1
00:00:04,440 --> 00:00:12,400
Speaker 1: Welcome to Tech Stuff, a production from iHeartRadio. Hey thereon

2
00:00:12,520 --> 00:00:15,720
Speaker 1: Welcome to Tech Stuff. I'm your host, Jonathan Strickland. I'm

3
00:00:15,720 --> 00:00:19,400
Speaker 1: an executive producer with iHeartRadio. And how the tech are you.

4
00:00:20,079 --> 00:00:23,520
Speaker 1: I am still in Las Vegas, Nevada. You can probably

5
00:00:23,520 --> 00:00:25,720
Speaker 1: tell that my voice is going. I did a lot

6
00:00:25,720 --> 00:00:29,319
Speaker 1: of talking yesterday. I had to do some recordings of

7
00:00:29,360 --> 00:00:32,479
Speaker 1: the Restless Ones podcast, and I did a lot of

8
00:00:32,680 --> 00:00:36,120
Speaker 1: chatting with other folks, and yeah, I don't know if

9
00:00:36,120 --> 00:00:37,760
Speaker 1: I'm coming down with anything. I sure hope I'm not.

10
00:00:37,840 --> 00:00:40,760
Speaker 1: I've been masking every time I can, whenever I'm going

11
00:00:40,760 --> 00:00:44,360
Speaker 1: out in public, and I recommend that y'all who have

12
00:00:44,400 --> 00:00:46,720
Speaker 1: to go out in public do the same if you can,

13
00:00:47,159 --> 00:00:50,720
Speaker 1: because obviously COVID is having another surge, and I want

14
00:00:50,760 --> 00:00:54,160
Speaker 1: folks to be safe. And hopefully all I have is

15
00:00:54,280 --> 00:00:56,600
Speaker 1: just like wear and tear on the old vocal cords

16
00:00:56,600 --> 00:01:00,480
Speaker 1: and that's it. We'll obviously be very careful and keep checking.

17
00:01:00,920 --> 00:01:04,280
Speaker 1: But in the meantime, we have some tech news to

18
00:01:04,319 --> 00:01:08,440
Speaker 1: get to, so let's talk about that. Officials here in

19
00:01:08,480 --> 00:01:10,760
Speaker 1: the United States, as well as some in Japan, have

20
00:01:10,760 --> 00:01:14,280
Speaker 1: announced the discovery of a Chinese hacker attack that is

21
00:01:14,360 --> 00:01:19,320
Speaker 1: infiltrating organizations by compromising older routers. You can read up

22
00:01:19,319 --> 00:01:22,760
Speaker 1: on this in Ours Technica. There's an article by Dan Gooden.

23
00:01:22,959 --> 00:01:27,200
Speaker 1: The article is titled Backdoored firmware lets China State hackers

24
00:01:27,200 --> 00:01:31,840
Speaker 1: control routers with magic packets. The article goes into a

25
00:01:31,880 --> 00:01:34,479
Speaker 1: lot of technical detail. I'm not going to bother doing

26
00:01:34,560 --> 00:01:37,520
Speaker 1: that here because this is really just a news item.

27
00:01:37,800 --> 00:01:41,360
Speaker 1: But essentially this hacker group, which has lots of different names,

28
00:01:41,360 --> 00:01:44,440
Speaker 1: I'll just choose one of them, which is black Tech. First,

29
00:01:44,440 --> 00:01:47,440
Speaker 1: they have to get access to a system. Now how

30
00:01:47,480 --> 00:01:51,000
Speaker 1: they do that doesn't really matter. It's just they need

31
00:01:51,040 --> 00:01:54,640
Speaker 1: to get access. First, administrative access, like administrator level access

32
00:01:54,680 --> 00:01:58,520
Speaker 1: to be specific. They might get that through some compromise

33
00:01:58,600 --> 00:02:02,000
Speaker 1: login credentials, perhaps from another hacker group, maybe they use

34
00:02:02,000 --> 00:02:05,640
Speaker 1: social engineering, but whatever. First they get that access. With

35
00:02:05,760 --> 00:02:09,560
Speaker 1: that administrator level access to the system, they then push

36
00:02:09,639 --> 00:02:13,880
Speaker 1: an older version of firmware to certain routers, older routers

37
00:02:13,880 --> 00:02:16,240
Speaker 1: that don't have a protection against this kind of attack.

