Speaker 1: This is Gavin Newsom, and this is Richard Haas. Richard,
Speaker 1: thank you so much for taking the time to come on,
Speaker 1: particularly at a remarkable time in world history, particularly in
Speaker 1: history unfolding in the Middle East. Today. President Trump seemed
Speaker 1: to have a day that he's been looking forward to
Speaker 1: for years and years and years, pushing NATO to move
Speaker 1: from two percent to five percent. What was your takeaway
Speaker 1: from this NATO summit, at least the first day, and
Speaker 1: just Trump deserve I think a lot of praise and
Speaker 1: for an accomplishment here.
Speaker 2: I would argue President Trump, well, first of all, got
Speaker 2: being good to be with you. Thank you, Like I
Speaker 2: would argue President Trump deserves credit for spurring the Europeans
Speaker 2: to do they ought to have done years before, they
Speaker 2: ought to be putting forward a larger share of the
Speaker 2: effort for what's a common defense.
Speaker 3: I was just as an aside.
Speaker 2: I would say, much more important to me than whether
Speaker 2: the Europeans spend three percent or two and a half
Speaker 2: or four and a half is how they spend it.
Speaker 2: And I'd actually say something you'd probably agree with. In
Speaker 2: public policy, how you spend money is almost always more
Speaker 2: important than how much you spend, and the problem with
Speaker 2: European defense is not just that they spend too little,
Speaker 2: but each country pretty much determines how it spends its
Speaker 2: defense euros, so the whole ends up being less than
Speaker 2: the sum of its parts. So I would be pushing
Speaker 2: if I were advising the president, I would say, yeah,
Speaker 2: push them to do more, but secondly, also push them
Speaker 2: in a sense to become more European, rather than country
Speaker 2: by country by country, which is the way they often
Speaker 2: go about it.
Speaker 3: But I think that part is good.
Speaker 2: Less good is I think he's introduced some doubts into
Speaker 2: the reliability of the United States and when I call
Speaker 2: the automatic quality of Article five, America's willingness to go
Speaker 2: to bat for Europe. And obviously there's also some fairly
Speaker 2: significant differences about how to handle the most immediate threat,
Speaker 2: which is Russia and the war in Ukraine. So I
Speaker 2: think it's a mixed bag. But yes, it's good to
Speaker 2: see the Europeans essentially getting pushed to do more.
Speaker 1: And it's interesting just as you unpack and I appreciate
Speaker 1: how you spend and where you spend. It was interesting
Speaker 1: just looking at some of the details that their direct
Speaker 1: spend in support of Ukraine would be considered as part
Speaker 1: of that contribution as it relates to that breakdown of
Speaker 1: five percent. It was also, though interesting to see the
Speaker 1: breakdown within the countries. Obviously Germany looking to move quicker
Speaker 1: by twenty twenty nine with close to seventy percent increase
Speaker 1: in their domestic defense spending, and then Spain, who was
Speaker 1: called out by the President today, looking not necessarily to
Speaker 1: reach that numerica. Does that mean much to you or
Speaker 1: is that just that's just noise?
Speaker 2: The most interesting part of that is Germany less what
Speaker 2: Germany is prepared to do in defense, though doing more
Speaker 2: is welcome, but Germany has changed its laws and essentially
Speaker 2: now is able to raise serious debt, which was something
Speaker 2: that modern Germany had an allergy to because of the
Speaker 2: whole Weimar experience, and the fact that Germany now can
Speaker 2: really go into the markets and raise that gives them
Speaker 2: far more capacity to potentially grow their economies as well
Speaker 2: as to contribute to national security.
Speaker 3: And then even go so.
Speaker 2: Far as to say the most interesting figure in Europe
Speaker 2: right now is the new Chancellor of Germany. And even
Speaker 2: though he had a rough start and getting confirmed and
Speaker 2: so forth by his parliament, I actually think the Chancellor
Speaker 2: Mertz is in a position to in some ways have
Speaker 2: Germany stake out the leadership position in Europe, something that
Speaker 2: historically since World War Two Germany has been reticent to
Speaker 2: do so. Would I would watch that space, particularly since
Speaker 2: the French, the British and others are so gridlocked domestically.
Speaker 2: I think Germany now occupies the critical position.
Speaker 1: When you referenced the Article five sort of you know,
Speaker 1: I think the president when he was flying over there
Speaker 1: was some ambiguity once again sort of creating some doubt
Speaker 1: and anxiety. He seemed to shift tone a little bit
Speaker 1: when he landed, But that is just that on again,
Speaker 1: off again relationship to the Article five. Is that what
Speaker 1: you're referring to as sort of a lack of certainty
Speaker 1: and confidence in the president?
Speaker 3: Yeah.
Speaker 2: For those who haven't read the NATO treaty recently, Article
Speaker 2: five is the core of the agreement. We're essentially an
Speaker 2: attack on one who is considered to be an attack
Speaker 2: on all. Curiously, it's only been invoked once in NATO's
Speaker 2: entire history, and that was on behalf of the United
Speaker 2: States after nine to eleven. But alliances depend upon predictability
Speaker 2: and reliability and dependability, and I would argue that President
Speaker 2: Trump has introduced a significant degree of uncertainty into that,
Speaker 2: which I think is counterproductive. He would argue, perhaps it
Speaker 2: was necessary to get the Europeans to do more. I
Speaker 2: would have said, well, probably there's better ways to do that,
Speaker 2: but that's where we are, and to the extent Russia sensus,
Speaker 2: there's uncertainty there putin who as we've seen in Ukraine,
Speaker 2: can be risk frunt it might be more likely to
Speaker 2: take risks. So I always believe that the best way
Speaker 2: to deter is through certainty. So your friends know you'll
Speaker 2: be there for them, and just as important, your enemies
Speaker 2: know you'll be there for your friends. So I would
Speaker 2: like for President Trump, as the days and weeks and
Speaker 2: months unfold, to look for opportunities to make clear that
Speaker 2: whatever our differences are with Europe over their level of
Speaker 2: defense effort, we see it as in our interest to
Speaker 2: be there with them.
Speaker 1: You're here. What in terms of the actual bombing itself,
Speaker 1: and I think my most objective standards, it was a success.
Speaker 1: Whether or not these sites were quote unquote obliterated, that's
Speaker 1: a separate conversation, is that your assessment that this was
Speaker 1: a success, that in the spirit of what you just
Speaker 1: said around some certainty that the President wasn't bluffing in
Speaker 1: terms of wanting to get diplomatic deal done. They appeared
Speaker 1: not to want to move in that direction, so then
Speaker 1: he asserted himself militarily.
Speaker 3: I think it was the right thing to do.
Speaker 2: For years, we've been playing this game with the Iranians
Speaker 2: where they were enriching uranium far far, far beyond levels
Speaker 2: anybody would need to generate electricity, so we all knew
Speaker 2: what this was about to put into place. The were
Speaker 2: prerequisites for a nuclear weapons program. I also understood we
Speaker 2: couldn't allow Iron to get on the threshold, much less
Speaker 2: have nuclear weapons. We made that mistake. I would argue
Speaker 2: with North Korea, we don't want to have it now
Speaker 2: in this part of the world, because if Aron ever
Speaker 2: got nuclear weapons, not only would they act more aggressively
Speaker 2: imposed potentially an existential threat to Israel. But you know,
Speaker 2: and I know, the Saudis, the Egyptians, the Turks and
Speaker 2: others would follow suits. And the only thing worse than
Speaker 2: the Middle East we've known is the Middle East I've
Speaker 2: just described. So I think what Israel and then the
Speaker 2: United States did was warrant it we'll see what the
Speaker 2: results are. Whatever the Iran, whatever happened, the Iranian program
Speaker 2: was not obliterated. Elements of their program I expect will
Speaker 2: have survived the attacks on the three sides. More important,
Speaker 2: I don't know. You don't know, probably the president doesn't
Speaker 2: know what amount of uranium or number of centrifuges and
Speaker 2: so forth are under some roof of some warehouse and
Speaker 2: some other part of Iran. I actually think going forward, Devin,
Speaker 2: we have got to assume just the opposite, that the
Speaker 2: Iranian program was not obliterating, but elements of that program exist.
