be 369 00:19:14,200 --> 00:19:18,520 Speaker 1: consulted as owners. People think if they object, you'll listen 370 00:19:18,520 --> 00:19:21,639 Speaker 1: to them, and you may be slow in implementing a 371 00:19:21,680 --> 00:19:23,520 Speaker 1: decision that you thought was the right thing to do, 372 00:19:23,560 --> 00:19:26,520 Speaker 1: but people are objecting, and so you socialize things more. 373 00:19:27,160 --> 00:19:30,000 Speaker 1: People in the firm get paid based upon how the 374 00:19:30,040 --> 00:19:32,119 Speaker 1: firm as a whole did, not their little cylinder and 375 00:19:32,200 --> 00:19:36,000 Speaker 1: not their little space. There's a lot of differences between 376 00:19:36,000 --> 00:19:40,520 Speaker 1: a partnership culture and a regular corporate and I think 377 00:19:40,720 --> 00:19:43,200 Speaker 1: the firm did a good job in protecting that even 378 00:19:43,200 --> 00:19:45,240 Speaker 1: though nobody's been a partner for a long time, but 379 00:19:45,920 --> 00:19:50,920 Speaker 1: they call themselves partners and it's real. And I'll tell 380 00:19:50,920 --> 00:19:54,040 Speaker 1: you another thing, there's an economic difference. When I was 381 00:19:54,600 --> 00:19:57,919 Speaker 1: in a private partnership, you care about your capital account. 382 00:19:58,000 --> 00:20:00,639 Speaker 1: You don't have stock at the end of you and 383 00:20:00,680 --> 00:20:03,560 Speaker 1: you leave your capital in the firm because that's your money, 384 00:20:03,600 --> 00:20:07,080 Speaker 1: is the working capital of the firm. You care about 385 00:20:07,080 --> 00:20:09,800 Speaker 1: how money accretes into your capital camp, but you don't 386 00:20:09,840 --> 00:20:13,520 Speaker 1: care if it's a smooth accretion every year or if 387 00:20:13,560 --> 00:20:16,359 Speaker 1: it rises five percent every year. You care what it 388 00:20:16,400 --> 00:20:19,240 Speaker 1: looks like after twenty, twenty, five, thirty years. And so 389 00:20:19,440 --> 00:20:22,040 Speaker 1: if on a ten year cycle you make money four years, 390 00:20:22,080 --> 00:20:24,679 Speaker 1: lose money in two years, break even four other years, 391 00:20:24,960 --> 00:20:28,000 Speaker 1: that's perfectly fine, as long as it's enough. In a 392 00:20:28,040 --> 00:20:31,520 Speaker 1: corporation and a public company, it's not just your earnings, 393 00:20:31,520 --> 00:20:34,000 Speaker 1: it's your earnings times a multiple, and the multiple is 394 00:20:34,000 --> 00:20:38,640 Speaker 1: governed by people's sense of the stability of your earnings 395 00:20:38,680 --> 00:20:40,960 Speaker 1: and the growth of your earnings. So all of a sudden, 396 00:20:41,880 --> 00:20:45,399 Speaker 1: you care about your e your earnings, but you really 397 00:20:45,440 --> 00:20:49,199 Speaker 1: care about your pe and maybe you'll forego some of 398 00:20:49,240 --> 00:20:52,879 Speaker 1: your earnings in order to have more stability in those earnings, 399 00:20:52,920 --> 00:20:55,560 Speaker 1: so you get a higher multiple. And so I think 400 00:20:55,640 --> 00:20:58,719 Speaker 1: over time the real test was how do you function 401 00:20:58,840 --> 00:21:02,080 Speaker 1: recognize that you had different ownership base i e. Public 402 00:21:02,119 --> 00:21:06,679 Speaker 1: shareholders versus the partnership. How do you satisfy your public 403 00:21:06,720 --> 00:21:09,560 Speaker 1: owners who care about a share price and still have 404 00:21:09,720 --> 00:21:13,080 Speaker 1: all those partnership culture elements, you know, the risk profile everything. 405 00:21:13,480 --> 00:21:16,960 Speaker 1: I'd say that process started with my predecessor, Hank who 406 00:21:17,600 --> 00:21:20,760 Speaker 1: Hank Paulson, who was CEO in the firm Win Public. 