1 00:00:01,000 --> 00:00:04,320 Speaker 1: From UFOs two, ghosts and government cover ups. History is 2 00:00:04,400 --> 00:00:08,000 Speaker 1: riddled with unexplained events. You can turn back now or 3 00:00:08,080 --> 00:00:16,040 Speaker 1: learn the stuff they don't want you to now previously 4 00:00:16,280 --> 00:00:18,480 Speaker 1: on the stuff they don't want you to know. Stay 5 00:00:18,520 --> 00:00:22,000 Speaker 1: away from that. Damat it's gonna blow. The movie of 6 00:00:22,120 --> 00:00:25,239 Speaker 1: terrorism must be stopped. But what if someone tried to 7 00:00:25,280 --> 00:00:28,920 Speaker 1: censor pants. Hey guys, it's Jonathan's Strickland. I'm from Tech 8 00:00:28,960 --> 00:00:31,560 Speaker 1: Stuff and I'm still in this room with you. Yes, 9 00:00:31,680 --> 00:00:34,760 Speaker 1: this is part two of our episodes. Let's just hop 10 00:00:34,800 --> 00:00:37,200 Speaker 1: in that you know who we are. I'm Matt. That's 11 00:00:37,240 --> 00:00:39,760 Speaker 1: been this is Jonathan. We're having a great time and 12 00:00:39,880 --> 00:00:43,880 Speaker 1: it's getting hacky and kind of North Korea in here. Yeah. 13 00:00:48,280 --> 00:00:52,160 Speaker 1: Another thing to remember about this, uh something else that 14 00:00:52,159 --> 00:00:55,160 Speaker 1: that doesn't necessarily point the finger at North Korea, but 15 00:00:55,440 --> 00:00:57,800 Speaker 1: to show the magnitude of this attack. It wasn't just 16 00:00:57,880 --> 00:01:02,760 Speaker 1: the information with stolen. They white computers at Sony Pictures. 17 00:01:02,800 --> 00:01:04,959 Speaker 1: So people who came into work on that Monday. I 18 00:01:05,000 --> 00:01:08,720 Speaker 1: read uh an interview with the guy he wasn't named, 19 00:01:08,720 --> 00:01:13,160 Speaker 1: but he wasn't employee son the aftermath, Yes, where he said, yeah, 20 00:01:13,160 --> 00:01:15,200 Speaker 1: we come into work on Monday, we turn on our 21 00:01:15,240 --> 00:01:18,119 Speaker 1: computers were working. Suddenly all the computers go black. We 22 00:01:18,160 --> 00:01:21,440 Speaker 1: figure there's just some sort of network error or something. 23 00:01:21,520 --> 00:01:24,160 Speaker 1: We realize that there's a real problem, and we go 24 00:01:24,240 --> 00:01:26,520 Speaker 1: home not thinking it's a big deal because it was 25 00:01:26,560 --> 00:01:28,680 Speaker 1: the week of Thanksgiving, which is a holiday week here 26 00:01:28,680 --> 00:01:31,320 Speaker 1: in the United States. So they went home thinking, oh, 27 00:01:31,319 --> 00:01:32,880 Speaker 1: we'll just come back and it will just be an 28 00:01:32,920 --> 00:01:35,880 Speaker 1: extra on holiday. We hurry for us. They come back 29 00:01:35,920 --> 00:01:38,920 Speaker 1: the following Monday, there's still problems, and then they realize 30 00:01:39,800 --> 00:01:42,720 Speaker 1: there could be a lot of personal information about the 31 00:01:42,800 --> 00:01:45,600 Speaker 1: employees of Sony that was wrapped up as part of 32 00:01:45,640 --> 00:01:49,160 Speaker 1: this attack, and it could involve things like insurance claim 33 00:01:49,760 --> 00:01:53,080 Speaker 1: just really personal stuff. They could impact real human beings 34 00:01:53,120 --> 00:01:58,160 Speaker 1: who have real lives. Security number yeah, yeah, social security numbers. 35 00:01:58,480 --> 00:02:01,920 Speaker 1: That means that opens the door for hossibility of medical information. 36 00:02:02,280 --> 00:02:04,360 Speaker 1: And I have a little bit of a theory about 37 00:02:04,400 --> 00:02:06,280 Speaker 1: this stuff, but I'm gonna hold it until we get 38 00:02:06,280 --> 00:02:08,960 Speaker 1: through the rest of this story. On December four, North 39 00:02:09,040 --> 00:02:12,720 Speaker 1: Korea officially denies any involvement in the Sony hack. Like 40 00:02:12,840 --> 00:02:15,440 Speaker 1: Shaggy and MC, some of the older members of our 41 00:02:15,440 --> 00:02:20,840 Speaker 1: audience may remember he said it wasn't me. Wow, that's 42 00:02:20,880 --> 00:02:24,120 Speaker 1: not bad. Hey, you know Shaggy formerly a marine as well. 43 00:02:24,760 --> 00:02:31,400 Speaker 1: But I didn't see that coming. It wasn't But this, uh, 44 00:02:31,560 --> 00:02:35,239 Speaker 1: these leaked emails are still coming out. Journalists are all 45 00:02:35,240 --> 00:02:40,000 Speaker 1: over this scour and the documents. Uh, the spokesperson and 46 00:02:40,000 --> 00:02:43,040 Speaker 1: I remember we said that December four right, North Korea 47 00:02:43,080 --> 00:02:46,520 Speaker 1: officially says it wasn't me and uh. December eighth, however, 48 00:02:46,560 --> 00:02:50,200 Speaker 1: a spokesperson for North Korea says the cyber attack might 49 00:02:50,440 --> 00:02:55,240 Speaker 1: have been a righteous deed of supporters and sympathizers, but 50 00:02:55,720 --> 00:02:59,680 Speaker 1: it wasn't directly linked to US, which is very similar 51 00:02:59,760 --> 00:03:03,600 Speaker 1: to some of the stuff we've heard from state sponsored 52 00:03:03,639 --> 00:03:09,440 Speaker 1: cyber attacks via Moscow via Beijing. Um, and I'm sure 53 00:03:09,520 --> 00:03:11,840 Speaker 1: that you know, I'm sure that Uncle Sam's doing a 54 00:03:11,880 --> 00:03:17,320 Speaker 1: couple too. Stucks, not anybody, Hey, that was officially not 55 00:03:17,600 --> 00:03:21,480 Speaker 1: the United States. That's the old plank in the eye 56 00:03:21,480 --> 00:03:23,040 Speaker 1: thing and get the spec out of your eye. But 57 00:03:23,120 --> 00:03:26,480 Speaker 1: there's a plank in mind. Right. So this continues though. Yeah, 58 00:03:26,520 --> 00:03:29,560 Speaker 1: and then on December nine, there was a message posted 59 00:03:29,560 --> 00:03:32,720 Speaker 1: to get hub which was allegedly from the Guardians of Peace. 60 00:03:32,720 --> 00:03:36,560 Speaker 1: Now it is extremely difficult to verify whether or not 61 00:03:36,680 --> 00:03:39,720 Speaker 1: in an anonymous message like that is from the same 62 00:03:39,760 --> 00:03:42,320 Speaker 1: person that posted the other anonymous thing. This is this 63 00:03:42,360 --> 00:03:45,880 Speaker 1: is like attributing anything to the group anonymous right where 64 00:03:46,000 --> 00:03:48,840 Speaker 1: where anonymous itself is not a cohesive group with a 65 00:03:48,880 --> 00:03:54,320 Speaker 1: single leader. It's actually a sort of a morphous semi organization. 66 00:03:54,480 --> 00:03:57,320 Speaker 1: And you could even have one group of people within 67 00:03:57,400 --> 00:04:01,320 Speaker 1: that organization want to do something like that's in it. Yeah, 68 00:04:01,520 --> 00:04:05,040 Speaker 1: exactly so well in that light, since we're not sure 69 00:04:05,080 --> 00:04:08,320 Speaker 1: if this message came from the same people that you 70 00:04:08,360 --> 00:04:11,800 Speaker 1: did the voice of Ben, would you mind doing an 71 00:04:11,800 --> 00:04:14,560 Speaker 1: evil voice or like an evil voice, or however you 72 00:04:14,560 --> 00:04:18,160 Speaker 1: want to spend it, stop immediately showing the movie of terrorism, 73 00:04:18,160 --> 00:04:20,200 Speaker 1: which can back the regional peace then cause the war. 74 00:04:20,279 --> 00:04:23,400 Speaker 1: See added that sea at the end, we know nothing 75 00:04:23,440 --> 00:04:26,120 Speaker 1: about the dartning email received by Sony Staffa. See, but 76 00:04:26,160 --> 00:04:28,760 Speaker 1: you should judge wisely by yourself why such things are 77 00:04:28,760 --> 00:04:32,120 Speaker 1: happening and who's responsible for you Sony and FBI cannot 78 00:04:32,160 --> 00:04:40,359 Speaker 1: find us amazing, So so this this supposed representative Guardians 79 00:04:40,400 --> 00:04:44,719 Speaker 1: of Peace, denies knowledge of a previous message also supposedly 80 00:04:44,800 --> 00:04:49,680 Speaker 1: from Guardians of Peace. But it's also for the first 81 00:04:49,720 --> 00:04:53,040 Speaker 1: time in the messages from these guys saying stop the 82 00:04:53,080 --> 00:04:56,120 Speaker 1: movie of terrorism. It does not say the interview, right, 83 00:04:57,040 --> 00:04:59,960 Speaker 1: but it's specifically talking about a movie. Else is a 84 00:05:00,000 --> 00:05:03,440 Speaker 1: stop immediately showing and the movie hadn't come out yet, right, Uh, 85 00:05:03,560 --> 00:05:07,520 Speaker 1: December tenth, though, they get this message gets a little 86 00:05:07,560 --> 00:05:11,640 Speaker 1: bit of street cred courtesy of Joe Demo, rest Assistant 87 00:05:11,640 --> 00:05:15,320 Speaker 1: director for the FBI Cyber Division. Yeah, he was talking 88 00:05:15,320 --> 00:05:18,760 Speaker 1: at a cybersecurity conference when he said, quote, there is 89 00:05:18,880 --> 00:05:21,440 Speaker 1: no this is on December ten, quote there is no 90 00:05:21,560 --> 00:05:25,320 Speaker 1: attribution to North Korea. At this point, they speaking of 91 00:05:25,360 --> 00:05:29,520 Speaker 1: the attack, the Sony hack, right, and it's been described 92 00:05:29,520 --> 00:05:33,640 Speaker 1: by a private security firm named fire Eye as an unparalleled, 93 00:05:33,680 --> 00:05:36,640 Speaker 1: well planned crime carried out by an organized group for 94 00:05:36,720 --> 00:05:40,240 Speaker 1: which neither spe nor any other companies could have been 95 00:05:40,279 --> 00:05:43,800 Speaker 1: fully prepared. So that Sony Picture Entertainment, So they say, 96 00:05:43,839 --> 00:05:47,320 Speaker 1: there's no