Speaker 3: And what's worrisome to me, I'll be honest with you.
Speaker 2: I would think that a lot of Iranian leaders have said, Hey,
Speaker 2: this never would have happened. Had we had nuclear weapons,
Speaker 2: we could have deterred the Israelis in the Americas. So
Speaker 2: I worry that going forward, I think their determination to
Speaker 2: develop nuclear weapons might, if anything, be even greater.
Speaker 1: Well, you know, I want to just pick up on
Speaker 1: that point because that's interesting observation in an important one.
Speaker 1: And we'll get to North Korea as well in a second.
Speaker 1: Because your reference goes back to the opportunity the United
Speaker 1: States had under the Clinton administration to take out their
Speaker 1: program before it proliferated. But I want to talk a
Speaker 1: little bit about the Non Proliferation Treaty. People have brought
Speaker 1: that up since the nineteen seventies. I think two hundred
Speaker 1: countries were signatories to that, including Iran. There were a
Speaker 1: number of countries that have developed nuclear programs that were
Speaker 1: not original signers to that. Obviously Korea and Israel and
Speaker 1: the extent they have a nuclear program quote unquote, but
Speaker 1: certainly India and Pakistan. But those countries as a consequence,
Speaker 1: would make the claim you just made that they've been
Speaker 1: they've had that deterrent. Now Iran assumed that they would
Speaker 1: not be bombed, I presume under the terms of the
Speaker 1: Non Proliferation Treaty. Does that put at risk the entire
Speaker 1: notion of the non Proliferation Treaty?
Speaker 3: What's just occurred, So let me give you a slightly
Speaker 3: convoluted answer.
Speaker 2: The Non Proliferation Treaty is only a small piece of
Speaker 2: the effort against non proliferation. I don't think it's a
Speaker 2: wildly successful piece in many ways because it really is
Speaker 2: a gentleman's agreement. We declare what facilities we're doing, certain
Speaker 2: types of research or engineering in and then the inspectors
Speaker 2: come look at them. The inspectors can't look at places that.
Speaker 3: Are not known.
Speaker 2: So the entire treaty in that sense is based upon
Speaker 2: a degree of faith that I tend.
Speaker 3: Not to have.
Speaker 2: North Korea withdrew from the treaty and there was no
Speaker 2: particular penalty or anything for them having done so. Turns
Speaker 2: out the most important non proliferation tool out there is
Speaker 2: not the Treaty. It's called America's alliances. By giving countries
Speaker 2: the confidence that we are there for them, they then
Speaker 2: don't need to become self sufficient, and the biggest way
Speaker 2: to accelerate proliferation will be, for example, of the South
Speaker 2: Koreans or other has come to have doubts about their
Speaker 2: relationships with US. So don't get me wrong, I'm not
Speaker 2: saying the Non Proliferation Treaty doesn't have some utility, and
Speaker 2: I think in particular the inspection provisions can be useful,
Speaker 2: but we shouldn't exaggerate it's impact that Iran I would
Speaker 2: think was going to do and is going to do
Speaker 2: and what it wants regardless of its obligations under.
Speaker 1: This treat So back to what you were saying, I mean,
Speaker 1: so just let's speculate what goes happens going forward. Obviously,
Speaker 1: this notion of resim change, people sort of pull back
Speaker 1: a little bit, or least it appears the President's pulled back.
Speaker 1: I don't know if BB is pulled back on the
Speaker 1: notion of regime change. But what won't change is their pursuit,
Speaker 1: presumably of a nuclear weapon. As you note, we don't
Speaker 1: know that the program was quote unquote obliterated. Even if
Speaker 1: the physical sites may have been, we don't know where
Speaker 1: this enriched uranium is and centrifugius you imagine. Now your
Speaker 1: concern is now what that they accelerate that program with
Speaker 1: the darkness, meaning without any international inspectors.
Speaker 3: That's my concern.
Speaker 2: It might not be their immedia priority, which I think
Speaker 2: is to shore up the regime. But at some point
Speaker 2: I do think reconstituting a program will become a priority,
Speaker 2: which means, by the way, the day may come where
Speaker 2: Israeli United States needs to once again use military force
Speaker 2: if we discover some activity going on in the Iranians
Speaker 2: won't voluntarily give it up. It's not normal that problems
Speaker 2: get solved. When I was the head of the Council,
Speaker 2: on Foreign Relations. I used to discourage the Fellows from
Speaker 2: using the words solved or solution, because that's just the
Speaker 2: way history works. So I don't believe whatever it is
Speaker 2: we accomplished the other day, however much we accomplished, it
Speaker 2: didn't solve the problem. It may have reduced it. It
Speaker 2: may have set back the Iranian program, but that'll pop
Speaker 2: up again. It's by the way you mentioned regime change.
Speaker 2: It's one of the reasons that people, I think are
Speaker 2: attracted to the idea. If you can't solve the Iranian
Speaker 2: problem through military force or through diplomacy, then people say,
Speaker 2: what's left, Well, let's get a benign government. And I
Speaker 2: think that's why there's so much interest in regime change.
Speaker 2: The problem is it's easier to talk about it than
Speaker 2: bring it about. I don't see the prerequisites in place
Speaker 2: for it, and in any case, you can't base.
Speaker 3: Your policy on it.
Speaker 2: People don't like it when I say this, but it's
Speaker 2: a wish more than a strategy. If it were to happen.
Speaker 2: I think it brings problems but obvious benefits with it.
Speaker 2: But we just can't count on it, and no president
Speaker 2: can give the order to say Secretary of Defense or
Speaker 2: state and say, get me regime change in Iran.
Speaker 3: They wouldn't have then the tools to necessarily.
Speaker 1: Carry it out when it comes to just issues of trust.
Speaker 1: And you know, I think one of the questions that
Speaker 1: I get and I ask myself all the time, I
Speaker 1: feel like, for most of my adult life, I've been
Speaker 1: hearing baby Net and Yaho say they're just months away,
Speaker 1: a year away from having weapons grade nuclear weapons, and
Speaker 1: you know, a certain point you just stopped believing it.
Speaker 1: But your assessment, you know, your own objective assessment this
Speaker 1: time did appear to be different, that they were getting
Speaker 1: closer and actually appeared to be within a matter of
Speaker 1: months in a position where potentially we had a weapons
Speaker 1: grade weapon coming out of Iran? Is that accurate?
Speaker 2: Pretty much? Look, this was a gathering threat. It wasn't
Speaker 2: an imminent threat. It was a gathering threat. And the
Speaker 2: question is how close Now we know they had done
Speaker 2: most of the enrichment work they need to do to
Speaker 2: get it uranium enriched a plus or minus sixty percent,
Speaker 2: that's not just sixty percent of the effort, that's actually
Speaker 2: closer to ninety percent of the effort. For reasons of physics,
Speaker 2: that I couldn't explain because I don't understand them well enough.
Speaker 3: But I think I'm right there. Now. What you don't
Speaker 3: know is how close they were on some of the
Speaker 3: other things.