407 00:21:20,800 --> 00:21:25,439 Speaker 1: It certainly continued threading that needle with me, and I 408 00:21:25,520 --> 00:21:28,760 Speaker 1: tell you, I think successor David Solomon has done a 409 00:21:28,760 --> 00:21:31,720 Speaker 1: good time, and in some ways he's completed that transition 410 00:21:32,320 --> 00:21:36,040 Speaker 1: to a great extent because what I didn't do so 411 00:21:36,200 --> 00:21:38,399 Speaker 1: much and what he did. I kept a lot of 412 00:21:38,440 --> 00:21:44,399 Speaker 1: our investing investing opportunities on balance sheet, which was a 413 00:21:44,520 --> 00:21:47,520 Speaker 1: very big source of E P and L, but it 414 00:21:47,560 --> 00:21:52,040 Speaker 1: was somewhat sometimes a burden on our PE multiple because 415 00:21:52,040 --> 00:21:54,960 Speaker 1: it would be much more volatile. He's moved a lot 416 00:21:54,960 --> 00:21:59,480 Speaker 1: of that off balance sheet, which frankly was what our 417 00:21:59,480 --> 00:22:02,439 Speaker 1: real owner at this point really would want to have happened, 418 00:22:02,800 --> 00:22:04,560 Speaker 1: you know, for a long time and Hank's tenure and 419 00:22:04,640 --> 00:22:08,040 Speaker 1: my tenure, we were a public company, but most of 420 00:22:08,040 --> 00:22:11,080 Speaker 1: the shares were owned by insiders, by partners. Over time, 421 00:22:11,200 --> 00:22:13,879 Speaker 1: partners retire, they sell their stock, and so over time 422 00:22:14,240 --> 00:22:17,919 Speaker 1: it becomes more and more like a traditional public company 423 00:22:17,920 --> 00:22:20,879 Speaker 1: where the public owns the vast majority of shares and 424 00:22:20,920 --> 00:22:24,840 Speaker 1: the insiders own a small amount. Early in my tenure, 425 00:22:25,520 --> 00:22:29,160 Speaker 1: the partners, you know, the traditional older partners, still own 426 00:22:29,240 --> 00:22:31,399 Speaker 1: most of the stock, and it was reflected in a 427 00:22:31,400 --> 00:22:34,280 Speaker 1: board of directors where we had sometimes four or five 428 00:22:34,400 --> 00:22:37,920 Speaker 1: Goldman people, Goldman employees were on the board of directors. 429 00:22:38,160 --> 00:22:39,200 Speaker 1: That wouldn't happen today. 430 00:22:40,920 --> 00:22:43,920 Speaker 2: After the break, Lloyd Blain finds thoughts on Kathy Rummler's 431 00:22:43,960 --> 00:22:48,000 Speaker 2: resignation following the latest Epstein files release and his perspective 432 00:22:48,080 --> 00:23:00,040 Speaker 2: on how companies should engage with politics. There is a, 433 00:23:00,040 --> 00:23:03,359 Speaker 2: as I see it, a very vibrant alumni network, in 434 00:23:03,440 --> 00:23:06,360 Speaker 2: part thanks to you and your work kicking that off 435 00:23:06,359 --> 00:23:09,320 Speaker 2: and organizing it. How actively are you engaged with what 436 00:23:09,400 --> 00:23:11,080 Speaker 2: the firm is doing? You and you and other alums 437 00:23:11,080 --> 00:23:12,080 Speaker 2: of the from watching what's. 438 00:23:11,920 --> 00:23:15,160 Speaker 1: Happening all the time. I mean, it's a very important thing. 439 00:23:15,400 --> 00:23:18,600 Speaker 1: It's very important to the core of Goldman Sachs that 440 00:23:18,640 --> 00:23:21,520 Speaker 1: we care about our alumni, and in return, the alumni 441 00:23:21,560 --> 00:23:23,720 Speaker 1: care very much about the firm. If you went to 442 00:23:23,800 --> 00:23:27,359 Speaker 1: somebody who had been at Goldman Sachs for five years 443 00:23:27,359 --> 00:23:29,919 Speaker 1: twenty five years ago, had a great career and you 444 00:23:29,960 --> 00:23:32,199 Speaker 1: ask them to, oh, tell me about yourself, first thing 445 00:23:32,240 --> 00:23:34,440 Speaker 1: they'll say is, I'm ex Goldman. A lot of people 446 00:23:34,480 --> 00:23:38,679 Speaker 1: at Goldman Sachs go into public service after that tenure 447 00:23:38,720 --> 00:23:42,160 Speaker 1: at the firm, and in fact, people refer to sometimes 448 00:23:42,200 --> 00:23:46,240 Speaker 1: revolving doors. Ur wasn't a revolving door government took from Goldman. 449 00:23:46,560 --> 00:23:49,439 Speaker 1: We didn't hire principally, we didn't hire people from government. 