WEBVTT - Tech News: Hackers Gotta Hack

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<v Speaker 1>Welcome to Tech Stuff, a production from iHeartRadio. Hey thereon

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<v Speaker 1>Welcome to Tech Stuff. I'm your host, Jonathan Strickland. I'm

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<v Speaker 1>an executive producer with iHeartRadio. And how the tech are you.

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<v Speaker 1>I am still in Las Vegas, Nevada. You can probably

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<v Speaker 1>tell that my voice is going. I did a lot

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<v Speaker 1>of talking yesterday. I had to do some recordings of

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<v Speaker 1>the Restless Ones podcast, and I did a lot of

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<v Speaker 1>chatting with other folks, and yeah, I don't know if

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<v Speaker 1>I'm coming down with anything. I sure hope I'm not.

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<v Speaker 1>I've been masking every time I can, whenever I'm going

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<v Speaker 1>out in public, and I recommend that y'all who have

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<v Speaker 1>to go out in public do the same if you can,

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<v Speaker 1>because obviously COVID is having another surge, and I want

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<v Speaker 1>folks to be safe. And hopefully all I have is

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<v Speaker 1>just like wear and tear on the old vocal cords

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<v Speaker 1>and that's it. We'll obviously be very careful and keep checking.

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<v Speaker 1>But in the meantime, we have some tech news to

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<v Speaker 1>get to, so let's talk about that. Officials here in

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<v Speaker 1>the United States, as well as some in Japan, have

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<v Speaker 1>announced the discovery of a Chinese hacker attack that is

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<v Speaker 1>infiltrating organizations by compromising older routers. You can read up

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<v Speaker 1>on this in Ours Technica. There's an article by Dan Gooden.

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<v Speaker 1>The article is titled Backdoored firmware lets China State hackers

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<v Speaker 1>control routers with magic packets. The article goes into a

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<v Speaker 1>lot of technical detail. I'm not going to bother doing

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<v Speaker 1>that here because this is really just a news item.

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<v Speaker 1>But essentially this hacker group, which has lots of different names,

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<v Speaker 1>I'll just choose one of them, which is black Tech. First,

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<v Speaker 1>they have to get access to a system. Now how

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<v Speaker 1>they do that doesn't really matter. It's just they need

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<v Speaker 1>to get access. First, administrative access, like administrator level access

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<v Speaker 1>to be specific. They might get that through some compromise

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<v Speaker 1>login credentials, perhaps from another hacker group, maybe they use

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<v Speaker 1>social engineering, but whatever. First they get that access. With

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<v Speaker 1>that administrator level access to the system, they then push

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<v Speaker 1>an older version of firmware to certain routers, older routers

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<v Speaker 1>that don't have a protection against this kind of attack.

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<v Speaker 1>And typically they're targeting routers that are on the edge

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<v Speaker 1>of networks. So for example, they might target a branch

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<v Speaker 1>office of a larger company, partly because they're less likely

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<v Speaker 1>to be noticed, and that security won't be quite as

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<v Speaker 1>robust as it would be if it were at HQ. Now,

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<v Speaker 1>because these routers have a trusted relationship with all the

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<v Speaker 1>other computer systems that are connected to that company, the

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<v Speaker 1>hackers are then able to get widespread access to the

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<v Speaker 1>full organization. They target the edge routers, they infect those,

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<v Speaker 1>and then they snoop around Good and explains in his

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<v Speaker 1>piece that the more recent router hardware that has come

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<v Speaker 1>out over the last couple of years includes protections against

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<v Speaker 1>this type of attack, But obviously most organizations aren't updating

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<v Speaker 1>their routers regularly. They do so when they need to,

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<v Speaker 1>and determining if your system has been affected it seems

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<v Speaker 1>like it's not very easy or straightforward, particularly if the

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<v Speaker 1>hackers are actually being really careful. So it's another example

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<v Speaker 1>of how cyberwar is a real ongoing thing and that

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<v Speaker 1>state backed hackers continue to infiltrate both companies and public organizations.

