1 00:00:01,760 --> 00:00:04,880 Speaker 1: All Zone Media. 2 00:00:05,320 --> 00:00:08,360 Speaker 2: Welcome back to It Could Happen here, the podcast that's 3 00:00:08,400 --> 00:00:11,520 Speaker 2: happening here in your ear. And one of the things 4 00:00:11,560 --> 00:00:16,320 Speaker 2: that we love talking about here is a critical ingredient 5 00:00:16,480 --> 00:00:22,040 Speaker 2: towards creeping authoritarianism, towards growing corporate control and surveillance over 6 00:00:22,079 --> 00:00:24,880 Speaker 2: all of our lives, which is of course technology that 7 00:00:24,960 --> 00:00:29,080 Speaker 2: makes it even easier to monitor you than it already is. 8 00:00:29,160 --> 00:00:32,800 Speaker 2: We're not talking primarily about like the government monitoring you, 9 00:00:32,840 --> 00:00:35,040 Speaker 2: because they can, you know, do stuff like just pull 10 00:00:35,080 --> 00:00:37,880 Speaker 2: your phone data from a you know what, which cell 11 00:00:37,960 --> 00:00:40,640 Speaker 2: towers is pinged. We're talking about the kind of stuff 12 00:00:40,680 --> 00:00:44,640 Speaker 2: that allows basically whoever can get an app on your 13 00:00:44,680 --> 00:00:48,800 Speaker 2: phone to track and stalk you. And Yeah, I'm going 14 00:00:48,840 --> 00:00:52,200 Speaker 2: to first introduce Mia Wong. Mia, welcome to the show 15 00:00:52,280 --> 00:00:56,480 Speaker 2: that you also host. Yes, I'm here. So what are 16 00:00:56,520 --> 00:00:58,319 Speaker 2: we what are we talking about today? And who are 17 00:00:58,360 --> 00:01:02,720 Speaker 2: we talking with? Yeah, so we are talking about stalker war, 18 00:01:02,760 --> 00:01:05,280 Speaker 2: which is the sort of broad name for the category 19 00:01:05,360 --> 00:01:07,880 Speaker 2: of software that Robert has been talking about. And we 20 00:01:07,959 --> 00:01:12,760 Speaker 2: are talking about someone who hacked well a stoker where 21 00:01:12,920 --> 00:01:15,880 Speaker 2: stalker Yeah, one. 22 00:01:15,680 --> 00:01:19,120 Speaker 3: Of the stockerware companies my Aris and Crime, the fame 23 00:01:19,240 --> 00:01:22,520 Speaker 3: hacker of the no fly list. Yeah, returning guests, always 24 00:01:22,520 --> 00:01:23,319 Speaker 3: happy to have you on. 25 00:01:24,319 --> 00:01:29,240 Speaker 4: Yeah, I always happy to be on. Yeah. 26 00:01:29,280 --> 00:01:33,520 Speaker 3: So I think I think, I don't know. I think 27 00:01:33,520 --> 00:01:37,319 Speaker 3: there's a real tendency among and I see this among 28 00:01:37,400 --> 00:01:40,240 Speaker 3: leftists a lot for kind of good reasons and kind 29 00:01:40,280 --> 00:01:45,479 Speaker 3: of not good reasons to really only focus on state 30 00:01:45,640 --> 00:01:50,040 Speaker 3: and like large corporate actors in terms of surveillance. And 31 00:01:50,480 --> 00:01:51,360 Speaker 3: that's a mistake. 32 00:01:52,160 --> 00:01:53,040 Speaker 4: Yeah, totally. 33 00:01:54,480 --> 00:01:56,760 Speaker 3: Yeah, And so I guess I guess the place where 34 00:01:56,800 --> 00:01:58,680 Speaker 3: I want to start before we get into the specific 35 00:01:58,720 --> 00:02:02,040 Speaker 3: company that you do, is it still called owned? 36 00:02:03,040 --> 00:02:06,320 Speaker 4: I can't. It's fine to call it owned or pond 37 00:02:06,720 --> 00:02:10,320 Speaker 4: or whatever. I still do that. Sometimes people get confused. 38 00:02:10,760 --> 00:02:13,280 Speaker 3: But yeah, yeah, But before we get into that, I 39 00:02:13,360 --> 00:02:15,200 Speaker 3: want to I want to ask you a bit because 40 00:02:15,200 --> 00:02:18,280 Speaker 3: you've done a lot of sort of I guess you 41 00:02:18,280 --> 00:02:22,240 Speaker 3: could call it research, both actual research wise and then 42 00:02:22,480 --> 00:02:25,840 Speaker 3: in terms of poking around their servers. 43 00:02:26,120 --> 00:02:29,480 Speaker 4: Research and journalism and whatever. Do you want to call it? 44 00:02:29,600 --> 00:02:33,919 Speaker 3: Yeah, hex, Yeah, So I wanted to just start off 45 00:02:33,960 --> 00:02:35,919 Speaker 3: by asking if you can give sort of like a 46 00:02:35,960 --> 00:02:38,360 Speaker 3: brief summary of what stalker ware is. 47 00:02:39,880 --> 00:02:42,760 Speaker 4: Yeah. So so, so stoker ware like as a category 48 00:02:42,840 --> 00:02:45,880 Speaker 4: encompasses like a number of different types of apps. Most 49 00:02:45,919 --> 00:02:48,680 Speaker 4: of them, like on the service, advertise themselves as like 50 00:02:48,800 --> 00:02:52,840 Speaker 4: parental control software, which is already bad enough. Just to 51 00:02:52,880 --> 00:02:55,840 Speaker 4: be clear that there's like advertised for like spying on 52 00:02:55,880 --> 00:02:58,799 Speaker 4: your children's phone, like seeing their location in real time, 53 00:02:58,840 --> 00:03:02,799 Speaker 4: seeing their such as that they receive any photo they take. 54 00:03:03,360 --> 00:03:07,040 Speaker 4: Ostensibly this is to prevent bullying and help with them 55 00:03:07,160 --> 00:03:09,760 Speaker 4: when they get depressed because they don't trust you and 56 00:03:09,800 --> 00:03:13,520 Speaker 4: talk to you for whatever reason. But obviously a lot 57 00:03:13,560 --> 00:03:16,880 Speaker 4: of these are then furthermore because that's like that, Sure, 58 00:03:16,919 --> 00:03:19,760 Speaker 4: that's a like target audience, that's a demographic you can 59 00:03:19,800 --> 00:03:23,920 Speaker 4: advertise too. But then there's this even bigger potential target 60 00:03:23,919 --> 00:03:28,320 Speaker 4: demographic of people who are insecure in their relationship, mostly men, 61 00:03:28,400 --> 00:03:31,120 Speaker 4: not only men, but who are then solved this idea 62 00:03:31,200 --> 00:03:34,640 Speaker 4: that they can use software like this for stalking their partner, 63 00:03:34,720 --> 00:03:37,240 Speaker 4: for finding out if they are cheating on you, things 64 00:03:37,360 --> 00:03:39,880 Speaker 4: like that, which is obviously an even bigger problem, which 65 00:03:39,920 --> 00:03:42,680 Speaker 4: once again not to discount the problems. That's spying on 66 00:03:42,720 --> 00:03:45,680 Speaker 4: your children. It's already like bad enough, but yeah, lead 67 00:03:45,760 --> 00:03:48,960 Speaker 4: this leads to this whole big industry of these apps 68 00:03:49,000 --> 00:03:53,760 Speaker 4: being used by partners against each other, like also just 69 00:03:53,800 --> 00:03:57,400 Speaker 4: by people, like against anyone in the in their surroundings 70 00:03:57,440 --> 00:04:01,000 Speaker 4: that they suspect might be doing something might be like 71 00:04:01,960 --> 00:04:04,880 Speaker 4: talking behind their backs. It often kind of turns into 72 00:04:05,000 --> 00:04:07,960 Speaker 4: like it obviously turns into this obsessive thing, especially if 73 00:04:08,000 --> 00:04:10,920 Speaker 4: you're solved this idea that this this app can magically 74 00:04:10,960 --> 00:04:14,080 Speaker 4: solve like interpersonal issues, like with anything that sells you 75 00:04:14,160 --> 00:04:16,880 Speaker 4: this magic idea of being able to solve any problem. 76 00:04:17,160 --> 00:04:19,640 Speaker 4: That these people start kind of spying on everyone in 77 00:04:19,680 --> 00:04:23,880 Speaker 4: their like circles to some of them, like not everyone, 78 00:04:23,960 --> 00:04:26,000 Speaker 4: most like a lot of people only spying like their 79 00:04:26,000 --> 00:04:28,880 Speaker 4: partner or like their child or whatever. But it often 80 00:04:28,960 --> 00:04:32,320 Speaker 4: like spirals out of control into this like controlling everyone 81 00:04:32,360 --> 00:04:34,760 Speaker 4: in their surroundings, knowing what everyone is up to where 82 00:04:34,800 --> 00:04:37,599 Speaker 4: they are, and spending like hundreds of dollars a month 83 00:04:37,640 --> 00:04:40,880 Speaker 4: on doing so. And yeah, that's pretty fucked up if 84 00:04:40,920 --> 00:04:41,560 Speaker 4: you ask me. 85 00:04:41,960 --> 00:04:45,040 Speaker 2: Yeah, yeah. One of the things that's interesting too. It's 86 00:04:45,080 --> 00:04:47,520 Speaker 2: also in a lot of cases illegal. This is going 87 00:04:47,600 --> 00:04:49,599 Speaker 2: to vary, you know, from country to country, in state 88 00:04:49,640 --> 00:04:52,320 Speaker 2: to state, but in the US there are states like California, 89 00:04:52,360 --> 00:04:54,520 Speaker 2: which gets pointed out in the very good Tech Crunch 90 00:04:54,600 --> 00:04:58,880 Speaker 2: investigation on truth spy, where there are really strict laws 91 00:04:58,920 --> 00:05:00,800 Speaker 2: that journalists like you have to by bias to win. 92 00:05:00,880 --> 00:05:04,440 Speaker 2: You can record someone that these these apps absolutely break. 