38
00:02:16,840 --> 00:02:20,440
Speaker 1: And typically they're targeting routers that are on the edge

39
00:02:20,560 --> 00:02:24,800
Speaker 1: of networks. So for example, they might target a branch

40
00:02:25,120 --> 00:02:29,839
Speaker 1: office of a larger company, partly because they're less likely

41
00:02:29,919 --> 00:02:32,520
Speaker 1: to be noticed, and that security won't be quite as

42
00:02:32,639 --> 00:02:35,679
Speaker 1: robust as it would be if it were at HQ. Now,

43
00:02:35,680 --> 00:02:39,840
Speaker 1: because these routers have a trusted relationship with all the

44
00:02:39,880 --> 00:02:43,560
Speaker 1: other computer systems that are connected to that company, the

45
00:02:43,600 --> 00:02:46,200
Speaker 1: hackers are then able to get widespread access to the

46
00:02:46,240 --> 00:02:51,000
Speaker 1: full organization. They target the edge routers, they infect those,

47
00:02:51,520 --> 00:02:55,200
Speaker 1: and then they snoop around Good and explains in his

48
00:02:55,280 --> 00:02:58,359
Speaker 1: piece that the more recent router hardware that has come

49
00:02:58,400 --> 00:03:01,400
Speaker 1: out over the last couple of years includes protections against

50
00:03:01,400 --> 00:03:05,480
Speaker 1: this type of attack, But obviously most organizations aren't updating

51
00:03:05,480 --> 00:03:08,280
Speaker 1: their routers regularly. They do so when they need to,

52
00:03:09,080 --> 00:03:12,560
Speaker 1: and determining if your system has been affected it seems

53
00:03:12,560 --> 00:03:15,600
Speaker 1: like it's not very easy or straightforward, particularly if the

54
00:03:15,639 --> 00:03:19,000
Speaker 1: hackers are actually being really careful. So it's another example

55
00:03:19,320 --> 00:03:23,639
Speaker 1: of how cyberwar is a real ongoing thing and that

56
00:03:23,720 --> 00:03:28,280
Speaker 1: state backed hackers continue to infiltrate both companies and public organizations.

57
00:03:29,160 --> 00:03:33,120
Speaker 1: As for the magic packets, those are little small packets

58
00:03:33,120 --> 00:03:35,640
Speaker 1: of data that the hackers are using essentially to open

59
00:03:35,760 --> 00:03:40,000
Speaker 1: or close backdoor access into these systems, and typically the

60
00:03:40,040 --> 00:03:43,640
Speaker 1: magic packets kind of blend in with overall network traffic

61
00:03:44,080 --> 00:03:46,880
Speaker 1: so that's kind of why they were called that. Back

62
00:03:46,880 --> 00:03:50,000
Speaker 1: in July, word got out that hackers had leveraged a

63
00:03:50,080 --> 00:03:53,520
Speaker 1: stolen Microsoft certificate to gain access to the email systems

64
00:03:53,560 --> 00:03:58,880
Speaker 1: belonging to really large organizations, including the United States State Department. Now,

65
00:03:58,920 --> 00:04:01,400
Speaker 1: the New York Times report that the hackers stole around

66
00:04:01,440 --> 00:04:07,600
Speaker 1: sixty thousand emails, primarily from ten email accounts. Further, nine

67
00:04:07,800 --> 00:04:10,560
Speaker 1: of those ten accounts belong to members of the State

68
00:04:10,560 --> 00:04:14,440
Speaker 1: Department who are working on projects that involve East Asian affairs. Now,

69
00:04:14,440 --> 00:04:18,159
Speaker 1: the State Department has not formally accused China of being

70
00:04:18,200 --> 00:04:21,920
Speaker 1: behind the attacks, but that seems to be the implication here.