450 00:23:49,560 --> 00:23:52,560 Speaker 1: Was the other way around. But we get people that 451 00:23:52,600 --> 00:23:56,440 Speaker 1: were public servicing minded. We care about our alumni. If 452 00:23:56,520 --> 00:23:59,720 Speaker 1: somebody is going into government fifteen years after, guess who 453 00:23:59,720 --> 00:24:03,080 Speaker 1: they are to help them with their process of getting 454 00:24:03,160 --> 00:24:07,840 Speaker 1: through getting through the Senate process of confirmation or other things. 455 00:24:08,280 --> 00:24:11,159 Speaker 1: But having been there is highly valuable. It's a very 456 00:24:11,160 --> 00:24:14,520 Speaker 1: important recruiting tool, and it's a very important morale lift. 457 00:24:15,080 --> 00:24:19,199 Speaker 1: And of part of the perks of being at the 458 00:24:19,240 --> 00:24:22,240 Speaker 1: firm is that you get to have been at the firm. 459 00:24:22,560 --> 00:24:24,280 Speaker 1: There are always going to be people who think they're 460 00:24:24,280 --> 00:24:26,840 Speaker 1: going for thirty years to Golman. They stay three, and 461 00:24:26,880 --> 00:24:28,760 Speaker 1: there are people who only intend to stay three and 462 00:24:28,800 --> 00:24:32,720 Speaker 1: they stay thirty. But whether it's three or thirty, it's 463 00:24:32,760 --> 00:24:35,000 Speaker 1: a good place to get your training, start your career, 464 00:24:35,400 --> 00:24:37,520 Speaker 1: and to maintain the relationship. 465 00:24:36,920 --> 00:24:40,480 Speaker 2: With I suspect that you, as a Goldman alum, have 466 00:24:40,640 --> 00:24:43,680 Speaker 2: followed the scandal that erupted around Kathy Rumler, the general 467 00:24:43,760 --> 00:24:47,120 Speaker 2: counsel who came into that job after you you'd left, 468 00:24:47,640 --> 00:24:50,280 Speaker 2: A scandal that was brought about by the fact that 469 00:24:50,960 --> 00:24:53,640 Speaker 2: many emails between her and Jeffrey Epstein were made public. 470 00:24:54,400 --> 00:24:58,159 Speaker 2: She effectively became a reputational risk herself. And I'm curious 471 00:24:58,240 --> 00:25:00,800 Speaker 2: how you think the firm, again an alum, how you 472 00:25:01,600 --> 00:25:02,520 Speaker 2: think they've handled that. 473 00:25:03,440 --> 00:25:06,000 Speaker 1: You know, I'd tell you I don't shy away from, 474 00:25:06,200 --> 00:25:10,159 Speaker 1: you know, provocation, But I just don't know. I hadn't 475 00:25:10,200 --> 00:25:12,880 Speaker 1: met Kathy. She came in after I left. I don't 476 00:25:12,920 --> 00:25:16,880 Speaker 1: know what the calculus was. I'd say, in general, one 477 00:25:16,920 --> 00:25:20,399 Speaker 1: of the ways in which you're a good partnership is 478 00:25:20,840 --> 00:25:23,520 Speaker 1: if you think, and again this is a big if. 479 00:25:23,640 --> 00:25:26,000 Speaker 1: I don't know, I really don't know. I don't know 480 00:25:26,040 --> 00:25:27,879 Speaker 1: what was exchanged. I don't know, Kathy, I don't know 481 00:25:27,920 --> 00:25:33,000 Speaker 1: the situation, but I'll say as a generic matter applied 482 00:25:33,080 --> 00:25:36,080 Speaker 1: to other situations like the financial crisis or a big loss, 483 00:25:36,480 --> 00:25:37,840 Speaker 1: let I prefer to talk about that. And you can 484 00:25:37,920 --> 00:25:41,760 Speaker 1: endraw your own analogy where something goes wrong, or we're 485 00:25:41,800 --> 00:25:44,639 Speaker 1: doing M and A and in M and A transaction 486 00:25:44,800 --> 00:25:46,960 Speaker 1: as people here. You know you have a TV station. 