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<v Speaker 1>As for the magic packets, those are little small packets

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<v Speaker 1>of data that the hackers are using essentially to open

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<v Speaker 1>or close backdoor access into these systems, and typically the

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<v Speaker 1>magic packets kind of blend in with overall network traffic

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<v Speaker 1>so that's kind of why they were called that. Back

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<v Speaker 1>in July, word got out that hackers had leveraged a

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<v Speaker 1>stolen Microsoft certificate to gain access to the email systems

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<v Speaker 1>belonging to really large organizations, including the United States State Department. Now,

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<v Speaker 1>the New York Times report that the hackers stole around

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<v Speaker 1>sixty thousand emails, primarily from ten email accounts. Further, nine

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<v Speaker 1>of those ten accounts belong to members of the State

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<v Speaker 1>Department who are working on projects that involve East Asian affairs. Now,

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<v Speaker 1>the State Department has not formally accused China of being

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<v Speaker 1>behind the attacks, but that seems to be the implication here.

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<v Speaker 1>The hack has sparked conversations within the US government on

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<v Speaker 1>how to harden systems against hacker attacks, including the possibility

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<v Speaker 1>of moving away from single vendor solutions like using Microsoft.

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<v Speaker 1>And while there's an element of closing the barn door

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<v Speaker 1>after the horse has already escaped going on here, I

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<v Speaker 1>do think putting all your trust in a single vendor

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<v Speaker 1>can lead to massive problems down the line. But honestly,

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<v Speaker 1>there aren't really any easy, fully reliable solutions here. Security

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<v Speaker 1>researchers revealed that all modern GPUs, that is graphics processing

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<v Speaker 1>units have their own way to compress data. But even

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<v Speaker 1>though they're each using a different method, that method can

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<v Speaker 1>be exploited to steal pixels from a website. Which sounds weird, right,

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<v Speaker 1>but essentially here's how it works. You get hackers and

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<v Speaker 1>they create a malicious website that has the same name

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<v Speaker 1>but a different domain as their target. So let's say

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<v Speaker 1>they've identified a target website that they don't have access

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<v Speaker 1>to directly, maybe it's behind some sort of protective measure,

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<v Speaker 1>So they create a different website has the same name

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<v Speaker 1>but a different domain, so instead of dot com, maybe

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<v Speaker 1>it's dot biz. Now in this malicious version of the website,

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<v Speaker 1>they include an iframe. The iframe serves as a spot

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<v Speaker 1>where you can embed other content into your website. So

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<v Speaker 1>one common use for iframes is to embed ads in them,

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<v Speaker 1>and that allows the site to swap ads out dynamically

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<v Speaker 1>and the iframe kind of holds its place. They then

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<v Speaker 1>rely on the GPU's data compression scheme to pull pixels

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<v Speaker 1>into a side channel, and they pull it from the

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<v Speaker 1>target website. You reconstruct what appears on your target site.

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<v Speaker 1>So you might have a corporate website that's usually behind

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<v Speaker 1>protection and the hackers create a malicious site named the

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<v Speaker 1>same thing, but on a different domain, and by stealing pixels,

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<v Speaker 1>they can recreate what was on that target website, potentially

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<v Speaker 1>gaining access to sensitive data, including things like you know,

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<v Speaker 1>log in credentials. The researchers were mostly showing that this

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<v Speaker 1>is possible. They didn't indicate that it's an active concern, Like,

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<v Speaker 1>they didn't say that this is something that they're seeing

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<v Speaker 1>actively deployed out there, but that in fact the hardware

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<v Speaker 1>across all GPU manufacturers allows for this, and since it

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<v Speaker 1>is possible, sooner or later someone will do it. Right,

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<v Speaker 1>So there are ways to block pixels stealing. Most of

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<v Speaker 1>those involve website administrators being proactive on the matter. They

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<v Speaker 1>can build stuff into the header of a web page

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<v Speaker 1>that will protect against that kind of thing, but that's

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<v Speaker 1>a lot of work. It is also probably, you know,

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<v Speaker 1>it's likely, I think that we're going to see companies

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<v Speaker 1>that make web browsers that facilitate this kind of attack

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<v Speaker 1>to address that in the future. The European Union issued

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<v Speaker 1>a report stating that after analyzing various social network platforms

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<v Speaker 1>out there, one in particular stands out when it comes

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<v Speaker 1>to the proliferation of disinformation. Do you have any guesses?