71
00:04:22,360 --> 00:04:25,600
Speaker 1: The hack has sparked conversations within the US government on

72
00:04:25,640 --> 00:04:29,360
Speaker 1: how to harden systems against hacker attacks, including the possibility

73
00:04:29,360 --> 00:04:34,159
Speaker 1: of moving away from single vendor solutions like using Microsoft.

74
00:04:34,640 --> 00:04:37,440
Speaker 1: And while there's an element of closing the barn door

75
00:04:37,560 --> 00:04:40,360
Speaker 1: after the horse has already escaped going on here, I

76
00:04:40,440 --> 00:04:43,760
Speaker 1: do think putting all your trust in a single vendor

77
00:04:43,880 --> 00:04:46,760
Speaker 1: can lead to massive problems down the line. But honestly,

78
00:04:46,760 --> 00:04:51,279
Speaker 1: there aren't really any easy, fully reliable solutions here. Security

79
00:04:51,320 --> 00:04:56,279
Speaker 1: researchers revealed that all modern GPUs, that is graphics processing

80
00:04:56,360 --> 00:05:00,240
Speaker 1: units have their own way to compress data. But even

81
00:05:00,240 --> 00:05:03,000
Speaker 1: though they're each using a different method, that method can

82
00:05:03,040 --> 00:05:07,240
Speaker 1: be exploited to steal pixels from a website. Which sounds weird, right,

83
00:05:07,600 --> 00:05:10,800
Speaker 1: but essentially here's how it works. You get hackers and

84
00:05:10,839 --> 00:05:13,880
Speaker 1: they create a malicious website that has the same name

85
00:05:14,080 --> 00:05:17,840
Speaker 1: but a different domain as their target. So let's say

86
00:05:17,839 --> 00:05:20,479
Speaker 1: they've identified a target website that they don't have access

87
00:05:20,480 --> 00:05:24,080
Speaker 1: to directly, maybe it's behind some sort of protective measure,

88
00:05:24,640 --> 00:05:27,800
Speaker 1: So they create a different website has the same name

89
00:05:28,040 --> 00:05:30,280
Speaker 1: but a different domain, so instead of dot com, maybe

90
00:05:30,279 --> 00:05:34,520
Speaker 1: it's dot biz. Now in this malicious version of the website,

91
00:05:34,640 --> 00:05:37,840
Speaker 1: they include an iframe. The iframe serves as a spot

92
00:05:37,880 --> 00:05:41,000
Speaker 1: where you can embed other content into your website. So

93
00:05:41,800 --> 00:05:45,120
Speaker 1: one common use for iframes is to embed ads in them,

94
00:05:45,120 --> 00:05:48,200
Speaker 1: and that allows the site to swap ads out dynamically

95
00:05:48,320 --> 00:05:51,200
Speaker 1: and the iframe kind of holds its place. They then

96
00:05:51,279 --> 00:05:55,440
Speaker 1: rely on the GPU's data compression scheme to pull pixels

97
00:05:55,440 --> 00:05:58,359
Speaker 1: into a side channel, and they pull it from the

98
00:05:58,360 --> 00:06:04,560
Speaker 1: target website. You reconstruct what appears on your target site.

99
00:06:05,080 --> 00:06:08,279
Speaker 1: So you might have a corporate website that's usually behind

100
00:06:08,279 --> 00:06:11,159
Speaker 1: protection and the hackers create a malicious site named the

101
00:06:11,200 --> 00:06:14,680
Speaker 1: same thing, but on a different domain, and by stealing pixels,

102
00:06:15,040 --> 00:06:18,200
Speaker 1: they can recreate what was on that target website, potentially

103
00:06:18,240 --> 00:06:21,240
Speaker 1: gaining access to sensitive data, including things like you know,

104
00:06:21,279 --> 00:06:25,359
Speaker 1: log in credentials. The researchers were mostly showing that this

105
00:06:25,640 --> 00:06:29,800
Speaker 1: is possible. They didn't indicate that it's an active concern, Like,

106
00:06:29,839 --> 00:06:32,800
Speaker 1: they didn't say that this is something that they're seeing

107
00:06:32,880 --> 00:06:36,440
Speaker 1: actively deployed out there, but that in fact the hardware

