WEBVTT - Businessweek Extra - Michael Ainslie

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<v Speaker 1>This is Bloomberg Business Week from Bloomberg Radio. I'm Jason

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<v Speaker 1>Kelly and I'm Carol Masser. Welcome to the Bloomberg Business

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<v Speaker 1>Week Extra. It's our weekly podcast bringing you an in

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<v Speaker 1>depth interview you will not hear anywhere else. There are

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<v Speaker 1>some individuals who live a life that often finds them

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<v Speaker 1>in the center of high profile events. That includes Michael Ainslee.

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<v Speaker 1>He has done so many things and found himself really

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<v Speaker 1>at moments in our history. Well, we talked so much

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<v Speaker 1>about being in the room where it happens, of course,

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<v Speaker 1>but so many rooms and some amazing places that he's been.

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<v Speaker 1>He's got a new book out, it's called A Nose

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<v Speaker 1>for Trouble, and we're so delighted he's here with us

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<v Speaker 1>in New York City. First of all, Michael, congrats on

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<v Speaker 1>the book. Welcome back to Bloomberg. Thank you. It's nice

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<v Speaker 1>to be here. So why do it? You know? Two reasons.

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<v Speaker 1>I have a lot of young people that I care about,

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<v Speaker 1>five kids, eight grandkids, scores of posse scholars that I've

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<v Speaker 1>mentored over the years. I want them to know that

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<v Speaker 1>life is not easy. There are a lot of bad

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<v Speaker 1>things happened to all of us, and the question is

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<v Speaker 1>how do you deal with it, how do you learn

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<v Speaker 1>from it? Where do you go next? So my nose

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<v Speaker 1>for trouble got me into some difficulty every decade of

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<v Speaker 1>my life, and I think I've made some pretty good

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<v Speaker 1>choices afterwards. Second reason, there's a whole story about Lehman

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<v Speaker 1>that's never been told. We were muzzled as directors for

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<v Speaker 1>five six years by the lawyers saying we couldn't talk,

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<v Speaker 1>and I have views on that. The rest of that story, Well, Jason,

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<v Speaker 1>I would go through the galleys, and I think both

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<v Speaker 1>of us were like, all right, where's the Lehman party?

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<v Speaker 1>Because I do think you were in the room where

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<v Speaker 1>it happened. When it came to the vote on whether

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<v Speaker 1>or not Lehman should file for bankruptcy. Take us there.

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<v Speaker 1>It was incredibly scary. Uh. It happened so fast. We

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<v Speaker 1>thought the Fed would continue to lend to us, We

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<v Speaker 1>thought there might be a merger, and yet that weekend

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<v Speaker 1>it became clear the government was backing out. They were

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<v Speaker 1>not going to do their job as a lender of

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<v Speaker 1>two financial institutions, and the biggest bankruptcy in world history

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<v Speaker 1>was facing us. We considered not doing it. We said,

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<v Speaker 1>let's see if they'll really flinch. Will they lend tomorrow

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<v Speaker 1>morning if we don't declare? But what a terrible game

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<v Speaker 1>of chicken to be playing it was if if if

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<v Speaker 1>we had said no and they had said no, we'd

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<v Speaker 1>probably all not be here right now. It would have

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<v Speaker 1>been awful. And so as you've had time to both

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<v Speaker 1>think about it yourself, obviously you put a lot of

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<v Speaker 1>it down in the book, as you've had a chance

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<v Speaker 1>to talk to to other people, what were those sort

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<v Speaker 1>of catalytic moments, both in your board room and in

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<v Speaker 1>Washington that ultimately led to the fate of Lehman. Well,

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<v Speaker 1>Hank Paulson, Well, not like my book. Yeah, but he's

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<v Speaker 1>got a tough skin. Uh. First of all, it was

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<v Speaker 1>Bernankee's decision. The Federal Reserve is supposed to lend to

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<v Speaker 1>financial institutions. They abdicated and turned it over to Paulson.

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<v Speaker 1>Paulson made a political decision. It was not an economic decision.