way to prepare for this sort of level. Uh, 97 00:05:47,400 --> 00:05:50,400 Speaker 1: this sort of cybers you know. But they also discussed 98 00:05:50,400 --> 00:05:56,240 Speaker 1: how they were criticizing Sony for their security. Um, they're 99 00:05:56,240 --> 00:05:59,200 Speaker 1: saying that there were a lot of backdoors and and 100 00:05:59,440 --> 00:06:01,880 Speaker 1: essentially little uh, let's just I don't know if you 101 00:06:01,960 --> 00:06:06,359 Speaker 1: call loopholes, but fairly easy ways of gaining access. Sure, 102 00:06:06,520 --> 00:06:08,680 Speaker 1: I mean backdoors is probably the best way of putting it. Like, 103 00:06:09,279 --> 00:06:11,920 Speaker 1: the two things you've got to worry about with your 104 00:06:12,080 --> 00:06:15,719 Speaker 1: your online security is just the value of the security 105 00:06:15,760 --> 00:06:17,680 Speaker 1: system and then the value of the people who use it. 106 00:06:18,320 --> 00:06:21,599 Speaker 1: Those are the two elements. Well, we know that, for instance, 107 00:06:21,640 --> 00:06:23,960 Speaker 1: with I Love You brought up stuck stucks net earlier 108 00:06:24,200 --> 00:06:27,520 Speaker 1: because one of the things that was abundantly clear about 109 00:06:27,600 --> 00:06:32,400 Speaker 1: stocks net this this was this was a program most 110 00:06:32,440 --> 00:06:35,920 Speaker 1: likely created by Israel and the United States working together, right, 111 00:06:36,200 --> 00:06:39,599 Speaker 1: And what it did was it altered the speed of 112 00:06:39,760 --> 00:06:43,520 Speaker 1: center fugees I mean in the nuclear processing in or 113 00:06:43,640 --> 00:06:48,520 Speaker 1: On and uh and then screwed up the entire nuclear 114 00:06:49,360 --> 00:06:54,239 Speaker 1: facility or at least the process of refining this Those computers. However, 115 00:06:54,320 --> 00:06:57,159 Speaker 1: we're offline, which means that the only way that stucks 116 00:06:57,160 --> 00:06:59,760 Speaker 1: net could be introduced into that system would be what 117 00:07:00,080 --> 00:07:02,880 Speaker 1: a USB drive ME thumb thumb drive of some sort 118 00:07:03,080 --> 00:07:06,000 Speaker 1: or some other some other physical delivery system, which would 119 00:07:06,040 --> 00:07:08,720 Speaker 1: mean getting physical access to those machines, which would mean 120 00:07:09,360 --> 00:07:15,800 Speaker 1: either infiltrating the system entirely, as in having a like 121 00:07:15,840 --> 00:07:18,800 Speaker 1: a cover agent going in and becoming part of this 122 00:07:18,960 --> 00:07:23,600 Speaker 1: or more likely using social engineering to get access, uh, 123 00:07:23,720 --> 00:07:27,600 Speaker 1: using just simple lying to people. It's really easy. If 124 00:07:27,640 --> 00:07:31,520 Speaker 1: I walk into a company and I tell an overworked 125 00:07:31,560 --> 00:07:35,200 Speaker 1: receptionist that I'm there because there was an I t 126 00:07:35,440 --> 00:07:38,000 Speaker 1: issue that and I need access to a certain floor, 127 00:07:38,680 --> 00:07:44,000 Speaker 1: or nine times ten I get that access. Really well, 128 00:07:45,720 --> 00:07:47,480 Speaker 1: why do you think I'm not my desk so much 129 00:07:47,560 --> 00:07:50,120 Speaker 1: during the day. What happened to the old janitor buddy? 130 00:07:51,680 --> 00:07:54,239 Speaker 1: That's that's a really good point that the human element 131 00:07:54,440 --> 00:07:58,000 Speaker 1: is often going to be what compromises a system. Sure, 132 00:07:58,200 --> 00:08:01,800 Speaker 1: and we also know that Seth Rogan and James Franco, 133 00:08:01,840 --> 00:08:03,960 Speaker 1: of course have some stuff to say about this. I mean, 134 00:08:04,040 --> 00:08:06,120 Speaker 1: I don't know if they still get paid if the 135 00:08:06,160 --> 00:08:09,320 Speaker 1: movie doesn't come out the way it was supposed to. Um. 136 00:08:09,440 --> 00:08:12,200 Speaker 1: I yeah, I don't know if the full contract was 137 00:08:12,280 --> 00:08:14,280 Speaker 1: released in the Hacks. If it was, I have not 138 00:08:14,360 --> 00:08:16,520 Speaker 1: read it. I just talked about the money that they 139 00:08:16,560 --> 00:08:19,080 Speaker 1: made for the films. But one thing I do know 140 00:08:19,160 --> 00:08:21,160 Speaker 1: is that they went on Howard Sterns Show on the 141 00:08:21,920 --> 00:08:27,280 Speaker 1: of December and in discussions with Mr Stern, I just 142 00:08:27,320 --> 00:08:31,080 Speaker 1: wanted to read this one quote from Seth Rogan. He says, 143 00:08:31,240 --> 00:08:33,120 Speaker 1: I can't do an impression of seth Rogan man, I 144 00:08:33,120 --> 00:08:36,839 Speaker 1: wish I could. All right, I believe in you, dude, 145 00:08:37,000 --> 00:08:41,320 Speaker 1: he says. Now, no one has definitively told us that 146 00:08:41,400 --> 00:08:44,240 Speaker 1: North Korea is who did that. One day, I'm like, 147 00:08:44,559 --> 00:08:46,360 Speaker 1: it's for sure them, and the next day I'm like, 148 00:08:46,400 --> 00:08:49,640 Speaker 1: there's no way it's them. It seems too it seems 149 00:08:49,679 --> 00:08:53,240 Speaker 1: too savvy of Hollywood politics. And he's speaking as a 150 00:08:53,280 --> 00:08:56,840 Speaker 1: producer of the film, um you know, and director and writer. 151 00:08:57,320 --> 00:08:59,920 Speaker 1: And when they were talking about this stuff, they were 152 00:09:00,240 --> 00:09:03,720 Speaker 1: speaking about some of the more insider information that was leaked. 153 00:09:03,960 --> 00:09:06,559 Speaker 1: And why would they leak all of that stuff? Why 154 00:09:06,559 --> 00:09:09,880 Speaker 1: would North Korea care about that? Why would North Korea 155 00:09:09,960 --> 00:09:13,800 Speaker 1: be aware that that itself would be the key to 156 00:09:14,920 --> 00:09:20,320 Speaker 1: UH to causing action to happen, especially since North Korea 157 00:09:20,440 --> 00:09:23,640 Speaker 1: didn't if it were, if it was in fact North Korea, 158 00:09:23,679 --> 00:09:25,880 Speaker 1: and the interview was in fact the reason for it, 159 00:09:26,280 --> 00:09:29,320 Speaker 1: Why wasn't that ever part of the messaging at the 160 00:09:29,400 --> 00:09:33,760 Speaker 1: initial messaging? Right? Why is the messaging seemed to evolve? 161 00:09:34,080 --> 00:09:37,560 Speaker 1: And UH, speaking of evolving, we know in December sixteen, 162 00:09:37,679 --> 00:09:41,360 Speaker 1: they upped the stakes and specified the interview itself when 163 00:09:41,360 --> 00:09:44,760 Speaker 1: they said that movie theaters showing this feature would be 164 00:09:44,840 --> 00:09:48,800 Speaker 1: attacked and a quote here nine eleven style they said, 165 00:09:48,960 --> 00:09:50,400 Speaker 1: and that, I mean, if you want to hit a 166 00:09:50,400 --> 00:09:54,880 Speaker 1: hot button like nerve in in the American Psychic, that's 167 00:09:54,920 --> 00:09:57,240 Speaker 1: all you have to say. And as Jon Stewart said, 168 00:09:58,840 --> 00:10:03,480 Speaker 1: I had no idea that was a style though, right, yes, 169 00:10:03,960 --> 00:10:06,640 Speaker 1: And then you you go back to our recent memory, 170 00:10:06,720 --> 00:10:11,800 Speaker 1: you think about the Batman shooting at a movie theater, Yeah, 171 00:10:11,840 --> 00:10:15,240 Speaker 1: and you just it kind of conjures a lot of images. Well, yeah, 172 00:10:15,240 --> 00:10:19,320 Speaker 1: there there have been actual acts of terror, depending upon 173 00:10:19,520 --> 00:10:21,599 Speaker 1: you know how you look at at the definition, but 174 00:10:21,640 --> 00:10:23,520 Speaker 1: there have been acts of terror that have taken place 175 00:10:23,640 --> 00:10:29,960 Speaker 1: inside UH movie theaters in the United States. And so 176 00:10:30,360 --> 00:10:33,920 Speaker 1: this was a very evocative kind of message. It's one 177 00:10:33,960 --> 00:10:37,240 Speaker 1: that a lot of companies took very seriously for for 178 00:10:37,840 --> 00:10:40,280 Speaker 1: understandable reasons. I mean, there was a lot of backlash 179 00:10:40,400 --> 00:10:43,200 Speaker 1: for the for their their actions, that action being that 180 00:10:43,559 --> 00:10:47,680 Speaker 1: Car Mike theaters began to cancel screenings of the interview 181 00:10:47,720 --> 00:10:52,560 Speaker 1: and that was followed by every other major UH theater chain, 182 00:10:52,880 --> 00:10:55,400 Speaker 1: to the point where it looked like the only place 183 00:10:55,400 --> 00:10:57,240 Speaker 1: you were going to see the Interview for a while 184 00:10:57,360 --> 00:11:00,160 Speaker 1: was going to be in these tiny, little independent art 185 00:11:00,200 --> 00:11:02,320 Speaker 1: house theaters, which is the weirdest thing in the world. 186 00:11:02,720 --> 00:11:06,800 Speaker 1: This is a major film from a major motion picture 187 00:11:06,880 --> 00:11:10,160 Speaker 1: studio that would only get seen in art house pictures, 188 00:11:10,360 --> 00:11:13,800 Speaker 1: our art house theaters. And then you don't even get that. 189 00:11:14,320 --> 00:11:18,320 Speaker 1: So Sony announces the cancelation of the whole theatrical release. 