108
00:06:36,560 --> 00:06:40,600
Speaker 1: across all GPU manufacturers allows for this, and since it

109
00:06:40,680 --> 00:06:44,040
Speaker 1: is possible, sooner or later someone will do it. Right,

110
00:06:44,320 --> 00:06:48,120
Speaker 1: So there are ways to block pixels stealing. Most of

111
00:06:48,120 --> 00:06:52,440
Speaker 1: those involve website administrators being proactive on the matter. They

112
00:06:52,480 --> 00:06:54,839
Speaker 1: can build stuff into the header of a web page

113
00:06:55,320 --> 00:06:58,080
Speaker 1: that will protect against that kind of thing, but that's

114
00:06:58,120 --> 00:07:01,000
Speaker 1: a lot of work. It is also probably, you know,

115
00:07:01,200 --> 00:07:03,479
Speaker 1: it's likely, I think that we're going to see companies

116
00:07:03,520 --> 00:07:06,760
Speaker 1: that make web browsers that facilitate this kind of attack

117
00:07:06,960 --> 00:07:10,960
Speaker 1: to address that in the future. The European Union issued

118
00:07:11,000 --> 00:07:15,680
Speaker 1: a report stating that after analyzing various social network platforms

119
00:07:15,680 --> 00:07:18,720
Speaker 1: out there, one in particular stands out when it comes

120
00:07:18,760 --> 00:07:23,200
Speaker 1: to the proliferation of disinformation. Do you have any guesses?

121
00:07:23,680 --> 00:07:27,200
Speaker 1: If you said X marks the spot, meaning the platform

122
00:07:27,280 --> 00:07:33,160
Speaker 1: formerly known as Twitter, you win a prize a virtual

123
00:07:33,200 --> 00:07:38,800
Speaker 1: donut enjoy Anyway, the EU previously established a voluntary code

124
00:07:39,000 --> 00:07:45,000
Speaker 1: of practice on disinformation, and tons of platforms signed to

125
00:07:45,200 --> 00:07:48,400
Speaker 1: pledge and that they would follow this voluntary code, so

126
00:07:48,440 --> 00:07:53,239
Speaker 1: that includes Google and YouTube, meta primarily Facebook and LinkedIn.

127
00:07:53,400 --> 00:07:57,240
Speaker 1: They all signed it, along with like forty other platforms.

128
00:07:57,960 --> 00:08:00,920
Speaker 1: It also used to include X, but at last May

129
00:08:01,200 --> 00:08:03,560
Speaker 1: Elon Musk decided that X was going to peace out

130
00:08:03,600 --> 00:08:07,240
Speaker 1: of that voluntary code. Now, researchers in the EU say

131
00:08:07,280 --> 00:08:10,960
Speaker 1: that disinformation is spreading like wildfire on X and that

132
00:08:11,120 --> 00:08:14,200
Speaker 1: the problem is only getting worse. Also, X has recently

133
00:08:14,240 --> 00:08:16,840
Speaker 1: disabled a feature that used to allow users to report

134
00:08:16,880 --> 00:08:21,760
Speaker 1: cases of misinformation about elections. So this means, assuming those

135
00:08:21,840 --> 00:08:24,880
Speaker 1: EU researchers are right that X is not just the

136
00:08:25,000 --> 00:08:28,920
Speaker 1: worst when it comes to preventing misinformation and disinformation from

137
00:08:29,080 --> 00:08:33,160
Speaker 1: propagating across their system, they are actively turning off features

138
00:08:33,200 --> 00:08:35,760
Speaker 1: that would do anything about it, which is a big

139
00:08:35,760 --> 00:08:40,760
Speaker 1: old yikes. An article in the LGBTQ Nation reveals that

140
00:08:40,920 --> 00:08:45,120
Speaker 1: TikTok is working with the government of Kenya to restrict

141
00:08:45,200 --> 00:08:51,040
Speaker 1: and remove LGBTQ plus content from the platform within Kenya's borders. Now.