Speaker 2: The actual fabrication of explosive device is the bomb, and
Speaker 2: so forth. And there there was the Israelis, believe the
Speaker 2: economists published some very interesting stuff about it, that they
Speaker 2: had made some breakthroughs, they had had some secret programs
Speaker 2: and so forth. And I think we have to be tolerant,
Speaker 2: just like after nine to eleven we were less willing
Speaker 2: to run certain risks, say about what Iraq could do.
Speaker 2: And this is not a justification for the Iraq war.
Speaker 2: I was against it, but just I understand some of
Speaker 2: the thinking. I think Israel after October seventh had less
Speaker 2: tolerance of running certain risks in their case. So I
Speaker 2: just think the combination of a change mentality in Israel,
Speaker 2: the evisceration of groups like Hisbella, which couldn't really attack
Speaker 2: Israel anymore, and this new intelligence would suggested, however, far
Speaker 2: along the Iranians, for they were farther along. And I
Speaker 2: think for all those reasons, the Israelis decided to act
Speaker 2: and we came in behind.
Speaker 1: Does this keep BB in power for another extended period
Speaker 1: of time.
Speaker 2: We roughly what sixteen seventeen months to run before he
Speaker 2: has to. I think the elections are scheduled for October
Speaker 2: of next year. It certainly helps them. Mean Israel, as
Speaker 2: you know, is deeply divided about issues on democracy, Gaza,
Speaker 2: what have you, whether the religious can be drafted and
Speaker 2: so forth. They are not divided on Iran, left and right,
Speaker 2: hawk and dove. There aren't a lot of doves in
Speaker 2: Israel when it comes to rod. So it clearly helps BB.
Speaker 2: It changes the conversation a little bit, It brings Israel together.
Speaker 2: It's seen as an accomplishment, and he has He has
Speaker 2: changed in many ways israel strategic reality given the change
Speaker 2: in Syria is volah, the weakening of a masque. Whatever
Speaker 2: you think, however critical people watching this might be of
Speaker 2: what Israel's done and how it's done it in Gaza,
Speaker 2: the reality is that BB nets and Yahou in the
Speaker 2: last what eighteen months, has dramatically reduced the external threat
Speaker 2: to Israel.
Speaker 1: And on that basis, are you confident that we'll have
Speaker 1: sort of a you know, Abraham Accord two point zero
Speaker 1: with Saudi coming in? Is that the map that you
Speaker 1: see changing or is that still opening end in question
Speaker 1: with the everything that's going on or not going on
Speaker 1: in Gaza, West Bank, et cetera. What's your over under
Speaker 1: on that look?
Speaker 2: As you know, for a while it looked like it
Speaker 2: was going to happen before October seventh, and then because
Speaker 2: of if you were October eighth and Israeli policy, the
Speaker 2: Saudis backed off. They got nervous or uneasy about it.
Speaker 2: Two things may have changed now, though, which is interesting.
Speaker 2: One is beaving that Tan Yahoo. As you were just suggesting,
Speaker 2: Gavin politically is stronger than he was, so he might
Speaker 2: give him more leverage against those in his government who
Speaker 2: oppose any sort of change in policy on Gaza.
Speaker 3: Secondly, there's this guy named Donald Trump.
Speaker 2: It's interesting on how many occasions Trump has distanced himself
Speaker 2: from beving that Ta Nyahoo. He did it on the huties,
Speaker 2: he did it on the prisoner move with Hamas he
Speaker 2: told the Israelis a few weeks ago, don't you dare
Speaker 2: attack around. We're trying to see if diplomacy works. Just
Speaker 2: the other day, shall we say, I'm rather colorful language.
Speaker 2: He was out there. So it's possible that tomorrow he
Speaker 2: would tell the israel Is, hey, knock it off in
Speaker 2: Gaza or do this on the West Bank. There's an
Speaker 2: unsentimental quality to America firstism. And one of the things
Speaker 2: you see, we've beganned the conversation talking about Europe. Well,
Speaker 2: one of the things, whether we're talking about security or
Speaker 2: tariffs or now this being an ally of the United
Speaker 2: States ain't when it used to be. When it comes
Speaker 2: to Donald Trump, friends and allies no longer get preferred treatment.
Speaker 2: So it wouldn't shock me if Donald Trump, in his
Speaker 2: hope to get the Saut East to normalize with Israel,
Speaker 2: put real pressure on bb Nets and Yao and we
Speaker 2: put the Israelis in a real jam. Trump is popular
Speaker 2: in Israel. And also it's almost like Nixon going to China.
Speaker 2: Nixon Wan said, you know, they didn't have Nixon to
Speaker 2: worry about. Well, you can't do an end run around
Speaker 2: Donald Trump. So if Donald Trump leans on vving Netshanyahu,
Speaker 2: who are the Israelis going to appeal to in American
Speaker 2: domestic politics. So I actually, I actually think that's a
Speaker 2: curious possibility that something could happen there.
Speaker 1: Do you find him under the influence And I say,
Speaker 1: that loosely, I mean because of his own financial relationships
Speaker 1: to the UAE and guitar and the Saudi's sort of
Speaker 1: the Arab I mean, do you think they will play
Speaker 1: an outsize role in influencing Trump in that respect?
Speaker 2: Look, if they had, you probably would have gone ahead
Speaker 2: and done the strike. As much as they wanted around
Speaker 2: cut down to size. They were very nervous that they
Speaker 2: were going to be in the line of fire of retaliation.
Speaker 2: So my guess is there an influence but not a
Speaker 2: determinant of what he does.
Speaker 3: And I say that in no way how would I
Speaker 3: put it.
Speaker 2: I'm not comfortable with, shall we say, this merging of
Speaker 2: the personal the government when it comes to wealth creation
Speaker 2: or you know, the fact that people don't refuse themselves
Speaker 2: from things, or they carry on private sector activity. I'm
Speaker 2: as uncomfortable as I expect you are, or a lot
Speaker 2: of people watching that, But I don't think they have.
Speaker 3: I haven't seen that they have undoing. I haven't seen it.
Speaker 1: Over is, you've written a lot about doctrines. You talk
Speaker 1: about the Monroe doctrine. I think eighteen twenty three you've
Speaker 1: sort of walked us through the Truman doctrine and aspects
Speaker 1: of of not only Reagan, but even the freedom doctrine
Speaker 1: as you refer to it under the Bush administration dealing
Speaker 1: with terrorism, no place to hide? What do you have
Speaker 1: any sense of what the hell that Trump doctrine is? Or,
Speaker 1: I mean, Jade Vance tried to sert one in a
Speaker 1: speech yesterday. What America first? What is it? What's your sense?
Speaker 3: It's a good question. I think about it a lot.
Speaker 2: Well, it might be earlier, it's still early, particularly in
Speaker 2: the second term, and the second term is a hell
Speaker 2: of a lot more than a continuation of the first term.
Speaker 2: You may love that, you may hate it, but it
Speaker 2: ain't Trump two point zero is more than an extension
Speaker 2: of Trump one point Oh. There is something with this
Speaker 2: America first ism that our alliances aren't as predictable, our
Speaker 2: enemies aren't aren't seen as enemies. There's a kind of
Speaker 2: perpetual maneuver in American foreign policies. I'm not quite sure
Speaker 2: if that adds to a doctrine. In some ways, doctrines
Speaker 2: lead you to predictable outcomes. In a funny sort of way,
Speaker 2: Trump America first ism at times leads you to unpredictable outcomes.