93 00:05:05,000 --> 00:05:07,400 Speaker 4: Yes, it's specifically I think that doesn't. Most of these 94 00:05:07,440 --> 00:05:09,960 Speaker 4: app will have like disclaimerate upon that is like this 95 00:05:10,080 --> 00:05:13,120 Speaker 4: might be I legal and your jurisdiction, and please ask 96 00:05:13,200 --> 00:05:15,920 Speaker 4: for consent before doing this, and then they have lots 97 00:05:15,960 --> 00:05:18,360 Speaker 4: of tutorials on how to install this in someone's device 98 00:05:18,400 --> 00:05:21,760 Speaker 4: without their consent. Yeah, but it's like always like a 99 00:05:22,040 --> 00:05:24,320 Speaker 4: we do not take any like we we it's not 100 00:05:24,480 --> 00:05:27,240 Speaker 4: our fault if you break the law basically, which obviously, 101 00:05:27,279 --> 00:05:29,960 Speaker 4: like it's so far not a lot of this has 102 00:05:30,040 --> 00:05:32,400 Speaker 4: been challenged in court, but I don't think this would 103 00:05:32,400 --> 00:05:36,760 Speaker 4: hold up too long. But I don't think just saying 104 00:05:36,880 --> 00:05:38,880 Speaker 4: we make a product to do crimes with if you 105 00:05:39,000 --> 00:05:40,919 Speaker 4: do crimes of it, it's not I mean it works 106 00:05:40,960 --> 00:05:42,000 Speaker 4: for the gun industry. 107 00:05:42,080 --> 00:05:46,440 Speaker 2: So yeah. The difference is that like the with the 108 00:05:46,480 --> 00:05:48,839 Speaker 2: gun industry, it's a product where there is a legal 109 00:05:48,880 --> 00:05:51,720 Speaker 2: and an illegal, like clear way to do it. 110 00:05:52,040 --> 00:05:54,320 Speaker 4: The thing with stocker were as well is that like 111 00:05:54,320 --> 00:05:56,440 Speaker 4: a lot of them will also explicitly say the only 112 00:05:56,560 --> 00:05:58,840 Speaker 4: real use of this we allow you to do to 113 00:05:59,120 --> 00:06:02,440 Speaker 4: use it for is to surveill your child, which unfortunately 114 00:06:02,640 --> 00:06:06,000 Speaker 4: is legal in most jurisdictions because children are property of 115 00:06:06,040 --> 00:06:09,400 Speaker 4: their parents. Yeah quotes because I do not agree with that, but. 116 00:06:10,520 --> 00:06:12,919 Speaker 2: Yeah, it's one of those things where people using it, 117 00:06:13,000 --> 00:06:15,760 Speaker 2: like someone installing an app on their exes or their 118 00:06:15,920 --> 00:06:20,520 Speaker 2: their partner's phone or whatever without consent, could very easily 119 00:06:20,839 --> 00:06:23,800 Speaker 2: would lose any court case. Whether or not the company 120 00:06:23,839 --> 00:06:26,080 Speaker 2: would get in trouble. I think is going to rely 121 00:06:26,200 --> 00:06:28,840 Speaker 2: a lot on the stuff the videos they're posting about, 122 00:06:28,880 --> 00:06:30,760 Speaker 2: like how to put how to get these apps on 123 00:06:30,839 --> 00:06:33,159 Speaker 2: people's phones without them knowing, but like they do have 124 00:06:33,200 --> 00:06:35,719 Speaker 2: that out with like no, it's just for surveilling children, 125 00:06:35,760 --> 00:06:36,120 Speaker 2: which is. 126 00:06:36,080 --> 00:06:38,799 Speaker 4: Great, and for anyone else you need consent or whatever. 127 00:06:38,839 --> 00:06:40,680 Speaker 4: But I think it is important, yeah, to point us 128 00:06:40,720 --> 00:06:43,520 Speaker 4: out very early for anyone who's listening to this because 129 00:06:43,560 --> 00:06:46,400 Speaker 4: they think they might have stock over on their phones, 130 00:06:46,480 --> 00:06:48,640 Speaker 4: or because they know they have stock Averre on their phones, 131 00:06:48,960 --> 00:06:52,440 Speaker 4: you can use this in a domestic abuse case, well immediately, 132 00:06:52,480 --> 00:06:56,440 Speaker 4: this is explicit proof that abuse is happening, no matter 133 00:06:56,520 --> 00:06:59,520 Speaker 4: anything else, because like that's the thing generally with domestic 134 00:06:59,560 --> 00:07:03,880 Speaker 4: abuse case it's really hard to prove abuses happening. Stalkerware 135 00:07:04,360 --> 00:07:07,200 Speaker 4: and any other type of spying device like also physical 136 00:07:07,279 --> 00:07:11,120 Speaker 4: GPS trackers and stuff that is immediate proof that there 137 00:07:11,200 --> 00:07:14,600 Speaker 4: is a there's controlling behavior going on, that you are 138 00:07:14,600 --> 00:07:17,840 Speaker 4: being spined on. This it cannot only be used and 139 00:07:17,880 --> 00:07:22,640 Speaker 4: there's explicit, admissible evidence. This is also usually like makes 140 00:07:22,720 --> 00:07:26,160 Speaker 4: cases first like not for you like it just yeah, 141 00:07:26,280 --> 00:07:30,679 Speaker 4: it like can potentially add charges and make it more serious, 142 00:07:30,720 --> 00:07:33,560 Speaker 4: and that it can help making cops give a shit 143 00:07:33,760 --> 00:07:36,960 Speaker 4: about like abuse, which yeah, I hate that I need 144 00:07:36,960 --> 00:07:39,440 Speaker 4: to say that, but yeah, it's like it makes it 145 00:07:39,520 --> 00:07:42,400 Speaker 4: more serious because there's like spyware and whatever. 146 00:07:42,480 --> 00:07:44,840 Speaker 2: It's easy evidence first off, like you can prove they're 147 00:07:44,840 --> 00:07:46,800 Speaker 2: spying on you. And second, if you are in one 148 00:07:46,800 --> 00:07:49,200 Speaker 2: of the states where that violates the law, then you 149 00:07:49,200 --> 00:07:52,160 Speaker 2: can immediately say this person is breaking the law, like 150 00:07:52,640 --> 00:07:54,480 Speaker 2: this is we don't have to debate whether or not 151 00:07:54,560 --> 00:07:56,200 Speaker 2: they've they've crossed the line. 152 00:07:56,840 --> 00:07:59,560 Speaker 4: Yeah, And even if it doesn't directly break the law 153 00:07:59,600 --> 00:08:02,520 Speaker 4: to spy on someone on a partner like it, depending 154 00:08:02,520 --> 00:08:04,480 Speaker 4: on the on the on the region, it can be 155 00:08:04,560 --> 00:08:07,400 Speaker 4: kind of a hazy thing, especially if it's a device 156 00:08:07,440 --> 00:08:10,200 Speaker 4: you might co own if it's like a state where 157 00:08:10,240 --> 00:08:12,640 Speaker 4: you where with like code possession or whatever. In the US, 158 00:08:12,800 --> 00:08:14,920 Speaker 4: I do not know US law very much around this, 159 00:08:15,080 --> 00:08:18,080 Speaker 4: but yeah, there's like laws like that. But usually still 160 00:08:18,080 --> 00:08:20,240 Speaker 4: the fact that you're being spied on can be used 161 00:08:20,240 --> 00:08:23,520 Speaker 4: as proof for other abuse things you might be alleging, 162 00:08:23,800 --> 00:08:26,520 Speaker 4: because it's like hard proof that something is happening. And 163 00:08:26,560 --> 00:08:30,520 Speaker 4: also usually these companies will somewhat have to respond to 164 00:08:30,560 --> 00:08:32,319 Speaker 4: some point US, so they will have to give out 165 00:08:32,360 --> 00:08:35,400 Speaker 4: like who that account on there is behind like the 166 00:08:35,520 --> 00:08:37,800 Speaker 4: spying on your phone for some of them. We can 167 00:08:37,840 --> 00:08:40,240 Speaker 4: also there's also tools that help you find out who 168 00:08:40,280 --> 00:08:43,439 Speaker 4: is spying on you, or there's like someone with forensic 169 00:08:43,520 --> 00:08:44,440 Speaker 4: background can help. 170 00:08:45,040 --> 00:08:48,480 Speaker 2: Yeah, and I think people. One thing we should note 171 00:08:48,559 --> 00:08:51,320 Speaker 2: is that if you're kind of curious, has my device 172 00:08:51,360 --> 00:08:54,080 Speaker 2: been infected by some of these tools, one the one 173 00:08:54,120 --> 00:08:56,880 Speaker 2: that we've been talking about most truth spy. If you 174 00:08:56,960 --> 00:08:59,200 Speaker 2: go to that tech Crunch article. 