1 00:00:00,240 --> 00:00:04,720 Speaker 1: From UFOs to psychic powers and government conspiracies. History is 2 00:00:04,800 --> 00:00:09,119 Speaker 1: riddled with unexplained events. You can turn back now or 3 00:00:09,200 --> 00:00:12,079 Speaker 1: learn the stuff they don't want you to know. A 4 00:00:12,240 --> 00:00:25,680 Speaker 1: production of I Heart Radio. Hello, welcome back to the show. 5 00:00:25,760 --> 00:00:28,600 Speaker 1: My name is Matt, my name is known. They called 6 00:00:28,600 --> 00:00:32,160 Speaker 1: me Ben. We're joined as always with our superproducer Alexis 7 00:00:32,200 --> 00:00:36,280 Speaker 1: code named Dot Holiday Jackson. Most importantly, you are you. 8 00:00:36,280 --> 00:00:39,680 Speaker 1: You are here. That makes this the stuff they don't 9 00:00:39,880 --> 00:00:43,080 Speaker 1: want you to know. Uh, folks. As we said before, 10 00:00:43,120 --> 00:00:45,920 Speaker 1: August is always a busy month for your pals over 11 00:00:46,000 --> 00:00:48,640 Speaker 1: here at stuff they don't want you to know. And 12 00:00:48,760 --> 00:00:52,599 Speaker 1: we're all officially back ish in the States. We're going 13 00:00:52,640 --> 00:00:56,240 Speaker 1: to be back in Atlanta altogether pretty soon. But the 14 00:00:56,360 --> 00:01:00,160 Speaker 1: show goes on. So we're returning to you with were 15 00:01:00,360 --> 00:01:03,520 Speaker 1: Strange News and Matt Well. I think you guys both 16 00:01:03,560 --> 00:01:06,800 Speaker 1: had run ins before with the experience I described in 17 00:01:06,840 --> 00:01:10,399 Speaker 1: the in the original Strange News, which is it can 18 00:01:10,440 --> 00:01:14,640 Speaker 1: be so devilish lee difficult to find just one story sometimes. 19 00:01:14,720 --> 00:01:17,120 Speaker 1: And we've got we've got a backlog right because we 20 00:01:17,160 --> 00:01:20,720 Speaker 1: had some classic episodes last week in place of Strange 21 00:01:20,720 --> 00:01:23,160 Speaker 1: News and listener mail segments. But we're coming with some 22 00:01:23,280 --> 00:01:27,200 Speaker 1: fire today. Well, yeah, yeah, we're super kind to you know, 23 00:01:27,280 --> 00:01:30,120 Speaker 1: put off one or more of these, um due to 24 00:01:30,200 --> 00:01:32,320 Speaker 1: my absence, and I'm really happy to be back. A 25 00:01:32,400 --> 00:01:34,560 Speaker 1: lot of these stories continue to be valid. There may 26 00:01:34,600 --> 00:01:37,319 Speaker 1: even be updates from the first hits that we had 27 00:01:37,360 --> 00:01:39,560 Speaker 1: of them, and um yeah, I'm really excited to dig 28 00:01:39,560 --> 00:01:42,160 Speaker 1: in and see what everyone came up with. Well, let's 29 00:01:42,160 --> 00:01:45,000 Speaker 1: get started. Then mine is a little bit stale, if 30 00:01:45,080 --> 00:01:53,240 Speaker 1: not hardened and uh dehydrated, perhaps piece of give us 31 00:01:53,280 --> 00:01:58,200 Speaker 1: the straight man. I was picturingly more like a piece 32 00:01:58,200 --> 00:02:00,600 Speaker 1: of shredded wheat that had fallen between the car seats. 33 00:02:00,600 --> 00:02:02,880 Speaker 1: And then you went somewhere completely different with that, and 34 00:02:02,920 --> 00:02:08,320 Speaker 1: I respect you for it. Man, Well, thank you. Uh, 35 00:02:08,520 --> 00:02:14,440 Speaker 1: we're jumping to some news from July eight two comes 36 00:02:14,480 --> 00:02:18,400 Speaker 1: from AP News, written by Samantha Hendrickson. Title of the 37 00:02:18,520 --> 00:02:27,280 Speaker 1: story is feces mailed to Ohio GOP lawmakers Post Office Investigates. Well, 38 00:02:27,720 --> 00:02:29,919 Speaker 1: we've we've talked about things that have been sent through 39 00:02:29,919 --> 00:02:33,240 Speaker 1: the mail before on this show. We've talked about ye 40 00:02:33,320 --> 00:02:37,919 Speaker 1: old Ted Kazinski, probably the most dangerous of the people 41 00:02:37,960 --> 00:02:40,120 Speaker 1: and events that we've spoken about when it comes to 42 00:02:40,240 --> 00:02:44,440 Speaker 1: what happens with our our mail and the heroic people 43 00:02:44,480 --> 00:02:47,920 Speaker 1: that are out there right now delivering it every day. 44 00:02:47,960 --> 00:02:50,080 Speaker 1: Thank you to everybody out there listening that does that 45 00:02:50,400 --> 00:02:52,320 Speaker 1: or is doing it now right. Some of our folks 46 00:02:52,360 --> 00:02:57,160 Speaker 1: are on deliveries that is correct from Amazon to what 47 00:02:57,440 --> 00:03:06,240 Speaker 1: dhl uspsd X know your neighborhood corner guy even might 48 00:03:06,280 --> 00:03:14,320 Speaker 1: make a trip curry carrying pigeon task rabbit. Yes, you're 49 00:03:14,360 --> 00:03:17,480 Speaker 1: dealing with all kinds of strange substances that you are 50 00:03:17,560 --> 00:03:21,519 Speaker 1: unaware of because they are packaged up all nice and neat, unless, 51 00:03:21,560 --> 00:03:25,359 Speaker 1: of course, they smell a little bit like poo poo. Uh. 52 00:03:25,440 --> 00:03:27,679 Speaker 1: Even then you might not be aware because it could 53 00:03:27,720 --> 00:03:30,280 Speaker 1: just be contaminated with fecal matter and not you know, 54 00:03:30,440 --> 00:03:34,960 Speaker 1: smell like the full thing. In this story, it discusses 55 00:03:35,000 --> 00:03:39,000 Speaker 1: how twenty five individual state Republican senators in one week 56 00:03:39,520 --> 00:03:44,960 Speaker 1: were sent mail that was contaminated with feces or feces 57 00:03:45,080 --> 00:03:51,720 Speaker 1: was specifically mailed within a letter, right within an envelope. 58 00:03:52,000 --> 00:03:54,840 Speaker 1: Here's the deal too. It wasn't like it was some 59 00:03:54,920 --> 00:03:57,040 Speaker 1: kind of manifesto that was written to each of these 60 00:03:57,040 --> 00:04:01,360 Speaker 1: individual lawmakers. It was just it was just pop it 61 00:04:01,440 --> 00:04:03,960 Speaker 1: wasn't as though there was some point to be made 62 00:04:04,040 --> 00:04:07,080 Speaker 1: necessarily other than here, this is what I think you 63 00:04:07,080 --> 00:04:10,920 Speaker 1: should get in the mail. Well, whatever happened to carrying 64 00:04:10,920 --> 00:04:13,920 Speaker 1: your own hoop to the doorstep of your enemy and 65 00:04:13,920 --> 00:04:16,520 Speaker 1: and and setting it on fire manually? I mean, why 66 00:04:16,520 --> 00:04:18,599 Speaker 1: do we have to involve these third parties in this? 67 00:04:18,839 --> 00:04:23,880 Speaker 1: It just seems very inconsiderate innocence, you know, cowards. I say, 68 00:04:24,520 --> 00:04:27,560 Speaker 1: if you, if you take take the take the flaming 69 00:04:27,600 --> 00:04:31,320 Speaker 1: poop to your opponent. Also, Matt, before we go on, 70 00:04:31,440 --> 00:04:33,520 Speaker 1: I just want to answer a question I'm sure a 71 00:04:33,520 --> 00:04:36,040 Speaker 1: lot of our fellow listeners have, and it's it's a 72 00:04:36,080 --> 00:04:39,479 Speaker 1: weird one because I looked into this before we rolled. Actually, 73 00:04:39,480 --> 00:04:42,680 Speaker 1: I've been excited about this story. Uh. It is in 74 00:04:42,720 --> 00:04:46,440 Speaker 1: the United States entirely legal and not against the law 75 00:04:47,000 --> 00:04:51,520 Speaker 1: to mail poop unless you are specifically mailing it to 76 00:04:51,600 --> 00:04:55,880 Speaker 1: harass people. Did that the motive? We remember, Matt, you 77 00:04:55,880 --> 00:05:00,560 Speaker 1: did another story while back that discussed the legal and 78 00:05:00,640 --> 00:05:02,760 Speaker 1: the way it has to be marked. If you're sending 79 00:05:02,800 --> 00:05:11,600 Speaker 1: like medical specimens that could contain you know, agents body right, 80 00:05:11,800 --> 00:05:14,640 Speaker 1: but it also like you know, pathogens and things like that, 81 00:05:14,680 --> 00:05:17,280 Speaker 1: there has to be some labeling if you're doing if 82 00:05:17,320 --> 00:05:20,600 Speaker 1: you're going by the book, Yeah, it becomes dangerous and 83 00:05:20,960 --> 00:05:23,560 Speaker 1: and I don't know the legality been about it, but 84 00:05:23,760 --> 00:05:28,040 Speaker 1: it becomes dangerous if it's unsecured specimen, right, if it's 85 00:05:28,120 --> 00:05:38,200 Speaker 1: just just in a container, that's what it's bad. And 86 00:05:38,279 --> 00:05:43,360 Speaker 1: that's that's how the state of Ohio characterize it, right, 87 00:05:43,360 --> 00:05:47,760 Speaker 1: Because when you send an unsecured sample in this way 88 00:05:47,800 --> 00:05:50,599 Speaker 1: to the Statehouse, everybody in that state House, or at 89 00:05:50,640 --> 00:05:53,920 Speaker 1: least the mail receiving area of that Statehouse, or if 90 00:05:53,960 --> 00:05:57,000 Speaker 1: the mail actually gets to the office of one of 91 00:05:57,040 --> 00:06:00,120 Speaker 1: the lawmakers, that's when it becomes dangerous because any one 92 00:06:00,160 --> 00:06:04,359 Speaker 1: that opens it, they themselves could become contaminated, maybe even 93 00:06:04,800 --> 00:06:06,240 Speaker 1: you know, depending on what it looks like. Because we 94 00:06:06,279 --> 00:06:08,719 Speaker 1: don't have a ton of information. They didn't take any 95 00:06:08,760 --> 00:06:16,919 Speaker 1: pictures at least that I've seen, uh of fiber. What 96 00:06:17,080 --> 00:06:20,239 Speaker 1: was the consistency? Was it ropey? Was it a ropy 97 00:06:22,080 --> 00:06:24,880 Speaker 1: water test? Was there a water test? Is it a floater? 98 00:06:25,080 --> 00:06:27,680 Speaker 1: Is it a plunker? I mean, these are health questions 99 00:06:27,720 --> 00:06:31,120 Speaker 1: at some point. I'm just concerned for the health and 100 00:06:31,160 --> 00:06:34,760 Speaker 1: well being of this. I'm titling, I'm titling this part 101 00:06:34,800 --> 00:06:37,839 Speaker 1: is loose poop. It's going to be the title lose 102 00:06:37,920 --> 00:06:42,760 Speaker 1: foods SI scoops. I don't know skits never mind, move on, 103 00:06:42,920 --> 00:06:45,200 Speaker 1: moving on, alright, So, so I'm gonna give you a 104 00:06:45,320 --> 00:06:49,560 Speaker 1: quote from this original article from John Fortney Fortney fo 105 00:06:49,680 --> 00:06:51,680 Speaker 1: or t N E. Y. I honestly don't know how 106 00:06:51,680 --> 00:06:55,120 Speaker 1: to pronounce it. Um, but he gave this quote. This 107 00:06:55,160 --> 00:06:57,680 Speaker 1: type of bio hazard attack doesn't just stop with the 108 00:06:57,680 --> 00:07:00,599 Speaker 1: people it's directed towards. This is something that could potentially 109 00:07:00,600 --> 00:07:03,880 Speaker 1: affect every single employee at the Ohio Statehouse, regardless of 110 00:07:03,880 --> 00:07:08,440 Speaker 1: their political affiliation. Um, that makes sense. And then moving 111 00:07:08,440 --> 00:07:10,240 Speaker 1: away from that quote, I'm gonna give you another quote 112 00:07:10,240 --> 00:07:13,600 Speaker 1: from the article says, the US Postal Services Law Enforcement 113 00:07:13,680 --> 00:07:17,640 Speaker 1: Arm is investigating the matter as a federal crime, a 114 00:07:17,840 --> 00:07:22,960 Speaker 1: federal crime most likely because it was aimed at lawmakers, right. Um. 115 00:07:23,040 --> 00:07:26,080 Speaker 1: And they also said in this article they wouldn't comment 116 00:07:26,400 --> 00:07:30,280 Speaker 1: when this happened on whether it was human or animal waste. 