190 00:11:18,400 --> 00:11:21,240 Speaker 1: And mind you, this is after car Mike begins sets 191 00:11:21,240 --> 00:11:25,640 Speaker 1: off that domino, after they canceled the premiere on Team, 192 00:11:26,600 --> 00:11:29,120 Speaker 1: And not only did they announce the cancelation of the 193 00:11:29,120 --> 00:11:32,120 Speaker 1: theatrical release, they went further than that. They said that 194 00:11:32,480 --> 00:11:36,200 Speaker 1: this movie would not be released in any format for 195 00:11:36,440 --> 00:11:40,040 Speaker 1: at least the foreseeable future. So they were saying at 196 00:11:40,080 --> 00:11:41,920 Speaker 1: that time, they were saying, it's not going to come 197 00:11:41,920 --> 00:11:43,719 Speaker 1: out in video on demand because a lot of people said, 198 00:11:43,720 --> 00:11:45,880 Speaker 1: why don't you just release a video on demato, Yeah, 199 00:11:45,880 --> 00:11:48,880 Speaker 1: they can't attack us all and they yeah, they're not 200 00:11:48,920 --> 00:11:52,280 Speaker 1: going to come into our homes. But there's there's not 201 00:11:52,280 --> 00:11:54,640 Speaker 1: gonna be that you could or you could do it 202 00:11:54,679 --> 00:11:57,240 Speaker 1: as you know DVD or Blu ray. But they were saying, no, 203 00:11:57,400 --> 00:12:00,000 Speaker 1: we have no plans to release this film in any form, 204 00:12:00,040 --> 00:12:02,719 Speaker 1: and read it even banned a couple of users. That's 205 00:12:02,720 --> 00:12:06,079 Speaker 1: how you know, stuff's getting real for sharing some leaked 206 00:12:06,120 --> 00:12:10,959 Speaker 1: documents and I think for possibly trying to find the 207 00:12:12,320 --> 00:12:16,720 Speaker 1: actual interview, the the actual movie. So so remember back 208 00:12:16,760 --> 00:12:19,200 Speaker 1: on the tenth, the FBI said there is no link, 209 00:12:19,360 --> 00:12:24,720 Speaker 1: no attribution. Then on the UM and I hate to 210 00:12:24,840 --> 00:12:28,319 Speaker 1: use this quote anonymous White House officials, but that's how 211 00:12:28,320 --> 00:12:32,439 Speaker 1: the Guardian reported it. UM anonymous White House officials say 212 00:12:32,440 --> 00:12:35,480 Speaker 1: that the US has evidence that the hack was coordinated 213 00:12:36,040 --> 00:12:38,679 Speaker 1: by North Korea. Now there's some words in there that 214 00:12:39,920 --> 00:12:43,360 Speaker 1: they're a little vague. I think on purpose, coordinated could 215 00:12:43,480 --> 00:12:48,360 Speaker 1: mean that North Korea could have been essentially the the 216 00:12:48,800 --> 00:12:50,600 Speaker 1: if you want to think about the money behind the 217 00:12:50,640 --> 00:12:56,360 Speaker 1: attacks attack, and then they essentially higher out our contract 218 00:12:56,360 --> 00:12:59,760 Speaker 1: out hackers, possibly in some place like China or Russia 219 00:12:59,800 --> 00:13:01,720 Speaker 1: where we know there are a lot of state sponsored 220 00:13:01,760 --> 00:13:06,920 Speaker 1: hackers and already UM and use them to perpetuate this attack. 221 00:13:07,400 --> 00:13:09,920 Speaker 1: And then yet still could come come out and say, hey, 222 00:13:09,960 --> 00:13:14,160 Speaker 1: we didn't do it right, And we see what's funny 223 00:13:14,160 --> 00:13:16,400 Speaker 1: about the statement too. I think you make a great 224 00:13:16,440 --> 00:13:21,160 Speaker 1: case for the word coordinated. Folks, ladies and gentlemen. Whenever 225 00:13:21,280 --> 00:13:25,800 Speaker 1: you read a report that says anonymous White House officials 226 00:13:25,920 --> 00:13:29,280 Speaker 1: or a government official who did not want to be named. 227 00:13:29,720 --> 00:13:33,120 Speaker 1: That means that they're giving a leak with the with 228 00:13:33,240 --> 00:13:37,640 Speaker 1: the blessing of whichever institution they originate from. And also 229 00:13:38,280 --> 00:13:42,320 Speaker 1: it's meant to avoid some responsibility of an official statement. 230 00:13:42,559 --> 00:13:47,800 Speaker 1: So that anonymous White House official who said that everybody, 231 00:13:47,880 --> 00:13:52,280 Speaker 1: everybody in the White House was like, yeah, that's fine, 232 00:13:53,200 --> 00:13:55,800 Speaker 1: but you know, don't say your name. Don't see you 233 00:13:55,840 --> 00:13:59,040 Speaker 1: said it. Yeah, it's so weird how that works, the 234 00:13:59,080 --> 00:14:02,960 Speaker 1: strategicallying of information like that. I wish I could strategically 235 00:14:03,160 --> 00:14:06,600 Speaker 1: leak information like that, just strategically leak. I've just been 236 00:14:06,679 --> 00:14:11,839 Speaker 1: leaving a trail all of the time. That's so. Yeah, 237 00:14:11,880 --> 00:14:14,320 Speaker 1: So we've solved one mystery on the show already. Um, 238 00:14:14,520 --> 00:14:18,320 Speaker 1: we know the President Obama says he has a problem 239 00:14:18,360 --> 00:14:22,080 Speaker 1: with Sony refusing to release the interview. You know, it's 240 00:14:22,120 --> 00:14:25,360 Speaker 1: bowing to terrorism. He made a statement about it, so 241 00:14:25,440 --> 00:14:28,160 Speaker 1: he officially says something later. Well, and this was the 242 00:14:28,160 --> 00:14:30,320 Speaker 1: backlash I was talking about earlier, Right, Yeah, there were 243 00:14:30,320 --> 00:14:33,680 Speaker 1: a lot of people who immediately criticized the theater chains 244 00:14:33,800 --> 00:14:36,640 Speaker 1: for for pulling it out, and then later criticizing Sony 245 00:14:36,760 --> 00:14:38,240 Speaker 1: for saying that they were not going to release it 246 00:14:38,280 --> 00:14:41,240 Speaker 1: under any format. And these were people and I include 247 00:14:41,240 --> 00:14:44,280 Speaker 1: myself in this, who didn't necessarily have any desire to 248 00:14:44,440 --> 00:14:47,160 Speaker 1: see the movie. They just didn't like the precedent this 249 00:14:47,280 --> 00:14:51,400 Speaker 1: was setting. Personally, I didn't like the precedent of saying 250 00:14:51,960 --> 00:14:55,840 Speaker 1: your threats are effective, and therefore you can affect me. 251 00:14:55,920 --> 00:14:59,520 Speaker 1: Because here, two thousand fourteen was the year of the 252 00:14:59,520 --> 00:15:03,720 Speaker 1: security breach you had. You had so many companies hit 253 00:15:03,760 --> 00:15:09,640 Speaker 1: by different security breaches and eBay mount Cox target whether 254 00:15:09,680 --> 00:15:13,760 Speaker 1: that was technically to but but the fallout continued. The 255 00:15:13,800 --> 00:15:17,960 Speaker 1: CEO of Targets stepped down because of those. So we've 256 00:15:18,040 --> 00:15:21,040 Speaker 1: had a whole year of security breaches and then when 257 00:15:21,080 --> 00:15:23,560 Speaker 1: you have this happen and you have a threat, a 258 00:15:23,600 --> 00:15:26,920 Speaker 1: non specific threat come in and then you see this 259 00:15:27,000 --> 00:15:30,640 Speaker 1: dramatic reaction to it. The message that sends out to everybody, 260 00:15:30,680 --> 00:15:34,960 Speaker 1: the perpetrators and everybody else is that with some effort, you, 261 00:15:35,520 --> 00:15:38,920 Speaker 1: an individual or small group of individuals, can impact an 262 00:15:39,200 --> 00:15:43,880 Speaker 1: enormous number of people, an entire industry of people. And 263 00:15:43,960 --> 00:15:47,480 Speaker 1: that opens the floodgates for people to say, well, heck, 264 00:15:48,240 --> 00:15:50,920 Speaker 1: I could do that. I mean even just for for 265 00:15:50,920 --> 00:15:55,560 Speaker 1: for giggles, like I don't have any ideological problem with anybody, 266 00:15:55,600 --> 00:15:58,200 Speaker 1: But the thought of being able to affect that many 267 00:15:58,280 --> 00:16:01,240 Speaker 1: people is really a pe linked to a certain group 268 00:16:01,360 --> 00:16:04,360 Speaker 1: of folks. Yeah, I mean, how far away are we 269 00:16:04,520 --> 00:16:08,240 Speaker 1: from a super villain just co opting YouTube and appearing 270 00:16:08,280 --> 00:16:11,760 Speaker 1: and being like, you know, attention America. If you do 271 00:16:11,880 --> 00:16:15,160 Speaker 1: not immediately reassemble the cast of night Calls, that will 272 00:16:15,200 --> 00:16:20,360 Speaker 1: be grave consequences. Yeah, I'm I'm going after PUTI Pie. 273 00:16:20,360 --> 00:16:25,640 Speaker 1: That's what I'm just gonna appear in from Well, I'd 274 00:16:25,680 --> 00:16:28,560 Speaker 1: just like to say that it's not releasing this movie 275 00:16:28,680 --> 00:16:30,960 Speaker 1: at all if that is indeed what happens, which it 276 00:16:31,000 --> 00:16:33,080 Speaker 1: doesn't seem to be, you know, what's going to happen. 