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<v Speaker 1>He was not based on Lehman's collateral. There was plenty

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<v Speaker 1>of collateral there. I want to promote not only my book,

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<v Speaker 1>but this book. This is by Lawrence Ball, the dean

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<v Speaker 1>of economics at Johns Hopkins. This is the ultimate book

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<v Speaker 1>about the Lehman bankruptcy. It's two hundred pages of data

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<v Speaker 1>and very very thoughtful prose about what went on. And

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<v Speaker 1>I really recommended anyone that's serious about financial history take

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<v Speaker 1>a look at Larry Ball's book. He's a very very

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<v Speaker 1>good scholar. In any event, um, we were we were

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<v Speaker 1>left with no alternative. Uh did you realize that in

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<v Speaker 1>the last week of Lehman existence, our clearing bank JP

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<v Speaker 1>Morgan Chase demanded and got eight point six billion of

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<v Speaker 1>our cash collateral to shore themselves up against Lehman possible losses. Well,

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<v Speaker 1>they had the right to do that. Apparently the fine

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<v Speaker 1>print of their loan agreement let them do that, because

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<v Speaker 1>we lost that lawsuit four years later. However, it drained

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<v Speaker 1>the liquidity out of Lehman. We were solvent until literally

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<v Speaker 1>three or four days before the bankruptcy. So why why

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<v Speaker 1>did it happen to Lehman? Why was why was Lehman

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<v Speaker 1>the one firm that was allowed to fall? Here's my explanation.

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<v Speaker 1>We all know that A I G was much bigger

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<v Speaker 1>than Lehman. If they had gone under, the world would

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<v Speaker 1>have changed. A I G oed Goldman sacks billions and

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<v Speaker 1>billions of dollars for various commitments. In my belief, Paulson said,

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<v Speaker 1>I can't get both done. I can't save Lehman and

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<v Speaker 1>save I G. And if I can only save one,

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<v Speaker 1>I'll save a G. And I think we were collateral damage.

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<v Speaker 1>We had done nothing wrong. That's why nobody went to jail.

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<v Speaker 1>The examiner's suit. The bankruptcy examiners said, there's no colorable

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<v Speaker 1>crime here and no colorable violation. Value their management for

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<v Speaker 1>the board. But when the FED closes its window, you

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<v Speaker 1>can't function. Michael, one of the things you talk about

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<v Speaker 1>in your book, both explicitly and implicitly, is that ultimately,

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<v Speaker 1>these are people making these decisions. These are people with relationships,

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<v Speaker 1>longstanding relationships, some good, some bad, and at the very

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<v Speaker 1>least complicated. What do you make of the role that

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<v Speaker 1>some of those relationships played in the ultimate demise of Lehman.

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<v Speaker 1>I think they were important. I think Paulson liked and

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<v Speaker 1>was close to his successor at Goldman. He didn't like

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<v Speaker 1>Dick Fold. They had had very contentious relations over the years.

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<v Speaker 1>Lehman had stolen some of Goldman's best people. John Walker

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<v Speaker 1>had just come over to run asset management for Lehman.

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<v Speaker 1>Uh Fold had turned down a request to put a

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<v Speaker 1>lot of money into long term capital management back in

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<v Speaker 1>the late nineties. We were asked to put into fifty million.

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<v Speaker 1>Dick finally, very late in the game, put in a

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<v Speaker 1>hundred million for for Lehman. Paulson was furious. Paulson felt

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<v Speaker 1>Fold wasn't trying hard enough to find a takeover partner

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<v Speaker 1>or a merger partner, so there were a lot of

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<v Speaker 1>frictions there. Michael, was there any point in the stage

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<v Speaker 1>leading up to September when Lehman filed for bankruptcy? I

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<v Speaker 1>know that date, It's my anniversary, so it's kind of

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<v Speaker 1>in my brain forever and ever. But I do wonder

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<v Speaker 1>do you recall in those days leading up where there

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<v Speaker 1>was the possibility that they could have been bought at,

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<v Speaker 1>that there could have been a partnership or a combination

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<v Speaker 1>that would have really changed the future of Lehman, That

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<v Speaker 1>Lehman would still be around today, maybe in some form,