175 00:08:59,280 --> 00:09:01,600 Speaker 4: Or to my art it also has a link yet. 176 00:09:01,480 --> 00:09:04,080 Speaker 2: Or to ye to your article on your website. There's 177 00:09:04,280 --> 00:09:06,320 Speaker 2: a tool you can use where you it'll tell you 178 00:09:06,360 --> 00:09:10,760 Speaker 2: how to get your IMSI I think I am I Yeah, 179 00:09:11,240 --> 00:09:13,000 Speaker 2: which you just dial a thing on your phone and 180 00:09:13,200 --> 00:09:16,280 Speaker 2: it gives you that number. It's basically how you identify 181 00:09:16,520 --> 00:09:19,720 Speaker 2: specific bones and you plug that in. It will let 182 00:09:19,800 --> 00:09:22,640 Speaker 2: you know if your device has been compromised. 183 00:09:22,559 --> 00:09:25,599 Speaker 4: Now like December last year up until there is the 184 00:09:25,720 --> 00:09:28,800 Speaker 4: data and if you yeah, it can pretty much tell 185 00:09:28,840 --> 00:09:31,560 Speaker 4: you if you've been spined on using this specific tool 186 00:09:31,600 --> 00:09:34,160 Speaker 4: until then. For other stuff, there's also guides usually on 187 00:09:34,200 --> 00:09:37,760 Speaker 4: TechCrunch and otherwise also on Stop Stockerwear dot ARC, which 188 00:09:37,760 --> 00:09:41,120 Speaker 4: is the US Coalition against Stalker War, and also just generally, 189 00:09:41,559 --> 00:09:45,160 Speaker 4: I think a lot of like more local anti stocking, 190 00:09:45,200 --> 00:09:47,800 Speaker 4: anti abuse works are not as informed yet as they 191 00:09:47,840 --> 00:09:50,680 Speaker 4: should be, but there's still a good point also to 192 00:09:50,760 --> 00:09:52,520 Speaker 4: reach out to or like. 193 00:09:52,679 --> 00:09:56,400 Speaker 2: Yeah, yeah. One of my questions about truth Spy that 194 00:09:56,440 --> 00:09:59,200 Speaker 2: I'm hoping you can answer is I know that you 195 00:09:59,320 --> 00:10:03,920 Speaker 2: can like text messages get transferred via it, your call records, 196 00:10:03,960 --> 00:10:06,319 Speaker 2: all that kind of stuff, get and who you were calling. 197 00:10:06,679 --> 00:10:09,840 Speaker 2: Does that include messages for like encrypted apps like Signal 198 00:10:10,040 --> 00:10:11,839 Speaker 2: or is that not accessible through this? 199 00:10:11,960 --> 00:10:14,880 Speaker 4: It depends, Like for some of these, it will like 200 00:10:14,960 --> 00:10:17,959 Speaker 4: get signal messages, what's the messages and everything generally by 201 00:10:18,000 --> 00:10:22,679 Speaker 4: reading the notification contents, because like from notifications you know, 202 00:10:22,760 --> 00:10:26,240 Speaker 4: like what messages are have been like received. Sometimes it 203 00:10:26,280 --> 00:10:28,320 Speaker 4: will only then have the received messages and not the 204 00:10:28,360 --> 00:10:31,080 Speaker 4: set messages. Often these also include like a key logger 205 00:10:31,400 --> 00:10:35,640 Speaker 4: component that mapps messages then sent back as well. It 206 00:10:35,760 --> 00:10:39,400 Speaker 4: depends a lot what these apps collect, but for most 207 00:10:39,440 --> 00:10:42,040 Speaker 4: of them, also the collection for other texting apps is 208 00:10:42,080 --> 00:10:45,040 Speaker 4: usually kind of broken. None of these apps are really 209 00:10:45,080 --> 00:10:48,760 Speaker 4: well maintained. They're mostly just quick cash graps, yeah, are 210 00:10:48,760 --> 00:10:51,240 Speaker 4: there to maintain features usually don't really work. 211 00:10:51,760 --> 00:10:54,960 Speaker 2: And it seems like based on that, one thing people 212 00:10:55,040 --> 00:10:57,120 Speaker 2: can do outside of checking to see if their device 213 00:10:57,160 --> 00:11:02,600 Speaker 2: has been compromised, is do stuff like turn off notifications 214 00:11:02,720 --> 00:11:05,679 Speaker 2: for appslaing signal right, like, and that's that's actually just 215 00:11:05,720 --> 00:11:10,640 Speaker 2: generally good advice. Notifications are a compromise of the security 216 00:11:10,679 --> 00:11:14,800 Speaker 2: that signal offers. Don't have them enabled, you know, yeah, 217 00:11:15,120 --> 00:11:15,440 Speaker 2: or at the. 218 00:11:15,520 --> 00:11:18,000 Speaker 4: Very least disabled them on the lock screen on Android. Yeah, 219 00:11:18,000 --> 00:11:21,000 Speaker 4: I don't know how. I think that's also possible on iOS, 220 00:11:21,040 --> 00:11:23,040 Speaker 4: but I think I doesn't show message content on the 221 00:11:23,080 --> 00:11:26,800 Speaker 4: lock screen anyways. I'm not sure anymore. But yeah, it's 222 00:11:26,880 --> 00:11:29,040 Speaker 4: just also small things like that, And also like one 223 00:11:29,080 --> 00:11:32,679 Speaker 4: of the key tells that someone probably tampered with your phone, 224 00:11:32,760 --> 00:11:36,400 Speaker 4: especially for Android, is if Google play Protect is disabled 225 00:11:36,760 --> 00:11:40,199 Speaker 4: and you do not remember disabling it for something else, 226 00:11:40,520 --> 00:11:43,600 Speaker 4: it was almost definitely disabled because someone installed something on 227 00:11:43,640 --> 00:11:46,040 Speaker 4: your phone. Just try re enabling it. Then they will 228 00:11:46,080 --> 00:11:48,600 Speaker 4: probably tell you something. The thing also to keep in 229 00:11:48,600 --> 00:11:51,360 Speaker 4: mind if you find stockaware on your phone, please get 230 00:11:51,440 --> 00:11:54,920 Speaker 4: professional help. Do not just delete it. Do not like 231 00:11:55,040 --> 00:11:58,480 Speaker 4: necessarily confront whoever you think might be your abuser about 232 00:11:58,520 --> 00:12:01,240 Speaker 4: it unless you're very issue that that's the situation you 233 00:12:01,280 --> 00:12:05,000 Speaker 4: can handle, because like, yeah, that that there's one of 234 00:12:05,000 --> 00:12:07,800 Speaker 4: those things that like bringing it up or just deleting 235 00:12:07,840 --> 00:12:12,080 Speaker 4: it can very quickly lead to like yeah, yeah, complicating 236 00:12:12,120 --> 00:12:13,200 Speaker 4: the situation a lot. 237 00:12:13,960 --> 00:12:15,680 Speaker 3: You know what else complicates the situation. 238 00:12:16,400 --> 00:12:17,840 Speaker 2: These ads. 239 00:12:29,000 --> 00:12:30,160 Speaker 3: And we are back. 240 00:12:31,160 --> 00:12:34,360 Speaker 2: So when it comes to the actual fight against this stuff, 241 00:12:34,400 --> 00:12:36,880 Speaker 2: obviously what you're doing is a big part of it. 242 00:12:37,000 --> 00:12:41,400 Speaker 2: Getting inside these companies and finding out like what they're 243 00:12:41,400 --> 00:12:44,800 Speaker 2: doing and their capabilities is huge for in terms of 244 00:12:44,880 --> 00:12:47,520 Speaker 2: like what regular people are people who are interested in 245 00:12:47,559 --> 00:12:50,880 Speaker 2: becoming activists about this can do. What does the what 246 00:12:51,000 --> 00:12:53,720 Speaker 2: is the struggle to actually fight this stuff look like? 247 00:12:53,720 --> 00:12:56,120 Speaker 2: Like how do we how do we put a bullet 248 00:12:56,160 --> 00:12:57,520 Speaker 2: in this industry's head. 249 00:12:57,640 --> 00:12:59,560 Speaker 4: I think one of the biggest things. And also like 250 00:12:59,600 --> 00:13:01,640 Speaker 4: why I do the worker do with like hacking it 251 00:13:01,679 --> 00:13:04,080 Speaker 4: with encouraging others to like send me data, be that 252 00:13:04,240 --> 00:13:07,320 Speaker 4: insiders from these companies sending it either to me or 253 00:13:07,360 --> 00:13:10,640 Speaker 4: like tech Crunch specifically