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<v Speaker 1>If you said X marks the spot, meaning the platform

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<v Speaker 1>formerly known as Twitter, you win a prize a virtual

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<v Speaker 1>donut enjoy Anyway, the EU previously established a voluntary code

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<v Speaker 1>of practice on disinformation, and tons of platforms signed to

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<v Speaker 1>pledge and that they would follow this voluntary code, so

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<v Speaker 1>that includes Google and YouTube, meta primarily Facebook and LinkedIn.

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<v Speaker 1>They all signed it, along with like forty other platforms.

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<v Speaker 1>It also used to include X, but at last May

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<v Speaker 1>Elon Musk decided that X was going to peace out

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<v Speaker 1>of that voluntary code. Now, researchers in the EU say

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<v Speaker 1>that disinformation is spreading like wildfire on X and that

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<v Speaker 1>the problem is only getting worse. Also, X has recently

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<v Speaker 1>disabled a feature that used to allow users to report

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<v Speaker 1>cases of misinformation about elections. So this means, assuming those

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<v Speaker 1>EU researchers are right that X is not just the

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<v Speaker 1>worst when it comes to preventing misinformation and disinformation from

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<v Speaker 1>propagating across their system, they are actively turning off features

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<v Speaker 1>that would do anything about it, which is a big

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<v Speaker 1>old yikes. An article in the LGBTQ Nation reveals that

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<v Speaker 1>TikTok is working with the government of Kenya to restrict

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<v Speaker 1>and remove LGBTQ plus content from the platform within Kenya's borders. Now.

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<v Speaker 1>This is because Kenya's government has banned same sex sexual relationships,

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<v Speaker 1>and currently the government is also considering an additional law

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<v Speaker 1>that would hunish homosexuality with a lifetime prison sentence. TikTok

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<v Speaker 1>has already deplatformed and demonetized TikTok users in Kenya who,

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<v Speaker 1>according to the country's laws, have posted restricted content. Apparently,

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<v Speaker 1>TikTok CEO has committed to not only being more active

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<v Speaker 1>to remove LGBTQ plus content from the platform within Kenya,

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<v Speaker 1>but to also launch a campaign to urge users to

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<v Speaker 1>instead post quote unquote positive content, which sounds disturbingly close

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<v Speaker 1>to conversion therapy. In my opinion, it's really ugly stuff

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<v Speaker 1>and my heart goes out to the people of Kenya.

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<v Speaker 1>This week, Meta announced an update to its line of

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<v Speaker 1>smart glasses, previously known as Stories, but to be really

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<v Speaker 1>formal about they are now known as ray Ban Meta

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<v Speaker 1>smart Glasses. The glasses have a pair of cameras in

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<v Speaker 1>them when at the top of each corner of the frames,

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<v Speaker 1>and they contain five microphones that are meant to provide

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<v Speaker 1>better sound pickup when you use your glasses, you know,

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<v Speaker 1>take a phone call or something. They also have speakers

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<v Speaker 1>that the company says will make it easy for the

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<v Speaker 1>wearer to hear what's playing on their glasses, but it won't,

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<v Speaker 1>you know, irritate the living heck out of everybody else

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<v Speaker 1>who happens to be nearby. The glasses can take about

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<v Speaker 1>five hundred photos at twelve megapixel resolution or around one

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<v Speaker 1>hundred and thirty second long video clips at ten ADP

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<v Speaker 1>before you end up using up all the storage on

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<v Speaker 1>the device and it's time to offload stuff. The battery