142
00:08:51,080 --> 00:08:55,920
Speaker 1: This is because Kenya's government has banned same sex sexual relationships,

143
00:08:56,200 --> 00:08:59,360
Speaker 1: and currently the government is also considering an additional law

144
00:08:59,520 --> 00:09:04,640
Speaker 1: that would hunish homosexuality with a lifetime prison sentence. TikTok

145
00:09:04,679 --> 00:09:08,480
Speaker 1: has already deplatformed and demonetized TikTok users in Kenya who,

146
00:09:08,520 --> 00:09:13,360
Speaker 1: according to the country's laws, have posted restricted content. Apparently,

147
00:09:13,760 --> 00:09:17,520
Speaker 1: TikTok CEO has committed to not only being more active

148
00:09:17,760 --> 00:09:22,120
Speaker 1: to remove LGBTQ plus content from the platform within Kenya,

149
00:09:22,200 --> 00:09:24,680
Speaker 1: but to also launch a campaign to urge users to

150
00:09:24,800 --> 00:09:30,600
Speaker 1: instead post quote unquote positive content, which sounds disturbingly close

151
00:09:30,640 --> 00:09:34,920
Speaker 1: to conversion therapy. In my opinion, it's really ugly stuff

152
00:09:34,920 --> 00:09:38,120
Speaker 1: and my heart goes out to the people of Kenya.

153
00:09:38,160 --> 00:09:40,960
Speaker 1: This week, Meta announced an update to its line of

154
00:09:40,960 --> 00:09:45,280
Speaker 1: smart glasses, previously known as Stories, but to be really

155
00:09:45,320 --> 00:09:48,559
Speaker 1: formal about they are now known as ray Ban Meta

156
00:09:48,600 --> 00:09:51,599
Speaker 1: smart Glasses. The glasses have a pair of cameras in

157
00:09:51,640 --> 00:09:54,600
Speaker 1: them when at the top of each corner of the frames,

158
00:09:55,320 --> 00:09:58,040
Speaker 1: and they contain five microphones that are meant to provide

159
00:09:58,040 --> 00:10:00,360
Speaker 1: better sound pickup when you use your glasses, you know,

160
00:10:01,120 --> 00:10:04,199
Speaker 1: take a phone call or something. They also have speakers

161
00:10:04,320 --> 00:10:06,040
Speaker 1: that the company says will make it easy for the

162
00:10:06,040 --> 00:10:09,440
Speaker 1: wearer to hear what's playing on their glasses, but it won't,

163
00:10:09,480 --> 00:10:11,839
Speaker 1: you know, irritate the living heck out of everybody else

164
00:10:11,840 --> 00:10:14,840
Speaker 1: who happens to be nearby. The glasses can take about

165
00:10:14,840 --> 00:10:19,000
Speaker 1: five hundred photos at twelve megapixel resolution or around one

166
00:10:19,080 --> 00:10:22,200
Speaker 1: hundred and thirty second long video clips at ten ADP

167
00:10:22,559 --> 00:10:24,720
Speaker 1: before you end up using up all the storage on

168
00:10:24,760 --> 00:10:27,680
Speaker 1: the device and it's time to offload stuff. The battery

169
00:10:27,760 --> 00:10:30,960
Speaker 1: reportedly is good for like four to six hours of use,

170
00:10:31,200 --> 00:10:33,400
Speaker 1: and they come in a case that can also serve

171
00:10:33,480 --> 00:10:35,880
Speaker 1: as a charger, and the case itself can hold enough

172
00:10:35,920 --> 00:10:38,600
Speaker 1: battery juice to recharge the glasses several times before the

173
00:10:38,640 --> 00:10:42,000
Speaker 1: case itself needs to be recharged. You can also live

174
00:10:42,040 --> 00:10:46,080
Speaker 1: stream while wearing these glasses too. The controls include both

175
00:10:46,120 --> 00:10:48,320
Speaker 1: a touch system and the stems of the eyeglasses and

176
00:10:48,480 --> 00:10:52,280
Speaker 1: voice commands, and essentially these things do some of, but

177
00:10:52,480 --> 00:10:56,560
Speaker 1: not all, of the stuff that Google Glass did years ago,

178
00:10:56,640 --> 00:10:59,280
Speaker 1: but they do look a lot better. They do not