Speaker 2: It's not isolationist, though I would say it's quite unilateral,
Speaker 2: you know, as we saw the the other day. I
Speaker 2: also wrote a few weeks ago that there is something
Speaker 2: of a doctrine. It's the opposite of the freedom doctrine,
Speaker 2: where under people like George W.
Speaker 3: Bush or even Reagan.
Speaker 2: Or Carter, we cared an awful lot about how governments
Speaker 2: treated their own people. This is just the opposite. This
Speaker 2: is all look the other way foreign policy. What you
Speaker 2: do inside your boards is your business. All we care
Speaker 2: about is that our business. So there's almost amoral quality
Speaker 2: to Trump be in foreign policy. And again, doctrines have
Speaker 2: to explain and predict. So I'm not quite sure yet
Speaker 2: we have anything that quite rises to that level.
Speaker 1: Interesting. I mean, the only thing that would that would
Speaker 1: contradict that modestly was JD Vance's speech in Munich where
Speaker 1: he's lecturing the Europeans one hundred percent.
Speaker 2: You're right to point out that contradiction. It's the one
Speaker 2: area where it's almost like there's an equation of elite
Speaker 2: Ivy League universities with elite Europe. And that's the one
Speaker 2: place where the administration is willing to tackle internal situations
Speaker 2: or circumstances in foreign countries.
Speaker 3: But I think that's the exception that kind of proves
Speaker 3: the rule.
Speaker 1: Interesting. So where where's Putin now? What's he seen? What's what?
Speaker 1: What do you think he's made of the last twelve days?
Speaker 1: Where is he in relationship? I mean he's got a
Speaker 1: free pass in some respects. The eyes are off him.
Speaker 1: He's stepping things up in Ukraine. Is it status quo
Speaker 1: ante or is he now reconsidering things?
Speaker 2: Probably a mixed bag. Well, as you say, I think
Speaker 2: you're a hundred percent right. He has to be happy
Speaker 2: with the fact that both at the G seven and
Speaker 2: then at Nato Zelenski and Ukraine were not quite center
Speaker 2: stage yep. And that very much fits or feeds Putin's idea.
Speaker 2: The time is on his side, so I think he
Speaker 2: has to feel pretty good, pretty good about that. Anytime
Speaker 2: there's instability that increases energy prices, not that we've seen
Speaker 2: a real price bike, that's got to make him feel good.
Speaker 3: Given his economy, it's got to.
Speaker 2: Feel a little bit uneasy with this demonstration of American power,
Speaker 2: with the discrepancy between what the United States can do
Speaker 2: and what say Iran could do.
Speaker 3: That's got to make them a little bit.
Speaker 2: Uneasy, but I would think all things equal to the
Speaker 2: last few days probably made them feel okay.
Speaker 3: For one other reason.
Speaker 2: I don't know if you noticed, the won my Hutzpow
Speaker 2: Award for the month the statement by the Russia Foreign
Speaker 2: Ministry critical of ISRAE for not respecting the territorial integrity
Speaker 2: and sovereignty of a UN member.
Speaker 3: And I'm sitting there reading that, going really really so.
Speaker 2: But the Russians have to like the idea that we
Speaker 2: are we would unilaterally decide that certain uses of force
Speaker 2: were somehow acceptable, and that's got to be something that
Speaker 2: Putin might actually, you know, welcome.
Speaker 1: And do you welcome? Sort of I mean, look from
Speaker 1: a tactical perspective, turn the page. In terms of trying
Speaker 1: to negotiate peace in Ukraine. Obviously stubborn, he wasn't able
Speaker 1: to get it done before he took the oath of office.
Speaker 1: He wasn't able to get it done within the twenty
Speaker 1: four hour time clock, and he set himself up for
Speaker 1: but sort of the overtures to Putin, sort of negotiating
Speaker 1: Putin's talking points and putting Zelenski on the spot. But
Speaker 1: where do you think Trump is right now in relationship to.
Speaker 1: You know, he's been a little more critical, at least publicly,
Speaker 1: been willing to be slightly more critical Putin, do you
Speaker 1: where do you think the administration is move into to
Speaker 1: a conclusion or solution here.
Speaker 2: They're caught in the inconsistency of their own policy. They're
Speaker 2: right to say that we need peace there. And I
Speaker 2: think they had one improvement over the Biden policy, where
Speaker 2: the Biden administration would never speak honestly with Zelenski, at
Speaker 2: least publicly, and say, look, you know and we know
Speaker 2: that you're not going to militarily liberate Crimea or all
Speaker 2: the East. Let's go for a deal that we get
Speaker 2: a cease fire. It doesn't prejudice your long term goals,
Speaker 2: but let's stop this war. That's Trump's idea, and I
Speaker 2: think that's smart. I think that's realistic. Where he's inconsistent
Speaker 2: is he sabotaged. He's sabotaging the chance for getting it
Speaker 2: by not being supportive of Ukraine. That gives Putin again
Speaker 2: the confidence that time is on his side. If this
Speaker 2: president would announce this summer, when the pipeline begins to
Speaker 2: run dry, we're going to re up American aid for Ukraine,
Speaker 2: not so they can militarily liberate all their land. That's
Speaker 2: going to have to be done diplomatically, but so Russian
Speaker 2: efforts will not succeed. I think that would turn the
Speaker 2: war out, and I actually think we may with the
Speaker 2: more specifical I think that would persuade Putin over time
Speaker 2: that more war would not lead to more territory. And
Speaker 2: I think that actually would be the way to get
Speaker 2: things at the negotiating table, not for peace, but for
Speaker 2: cease fires. So the administration has the right goals, it's
Speaker 2: just not going it's going about it in one hundred
Speaker 2: percent the wrong way.
Speaker 1: Is she looking at you know, a year whatever we're
Speaker 1: in with Ukraine? Is that make him more or less
Speaker 1: likely to pursue and make advanced pursuits in Taiwan? Or
Speaker 1: has he seen something different the asymmetry of warfare now,
Speaker 1: the nature and change the transformation of warfare. What's your
Speaker 1: sense of where she is at this moment as well
Speaker 1: in relate not only to Ukraine, but also perhaps more
Speaker 1: broadly as well to what the Trump administration just initiated
Speaker 1: in bb in around.
Speaker 2: My glim answer to is going to be both or yes.
Speaker 2: I think on one hand, he looks at Ukraine. He
Speaker 2: looks at the sanctions that have been introduced. He looks
Speaker 2: at how Putin overestimated the capabilities of his own military.
Speaker 2: He's seen how the West came to bat indirectly but
Speaker 2: decisively for Ukraine.
Speaker 3: That had to have given him pause. I mean, look,
Speaker 3: think about it. There's no general in the Chinese military
Speaker 3: who has military experience. Yeah, they have.
Speaker 2: The least time they fought to wars against Vietnam, they didn't.
Speaker 2: They didn't do so hot. And for the Chinese government
Speaker 2: to go to war against Taiwan and not succeed, imagine
Speaker 2: the domestic political consequences of that, The questions of legitimacy
Speaker 2: they would raise, not just for she as a person,
Speaker 2: but for the party. So I actually think they're they're
Speaker 2: somewhat cautious here. I also think they have to find
Speaker 2: it impossible to read Donald Trump again, given the tariffs,
Speaker 2: given what he just did the other day, and I
Speaker 2: think that must introduce a role of caution. I think
Speaker 2: they've got some internal issues. He's been purging a lot
Speaker 2: of military leaders. They've obviously got their economic challenges. So
Speaker 2: he hasn't given up. Don't get me wrong, that Taiwan
Speaker 2: is his legacy. That's his way to make himself a
Speaker 2: major figure in modern Chinese history. But I don't think
Speaker 2: the moments arrived. I think he wants to get a
Speaker 2: better reading on Donald Trump. We still don't have a
Speaker 2: good feel for the Trump administration's relations with Japan, Taiwan, Australia,
Speaker 2: but none of it's going particularly well. I think he
Speaker 2: probably wants to see some more about the lessons of
Speaker 2: the modern battlefield. He still wants to build up, among
Speaker 2: other things, as nuclear arms.