currently because like me and tech 254 00:13:10,679 --> 00:13:13,880 Speaker 4: crunch are like the only people really doing like journalism 255 00:13:13,960 --> 00:13:17,920 Speaker 4: on this like regularly. And the important thing with like 256 00:13:18,000 --> 00:13:20,560 Speaker 4: journalism and all of this is like awareness. It's very 257 00:13:20,600 --> 00:13:22,800 Speaker 4: important to create awareness about this. That's also why I 258 00:13:22,880 --> 00:13:25,079 Speaker 4: do the media work with like being on this podcast 259 00:13:25,120 --> 00:13:28,080 Speaker 4: and things like that. I think the most important thing 260 00:13:28,320 --> 00:13:31,160 Speaker 4: is to make people aware, like talk about this in 261 00:13:31,200 --> 00:13:35,040 Speaker 4: your feminist circles or whatever, things like that especially bring 262 00:13:35,080 --> 00:13:37,840 Speaker 4: it up just also in like general info things about 263 00:13:37,840 --> 00:13:40,360 Speaker 4: abuse or how to detect abuse. I think the most 264 00:13:40,400 --> 00:13:44,400 Speaker 4: important thing to do against stocker whereas demestify it, because 265 00:13:44,400 --> 00:13:46,480 Speaker 4: most people don't even know that this is a thing, 266 00:13:46,640 --> 00:13:49,880 Speaker 4: that this is, like that there's just commercially available spyware 267 00:13:50,480 --> 00:13:53,160 Speaker 4: anyone can install on your phone. It's as important to 268 00:13:53,200 --> 00:13:55,520 Speaker 4: not like give in to some sort of paranoia as 269 00:13:55,559 --> 00:13:58,760 Speaker 4: with any of these things. It's just important to like, yeah, 270 00:13:58,880 --> 00:14:03,760 Speaker 4: generate awareness about it. And like spread these articles, let 271 00:14:04,080 --> 00:14:08,440 Speaker 4: friends know that this is a potential thing, and then yeah, 272 00:14:09,280 --> 00:14:11,199 Speaker 4: the hard thing with this is that, like obviously it 273 00:14:11,240 --> 00:14:14,000 Speaker 4: should will probably help if there was some sort of 274 00:14:14,120 --> 00:14:16,800 Speaker 4: legislation against some of this, it's going to be very 275 00:14:16,840 --> 00:14:21,200 Speaker 4: hard to get any proper legislation that ends this industry 276 00:14:21,400 --> 00:14:24,040 Speaker 4: because in most Western countries, which are the only countries 277 00:14:24,080 --> 00:14:27,000 Speaker 4: which unfortunately they would have enough power to like actually 278 00:14:27,080 --> 00:14:30,360 Speaker 4: get these apps shut down, because that's the world we 279 00:14:30,480 --> 00:14:33,040 Speaker 4: live in. But the problem there is usually that like 280 00:14:33,040 --> 00:14:35,480 Speaker 4: this notion that children are owned by their parents is 281 00:14:35,640 --> 00:14:38,680 Speaker 4: too strong to really make a full case against these apps. 282 00:14:38,960 --> 00:14:41,360 Speaker 4: And at the very best what I can, like the 283 00:14:41,480 --> 00:14:47,040 Speaker 4: very best time kind of hoping for from from legislators 284 00:14:47,120 --> 00:14:50,280 Speaker 4: is just a ban on advertising these apps on use 285 00:14:50,320 --> 00:14:53,320 Speaker 4: against other adults, which would be big already, but that 286 00:14:53,760 --> 00:14:56,400 Speaker 4: doesn't really solve the issue because there's still going to 287 00:14:56,440 --> 00:14:58,960 Speaker 4: be enough people who know of their use for use 288 00:14:58,960 --> 00:15:01,080 Speaker 4: against adults, and the there's going to be enough people 289 00:15:01,120 --> 00:15:04,720 Speaker 4: on like Creddit threads talking about, hey, well yeah, you 290 00:15:05,120 --> 00:15:07,560 Speaker 4: oh you're not sure if your government is cheating on you, look, 291 00:15:07,600 --> 00:15:10,080 Speaker 4: you can just use this app, you know. That's also 292 00:15:10,120 --> 00:15:13,240 Speaker 4: how most of this marketing for this works. It's just yeah, 293 00:15:13,240 --> 00:15:15,280 Speaker 4: at the end of the day, this is like a 294 00:15:15,360 --> 00:15:19,960 Speaker 4: patriarchal issue. So yeah, I think that's also why, like 295 00:15:20,080 --> 00:15:22,760 Speaker 4: I am so focused on like the hacking and the 296 00:15:22,960 --> 00:15:26,160 Speaker 4: like blowing these companies up and showing like who's behind them. 297 00:15:26,240 --> 00:15:28,200 Speaker 4: It's because at the end of the day, the most 298 00:15:28,200 --> 00:15:31,320 Speaker 4: effective thing we have against these companies is like the 299 00:15:31,440 --> 00:15:34,120 Speaker 4: grassroots movement of making them too scared to run in 300 00:15:34,160 --> 00:15:37,360 Speaker 4: this business, making it not profitable enough, because as I said, 301 00:15:37,400 --> 00:15:40,240 Speaker 4: most of this is like quick cash grabs from like 302 00:15:40,480 --> 00:15:45,480 Speaker 4: web design studios and outsourcing companies. Yeah that a're just 303 00:15:45,920 --> 00:15:48,200 Speaker 4: making a quick buck from this because otherwise they don't 304 00:15:48,200 --> 00:15:50,520 Speaker 4: get paid enough. Like that's the sad thing really is 305 00:15:50,520 --> 00:15:53,840 Speaker 4: how much of this industry is in all of these countries. 306 00:15:54,200 --> 00:15:57,960 Speaker 4: Western companies outsource their IT too, because there's lots of 307 00:15:58,000 --> 00:16:01,280 Speaker 4: IT companies there and they are entirely reliant on like 308 00:16:01,840 --> 00:16:06,200 Speaker 4: Western companies giving them very underpaid tasks. And Yeah, this 309 00:16:06,320 --> 00:16:08,760 Speaker 4: problem that you now have a bunch of employees and 310 00:16:08,840 --> 00:16:11,200 Speaker 4: not enough money to always pay them. And what do 311 00:16:11,280 --> 00:16:13,440 Speaker 4: you do, You like find some weird niche of like 312 00:16:13,480 --> 00:16:16,760 Speaker 4: a tech product you can quickly build. Yeah, and this 313 00:16:16,880 --> 00:16:19,200 Speaker 4: is like one of those easy niches. It's like always 314 00:16:19,200 --> 00:16:23,600 Speaker 4: the scummy stuff and like yeah, it's that's also why 315 00:16:23,760 --> 00:16:25,600 Speaker 4: like so many of these companies are like based out 316 00:16:25,640 --> 00:16:28,680 Speaker 4: of Vietnam, out of Iran and whatever. It's just companies 317 00:16:28,720 --> 00:16:31,960 Speaker 4: that already have it hard enough to do business globally, 318 00:16:31,960 --> 00:16:36,840 Speaker 4: where the IT industry is like falling apart because there's 319 00:16:36,840 --> 00:16:40,760 Speaker 4: not enough like local customers and anything that's international. You're 320 00:16:40,880 --> 00:16:44,280 Speaker 4: just the cheap workforce, right, So yeah, it's it's once 321 00:16:44,320 --> 00:16:47,240 Speaker 4: again also like a class problem. I don't like most 322 00:16:47,320 --> 00:16:49,920 Speaker 4: people working in this industry know that they're working in 323 00:16:49,920 --> 00:16:51,440 Speaker 4: a like scummy industry. 324 00:16:51,800 --> 00:16:54,480 Speaker 2: Yeah of course, but like yeah, you got to get 325 00:16:54,480 --> 00:16:55,560 Speaker 2: paid and that's. 326 00:16:55,480 --> 00:16:58,280 Speaker 4: Yeah, And that's like why I think making it more 327 00:16:58,360 --> 00:17:01,120 Speaker 4: scary to operate in this industry is like, yes, the 328 00:17:01,280 --> 00:17:03,960 Speaker 4: wait to go because like with just like these like 329 00:17:04,119 --> 00:17:07,359 Speaker 4: four hacks that have happened against these companies over the 330 00:17:07,440 --> 00:17:10,760 Speaker 4: last like half a year or so, two of them, 331 00:17:11,119 --> 00:17:14,520 Speaker 4: three of them, three of them have shut down completely. 