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<v Speaker 1>reportedly is good for like four to six hours of use,

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<v Speaker 1>and they come in a case that can also serve

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<v Speaker 1>as a charger, and the case itself can hold enough

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<v Speaker 1>battery juice to recharge the glasses several times before the

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<v Speaker 1>case itself needs to be recharged. You can also live

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<v Speaker 1>stream while wearing these glasses too. The controls include both

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<v Speaker 1>a touch system and the stems of the eyeglasses and

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<v Speaker 1>voice commands, and essentially these things do some of, but

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<v Speaker 1>not all, of the stuff that Google Glass did years ago,

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<v Speaker 1>but they do look a lot better. They do not

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<v Speaker 1>as far as I can tell, create any sort of

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<v Speaker 1>ar view of the world around you, which Google Glass

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<v Speaker 1>could sort of do. And already folks are worried about

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<v Speaker 1>privacy issues with these glasses. They're concerned that you could

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<v Speaker 1>be on video or have someone snapping pictures of you

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<v Speaker 1>without your knowledge or consent. Now I get that concern.

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<v Speaker 1>It's a legit concern, don't get me wrong, But y'all,

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<v Speaker 1>that's already happening. There are so many cameras out there,

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<v Speaker 1>whether they're in phones or in security systems like in

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<v Speaker 1>door bells or in cars, So I pretty much guarantee

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<v Speaker 1>that you're on camera frequently throughout an average day. But

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<v Speaker 1>I do understand how it gets creepy when you're talking

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<v Speaker 1>about someone wearing the camera on their face. Anyway, Meta

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<v Speaker 1>is taking pre orders on these things, which start at

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<v Speaker 1>around two hundred and ninety nine US dollars, and they'll

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<v Speaker 1>start shipping in mid October. So maybe your Halloween costume

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<v Speaker 1>can be invasive surveillance. That's a fun one. All right,

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<v Speaker 1>We're gonna take a quick break and we're gonna come

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<v Speaker 1>back with more news in just a moment. We're back.

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<v Speaker 1>Reddit indicated this week that it will remove the opt

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<v Speaker 1>out feature for personalized ads, or at least some Reddit

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<v Speaker 1>users around the world. So the new policy says that

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<v Speaker 1>Reddit will take your activity on the platform and then

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<v Speaker 1>use that to decide which ads to display to you.

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<v Speaker 1>So let's say you spend a lot of time on

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<v Speaker 1>subreddits that are dedicated to gaming, Well, then you're more

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<v Speaker 1>likely to see ads related to gaming while on Reddit. Right.

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<v Speaker 1>It says this is for your benefit, But there are

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<v Speaker 1>a lot of users who are upset because the message

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<v Speaker 1>that they're picking up on is Reddit is determined to

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<v Speaker 1>track their behavior across the site and there's no way

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<v Speaker 1>to tell Reddit to knock it off. And while Reddit

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<v Speaker 1>says users all around the world will be able to

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<v Speaker 1>opt out of personalized advertising based off of quote unquote

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<v Speaker 1>information and activity from our partners, only users in select

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<v Speaker 1>locations will actually be able to opt out of personalized

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<v Speaker 1>ads based off their activity on Reddit itself. I'm guessing

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<v Speaker 1>those select locations will be places like the European Union,

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<v Speaker 1>which has some pretty strict rules in place when it

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<v Speaker 1>comes to user privacy, and any place that doesn't have

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<v Speaker 1>those kind of rules, Redd, it's going to be tracking

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<v Speaker 1>you like crazy. And now, the latest in the long

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<v Speaker 1>arduous story of Microsoft's plan to acquire Activision Blizzard. When

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<v Speaker 1>last we left our tail, Microsoft was working hard to

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<v Speaker 1>convince regulators in the UK that the deal would not

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<v Speaker 1>result in an anti competitive situation within the world of

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<v Speaker 1>console gaming in general and cloud based streaming gaming in particular.