Speaker 3: One of the.
Speaker 2: Lessons I think Shiesh Jing learn gav was the United
Speaker 2: States did not get directly involved in helping Ukraine, and
Speaker 2: he I think from Xijianpingk's point of view, that was
Speaker 2: because of the mass of Russian nuclear arsenal. So China
Speaker 2: right now is the owner of the world's fastest growing
Speaker 2: nuclear arsenal. They're adding hundreds and hundreds of nuclear weapons
Speaker 2: each year. They want to get they kind of want
Speaker 2: to get the bronze medal in the Serious Nuclear Arsenal's Olympics,
Speaker 2: and they're moving as quickly as they can in that direction.
Speaker 2: But my guess is they don't want to show down
Speaker 2: over Taiwan. For several years until they believe they can
Speaker 2: offset or deter any American pressure because of our nuclear advantages.
Speaker 1: What do you make of the new president in Taiwan?
Speaker 1: He's rolling out I think this week a unity tour,
Speaker 1: is giving speeches. He seems to be you know, you know,
Speaker 1: it's sort of not poking the bear, but certainly trying
Speaker 1: to sort of suggest more muscularity visa the mainland China.
Speaker 1: Is that you know, what do you what do you
Speaker 1: read into that?
Speaker 2: Yeah, I mean, some of that's politics, some of it
Speaker 2: spoken to bear. My view is what I really want
Speaker 2: to do is see Taiwan get stronger. In Taiwan's the
Speaker 2: level of defense effort is not in the right zip code. Still,
Speaker 2: they've got to do a lot more. I look at
Speaker 2: I mean, we talked about Israel a lot, and you know,
Speaker 2: Israel's and shall we say, difficult strategic situation at least
Speaker 2: it has been for most of its existence. And you
Speaker 2: look at the level of military effort they've produced, or
Speaker 2: even US during the Cold War, we were probably spending
Speaker 2: i don't know, on the average of maybe six five,
Speaker 2: six seven percent of GDP. Taiwan's nowhere near that. And
Speaker 2: look at the disparities between the mainland and Taiwan. So
Speaker 2: Taiwan more important than what they say is what they do,
Speaker 2: and I would say they've really got to make a
Speaker 2: much larger effort. They've got to also look very carefully
Speaker 2: at what just happened in the Middle East and what's
Speaker 2: happened in Ukraine and ask themselves whether they are incorporating
Speaker 2: the right strategic lessons. Too much of the Taiwan military
Speaker 2: historically has elements almost of ours, a small number of
Speaker 2: expensive aircraft and so forth. I actually think they need
Speaker 2: something much larger numbers are smaller, cheaper systems would probably
Speaker 2: be helpful. The other country to really watch there is Japan.
Speaker 2: I actually think we're at a moment in history where
Speaker 2: Japan's our most important ally still the world's third largest economy,
Speaker 2: and militarily it's central to any scenario involving Chinese pressure
Speaker 2: against Taiwan. And I worry about the deterioration and that
Speaker 2: relationship of late. So again, things like that might actually
Speaker 2: affect Chinese calculations as well. But all I said, even
Speaker 2: though you know, I worry about a lot, and I
Speaker 2: worry about this as a strategic, medium, long term challenge.
Speaker 3: I don't get the sense this is a near term challenge.
Speaker 1: Interesting only slight correction. Japan is fourth to California's third.
Speaker 1: I just had it comment on that four points. I'm
Speaker 1: just saying, I'm waiting for my G seven invitation. That's
Speaker 1: all you know, our G G five. I mean, I
Speaker 1: don't know whatever G four of three. It's interesting you
Speaker 1: say Japan is the most important. I've heard people others
Speaker 1: sort of you know, suggest that Australia plays an outsize
Speaker 1: role in terms of just you know, looking at the
Speaker 1: sort of strategic realignment. Where do you make I mean
Speaker 1: that president or the leadership there surprised some punderance and
Speaker 1: pulling out a pretty healthy margin and the victory. Obviously
Speaker 1: they're overtures back and forth to China. But you made
Speaker 1: a point which I don't really reflected on Trump's sort
Speaker 1: of ambiguity with those relationships South Korea obviously and Japan
Speaker 1: and the trilat that the Bidy administration had. Now we're
Speaker 1: seeing that taking shape with she and obviously Australia seems
Speaker 1: to be sort of the plus one right now. But
Speaker 1: give me your sense of where Australia plays.
Speaker 3: Look, Australia does play an outsize role.
Speaker 2: I think that the relationship isn't as robust as it
Speaker 2: ought to be, hasn't gotten a whole lot of attention,
Speaker 2: a lot of you know, a lot of our economic
Speaker 2: policy has alienated our friends, you know, the tariffs in particular.
Speaker 2: Most of the line on defense is do more, do more,
Speaker 2: do more, and that gets a little bit old after
Speaker 2: a while. So I would like to see if you
Speaker 2: will more consultation with them. And again, you can't have
Speaker 2: economic policy and military or strategic policy carried out in
Speaker 2: separate silos. It's very hard to hammer an ally or
Speaker 2: friend over trade issues on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays, and
Speaker 2: expect on Tuesdays, Thursdays, and Saturdays. The strategic relationship is
Speaker 2: going to be just fine. Doesn't work that way, So
Speaker 2: I would say this is again I'm critical of a
Speaker 2: lot of the economic policy on it its own merits.
Speaker 3: I don't think it makes sense full stop.
Speaker 2: But even putting that aside, it certainly doesn't make sense
Speaker 2: because it ends up penalizing more than anyone our friends,
Speaker 2: just those with the exception of China. It's our friends
Speaker 2: and neighbors who are, as you know, our biggest economic partners.
Speaker 1: Today. Donald Trump in his press conference when I was
Speaker 1: confronted on why he hasn't solved the conflict in Ukraine immediately, well,
Speaker 1: he pivoted to his success in immediately solving the crisis
Speaker 1: in Pakistan and India. Overstated, understated? Is that an early
Speaker 1: success that he deserves more credit than perhaps he's been given.
Speaker 2: It sounds slightly ungenerous my part, but I think it's
Speaker 2: a bit exaggerated. And it also has rub raw US
Speaker 2: Indian relations.
Speaker 1: I was going to ask that next.
Speaker 2: Yeah, and look, it's always been difficult dealing with Pakistan
Speaker 2: and dealing with India. But I think the great breakthrough,
Speaker 2: and it was a bipartisan one of them the last
Speaker 2: several administrations, was that US Indian relations got on a firmer,
Speaker 2: more important strategic footing made sense given India's demographics, economics,
Speaker 2: relationship with China and so forth. We bean, as you know,
Speaker 2: to bring Indian into various Asia Pacific strategic groupings. I've
Speaker 2: always seen Pakistan more as a problem than as a partner.
Speaker 2: It was a problem in Afghanistan in many ways, and
Speaker 2: you know, the questions of democracy and human rights, the
Speaker 2: role of the military and politics it's been a very
Speaker 2: uneasy country. If you had asked me years ago what
Speaker 2: keeps me up most tonight, I might have said Pakistan,
Speaker 2: in part because the potential loss of command and control
Speaker 2: over nuclear materials. So the even handedness that we've reintroduced.