117 00:07:30,680 --> 00:07:34,720 Speaker 1: That's what they said. So that's that was early July 118 00:07:35,120 --> 00:07:40,280 Speaker 1: of this year. Then, you guys, almost exactly a month later, 119 00:07:41,280 --> 00:07:44,800 Speaker 1: on August eight, another story came out of the AP 120 00:07:44,960 --> 00:07:50,840 Speaker 1: again by Samantha Hendrickson and this title is x Ohio 121 00:07:51,120 --> 00:07:57,800 Speaker 1: court mediator arrested allegedly sent feces to GOP. So it 122 00:07:57,880 --> 00:08:01,200 Speaker 1: took a month, but they tracked down the old culprit because, 123 00:08:01,320 --> 00:08:03,720 Speaker 1: I mean probably because they he gave him a nice 124 00:08:03,720 --> 00:08:07,400 Speaker 1: little DNA sample every time he committed a crime. I'm 125 00:08:07,440 --> 00:08:12,760 Speaker 1: assuming a serial poop Taylor. Oh, I didn't catch that. Yeah, 126 00:08:12,760 --> 00:08:18,480 Speaker 1: it was Yeah, that's how it happened. Yes, at least. 127 00:08:19,080 --> 00:08:22,840 Speaker 1: I'm sorry. I'm sorry, I'm not Yeah, I'll just give 128 00:08:22,880 --> 00:08:26,560 Speaker 1: you here. It was at least three dozen feces filled 129 00:08:26,720 --> 00:08:30,080 Speaker 1: letters that were sent by this one person. And the 130 00:08:30,080 --> 00:08:32,720 Speaker 1: person arrested. His name is Richard. I won't give you 131 00:08:32,720 --> 00:08:34,680 Speaker 1: a full thing just for the sake of this episode. 132 00:08:34,679 --> 00:08:36,880 Speaker 1: You can look it up if you want to. He 133 00:08:37,200 --> 00:08:41,920 Speaker 1: is a seventy seven year old man from m O 134 00:08:42,040 --> 00:08:45,040 Speaker 1: G A d O R E Ohio. Seventy seven year 135 00:08:45,080 --> 00:08:49,240 Speaker 1: old dude angry send him poop everywhere, regular as hell, 136 00:08:49,679 --> 00:08:52,439 Speaker 1: I would argue. I want to point out that a 137 00:08:52,559 --> 00:08:55,600 Speaker 1: court mediator is an interesting position for someone to have 138 00:08:56,040 --> 00:08:58,960 Speaker 1: as a background and make this decision, because a court 139 00:08:59,040 --> 00:09:04,960 Speaker 1: mediator is all about finding reasonable agreements between two opposing parties. 140 00:09:05,240 --> 00:09:08,560 Speaker 1: So I think maybe our pal Richard has been saving 141 00:09:08,640 --> 00:09:11,560 Speaker 1: up some frustration for a while. This is not typical 142 00:09:11,640 --> 00:09:18,120 Speaker 1: court mediator behavior. We should say, yeah, he'st do They 143 00:09:18,160 --> 00:09:20,200 Speaker 1: usually say to you, like I a mediator, it's successful 144 00:09:20,240 --> 00:09:24,160 Speaker 1: of doing their job. Than neither parties are particularly happy. True, 145 00:09:24,160 --> 00:09:27,199 Speaker 1: it's kind of Solomon's. Uh, it's kind of a King 146 00:09:27,280 --> 00:09:30,640 Speaker 1: Solomon argument at times. Right that no one should walk 147 00:09:30,679 --> 00:09:35,040 Speaker 1: away feeling like Dave knocked it out, because then it's 148 00:09:35,040 --> 00:09:39,480 Speaker 1: not a compromise or negotiation. But uh, this so, Matt, Okay, 149 00:09:39,480 --> 00:09:42,240 Speaker 1: we've established that this guy did it, Like you said, 150 00:09:42,320 --> 00:09:46,080 Speaker 1: it's a very important point. Believe he WINNI mail poop. Right. 151 00:09:46,200 --> 00:09:49,319 Speaker 1: He's charged but not convicted. It's not going to take 152 00:09:49,360 --> 00:09:55,080 Speaker 1: a ton of forensic science to verify, uh, to verify 153 00:09:55,160 --> 00:09:58,600 Speaker 1: who's playing Santa with the coca here? Yeah? Yeah, because 154 00:09:58,640 --> 00:10:00,480 Speaker 1: you think about it, even if it was maybe an 155 00:10:00,520 --> 00:10:04,320 Speaker 1: animal that Richard owns, uh it could they could trace 156 00:10:04,400 --> 00:10:06,440 Speaker 1: that back to the animal, get a DNA sample and 157 00:10:06,480 --> 00:10:08,880 Speaker 1: then oh there you go, Bob's your uncle. I don't 158 00:10:08,880 --> 00:10:11,000 Speaker 1: know how it works. Uh, it was it was the 159 00:10:11,480 --> 00:10:16,679 Speaker 1: right poop. So he's charged with sending quote injurious articles 160 00:10:16,720 --> 00:10:20,760 Speaker 1: as non maaile vel violating a federal law that prohibits 161 00:10:20,800 --> 00:10:24,559 Speaker 1: mailing certain things, including hazardous materials um And that's according 162 00:10:24,600 --> 00:10:27,080 Speaker 1: court records. The thing that he has charged with, this 163 00:10:27,160 --> 00:10:30,440 Speaker 1: specific thing is a misdemeanor, but it carries a maximum 164 00:10:30,480 --> 00:10:34,199 Speaker 1: prison sentence of a year and a one hundred thousand 165 00:10:34,240 --> 00:10:39,280 Speaker 1: dollar fine. That is an expensive poop trip. That is egregious. 166 00:10:39,320 --> 00:10:42,880 Speaker 1: Like also, though, is it because and I don't know 167 00:10:42,960 --> 00:10:46,760 Speaker 1: this part, that is it because they proved a malicious intent? 168 00:10:47,040 --> 00:10:50,920 Speaker 1: Or is it simply because he was not adhering to 169 00:10:51,120 --> 00:10:55,959 Speaker 1: the procedures and the correct packaging precautions people left. That's 170 00:10:56,000 --> 00:11:00,160 Speaker 1: a very interesting distinction because sure feels like, you know, 171 00:11:00,559 --> 00:11:05,240 Speaker 1: it could be seen as a there's a threatening, you know, behavior, 172 00:11:05,920 --> 00:11:08,040 Speaker 1: but that's hard to prove, right, Like, it's all about 173 00:11:08,040 --> 00:11:11,440 Speaker 1: intent there. So how do they ultimately get him, Matt, Well, 174 00:11:11,480 --> 00:11:13,520 Speaker 1: it could be presented that way. I will tell you 175 00:11:13,520 --> 00:11:15,559 Speaker 1: how they ultimately got him. And this is an important note, 176 00:11:16,040 --> 00:11:22,000 Speaker 1: the poop filled letters never actually made it to the offices. Okay, 177 00:11:22,000 --> 00:11:24,439 Speaker 1: So we we were theorizing like it would be dangerous 178 00:11:24,520 --> 00:11:27,079 Speaker 1: right there, um Fortnity was talking about it would be 179 00:11:27,120 --> 00:11:30,679 Speaker 1: dangerous if it showed up, but because the the United 180 00:11:30,679 --> 00:11:34,679 Speaker 1: States Mail services, so it's crazy complicated, uh, and it's 181 00:11:34,679 --> 00:11:39,000 Speaker 1: amazing the way the system functions. These letters were deemed 182 00:11:39,040 --> 00:11:42,360 Speaker 1: to have stuff in them that shouldn't be mailed because 183 00:11:42,960 --> 00:11:47,880 Speaker 1: there were false return addresses on the on the actual envelopes, 184 00:11:48,480 --> 00:11:52,040 Speaker 1: so the system caught it before it even sent anything out. 185 00:11:52,160 --> 00:11:55,960 Speaker 1: Because if if a return address is not correct, uh, 186 00:11:56,080 --> 00:12:00,520 Speaker 1: it often will get placed into a specific sorting not 187 00:12:00,640 --> 00:12:03,080 Speaker 1: a bin, but a sorting system, and then it would 188 00:12:03,120 --> 00:12:07,560 Speaker 1: be returned or destroyed or just kept until a correct 189 00:12:07,559 --> 00:12:11,599 Speaker 1: return address could be found because a phony or inaccurate 190 00:12:11,640 --> 00:12:14,200 Speaker 1: return address it would be a red flag. So I mean, 191 00:12:14,520 --> 00:12:17,000 Speaker 1: do do some of those maybe like go through higher 192 00:12:17,040 --> 00:12:21,000 Speaker 1: scrutiny sorting or like inspection or is it is the 193 00:12:21,120 --> 00:12:24,400 Speaker 1: like you know, the typical procedure. They just go back immediately. 194 00:12:24,600 --> 00:12:26,400 Speaker 1: I don't know the ins and outs of it, of 195 00:12:26,440 --> 00:12:29,320 Speaker 1: how it functions. There's a great video you can watch 196 00:12:29,559 --> 00:12:33,800 Speaker 1: their several actually that shows part of the the system, 197 00:12:33,880 --> 00:12:35,880 Speaker 1: but not all of it because some of that stuff 198 00:12:36,040 --> 00:12:38,760 Speaker 1: is pretty sensitive and and you know, it would be 199 00:12:38,840 --> 00:12:43,400 Speaker 1: dangerous if everybody knew exactly how it functioned. But it's 200 00:12:43,440 --> 00:12:45,679 Speaker 1: it's super cool and and and complicated is the best 201 00:12:45,679 --> 00:12:47,480 Speaker 1: way to say, I don't know, Ben, Do you know more? Yeah, 202 00:12:47,520 --> 00:12:51,720 Speaker 1: a little bit? Uh? So what what you need to do? Really, 203 00:12:52,200 --> 00:12:55,439 Speaker 1: and this is not advice, but if you which you 204 00:12:55,520 --> 00:12:59,439 Speaker 1: need to remember when you're mailing something is you don't 205 00:12:59,520 --> 00:13:02,520 Speaker 1: have to put the full return address. In the US, 206 00:13:02,600 --> 00:13:04,839 Speaker 1: you can often just put the ZIP code or used 207 00:13:04,840 --> 00:13:07,240 Speaker 1: to be able to. And so the easiest way for 208 00:13:07,280 --> 00:13:10,680 Speaker 1: someone to cross check that is to say, hey, was 209 00:13:10,800 --> 00:13:14,080 Speaker 1: this dropped in a box or sent through the post 210 00:13:14,600 --> 00:13:18,120 Speaker 1: uh in a place where that ZIP code is right? 211 00:13:18,400 --> 00:13:21,840 Speaker 1: Or was it really far away? Is somebody sending something 212 00:13:22,080 --> 00:13:25,760 Speaker 1: from say Dallas, but they're purporting to send it from 213 00:13:25,800 --> 00:13:30,200 Speaker 1: Portland's unnecessary tongue twister there? So what you want to 214 00:13:30,240 --> 00:13:34,840 Speaker 1: do if you again this is not advice, but what 215 00:13:34,840 --> 00:13:37,440 Speaker 1: what you would want to do as an observation is 216 00:13:37,480 --> 00:13:41,240 Speaker 1: if you were trying to send something from UH nine 217 00:13:41,240 --> 00:13:43,880 Speaker 1: o two one oh to take a famous zip code, 218 00:13:44,200 --> 00:13:47,880 Speaker 1: then you would physically want to drop it in a 219 00:13:47,960 --> 00:13:50,240 Speaker 1: box in nine O two one oh. And if you 220 00:13:50,360 --> 00:13:55,559 Speaker 1: don't want to be um, well this goes into being surveilled. 221 00:13:55,640 --> 00:13:57,800 Speaker 1: But uh, if you if you want to try to 222 00:13:57,840 --> 00:14:01,200 Speaker 1: be clean, let's serve that eagle doesn't get mad at 223 00:14:01,200 --> 00:14:03,560 Speaker 1: as Matt Noel. Let's say you're trying to surprise someone 224 00:14:03,840 --> 00:14:05,880 Speaker 1: and it's a nice thing. You're not sending them poop, 225 00:14:05,920 --> 00:14:10,160 Speaker 1: You're sending them, uh, the happy Birthday card or whatever. 