277 00:16:33,680 --> 00:16:36,600 Speaker 1: But if they did that, then it would be effectively 278 00:16:36,640 --> 00:16:39,560 Speaker 1: paying a forty seven million dollar ransom or however much 279 00:16:39,560 --> 00:16:41,760 Speaker 1: it costs to create the film, plus whatever money they 280 00:16:41,800 --> 00:16:45,840 Speaker 1: would have made opening day on Christmas when everybody goes 281 00:16:45,920 --> 00:16:49,479 Speaker 1: to see movies, and having to cancel those public appearances 282 00:16:49,520 --> 00:16:51,400 Speaker 1: to oh yeah, like this night show they didn't go 283 00:16:51,440 --> 00:16:53,560 Speaker 1: on there, all those things. It's just crazy to think 284 00:16:53,720 --> 00:16:56,520 Speaker 1: if you cave to this, just what you're giving up 285 00:16:56,560 --> 00:16:59,720 Speaker 1: and the FBI comes back around and now we're getting 286 00:16:59,720 --> 00:17:03,280 Speaker 1: close and closer to the present day, because they say. 287 00:17:03,360 --> 00:17:05,840 Speaker 1: In a statement released on Friday this via The Guardian, 288 00:17:06,000 --> 00:17:09,600 Speaker 1: the FBI said a technical analysis of the malignant software 289 00:17:10,000 --> 00:17:15,800 Speaker 1: known as malware used in the attack has been linked 290 00:17:15,800 --> 00:17:19,679 Speaker 1: to other malware uh that the FBI knows North Korean 291 00:17:19,720 --> 00:17:24,080 Speaker 1: actors previously developed. There were similarities and specific lines of code, 292 00:17:24,160 --> 00:17:28,560 Speaker 1: encryption algorithms, data deletion methods, and compromise networks. The FBI said, 293 00:17:28,760 --> 00:17:34,600 Speaker 1: I like how they explained malware, but not encryption algorithms. Malware, 294 00:17:34,720 --> 00:17:37,520 Speaker 1: you know, that's what we used to call viruses. I 295 00:17:37,600 --> 00:17:40,240 Speaker 1: use that accent because it was The Guardian. So so 296 00:17:40,480 --> 00:17:44,159 Speaker 1: there's another interesting phrase here, North Korean actors. This is 297 00:17:44,200 --> 00:17:48,360 Speaker 1: all a slow bill toward my theory. North Korean actors. Uh, 298 00:17:48,600 --> 00:17:52,520 Speaker 1: that's not necessarily a member of the North Korean government, 299 00:17:53,560 --> 00:17:58,760 Speaker 1: someone who appears in a theatrical production of North Korea 300 00:17:58,920 --> 00:18:03,600 Speaker 1: or it performs in one super adamant North Korean dude, 301 00:18:03,800 --> 00:18:08,760 Speaker 1: it's like you can. So yeah. This is also something 302 00:18:08,760 --> 00:18:12,040 Speaker 1: else I should point out is that code, whether or 303 00:18:12,119 --> 00:18:15,520 Speaker 1: not it originates in a particular country, doesn't belong there. 304 00:18:16,080 --> 00:18:18,040 Speaker 1: Like as soon as it gets out in the wild, 305 00:18:18,080 --> 00:18:22,440 Speaker 1: it's out there and people will make use of whatever works. 306 00:18:23,240 --> 00:18:26,720 Speaker 1: It's it's well, it's impossible to to appropriate code and 307 00:18:26,760 --> 00:18:29,320 Speaker 1: then use it for your own purposes. In fact, there 308 00:18:29,320 --> 00:18:32,560 Speaker 1: are hackers out there, and I use hackers very loosely 309 00:18:32,600 --> 00:18:36,560 Speaker 1: in this sense, that don't ever write any code themselves. 310 00:18:37,359 --> 00:18:40,440 Speaker 1: Script kitties. They get hold of code that's been previously 311 00:18:40,440 --> 00:18:44,080 Speaker 1: written and they repurpose it for something else, and often 312 00:18:44,119 --> 00:18:47,720 Speaker 1: they do it with minimum alteration, or maybe no alteration 313 00:18:47,720 --> 00:18:50,560 Speaker 1: at all. This is a great way of saying how 314 00:18:50,720 --> 00:18:54,600 Speaker 1: the Sony hack was inherently different from the d d 315 00:18:54,680 --> 00:18:58,000 Speaker 1: o S attacks that brought down Microsoft Xbox Live during 316 00:18:58,040 --> 00:19:00,680 Speaker 1: the same time frame, because that was a simple D 317 00:19:00,760 --> 00:19:03,040 Speaker 1: d o S attack, which I was telling Matt earlier, 318 00:19:03,160 --> 00:19:05,840 Speaker 1: that's that's kind of like the equivalent of me walking 319 00:19:05,880 --> 00:19:07,200 Speaker 1: up to one of you while you're trying to work 320 00:19:07,240 --> 00:19:08,800 Speaker 1: and go, hey, what you're doing, what you're doing, Hey, 321 00:19:08,800 --> 00:19:09,920 Speaker 1: what you're doing, what you're doing, what you're doing, what 322 00:19:09,960 --> 00:19:11,720 Speaker 1: you're doing, what you're working on, what you're doing, and 323 00:19:11,840 --> 00:19:13,960 Speaker 1: just doing that all day long. You can't get anything 324 00:19:14,000 --> 00:19:19,040 Speaker 1: done because I'm irritating you. Normal and that's exactly what 325 00:19:19,080 --> 00:19:21,280 Speaker 1: happens with a D d S attack. Well, that's a 326 00:19:21,720 --> 00:19:25,639 Speaker 1: that's a very unsophisticated attack, right, It's it's just throwing 327 00:19:25,640 --> 00:19:31,280 Speaker 1: a hammer at somebody. This attack was much more robust, 328 00:19:31,440 --> 00:19:34,520 Speaker 1: much more. It involved way more levels than just a 329 00:19:34,560 --> 00:19:38,680 Speaker 1: D D S attacks exactly, And like sneaking in at night, 330 00:19:38,800 --> 00:19:41,600 Speaker 1: setting up and booby trapping your entire house and then 331 00:19:41,600 --> 00:19:43,199 Speaker 1: waiting till you're at work the next day and just 332 00:19:43,320 --> 00:19:49,240 Speaker 1: setting it. It's home alone. It's McCauley Culkins possibly involved, No, 333 00:19:49,359 --> 00:19:51,480 Speaker 1: he was not involved. Was that? Kids think Kevin was 334 00:19:51,640 --> 00:19:54,800 Speaker 1: Kevin and home alone? Yeah, so now we know what 335 00:19:55,600 --> 00:20:02,960 Speaker 1: he's hacking into home alone sevens But no, I mean, 336 00:20:03,000 --> 00:20:05,080 Speaker 1: this is the reason why I bring all that up 337 00:20:05,600 --> 00:20:08,960 Speaker 1: is that it is possible that someone could be using 338 00:20:08,960 --> 00:20:11,560 Speaker 1: code that does in fact have code coming from North 339 00:20:11,640 --> 00:20:15,800 Speaker 1: Korea and not be connected to North Korea. It's also 340 00:20:15,880 --> 00:20:18,199 Speaker 1: possible the other ways, or maybe using you on purpose 341 00:20:18,240 --> 00:20:21,239 Speaker 1: because it did come from North Korea. And in the 342 00:20:21,320 --> 00:20:26,119 Speaker 1: murky world of espionage, those kind of things are not impossible. 343 00:20:26,359 --> 00:20:29,760 Speaker 1: I mean, I don't know if they're they are possible. 344 00:20:29,840 --> 00:20:32,080 Speaker 1: I think it's a leap to say they're plausible. But 345 00:20:32,160 --> 00:20:36,600 Speaker 1: what what about this? Here's an interesting statistic North Korea 346 00:20:36,760 --> 00:20:42,520 Speaker 1: has about a thousand email addresses, and for comparison, you 347 00:20:42,560 --> 00:20:45,720 Speaker 1: can find about that many. According to a recent story 348 00:20:45,760 --> 00:20:48,399 Speaker 1: by MPR, you can find a thousand email addresses in 349 00:20:48,480 --> 00:20:50,919 Speaker 1: maybe a block of New York City. Yeah, I mean, 350 00:20:50,960 --> 00:20:56,160 Speaker 1: I've got like four year fifty myself. That's true. That's 351 00:20:56,200 --> 00:21:01,280 Speaker 1: probably that's probably an exaggeration, right, So in the whole, uh, 352 00:21:01,440 --> 00:21:06,800 Speaker 1: the North Korean population is not full of you know, 353 00:21:07,359 --> 00:21:09,960 Speaker 1: tech literati. Well, they're they're most of them are not 354 00:21:10,040 --> 00:21:13,560 Speaker 1: allowed to have any connection to the internet. This there's 355 00:21:13,560 --> 00:21:16,920 Speaker 1: a couple of other interesting points that have kind of 356 00:21:17,080 --> 00:21:19,520 Speaker 1: unraveled over the last couple of days as we record this. 357 00:21:20,280 --> 00:21:24,120 Speaker 1: One is that the uh, the internet in North Korea 358 00:21:24,240 --> 00:21:28,280 Speaker 1: suffered some major slowing down to the point where people 359 00:21:28,280 --> 00:21:30,280 Speaker 1: were saying no one would be able to connect, and 360 00:21:30,320 --> 00:21:33,040 Speaker 1: that raised questions and we don't have answers for this. 361 00:21:33,359 --> 00:21:35,520 Speaker 1: They raised the question of is this at all connected 362 00:21:35,680 --> 00:21:39,720 Speaker 1: to this Sony hack? Was it a retaliation because there 363 00:21:39,840 --> 00:21:42,600 Speaker 1: was a statement of there would be a proportional response 364 00:21:43,240 --> 00:21:45,639 Speaker 1: to any attack that was against the United States. So 365 00:21:45,680 --> 00:21:49,719 Speaker 1: how do you what's a what's proportionate to having a 366 00:21:49,760 --> 00:21:55,240 Speaker 1: company have the North Korean film do you do you 367 00:21:55,640 --> 00:21:58,639 Speaker 1: shut down the military and government access to the internet, 368 00:21:58,680 --> 00:22:01,360 Speaker 1: because that's that's pretty much the only people in North 369 00:22:01,440 --> 00:22:05,439 Speaker 1: Korea who have the access we're talking about, UH. Or 370 00:22:06,280 --> 00:22:09,200 Speaker 1: was it some totally unrelated group that decided to take 371 00:22:09,200 --> 00:22:12,120 Speaker 1: it upon themselves kind of the way North Korea was saying, Hey, 372 00:22:12,160 --> 00:22:14,959 Speaker 1: it wasn't us, but whoever it was, you guys are awesome. 373 00:22:16,480 --> 00:22:19,240 Speaker 1: Is it the same thing but now going against North Korea? 