Speaker 2: And then the shorthand for this is that we've we've
Speaker 2: once again, we've once again hyphenated the relationship.
Speaker 3: So rather than having a strategic relationship with India and.
Speaker 2: A lesser relationship with Pakistan, we now once again have
Speaker 2: India Pakistan policy. And it seems to me that is
Speaker 2: not a wise approach given what I would argue is
Speaker 2: India's greater inherent importance and potential.
Speaker 3: You know, how close they really were?
Speaker 2: You know, I don't think things were that close to
Speaker 2: escalating or getting out of a hand that said, Look,
Speaker 2: anytime the United States can dampen down actual or potential hostilities,
Speaker 2: you know, great, and I would you know, say well
Speaker 2: done to the President or the Secretary of State or
Speaker 2: anyone else who had a hand in it. But yeah,
Speaker 2: I wouldn't exaggerate it here. And again it may have
Speaker 2: come at some cost as well.
Speaker 1: Yeah, well, and then there was also a price. The
Speaker 1: largest I think one of their crypto exchanges in Pakistan
Speaker 1: now is yeah, well, and we'll get back into the
Speaker 1: corruption questions, or at least questions of corruption.
Speaker 2: Look, I've heard that, and yeah, I don't know, but yeah,
Speaker 2: it is what it is.
Speaker 1: It is what it is. So you've been writing a
Speaker 1: lot about, talking a lot about, and obviously only highlighted
Speaker 1: with the last few weeks, But what the hell's wrong
Speaker 1: with American foreign policy? We get so damn bogged down
Speaker 1: in the Middle East. You've made the point there's a
Speaker 1: whole world out there. We talked, we've sort of jumped
Speaker 1: around different countries, different regions, but the reality is we
Speaker 1: have been for decades and decades and decades bogged down
Speaker 1: in the Middle East. You you e've an interesting history
Speaker 1: working in Republican administrations, Bush administrations, But you made the
Speaker 1: notation earlier, and it's important point to highlight you were
Speaker 1: opposed to that last war in Iraq, and so you've
Speaker 1: seen some light and some wisdom through all this. But
Speaker 1: what the hell has happened to the United States over
Speaker 1: the last I mean, my entire lifetime been consumed by
Speaker 1: countries none of us could pronounce. No one knows the
Speaker 1: difference between Iraq and Iran. I think there was a
Speaker 1: song about that, and you know what's going on, Richard help.
Speaker 3: Us a fair question.
Speaker 2: Just for the record, I didn't work for a democratic administration.
Speaker 2: I worked in the Carter Pentagon. And one of the
Speaker 2: big issues then was the Middle East. Is nineteen seventy
Speaker 2: nine you had the revolution in Iran, then you had
Speaker 2: the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan.
Speaker 3: Look when the Cold War ended, what thirty five years.
Speaker 2: Ago, I don't think anyone would have predicted Devin that
Speaker 2: the Middle East would be such a focus of American
Speaker 2: fire policy. The first real crisis of the post Cold
Speaker 2: War era was the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. We President
Speaker 2: Bush forty one rallied the country in the world to
Speaker 2: Kuwait's defense.
Speaker 3: It was quite extraordinary. I think it was actually to me.
Speaker 2: Like I duly note that I was part of the administration,
Speaker 2: I worked on the Middle East. But you know, credit
Speaker 2: I think is due to the President, bren Scokropt, Jim
Speaker 2: Baker and others. It was quite remarkably done well, and
Speaker 2: I think what we did was necessary. The two thousand
Speaker 2: and three Iraq War was a war of choice. I
Speaker 2: think it was misguided and some other I think with
Speaker 2: the other day what we did was I think was warranted.
Speaker 2: But in general, if I look at the map of
Speaker 2: American farm policity and that you still have forty thousand
Speaker 2: troops in the Middle East, it seems to me that
Speaker 2: it's a disproportionate focus for US. It's the one it's
Speaker 2: one of the parts the world where you don't have
Speaker 2: a great power presence, you don't really have much great
Speaker 2: power competition, and that it's you have regional powers, not
Speaker 2: great powers.
Speaker 3: I would say.
Speaker 2: Ultimately twenty first century history is going to be much
Speaker 2: more written about what happens in Europe and above all
Speaker 2: the Asia Pacific. Asia Pacific is where the people are,
Speaker 2: it's where the wealth is, It's where the militaries are
Speaker 2: going to be. US China competition will be defining. So
Speaker 2: it seems to me strategically there is still something odd
Speaker 2: about the emphasis that the Middle East gets, and I
Speaker 2: think we've we've gotten too ambitious there at times. I think,
Speaker 2: in particular forty three's effort to transform it to bring
Speaker 2: about democracy was.
Speaker 3: I think still advised.
Speaker 2: I'll be diplomatic here and so forth, and some other
Speaker 2: things that we've done again were I would say we
Speaker 2: should do no more than is necessary in the Middle East,
Speaker 2: because there's other parts of the world that I would
Speaker 2: argue are strategically more important, and we just.
Speaker 3: Find ourselves more about that.
Speaker 2: I don't have a good answer for you exactly why
Speaker 2: at times, but somehow it's captured our imagination. One of
Speaker 2: the odd things for secretaries of state, and I worked
Speaker 2: with quite a few. How getting heavily involved in Middle
Speaker 2: East and diplomacy was almost part of the job after
Speaker 2: Henry Kissinger, and I like it or not, people found
Speaker 2: themselves doing it, and yeah, less my take on all
Speaker 2: that is, no mediator can ever be more successful than
Speaker 2: the protagonists want or would allow him to be. And
Speaker 2: I think at times we've too often substituted our own
Speaker 2: efforts for what was missing on the part of the locals.
Speaker 2: So my argument is not to get out of the
Speaker 2: Middle East, but I would where possible dial it down.
Speaker 1: So you know, it's interesting. We had Steve Bannon on
Speaker 1: this show, and I don't get the merits and demerits
Speaker 1: of that conversation, but he's had a lot of more
Speaker 1: public conversations about what he perceived, or at least asserted
Speaker 1: was the wisdom of Trump focusing on things like Greenland
Speaker 1: or countries like Greenland, focusing on the Panama Canal. Looking
Speaker 1: at it more from a strategic prism sort of you know,
Speaker 1: hemispheric framework and sort of creating a stronger consciousness to
Speaker 1: sort of regionalize our American first framework and to put
Speaker 1: it in, you know, in at least creating a narrative
Speaker 1: around what some of us perceived as just the absurdity
Speaker 1: of these threats to take over Greenland, make Canada fifty
Speaker 1: first state, and invade or take over the Panama Canal.
Speaker 1: Is there any merit to that argument or is it
Speaker 1: just folly?
Speaker 2: Folly would be generous the terrible idea. Look, it seems
Speaker 2: to be setting up a kind of spheres of influence
Speaker 2: approach to the world. So we would have the lead
Speaker 2: role in this part of the world, presumably Russia would
Speaker 2: have a lead role in the European theater, China and
Speaker 2: the Asia Pacific. Russia and China would be very happy
Speaker 2: with that arrangement. No one in this hemisphere would be
Speaker 2: so in a f any sort of way. We wouldn't
Speaker 2: succeed at playing an outsized role because it would be
Speaker 2: resisted every inch.
Speaker 3: Of the way.
Speaker 2: Americans, including a lot of the Maga people, wouldn't want
Speaker 2: us involved in imperial wars in this part of the world,
Speaker 2: whether it's Panama or Mexico, or Greenland or Canada.