487 00:25:47,080 --> 00:25:50,199 Speaker 1: People here well know. Sometimes your opponents in an M 488 00:25:50,200 --> 00:25:52,119 Speaker 1: and A will use the media against you, and it 489 00:25:52,280 --> 00:25:56,840 Speaker 1: make accusations and try to hat we'll try to gin 490 00:25:56,960 --> 00:26:00,879 Speaker 1: up support for themselves by slandering the opposition in some 491 00:26:00,960 --> 00:26:03,960 Speaker 1: way or another. If you even if the pressure on 492 00:26:04,040 --> 00:26:07,320 Speaker 1: you in that kind of a context gets severe, if 493 00:26:07,359 --> 00:26:09,919 Speaker 1: you cut and run on somebody in your funt that 494 00:26:10,040 --> 00:26:13,119 Speaker 1: you think, whether you're right or wrong, you think is 495 00:26:13,240 --> 00:26:16,320 Speaker 1: unfair and you really think it, and you really think 496 00:26:16,359 --> 00:26:18,720 Speaker 1: they did nothing wrong, You really think that somebody is 497 00:26:18,760 --> 00:26:21,320 Speaker 1: just picking on them, and you really think it's caught 498 00:26:21,440 --> 00:26:23,520 Speaker 1: kind of get caught up because there's some hostile M 499 00:26:23,560 --> 00:26:26,159 Speaker 1: and A situation not real and if you add badly 500 00:26:26,160 --> 00:26:31,440 Speaker 1: to your own people, that's not just a specific costly 501 00:26:31,480 --> 00:26:34,000 Speaker 1: thing to do with respect to that person. But that's 502 00:26:34,040 --> 00:26:36,639 Speaker 1: a signaling that goes on to the rest of the organization, 503 00:26:37,200 --> 00:26:41,119 Speaker 1: and so one, you know one doesn't do that. So 504 00:26:41,640 --> 00:26:44,200 Speaker 1: you're asking me a specific question about a specific person. 505 00:26:44,240 --> 00:26:46,280 Speaker 1: I don't know enough to comment on that, but I 506 00:26:46,320 --> 00:26:49,400 Speaker 1: will say what people are neglecting in looking at these 507 00:26:49,440 --> 00:26:53,359 Speaker 1: situations is I don't think that people who you know. 508 00:26:53,520 --> 00:26:57,119 Speaker 1: I look in the mortgage crisis, you know there are 509 00:26:57,119 --> 00:26:59,240 Speaker 1: a lot of people, you know, you have people at 510 00:26:59,240 --> 00:27:02,360 Speaker 1: other firms blew up certain things. I got fired. Did 511 00:27:02,400 --> 00:27:04,960 Speaker 1: anybody ever here ever know the name of somebody the 512 00:27:05,000 --> 00:27:07,200 Speaker 1: person who is running the mortgage business at Golman Sachs 513 00:27:07,280 --> 00:27:10,760 Speaker 1: during that era. No, it's all me. I was the symbol. 514 00:27:10,800 --> 00:27:12,760 Speaker 1: I was the guy in charge. Everyone did this. I 515 00:27:12,800 --> 00:27:14,640 Speaker 1: promise you. I never sold a mortgage in the firm. 516 00:27:15,320 --> 00:27:17,840 Speaker 1: First all, we didn't do mortgages. It was secondary markets 517 00:27:17,840 --> 00:27:19,760 Speaker 1: in that But if they were doing their job and 518 00:27:19,760 --> 00:27:22,320 Speaker 1: did nothing wrong and hedged appropriately and didn't lose money 519 00:27:22,359 --> 00:27:26,199 Speaker 1: and did everything right, we didn't fire those people because 520 00:27:26,240 --> 00:27:28,639 Speaker 1: there was a clamor for that to happen. And if 521 00:27:28,640 --> 00:27:30,800 Speaker 1: I had done it, we wouldn't have been Goldman Sachs anymore. 522 00:27:30,840 --> 00:27:32,800 Speaker 1: We wouldn't have the people, we wouldn't be able to recruit, 523 00:27:32,800 --> 00:27:35,159 Speaker 1: we wouldn't be able to retain, the firm wouldn't have 524 00:27:35,160 --> 00:27:37,840 Speaker 1: had its relationship with the people. So I am intentionally 525 00:27:37,920 --> 00:27:40,080 Speaker 1: not asking the specific question you're asking because I don't 526 00:27:40,080 --> 00:27:42,160 Speaker 1: know about it. It's not like I'm shying away from 527 00:27:42,440 --> 00:27:45,720 Speaker 1: it'd be unfair. But I will say what doesn't get 528 00:27:46,359 --> 00:27:50,440 Speaker 1: talked about is the support that a firm should show 529 00:27:50,560 --> 00:27:53,960 Speaker 1: to its people if they believe that there's unfairness in 530 00:27:54,000 --> 00:27:55,679 Speaker 1: the world. And by the way, we're seeing some of 531 00:27:55,720 --> 00:27:59,119 Speaker 1: this stuff where people get merely sighted. I'm not saying 532 00:27:59,200 --> 00:28:02,960 Speaker 1: in this situation and where in a cancel culture world. 