226 00:14:10,720 --> 00:14:12,920 Speaker 1: Then what you would want to do is not go 227 00:14:13,080 --> 00:14:17,559 Speaker 1: into the physical uh post office. You would want to 228 00:14:17,600 --> 00:14:19,960 Speaker 1: go to a letter drop and then you would drop 229 00:14:20,000 --> 00:14:23,520 Speaker 1: it there in the same zip code as the return address, 230 00:14:23,560 --> 00:14:27,280 Speaker 1: so you're not faking the return address. Really, it's it's 231 00:14:27,360 --> 00:14:29,600 Speaker 1: not too much of a workaround, but it's the best 232 00:14:29,640 --> 00:14:31,920 Speaker 1: way to do it. Hey, that that would work out. 233 00:14:32,360 --> 00:14:33,880 Speaker 1: I want to get back to you the question you 234 00:14:33,920 --> 00:14:37,800 Speaker 1: asked nol how do they catch him? So the US 235 00:14:37,880 --> 00:14:42,640 Speaker 1: Postal Inspection Service actually surveilled him. They watched him, and 236 00:14:42,680 --> 00:14:46,160 Speaker 1: they watched him in his home, which is kind of 237 00:14:46,880 --> 00:14:51,200 Speaker 1: kind of creepy, uh, but it's what you do. They 238 00:14:51,240 --> 00:14:54,680 Speaker 1: watched him attempt to mail a letter while wearing gloves, 239 00:14:55,040 --> 00:14:58,680 Speaker 1: which you know, there's a little sass if you're going 240 00:14:58,720 --> 00:15:00,920 Speaker 1: to do that. Maybe you're just trying to be tidy 241 00:15:01,080 --> 00:15:06,760 Speaker 1: and you know safe or not contaminate your your envelope 242 00:15:06,760 --> 00:15:08,480 Speaker 1: with feces because you just went to the bathroom, so 243 00:15:08,520 --> 00:15:10,040 Speaker 1: you put on gloves. It's just to be nice to 244 00:15:10,520 --> 00:15:13,960 Speaker 1: the receiver. But in this case, they went and checked 245 00:15:14,000 --> 00:15:17,840 Speaker 1: out the letter and it was determined to be contaminated 246 00:15:17,840 --> 00:15:22,160 Speaker 1: with feces and it was addressed to Jim Jordan's representative, 247 00:15:22,240 --> 00:15:26,880 Speaker 1: Jim Jordan's apparently. Uh so this is There's another similar 248 00:15:26,960 --> 00:15:31,680 Speaker 1: case from a few years ago from I think, but 249 00:15:31,760 --> 00:15:34,920 Speaker 1: it wasn't politically motivated. There was this lady in Iowa 250 00:15:35,520 --> 00:15:40,040 Speaker 1: who got charged for mailing cow feeces calmaneure to her 251 00:15:40,080 --> 00:15:43,560 Speaker 1: neighbors because they didn't like how her dog was barking. 252 00:15:43,840 --> 00:15:47,720 Speaker 1: Her dog was behaving, and uh she got charged with 253 00:15:47,960 --> 00:15:52,480 Speaker 1: third degree harassment. So I'm not sure what the uh like, 254 00:15:52,600 --> 00:15:55,760 Speaker 1: what the sentencinge would be for that. But with at 255 00:15:55,760 --> 00:15:58,240 Speaker 1: the age of seventy seven, you know, we can make 256 00:15:58,320 --> 00:16:03,440 Speaker 1: some assumptions that this guy is um he's putting his 257 00:16:04,320 --> 00:16:08,920 Speaker 1: personal beliefs over the idea of personal safety. Right. It 258 00:16:08,920 --> 00:16:13,960 Speaker 1: doesn't sound like he was trying especially hard to remain anonymous. 259 00:16:14,440 --> 00:16:18,040 Speaker 1: It seems like he kind of was, but maybe he 260 00:16:18,040 --> 00:16:21,120 Speaker 1: didn't care because he's seventy seven and he's like everyone, 261 00:16:21,160 --> 00:16:25,520 Speaker 1: am I going to get a year right now? He's 262 00:16:25,520 --> 00:16:29,880 Speaker 1: out on bond. I think it's dollar bond, and his 263 00:16:30,000 --> 00:16:32,960 Speaker 1: next hearing is tomorrow as of the day that we 264 00:16:33,000 --> 00:16:36,400 Speaker 1: record this, not when you're hearing it, so August. But 265 00:16:36,560 --> 00:16:39,320 Speaker 1: if they can't, if they can't prove he was doing 266 00:16:39,360 --> 00:16:43,360 Speaker 1: it as harassment, right, If they can't prove the motive, 267 00:16:43,440 --> 00:16:46,440 Speaker 1: then that might change the conversation. What if he is 268 00:16:46,520 --> 00:16:49,920 Speaker 1: just um what what if he's able to say I'm 269 00:16:49,960 --> 00:16:52,920 Speaker 1: just very proud of my hoop and I want more 270 00:16:52,920 --> 00:16:55,200 Speaker 1: people to appreciate it. I want to hear that argument. 271 00:16:55,240 --> 00:16:57,360 Speaker 1: I want to be a juror if if there, if 272 00:16:57,440 --> 00:17:04,119 Speaker 1: ever goes to trial law and order court, can we 273 00:17:04,280 --> 00:17:06,400 Speaker 1: do a little a little quick math here? How many 274 00:17:06,640 --> 00:17:14,959 Speaker 1: instances did you say? It was? Three? Yeah, and and 275 00:17:14,960 --> 00:17:19,239 Speaker 1: and what was the potential finds to be levied? It's 276 00:17:19,280 --> 00:17:21,840 Speaker 1: a misdemeanor, I would see. Now here's the thing. I 277 00:17:21,880 --> 00:17:25,120 Speaker 1: don't know if each one would be account right. So 278 00:17:25,160 --> 00:17:29,160 Speaker 1: if each is each letter account of this misdemeanor, I 279 00:17:29,160 --> 00:17:32,399 Speaker 1: think it is one collective thing. It would be it 280 00:17:32,440 --> 00:17:35,520 Speaker 1: would be separate. Um, it would have to be a 281 00:17:35,560 --> 00:17:41,480 Speaker 1: separate account for each Then that's thirty six years. Uh 282 00:17:41,920 --> 00:17:46,639 Speaker 1: oh god, a hundred thousand dollars times thirty six. Yeah, 283 00:17:47,080 --> 00:17:50,040 Speaker 1: I don't that's they're not they're probably not going to 284 00:17:50,080 --> 00:17:51,800 Speaker 1: give them as no for sure, but let's just so 285 00:17:51,960 --> 00:18:01,040 Speaker 1: that's my my bad at math, it looks like thirty 286 00:18:01,160 --> 00:18:08,160 Speaker 1: six No, three hundred and sixty million dollars. No, three 287 00:18:08,200 --> 00:18:10,840 Speaker 1: point six thank you, three point six million. I'm not 288 00:18:11,240 --> 00:18:17,679 Speaker 1: doing the decimal right, that's that's expensive time on the throne, presumably, 289 00:18:17,720 --> 00:18:19,520 Speaker 1: How would you go about this? But okay, we don't 290 00:18:19,560 --> 00:18:21,639 Speaker 1: have to go into the specifics. Would just squat and 291 00:18:21,680 --> 00:18:25,199 Speaker 1: do it right over the contact? Okay, anyway, Matt, this 292 00:18:25,280 --> 00:18:28,919 Speaker 1: was illuminating. Um. It obviously gave us a lot to 293 00:18:29,560 --> 00:18:31,639 Speaker 1: you know, to make jokes about. But it does, you know, 294 00:18:32,080 --> 00:18:35,640 Speaker 1: it does really show an interesting view into the way 295 00:18:35,680 --> 00:18:37,959 Speaker 1: the postal system works, in the way these types of 296 00:18:38,000 --> 00:18:40,879 Speaker 1: things are assessed. You know. Obviously this is easy to 297 00:18:40,920 --> 00:18:44,080 Speaker 1: kind of joke about because it wasn't like anthrax, you know, 298 00:18:44,440 --> 00:18:46,320 Speaker 1: or like a dirty bomb or something. Well, it was 299 00:18:46,440 --> 00:18:49,560 Speaker 1: definitely never mind, but it's it's an easy way to 300 00:18:49,640 --> 00:18:52,880 Speaker 1: kind of carry on these kinds of investigations without having 301 00:18:52,880 --> 00:18:56,600 Speaker 1: to get too heavy. Um, but man, a lot of 302 00:18:56,600 --> 00:19:00,520 Speaker 1: effort with the method. The method is it is a 303 00:19:00,520 --> 00:19:05,200 Speaker 1: bucket next to the toilet, and those fancy metal it's 304 00:19:05,200 --> 00:19:08,239 Speaker 1: a really fancy metal letter opener. You've seen them. Like, 305 00:19:08,320 --> 00:19:10,240 Speaker 1: it looks like a little knife. You just make you 306 00:19:10,400 --> 00:19:13,600 Speaker 1: get that and exactly you just kinda scoop a little 307 00:19:13,600 --> 00:19:15,439 Speaker 1: out and then just give it a nice I mean, 308 00:19:15,480 --> 00:19:18,040 Speaker 1: you just gotta just give it a nice little slide 309 00:19:18,040 --> 00:19:21,080 Speaker 1: across the interior. You guys are joking, but there are 310 00:19:21,520 --> 00:19:25,720 Speaker 1: there are things legitimate medical procedures where people have to 311 00:19:25,800 --> 00:19:28,399 Speaker 1: send in a stool sample and you get like a 312 00:19:28,440 --> 00:19:31,960 Speaker 1: little container and you have to put some of your 313 00:19:32,000 --> 00:19:34,439 Speaker 1: feces in there and you can send it through the 314 00:19:34,440 --> 00:19:38,800 Speaker 1: post I agree, Matt, this is this illuminating. This makes 315 00:19:38,800 --> 00:19:41,480 Speaker 1: me think back to some of our fellow conspiracy realists 316 00:19:41,480 --> 00:19:43,119 Speaker 1: who had written to me and said, why don't you 317 00:19:43,160 --> 00:19:46,120 Speaker 1: guys do something like stuff the post Office doesn't want 318 00:19:46,119 --> 00:19:48,760 Speaker 1: you to know, or stuff about shipping, which I think 319 00:19:48,840 --> 00:19:52,040 Speaker 1: is going to be worthwhile. Also, I just found this 320 00:19:52,080 --> 00:19:55,000 Speaker 1: because I was curious. I wanted to give us um 321 00:19:55,040 --> 00:19:57,119 Speaker 1: some clarity where we're ending here, because I know a 322 00:19:57,119 --> 00:19:59,640 Speaker 1: lot of us in the audience did they have some questions. Now, 323 00:20:00,000 --> 00:20:02,240 Speaker 1: it's a brave new world, right if you can mail 324 00:20:02,280 --> 00:20:07,040 Speaker 1: poop legally. Whether or not this guy gets prosecuted depends 325 00:20:07,240 --> 00:20:12,159 Speaker 1: on whether the recipients decide to press charges. Since mailing 326 00:20:12,200 --> 00:20:16,200 Speaker 1: poop is legal, it's illegal if it's not packaged correctly, 327 00:20:16,520 --> 00:20:19,720 Speaker 1: and it's illegal if get this the person who receives 328 00:20:19,720 --> 00:20:23,040 Speaker 1: it takes offense. That's how that's kind of how the 329 00:20:23,119 --> 00:20:25,159 Speaker 1: laws raised. So if you get it and you're like, 330 00:20:25,160 --> 00:20:29,080 Speaker 1: oh great, we're poop, you know, people's pooper, like pokemons 331 00:20:29,080 --> 00:20:31,399 Speaker 1: to me, then it's not a crime. But if you 332 00:20:31,440 --> 00:20:34,320 Speaker 1: get it and you're like, oh no, but no, stop 333 00:20:34,359 --> 00:20:37,920 Speaker 1: mailing poop, then it's a crime. It's harassment. Things to 334 00:20:38,000 --> 00:20:39,840 Speaker 1: keep in mind from your friends and stuff. They don't 335 00:20:39,840 --> 00:20:42,919 Speaker 1: want you to know. Don't mail us poop. Don't do it. Please. 336 00:20:45,119 --> 00:20:48,560 Speaker 1: My dog is speaking of feces samples. I've had to 337 00:20:48,600 --> 00:20:50,119 Speaker 1: do that many a time with my dog and she 338 00:20:50,280 --> 00:20:52,760 Speaker 1: is just really loving this ball right now. Okay, hey, 339 00:20:52,760 --> 00:20:54,439 Speaker 1: we're gonna end this segment right here, but we'll be 340 00:20:54,520 --> 00:21:04,600 Speaker 1: right back with more strange news and we're back. Um. 341 00:21:04,720 --> 00:21:07,800 Speaker 1: This is a story that that we've all been aware 342 00:21:07,840 --> 00:21:10,439 Speaker 1: of for for a little while, surprisingly not getting as 343 00:21:10,480 --> 00:21:12,280 Speaker 1: nearly as much press as as I think any of 344 00:21:12,359 --> 00:21:14,800 Speaker 1: us would have expected. But it is revolving around two 345 00:21:14,920 --> 00:21:17,679 Speaker 1: very uh important issues I think of of of the 346 00:21:17,680 --> 00:21:21,159 Speaker 1: time we're living in UM, the privacy of of data 347 00:21:21,359 --> 00:21:23,760 Speaker 1: and what can be done with your data when it is, 348 00:21:23,800 --> 00:21:27,240 Speaker 1: like you know, UM being hosted by these large companies. 