Speaker 3: So I just think it's unnecessary.
Speaker 2: We can have the access the influence we need without
Speaker 2: an imperial coercive role. And again, the real strategic challenges
Speaker 2: of the century are not going to be met here.
Speaker 3: They're going to be met.
Speaker 2: In other parts of the world, above all Asia and
Speaker 2: the Pacific. So I think it's really a truly misguided approach.
Speaker 2: But it makes me uneasy because I can see something
Speaker 2: of it, and this kind of people don't yet speak
Speaker 2: about spheres of influence, but it's kind of in the
Speaker 2: air of the water, and I'm uneasy about it. But
Speaker 2: it's not a recipe for order. We would be resisted here,
Speaker 2: and history suggest wherever there'd be a lot of opposition.
Speaker 2: And by the way, it would become a real recipe
Speaker 2: for proliferation. Watch how if something like that were to
Speaker 2: begin to gain momentum, Watch countries in e urbeer in
Speaker 2: Asia decide they need nuclear weapons of their own. So
Speaker 2: I think that kind of an approach to the world
Speaker 2: would be quite honestly catastrophic.
Speaker 1: Questions around the globe in terms of concerns we so
Speaker 1: often neglect. Continent of Africa was a reference today of
Speaker 1: Congo from the President the only time we tend to
Speaker 1: focus on Africa as a relationship to China's investment. The
Speaker 1: same with the Central America or South America as well.
Speaker 1: I mean parts of the globe that seemed to be
Speaker 1: under resourced in terms of mind share and investment, strategic investments.
Speaker 1: What's your over under in terms of America's posture in
Speaker 1: South America, Central America. But first let's start in Africa.
Speaker 2: What makes Africa, siouey generous, What makes it unique going
Speaker 2: forward is demographics. Most of the world is getting a
Speaker 2: shrinking in number and getting older. South Asia is the
Speaker 2: one partial exception. Africa is an enormous exception. Africa is
Speaker 2: going to be increasing by what more than a billion
Speaker 2: people over the next generation or so, and the question
Speaker 2: is whether that's a burden or a bonus, and that.
Speaker 3: Remains to be seen.
Speaker 2: So I think Africa is important, not in the sense
Speaker 2: of great power strategic competition. That's a sideshow for the
Speaker 2: most part, but really it's a human story. It's with
Speaker 2: you know, all these people, and the question is can
Speaker 2: economically these people, can they be employed?
Speaker 3: Can governments provide services?
Speaker 2: You can you have good enough governance, So in places
Speaker 2: like Nigeria, South Africa and other countries that you don't.
Speaker 3: Have civil wars and so forth.
Speaker 2: So I think that's the big question for Africa, and
Speaker 2: by the way, pretty true of Latin America as well,
Speaker 2: without the democraptic dimension. But again, the biggest problems in
Speaker 2: Latin America are not whether Brazil is going to invade
Speaker 2: Argentina or whether Russia or China going to do.
Speaker 3: Some of the biggest issues they are internal their governance.
Speaker 3: Can the Mexican.
Speaker 2: Government meet the responsibilities and challenges of sovereignty within Mexico?
Speaker 2: Can they deal with cartels and drugs and criminals and
Speaker 2: the and the light and where possible. I think our
Speaker 2: policy ought to be to help these countries meet their challenges,
Speaker 2: because it's good for them, but it's also good for us.
Speaker 2: Then there'll be conditions of stability, better chance for democracy,
Speaker 2: better chance for trade and investment, better way to deal
Speaker 2: with whether it's health challenges or climate challenges or what
Speaker 2: have you. So we do it it's both. Again, it's
Speaker 2: not either or it's the right thing to do. It's
Speaker 2: helpful to them, but I think it also very much
Speaker 2: works in our favor. It's one of the reasons, by
Speaker 2: the way, I'm so critical of what we've done to
Speaker 2: the Agency for International Development. The real folly of that
Speaker 2: is not that it provides opportunities for China, which it does,
Speaker 2: but again, we weaken the ability of these societies and
Speaker 2: these governments to deal with their immediate challenges. That can't
Speaker 2: be good because ultimately failed states become places where terrorists
Speaker 2: set up shop, where disease breaks out and spread, Pirates
Speaker 2: do their things, criminals do their things. So again, even
Speaker 2: out of narrow self interest, we ought to be doing
Speaker 2: more in these places. So I just think it's quite
Speaker 2: short sighted.
Speaker 1: So let me move back, and I see it. You've
Speaker 1: got a book behind you that I want to talk
Speaker 1: about in a moment, and it brings us back a
Speaker 1: little bit more domestically, and it brings back sort of
Speaker 1: just to the prism of you know, my lens has
Speaker 1: changed dramatically in the last few weeks since I have
Speaker 1: just shy have five thousand members of the US military
Speaker 1: on the streets of one of America's largest cities, Los Angeles,
Speaker 1: without council consent on the support of the state revere
Speaker 1: the men and women in uniform that are out there
Speaker 1: just not their assignment. But it also sort of assigned
Speaker 1: some consideration and consciousness to this administration and what distinguishes
Speaker 1: it from the first Trump administration. I know you've got
Speaker 1: a blog You've written a little bit about this where
Speaker 1: you said Trump is organized a cabinet that are more
Speaker 1: of amplifiers than more traditional sort of metrics of people
Speaker 1: that would sort of, you know, great sort of a
Speaker 1: governing of our framework, regulatory or regulate some of the thinking.
Speaker 1: I mean, where's where are you today in terms of
Speaker 1: this administration? One hundred and fifty or so days in
Speaker 1: however many days, it's been growing concern simmering concerns We
Speaker 1: overstate authoritarianism. Is that a word that we should even
Speaker 1: be using. Is democracy hanging in the balance or are
Speaker 1: we fine? What's your sort of over under what's the
Speaker 1: temperature right now?
Speaker 2: The fact that we have to have this conversation tells
Speaker 2: you something am uneasy. I'm uncomfortable with words like authoritarianism
Speaker 2: all that that's something to be avoided ultimately, but there's
Speaker 2: tendencies that worry me. We haven't had. There's two major
Speaker 2: lines that the administrations walked right up to and played
Speaker 2: footsoe with but hasn't quite crossed in a decisive way.
Speaker 2: One was the one you were alluding to, which is
Speaker 2: the use of the American military inside our borders, and
Speaker 2: that to me has all sorts of implications for American democracy,
Speaker 2: but also it's terrible for the American military. It reduces readiness,
Speaker 2: It politicizes what has been in some ways the most
Speaker 2: successful modern American institution that we.
Speaker 3: Have. So that's one thing that makes me uneasy. We're not.
Speaker 2: We haven't quite crossed that line, but we've tiptoed up
Speaker 2: to it, as you know better than I do. The
Speaker 2: other is defiance of decisions by the judiciary, and again
Speaker 2: some of the quasi defiance, not quite hearing what the
Speaker 2: courts were saying on deportations and so far.
Speaker 3: So that leaves me uneasy. But I don't think.
Speaker 2: Either yet has reached the point of shall we say,
Speaker 2: broad crisis or crisis of the first order.
Speaker 3: But I think there's grounds for being uneasy.
Speaker 2: Look, it's the irony of this isn't lost here we are.
Speaker 2: It's now what late June and approximately what twelve months.
Speaker 2: In a week we're going to be marking the two
Speaker 2: hundred and fiftieth anniversary of this country. And to me,
Speaker 2: the lesson is not to take democracy for granted. You've
Speaker 2: done good things, by the way in your state with
Speaker 2: Josh Friday, I think in terms of promoting volunteerism and
Speaker 2: public service, which I think is great both for the
Speaker 2: values enhances, but also it brings Americans together. I've tried
Speaker 2: to make a big thing about Civics education. We shouldn't
Speaker 2: assume that people don't need it or somehow get it automatically.