374 00:22:19,440 --> 00:22:23,879 Speaker 1: Or could it just be a system failure that has 375 00:22:23,920 --> 00:22:26,720 Speaker 1: nothing to do with any of this? And the the 376 00:22:26,720 --> 00:22:29,679 Speaker 1: pure answer is that we do not know. Only the 377 00:22:29,720 --> 00:22:33,000 Speaker 1: people who would be responsible would know if in fact 378 00:22:33,200 --> 00:22:36,520 Speaker 1: someone's responsible. You know. There's also the there's also the 379 00:22:36,600 --> 00:22:43,640 Speaker 1: possibility that due to international tensions between the triumvirates here 380 00:22:43,760 --> 00:22:47,040 Speaker 1: of North Korea, China, the United States, we shall also 381 00:22:47,080 --> 00:22:51,000 Speaker 1: had South Korea and Japan. UH. There there's a possibility 382 00:22:51,119 --> 00:22:55,080 Speaker 1: that this might be handled in backdoor channels differently than 383 00:22:55,119 --> 00:22:57,680 Speaker 1: it's handled in the public sphere. And this is something 384 00:22:57,920 --> 00:23:03,800 Speaker 1: that quite often happened um in in dealings between North 385 00:23:03,880 --> 00:23:07,520 Speaker 1: Korea and many other many other countries. UH. And I 386 00:23:07,560 --> 00:23:11,680 Speaker 1: know this because during the nuclear during the last round 387 00:23:11,760 --> 00:23:16,720 Speaker 1: of failed nuclear talks, a North Korean UM, a member 388 00:23:16,760 --> 00:23:20,920 Speaker 1: of the North Korean Foreign Ministry, and his entourage visited 389 00:23:21,680 --> 00:23:24,040 Speaker 1: the school I was at at the time, and their 390 00:23:24,720 --> 00:23:30,320 Speaker 1: conversation was completely different worlds away from what you would 391 00:23:30,359 --> 00:23:33,840 Speaker 1: see on North Korea's official website, which you can't visit 392 00:23:33,960 --> 00:23:36,280 Speaker 1: and is in English and Korea. Yeah, he was telling 393 00:23:36,320 --> 00:23:38,560 Speaker 1: me about that. I don't know if you want to 394 00:23:38,600 --> 00:23:40,359 Speaker 1: read it. I mean, I think I think part of 395 00:23:40,400 --> 00:23:43,040 Speaker 1: that is, like, you know, the idea of saving face. Yes, 396 00:23:43,160 --> 00:23:46,320 Speaker 1: about the whole idea of how can we diffuse the 397 00:23:46,400 --> 00:23:50,320 Speaker 1: situation where no one looks like they are backing down 398 00:23:50,560 --> 00:23:53,840 Speaker 1: right or apologizing or week no one can look weak. 399 00:23:54,160 --> 00:23:58,320 Speaker 1: Speaking of that, on December nineteen and we were talking 400 00:23:58,320 --> 00:24:01,359 Speaker 1: about this, Seathan, North Korea offered to set up a 401 00:24:01,440 --> 00:24:04,080 Speaker 1: joint inquiry with the United States to find out who 402 00:24:04,119 --> 00:24:06,359 Speaker 1: was behind this hack. Yeah, they said, we don't. We 403 00:24:06,440 --> 00:24:09,320 Speaker 1: don't approve of all the things that have happened. We 404 00:24:09,400 --> 00:24:11,679 Speaker 1: do think that they had a noble goal in the 405 00:24:11,720 --> 00:24:15,280 Speaker 1: sense that this movie is an insult, but we didn't 406 00:24:15,600 --> 00:24:17,640 Speaker 1: we weren't responsible, and we will help you find out 407 00:24:17,680 --> 00:24:20,439 Speaker 1: who is in the United States said thanks, no, thanks, 408 00:24:20,680 --> 00:24:23,199 Speaker 1: but but here's the here's the thing. There are so 409 00:24:23,240 --> 00:24:27,439 Speaker 1: many different layers here, right, the layer of there's the 410 00:24:27,560 --> 00:24:30,680 Speaker 1: perception of whether or not North Korea is being sincere, 411 00:24:30,680 --> 00:24:34,160 Speaker 1: and it's offer whether whether they're being whether they are trustworthy, 412 00:24:34,880 --> 00:24:38,880 Speaker 1: whether we genuinely believe North Korea to be behind the attacks, 413 00:24:38,920 --> 00:24:41,880 Speaker 1: and we we we in this room, can't say whether 414 00:24:42,000 --> 00:24:46,560 Speaker 1: or not the US government genuinely believes that. Um. One 415 00:24:46,600 --> 00:24:49,119 Speaker 1: of the things that that came up in the discussion 416 00:24:49,119 --> 00:24:51,320 Speaker 1: Matt and I had was that a lot of the 417 00:24:51,840 --> 00:24:57,640 Speaker 1: there's no smoking gun pointing at North pointing from North 418 00:24:57,720 --> 00:25:01,080 Speaker 1: Korea for this particular incident that we are aware of, 419 00:25:01,160 --> 00:25:04,000 Speaker 1: but that doesn't mean there isn't one. There could be 420 00:25:04,040 --> 00:25:06,720 Speaker 1: one that the FBI is fully aware of but has 421 00:25:06,760 --> 00:25:09,840 Speaker 1: not made at all public, and therefore there it could 422 00:25:09,920 --> 00:25:13,000 Speaker 1: they could be completely sincere when they say we believe 423 00:25:13,040 --> 00:25:15,800 Speaker 1: North Korea to be behind this, right, and what would 424 00:25:15,840 --> 00:25:18,720 Speaker 1: the relationship be? I love that point because there is 425 00:25:19,320 --> 00:25:23,639 Speaker 1: not an easy black and white answer. I have a 426 00:25:23,680 --> 00:25:25,320 Speaker 1: little bit of a theory. If you guys would like 427 00:25:25,359 --> 00:25:26,840 Speaker 1: to hear, I would love to hear your theory. I've 428 00:25:26,840 --> 00:25:30,720 Speaker 1: got a theory of my own. So so Japan right 429 00:25:31,000 --> 00:25:34,400 Speaker 1: has a part of it. Yes, you're familiar with its work. 430 00:25:35,440 --> 00:25:40,560 Speaker 1: Japan has um a large ethnic Korean population, some of 431 00:25:40,600 --> 00:25:45,760 Speaker 1: whom are DPRK sympathizers, and UH, DPRK has to add 432 00:25:45,800 --> 00:25:49,040 Speaker 1: a little bit to its muddy reputation abroad. UH it's 433 00:25:49,160 --> 00:25:54,960 Speaker 1: often been found as the ringleader for illegal activity such 434 00:25:55,000 --> 00:25:58,959 Speaker 1: as smuggling or creation of methamphetamine, creation of the so 435 00:25:59,040 --> 00:26:02,320 Speaker 1: called Supernoe, which were fake hundred dollar bills that were 436 00:26:02,400 --> 00:26:06,800 Speaker 1: really really well done. And UH it is completely possible 437 00:26:07,119 --> 00:26:10,840 Speaker 1: that one UH, that one or more ethnic Koreans working 438 00:26:10,840 --> 00:26:15,400 Speaker 1: in Japan worked for Sony let open the door, or 439 00:26:15,440 --> 00:26:19,080 Speaker 1: there was some sort of exploit that was passed along 440 00:26:19,400 --> 00:26:23,080 Speaker 1: to hackers. What I don't think happened. I just don't 441 00:26:23,160 --> 00:26:27,760 Speaker 1: think that given all of the other concerns that DPRK 442 00:26:27,960 --> 00:26:30,520 Speaker 1: has right now, and it has a lot the relationship 443 00:26:30,600 --> 00:26:33,760 Speaker 1: with the Soviet unions pretty much well, the relationship with 444 00:26:33,840 --> 00:26:37,080 Speaker 1: Russia is pretty much non existent. The relationship with China 445 00:26:37,280 --> 00:26:41,520 Speaker 1: is deteriorating, especially in the wake of Kim Jong Ill's death. 446 00:26:41,880 --> 00:26:46,720 Speaker 1: I think this was maybe state approved, but I don't 447 00:26:46,720 --> 00:26:52,680 Speaker 1: think it was state spearheaded. If it was, the priorities 448 00:26:52,720 --> 00:26:56,000 Speaker 1: have to be way off. It's not necessarily the behavior 449 00:26:56,040 --> 00:26:58,240 Speaker 1: of a rational actor unless there's more to the story. 450 00:26:58,560 --> 00:27:01,720 Speaker 1: So I think what we're looking at would be contractors, 451 00:27:01,760 --> 00:27:06,200 Speaker 1: maybe sympathetic activists of some sort, because there are there 452 00:27:06,240 --> 00:27:08,840 Speaker 1: are even though a lot of people don't know this, 453 00:27:09,200 --> 00:27:15,280 Speaker 1: there are quite a few um sympathetic North Korea sympathizers 454 00:27:15,320 --> 00:27:18,800 Speaker 1: in South Korea in Japan, some of who are legit spies, 455 00:27:18,840 --> 00:27:21,080 Speaker 1: but many of whom I just grew up there and 456 00:27:21,240 --> 00:27:24,439 Speaker 1: are just supportive of it. Fun fact, the web master 457 00:27:24,600 --> 00:27:29,640 Speaker 1: from North Korea is from Spain. He is a Spanish national, 458 00:27:30,000 --> 00:27:32,480 Speaker 1: and North Korea has three web hosts, so I think 459 00:27:32,520 --> 00:27:35,159 Speaker 1: it's much more likely that this attack originated from a 460 00:27:35,200 --> 00:27:39,280 Speaker 1: country with better equipment. I agree with that. I think 461 00:27:39,600 --> 00:27:43,080 Speaker 1: I'll go a step further based upon the fact that 462 00:27:43,119 --> 00:27:47,080 Speaker 1: we see no real mention of the interview the movie 463 00:27:47,119 --> 00:27:51,280 Speaker 1: of terrorism in these early attempts, where the it seems 464 00:27:51,280 --> 00:27:54,080 Speaker 1: like it's more of extortion, pay us or this stuff 465 00:27:54,119 --> 00:27:58,919 Speaker 1: gets released, not stop doing this horrible thing. There's no 466 00:27:59,280 --> 00:28:01,480 Speaker 1: like the reason why we're doing this is because of this. 467 00:28:01,720 --> 00:28:04,520 Speaker 1: Now give us money or else releases. None of that 468 00:28:04,640 --> 00:28:09,240 Speaker 1: was there. I think that this to me, it seems 469 00:28:09,280 --> 00:28:11,919 Speaker 1: like it could be at least partially an inside job that, 470 00:28:12,240 --> 00:28:14,080 Speaker 1: like you were saying, it's someone who is familiar with 471 00:28:14,119 --> 00:28:18,200 Speaker 1: Sony systems. A lot of the information I've read seems 472 00:28:18,240 --> 00:28:21,520 Speaker 1: to indicate that the attackers at least had some password 473 00:28:21,600 --> 00:28:25,199 Speaker 1: access to certain systems at the get go, which is 474 00:28:25,280 --> 00:28:27,800 Speaker 1: not the easiest thing to get unless you already have it, 475 00:28:27,840 --> 00:28:32,520 Speaker 1: because they went through multiple systems. So I'm I'm thinking 476 00:28:32,560 --> 00:28:37,760 Speaker 1: that it was at least partially an inside job, probably 477 00:28:38,080 --> 00:28:42,640 Speaker 1: not directly related to anything with the interview at the beginning. 