332 00:17:14,800 --> 00:17:18,160 Speaker 4: Others seem to be slowly moving towards just building other 333 00:17:18,280 --> 00:17:23,879 Speaker 4: software primarily. Yeah, it's just like, yeah, it's like with 334 00:17:24,000 --> 00:17:26,520 Speaker 4: any other like shady industry that the best we can 335 00:17:26,560 --> 00:17:29,360 Speaker 4: do is just do not make it profitable to run 336 00:17:29,400 --> 00:17:33,159 Speaker 4: the software, because at the very best, anything else we 337 00:17:33,200 --> 00:17:35,600 Speaker 4: will get it's just pushing them more into the shadows, 338 00:17:35,600 --> 00:17:37,600 Speaker 4: which is not going to solve the issue at all. 339 00:17:38,160 --> 00:17:42,840 Speaker 2: Yeah. I think a lot about like strategic thinking, which 340 00:17:43,000 --> 00:17:45,040 Speaker 2: I do believe is kind of often in part because 341 00:17:45,080 --> 00:17:48,440 Speaker 2: of how rightfully negative most people on the left think 342 00:17:48,440 --> 00:17:52,119 Speaker 2: about the military. There's a tendency to ignore some of 343 00:17:52,280 --> 00:17:55,480 Speaker 2: like the theory around how to actually win a conflict 344 00:17:56,040 --> 00:17:59,480 Speaker 2: and all of it all all strategy really, when you're 345 00:17:59,520 --> 00:18:03,360 Speaker 2: talking about like defeating an opponent revolves around denying and 346 00:18:03,400 --> 00:18:06,919 Speaker 2: taking operational area from them, right Yeah, And that's what 347 00:18:06,920 --> 00:18:08,560 Speaker 2: you're talking about when you talk about, well we need 348 00:18:08,600 --> 00:18:10,359 Speaker 2: to stop this. You know, one of the first things 349 00:18:10,400 --> 00:18:12,439 Speaker 2: we can do as part of fighting this is to 350 00:18:12,520 --> 00:18:15,640 Speaker 2: stop them from being able to advertise certain places. Right 351 00:18:16,000 --> 00:18:19,200 Speaker 2: It's making sure that they're not able to operate without 352 00:18:19,240 --> 00:18:23,480 Speaker 2: being seen. It's basically cutting down their area, their space 353 00:18:23,560 --> 00:18:27,200 Speaker 2: to maneuver, their ability to profit, which cuts down their money, 354 00:18:27,240 --> 00:18:31,200 Speaker 2: their access to people, their ability to actually operate. 355 00:18:31,359 --> 00:18:31,520 Speaker 4: Right. 356 00:18:31,600 --> 00:18:33,959 Speaker 2: Like, that's what we're looking at in terms of how 357 00:18:34,000 --> 00:18:36,160 Speaker 2: do you kill this stuff. It's not one single Really, 358 00:18:36,200 --> 00:18:38,800 Speaker 2: I use the comparison of like a bullet, but it's 359 00:18:38,840 --> 00:18:41,439 Speaker 2: never going to be one bullet. These things are too durable. 360 00:18:41,440 --> 00:18:43,159 Speaker 2: There's too many countries in play to do that. 361 00:18:43,840 --> 00:18:46,800 Speaker 4: Yeah, that's also why I put so much emphasis on 362 00:18:46,960 --> 00:18:49,639 Speaker 4: doing media work about this and getting more people to 363 00:18:49,720 --> 00:18:53,040 Speaker 4: talk about this and getting more awareness of this out there, 364 00:18:53,520 --> 00:18:55,200 Speaker 4: to the point where I'm willing to work with more 365 00:18:55,200 --> 00:18:58,679 Speaker 4: conservative newspapers on this because everyone needs to know about this. 366 00:18:58,800 --> 00:19:00,520 Speaker 4: At the end of the day. This is how we 367 00:19:00,800 --> 00:19:03,840 Speaker 4: like stop people from falling victims to this. Most people 368 00:19:03,880 --> 00:19:06,800 Speaker 4: who are a victim of stocker apps have never heard 369 00:19:06,840 --> 00:19:10,080 Speaker 4: of stocker apps before, and I think that's like one 370 00:19:10,160 --> 00:19:11,960 Speaker 4: of the biggest ways to tackle this. And on the 371 00:19:12,040 --> 00:19:14,960 Speaker 4: other hand, we also have I think another big leverage 372 00:19:14,960 --> 00:19:17,399 Speaker 4: point with how many of these are getting hacked because 373 00:19:17,520 --> 00:19:20,120 Speaker 4: none of these apps are very secure. That's another thing 374 00:19:20,560 --> 00:19:24,159 Speaker 4: is this can also be leveraged against like the abusers 375 00:19:24,160 --> 00:19:26,640 Speaker 4: in this scenario. I think just pointing out to them 376 00:19:26,680 --> 00:19:29,040 Speaker 4: that all of these apps get hacked all the time 377 00:19:29,280 --> 00:19:31,040 Speaker 4: and that this is how they get found out, that 378 00:19:31,040 --> 00:19:34,080 Speaker 4: that this is how their data of them as abusers 379 00:19:34,200 --> 00:19:36,960 Speaker 4: ends up landing on the internet. I think It's also 380 00:19:37,160 --> 00:19:39,480 Speaker 4: like a very important angle at the end of the day, 381 00:19:39,560 --> 00:19:41,679 Speaker 4: is just to make it clear like yeah, no, not 382 00:19:41,760 --> 00:19:46,359 Speaker 4: even you are like secure from this having consequences for 383 00:19:46,440 --> 00:19:50,360 Speaker 4: your life, like beyond like direct interpersonal or legal consequences. 384 00:19:50,520 --> 00:19:54,119 Speaker 4: This can and in the past has result in like 385 00:19:54,200 --> 00:19:56,440 Speaker 4: your email adders being on a list of people who 386 00:19:56,480 --> 00:19:59,760 Speaker 4: have do abuse to people online. You don't want to 387 00:19:59,760 --> 00:20:02,400 Speaker 4: be on such a list. I think that's also important 388 00:20:02,560 --> 00:20:06,080 Speaker 4: just to like point out there isn't one stockover app 389 00:20:06,119 --> 00:20:08,240 Speaker 4: that's not eventually going to get hacked. There is a 390 00:20:08,240 --> 00:20:11,119 Speaker 4: big war against these apps. They're all like there's so 391 00:20:11,200 --> 00:20:14,280 Speaker 4: many different hacking groups that keep sending me data from 392 00:20:14,320 --> 00:20:17,720 Speaker 4: these like I'm already working on another article that already 393 00:20:17,960 --> 00:20:21,080 Speaker 4: once again affects like the data of like I think 394 00:20:21,160 --> 00:20:24,800 Speaker 4: like eighty thousand more like abusers, and it's just the 395 00:20:24,880 --> 00:20:27,159 Speaker 4: abuser data this time. But I'm still going to report 396 00:20:27,200 --> 00:20:30,159 Speaker 4: on it like it's it's it's this is not going 397 00:20:30,240 --> 00:20:33,120 Speaker 4: to stop. It's even also not going to stop when 398 00:20:33,160 --> 00:20:37,040 Speaker 4: I stop reporting on this myself, like I've there's been 399 00:20:37,080 --> 00:20:39,760 Speaker 4: work before me down on this. I also the first 400 00:20:39,760 --> 00:20:42,360 Speaker 4: time I got involved in finding stock over was back 401 00:20:42,359 --> 00:20:45,600 Speaker 4: in twenty twenty. People have been hacking these apps forever 402 00:20:45,840 --> 00:20:47,879 Speaker 4: and will keep hacking them. Like just look at the 403 00:20:47,920 --> 00:20:51,560 Speaker 4: Wikipedia page for stocker, where there's an ever growing list 404 00:20:51,640 --> 00:20:53,840 Speaker 4: of these apps that have been hacked. And I think 405 00:20:53,840 --> 00:20:57,000 Speaker 4: at this point that like official count being kept by 406 00:20:57,040 --> 00:21:00,560 Speaker 4: one of the people at TechCrunch is at like thirty apps, 407 00:21:01,200 --> 00:21:05,080 Speaker 4: a few of which have been hacked two or three times. Yeah, 408 00:21:06,200 --> 00:21:09,240 Speaker 4: these are not These are not secure apps for any. 409 00:21:09,119 --> 00:21:12,840 Speaker 2: No, no, no, of course not. Yeah, and they yeah, 410 00:21:12,920 --> 00:21:16,159 Speaker 2: I mean it makes sense that like an app dedicated 411 00:21:16,200 --> 00:21:20,600 Speaker 2: to violating people's privacy for money would also basically violate 412 00:21:20,680 --> 00:21:22,680 Speaker 2: the privacy of the people using it. 413 00:21:22,800 --> 00:21:26,520 Speaker 4: Yeah, and also they don't care. Like I said, it's 414 00:21:26,560 --> 00:21:29,520 Speaker 4: a cash grap, it's nothing else. There's a few apps 415 00:21:29,520 --> 00:21:31,600 Speaker 4: that are like a little more than a cash crap, 416 00:21:31,640 --> 00:21:34,240 Speaker 4: but it's usually just because they're made, Like there's still 417 00:21:34,320 --> 00:21:36,639 Speaker 4: a cash grap, but they're like more well made, but 418 00:21:36,680 --> 00:21:39,040 Speaker 4: it's because they're a cash graph from a company that 419 00:21:39,160 --> 00:21:43,879 Speaker 4: has better developers or more money to do the initial investment. 