179
00:10:59,440 --> 00:11:01,360
Speaker 1: as far as I can tell, create any sort of

180
00:11:01,760 --> 00:11:04,079
Speaker 1: ar view of the world around you, which Google Glass

181
00:11:04,080 --> 00:11:06,960
Speaker 1: could sort of do. And already folks are worried about

182
00:11:06,960 --> 00:11:09,480
Speaker 1: privacy issues with these glasses. They're concerned that you could

183
00:11:09,520 --> 00:11:11,840
Speaker 1: be on video or have someone snapping pictures of you

184
00:11:12,280 --> 00:11:15,199
Speaker 1: without your knowledge or consent. Now I get that concern.

185
00:11:15,400 --> 00:11:17,959
Speaker 1: It's a legit concern, don't get me wrong, But y'all,

186
00:11:17,960 --> 00:11:21,080
Speaker 1: that's already happening. There are so many cameras out there,

187
00:11:21,320 --> 00:11:24,200
Speaker 1: whether they're in phones or in security systems like in

188
00:11:24,320 --> 00:11:27,720
Speaker 1: door bells or in cars, So I pretty much guarantee

189
00:11:27,760 --> 00:11:32,320
Speaker 1: that you're on camera frequently throughout an average day. But

190
00:11:32,400 --> 00:11:34,720
Speaker 1: I do understand how it gets creepy when you're talking

191
00:11:34,720 --> 00:11:38,280
Speaker 1: about someone wearing the camera on their face. Anyway, Meta

192
00:11:38,320 --> 00:11:40,440
Speaker 1: is taking pre orders on these things, which start at

193
00:11:40,480 --> 00:11:43,400
Speaker 1: around two hundred and ninety nine US dollars, and they'll

194
00:11:43,400 --> 00:11:47,640
Speaker 1: start shipping in mid October. So maybe your Halloween costume

195
00:11:48,040 --> 00:11:52,400
Speaker 1: can be invasive surveillance. That's a fun one. All right,

196
00:11:52,640 --> 00:11:54,920
Speaker 1: We're gonna take a quick break and we're gonna come

197
00:11:54,960 --> 00:12:06,520
Speaker 1: back with more news in just a moment. We're back.

198
00:12:07,000 --> 00:12:10,320
Speaker 1: Reddit indicated this week that it will remove the opt

199
00:12:10,400 --> 00:12:14,600
Speaker 1: out feature for personalized ads, or at least some Reddit

200
00:12:14,679 --> 00:12:18,160
Speaker 1: users around the world. So the new policy says that

201
00:12:18,240 --> 00:12:22,000
Speaker 1: Reddit will take your activity on the platform and then

202
00:12:22,120 --> 00:12:24,720
Speaker 1: use that to decide which ads to display to you.

203
00:12:25,040 --> 00:12:26,920
Speaker 1: So let's say you spend a lot of time on

204
00:12:27,000 --> 00:12:30,360
Speaker 1: subreddits that are dedicated to gaming, Well, then you're more

205
00:12:30,480 --> 00:12:33,520
Speaker 1: likely to see ads related to gaming while on Reddit. Right.

206
00:12:33,559 --> 00:12:36,800
Speaker 1: It says this is for your benefit, But there are

207
00:12:36,800 --> 00:12:39,600
Speaker 1: a lot of users who are upset because the message

208
00:12:39,600 --> 00:12:41,800
Speaker 1: that they're picking up on is Reddit is determined to

209
00:12:41,840 --> 00:12:44,920
Speaker 1: track their behavior across the site and there's no way

210
00:12:44,960 --> 00:12:47,520
Speaker 1: to tell Reddit to knock it off. And while Reddit

211
00:12:47,559 --> 00:12:50,360
Speaker 1: says users all around the world will be able to

212
00:12:50,400 --> 00:12:54,240
Speaker 1: opt out of personalized advertising based off of quote unquote

213
00:12:54,640 --> 00:12:59,000
Speaker 1: information and activity from our partners, only users in select

214
00:12:59,040 --> 00:13:02,319
Speaker 1: locations will actually be able to opt out of personalized

215
00:13:02,360 --> 00:13:06,320
Speaker 1: ads based off their activity on Reddit itself. I'm guessing