478 00:28:43,000 --> 00:28:45,120 Speaker 1: It was only to me. It seems like that was 479 00:28:45,160 --> 00:28:49,240 Speaker 1: a leap on opportunity. After after the after other people 480 00:28:49,280 --> 00:28:51,280 Speaker 1: started bringing it up, they're like, oh, wow, crap, we 481 00:28:51,320 --> 00:28:55,960 Speaker 1: should totally say that's the reason that Yeah, that was 482 00:28:56,040 --> 00:29:00,320 Speaker 1: that was our plan the whole time. Yeah. Now, now again, 483 00:29:00,560 --> 00:29:03,120 Speaker 1: this is based on the information that's available to us, right, 484 00:29:03,240 --> 00:29:06,320 Speaker 1: and so we're only we're drawing some conclusions based upon 485 00:29:06,440 --> 00:29:09,840 Speaker 1: limited amounts of information. If this were office space, we 486 00:29:09,840 --> 00:29:12,040 Speaker 1: would have the leap to conclusions, Matt out and we 487 00:29:12,080 --> 00:29:16,040 Speaker 1: would be shopping away. So I want to stress that 488 00:29:16,120 --> 00:29:18,360 Speaker 1: because even though that's something that I personally kind of 489 00:29:18,360 --> 00:29:21,480 Speaker 1: have a gut feeling about, I'm also more than happy to. 490 00:29:21,920 --> 00:29:25,560 Speaker 1: I'm ready to say. Look, I could totally be wrong, 491 00:29:25,680 --> 00:29:27,920 Speaker 1: and it would not take a lot to prove that 492 00:29:28,000 --> 00:29:31,920 Speaker 1: I'm wrong. However, just from my own perspective this whole time, 493 00:29:32,440 --> 00:29:35,480 Speaker 1: I've been a little skeptical of the North Korea connection. 494 00:29:35,760 --> 00:29:39,120 Speaker 1: I guess it could be like a North Korea approved thing, 495 00:29:39,280 --> 00:29:42,880 Speaker 1: or even a North Korea sponsored thing, but it just 496 00:29:43,520 --> 00:29:48,000 Speaker 1: it seems like it seems like the actual attack and 497 00:29:48,080 --> 00:29:52,160 Speaker 1: the language used as extortion at the beginning, and the 498 00:29:52,280 --> 00:29:56,080 Speaker 1: method of embarrassing the company comes from a much more 499 00:29:56,160 --> 00:30:01,440 Speaker 1: insider perspective than at another country country that's upset. It 500 00:30:01,480 --> 00:30:05,280 Speaker 1: seems personal to me. Yeah, so then we've got some 501 00:30:05,440 --> 00:30:08,560 Speaker 1: other possibilities here right now. You're not gonna let me 502 00:30:08,640 --> 00:30:11,240 Speaker 1: have my theory, had your theory? No, that was the 503 00:30:11,280 --> 00:30:13,360 Speaker 1: intro to your theory. Oh man, thank you for talking 504 00:30:13,400 --> 00:30:17,080 Speaker 1: my theory. I apologize. I apologize. So I want to 505 00:30:17,080 --> 00:30:23,240 Speaker 1: bring in the overall digital rights management arguments and argument. 506 00:30:23,240 --> 00:30:24,920 Speaker 1: This is someone who's upset that they put in a 507 00:30:25,000 --> 00:30:27,400 Speaker 1: Sony c D way back in the day, the back 508 00:30:27,400 --> 00:30:30,240 Speaker 1: door attack on their computer. No, no, okay, the idea 509 00:30:30,320 --> 00:30:32,680 Speaker 1: of this guy has been a Harvard of grudge since 510 00:30:34,280 --> 00:30:38,000 Speaker 1: Oh yeah, that's true. I mean no, So the idea 511 00:30:38,080 --> 00:30:41,960 Speaker 1: of structure controls over the Internet that have been attempted 512 00:30:42,000 --> 00:30:44,840 Speaker 1: to be put into legislation in the United States several 513 00:30:44,880 --> 00:30:48,960 Speaker 1: times and shot down spectacularly by the Internet a couple 514 00:30:49,000 --> 00:30:51,680 Speaker 1: of times. You're talking about it in the leaks, right, 515 00:30:51,760 --> 00:30:53,760 Speaker 1: they were talking about in the leaks and the mp 516 00:30:54,040 --> 00:30:58,760 Speaker 1: A A in general trying to work kind of against Google. 517 00:30:59,360 --> 00:31:04,160 Speaker 1: I don't know if you've Goliath. Oh yeah, I mean Goliath. Yes, 518 00:31:04,720 --> 00:31:08,960 Speaker 1: I haven't hear. Can tell me more about it, tell 519 00:31:09,000 --> 00:31:11,480 Speaker 1: the tech guy more about Okay, Well that's why. That's 520 00:31:11,720 --> 00:31:13,800 Speaker 1: this is the main reason I wanted you to be 521 00:31:13,840 --> 00:31:16,840 Speaker 1: in this room, besides having all the other knowledge, Sanathan, 522 00:31:17,240 --> 00:31:19,680 Speaker 1: to talk about Goliath, because I don't know enough about it. 523 00:31:19,920 --> 00:31:22,000 Speaker 1: I've barely touched the surface on it, and Ben and 524 00:31:22,040 --> 00:31:24,000 Speaker 1: I will have to do another full show just on 525 00:31:24,080 --> 00:31:29,680 Speaker 1: that subject. So there is to me. And this is 526 00:31:29,720 --> 00:31:33,640 Speaker 1: just Matt Frederick's opinion. Everybody, this seems like a an 527 00:31:33,680 --> 00:31:37,200 Speaker 1: opportunity whether or not who did it doesn't matter, um 528 00:31:37,240 --> 00:31:41,520 Speaker 1: an opportunity for those people who want stricter controls and 529 00:31:41,600 --> 00:31:45,800 Speaker 1: security controls over the Internet and search controls through Google. 530 00:31:45,880 --> 00:31:48,640 Speaker 1: For pirate of material and all this stuff. It seems 531 00:31:48,640 --> 00:31:51,280 Speaker 1: like a great opportunity for them to really say, hey, guys, 532 00:31:51,320 --> 00:31:52,920 Speaker 1: look at all the damage this cause. Look at all 533 00:31:52,960 --> 00:31:57,400 Speaker 1: the monetary and personal just damage that's been caused here. 534 00:31:57,840 --> 00:32:02,640 Speaker 1: We need your help. Please secure the Internet for freedom. 535 00:32:02,680 --> 00:32:05,479 Speaker 1: This is uh, this is absolutely what's gonna happen. You're 536 00:32:05,480 --> 00:32:07,800 Speaker 1: gonna see lots of companies that have a vested interest 537 00:32:07,840 --> 00:32:12,000 Speaker 1: in keeping their intellectual property private from you know, jumping 538 00:32:12,040 --> 00:32:15,640 Speaker 1: at every single possible opportunity to do so to to 539 00:32:15,720 --> 00:32:21,000 Speaker 1: protect themselves, even at the expense of the ability for 540 00:32:21,000 --> 00:32:22,560 Speaker 1: the rest of us to use the Internet the way 541 00:32:22,560 --> 00:32:25,920 Speaker 1: we've become accustomed to. However, that being said, it's a 542 00:32:26,040 --> 00:32:30,120 Speaker 1: very difficult argument to make from that perspective, simply because 543 00:32:30,160 --> 00:32:33,280 Speaker 1: the damage that was done to Sony went well beyond 544 00:32:33,520 --> 00:32:36,320 Speaker 1: a few movies being linked to the Internet. In fact, 545 00:32:36,360 --> 00:32:39,320 Speaker 1: if you were to argue that that was the major 546 00:32:39,440 --> 00:32:42,320 Speaker 1: cost of the damages, everyone would laugh at you, because 547 00:32:43,200 --> 00:32:46,520 Speaker 1: you know, it's it's hundreds of millions of dollars potentially. 548 00:32:47,600 --> 00:32:50,200 Speaker 1: And you know, we've had this discussion before too, that 549 00:32:50,200 --> 00:32:53,360 Speaker 1: that a stolen movie doesn't necessarily mean a lost ticket sale. 550 00:32:54,080 --> 00:32:56,160 Speaker 1: One you can't guarantee that the person wouldn't go and 551 00:32:56,200 --> 00:32:58,360 Speaker 1: see it anyway, or two that the person would have 552 00:32:58,480 --> 00:33:01,640 Speaker 1: seen it had they not pirated it. That's another argument. 553 00:33:02,480 --> 00:33:04,360 Speaker 1: I think that it's one of those things that's going 554 00:33:04,440 --> 00:33:08,760 Speaker 1: to ramp up the discussion about internet security. It's going 555 00:33:08,800 --> 00:33:13,000 Speaker 1: to end up having a lot of companies propose changes 556 00:33:13,080 --> 00:33:17,400 Speaker 1: that would be restrictive. But I don't think it's gonna 557 00:33:17,440 --> 00:33:19,360 Speaker 1: go much further than that. And part of the reason 558 00:33:19,400 --> 00:33:23,200 Speaker 1: for that is also that we have, simultaneously going on 559 00:33:23,360 --> 00:33:27,880 Speaker 1: while this hack is unfolding, the ongoing discussion about reclassifying 560 00:33:28,040 --> 00:33:31,320 Speaker 1: Internet in the United States as a utility, which would 561 00:33:31,320 --> 00:33:36,600 Speaker 1: give the FCC the authority to actually impose net neutrality 562 00:33:36,680 --> 00:33:38,920 Speaker 1: rules which were struck down at the beginning of two 563 00:33:38,960 --> 00:33:42,120 Speaker 1: thousand fourteen. Well, yeah, but the problem there is going 564 00:33:42,200 --> 00:33:45,680 Speaker 1: to be job security. I mean, who's the FCC gonna 565 00:33:45,840 --> 00:33:49,440 Speaker 1: work for. Like the individuals in the FCC, I have 566 00:33:49,600 --> 00:33:52,320 Speaker 1: to think about their career, tragic right. They have to 567 00:33:52,360 --> 00:33:54,600 Speaker 1: figure out how where am I going to get those 568 00:33:54,680 --> 00:33:58,120 Speaker 1: huge bags of money that they left at my stoop. 569 00:33:58,320 --> 00:34:00,640 Speaker 1: You can't walk around with an empty or lap sack 570 00:34:00,680 --> 00:34:02,959 Speaker 1: of it and a cash sign on it. If anyone 571 00:34:03,160 --> 00:34:06,280 Speaker 1: for the FCC is listening, I don't necessarily abscribe abscribe 572 00:34:06,320 --> 00:34:09,560 Speaker 1: to this, uh, this scenario that Mr Bolan is putting forward. 