420 00:21:44,359 --> 00:21:46,560 Speaker 4: The thing is also like most of these companies don't 421 00:21:46,560 --> 00:21:48,720 Speaker 4: have a lot of initial investment, And I think the 422 00:21:48,760 --> 00:21:52,280 Speaker 4: important thing to consider as well, here is one big 423 00:21:52,600 --> 00:21:55,240 Speaker 4: area of this that I have not yet started tackling, 424 00:21:55,280 --> 00:21:57,480 Speaker 4: but I do want to like look into more sometimes. 425 00:21:57,480 --> 00:22:02,159 Speaker 4: Is a big reason this industry is and most of 426 00:22:02,200 --> 00:22:04,680 Speaker 4: these apps have a lot of users despite there being 427 00:22:04,720 --> 00:22:09,080 Speaker 4: so many of them, is the affiliate marketing industry. Once again, 428 00:22:09,160 --> 00:22:12,879 Speaker 4: our very beloved friend. Yeah, all of these apps are 429 00:22:12,960 --> 00:22:16,520 Speaker 4: parts of various affiliate marketing networks, some of them started 430 00:22:16,560 --> 00:22:20,600 Speaker 4: by Stockerware Company, and some of them just other like 431 00:22:21,000 --> 00:22:23,720 Speaker 4: things to advertise all the shady things like all those 432 00:22:23,720 --> 00:22:26,439 Speaker 4: phone number locator apps or whatever, that's also part of 433 00:22:26,480 --> 00:22:29,880 Speaker 4: those same affiliate marketing networks. And there's lots of money 434 00:22:30,000 --> 00:22:32,520 Speaker 4: flowing here, and there's lots of money flowing to very 435 00:22:32,560 --> 00:22:35,880 Speaker 4: big tech YouTube channels, and I might soon have some 436 00:22:36,000 --> 00:22:39,200 Speaker 4: proof for some of that. But that's how these are advertised. 437 00:22:39,240 --> 00:22:42,399 Speaker 4: It's everyone who advertises stockerware to you, who has a 438 00:22:42,400 --> 00:22:46,159 Speaker 4: big platform, is doing that because they're getting money, not 439 00:22:46,359 --> 00:22:47,359 Speaker 4: for any other reason. 440 00:22:48,480 --> 00:22:50,640 Speaker 2: We need to do more heads. 441 00:22:50,880 --> 00:23:05,840 Speaker 3: We will be back shortly, and we are back. 442 00:23:06,800 --> 00:23:09,119 Speaker 2: Well that's all I had, Miya, what do you got? 443 00:23:09,840 --> 00:23:12,520 Speaker 3: Yeah, I guess there's there's another thing I wanted to 444 00:23:12,560 --> 00:23:15,479 Speaker 3: ask a little bit about, which Zach Whitaker who's been 445 00:23:15,560 --> 00:23:17,639 Speaker 3: one of the journal journalists that tech Crunch doing a 446 00:23:17,680 --> 00:23:21,040 Speaker 3: lot of the research is great. One of the things 447 00:23:21,160 --> 00:23:24,080 Speaker 3: that he brings up that I think is another I 448 00:23:24,080 --> 00:23:26,720 Speaker 3: don't know, it's kind of a plane with fire angle 449 00:23:26,800 --> 00:23:29,560 Speaker 3: on them. But one of the issues that these companies 450 00:23:29,600 --> 00:23:34,919 Speaker 3: seem to have is payment platforms, because a lot of 451 00:23:34,960 --> 00:23:38,320 Speaker 3: payment platforms look at this and go wait, hold. 452 00:23:38,080 --> 00:23:40,600 Speaker 4: On, yeah, So that's yeah. We've talked about that a 453 00:23:40,640 --> 00:23:42,919 Speaker 4: little bit. That's an angle. We've also been a fighting 454 00:23:42,960 --> 00:23:44,960 Speaker 4: on a lot. Like me and Sig, we work on 455 00:23:45,080 --> 00:23:46,399 Speaker 4: most of these stories together. 456 00:23:46,600 --> 00:23:47,440 Speaker 1: Like it. 457 00:23:47,600 --> 00:23:49,960 Speaker 4: It's kind of funny. We both got each other into 458 00:23:49,960 --> 00:23:52,880 Speaker 4: the stock over thing back in twenty twenty. As I mentioned, 459 00:23:53,040 --> 00:23:55,240 Speaker 4: that was the first time I stumbled into a stock 460 00:23:55,320 --> 00:23:58,080 Speaker 4: cover app with a security issue. I reached out to 461 00:23:58,200 --> 00:24:01,200 Speaker 4: some random journalist that tech Crunch about it, and now 462 00:24:01,240 --> 00:24:03,840 Speaker 4: he is the only one talking about this forever because 463 00:24:03,880 --> 00:24:06,399 Speaker 4: I reached out to him that one time and he 464 00:24:06,480 --> 00:24:11,080 Speaker 4: got sucked into this horrible, horrible world of spying. But yeah, like, 465 00:24:11,119 --> 00:24:13,800 Speaker 4: one of the things we focus on a lot is 466 00:24:14,160 --> 00:24:17,680 Speaker 4: reporting these companies to their payment providers, to their server hosters, 467 00:24:18,200 --> 00:24:20,880 Speaker 4: to the point where sometimes like for weeks sack will 468 00:24:21,000 --> 00:24:23,160 Speaker 4: just wait for them to switch to a new provider 469 00:24:23,200 --> 00:24:25,439 Speaker 4: after we got them taken them from like PayPal, and 470 00:24:25,480 --> 00:24:28,040 Speaker 4: then from their other PayPal account where they're just using 471 00:24:28,160 --> 00:24:31,639 Speaker 4: like the checkout experience from one of their completely unrelated 472 00:24:31,680 --> 00:24:34,920 Speaker 4: software projects which they will later claim is not related 473 00:24:34,960 --> 00:24:37,800 Speaker 4: at all and there are different companies and whatever. But 474 00:24:37,840 --> 00:24:40,400 Speaker 4: then like eventually they get taken down from that as well, 475 00:24:40,440 --> 00:24:42,760 Speaker 4: and usually we can get them taken them from most 476 00:24:42,800 --> 00:24:46,160 Speaker 4: like Western hosters, like especially US hosters, will immediately take 477 00:24:46,200 --> 00:24:49,159 Speaker 4: them down. You do not want to risk being the 478 00:24:49,240 --> 00:24:53,439 Speaker 4: company hosting spyware on US grounds. Yeah, yeah, it's just 479 00:24:53,840 --> 00:24:56,879 Speaker 4: like same with EU hosters, Like the few companies that 480 00:24:56,880 --> 00:25:00,320 Speaker 4: we've seen that were on Headsnerd, they immediately react because 481 00:25:00,359 --> 00:25:03,680 Speaker 4: it's like, yeah, no want like under EULO, you don't 482 00:25:03,720 --> 00:25:05,960 Speaker 4: want to like risk that. And also just because you 483 00:25:06,000 --> 00:25:08,000 Speaker 4: don't want to host that, like there's no reason for 484 00:25:08,080 --> 00:25:10,879 Speaker 4: you to host shit like that. It will have like 485 00:25:10,960 --> 00:25:16,000 Speaker 4: image consequences, and that's an important thing that is maybe 486 00:25:16,040 --> 00:25:18,720 Speaker 4: also something you can do as more like a grassroots thing. 487 00:25:19,040 --> 00:25:21,119 Speaker 4: It's also like if you find one of these apps 488 00:25:21,359 --> 00:25:23,840 Speaker 4: and if you see, oh, they're using like PayPal or whatever, 489 00:25:24,560 --> 00:25:27,639 Speaker 4: just reach out. I think paper is even harder to 490 00:25:27,680 --> 00:25:30,280 Speaker 4: reach as like just an average lay person. I don't 491 00:25:30,320 --> 00:25:32,879 Speaker 4: expect them to reply. They might still take action, you 492 00:25:32,920 --> 00:25:36,040 Speaker 4: will have to manually check. PayPal doesn't really reply to 493 00:25:36,119 --> 00:25:39,639 Speaker 4: things ever. But yeah, same as like hosting company, if 494 00:25:39,680 --> 00:25:42,800 Speaker 4: it's either hosted on like a European or American hosting company, 495 00:25:42,840 --> 00:25:45,160 Speaker 4: I just just reach out, be like, hey, there's someone 496 00:25:45,240 --> 00:25:48,880 Speaker 4: running spyware on your thing. Also used the word spyware, 497 00:25:49,000 --> 00:25:50,840 Speaker 4: not stocker, where they will not know what that is, 498 00:25:50,960 --> 00:25:55,560 Speaker 4: and it is spyware. So yeah, and that can usually 499 00:25:55,600 --> 00:25:58,719 Speaker 4: get them taken down. And often they don't have proper 500 00:25:58,760 --> 00:26:01,320 Speaker 4: backups and will have a few months of data missing, 501 00:26:01,359 --> 00:26:04,520 Speaker 4: and it's like, yeah, that's how you slowly grind them 502 00:26:04,520 --> 00:26:07,760 Speaker 4: to a halt. Yeah. And also once again like if 503 00:26:07,800 --> 00:26:10,679 Speaker 4: you have tips about any of these companies, be it 504 00:26:10,760 --> 00:26:14,800 Speaker 4: having found a vulnerability just or insider info especially I'm 505 00:26:14,800 --> 00:26:17,240 Speaker 4: always very happy about the insider info. You can reach 506 00:26:17,240 --> 00:26:20,240 Speaker 4: out to either me or Sakudak. We're both very happy 507 00:26:20,280 --> 00:26:23,040 Speaker 4: to talk about this. Yeah. 508 00:26:23,160 --> 00:26:26,280 Speaker 3: Yeah, that's something that's been used really effectively by right 509 00:26:26,280 --> 00:26:30,000 Speaker 3: wingers to target sex workers. There's been a huge thing, 510 00:26:30,040 --> 00:26:33,840 Speaker 3: there's been a bunch of campaigns to get platform companies. 