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<v Speaker 1>maybe not in name, but in some form. Well, I

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<v Speaker 1>mean it is still kind of around if you think

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<v Speaker 1>about the assets and how they were distributed, but in

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<v Speaker 1>a different way. The closest we came to a merger

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<v Speaker 1>was with Berkeley's and that should have happened. Uh. The

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<v Speaker 1>Chancellor of the Exchequer in in London said we won't

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<v Speaker 1>give you a waiver of a shareholder vote. That killed

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<v Speaker 1>the deal. But he could have done that, we believe,

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<v Speaker 1>and uh, that should have happened and Berkeley's would be

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<v Speaker 1>you know, some form of combination of Barkley's and Lehman

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<v Speaker 1>would still exist. What were the American officials helping you

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<v Speaker 1>was in terms of that process as as much as

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<v Speaker 1>they could have, because because at that point everybody had

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<v Speaker 1>to come together because it was a global crisis. I

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<v Speaker 1>think they were. I think Paulson really did want to

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<v Speaker 1>see that happen. The sad thing is that Alistair Darling,

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<v Speaker 1>the Chancellor of the Exchequer, said we don't want to

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<v Speaker 1>import your cancer, not knowing that as soon as the

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<v Speaker 1>bankruptcy occurred, London's Leahman operation, which was huge, would be

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<v Speaker 1>bankrupt also. So they did get the cancer. And you

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<v Speaker 1>write about this in the book, Michael, sort of the aftermath,

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<v Speaker 1>and obviously you've had some years to reflect on it.

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<v Speaker 1>As as we've talked about so as a businessman is

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<v Speaker 1>a very successful businessman. As a human being, what do

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<v Speaker 1>you take away from what do you internalize that either

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<v Speaker 1>changes your worldview, changes your view of the financial system,

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<v Speaker 1>changes your view of maybe the next crisis um less

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<v Speaker 1>leverage all the banks, we were right there with them,

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<v Speaker 1>we were too leveraged, more equity UM. So that's been

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<v Speaker 1>a good thing coming out of the financial I think,

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<v Speaker 1>and we should not be rolling back those regulations. However,

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<v Speaker 1>the Fed's ability to act has been severely restricted by

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<v Speaker 1>Dodd Frank for example, and I only recently learned this.

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<v Speaker 1>Any refinancing that the FED approves now has to be

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<v Speaker 1>approved by the Secretary of the Treasury, which makes it

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<v Speaker 1>back to political politics. I don't think that's a good rule.

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<v Speaker 1>The FED should focus on the banking system, not on

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<v Speaker 1>the politics at the moment. What about is a human being?

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<v Speaker 1>What what do you take away from it? Because that

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<v Speaker 1>is a harrowing experience, as harrowing probably as anything from

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<v Speaker 1>a financial or a business perspective that anyone's gone through

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<v Speaker 1>in in in our lifetime. You see those people carrying

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<v Speaker 1>their boxes out like it's it's hard not to have

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<v Speaker 1>an impact, right, it's uh, you know you realize how

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<v Speaker 1>you know how many people were affected. And I study economics.

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<v Speaker 1>I love the field, and that's why I became a

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<v Speaker 1>real fan of Lawrence Ball. He has done a study

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<v Speaker 1>of the post ten years after Lehman, of the twenty

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<v Speaker 1>three countries of the O E c D, the growth

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<v Speaker 1>rates in those countries are still dramatically suppressed because of

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<v Speaker 1>the Lehman bankruptcy. It's still hurting our world. Why do

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<v Speaker 1>you think the German bond ten year German bond is

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<v Speaker 1>selling at minus point six or whatever it is negative yield.

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<v Speaker 1>The world's economies have not recovered today, twelve years later

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<v Speaker 1>from the Lehman bankruptcy. That's why I think it was

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<v Speaker 1>a huge policy mistake. I think Paulson should have fought

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<v Speaker 1>to save, at least for the moment, wipe out all

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<v Speaker 1>the equity holders, dilute, don't give the shareholders anything or

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<v Speaker 1>next to nothing, but don't let this this company go

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<v Speaker 1>into bankruptcy. All right, Well, we'd be remiss if we

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<v Speaker 1>had you and didn't talk a little bit about soth Bees.