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<v Speaker 1>Well last week that regulatory agency gave provisional approval to

0:13:47.200 --> 0:13:51.280
<v Speaker 1>the acquisition, so that roadblock was removed. But now the

0:13:51.360 --> 0:13:54.720
<v Speaker 1>United States Federal Trade Commission has once again objected to

0:13:54.800 --> 0:13:58.640
<v Speaker 1>this deal. Now, they previously attempted to secure an injunction

0:13:58.880 --> 0:14:03.480
<v Speaker 1>against the deal closing, but a US District Court judge

0:14:03.480 --> 0:14:06.800
<v Speaker 1>denied that request and said that the FTC had failed

0:14:06.840 --> 0:14:10.040
<v Speaker 1>to produce evidence that this deal would actually be harmful

0:14:10.160 --> 0:14:15.160
<v Speaker 1>toward competition. The FTC then appealed that ruling, but then

0:14:15.280 --> 0:14:19.000
<v Speaker 1>withdrew the complaint not that long afterward, and it turns

0:14:19.040 --> 0:14:22.360
<v Speaker 1>out that was temporary because now they have submitted the

0:14:22.400 --> 0:14:26.080
<v Speaker 1>appeal again to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Once

0:14:26.280 --> 0:14:31.400
<v Speaker 1>the regulators in the UK gave their provisional approval, and

0:14:31.880 --> 0:14:34.760
<v Speaker 1>then once the court actually gives a decision one way

0:14:34.920 --> 0:14:38.760
<v Speaker 1>or the other, the FTC plans on an evidentiary hearing

0:14:38.840 --> 0:14:42.400
<v Speaker 1>on the matter. Now This on the surface sounds bad

0:14:42.480 --> 0:14:46.040
<v Speaker 1>for Microsoft and Activision Blizzard, but they could still go

0:14:46.120 --> 0:14:48.560
<v Speaker 1>through with their deal because there's no injunction against it,

0:14:48.920 --> 0:14:51.640
<v Speaker 1>and that deal is scheduled to close on October eighteenth.

0:14:52.320 --> 0:14:54.320
<v Speaker 1>Then once the deal is closed, they can worry about

0:14:54.320 --> 0:14:57.320
<v Speaker 1>any ongoing legal issues they might face after the fact,

0:14:57.360 --> 0:15:00.400
<v Speaker 1>but by then the deal will already be done. So

0:15:00.480 --> 0:15:04.160
<v Speaker 1>what I'm seeing is that most analysts think this deal

0:15:04.200 --> 0:15:08.640
<v Speaker 1>will finally close next month, and now for a few

0:15:09.280 --> 0:15:13.040
<v Speaker 1>AI stories, it's always going to be that. In a

0:15:13.120 --> 0:15:18.040
<v Speaker 1>tech Stuff News episode, an SEO consultant named Gagan Gotra

0:15:18.440 --> 0:15:24.000
<v Speaker 1>brought some concerning information about Google Bard conversations. So it

0:15:24.080 --> 0:15:27.720
<v Speaker 1>turns out if someone has a conversation with google Bard,

0:15:27.840 --> 0:15:30.840
<v Speaker 1>which I'm just going to remind you that's Google's AI

0:15:31.040 --> 0:15:36.359
<v Speaker 1>powered chatbot. It's similar to Open AI's chat GPT, specifically,

0:15:36.720 --> 0:15:40.960
<v Speaker 1>as it is integrated with bing, well, if you then

0:15:41.080 --> 0:15:45.760
<v Speaker 1>share a link of that conversation with someone else, then

0:15:45.920 --> 0:15:51.720
<v Speaker 1>Google will actually index that conversation, which means that conversation

0:15:51.800 --> 0:15:55.240
<v Speaker 1>with google Bard can pop up in future search results.