511 00:26:34,040 --> 00:26:36,440 Speaker 3: And yeah, so it's. 512 00:26:36,640 --> 00:26:39,400 Speaker 4: It's interesting that for once we can use the very 513 00:26:39,520 --> 00:26:43,720 Speaker 4: restrictive and conservative rules of payment providers for our good. 514 00:26:44,119 --> 00:26:44,679 Speaker 3: Yeah. 515 00:26:44,720 --> 00:26:47,320 Speaker 4: But yeah, basically any of the big payment providers will 516 00:26:47,320 --> 00:26:50,320 Speaker 4: not respect something like this. Some of the small regional 517 00:26:50,359 --> 00:26:53,280 Speaker 4: odd ones probably won't really give a shit. They have 518 00:26:53,359 --> 00:26:57,240 Speaker 4: no reason to. It's like revenue for them. But yeah, 519 00:26:57,640 --> 00:27:00,760 Speaker 4: it's generally worth trying. And I'm always glad like if 520 00:27:00,800 --> 00:27:03,240 Speaker 4: someone just reaches out to these companies and we don't 521 00:27:03,280 --> 00:27:06,600 Speaker 4: have to do that ourselves. I think me and second 522 00:27:06,560 --> 00:27:09,199 Speaker 4: to a few other people like actively working in this 523 00:27:09,280 --> 00:27:12,240 Speaker 4: are doing more than enough work currently. But yeah, like 524 00:27:12,440 --> 00:27:14,320 Speaker 4: just if you find one of these things that don't 525 00:27:14,359 --> 00:27:17,000 Speaker 4: go digging too deep. It's a depressing world. But if 526 00:27:17,040 --> 00:27:20,879 Speaker 4: you stumble upon one of these somewhere or whatever, just 527 00:27:20,880 --> 00:27:24,399 Speaker 4: just report them. It's it's it's going to disrupt their operations, 528 00:27:24,400 --> 00:27:28,080 Speaker 4: and if it happens often enough, they might just give up. Yeah, 529 00:27:28,320 --> 00:27:30,720 Speaker 4: And I mean, like in cases like the truth Spy, 530 00:27:30,800 --> 00:27:34,320 Speaker 4: they are willing to do extreme amounts of fraud to 531 00:27:35,880 --> 00:27:39,159 Speaker 4: get to money easily because they like started with like 532 00:27:39,280 --> 00:27:42,520 Speaker 4: mostly just in like with the market they could get 533 00:27:42,560 --> 00:27:46,120 Speaker 4: with their Vietnamese payment providers, right, And eventually they realized, well, 534 00:27:46,200 --> 00:27:48,840 Speaker 4: the US is like this really big market, right, but 535 00:27:49,040 --> 00:27:51,600 Speaker 4: for really easy like US stuff, we need like a 536 00:27:51,640 --> 00:27:55,320 Speaker 4: PayPal thing, right, So they made like over twelve fake 537 00:27:55,400 --> 00:27:59,640 Speaker 4: American identities with fake passports and fake addresses and sign 538 00:27:59,720 --> 00:28:02,000 Speaker 4: up to pay Paul a whole bunch of times and 539 00:28:02,119 --> 00:28:05,440 Speaker 4: had various employees that the company move money around. Yeah, 540 00:28:05,480 --> 00:28:10,159 Speaker 4: that's obviously not a thing the US government will like 541 00:28:10,320 --> 00:28:14,440 Speaker 4: if you do that. Generally speaking, they moved like millions 542 00:28:14,560 --> 00:28:19,199 Speaker 4: like that, so yeah, which is pretty crazy like that. 543 00:28:19,280 --> 00:28:22,879 Speaker 4: The amount of money that's moving in this industry is crazy, 544 00:28:23,000 --> 00:28:26,240 Speaker 4: Like yeah, actually, like most of these app apps will 545 00:28:26,240 --> 00:28:29,280 Speaker 4: be half broken, which no one ever complains about because 546 00:28:29,320 --> 00:28:31,760 Speaker 4: like it's shady, ye, Like you don't expect like if 547 00:28:31,800 --> 00:28:34,440 Speaker 4: you go online and you search for something shady like anything, 548 00:28:34,520 --> 00:28:37,159 Speaker 4: like be it piracy or whatever, you don't expect it 549 00:28:37,200 --> 00:28:39,360 Speaker 4: to be the best experience ever. Like you know, you're 550 00:28:39,400 --> 00:28:41,520 Speaker 4: getting some weird service and it's probably going to be 551 00:28:41,600 --> 00:28:44,360 Speaker 4: half broken. But yeah, like most of these talkover apps 552 00:28:44,400 --> 00:28:48,520 Speaker 4: start at like forty dollars a month and more and 553 00:28:48,560 --> 00:28:50,600 Speaker 4: then some days for more features, you pay like up 554 00:28:50,600 --> 00:28:53,480 Speaker 4: to sixty or seventy or so, and then all of 555 00:28:53,520 --> 00:28:56,520 Speaker 4: these have like tens of thousands of users, sometimes hundreds 556 00:28:56,560 --> 00:29:00,440 Speaker 4: of thousands of users. Yeah, you can do them yourself. 557 00:29:00,600 --> 00:29:04,480 Speaker 4: It's crazy. This is a really big industry, which makes 558 00:29:04,520 --> 00:29:06,320 Speaker 4: it so crazy to me that it's like not a 559 00:29:06,360 --> 00:29:09,920 Speaker 4: thing that's talked about more, especially in like feminist spaces 560 00:29:09,920 --> 00:29:12,400 Speaker 4: and things like that, because this is such a like 561 00:29:12,560 --> 00:29:16,160 Speaker 4: big angle of like modern tech enabled abuse that they 562 00:29:16,440 --> 00:29:19,800 Speaker 4: really think should should be more of a topic, especially 563 00:29:19,840 --> 00:29:21,640 Speaker 4: on the left, Like this is this is bad? 564 00:29:22,280 --> 00:29:25,640 Speaker 2: Yeah, no, this is like critically bad. I agree entirely. 565 00:29:25,720 --> 00:29:27,760 Speaker 4: And also like that the whole thing with like all 566 00:29:27,800 --> 00:29:30,320 Speaker 4: of this data being so easily accept your data can 567 00:29:30,600 --> 00:29:33,360 Speaker 4: end up getting sold on some dark web forum. You're 568 00:29:33,840 --> 00:29:36,800 Speaker 4: both asked the abuse around that's the target, right, and 569 00:29:36,920 --> 00:29:39,760 Speaker 4: the government can find these like I have no like 570 00:29:39,840 --> 00:29:42,200 Speaker 4: this is this is not me making a statement of 571 00:29:42,240 --> 00:29:45,760 Speaker 4: that's a thing that's happening, but there's nothing preventing that 572 00:29:46,440 --> 00:29:49,959 Speaker 4: from hacking these companies and getting like like I sometimes 573 00:29:50,120 --> 00:29:52,680 Speaker 4: like when whenever I get these data sets, and it's 574 00:29:52,720 --> 00:29:55,120 Speaker 4: always hard to work with data sets that include like 575 00:29:55,600 --> 00:29:59,120 Speaker 4: non consent essentially collected data of people right, yes, but 576 00:29:59,200 --> 00:30:01,640 Speaker 4: like I do want it's like do some due diligence checks, 577 00:30:01,640 --> 00:30:03,960 Speaker 4: like mostly trying to find if the government is using 578 00:30:03,960 --> 00:30:07,520 Speaker 4: a specific app. Sometimes yes, there's always like the odd 579 00:30:07,640 --> 00:30:10,400 Speaker 4: correction law of somebody officer who has signed up for 580 00:30:10,440 --> 00:30:14,440 Speaker 4: one or two of these apps or like education people 581 00:30:14,480 --> 00:30:16,720 Speaker 4: and whatever. But then I also some of the search 582 00:30:16,760 --> 00:30:19,040 Speaker 4: through the text message just for just some code words 583 00:30:19,080 --> 00:30:22,840 Speaker 4: and the amount of people moving drugs half Stocker were 584 00:30:22,840 --> 00:30:23,560 Speaker 4: on their phones. 