533 00:28:03,240 --> 00:28:06,439 Speaker 1: And again I'm talking more generically people are cunning and 534 00:28:06,480 --> 00:28:09,280 Speaker 1: running on people, not just in this context. Or you know, 535 00:28:09,359 --> 00:28:11,320 Speaker 1: every day you can read in the paper somebody's getting 536 00:28:11,320 --> 00:28:14,880 Speaker 1: fired for something that maybe three years from now they'll 537 00:28:14,880 --> 00:28:17,560 Speaker 1: look back and saying was that really? Was that really 538 00:28:17,560 --> 00:28:21,239 Speaker 1: a capital offense? And why the people overreacting to it. 539 00:28:21,320 --> 00:28:24,439 Speaker 1: So again I shy away from the specifics of this 540 00:28:24,520 --> 00:28:27,200 Speaker 1: because I don't know enough and it wouldn't be right 541 00:28:27,800 --> 00:28:30,840 Speaker 1: to comment. But I do say that the world more 542 00:28:30,920 --> 00:28:34,280 Speaker 1: generally isn't a bad The polarized world we're in today, 543 00:28:34,320 --> 00:28:39,320 Speaker 1: isn't a bad place with respect to penalties and accusations? 544 00:28:39,320 --> 00:28:44,320 Speaker 1: For question? You know, for you know, every crime is 545 00:28:44,360 --> 00:28:47,040 Speaker 1: a felony. Every felony is a capital offense, and I'm 546 00:28:47,040 --> 00:28:48,880 Speaker 1: not sure that that's warranted. 547 00:28:49,360 --> 00:28:51,320 Speaker 2: One more question on this note. You write about a 548 00:28:51,360 --> 00:28:55,200 Speaker 2: mantra that you used and read out to colleagues of 549 00:28:55,280 --> 00:28:57,000 Speaker 2: years at Golden and so there should be any tolerance 550 00:28:57,000 --> 00:28:59,480 Speaker 2: for bad behavior you observe at your company? Is that 551 00:28:59,520 --> 00:29:02,680 Speaker 2: not a book here? I think through sort of what's happened, 552 00:29:02,680 --> 00:29:05,520 Speaker 2: which is the board clearly vetted her and asked about 553 00:29:05,520 --> 00:29:06,160 Speaker 2: her relationship. 554 00:29:06,400 --> 00:29:07,920 Speaker 1: You keep wanting to talk about this. I don't really 555 00:29:08,000 --> 00:29:09,800 Speaker 1: have much to I don't have much to say about it. 556 00:29:10,200 --> 00:29:14,479 Speaker 1: I know, in a trial, the prosecutor informs the jury 557 00:29:15,120 --> 00:29:19,120 Speaker 1: about what, you know, how bad the victim suffered, But 558 00:29:19,200 --> 00:29:21,000 Speaker 1: at the end of the day, you still the jury 559 00:29:21,000 --> 00:29:24,080 Speaker 1: has to find out whether the person under trial was 560 00:29:24,120 --> 00:29:27,000 Speaker 1: the perpetrator or did anything wrong. So at the end 561 00:29:27,000 --> 00:29:28,960 Speaker 1: of the day, you can you can appeal to people's 562 00:29:29,000 --> 00:29:32,680 Speaker 1: emotion about how bad something, the outcome and the consequence 563 00:29:32,720 --> 00:29:35,040 Speaker 1: of something was, but you still have to decide whether 564 00:29:35,560 --> 00:29:38,640 Speaker 1: the person who's on the dock did something wrong. And 565 00:29:38,680 --> 00:29:42,600 Speaker 1: so you know, if you want to talk about what 566 00:29:42,720 --> 00:29:44,920 Speaker 1: happened in any given situation, I probably agree with you. 567 00:29:44,960 --> 00:29:46,920 Speaker 1: But at the end of the day, the ex lawyer 568 00:29:46,920 --> 00:29:51,840 Speaker 1: in me wants to focus this is all I am 569 00:29:51,920 --> 00:29:56,640 Speaker 1: with you, on the severity and the difficult of the outcomes. 570 00:29:56,960 --> 00:30:01,719 Speaker 1: And you want people who were responsible to suffer what 571 00:30:01,720 --> 00:30:03,719 Speaker 1: they deserve to suffer. But at the end of the day, 572 00:30:03,720 --> 00:30:05,080 Speaker 1: you still have to decide if these are the right 573 00:30:05,120 --> 00:30:08,160 Speaker 1: people and if what they did was caused the problem. 