349 00:21:27,400 --> 00:21:31,880 Speaker 1: And also obviously a huge one is is the tenuous 350 00:21:31,960 --> 00:21:35,919 Speaker 1: nature of of abortion law. Well, I mean it's not 351 00:21:35,960 --> 00:21:37,800 Speaker 1: really tenuous at all. It's it's technically the law of 352 00:21:37,800 --> 00:21:41,159 Speaker 1: the land that it's illegal, but there are different you know, 353 00:21:41,440 --> 00:21:46,080 Speaker 1: circumstances that will allow for an abortion in some states. 354 00:21:46,119 --> 00:21:48,520 Speaker 1: Basically it's obviously being sent back to the States because 355 00:21:48,520 --> 00:21:52,920 Speaker 1: of the overturning of the federal ro versus Weigh legislation case. 356 00:21:53,000 --> 00:21:55,919 Speaker 1: So it's it's something that is not going to just 357 00:21:56,080 --> 00:21:58,840 Speaker 1: you know, solidify overnight. But we are starting to see 358 00:21:58,880 --> 00:22:05,560 Speaker 1: cases kind of trickle through UM showing some future very 359 00:22:05,600 --> 00:22:08,760 Speaker 1: serious ramifications of this law. And I think, you know, 360 00:22:08,960 --> 00:22:11,680 Speaker 1: Matt and Ben were all of the mind that this 361 00:22:11,760 --> 00:22:13,840 Speaker 1: is something that will open the door to just folks 362 00:22:14,400 --> 00:22:18,800 Speaker 1: in desperation doing unsafe things. Potentially, you know, if they're 363 00:22:18,840 --> 00:22:21,800 Speaker 1: in need of an abortion and they can't they can't 364 00:22:21,840 --> 00:22:24,080 Speaker 1: get one legally. This is what we know about times 365 00:22:24,080 --> 00:22:28,320 Speaker 1: before abortion was legal federally, people were using all kinds 366 00:22:28,359 --> 00:22:32,080 Speaker 1: of horrific improvised methods and you know, going to underground 367 00:22:32,160 --> 00:22:36,080 Speaker 1: clinics that were you know, at the very least sketchy 368 00:22:36,240 --> 00:22:39,520 Speaker 1: and shady. Yeah, ro versus Wade. Again, to be clear, 369 00:22:39,600 --> 00:22:42,000 Speaker 1: I said this in the past. It's not it's not 370 00:22:42,040 --> 00:22:45,399 Speaker 1: an opinion, folks, It's a fact, regardless of value feel personally, 371 00:22:45,480 --> 00:22:49,840 Speaker 1: Roll versus Way being overturned does not illegalize abortion across 372 00:22:49,880 --> 00:22:54,880 Speaker 1: the board. It effectively only illegalizes it for the poor. Uh, 373 00:22:55,000 --> 00:22:57,440 Speaker 1: people who are privileged and well to do are going 374 00:22:57,520 --> 00:23:01,200 Speaker 1: to still be able to get that procedure and there's 375 00:23:01,280 --> 00:23:04,040 Speaker 1: it's not gonna change their lives. In particular. This is 376 00:23:04,080 --> 00:23:07,639 Speaker 1: to victimize the already disadvantaged. You know, I've seen it 377 00:23:08,080 --> 00:23:09,880 Speaker 1: phrase very similar to what you just said have been. 378 00:23:09,920 --> 00:23:14,840 Speaker 1: It doesn't outlaw abortion, it is outlaws safe abortion. UM. So, 379 00:23:14,920 --> 00:23:18,560 Speaker 1: this this case is a very kind of early example 380 00:23:18,600 --> 00:23:21,280 Speaker 1: of two of those things kind of colliding. The idea 381 00:23:21,320 --> 00:23:25,200 Speaker 1: of of of data privacy and security um and and 382 00:23:25,560 --> 00:23:29,800 Speaker 1: the idea of being prosecuted now for for seeking an 383 00:23:29,840 --> 00:23:32,680 Speaker 1: abortion or for taking manage into your own hands, um 384 00:23:32,720 --> 00:23:36,000 Speaker 1: and This case involves a young woman and her mother 385 00:23:36,600 --> 00:23:41,040 Speaker 1: UH in Madison County, Nebraska. UM, a forty one year 386 00:23:41,080 --> 00:23:46,160 Speaker 1: old woman, is now facing charges for helping her teenage 387 00:23:46,280 --> 00:23:52,600 Speaker 1: daughter uh illegally abort pregnancy UM using it would appear 388 00:23:53,520 --> 00:23:57,680 Speaker 1: like a morning after pill kind of situation. I haven't 389 00:23:57,720 --> 00:24:00,480 Speaker 1: seen I haven't read the full court documents, but based 390 00:24:00,520 --> 00:24:03,240 Speaker 1: on what I'm seeing in the in the reporting that's 391 00:24:03,240 --> 00:24:05,480 Speaker 1: out there, it's it's that um and. And then the 392 00:24:05,520 --> 00:24:09,240 Speaker 1: reason that we know what we know about this is 393 00:24:09,280 --> 00:24:13,800 Speaker 1: because the Facebook messages between the mother uh and and 394 00:24:13,800 --> 00:24:16,399 Speaker 1: and her daughter UM Jessica Burgess, by the way, is 395 00:24:16,440 --> 00:24:19,560 Speaker 1: the mother and the daughter is Celeste Burgess, are out there. 396 00:24:19,680 --> 00:24:23,120 Speaker 1: And that's because Facebook or metas or whatever gave them 397 00:24:23,200 --> 00:24:28,160 Speaker 1: over to law enforcement who were pursuing, you know, prosecution 398 00:24:28,440 --> 00:24:32,320 Speaker 1: of these two individuals um And. What we have is 399 00:24:32,359 --> 00:24:36,080 Speaker 1: a chain of of of communications between them referring to yeah, 400 00:24:36,200 --> 00:24:38,679 Speaker 1: one pill stops the hormones, and then you have to 401 00:24:38,680 --> 00:24:40,960 Speaker 1: wait twenty four hours to take the other one. That 402 00:24:41,040 --> 00:24:45,280 Speaker 1: sounds like either plan B right is there or there 403 00:24:45,280 --> 00:24:47,560 Speaker 1: are other ones that you can take later. I thought 404 00:24:47,600 --> 00:24:49,400 Speaker 1: that got there came a point where you pill would 405 00:24:49,400 --> 00:24:51,600 Speaker 1: no longer do the trick. That sounds like a Plan 406 00:24:51,680 --> 00:24:54,840 Speaker 1: B situation, but I'm not I'm not an expert. Um. 407 00:24:55,040 --> 00:24:57,720 Speaker 1: And then the mother writes, remember we burn the evidence, 408 00:24:58,320 --> 00:25:01,160 Speaker 1: I will finally be able to wear g means. I think, 409 00:25:01,320 --> 00:25:03,719 Speaker 1: I guess that's like, yeah, that's the daughter, excuse me celess. 410 00:25:03,720 --> 00:25:07,320 Speaker 1: So I guess he's referring to, hey, get my life back. Um. 411 00:25:07,359 --> 00:25:10,000 Speaker 1: There are some details in this story that are disturbing. 412 00:25:10,080 --> 00:25:13,719 Speaker 1: They do, they did report it as a miscarriage, and 413 00:25:13,760 --> 00:25:18,119 Speaker 1: then the fetus was They disposed of it themselves, the 414 00:25:18,400 --> 00:25:21,720 Speaker 1: mother and daughter, and they you know, basically got someone 415 00:25:21,800 --> 00:25:24,240 Speaker 1: else to help them do it. And then I think 416 00:25:24,240 --> 00:25:28,080 Speaker 1: when they realized that the authorities were onto them, they 417 00:25:28,119 --> 00:25:31,600 Speaker 1: like dug up the remains and and tried to burn 418 00:25:31,640 --> 00:25:34,080 Speaker 1: them or they were talking about doing that. There are 419 00:25:34,119 --> 00:25:37,280 Speaker 1: some some very very disturbing details in here. But again, 420 00:25:37,320 --> 00:25:40,000 Speaker 1: all of this comes from the fact that they couldn't 421 00:25:40,040 --> 00:25:43,119 Speaker 1: just do it, you know, properly. They couldn't just go 422 00:25:43,160 --> 00:25:44,880 Speaker 1: to a clinic and do it. I don't think money 423 00:25:45,000 --> 00:25:47,360 Speaker 1: is the issue here. This is literally like Nebraska has 424 00:25:47,400 --> 00:25:49,600 Speaker 1: already been a state that for a long time has 425 00:25:49,640 --> 00:25:56,000 Speaker 1: had very um, very difficult prohibitively difficult abortion laws. Um, 426 00:25:56,080 --> 00:25:59,160 Speaker 1: and this just made it even worse. So I'm marrying 427 00:25:59,160 --> 00:26:00,920 Speaker 1: the lead here again. The fact of the matter is 428 00:26:00,960 --> 00:26:03,160 Speaker 1: in the big part of the story is that Facebook 429 00:26:03,240 --> 00:26:07,720 Speaker 1: gave over these direct messages, these private messages between these 430 00:26:07,760 --> 00:26:11,399 Speaker 1: two users, you know. Um, and they did it in 431 00:26:11,520 --> 00:26:15,080 Speaker 1: response to a warrant. Metas did come out with a 432 00:26:15,119 --> 00:26:17,800 Speaker 1: statement to Motherboard to do the initial reporting on this thing. 433 00:26:18,080 --> 00:26:20,480 Speaker 1: Nothing in the valid warrant through received from local law 434 00:26:20,560 --> 00:26:23,320 Speaker 1: enforcement in early June prior to the Supreme Court decision 435 00:26:23,760 --> 00:26:29,560 Speaker 1: mentioned abortion. The warrants concerned charges related to a criminal investigation, 436 00:26:29,840 --> 00:26:32,159 Speaker 1: and court documents indicate that police at the time were 437 00:26:32,200 --> 00:26:35,000 Speaker 1: investigating the case of a stillborn baby who was burned 438 00:26:35,119 --> 00:26:38,320 Speaker 1: and buried, not a decision to have an abortion. Both 439 00:26:38,359 --> 00:26:41,080 Speaker 1: of these warrants were originally accompanied by non disclosure orders, 440 00:26:41,080 --> 00:26:44,000 Speaker 1: which prevented us from sharing any information about them. The 441 00:26:44,080 --> 00:26:47,720 Speaker 1: orders have now been lifted. Another Metas Books person tweeted 442 00:26:47,960 --> 00:26:50,920 Speaker 1: this is from the Motherboard article and identical statement, shortly 443 00:26:50,960 --> 00:26:56,320 Speaker 1: before the company contacted Motherboard with this comment. Um, So 444 00:26:56,440 --> 00:26:59,040 Speaker 1: I don't know. This is really messy on so many levels. 445 00:26:59,040 --> 00:27:00,679 Speaker 1: I really want to hear you guys, thoughts, because it 446 00:27:00,720 --> 00:27:04,280 Speaker 1: does appear that the warrants were served before the Supreme 447 00:27:04,280 --> 00:27:08,440 Speaker 1: Court decision it was handed down, but that they handed 448 00:27:08,480 --> 00:27:13,040 Speaker 1: over the messages after the timeline is a little a 449 00:27:13,080 --> 00:27:17,239 Speaker 1: little tricky yet honestly metas position in this case is 450 00:27:17,320 --> 00:27:22,240 Speaker 1: that they are legally required to comply with those sorts 451 00:27:22,280 --> 00:27:26,080 Speaker 1: of warrants, and that part, unfortunately, is true. I agree 452 00:27:26,080 --> 00:27:30,760 Speaker 1: with you that the timeline is messy, and their their 453 00:27:30,960 --> 00:27:37,800 Speaker 1: statement regarding this has triggered this conversation about whether or 454 00:27:37,840 --> 00:27:41,120 Speaker 1: not they knew they were talking. They were giving police 455 00:27:42,440 --> 00:27:48,280 Speaker 1: information about an alleged illegal abortion. But still with that, 456 00:27:48,320 --> 00:27:52,159 Speaker 1: you have to wonder did they get the warrant and 457 00:27:52,160 --> 00:27:54,960 Speaker 1: then just say, Okay, we're giving profile info, we're giving 458 00:27:55,080 --> 00:27:58,720 Speaker 1: d M info, but we're not reading it ourselves. Like, 459 00:27:58,840 --> 00:28:02,320 Speaker 1: what what's the process there? Because the argument seems to 460 00:28:02,359 --> 00:28:07,520 Speaker 1: say that they themselves did not connect the dots between 461 00:28:07,680 --> 00:28:12,240 Speaker 1: condemning this person right and just complying with a warrant. 