0:15:55.640 --> 0:15:59.040
<v Speaker 1>So let's say that you and a coworker are using

0:15:59.080 --> 0:16:02.240
<v Speaker 1>google Bard to help develop a business plan and this

0:16:02.400 --> 0:16:04.720
<v Speaker 1>is something that you do not want to share outside

0:16:04.760 --> 0:16:08.960
<v Speaker 1>of your organization. When you share that conversational link to

0:16:09.000 --> 0:16:13.760
<v Speaker 1>your coworker, the link itself becomes indexable, and then Google's

0:16:13.760 --> 0:16:16.560
<v Speaker 1>web craller will index the conversation, and if someone else

0:16:16.640 --> 0:16:20.360
<v Speaker 1>uses the right search query, that conversation can potentially pop

0:16:20.480 --> 0:16:22.560
<v Speaker 1>up in those search results, and the information that you

0:16:22.680 --> 0:16:26.360
<v Speaker 1>intended to be private has now been made public. Now,

0:16:26.360 --> 0:16:30.040
<v Speaker 1>obviously there are all sorts of situations where indexing the

0:16:30.120 --> 0:16:33.120
<v Speaker 1>barred conversation could turn out to be a really bad thing.

0:16:33.960 --> 0:16:36.320
<v Speaker 1>It's not that different from when open Ai had an

0:16:36.360 --> 0:16:40.520
<v Speaker 1>issue with chat GPT, where the chatbot would occasionally give

0:16:40.720 --> 0:16:46.320
<v Speaker 1>users access to other users chat histories with the chatbot. Now,

0:16:46.800 --> 0:16:49.560
<v Speaker 1>in the Google case, we're not talking about a bug,

0:16:50.000 --> 0:16:53.160
<v Speaker 1>we're talking about a feature. Because Gotra had an exchange

0:16:53.560 --> 0:16:58.200
<v Speaker 1>with Google research scientist Peter Lieu, and Peter pointed out

0:16:58.400 --> 0:17:01.520
<v Speaker 1>that the search engine will only end conversations if someone

0:17:01.520 --> 0:17:05.000
<v Speaker 1>has clicked on the share button, and Goscher's reply was

0:17:05.040 --> 0:17:08.040
<v Speaker 1>the same one I would have made. Namely, I think

0:17:08.080 --> 0:17:11.440
<v Speaker 1>most users would just assume that share just means you've

0:17:11.440 --> 0:17:15.040
<v Speaker 1>elected to share that conversation with someone in particular not

0:17:15.320 --> 0:17:19.480
<v Speaker 1>the whole world in general, but that appears to be

0:17:19.600 --> 0:17:23.600
<v Speaker 1>the case. Once upon a time, when chat GPT first

0:17:23.600 --> 0:17:27.080
<v Speaker 1>splashed on the scene, the chatbot could only draw information

0:17:27.240 --> 0:17:31.840
<v Speaker 1>from before September twenty twenty one. It didn't have access

0:17:32.000 --> 0:17:36.240
<v Speaker 1>to the real time web. It could not crawl the

0:17:36.240 --> 0:17:39.119
<v Speaker 1>web for current information. So you could not ask it

0:17:39.160 --> 0:17:42.600
<v Speaker 1>about breaking news or anything like that because it literally

0:17:42.640 --> 0:17:46.159
<v Speaker 1>just could not access those information sources. Now, back in

0:17:46.240 --> 0:17:50.200
<v Speaker 1>July of this year, OpenAI created a subscription based tier

0:17:50.240 --> 0:17:53.440
<v Speaker 1>of service that would let users rely on chat GPT

0:17:53.640 --> 0:17:57.639
<v Speaker 1>through bing searches to access current information. But that feature

0:17:57.920 --> 0:18:01.600
<v Speaker 1>soon went away. Why because users figured out that they

0:18:01.600 --> 0:18:05.680
<v Speaker 1>could use this particular feature to bypass paywalls and get

0:18:05.720 --> 0:18:07.639
<v Speaker 1>to content that normally you would have to pay a

0:18:07.680 --> 0:18:11.879
<v Speaker 1>subscription to access. That's not exactly something that either open

0:18:11.920 --> 0:18:15.760
<v Speaker 1>ai or Microsoft wants to deal with, so the feature

0:18:15.760 --> 0:18:20.000
<v Speaker 1>went offline. But now it's come back. OpenAI announced yesterday

0:18:20.040 --> 0:18:23.480
<v Speaker 1>that through bing, it will let users access real time

0:18:23.520 --> 0:18:28.439
<v Speaker 1>information using the chatbot, and it calls this authoritative. Now.