585 00:30:23,920 --> 00:30:28,080 Speaker 2: It's you know, yeah, and it's it's one of those 586 00:30:28,080 --> 00:30:32,040 Speaker 2: things where there are laws, like technically, if if my 587 00:30:32,200 --> 00:30:34,680 Speaker 2: understanding of the laws around this are correct, it is 588 00:30:34,720 --> 00:30:38,480 Speaker 2: illegal for an organization like the FBI to utilize these apps. 589 00:30:38,920 --> 00:30:42,640 Speaker 4: But yes, but we have an organized and called the 590 00:30:42,800 --> 00:30:44,040 Speaker 4: NSA who. 591 00:30:45,400 --> 00:30:48,120 Speaker 2: And it is it is on paper illegal for them 592 00:30:48,160 --> 00:30:50,760 Speaker 2: to do this with a third party app. But one 593 00:30:50,800 --> 00:30:54,440 Speaker 2: thing that often gets done, particularly by the FBI, but 594 00:30:54,840 --> 00:30:57,520 Speaker 2: you know, not just by them, is it's not illegal 595 00:30:57,960 --> 00:31:02,520 Speaker 2: for law enforcement agencies to tracked with private agencies. And 596 00:31:02,560 --> 00:31:05,440 Speaker 2: if those agencies you don't you just don't check in 597 00:31:05,520 --> 00:31:08,400 Speaker 2: on what they're doing, you know, what they're using. 598 00:31:08,520 --> 00:31:10,840 Speaker 4: But like yeah, or like if an inform or like 599 00:31:10,880 --> 00:31:13,800 Speaker 4: if an informant like sends you to data, like you're 600 00:31:13,840 --> 00:31:14,720 Speaker 4: not going to say. 601 00:31:14,600 --> 00:31:16,240 Speaker 2: No exactly exactly. 602 00:31:16,240 --> 00:31:18,520 Speaker 4: And also you don't really need to disclose that because 603 00:31:18,560 --> 00:31:20,920 Speaker 4: it's information and got froment informant. You do not need 604 00:31:20,920 --> 00:31:24,080 Speaker 4: to disclose that informant in court ever. So yeah, it's 605 00:31:25,720 --> 00:31:28,240 Speaker 4: it's it's there. There are there are ways around, you know, 606 00:31:28,320 --> 00:31:30,480 Speaker 4: the laws that we put up, not that we shouldn't 607 00:31:30,520 --> 00:31:34,000 Speaker 4: continue to extend those laws, but you shouldn't like just 608 00:31:34,040 --> 00:31:36,760 Speaker 4: because well they're not allowed to use this doesn't mean 609 00:31:36,760 --> 00:31:38,400 Speaker 4: they can't get access to the info. 610 00:31:38,600 --> 00:31:39,280 Speaker 2: Yeah. 611 00:31:39,360 --> 00:31:41,680 Speaker 4: Yeah. And also there's all this important thing like there's 612 00:31:41,720 --> 00:31:44,640 Speaker 4: more like also globally, like there's other governments that can't 613 00:31:44,720 --> 00:31:46,360 Speaker 4: just be using this, Like for one of the apps 614 00:31:46,360 --> 00:31:46,800 Speaker 4: I got. 615 00:31:46,640 --> 00:31:49,680 Speaker 2: The government, the Russian government doesn't give a ship. 616 00:31:50,120 --> 00:31:53,040 Speaker 4: That was also like another thing where I's like for 617 00:31:53,120 --> 00:31:54,840 Speaker 4: one of the apps I got data for. There was 618 00:31:54,880 --> 00:31:57,880 Speaker 4: some indication that at some point the Colombian National Police 619 00:31:57,920 --> 00:32:03,560 Speaker 4: did a bigger evaluation of using commercials spyware for their 620 00:32:03,680 --> 00:32:06,200 Speaker 4: use because you're in the country with not that big 621 00:32:06,240 --> 00:32:09,120 Speaker 4: of a like police budget in comparison, you cannot afford 622 00:32:09,160 --> 00:32:12,400 Speaker 4: like all the Coolestraeli tools everyone else has, So what 623 00:32:12,440 --> 00:32:14,920 Speaker 4: do you do? You just look for random apps you 624 00:32:14,960 --> 00:32:15,800 Speaker 4: can find, you know. 625 00:32:15,840 --> 00:32:19,960 Speaker 2: Yeah, you find the Walmart, the Kirklin, the wish to conversion. 626 00:32:20,040 --> 00:32:24,600 Speaker 2: I guess yeah, yeah, yeah yeah Ali Baba spywear right. Yeah. 627 00:32:25,440 --> 00:32:27,600 Speaker 4: I don't think most of them moved forward with this 628 00:32:27,680 --> 00:32:30,400 Speaker 4: because these apps fucking suck. Like they're bad. Like that's 629 00:32:30,560 --> 00:32:32,600 Speaker 4: that's the other thing, Like they don't even really do 630 00:32:32,680 --> 00:32:35,240 Speaker 4: their jump. Well, they're bad and you don't know who 631 00:32:35,280 --> 00:32:37,360 Speaker 4: is behind them. You cannot even go up to someone 632 00:32:37,400 --> 00:32:39,840 Speaker 4: and be like, yo, don't do this. You also knnot 633 00:32:39,840 --> 00:32:41,720 Speaker 4: go to the cops and be like this company is 634 00:32:41,760 --> 00:32:46,400 Speaker 4: scamming me, because yeah, I assume some people have probably 635 00:32:46,440 --> 00:32:49,080 Speaker 4: done that before, but it does involve with admitting to 636 00:32:49,120 --> 00:32:53,680 Speaker 4: a crime. So yeah, it's like, yeah, these companies just 637 00:32:53,760 --> 00:32:56,240 Speaker 4: get away with not giving a shit about their product 638 00:32:56,280 --> 00:32:56,800 Speaker 4: because like. 639 00:32:56,920 --> 00:33:01,560 Speaker 2: Yeah, yeah, well I think that's that's all we had. 640 00:33:01,880 --> 00:33:05,360 Speaker 2: Thank you Maya for both the work you're doing and 641 00:33:05,400 --> 00:33:07,760 Speaker 2: for talking to us. Yeah, is there anything you wanted 642 00:33:07,760 --> 00:33:09,760 Speaker 2: to plug before we roll out here? 643 00:33:09,920 --> 00:33:12,239 Speaker 4: Just my just my blog, I think where we're like, 644 00:33:12,280 --> 00:33:14,840 Speaker 4: I do this journalistic work and also more, there's about 645 00:33:14,880 --> 00:33:18,720 Speaker 4: to be another cool investigative piece out soon, which tincantually 646 00:33:18,800 --> 00:33:23,000 Speaker 4: involves more tracking and whatever and also involves like Hollywood 647 00:33:23,040 --> 00:33:25,600 Speaker 4: and more. It's it's, it's it's a crazy big story. 648 00:33:25,840 --> 00:33:28,880 Speaker 4: I promise that will be out like hopefully in a 649 00:33:28,880 --> 00:33:32,120 Speaker 4: month or so. But yeah, my blog at Maya dot 650 00:33:32,200 --> 00:33:36,400 Speaker 4: CRIMEU dot gay crime, you as in crime w yeah, 651 00:33:36,400 --> 00:33:41,840 Speaker 4: and kay as in gay yeah. Yeah. Just check out 652 00:33:41,840 --> 00:33:43,880 Speaker 4: my blog at the bottom of the blog. There's all 653 00:33:43,880 --> 00:33:46,240 Speaker 4: my links to my social media for anyone who's like 654 00:33:46,320 --> 00:33:48,720 Speaker 4: listening to this and has been wondering where I am. 655 00:33:48,800 --> 00:33:50,280 Speaker 4: I am back on Twitter as well. 656 00:33:50,680 --> 00:33:54,600 Speaker 2: Yeah for now for you, that's for for all of 657 00:33:54,640 --> 00:33:58,160 Speaker 2: us these days. That's always like this point. 658 00:33:58,200 --> 00:34:00,400 Speaker 4: But yeah, I am back on Twitter. I am I'm 659 00:34:00,440 --> 00:34:03,320 Speaker 4: posting there sometimes. Yeah. 660 00:34:04,680 --> 00:34:08,040 Speaker 2: All right, well, thank you and thank you all for listening. 661 00:34:08,120 --> 00:34:10,640 Speaker 2: We will be back tomorrow unless this comes out on 662 00:34:10,680 --> 00:34:13,360 Speaker 2: a Friday, in which case we'll be back at some 663 00:34:13,480 --> 00:34:14,799 Speaker 2: other point, but soon. 664 00:34:20,680 --> 00:34:23,080 Speaker 1: It could happen here as a production of cool Zone Media. 665 00:34:23,280 --> 00:34:25,920 Speaker 1: For more podcasts from cool Zone Media, visit our website 666 00:34:26,000 --> 00:34:29,120 Speaker 1: Coolzonemedia dot com, or check us out on the iHeartRadio app, 667 00:34:29,120 --> 00:34:32,319 Speaker 1: Apple Podcasts, or wherever you listen to podcasts. You can 668 00:34:32,360 --> 00:34:35,040 Speaker 1: find sources for it could happen here. Updated monthly at 669 00:34:35,080 --> 00:34:38,320 Speaker 1: coolzonemedia dot com Slash sources. Thanks for listening.