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<v Speaker 1>That was also an interesting chapter, to say the least,

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<v Speaker 1>in your life, what's the most notable thing that that

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<v Speaker 1>you remember, that that you take away from that experience?

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<v Speaker 1>Because you write extensively about it in the book. UM.

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<v Speaker 1>Sotheby's is a great, great institution. It's just been sold

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<v Speaker 1>again recently to a Frenchman Pratt Patrick Rockey. Private, private,

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<v Speaker 1>which it should be. It's not a business that should

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<v Speaker 1>be in the public markets. It's two seasonal and cyclical

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<v Speaker 1>and uh subject of short sellers telling stories and so fixing.

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<v Speaker 1>That's that's the story that is so painful. The auction

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<v Speaker 1>business has two sides to its revenue. The buyer's pay

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<v Speaker 1>part called the buyer's premium. After the recession in the

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<v Speaker 1>early nineties, I changed the buyer's premium to a sliding

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<v Speaker 1>scale and that has really really sustained the business. After

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<v Speaker 1>I left, my successor looked at the other side of

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<v Speaker 1>the commission structure, what's called the selling commission, seller's commission

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<v Speaker 1>illegally with Christie's working for several years, she built up

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<v Speaker 1>a file of five hundred pages of illegal documents. It's

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<v Speaker 1>incredible to me that they did this and thought it

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<v Speaker 1>could be gotten away with UM. In any event, that

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<v Speaker 1>almost took Sethby's down and almost put the company out

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<v Speaker 1>of business. With the fines, the penalties, the client relationships

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<v Speaker 1>that were lost in damage and you had no idea

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<v Speaker 1>you were there to ninety four think for a decade,

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<v Speaker 1>no idea, no idea. I stayed on the board for

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<v Speaker 1>three more years, uh Taubman's request, and UH saw some

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<v Speaker 1>of the changes happening, some of which I didn't like,

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<v Speaker 1>but I was no longer CEO. But um it came

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<v Speaker 1>out in two thousand and the way it came out

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<v Speaker 1>as interesting. The Christie CEO Christopher Damage was fired by

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<v Speaker 1>UH French Saspino that the owner of Christie's. He gave

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<v Speaker 1>a few pages of these documents, these illegal documents to Pino,

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<v Speaker 1>and said, if you want more of these, you're going

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<v Speaker 1>to have to pay me. And so Pino obviously weighed

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<v Speaker 1>his options and chose to pay him ten million I

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<v Speaker 1>think it was ten million pounds. He got the five

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<v Speaker 1>page package of illegal agreements, sent them to an American

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<v Speaker 1>lawyer where they were known as the hot Potato, and

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<v Speaker 1>that led the race to the Justice Department because the

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<v Speaker 1>first one in gets immunity, and Christie's apparently beat Dede

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<v Speaker 1>Brooks by a day or two and they got immunity.

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<v Speaker 1>Although Anthony Tennant, their chairman, could never leave England because

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<v Speaker 1>he was implicated in any event. It was high drama

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<v Speaker 1>and really a tragedy, and it just shows, you know,

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<v Speaker 1>a moral compass is the most important thing in business

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<v Speaker 1>in my view. I love that you say that. Jason

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<v Speaker 1>and I have so many conversations, and we were talking

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<v Speaker 1>about you say in your book how much you learned

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<v Speaker 1>from your father in terms of how to treat people?

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<v Speaker 1>And we both said the same thing. You know that

0:14:12.400 --> 0:14:14.079
<v Speaker 1>my dad didn't matter whether you were the head of

0:14:14.080 --> 0:14:17.559
<v Speaker 1>a company or you know, somebody at a grocery store.

0:14:17.920 --> 0:14:20.760
<v Speaker 1>And I feel like we've gotten away from that in

0:14:20.840 --> 0:14:23.080
<v Speaker 1>terms of treatment of people, and also the moral compass,

0:14:23.280 --> 0:14:26.800
<v Speaker 1>whether you're a politician, whether you're a business person. What's happened?