462 00:28:12,720 --> 00:28:14,840 Speaker 1: And and again, you know, it's a it's an interesting 463 00:28:14,960 --> 00:28:17,400 Speaker 1: argument because as far as I can tell, they would 464 00:28:17,480 --> 00:28:20,160 Speaker 1: be required right to comply with a warrant. You can't 465 00:28:20,200 --> 00:28:23,960 Speaker 1: just say no, that was a question that I had 466 00:28:24,080 --> 00:28:27,520 Speaker 1: and Matt, you know, I know you've brought stories to 467 00:28:27,600 --> 00:28:29,400 Speaker 1: the table in the past, or you've definitely been something 468 00:28:29,400 --> 00:28:32,639 Speaker 1: that I know has been on your radar UM involving 469 00:28:32,920 --> 00:28:36,639 Speaker 1: Apple and there end to end encryption UM when it 470 00:28:36,640 --> 00:28:39,800 Speaker 1: comes to eye message and you know, like text messages 471 00:28:40,160 --> 00:28:43,480 Speaker 1: between iPhone users UM, and they have what's called end 472 00:28:43,520 --> 00:28:46,640 Speaker 1: to end encryption, and there was that whole story, Uh, 473 00:28:46,760 --> 00:28:49,200 Speaker 1: I think you brought I can't remember exactly, but I 474 00:28:49,280 --> 00:28:51,800 Speaker 1: know them we've talked about where there was that shooter 475 00:28:52,640 --> 00:28:55,760 Speaker 1: UM and the government was trying to petition Apple to 476 00:28:55,880 --> 00:28:58,960 Speaker 1: like write like a back door, UH, so they could 477 00:28:58,960 --> 00:29:02,120 Speaker 1: get access to the the guy's phone UM because like 478 00:29:02,160 --> 00:29:04,560 Speaker 1: Apple even can't do it if they don't have the password, 479 00:29:05,040 --> 00:29:06,600 Speaker 1: and they were saying they wouldn't do it because it 480 00:29:06,640 --> 00:29:09,480 Speaker 1: would like it we could potentially, like you know, be 481 00:29:10,600 --> 00:29:12,880 Speaker 1: a vulnerability for like all of their users. I think 482 00:29:12,920 --> 00:29:16,160 Speaker 1: that one was specifically about getting into his phone. UM. 483 00:29:16,200 --> 00:29:19,240 Speaker 1: But also like Facebook, I just found this page that 484 00:29:19,360 --> 00:29:23,520 Speaker 1: says describes what does intend encryption? How does it work? 485 00:29:23,520 --> 00:29:26,600 Speaker 1: And Facebook on their own website describes it as uh, 486 00:29:26,640 --> 00:29:28,640 Speaker 1: it has extra security and protection to your messages and 487 00:29:28,680 --> 00:29:31,400 Speaker 1: calls and uh, and calls in a conversation so that 488 00:29:31,480 --> 00:29:34,040 Speaker 1: only you and whoever you're talking to you can see it. 489 00:29:34,520 --> 00:29:37,240 Speaker 1: And then it says no one can read your messages 490 00:29:37,360 --> 00:29:39,520 Speaker 1: or hear your calls. Accept the people who have these 491 00:29:39,520 --> 00:29:43,480 Speaker 1: special keys, because that's what the encryption key. Not even Facebook, 492 00:29:43,800 --> 00:29:47,360 Speaker 1: We couldn't even if we wanted to. Has something changed 493 00:29:47,400 --> 00:29:51,480 Speaker 1: since this fact was written. I don't understand how they're 494 00:29:51,520 --> 00:29:54,480 Speaker 1: able to say that they use end in encryption and 495 00:29:54,680 --> 00:29:58,880 Speaker 1: messenger and then give over specific d M s like 496 00:29:59,000 --> 00:30:02,160 Speaker 1: that when they say that they don't have the key. 497 00:30:02,240 --> 00:30:04,560 Speaker 1: That's a good question, but unfortunately I don't have the answer. 498 00:30:04,880 --> 00:30:07,040 Speaker 1: I've watched some really helpful videos on how end and 499 00:30:07,320 --> 00:30:11,440 Speaker 1: encryption works, and it is fascinating and theoretically that is correct. 500 00:30:11,520 --> 00:30:14,000 Speaker 1: What what you just read where it would be physically 501 00:30:14,000 --> 00:30:18,440 Speaker 1: impossible for someone to read those secured messages unless they 502 00:30:18,480 --> 00:30:21,840 Speaker 1: had the specific keys, right, because you need two keys 503 00:30:21,880 --> 00:30:24,600 Speaker 1: to to send it and read it to you need 504 00:30:24,640 --> 00:30:27,960 Speaker 1: two keys to read it on either end. Right. Um, 505 00:30:28,120 --> 00:30:31,200 Speaker 1: it's really cool the way messages get sent. I think 506 00:30:31,200 --> 00:30:33,760 Speaker 1: it's a lock box example that you can find on 507 00:30:33,840 --> 00:30:36,600 Speaker 1: YouTube right now, where I think we mentioned this on 508 00:30:36,600 --> 00:30:39,120 Speaker 1: the show before you can watch online. It's it shows 509 00:30:39,160 --> 00:30:42,240 Speaker 1: how if you put certain locks in a like you've 510 00:30:42,280 --> 00:30:46,000 Speaker 1: got three, three or four keys, I think that actually 511 00:30:46,040 --> 00:30:49,280 Speaker 1: are required to send a secure end end message like that. 512 00:30:49,520 --> 00:30:51,480 Speaker 1: I think it's a feature. I think it's sort of 513 00:30:51,520 --> 00:30:54,760 Speaker 1: like you know, having like private browsing in your Chrome, 514 00:30:54,960 --> 00:30:58,200 Speaker 1: you know tabs. I think you have to like specifically said, 515 00:30:58,240 --> 00:31:01,480 Speaker 1: I don't think all Facebook messages are end to end 516 00:31:01,560 --> 00:31:04,200 Speaker 1: encrypted because there's a section on this help center for 517 00:31:04,200 --> 00:31:07,160 Speaker 1: a messenger this says secret conversations, and then it goes 518 00:31:07,200 --> 00:31:08,680 Speaker 1: into all this stuff, and I think it's like a 519 00:31:09,360 --> 00:31:12,040 Speaker 1: like I like, I like a teacher. Here's what I'll add. 520 00:31:12,480 --> 00:31:16,960 Speaker 1: You should assume that anything you do on the internet 521 00:31:17,000 --> 00:31:21,400 Speaker 1: will one day become public knowledge. There is no real 522 00:31:21,520 --> 00:31:26,080 Speaker 1: secrecy that you can safely assume, even honestly. Yes, if 523 00:31:26,080 --> 00:31:28,680 Speaker 1: you look at the nuts and bolts technically of a 524 00:31:28,720 --> 00:31:31,760 Speaker 1: lot of end to end encryption. UM, I'm a big fan, 525 00:31:32,160 --> 00:31:33,880 Speaker 1: as you guys know. I'm always trying to get us 526 00:31:33,880 --> 00:31:37,360 Speaker 1: to move our group chat to things like signal or telegram, 527 00:31:37,720 --> 00:31:41,240 Speaker 1: uh for these reasons. But you cannot assume, you just 528 00:31:41,360 --> 00:31:45,520 Speaker 1: you simply cannot safely assume at this point that anything 529 00:31:45,560 --> 00:31:49,240 Speaker 1: you do online is private, okay to put a to 530 00:31:49,320 --> 00:31:52,600 Speaker 1: put a fine point on a conspiracy realist, all the 531 00:31:52,640 --> 00:31:54,920 Speaker 1: stuff you don't want people to know you're clicking on 532 00:31:55,000 --> 00:31:58,400 Speaker 1: at three am. Someone knows whether it's your I s P, 533 00:31:59,040 --> 00:32:03,080 Speaker 1: whether it's five Eyes, whether it's your pal interned Steve 534 00:32:03,440 --> 00:32:06,320 Speaker 1: as we're gonna learn later this week. Everybody's got one. 535 00:32:07,120 --> 00:32:11,320 Speaker 1: So I don't know. It's terrible though, that this applies 536 00:32:11,360 --> 00:32:13,880 Speaker 1: to people who are at some of the most vulnerable 537 00:32:13,920 --> 00:32:18,200 Speaker 1: positions in their lives, you know. And and the problem 538 00:32:18,280 --> 00:32:21,080 Speaker 1: with some of these statements is just like we were 539 00:32:21,120 --> 00:32:24,360 Speaker 1: talking about with the reasoning about invading the Hague, we're 540 00:32:24,400 --> 00:32:28,560 Speaker 1: seeing authorities, in this case, secular tech authorities, kind of 541 00:32:28,560 --> 00:32:31,280 Speaker 1: picking the story that's convenient for them, you know, And 542 00:32:31,360 --> 00:32:33,720 Speaker 1: it looks us I'm not saying their lying. I'm just 543 00:32:33,760 --> 00:32:36,920 Speaker 1: saying it feels very convenient. Guys. Can you just answer 544 00:32:36,960 --> 00:32:40,520 Speaker 1: me this. Why was there an investigation in the first place? Here? 545 00:32:40,920 --> 00:32:43,600 Speaker 1: I haven't found that that's the price. It has to 546 00:32:43,640 --> 00:32:47,560 Speaker 1: do with the disposing of the remains, um, but that 547 00:32:47,640 --> 00:32:49,320 Speaker 1: I'm not in any of this reporting. And again I 548 00:32:49,360 --> 00:32:52,480 Speaker 1: haven't read the full document seeing like why they were 549 00:32:52,560 --> 00:32:54,880 Speaker 1: suspected in the first place, to the point where they 550 00:32:54,920 --> 00:32:58,280 Speaker 1: sought this warrant um and also ultimately the warrant allowed 551 00:32:58,320 --> 00:33:01,040 Speaker 1: them to get access to their phone and stuff too. 552 00:33:01,280 --> 00:33:04,920 Speaker 1: So Nebraska has a, like I said, a very tight 553 00:33:05,520 --> 00:33:10,280 Speaker 1: um abortion law. Like even before this this overturning of Rev. Wade, 554 00:33:11,000 --> 00:33:13,960 Speaker 1: it's twenty weeks, I believe that's what it's been. Um. 555 00:33:14,240 --> 00:33:17,360 Speaker 1: So they were already, you know, with they were already 556 00:33:17,880 --> 00:33:20,720 Speaker 1: in reach of that law despite what happened with the 557 00:33:20,720 --> 00:33:25,240 Speaker 1: Supreme Court. But and but it was reported as a miscarriage, right, 558 00:33:25,720 --> 00:33:28,360 Speaker 1: they reported it that way, that's right. But then there 559 00:33:28,400 --> 00:33:32,200 Speaker 1: was something that didn't look right in the investigation. Perhaps 560 00:33:32,960 --> 00:33:34,680 Speaker 1: did you catch any of this? I just don't understand it. 561 00:33:35,320 --> 00:33:37,720 Speaker 1: I don't. I just don't understand how that that it 562 00:33:37,800 --> 00:33:40,800 Speaker 1: was a miscarriage, which is a terrible, horrific thing that 563 00:33:40,880 --> 00:33:46,400 Speaker 1: happens all the time to to families, couples, individuals, and 564 00:33:46,960 --> 00:33:51,080 Speaker 1: somehow someone decided it was time to investigate this miscarriage. 