574 00:30:08,360 --> 00:30:10,320 Speaker 1: And so that's all. You know. You can go around, 575 00:30:10,800 --> 00:30:14,120 Speaker 1: go around about it, but I don't know this situation, only. 576 00:30:13,920 --> 00:30:14,880 Speaker 2: Pull back and ask just about that. 577 00:30:14,960 --> 00:30:17,920 Speaker 1: By the way, I got called by press people to 578 00:30:18,080 --> 00:30:21,600 Speaker 1: comment on my mentions in the Epstein file. There are 579 00:30:21,640 --> 00:30:25,920 Speaker 1: five mentions of his office trying to get in touch 580 00:30:25,960 --> 00:30:30,120 Speaker 1: with me to invite me to specific dinners, and I 581 00:30:30,240 --> 00:30:32,480 Speaker 1: kept being out of town. And by the way, I 582 00:30:32,640 --> 00:30:35,600 Speaker 1: have no memory of it. But you know, when people 583 00:30:35,680 --> 00:30:38,240 Speaker 1: I didn't know call my office invited me to stuff, 584 00:30:38,720 --> 00:30:40,520 Speaker 1: I never said no, but I didn't say yes if 585 00:30:40,520 --> 00:30:44,240 Speaker 1: I didn't know them. And so the fifth time the 586 00:30:44,280 --> 00:30:48,160 Speaker 1: memo went back internal to Epstein's organization. Should I keep 587 00:30:48,160 --> 00:30:51,360 Speaker 1: trying with Lloyd or should I give it up? And 588 00:30:51,400 --> 00:30:53,200 Speaker 1: the answer came back, I think at this point give 589 00:30:53,200 --> 00:30:57,320 Speaker 1: it up. And I didn't know that because if somebody 590 00:30:57,360 --> 00:30:59,040 Speaker 1: had asked me, did I ever meet him? No? Did 591 00:30:59,080 --> 00:31:01,040 Speaker 1: I ever engage with them? No? But it was, you know, 592 00:31:01,160 --> 00:31:04,440 Speaker 1: sidebar third parties discussing how I was responding, and I 593 00:31:04,520 --> 00:31:08,160 Speaker 1: frankly have no memory of not being responsive. But that 594 00:31:08,200 --> 00:31:12,160 Speaker 1: didn't stop reporters before I knew how I was mentioned 595 00:31:12,640 --> 00:31:14,200 Speaker 1: calling me up and asking me if I wanted to 596 00:31:14,280 --> 00:31:17,160 Speaker 1: comment on my mentions, just saying. 597 00:31:18,720 --> 00:31:23,160 Speaker 2: You characterize yourself as a moderate globalist. And I wonder 598 00:31:23,720 --> 00:31:26,720 Speaker 2: how you see the way that corporate America is interacting 599 00:31:26,800 --> 00:31:30,920 Speaker 2: with Washington today. What do you think as you watch 600 00:31:31,840 --> 00:31:35,120 Speaker 2: your contemporaries other CEOs interact with this White House in 601 00:31:35,160 --> 00:31:35,920 Speaker 2: the way in which they are. 602 00:31:36,080 --> 00:31:37,600 Speaker 1: Look, you have to do what you have to do. 603 00:31:37,640 --> 00:31:40,600 Speaker 1: If somebody I say somewhere else, look I don't want 604 00:31:40,600 --> 00:31:42,000 Speaker 1: to do this, I don't want to do that, blah 605 00:31:42,000 --> 00:31:43,800 Speaker 1: blah blah. But if somebody puts a gun in your head, 606 00:31:43,840 --> 00:31:46,080 Speaker 1: you're going to do stuff you otherwise wouldn't like to do. 607 00:31:47,760 --> 00:31:51,200 Speaker 1: I think I think we shouldn't have blue companies and 608 00:31:51,280 --> 00:31:51,960 Speaker 1: red companies. 609 00:31:53,240 --> 00:31:55,280 Speaker 2: I mean, I don't it feels that way to you? 610 00:31:55,400 --> 00:31:58,160 Speaker 1: Yeah, sorrying to go, oh yeah, it's starrying to feel 611 00:31:58,160 --> 00:32:02,760 Speaker 1: that people are being asked and expected to take positions 612 00:32:03,280 --> 00:32:06,280 Speaker 1: on the issue. On controversial issues, I think that, by 613 00:32:06,280 --> 00:32:09,840 Speaker 1: the way, are properly left to the political sector. I'm 614 00:32:09,880 --> 00:32:12,320 Speaker 1: not saying that people shouldn't have positions on them, but 615 00:32:12,400 --> 00:32:16,200 Speaker 1: not in terms of your platform. Because you're a you know, 616 00:32:16,280 --> 00:32:20,520 Speaker 1: because you're a consumer company and you're selling toothpaste. But 617 00:32:20,560 --> 00:32:23,920 Speaker 1: people