0:14:27.600 --> 0:14:30.360
<v Speaker 1>You know from the varsity blues like what has happened?

0:14:30.640 --> 0:14:32.920
<v Speaker 1>Am I just being an older person looking back to

0:14:32.960 --> 0:14:36.040
<v Speaker 1>the sweeter days? What has happened? I wish I had

0:14:36.040 --> 0:14:38.200
<v Speaker 1>a good answer. I wish I knew, and I wish

0:14:38.240 --> 0:14:40.920
<v Speaker 1>I could help go back to the way we we

0:14:40.960 --> 0:14:44.640
<v Speaker 1>did things. And I think most people still do. I

0:14:44.640 --> 0:14:48.800
<v Speaker 1>think too much. This is a money yes, yes, And

0:14:48.840 --> 0:14:52.480
<v Speaker 1>I say that in my book. After I left Sotherby's,

0:14:52.640 --> 0:14:54.760
<v Speaker 1>I looked at where I wanted to put my energy.

0:14:54.920 --> 0:14:56.640
<v Speaker 1>I was in my fifties, I still had a lot

0:14:56.720 --> 0:15:02.200
<v Speaker 1>of energy left and the money that was chasing art.

0:15:03.240 --> 0:15:06.440
<v Speaker 1>It was really not about buying art. It was about

0:15:06.560 --> 0:15:10.640
<v Speaker 1>the buyer of the art getting a high profile, wanting

0:15:10.680 --> 0:15:13.880
<v Speaker 1>to be visible, wanting to be known. Overnight. You could

0:15:13.880 --> 0:15:17.320
<v Speaker 1>become a world celebrity by paying a hundred million dollars

0:15:17.360 --> 0:15:21.320
<v Speaker 1>for a Picasso. You still can, and they do. Um.

0:15:21.320 --> 0:15:24.720
<v Speaker 1>So I put my efforts into into my Posse Foundation.

0:15:24.920 --> 0:15:27.840
<v Speaker 1>I'd love to tell you about possee tell us about it.

0:15:27.840 --> 0:15:30.080
<v Speaker 1>It was a really online about it. When you're helping

0:15:30.080 --> 0:15:33.960
<v Speaker 1>other kids right get opportunities education. Thirty years ago, I'm

0:15:34.000 --> 0:15:36.800
<v Speaker 1>still at Southern Bey's. I met a woman named Debbie Beale.

0:15:37.480 --> 0:15:42.000
<v Speaker 1>Debbie was a twenty four year old young, idealistic great

0:15:42.360 --> 0:15:46.920
<v Speaker 1>UH community leader and she was interviewing a bunch of

0:15:46.960 --> 0:15:50.040
<v Speaker 1>kids who had dropped out of college but had the

0:15:50.080 --> 0:15:53.040
<v Speaker 1>ability to do the work. And one of them spoke

0:15:53.120 --> 0:15:56.080
<v Speaker 1>up and he said, I would never have dropped out

0:15:56.120 --> 0:16:00.160
<v Speaker 1>if I'd had my POSSE with She said, Posse, it's

0:16:00.160 --> 0:16:03.040
<v Speaker 1>at me. What's that? He said? My guys, my gals

0:16:03.040 --> 0:16:07.320
<v Speaker 1>that backed me up, my buddies. She Debbie is an

0:16:07.320 --> 0:16:10.360
<v Speaker 1>amazing woman. She's now one of the MacArthur Genius Awards.