Speaker 2: The answers they do need it and they don't get
Speaker 2: in their schools. For the most part, that ought to
Speaker 2: become much bigger priority, and we ought to think a
Speaker 2: lot about what we need uh to do to make
Speaker 2: sure American democracy works. But I get uneasy with some
Speaker 2: of the attacks on civil society, whether it's law firms
Speaker 2: or universities or or what have you. So I think
Speaker 2: there's a lot of yellow lights flashing, and so my
Speaker 2: view is we ought to we ought to be mindful
Speaker 2: of them and not again not take anything for granted,
Speaker 2: or you know, you know Churchill has always quoted for everything. Uh,
Speaker 2: and one of them is that you Americans can always
Speaker 2: be counted on to do the right thing after they
Speaker 2: do everything else.
Speaker 3: There's a kind of sanguine quality.
Speaker 2: Or yeah, we get in trouble, but we've always come
Speaker 2: out in the right place and never sell America short.
Speaker 3: Probably, but let's not take it for granted. That's my
Speaker 3: only view.
Speaker 2: I think it's just a we ought to feel a
Speaker 2: sense of urgency and the given how enormous the stakes are.
Speaker 2: I don't think anybody kind of how to put it,
Speaker 2: democracy can't be a spectator sport. And whether you were
Speaker 2: in positions of authority like you, whether you're a quote
Speaker 2: unquote justice citizen or you're a CEO of some business
Speaker 2: or what have you.
Speaker 3: I just think there's ways for people to make a difference,
Speaker 3: and again, we just can't. It's too valuable to not.
Speaker 2: How I put it, none of us wants to be
Speaker 2: in a position where, if things do heads out, we
Speaker 2: wish we had done things that we know that we
Speaker 2: simply sat on the sidelines.
Speaker 1: You talk about citizenship, you've written about citizenship, and you've
Speaker 1: challenged us to reconsider what you refer to as sort
Speaker 1: of a lopsided notion of citizenship, that it's not just
Speaker 1: about rights, it's about obligations. You wrote a book, the
Speaker 1: Bill of Obligations, and you enumerate a framework about the
Speaker 1: critical importance of service and civics, the common good, the
Speaker 1: best of you know, the wrong and republic, Greek democracy,
Speaker 1: and I think the principles are founding fathers. To talk
Speaker 1: to us a little bit about what inspired you to
Speaker 1: write the book. You wrote it a few years ago,
Speaker 1: I imagine inspiration today would be even more acute. But
Speaker 1: it's an important and essential read. And by the way,
Speaker 1: it's fantastic for anyone that's listening. Talk to me Richard
Speaker 1: a little bit and all of us about what inspired
Speaker 1: this book and what you're really trying to communicate.
Speaker 3: Well, first of all, thank you.
Speaker 2: Years before I wrote another book called Foreign Policy Begins
Speaker 2: at Home. And you know, I'm a fart as you look,
Speaker 2: as we can see from this conversation, for better or worse,
Speaker 2: I'm a foreign policy guy. That's my educational training, that's
Speaker 2: my professional experience. But probably about a decade ago I
Speaker 2: started to see much greater connection between what we were
Speaker 2: doing or not doing here at home, and our ability
Speaker 2: to be effective abroad. I wrote about everything from indebtedness
Speaker 2: ten years ago. A big issue was energy dependence. By
Speaker 2: the way, shows we can work through things. Quality or
Speaker 2: lack of it, of our public education, strength of our democracy.
Speaker 3: And I was worried very much.
Speaker 2: A decade ago about our inability to generate majorities to
Speaker 2: deal with the challenges increasingly, particularly at the federal level,
Speaker 2: less so at the state level. We were gridlocked. And
Speaker 2: what I noticed in the year since that things weren't
Speaker 2: getting better, things were getting worse. And so I just decided,
Speaker 2: I can't quite answer your question what inspired me, but
Speaker 2: I was just thinking a lot about it. And I
Speaker 2: take long walks when I think about a book, and
Speaker 2: Central Park becomes my co author. And just then went
Speaker 2: back and reread or in some cases read for the
Speaker 2: first time, a lot of the great works of American
Speaker 2: political history, and I was just struck by how much
Speaker 2: explicitly a lot of our modern are not so modern
Speaker 2: history was about the expansion of rights what Lincoln called
Speaker 2: the unfinished work, and I get it, and it's actually
Speaker 2: been one of the great things civil rights and so forth.
Speaker 2: We have a lot to be proud of in this
Speaker 2: country towards a more perfect union. We're not there, but
Speaker 2: we've made some real strides. But it seemed to be
Speaker 2: lost in that. Increasingly was the other side of us
Speaker 2: that no one was any more talking about obligations. It's
Speaker 2: interesting the founding fathers didn't talk about it a lot explicitly.
Speaker 2: I think they assumed it. Gavin, I think it was implicit.
Speaker 2: They didn't think they needed to remind people about it.
Speaker 2: But increasingly it seemed to me we did. You look
Speaker 2: at the numbers of the people who are eligible to
Speaker 2: vote and don't vote, the amount of people who get
Speaker 2: their information quote unquote from TikTok rather than from serious sources,
Speaker 2: the polls that show young people don't value democracy, don't
Speaker 2: think it's worth saving, the lack of public service opportunities increasingly,
Speaker 2: the failure to require quality the civics to be taught
Speaker 2: in classrooms, growing threats or realities of pe to go violence,
Speaker 2: and on and on, and things like COVID and so forth,
Speaker 2: showed me that a lack of what you mentioned before
Speaker 2: about the common good, whether to get vaccinated, to wear
Speaker 2: a mask. It's not just for me, but it's also
Speaker 2: for the other person. So it just all added up
Speaker 2: and I just decided that I would I would put
Speaker 2: my hand to it. So it's for me as an author.
Speaker 2: It was great. But I learned more writing that book
Speaker 2: than any other book I've ever written, because I knew
Speaker 2: less about it going in.
Speaker 1: And you've written what sixteen book? How many books?
Speaker 2: I've written a dozen and edited a few more. So
Speaker 2: it's a it's a large it's up to sixteen. But
Speaker 2: I'm not done yet. I got a few more in me.
Speaker 1: There's plenty of chapters of your life left and and
Speaker 1: and look, I'm grateful for this opportunity to share a
Speaker 1: little bit of your time and your your your action
Speaker 1: and passion as it were. And when we get you back,
Speaker 1: I need you back for the original conversation we haven't had,
Speaker 1: which is what the hell is going on with my party,
Speaker 1: the Democratic Party?
Speaker 3: Uh?
Speaker 1: And how we're going to take back the House, what
Speaker 1: we need to do? Uh? And uh, how we get
Speaker 1: back on the right side of these presidential elections.
Speaker 3: You give me thirty more seconds.
Speaker 2: I was going to raise that which is out everyone's
Speaker 2: talking about bda battle damage assessment in terms of Iran.
Speaker 2: I was going to raise Bda in terms of the
Speaker 2: New York mayoral primary.
Speaker 1: Uh okay, is that how we're going to end this
Speaker 1: as opposed to begin this conversation. Uh? That is for
Speaker 1: all of you listening a preview of the next podcast
Speaker 1: or your us I guess on well, part one of
Speaker 1: this two part pod. Richard, thanks for being
Speaker 3: Here, Thank you sir, enjoying us