are shoving microphones in people's faces and say, you 618 00:32:23,960 --> 00:32:26,080 Speaker 1: really should take a position here. I mean, so you 619 00:32:26,080 --> 00:32:29,000 Speaker 1: could take a position as an individual, but recognize the 620 00:32:29,040 --> 00:32:31,000 Speaker 1: reason why they're shoving the microphone in your face is 621 00:32:31,000 --> 00:32:34,160 Speaker 1: because you have the platform of your company, and since 622 00:32:34,200 --> 00:32:37,479 Speaker 1: you are the interest in you is coming from people's 623 00:32:37,480 --> 00:32:39,040 Speaker 1: interests in that platform. I think you have a duty 624 00:32:39,040 --> 00:32:41,480 Speaker 1: to do what's in the interest of the company. Now, 625 00:32:41,720 --> 00:32:44,600 Speaker 1: I think there are times when you not only can, 626 00:32:44,960 --> 00:32:47,880 Speaker 1: but maybe you should take a position, and that is 627 00:32:47,960 --> 00:32:51,440 Speaker 1: specifically where the issue that's being debated is in the 628 00:32:51,480 --> 00:32:54,880 Speaker 1: core of your expertise. So if the if there's a 629 00:32:54,920 --> 00:32:57,880 Speaker 1: government shut down, looming because they can't pass the government 630 00:32:57,920 --> 00:33:00,680 Speaker 1: can't pass a budget. I think you can ask Goldman Sachs, 631 00:33:00,720 --> 00:33:03,360 Speaker 1: what do you think the consequences will be, and somebody 632 00:33:03,360 --> 00:33:06,360 Speaker 1: at Goman Sacks who knows about this stuff should comment 633 00:33:06,480 --> 00:33:08,640 Speaker 1: upon it, take a view, and explain it to the 634 00:33:08,680 --> 00:33:11,320 Speaker 1: public why they have the view that they have. I 635 00:33:11,320 --> 00:33:16,520 Speaker 1: think there are cases where the issue affects your people 636 00:33:16,760 --> 00:33:19,040 Speaker 1: in a way that otherwise wouldn't allow them may or 637 00:33:19,080 --> 00:33:21,760 Speaker 1: may not allow them to do their jobs, like marriage equality. 638 00:33:21,760 --> 00:33:24,720 Speaker 1: I took a very strong position on marriage equality. I 639 00:33:24,960 --> 00:33:27,400 Speaker 1: was the chairman of the New York City Partnership, which 640 00:33:27,400 --> 00:33:29,040 Speaker 1: is like the kind of the local Chamber of Commerce, 641 00:33:29,040 --> 00:33:31,000 Speaker 1: but only for very big but for very very big 642 00:33:31,000 --> 00:33:33,640 Speaker 1: companies in New York, and we were very strong on 643 00:33:33,720 --> 00:33:37,320 Speaker 1: that issue and we lobbied for it. But in that respect, 644 00:33:37,520 --> 00:33:39,680 Speaker 1: I'm the champion of the people who work at Goman Sachs. 645 00:33:40,280 --> 00:33:43,120 Speaker 1: As individuals. You can vote, you can make statements, you 646 00:33:43,120 --> 00:33:45,920 Speaker 1: can carry a placard and march, but I'm not sure 647 00:33:45,960 --> 00:33:50,800 Speaker 1: it's right to use the prestige of your corporation, and 648 00:33:50,920 --> 00:33:53,320 Speaker 1: certainly I don't think you should be required to do that. 649 00:33:53,720 --> 00:33:55,960 Speaker 1: And there are people who would want to require companies 650 00:33:56,000 --> 00:33:58,440 Speaker 1: to do that. It makes sense sense. Why should we 651 00:33:58,440 --> 00:34:01,760 Speaker 1: divide countries polarized enough? Why should we divide our economy 652 00:34:01,760 --> 00:34:02,160 Speaker 1: in half? 653 00:34:02,480 --> 00:34:05,320 Speaker 2: On that issue of polarization, we've seen companies have to 654 00:34:05,320 --> 00:34:07,400 Speaker 2: go to the White House, the US government taking stakes 655 00:34:07,400 --> 00:34:10,120 Speaker 2: in companies. What do you make of that in the 656 00:34:10,200 --> 00:34:13,880 Speaker 2: year twenty twenty six, to see a Republican president heading 657 00:34:13,880 --> 00:34:14,520 Speaker 2: down that path. 658 00:34:14,880 --> 00:34:18,160 Speaker 1: Look, I think, you know, one shouldn't defend the extreme 659 