565 00:33:51,160 --> 00:33:53,640 Speaker 1: I just like that blows my mind. The line in 566 00:33:53,680 --> 00:33:56,960 Speaker 1: the n p R. Pieces police in Norfolk, Nebraska had 567 00:33:57,000 --> 00:34:00,040 Speaker 1: been investigating the woman Jessica Burgess and her daughter's a 568 00:34:00,080 --> 00:34:03,760 Speaker 1: Less Burns for allegedly mishandling the fetal remains of what 569 00:34:03,880 --> 00:34:08,000 Speaker 1: they've told police was celest still birth. So maybe like 570 00:34:08,160 --> 00:34:10,440 Speaker 1: they buried it in the first place, and they weren't 571 00:34:10,440 --> 00:34:14,000 Speaker 1: supposed to do that, and then they like to legal 572 00:34:14,239 --> 00:34:18,400 Speaker 1: burning imburial. Illegal burning imburial is what the that's what 573 00:34:18,480 --> 00:34:23,120 Speaker 1: it warrant was regarding. So they kind of told and 574 00:34:23,880 --> 00:34:27,600 Speaker 1: if you are complying with a warrant and you're met up, Uh, 575 00:34:27,840 --> 00:34:32,520 Speaker 1: the thing here is that I did. You can find 576 00:34:33,360 --> 00:34:37,240 Speaker 1: the requests online. You can find the Madison County, Nebraska stuff. 577 00:34:37,280 --> 00:34:41,640 Speaker 1: It's linked out, and reading over it this the accounts 578 00:34:41,640 --> 00:34:46,759 Speaker 1: of this warrant, you would almost have to be willfully 579 00:34:46,800 --> 00:34:50,560 Speaker 1: ignoring the crux of the investigation. They never used the 580 00:34:50,600 --> 00:34:53,279 Speaker 1: A word. They never say abortion in these docs, but 581 00:34:53,400 --> 00:34:58,120 Speaker 1: they do talk about like they heavily imply it is 582 00:34:58,320 --> 00:35:01,640 Speaker 1: a fetus. Um. You know, without speaking to someone directly 583 00:35:01,800 --> 00:35:04,760 Speaker 1: met up and we probably won't hear from them outside 584 00:35:04,800 --> 00:35:07,399 Speaker 1: the public statements they made, But without speaking to them, 585 00:35:07,520 --> 00:35:10,759 Speaker 1: it's it's kind of hard to guess how they're internal 586 00:35:10,800 --> 00:35:13,920 Speaker 1: logic was working here. But one of the reason I'm 587 00:35:13,920 --> 00:35:17,600 Speaker 1: really glad we're talking about the story is we do 588 00:35:17,680 --> 00:35:21,120 Speaker 1: live in a surveillance state and stuff like this when 589 00:35:21,120 --> 00:35:24,440 Speaker 1: it happens, this is not going to be the last. Sadly, 590 00:35:24,520 --> 00:35:28,319 Speaker 1: it's heartbreaking and it's frightening. It should frighten everybody. There 591 00:35:28,360 --> 00:35:31,200 Speaker 1: has bigger ramifications to beyond just what we're talking about here. 592 00:35:31,239 --> 00:35:33,880 Speaker 1: Like again, this is a complicated one because it involves 593 00:35:33,960 --> 00:35:38,680 Speaker 1: two massive zeitgeisty topics in terms of like the abortion laws, 594 00:35:39,000 --> 00:35:42,120 Speaker 1: availability to safety and all of that and the privacy stuff. 595 00:35:42,239 --> 00:35:44,640 Speaker 1: But I found this really great right up on a 596 00:35:44,719 --> 00:35:47,839 Speaker 1: reporter's committee h for a Free Press, I think it's 597 00:35:47,880 --> 00:35:52,200 Speaker 1: what it's called, UM Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press. Uh, 598 00:35:52,200 --> 00:35:57,680 Speaker 1: And they identify two massive wrinkles that this creates in 599 00:35:58,360 --> 00:36:04,000 Speaker 1: the ability the press to report on stuff like this. Uh. 600 00:36:04,040 --> 00:36:06,200 Speaker 1: And they this is what they say. It's gonna read 601 00:36:06,200 --> 00:36:08,080 Speaker 1: it because I think it does such a good job. One, 602 00:36:08,160 --> 00:36:11,440 Speaker 1: the availability of medication abortions creates a new wrinkle in 603 00:36:11,480 --> 00:36:14,400 Speaker 1: how the law treats the procedure. Historically, it was exceedingly 604 00:36:14,520 --> 00:36:17,600 Speaker 1: rare for abortion patients versus providers to be targeted by 605 00:36:17,640 --> 00:36:21,360 Speaker 1: law enforcement. Rather, providers would be identified through decoys and informants, 606 00:36:21,360 --> 00:36:24,919 Speaker 1: and abortions were often identified after complications prompted a trip 607 00:36:24,920 --> 00:36:28,560 Speaker 1: to the emergency room. Today, however, medication abortions are quite 608 00:36:28,560 --> 00:36:31,719 Speaker 1: safe and the pills can be obtained online. As a consequence, 609 00:36:31,760 --> 00:36:35,480 Speaker 1: investigators have an incentive to both target the suspected patient 610 00:36:35,760 --> 00:36:39,680 Speaker 1: with investigative tools and to use highly invasive means to 611 00:36:39,680 --> 00:36:42,359 Speaker 1: do so, as they did here. And one of those 612 00:36:42,400 --> 00:36:46,600 Speaker 1: would be going after like specifically going after whistleblowers or 613 00:36:46,680 --> 00:36:50,120 Speaker 1: or anonymous sources. Um and and that is going to 614 00:36:50,160 --> 00:36:53,640 Speaker 1: create almost like a witch hunt kind of atmosphere here 615 00:36:53,800 --> 00:36:59,040 Speaker 1: that I think has really scary long term ramifications. So 616 00:36:59,640 --> 00:37:01,440 Speaker 1: I did really think about that aspect of it, but 617 00:37:01,480 --> 00:37:05,520 Speaker 1: it could potentially create that, I don't know, so scary 618 00:37:05,520 --> 00:37:07,799 Speaker 1: stuff here, much more to impact than we can in 619 00:37:07,840 --> 00:37:10,640 Speaker 1: this uh this strange news section. So let's take a 620 00:37:10,680 --> 00:37:12,719 Speaker 1: break and digest some of the stuff and then come 621 00:37:12,719 --> 00:37:22,920 Speaker 1: back with one more piece of strange news. And we 622 00:37:23,080 --> 00:37:27,799 Speaker 1: have returned, Fellow conspiracy realists. It feels so good to 623 00:37:27,840 --> 00:37:31,200 Speaker 1: be back. What do we miss well, Donald Trump's in 624 00:37:31,239 --> 00:37:35,080 Speaker 1: the news, Elon Musk and a Twitter whistleblower in the news. 625 00:37:35,360 --> 00:37:38,120 Speaker 1: Cambodia is getting some of its history back. Check out 626 00:37:38,120 --> 00:37:41,520 Speaker 1: our episode on Museums and the providence of the things 627 00:37:41,600 --> 00:37:45,400 Speaker 1: they take. Uh, Steven Seagal going hard on the paint 628 00:37:45,440 --> 00:37:48,919 Speaker 1: for Russia in a move that will surprise nobody. And 629 00:37:49,000 --> 00:37:51,440 Speaker 1: I've got to get back on daily see guys at 630 00:37:51,440 --> 00:37:54,160 Speaker 1: some point just to talk trash about Steven Seagal. But 631 00:37:54,200 --> 00:37:57,080 Speaker 1: you'll see you'll see some of ours guys, guys coming 632 00:37:57,280 --> 00:38:00,000 Speaker 1: to hang out with us. Maybe no spoilers the last 633 00:38:00,040 --> 00:38:05,040 Speaker 1: speak story. We have rumbas. Anybody got a roomba play 634 00:38:05,040 --> 00:38:07,919 Speaker 1: along at home? I hope your room is going now. 635 00:38:08,680 --> 00:38:11,799 Speaker 1: I have a like an off brand Rumba esque thing 636 00:38:12,160 --> 00:38:15,000 Speaker 1: and we put big giant Google shoes on it. No, 637 00:38:15,160 --> 00:38:17,319 Speaker 1: it's not even a shark. It's like it's a It's 638 00:38:17,360 --> 00:38:19,120 Speaker 1: it's one I can't even I can't even pronounce his name. 639 00:38:19,280 --> 00:38:22,280 Speaker 1: It's it's real dumb guys is banging in the walls 640 00:38:22,280 --> 00:38:25,280 Speaker 1: getting stuck on stuff. Uh. Adding a big dumb Google 641 00:38:25,400 --> 00:38:27,799 Speaker 1: I just made it even more delightful. But yeah, I 642 00:38:27,800 --> 00:38:30,040 Speaker 1: don't know if Rumba was much smarter. Um, but this 643 00:38:30,080 --> 00:38:32,480 Speaker 1: is about as dumb of a smart vacuum as you 644 00:38:32,480 --> 00:38:35,440 Speaker 1: could possibly get. And that I know. Uh, you and 645 00:38:35,480 --> 00:38:37,600 Speaker 1: I are very much of the same mind on a 646 00:38:37,640 --> 00:38:40,200 Speaker 1: lot of things. So I'm gonna take a wild guess 647 00:38:40,200 --> 00:38:42,640 Speaker 1: and say that you do not have a rumba. There 648 00:38:42,840 --> 00:38:45,640 Speaker 1: was one in this house for quite a time. There 649 00:38:45,719 --> 00:38:49,480 Speaker 1: is no longer one in this house. Yes, okay, very 650 00:38:49,520 --> 00:38:53,120 Speaker 1: careful answer. I respected, I respect you, bro. For the record, 651 00:38:53,600 --> 00:38:56,120 Speaker 1: my mind is not Internet connected. Just for the record, 652 00:38:56,160 --> 00:38:58,440 Speaker 1: mine is not Internet connected. This one is just strictly 653 00:38:58,480 --> 00:39:02,400 Speaker 1: a remote, controllable little widget. It does not, you know, 654 00:39:02,600 --> 00:39:06,560 Speaker 1: have any access to That's what makes it smart. The 655 00:39:06,600 --> 00:39:10,319 Speaker 1: Internet is what smarts it up exactly. So here's the thing. 656 00:39:10,840 --> 00:39:15,600 Speaker 1: So Roomba. Roomba made quite a splash and they're very successful. 657 00:39:16,239 --> 00:39:20,000 Speaker 1: Rumba has a parent company called I Robots. Uh, And 658 00:39:20,040 --> 00:39:22,920 Speaker 1: there you know, there's a They're part of the fad 659 00:39:22,920 --> 00:39:25,080 Speaker 1: where you put a little eye in front of everything, 660 00:39:25,239 --> 00:39:29,360 Speaker 1: started by Apple and propagated out through numerous companies, included 661 00:39:29,400 --> 00:39:33,680 Speaker 1: our corporate overlords, I Heart Media, the Clear Channel. So 662 00:39:34,520 --> 00:39:36,680 Speaker 1: so Rumba got in the news for a while. And 663 00:39:36,760 --> 00:39:38,520 Speaker 1: this is a little older story about when it cover 664 00:39:38,560 --> 00:39:41,560 Speaker 1: it because it's not getting the attention it needs. I 665 00:39:41,840 --> 00:39:46,800 Speaker 1: Robot was purchased by Amazon, which been Amazon bought Roomba. 666 00:39:46,840 --> 00:39:50,000 Speaker 1: When you think of the Humble little Roomba looks like 667 00:39:50,040 --> 00:39:54,960 Speaker 1: a Pixar character in many ways. You probably don't think 668 00:39:55,840 --> 00:39:58,760 Speaker 1: of a company or a product that's worth one point 669 00:39:58,840 --> 00:40:02,920 Speaker 1: seven bill in dollars, which is what Amazon paid for it. 670 00:40:03,000 --> 00:40:05,960 Speaker 1: You know, do you know how far like this is 671 00:40:06,040 --> 00:40:09,399 Speaker 1: hurting Jeff's plan to kind of sort of get into 672 00:40:09,440 --> 00:40:12,759 Speaker 1: space again for eleven minutes, and that's very important to him. 673 00:40:12,920 --> 00:40:16,160 Speaker 1: His eleven minutes kind of sort of in space, not 674 00:40:16,239 --> 00:40:20,799 Speaker 1: really space whatever. So this is on the heels of 675 00:40:20,840 --> 00:40:23,919 Speaker 1: some very troubling things that Amazon has been doing. They 676 00:40:24,040 --> 00:40:29,040 Speaker 1: recently acquired a company called One Medical, US healthcare company, 677 00:40:29,160 --> 00:40:33,479 Speaker 1: and then right on the heels of that, they made 678 00:40:33,480 --> 00:40:37,279 Speaker 1: this offer to buy I Robot. Why why are they 679 00:40:37,320 --> 00:40:41,759 Speaker 1: doing these things? Well, they're not buying the little vacuums. 