0:18:28.480 --> 0:18:31.919
<v Speaker 1>I personally find that designation questionable given how chatbots like

0:18:32.000 --> 0:18:37.240
<v Speaker 1>chat GPT are prone to producing hallucinations or confabulations, which

0:18:37.280 --> 0:18:40.800
<v Speaker 1>just means sometimes they make stuff up. So I'm not

0:18:40.840 --> 0:18:44.600
<v Speaker 1>sure how authoritative you can actually claim to be. If

0:18:44.640 --> 0:18:47.560
<v Speaker 1>you've been following the union strikes in Hollywood, you likely

0:18:47.640 --> 0:18:50.520
<v Speaker 1>know that the Writer's Guild of America or WGA, has

0:18:50.560 --> 0:18:53.760
<v Speaker 1>reached a provisional agreement with the Alliance of Motion Pictures

0:18:53.760 --> 0:18:58.320
<v Speaker 1>and Television Producers aka the AMPTP. A lot of the

0:18:58.560 --> 0:19:02.600
<v Speaker 1>WGA's concerns relate to tech, ranging from how streaming companies

0:19:02.600 --> 0:19:06.159
<v Speaker 1>determine payouts like residuals, to the role of artificial intelligence

0:19:06.600 --> 0:19:10.800
<v Speaker 1>should play in film and television. The agreement, which WGA

0:19:10.880 --> 0:19:13.480
<v Speaker 1>members will have to ratify in a vote, essentially says

0:19:13.520 --> 0:19:15.919
<v Speaker 1>that the studios will not be able to compel writers

0:19:15.960 --> 0:19:19.280
<v Speaker 1>to use AI, that any content that does involve generative

0:19:19.320 --> 0:19:22.160
<v Speaker 1>AI has to be labeled as such, and that AI

0:19:22.320 --> 0:19:24.560
<v Speaker 1>is not eligible to get a writing credit. Now that's

0:19:24.600 --> 0:19:27.119
<v Speaker 1>important when it comes to things like payments and residuals

0:19:27.160 --> 0:19:30.480
<v Speaker 1>and so on, Considering the US courts have recently found

0:19:30.480 --> 0:19:33.679
<v Speaker 1>that AI generated material is not eligible for copyright, I

0:19:33.720 --> 0:19:36.960
<v Speaker 1>think these changes are ultimately of benefit to both the

0:19:36.960 --> 0:19:42.240
<v Speaker 1>writers and the producers. Meanwhile, the actor strike still goes on. Okay,

0:19:42.760 --> 0:19:46.960
<v Speaker 1>that's it for the news for today Thursday, September twenty eighth,

0:19:47.320 --> 0:19:51.000
<v Speaker 1>twenty twenty three. Next week, I'll be back in Atlanta

0:19:51.480 --> 0:19:54.560
<v Speaker 1>and episodes will return as normal. They'll probably sound more

0:19:54.640 --> 0:19:58.000
<v Speaker 1>like the older episodes and not weird because I'm recording

0:19:58.040 --> 0:20:01.040
<v Speaker 1>in some hotel room in Las Vegas. So I hope

0:20:01.160 --> 0:20:03.480
<v Speaker 1>you are all well, and I'll talk to you again

0:20:04.240 --> 0:20:13.960
<v Speaker 1>really soon. Tech Stuff is an iHeartRadio production. For more

0:20:14.000 --> 0:20:18.760
<v Speaker 1>podcasts from iHeartRadio, visit the iHeartRadio app, Apple Podcasts, or

0:20:18.800 --> 0:20:20.719
<v Speaker 1>wherever you listen to your favorite shows.