00:34:18,200 --> 00:34:21,920 Speaker 1: of anything, So I generally, I think the economy does 660 00:34:21,960 --> 00:34:26,359 Speaker 1: well without centralized controls, centralized management of government dictates. I'm 661 00:34:26,440 --> 00:34:30,640 Speaker 1: glad that al Gore never built the Information super Highway 662 00:34:30,680 --> 00:34:34,400 Speaker 1: and laid all that cable five minutes before, you know, 663 00:34:34,440 --> 00:34:36,560 Speaker 1: before the cloud, the Internet and the cloud took over 664 00:34:36,600 --> 00:34:39,719 Speaker 1: and made it vestigial. The strength of the US economy 665 00:34:39,760 --> 00:34:42,879 Speaker 1: is that we have millions of decision makers, and the 666 00:34:42,920 --> 00:34:45,040 Speaker 1: real strength of the economy is that when those decision 667 00:34:45,080 --> 00:34:49,319 Speaker 1: makers are wrong, you know, you build an airport in 668 00:34:49,360 --> 00:34:52,400 Speaker 1: the wrong place, planes don't land, their fees don't get paid, 669 00:34:53,080 --> 00:34:55,920 Speaker 1: the bank loans don't get paid off. They repossess, they 670 00:34:55,920 --> 00:34:57,880 Speaker 1: plow it over, and they build a Walmart quicker than 671 00:34:57,920 --> 00:35:00,000 Speaker 1: any other country. Would that's the strength of our economy. 672 00:35:00,120 --> 00:35:05,280 Speaker 1: Me having government as a decider or having government owning 673 00:35:05,280 --> 00:35:08,200 Speaker 1: a stake such that it slows down the processes that 674 00:35:08,280 --> 00:35:11,319 Speaker 1: I just described is not a good thing. Is there 675 00:35:11,400 --> 00:35:17,320 Speaker 1: room for government? Sometimes? Yes, orphan drugs that otherwise wouldn't 676 00:35:17,320 --> 00:35:20,840 Speaker 1: be made, where we have a social thing, delivering rural 677 00:35:20,920 --> 00:35:25,040 Speaker 1: mail where nobody would the electrification of the Tennessee value 678 00:35:25,080 --> 00:35:27,320 Speaker 1: in the thirties, where nobody would have spent that money. 679 00:35:28,120 --> 00:35:32,480 Speaker 1: Supply chain where no individual company has the wherewithal of 680 00:35:32,520 --> 00:35:34,640 Speaker 1: the incentive to play that money with. They have to 681 00:35:34,680 --> 00:35:37,440 Speaker 1: invest some infrastructure as a matter of public policy or 682 00:35:37,560 --> 00:35:41,359 Speaker 1: national security. A lot of opportunities for government. Maybe they've 683 00:35:41,400 --> 00:35:45,000 Speaker 1: hit all the right ones, but I think there are 684 00:35:45,000 --> 00:35:47,439 Speaker 1: a lot of wrong ones that are possibly to be hit. 685 00:35:48,000 --> 00:35:51,200 Speaker 1: And if the government is involved in it, it may 686 00:35:51,239 --> 00:35:53,600 Speaker 1: get too much capital, and it may have that capital 687 00:35:53,680 --> 00:35:56,120 Speaker 1: much longer than it needs to do, and the incentive 688 00:35:56,160 --> 00:36:00,520 Speaker 1: structure is just discombobulated, so there's not no time for it. 689 00:36:01,200 --> 00:36:03,400 Speaker 2: But it's not a lot lood Blade Flan, Thank you 690 00:36:03,480 --> 00:36:03,839 Speaker 2: very much. 691 00:36:03,960 --> 00:36:04,279 Speaker 1: Thank you. 692 00:36:09,520 --> 00:36:11,880 Speaker 2: This is the big take from Bloomberg News. I'm David Gura. 693 00:36:12,280 --> 00:36:14,680 Speaker 2: To get more from the Big Take and unlimited access 694 00:36:14,680 --> 00:36:17,840 Speaker 2: to all of bloomberg dot Com. Subscribe today at bloomberg 695 00:36:17,880 --> 00:36:21,320 Speaker 2: dot com slash podcast offer. You can watch this episode 696 00:36:21,440 --> 00:36:23,840 Speaker 2: on YouTube. If you like this episode, make sure to 697 00:36:23,880 --> 00:36:26,400 Speaker 2: follow and review The Big Take wherever you listen to podcasts. 698 00:36:26,520 --> 00:36:29,239 Speaker 2: It helps people find the show. Thanks for listening. We'll 699 00:36:29,280 --> 00:36:29,960 Speaker 2: be back tomorrow