680 00:40:42,239 --> 00:40:46,359 Speaker 1: They're not super gas about the real estate that One 681 00:40:46,480 --> 00:40:50,399 Speaker 1: Medical has. They're super gas about the information it has 682 00:40:50,480 --> 00:40:53,080 Speaker 1: about you. We're talking about you made a great point, Matt, 683 00:40:53,080 --> 00:40:56,560 Speaker 1: wh We're talking about the smart aspect Rumba learns. That's 684 00:40:56,600 --> 00:40:58,600 Speaker 1: the thing people love about it, right, They're like, Oh, 685 00:40:58,600 --> 00:41:00,720 Speaker 1: it's kind of dumb and it's kind of bump bump 686 00:41:00,719 --> 00:41:04,560 Speaker 1: bump for a while, but eventually it figures out where 687 00:41:04,560 --> 00:41:07,480 Speaker 1: your furniture is, figures out the rooms, it figures out 688 00:41:07,480 --> 00:41:10,640 Speaker 1: the hallways, it maps them. And what a lot of 689 00:41:10,640 --> 00:41:13,719 Speaker 1: people didn't realize was that because this is connected to 690 00:41:13,840 --> 00:41:19,680 Speaker 1: the Internet, it shares that map, just like uh, just 691 00:41:19,760 --> 00:41:24,560 Speaker 1: like Amazon, Alexa and Google Home are so suspect to me. 692 00:41:24,840 --> 00:41:29,320 Speaker 1: That's why Nolan very glad that you're you're moving vacuum 693 00:41:29,360 --> 00:41:33,360 Speaker 1: cleaner is not Internet connected. This is not about products. 694 00:41:33,400 --> 00:41:36,800 Speaker 1: I'm gonna call it doubt. It's about the data. Because 695 00:41:36,840 --> 00:41:40,680 Speaker 1: now there is a If this all works out, Amazon 696 00:41:40,840 --> 00:41:45,640 Speaker 1: will have direct access to with no intermediary by the way, 697 00:41:45,760 --> 00:41:48,880 Speaker 1: no middleman, no gatekeeping, It will have direct access to 698 00:41:49,320 --> 00:41:53,680 Speaker 1: a full map of people's homes if they have room 699 00:41:53,719 --> 00:41:56,160 Speaker 1: bus For a lot of us, some people might be saying, 700 00:41:56,840 --> 00:42:00,799 Speaker 1: you know, what's the big deal, What's what's the big deal? Uh? I, 701 00:42:01,800 --> 00:42:04,560 Speaker 1: it doesn't bother me that people know where my laundry 702 00:42:04,600 --> 00:42:10,280 Speaker 1: room is, but consider that nothing again exists in a vacuum. 703 00:42:10,320 --> 00:42:12,279 Speaker 1: I've got to stop saying that so often. But it's 704 00:42:12,320 --> 00:42:16,440 Speaker 1: really bothering me these days. Because now if you are 705 00:42:16,480 --> 00:42:19,480 Speaker 1: part of one medical there will be medical information about you. 706 00:42:19,840 --> 00:42:22,680 Speaker 1: If you remember of Amazon Prime, then there's a lot 707 00:42:22,719 --> 00:42:25,279 Speaker 1: of stuff out there about you, and a lot of 708 00:42:25,320 --> 00:42:28,960 Speaker 1: conclusions that are drawn that you probably are not aware of. 709 00:42:29,400 --> 00:42:33,000 Speaker 1: You will be you will be flummixed a lot of 710 00:42:33,080 --> 00:42:36,840 Speaker 1: us listening today when you realize just how much info 711 00:42:36,920 --> 00:42:39,000 Speaker 1: there is on you to the point where I can 712 00:42:39,080 --> 00:42:43,080 Speaker 1: predict your behavior, which is something a lot of social 713 00:42:43,120 --> 00:42:46,920 Speaker 1: scientists have been looking for for decades. And what I 714 00:42:47,000 --> 00:42:49,280 Speaker 1: and what I say scientists too, I mean like DARPA 715 00:42:49,600 --> 00:42:51,480 Speaker 1: has been looking to do this for decades and they 716 00:42:51,520 --> 00:42:54,440 Speaker 1: got closer than you think a long time ago. So 717 00:42:54,600 --> 00:42:59,200 Speaker 1: now private companies are doing this and they're saying, look, 718 00:43:00,080 --> 00:43:04,000 Speaker 1: only I robot can check out these room bug maps. 719 00:43:04,880 --> 00:43:07,520 Speaker 1: But now if, like with Amazon at the helm of this, 720 00:43:07,880 --> 00:43:11,320 Speaker 1: then we don't know who would have access to that data. Um, 721 00:43:11,360 --> 00:43:15,399 Speaker 1: Amazon said they don't have any details to share, right. 722 00:43:15,480 --> 00:43:20,920 Speaker 1: Amazon is saying, no, it's not gonna Amazon is basically saying, 723 00:43:21,160 --> 00:43:24,280 Speaker 1: don't worry about it. You know what I mean, like, hey, guys, chill, 724 00:43:24,320 --> 00:43:30,520 Speaker 1: just be chill. So, uh, this announcement came on August five, 725 00:43:30,719 --> 00:43:33,560 Speaker 1: so later this month, as we record just last month 726 00:43:33,600 --> 00:43:37,680 Speaker 1: that you hear this, and it's crazy because they're not 727 00:43:38,080 --> 00:43:40,719 Speaker 1: the way these things work, doesn't It doesn't mean that 728 00:43:40,760 --> 00:43:44,160 Speaker 1: they're gonna get data from room BA homes going forward. 729 00:43:44,600 --> 00:43:47,200 Speaker 1: It means they're gonna get data ever since I robot 730 00:43:47,280 --> 00:43:51,319 Speaker 1: figured out how to do this. And if you talk 731 00:43:51,400 --> 00:43:55,000 Speaker 1: to people like Maurice Stuck, a former d o J 732 00:43:55,280 --> 00:44:00,399 Speaker 1: prosecutor and antitrust expert, you'll see that Amazon's like they're 733 00:44:00,440 --> 00:44:05,960 Speaker 1: assumed focus for this is more targeted advertising. The Amazon Alexe. 734 00:44:06,120 --> 00:44:09,719 Speaker 1: Here's when something breaks the room but knows you're it's 735 00:44:09,719 --> 00:44:12,439 Speaker 1: in the kitchen, you know what I mean? How how 736 00:44:13,080 --> 00:44:16,120 Speaker 1: how much more regular and specific can they get? And 737 00:44:16,160 --> 00:44:21,359 Speaker 1: this is also again this is a a concern of aggregation. Uh, 738 00:44:21,480 --> 00:44:24,480 Speaker 1: Matt off Air, Uh, we were talking a little bit 739 00:44:24,520 --> 00:44:31,200 Speaker 1: about the Amazon astro. I don't know if anybody has um. 740 00:44:31,320 --> 00:44:33,920 Speaker 1: I don't know how much experience do you think people 741 00:44:34,000 --> 00:44:37,120 Speaker 1: have with the Amazon astro. I think we've all we've 742 00:44:37,120 --> 00:44:42,080 Speaker 1: seen the commercial. Right, It's like you were talking about, Yeah, 743 00:44:43,719 --> 00:44:45,959 Speaker 1: tell me about the astro. I don't This is Yeah, 744 00:44:46,120 --> 00:44:49,640 Speaker 1: it's a tiny little robot that is way more expensive 745 00:44:49,719 --> 00:44:52,880 Speaker 1: than we can afford. But you know you've just got 746 00:44:52,920 --> 00:44:56,600 Speaker 1: an extra thousand dollars chilling, then hey, maybe you want 747 00:44:56,680 --> 00:45:01,080 Speaker 1: this Alexa on wheels that has a lot of cameras 748 00:45:01,120 --> 00:45:05,399 Speaker 1: and sensors and collects even more data on you what 749 00:45:05,480 --> 00:45:07,560 Speaker 1: you do and in this case kind of like room 750 00:45:07,600 --> 00:45:11,759 Speaker 1: but where you do it in your house. Uh, It's 751 00:45:11,800 --> 00:45:14,399 Speaker 1: just it's just super creepy. It's another one of these 752 00:45:14,440 --> 00:45:17,800 Speaker 1: things that if you add in the I robot info 753 00:45:18,080 --> 00:45:20,480 Speaker 1: with this Amazon, you know, if you happen to have 754 00:45:20,520 --> 00:45:23,640 Speaker 1: one of these robots, you basically just have all information 755 00:45:24,960 --> 00:45:28,799 Speaker 1: twenty pounds. It looks like a little Pixar cartoon. Uh. 756 00:45:28,840 --> 00:45:31,719 Speaker 1: It has voice commands, so of course you can hear YouTube. 757 00:45:31,960 --> 00:45:35,160 Speaker 1: It'll follow you around. It's got wheels if you I 758 00:45:35,200 --> 00:45:38,279 Speaker 1: put a little link in the in our chat here 759 00:45:39,000 --> 00:45:42,880 Speaker 1: and you can see that right now. Also, this thing 760 00:45:42,960 --> 00:45:44,640 Speaker 1: is kind of like a PS five. You have to 761 00:45:44,680 --> 00:45:47,520 Speaker 1: request and invite to buy it. As you said, Matt, 762 00:45:47,600 --> 00:45:52,200 Speaker 1: it's a thousand dollars right now. It's very cute, you know. 763 00:45:52,719 --> 00:45:56,920 Speaker 1: I'm sure it triggers some warm cuddly feelings for people. Um. 764 00:45:56,960 --> 00:46:00,359 Speaker 1: And it Also this is interesting Amazon is aware of 765 00:46:00,400 --> 00:46:03,960 Speaker 1: the concerns here because one of the big features advertised 766 00:46:03,960 --> 00:46:06,840 Speaker 1: for this also include this in the chat, is that 767 00:46:07,480 --> 00:46:13,400 Speaker 1: Amazon astro can can have its camera and microphone and 768 00:46:13,640 --> 00:46:17,320 Speaker 1: motion turned off with one button per Amazon. Per Jeff. 769 00:46:17,680 --> 00:46:23,319 Speaker 1: Also it uh, it can function as security. I don't 770 00:46:23,320 --> 00:46:25,600 Speaker 1: know if you guys had heard that part. It will 771 00:46:25,880 --> 00:46:30,840 Speaker 1: link up with your Ring subscription and Astro will patrol 772 00:46:31,360 --> 00:46:37,400 Speaker 1: and it will get this investigate activity. So so the 773 00:46:37,600 --> 00:46:40,160 Speaker 1: dog is where it's not supposed to be. Someone's breaking 774 00:46:40,200 --> 00:46:43,520 Speaker 1: into your house and then all of a sudden, which 775 00:46:43,600 --> 00:46:48,280 Speaker 1: is my Amazon Astro noise, Yeah, Danny is masturbating again. 776 00:46:50,880 --> 00:46:55,800 Speaker 1: Did you guys see that uh love Death in Robots piece? 777 00:46:56,239 --> 00:46:58,400 Speaker 1: That was kind of pick Sarry. It was kind of 778 00:46:58,440 --> 00:47:00,720 Speaker 1: like yeah with like it had like a them but type, 779 00:47:00,800 --> 00:47:04,040 Speaker 1: you know, Helper robot. They like it goes nuts and 780 00:47:04,160 --> 00:47:09,400 Speaker 1: it starts murdering everything. Uh, it goes somewhere more creative 781 00:47:09,400 --> 00:47:12,120 Speaker 1: than that eventually. No spoilers, but I did think that 782 00:47:12,120 --> 00:47:13,759 Speaker 1: one did a pretty good job of looking at the 783 00:47:13,840 --> 00:47:18,239 Speaker 1: like big picture dystopia that we are heading for. I 784 00:47:18,280 --> 00:47:22,239 Speaker 1: think it was partially inspired by things like the Astro. Uh. 785 00:47:22,280 --> 00:47:25,360 Speaker 1: And you know remember years back when we're talking about 786 00:47:25,560 --> 00:47:28,800 Speaker 1: the dog drones and I called it, man, it was 787 00:47:28,960 --> 00:47:31,360 Speaker 1: no hard thing to call, said, someone's gonna put a 788 00:47:31,360 --> 00:47:34,279 Speaker 1: gun on these, because that's how humans are. They're just 789 00:47:34,280 --> 00:47:37,200 Speaker 1: going to figure out the recoil and I got they 790 00:47:37,200 --> 00:47:43,080 Speaker 1: did it. So how far are these astro attachment's gonna go? 791 00:47:43,320 --> 00:47:48,800 Speaker 1: I mean businesses always seek to uh consolidate uh profits 792 00:47:48,840 --> 00:47:52,760 Speaker 1: while diversifying products. Right, not to be too Harvard business 793 00:47:52,760 --> 00:47:55,759 Speaker 1: about it, but this means that your astro in the 794 00:47:55,800 --> 00:47:58,160 Speaker 1: future might also have a room by included on it. 795 00:47:58,239 --> 00:48:01,759 Speaker 1: Maybe uh your room bow will becoming increasing way can 796 00:48:01,800 --> 00:48:06,600 Speaker 1: astro Uh they want to add these surveillance capabilities, and 797 00:48:06,640 --> 00:48:11,319 Speaker 1: then what happens when they start sort of mesh networking? Right? 