0:16:10.360 --> 0:16:14.080
<v Speaker 1>She's still CEO and president of POSSE. She called up

0:16:14.080 --> 0:16:16.640
<v Speaker 1>a friend at Vanderbilt, where I was an alumnus and

0:16:16.720 --> 0:16:20.640
<v Speaker 1>a board member, and asked him, would you take a

0:16:20.680 --> 0:16:24.480
<v Speaker 1>big gamble on a bunch of New York kids that

0:16:24.600 --> 0:16:26.840
<v Speaker 1>can't measure up on your s A T s because

0:16:26.840 --> 0:16:29.360
<v Speaker 1>they can't afford SA T prep courses and they don't

0:16:29.360 --> 0:16:33.120
<v Speaker 1>go to the great schools. But they are leaders. They

0:16:33.120 --> 0:16:35.640
<v Speaker 1>will be leaders and they will change your culture on

0:16:35.680 --> 0:16:41.040
<v Speaker 1>your campus. Fortunately, this professor went to the Dean of

0:16:40.520 --> 0:16:44.600
<v Speaker 1>of of Education at Vanderbilt, to Peabody School of Education,

0:16:44.600 --> 0:16:46.640
<v Speaker 1>and they said, let's do it. We need some more

0:16:46.720 --> 0:16:51.560
<v Speaker 1>kids from New York. Suddenly six kids. The first POSSE

0:16:51.720 --> 0:16:55.400
<v Speaker 1>was six kids arrives in Nashville, and they were a

0:16:55.480 --> 0:16:59.920
<v Speaker 1>Dominican and African American and you know whatever, and they

0:17:00.040 --> 0:17:03.880
<v Speaker 1>hit the campus by storm. The star of that little

0:17:03.880 --> 0:17:09.280
<v Speaker 1>group was a woman named Shirley Collado. Shirley I almost

0:17:09.320 --> 0:17:11.639
<v Speaker 1>get terry when I started talking about it as Shirley

0:17:12.320 --> 0:17:17.080
<v Speaker 1>Dominican cab driver's daughter, mother worked in a factory or

0:17:17.080 --> 0:17:20.040
<v Speaker 1>a pharmacist. Actually, um, they did not want her to

0:17:20.080 --> 0:17:24.800
<v Speaker 1>go to Nashville to Vanderbilt. She went on to be

0:17:24.840 --> 0:17:27.639
<v Speaker 1>a star at Vanderbille, get her PhD at Duke in

0:17:27.680 --> 0:17:32.280
<v Speaker 1>clinical psychology. When into academ was the dean of the

0:17:32.320 --> 0:17:36.200
<v Speaker 1>college at Middlebury. She's now the president of Ithaca College,

0:17:36.760 --> 0:17:39.439
<v Speaker 1>and she's on the board of Vanderbilt University. And she

0:17:39.600 --> 0:17:41.640
<v Speaker 1>was just on the search committee to pick the new

0:17:41.800 --> 0:17:46.600
<v Speaker 1>chancellor Vanderbille. Now that's what changing someone's life will do

0:17:47.520 --> 0:17:50.840
<v Speaker 1>and and change our institutions. We need more kids and

0:17:51.000 --> 0:17:56.320
<v Speaker 1>people of diverse backgrounds, all kinds of backgrounds on boards

0:17:56.600 --> 0:17:59.800
<v Speaker 1>making decisions in the room. As you said, then the

0:18:00.000 --> 0:18:02.440
<v Speaker 1>destations are better. It's all about access. And we've seen

0:18:02.440 --> 0:18:05.159
<v Speaker 1>the research about the importance of diversity. We've got to

0:18:05.240 --> 0:18:07.040
<v Speaker 1>leave it there. There's so much more we want to

0:18:07.080 --> 0:18:10.199
<v Speaker 1>talk to you about. So come back enjoining you and

0:18:10.200 --> 0:18:12.280
<v Speaker 1>everybody should check out the book because it really is

0:18:12.480 --> 0:18:16.800
<v Speaker 1>inspiring and trouble. Thank you, Michael Ansley. Thank you, And

0:18:16.880 --> 0:18:19.680
<v Speaker 1>you've been listening to Bloomberg Business Week Extra, be sort

0:18:19.680 --> 0:18:22.040
<v Speaker 1>of tune into Bloomberg Business Week Radio Live Monday through

0:18:22.040 --> 0:18:24.840
<v Speaker 1>Friday at two pm Wall Street Time. I'm Bloomberg Radio.

0:18:24.920 --> 0:18:27.480
<v Speaker 1>I'm Carol Masser, and I'm Jason Kelly. This is Bloomberg