573 00:34:09,920 --> 00:34:13,080 Speaker 1: I do. I'll get the I'll get the email where 574 00:34:13,320 --> 00:34:16,080 Speaker 1: uh they'll say, don't release this podcast or you will 575 00:34:16,120 --> 00:34:20,920 Speaker 1: be destroyed. Do you understand how the internet works? It's 576 00:34:20,920 --> 00:34:23,520 Speaker 1: already out there right right, and I know, I know 577 00:34:23,600 --> 00:34:26,600 Speaker 1: I'm ribbing the FCC a little bit, and the people 578 00:34:26,640 --> 00:34:30,520 Speaker 1: at that agency have at times done fantastic work, and 579 00:34:30,560 --> 00:34:33,040 Speaker 1: it can be really difficult when there's so much money involved. 580 00:34:33,239 --> 00:34:36,240 Speaker 1: Let's talk about Project Goliath, though, because you're really interested 581 00:34:36,560 --> 00:34:39,760 Speaker 1: in this, and it's it's a strange it's a strange 582 00:34:39,880 --> 00:34:43,879 Speaker 1: actual conspiracy, not a theory, but a group of individuals 583 00:34:43,920 --> 00:34:47,879 Speaker 1: coming together to make a move on what they call Goliath. Yeah, 584 00:34:48,000 --> 00:34:51,120 Speaker 1: using code words, whatever that is. Well, I mean you've 585 00:34:51,120 --> 00:34:53,799 Speaker 1: got to use co words because you never know when 586 00:34:53,880 --> 00:34:57,720 Speaker 1: your communications are going to get leaked to the public. 587 00:34:57,800 --> 00:34:59,920 Speaker 1: And if you are not covering your tracks and every 588 00:35:00,000 --> 00:35:02,920 Speaker 1: and automatically knows you're talking about Google, then and credit 589 00:35:03,400 --> 00:35:07,440 Speaker 1: the the secrecy, the veil of secrecy that Goliath provided 590 00:35:07,520 --> 00:35:10,480 Speaker 1: was not terribly thick. I mean, all of Jonathan's emails 591 00:35:10,480 --> 00:35:13,719 Speaker 1: are in code. Yeah, that's why. That's why you know 592 00:35:13,920 --> 00:35:16,879 Speaker 1: the subject red dog flies at one and you're like, oh, 593 00:35:16,960 --> 00:35:20,440 Speaker 1: it's that art I asked for for that article. Uh yeah, 594 00:35:20,480 --> 00:35:22,840 Speaker 1: it's hey, it's a red dog flying at one o'clock. 595 00:35:22,840 --> 00:35:26,080 Speaker 1: I thought it was, but you know I always eat it, 596 00:35:26,160 --> 00:35:33,040 Speaker 1: like eat yeah. Yeah, so that's red bull at um. Yeah, no, 597 00:35:33,120 --> 00:35:37,160 Speaker 1: it's it's so the Goliath. The Goliath story is only 598 00:35:37,840 --> 00:35:41,520 Speaker 1: partially related, partly because some of the information was gathered 599 00:35:41,560 --> 00:35:45,200 Speaker 1: from this league. But it is a collection of different 600 00:35:45,960 --> 00:35:52,759 Speaker 1: really big entities mostly Yeah, yeah, that are all concerned. 601 00:35:52,800 --> 00:35:57,800 Speaker 1: Disney isn't there too, I believe, concerned about uh Goliath's 602 00:35:58,600 --> 00:36:03,080 Speaker 1: uh influence on their industry and how they can somehow 603 00:36:03,160 --> 00:36:06,960 Speaker 1: mitigate that. Um. And you're right, it would go if 604 00:36:07,000 --> 00:36:08,799 Speaker 1: there'd be a whole episode and we'd have to go 605 00:36:08,840 --> 00:36:11,480 Speaker 1: into a whole episode to really talk about it. Well, 606 00:36:11,480 --> 00:36:14,440 Speaker 1: maybe this is where we kind of tease that sometime 607 00:36:14,520 --> 00:36:17,319 Speaker 1: in the future we're gonna have a Goliath episode. Yeah, 608 00:36:17,360 --> 00:36:19,719 Speaker 1: would you like to come back? We have to. We'd 609 00:36:19,719 --> 00:36:22,680 Speaker 1: love to have you because, uh, this this is an 610 00:36:22,719 --> 00:36:25,880 Speaker 1: interesting thing, and I want to just do the quick 611 00:36:25,880 --> 00:36:28,279 Speaker 1: and dirty in the interest of fairness thing that we 612 00:36:28,360 --> 00:36:32,280 Speaker 1: have to say. Sure, Goliath and I can't finger quote 613 00:36:32,280 --> 00:36:35,320 Speaker 1: hard enough there and the studios opposing it, along with 614 00:36:35,360 --> 00:36:38,440 Speaker 1: the m p A m p A A have different goals. 615 00:36:38,800 --> 00:36:42,000 Speaker 1: But it's not so much moral argument on either side 616 00:36:42,120 --> 00:36:46,560 Speaker 1: as it is which environment is better for our current business? Yeah, 617 00:36:46,840 --> 00:36:49,239 Speaker 1: so it's no, I mean, not like there's a hero 618 00:36:49,360 --> 00:36:53,280 Speaker 1: in a villain Google. Google's slogan is don't be evil. 619 00:36:53,960 --> 00:36:57,760 Speaker 1: But it is a business and we we are the product. 620 00:36:57,960 --> 00:37:00,640 Speaker 1: Just like in Facebook, you are the product. Same thing 621 00:37:00,640 --> 00:37:03,680 Speaker 1: with Google. I mean, Google is not a search engine company, 622 00:37:03,680 --> 00:37:07,120 Speaker 1: it's an ad company. But Jonathan, isn't money the root 623 00:37:07,120 --> 00:37:10,880 Speaker 1: of all evil? I swear snow, No, you are wrong. 624 00:37:11,440 --> 00:37:13,960 Speaker 1: It is the love of money that is the root 625 00:37:14,000 --> 00:37:16,200 Speaker 1: of all evil. Money itself is not the root of 626 00:37:16,200 --> 00:37:20,319 Speaker 1: all But what okay, then, what is correctly? I'd like 627 00:37:20,360 --> 00:37:22,959 Speaker 1: to point out, while you're while you're perfectly nay, I'd 628 00:37:23,000 --> 00:37:25,440 Speaker 1: like to point out that don't be evil is a 629 00:37:25,560 --> 00:37:28,879 Speaker 1: very very different statement from be good. Sure you could 630 00:37:28,880 --> 00:37:33,000 Speaker 1: be totally immoral, right, isn't that weird that that is 631 00:37:33,080 --> 00:37:40,160 Speaker 1: the happiness don't be evil? Well, to be fair, though, 632 00:37:40,200 --> 00:37:42,879 Speaker 1: I mean, we're making it sound really, really sinister, but 633 00:37:43,280 --> 00:37:47,360 Speaker 1: keep in mind it was a couple of college students 634 00:37:47,400 --> 00:37:50,200 Speaker 1: who started Google, and they were trying to keep in 635 00:37:50,239 --> 00:37:54,560 Speaker 1: mind certain values as this thing they had created ballooned 636 00:37:54,719 --> 00:37:58,839 Speaker 1: well beyond their their even their ambition. I mean they 637 00:37:58,840 --> 00:38:02,680 Speaker 1: were they all are really smart, really hard working guys. 638 00:38:03,239 --> 00:38:04,880 Speaker 1: But I think they'd be the first to tell you, Like, 639 00:38:05,239 --> 00:38:07,200 Speaker 1: you know, if you went back in time and told 640 00:38:07,280 --> 00:38:09,799 Speaker 1: Sarah Gey and Larry, hey, guys, this thing you're working 641 00:38:09,840 --> 00:38:12,920 Speaker 1: on is going to turn you into multibillionaires, they be 642 00:38:13,440 --> 00:38:15,759 Speaker 1: they look at you and say what I mean, Like, 643 00:38:15,840 --> 00:38:19,360 Speaker 1: this is going to take up a sizeable part of 644 00:38:19,400 --> 00:38:22,040 Speaker 1: a city in California. I've been to the Google campus. 645 00:38:22,120 --> 00:38:26,080 Speaker 1: It is enormous. Um You've got to have a car 646 00:38:26,280 --> 00:38:28,240 Speaker 1: or a bike to get around from building to building 647 00:38:28,239 --> 00:38:31,799 Speaker 1: because that's how big it is. And this is one company, 648 00:38:32,600 --> 00:38:34,160 Speaker 1: you know, it's It's one of those things where I 649 00:38:34,160 --> 00:38:36,600 Speaker 1: think they created that slogan at a time when they 650 00:38:36,600 --> 00:38:38,920 Speaker 1: were just trying to, you know, to keep themselves grounded. 651 00:38:39,200 --> 00:38:42,680 Speaker 1: It's just now, with the benefit of hindsight, now that 652 00:38:42,760 --> 00:38:47,000 Speaker 1: we see Google as this enormous entity, don't be evil, 653 00:38:47,040 --> 00:38:50,040 Speaker 1: starts to take on a different connotation to us. So 654 00:38:50,080 --> 00:38:52,440 Speaker 1: we just gotta remember the perspective. So I want to 655 00:38:52,440 --> 00:38:54,359 Speaker 1: add one more thing to the fire here, all right, 656 00:38:54,520 --> 00:38:58,719 Speaker 1: do you think that the people responsible for the two 657 00:38:58,719 --> 00:39:02,799 Speaker 1: thousand eleven heck are also involved in this one? Could 658 00:39:02,800 --> 00:39:05,480 Speaker 1: there be an inside person who just hasn't been caught 659 00:39:05,960 --> 00:39:10,200 Speaker 1: h R check your employment records. I mean, you never 660 00:39:10,239 --> 00:39:12,200 Speaker 1: say never. It just seems to me like this was 661 00:39:12,280 --> 00:39:17,440 Speaker 1: something that if if I stick with my insider theory, 662 00:39:18,440 --> 00:39:20,239 Speaker 1: it feels to me like this was something that had 663 00:39:20,280 --> 00:39:24,360 Speaker 1: been building up for a while for the person or 664 00:39:24,400 --> 00:39:28,680 Speaker 1: persons responsible, and there was something that was a tipping 665 00:39:28,719 --> 00:39:31,439 Speaker 1: point that caused the person to say, like, all right 666 00:39:31,520 --> 00:39:34,239 Speaker 1: that I'm doing it. I can't. I'm not gonna I'm 667 00:39:34,239 --> 00:39:37,120 Speaker 1: not gonna let this happen anymore. I'm not gonna um, 668 00:39:37,520 --> 00:39:41,160 Speaker 1: you know, I I'm tired of working with a company 669 00:39:41,200 --> 00:39:44,799 Speaker 1: that has these policies. Again, that only works if it 670 00:39:44,840 --> 00:39:48,440 Speaker 1: fits my theory of what happened. It could obviously be 671 00:39:48,480 --> 00:39:51,200 Speaker 1: something totally different, that is I'm completely off base for 672 00:39:51,280 --> 00:39:53,560 Speaker 1: And then my answer doesn't make sense. I mean, yeah, 673 00:39:53,680 --> 00:39:56,640 Speaker 1: if we're with lack of information, I think it's I 674 00:39:56,680 --> 00:39:59,600 Speaker 1: think it's plausible that there was an inside person. Um. 675 00:40:00,239 --> 00:40:05,040 Speaker 1: I'm also very curious about the evolution of this North 676 00:40:05,160 --> 00:40:10,319 Speaker 1: Korean conversation because the FBI seems pretty publicly convinced. And 677 00:40:10,480 --> 00:40:13,440 Speaker 1: I told Matt, I said, this could be indicative of 678 00:40:13,480 --> 00:40:15,839 Speaker 1: one of two things. In my mind, one is that 679 00:40:15,880 --> 00:40:18,880 Speaker 1: they in fact do have very compelling evidence that we 680 00:40:18,920 --> 00:40:21,360 Speaker 1: are just not aware of, and that North Korea is 681 00:40:21,400 --> 00:40:24,040 Speaker 1: in fact responsible. They can't release it because they illegally 682 00:40:24,080 --> 00:40:27,719 Speaker 1: gathered it, right whatever, whatever the reasoning behind it, they 683 00:40:27,760 --> 00:40:30,080 Speaker 1: have it, they know it, and we just can't be 684 00:40:30,080 --> 00:40:32,799 Speaker 1: privy as to how or why. The second part is 685 00:40:32,840 --> 00:40:35,480 Speaker 1: really compelling to me. The second idea is that the 686 00:40:35,520 --> 00:40:38,520 Speaker 1: FBI releases this information in an effort to actually lure 687 00:40:38,560 --> 00:40:41,240 Speaker 1: out the people who really did do it. The idea 688 00:40:41,320 --> 00:40:44,560 Speaker 1: being that, well, if we put pressure on this group 689 00:40:45,080 --> 00:40:48,399 Speaker 1: by saying that it is North Korea, then North Korea 690 00:40:48,440 --> 00:40:52,040 Speaker 1: is going to respond in a very antagonistic way. It's 691 00:40:52,040 --> 00:40:55,480 Speaker 1: going to escalate matters, it's going to start bringing a 692 00:40:55,520 --> 00:40:58,759 Speaker 1: lot more pressure on the group actually responsible. And I 693 00:40:58,760 --> 00:41:00,760 Speaker 1: don't know about you, but if I were a hacker 694 00:41:00,840 --> 00:41:04,239 Speaker 1: and I had caused this kind of chaos at first, 695 00:41:04,320 --> 00:41:07,960 Speaker 1: I'd be thinking, man, look at look at what a 696 00:41:07,960 --> 00:41:11,440 Speaker 1: bad hacker I am, man, I look at what I affected, 697 00:41:11,719 --> 00:41:14,960 Speaker 1: and then, as it would snowball, I think, whoa, things 698 00:41:14,960 --> 00:41:16,520 Speaker 1: are getting out of control. And then if I get 699 00:41:16,560 --> 00:41:18,760 Speaker 1: to the point where there's there are people talking about 700 00:41:18,920 --> 00:41:23,279 Speaker 1: using words like war and terrorism, I'm thinking this went 701 00:41:23,680 --> 00:41:25,960 Speaker 1: way out of proportion of what I was expecting. I 702 00:41:26,000 --> 00:41:28,399 Speaker 1: wanted to cause this company problems, so I didn't want 703 00:41:28,440 --> 00:41:32,280 Speaker 1: to capitulate the war, the world into war and death. 704 00:41:32,560 --> 00:41:34,760 Speaker 1: So then you get but then you have this FBI 705 00:41:34,880 --> 00:41:38,600 Speaker 1: group saying, well, you know, it's clearly North Korea. Meanwhile 706 00:41:38,640 --> 00:41:42,680 Speaker 1: they're thinking, all right, let's see who squirms. Yeah, yeah, right, 707 00:41:42,760 --> 00:41:45,200 Speaker 1: let's see which dog barks. Guys, I'm so happy that 708 00:41:45,200 --> 00:41:48,279 Speaker 1: we covered this. Yeah, I know, especially for Ben and I, 709 00:41:48,320 --> 00:41:51,080 Speaker 1: it's a little different because we generally don't cover things 710 00:41:51,080 --> 00:41:53,359 Speaker 1: that are happening now like this is still happening. There's 711 00:41:53,400 --> 00:41:56,239 Speaker 1: gonna be information that comes out. By the time you 712 00:41:56,520 --> 00:41:59,200 Speaker 1: hear this, there may be evidence that ends up making 713 00:41:59,200 --> 00:42:01,600 Speaker 1: a lot of the things I said moved. It was 714 00:42:01,640 --> 00:42:06,840 Speaker 1: bhuton the whole time. But thank you so much for 715 00:42:06,920 --> 00:42:11,520 Speaker 1: joining us for this conversation. Everybody, um and especially Jonathan. Yeah, 716 00:42:11,520 --> 00:42:14,640 Speaker 1: where can people see more of your stuff. Well, they 717 00:42:14,640 --> 00:42:17,760 Speaker 1: could go to If you want the super optimistic, happy 718 00:42:17,920 --> 00:42:20,640 Speaker 1: version of the future, you should go to fw thinking 719 00:42:20,680 --> 00:42:23,719 Speaker 1: dot com. That's forward thinking dot com. That's where I 720 00:42:23,719 --> 00:42:26,160 Speaker 1: I look at the future in all different aspects, not 721 00:42:26,200 --> 00:42:29,279 Speaker 1: just science and technology, but culture, and it is, uh, 722 00:42:29,360 --> 00:42:31,719 Speaker 1: you know, kind of the bright shiny version, not the 723 00:42:31,800 --> 00:42:34,000 Speaker 1: dark gloomy version. If you want the dark gloomy version. 724 00:42:34,040 --> 00:42:36,160 Speaker 1: Sometimes I cover that on my other show, tex Stuff, 725 00:42:36,640 --> 00:42:39,719 Speaker 1: which is a podcast you can subscribe to, publishes twice 726 00:42:39,719 --> 00:42:43,480 Speaker 1: a week, which several times Ben has been on several times. Yes, 727 00:42:43,680 --> 00:42:46,520 Speaker 1: we did an excellent episode about ambulances. We've had a 728 00:42:46,520 --> 00:42:49,560 Speaker 1: lot of positive feedback from people in the industry on 729 00:42:49,600 --> 00:42:52,799 Speaker 1: that one. Yeah, that's great. And then also you can 730 00:42:53,000 --> 00:42:55,239 Speaker 1: catch me on brain Stuff and What the Stuff, where 731 00:42:55,280 --> 00:42:59,160 Speaker 1: I end up being a dude on video who talks 732 00:42:59,160 --> 00:43:03,080 Speaker 1: about things and weird locations occasionally. Yeah, and you can 733 00:43:03,160 --> 00:43:05,640 Speaker 1: visit you can visit those sites at how stuff works 734 00:43:05,840 --> 00:43:09,040 Speaker 1: as YouTube page. There's a there's a great one you 735 00:43:09,120 --> 00:43:12,399 Speaker 1: did recently for brain Stuff on Old Timey Voices. That 736 00:43:12,480 --> 00:43:16,040 Speaker 1: was a top on the Transatlantic accent and as it 737 00:43:16,160 --> 00:43:18,840 Speaker 1: got a lot of really great feedback, it was featured 738 00:43:18,920 --> 00:43:21,800 Speaker 1: quite a few times in different places. Uh. And also 739 00:43:21,920 --> 00:43:24,719 Speaker 1: keep an eye out there will be a what the 740 00:43:24,800 --> 00:43:29,680 Speaker 1: Stuff that comes out in which Ben and I both 741 00:43:29,680 --> 00:43:32,919 Speaker 1: appear in the same episode. Oh yeah, I just saw 742 00:43:32,960 --> 00:43:37,600 Speaker 1: that picture that um So, speaking of feedback, we would 743 00:43:37,600 --> 00:43:41,520 Speaker 1: love to hear your take on the North Korea. Uh, well, 744 00:43:41,560 --> 00:43:46,319 Speaker 1: the alleged North Korea hacks in in Sony. So find 745 00:43:46,400 --> 00:43:49,480 Speaker 1: us on Facebook and Twitter where we are Conspiracy Stuff. 746 00:43:49,560 --> 00:43:53,560 Speaker 1: Check out our podcast on our blog or iTunes however 747 00:43:53,600 --> 00:43:56,520 Speaker 1: you get there. Don't forget even though our audio is awesome. 748 00:43:56,640 --> 00:44:00,400 Speaker 1: We have a regularly recurring video show. Don't know how 749 00:44:00,400 --> 00:44:03,359 Speaker 1: I made it through that way? Uh. And you can 750 00:44:03,480 --> 00:44:07,239 Speaker 1: find us on YouTube at Conspiracy Stuff. And also, don't 751 00:44:07,239 --> 00:44:11,040 Speaker 1: forget we have shirts now, so if you go to 752 00:44:11,480 --> 00:44:13,919 Speaker 1: stuff they don't want you to know dot spreadshirt dot 753 00:44:13,920 --> 00:44:17,520 Speaker 1: com the longest U r L that you will love. Uh, 754 00:44:17,760 --> 00:44:20,600 Speaker 1: buy some shirts if you wish how it would support 755 00:44:20,680 --> 00:44:23,120 Speaker 1: us and make us really happy. Remember, these are shirts 756 00:44:23,120 --> 00:44:25,600 Speaker 1: they don't want you to buy. That's exactly what it 757 00:44:25,600 --> 00:44:30,200 Speaker 1: says YouTube channel. That's yeah, someone did say that the 758 00:44:30,239 --> 00:44:32,360 Speaker 1: YouTube comments because they said you had a chance to 759 00:44:32,440 --> 00:44:35,120 Speaker 1: pick a new U r L and you went that way. 760 00:44:35,640 --> 00:44:37,920 Speaker 1: We didn't. We didn't get to choose it. We didn't. 761 00:44:38,000 --> 00:44:40,919 Speaker 1: It's not our fault. But anyway, thank you so much again. 762 00:44:41,000 --> 00:44:43,319 Speaker 1: Can't reader enough thank you for joining us. We hope 763 00:44:43,320 --> 00:44:46,080 Speaker 1: you were. Holiday was great and still is great at 764 00:44:46,120 --> 00:44:48,360 Speaker 1: the end of it. Right now, and uh, you know, 765 00:44:48,480 --> 00:44:50,600 Speaker 1: write to us. If you don't like social media and 766 00:44:50,640 --> 00:44:52,880 Speaker 1: all that stuff. You can only send us an email. 767 00:44:52,920 --> 00:45:00,320 Speaker 1: We are conspiracy at how stuff works dot com. For 768 00:45:00,480 --> 00:45:04,719 Speaker 1: more on this topic another unexplained phenomenon, visit YouTube dot 769 00:45:04,760 --> 00:45:08,160 Speaker 1: com slash conspiracy stuff. You can also get in touch 770 00:45:08,200 --> 00:45:11,080 Speaker 1: on Twitter at the handle at conspiracy stuff.