798 00:48:11,400 --> 00:48:14,680 Speaker 1: What happens when you are at the secret Wizard of 799 00:48:14,680 --> 00:48:17,960 Speaker 1: Oz control room in Amazon and you can map an 800 00:48:18,160 --> 00:48:24,640 Speaker 1: entire neighborhood and maybe during times of domestic unrest, you 801 00:48:24,680 --> 00:48:29,360 Speaker 1: get warrant and you have to supply the information that 802 00:48:29,480 --> 00:48:33,560 Speaker 1: you have about that entire neighborhood where protests just happened 803 00:48:33,600 --> 00:48:39,960 Speaker 1: to be taking place. God, I just connect that that 804 00:48:40,040 --> 00:48:46,600 Speaker 1: old sidewalk app up right, It's just it's everything, It's 805 00:48:46,600 --> 00:48:49,600 Speaker 1: already there. They're just not all in one body yet. 806 00:48:50,320 --> 00:48:52,480 Speaker 1: Oh well, here's the other thing you're gonna you're gonna 807 00:48:52,520 --> 00:48:58,160 Speaker 1: love for anybody's feeling to U two spooked about this? Well, 808 00:48:58,320 --> 00:49:01,560 Speaker 1: as long as you don't live in a ranch style house, 809 00:49:01,640 --> 00:49:03,680 Speaker 1: you may have a little bit of respite. Because right 810 00:49:03,719 --> 00:49:12,280 Speaker 1: now Astro and Rumba cannot go up or downstairs. So 811 00:49:12,280 --> 00:49:15,040 Speaker 1: so hide in the basement, hide on the second floor, 812 00:49:15,200 --> 00:49:18,640 Speaker 1: you know what I mean, And don't put the Amazon 813 00:49:18,800 --> 00:49:21,120 Speaker 1: Alexa up there. Now. Of course, we have to point 814 00:49:21,120 --> 00:49:22,719 Speaker 1: out a lot of this right now, A lot of 815 00:49:22,719 --> 00:49:26,319 Speaker 1: these concerns are proactive. I would say, there hasn't been 816 00:49:26,360 --> 00:49:33,400 Speaker 1: any proof yet of an obsessive, super sophisticated amount of 817 00:49:33,480 --> 00:49:40,120 Speaker 1: data being used against people, uh in yet at this point. Right, 818 00:49:40,160 --> 00:49:44,000 Speaker 1: but we have to remember that governments can still request 819 00:49:44,080 --> 00:49:48,600 Speaker 1: this stuff from different corporations, and in many cases those 820 00:49:48,640 --> 00:49:54,680 Speaker 1: corporations must comply. Also, data can be used predictively. The 821 00:49:54,719 --> 00:50:00,160 Speaker 1: predecessor for what happened with Meta recently is Target. You know, 822 00:50:00,239 --> 00:50:05,040 Speaker 1: and Target has hidden income stream selling surveillance equipment to 823 00:50:05,120 --> 00:50:08,160 Speaker 1: other businesses. Like next time you're in the target, look 824 00:50:08,200 --> 00:50:10,440 Speaker 1: up at the ceiling. See how many cameras there are. 825 00:50:10,480 --> 00:50:12,879 Speaker 1: There are a ton, They're very good at it. Well, 826 00:50:13,000 --> 00:50:14,480 Speaker 1: I just wanted to add, like we we we this 827 00:50:14,560 --> 00:50:18,080 Speaker 1: all kind of like meshes together. No point intended with 828 00:50:18,320 --> 00:50:22,400 Speaker 1: um the ring camera discussion that we've been having. And 829 00:50:22,440 --> 00:50:26,080 Speaker 1: I just found out that apparently Amazon is launching a 830 00:50:26,160 --> 00:50:31,600 Speaker 1: ring camera generated like like hidden camera show like in 831 00:50:31,640 --> 00:50:36,279 Speaker 1: America's stupidest criminals are like the funniest you know, front 832 00:50:36,360 --> 00:50:39,560 Speaker 1: yard goofs or whatever. And I need to look into 833 00:50:39,600 --> 00:50:42,279 Speaker 1: it further. I don't know you would think you would 834 00:50:42,280 --> 00:50:45,000 Speaker 1: have to be used or submitted because you know, like again, 835 00:50:45,200 --> 00:50:48,520 Speaker 1: I have the stupid app for Ring, and I know 836 00:50:48,520 --> 00:50:49,719 Speaker 1: there's a way that I can opt out of it, 837 00:50:49,760 --> 00:50:52,560 Speaker 1: but I get all these messages for this like neighborly whatever, 838 00:50:52,880 --> 00:50:55,160 Speaker 1: and and it comes with videos attachment be like creepy 839 00:50:55,200 --> 00:50:57,719 Speaker 1: prowler guy, what's that in his hand? And you look 840 00:50:57,719 --> 00:51:00,879 Speaker 1: at the video? Um, so I under you know how 841 00:51:00,920 --> 00:51:04,080 Speaker 1: this submission would work or if it literally is just 842 00:51:04,160 --> 00:51:07,520 Speaker 1: like well we if you if you read the terms 843 00:51:07,520 --> 00:51:09,480 Speaker 1: of service close enough, you'd see that we own all 844 00:51:09,480 --> 00:51:13,040 Speaker 1: this footage. Uh Wanda Sykes isst hosting it by the 845 00:51:14,360 --> 00:51:19,200 Speaker 1: normalized surveillance while vilifying the disadvantaged. For sure, I want 846 00:51:19,200 --> 00:51:21,480 Speaker 1: to finish what I was saying though about Target, because 847 00:51:21,560 --> 00:51:26,600 Speaker 1: Target used their data to predict a pregnancy that a 848 00:51:26,600 --> 00:51:29,240 Speaker 1: teenager and not told her parents about, and the parents 849 00:51:29,280 --> 00:51:32,120 Speaker 1: found out about it via target, So it's important to 850 00:51:32,160 --> 00:51:34,920 Speaker 1: remember that's the predecessor. Now, I didn't mean to roll 851 00:51:34,960 --> 00:51:36,799 Speaker 1: over you, man. Can I make one last point on 852 00:51:36,840 --> 00:51:39,399 Speaker 1: the rumor game show thing. I think you're right on there. 853 00:51:39,800 --> 00:51:44,520 Speaker 1: It feels like they're just increasing people's desire to keep 854 00:51:44,600 --> 00:51:47,400 Speaker 1: track of that ring footage and uploaded to neighbors. I 855 00:51:47,440 --> 00:51:49,359 Speaker 1: think this is a really great to a great way 856 00:51:49,360 --> 00:51:53,120 Speaker 1: to incentivize that, similar to America's funny sol videos where 857 00:51:53,120 --> 00:51:55,920 Speaker 1: if you offer people maybe just two hundred dollars or 858 00:51:56,200 --> 00:51:59,720 Speaker 1: five dollars, if your submission gets onto the TV show, 859 00:52:00,280 --> 00:52:03,239 Speaker 1: it's gonna that means more people are going to be 860 00:52:03,320 --> 00:52:06,359 Speaker 1: uploading their own videos for sure. That's right. The show 861 00:52:06,440 --> 00:52:09,000 Speaker 1: is going to be called Ring Nation, and they do 862 00:52:09,239 --> 00:52:11,640 Speaker 1: claim that they will be securing permission and then the 863 00:52:11,680 --> 00:52:13,799 Speaker 1: videos could come from other sources too, But it's all 864 00:52:13,840 --> 00:52:16,880 Speaker 1: going to be a big giant incentive for uploading your 865 00:52:16,960 --> 00:52:20,200 Speaker 1: videos to like, you know, whatever cms that they set 866 00:52:20,280 --> 00:52:23,080 Speaker 1: up for this thing. And um, it's a big old 867 00:52:23,080 --> 00:52:28,480 Speaker 1: commercial for ring and to to sew this up, folks, 868 00:52:28,520 --> 00:52:31,960 Speaker 1: to put a frightening bow on it without sounding like 869 00:52:32,120 --> 00:52:38,000 Speaker 1: a broken record or a whistleblower who is suffering from 870 00:52:38,040 --> 00:52:43,640 Speaker 1: Alzheimer's and repetitive motion of thought. Uh, this stuff is happening, 871 00:52:43,880 --> 00:52:48,160 Speaker 1: It's there is precedent to it, but this is untrammeled territory, 872 00:52:48,200 --> 00:52:52,760 Speaker 1: which means that again, technology is outpacing legislation. And since 873 00:52:52,840 --> 00:52:56,400 Speaker 1: the passage of the Patriot Act in the United States, 874 00:52:56,880 --> 00:53:01,240 Speaker 1: your rights to privacy in this kind tree and abroad, 875 00:53:01,320 --> 00:53:05,880 Speaker 1: by the way, shout out five eyes have eroded and 876 00:53:06,560 --> 00:53:10,520 Speaker 1: far past what you may be comfortable thinking about or considering. 877 00:53:10,920 --> 00:53:14,560 Speaker 1: So this is a step further down that direction. And 878 00:53:15,640 --> 00:53:18,440 Speaker 1: we want to hear stories. I definitely want to know 879 00:53:18,760 --> 00:53:21,360 Speaker 1: any weird things that have happened to you in these 880 00:53:21,480 --> 00:53:25,239 Speaker 1: our days of absolute surveillance, which are you know, we're 881 00:53:25,239 --> 00:53:28,640 Speaker 1: in the nascent days, but it's happening your kids, your grandkids. 882 00:53:28,719 --> 00:53:32,879 Speaker 1: If this continues on a current trend, Uh, they're going 883 00:53:32,920 --> 00:53:36,279 Speaker 1: to look at privacy is something kind of anachronistic and 884 00:53:36,360 --> 00:53:39,080 Speaker 1: old fashioned, and they'll do so with good reason. So 885 00:53:39,200 --> 00:53:42,000 Speaker 1: let us know what spooky things have happened to you. Uh, 886 00:53:42,160 --> 00:53:45,960 Speaker 1: let us know your take on mailing poop. Let us 887 00:53:46,040 --> 00:53:51,920 Speaker 1: know what what role you think private corporations should play 888 00:53:52,000 --> 00:53:57,040 Speaker 1: in privacy or security or the lack thereof. As always, 889 00:53:57,080 --> 00:53:59,040 Speaker 1: we can't wait to hear from you. We try to 890 00:53:59,080 --> 00:54:01,400 Speaker 1: be easy to find line correct. You can find us 891 00:54:01,440 --> 00:54:03,880 Speaker 1: on Facebook, you can find this on Twitter, and you 892 00:54:03,880 --> 00:54:06,560 Speaker 1: can find us on YouTube with the handle conspiracy Stuff. 893 00:54:06,760 --> 00:54:10,200 Speaker 1: On Instagram, we are Conspiracy Stuff show Yes. If you 894 00:54:10,200 --> 00:54:12,560 Speaker 1: would like to contact us with your voice, you can 895 00:54:12,600 --> 00:54:16,080 Speaker 1: call one eight three three st d w y t K. 896 00:54:16,920 --> 00:54:19,440 Speaker 1: It's a voicemail system. When you call in, you'll hear Ben. 897 00:54:19,520 --> 00:54:22,160 Speaker 1: Please give yourself a cool nickname that we can jot 898 00:54:22,239 --> 00:54:24,000 Speaker 1: down and know when you call in in the future. 899 00:54:24,480 --> 00:54:26,719 Speaker 1: And now you've got three minutes, say whatever you'd like. 900 00:54:27,000 --> 00:54:29,360 Speaker 1: Please include whether or not you give us permission to 901 00:54:29,440 --> 00:54:32,759 Speaker 1: use that voice of yours and your message on one 902 00:54:32,800 --> 00:54:35,760 Speaker 1: of our listener mail episodes. If you don't like that, hey, 903 00:54:35,800 --> 00:54:38,600 Speaker 1: that's fine, that's fine. Why don't you send us a 904 00:54:38,600 --> 00:54:41,960 Speaker 1: good old fashioned email. We are conspiracy at i heeart 905 00:54:42,040 --> 00:55:02,640 Speaker 1: radio dot com. Stuff they Don't Want you to Know 906 00:55:02,880 --> 00:55:05,840 Speaker 1: is a production of I Heart Radio. For more podcasts 907 00:55:05,840 --> 00:55:08,080 Speaker 1: from my heart Radio, visit the i heart Radio app, 908 00:55:08,160 --> 00:55:11,040 Speaker 1: Apple Podcasts, or wherever you listen to your favorite shows.