216
00:13:06,520 --> 00:13:09,760
Speaker 1: those select locations will be places like the European Union,

217
00:13:10,080 --> 00:13:12,000
Speaker 1: which has some pretty strict rules in place when it

218
00:13:12,040 --> 00:13:15,080
Speaker 1: comes to user privacy, and any place that doesn't have

219
00:13:15,160 --> 00:13:17,439
Speaker 1: those kind of rules, Redd, it's going to be tracking

220
00:13:17,480 --> 00:13:21,240
Speaker 1: you like crazy. And now, the latest in the long

221
00:13:22,080 --> 00:13:27,720
Speaker 1: arduous story of Microsoft's plan to acquire Activision Blizzard. When

222
00:13:28,000 --> 00:13:31,240
Speaker 1: last we left our tail, Microsoft was working hard to

223
00:13:31,240 --> 00:13:34,360
Speaker 1: convince regulators in the UK that the deal would not

224
00:13:34,440 --> 00:13:37,480
Speaker 1: result in an anti competitive situation within the world of

225
00:13:37,520 --> 00:13:42,240
Speaker 1: console gaming in general and cloud based streaming gaming in particular.

226
00:13:42,880 --> 00:13:47,160
Speaker 1: Well last week that regulatory agency gave provisional approval to

227
00:13:47,200 --> 00:13:51,280
Speaker 1: the acquisition, so that roadblock was removed. But now the

228
00:13:51,360 --> 00:13:54,720
Speaker 1: United States Federal Trade Commission has once again objected to

229
00:13:54,800 --> 00:13:58,640
Speaker 1: this deal. Now, they previously attempted to secure an injunction

230
00:13:58,880 --> 00:14:03,480
Speaker 1: against the deal closing, but a US District Court judge

231
00:14:03,480 --> 00:14:06,800
Speaker 1: denied that request and said that the FTC had failed

232
00:14:06,840 --> 00:14:10,040
Speaker 1: to produce evidence that this deal would actually be harmful

233
00:14:10,160 --> 00:14:15,160
Speaker 1: toward competition. The FTC then appealed that ruling, but then

234
00:14:15,280 --> 00:14:19,000
Speaker 1: withdrew the complaint not that long afterward, and it turns

235
00:14:19,040 --> 00:14:22,360
Speaker 1: out that was temporary because now they have submitted the

236
00:14:22,400 --> 00:14:26,080
Speaker 1: appeal again to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Once

237
00:14:26,280 --> 00:14:31,400
Speaker 1: the regulators in the UK gave their provisional approval, and

238
00:14:31,880 --> 00:14:34,760
Speaker 1: then once the court actually gives a decision one way

239
00:14:34,920 --> 00:14:38,760
Speaker 1: or the other, the FTC plans on an evidentiary hearing

240
00:14:38,840 --> 00:14:42,400
Speaker 1: on the matter. Now This on the surface sounds bad

241
00:14:42,480 --> 00:14:46,040
Speaker 1: for Microsoft and Activision Blizzard, but they could still go

242
00:14:46,120 --> 00:14:48,560
Speaker 1: through with their deal because there's no injunction against it,

243
00:14:48,920 --> 00:14:51,640
Speaker 1: and that deal is scheduled to close on October eighteenth.

244
00:14:52,320 --> 00:14:54,320
Speaker 1: Then once the deal is closed, they can worry about

245
00:14:54,320 --> 00:14:57,320
Speaker 1: any ongoing legal issues they might face after the fact,

246
00:14:57,360 --> 00:15:00,400
Speaker 1: but by then the deal will already be done. So

247
00:15:00,480 --> 00:15:04,160
Speaker 1: what I'm seeing is that most analysts think this deal

248
00:15:04,200 --> 00:15:08,640
Speaker 1: will finally close next month, and now for a few

249
00:15:09,280 --> 00:15:13,040
Speaker 1: AI stories, it's always going to be that. In a

250
00:15:13,120 --> 00:15:18,040
Speaker 1: tech Stuff News episode, an SEO consultant named Gagan Gotra

251
00:15:18,440 --> 00:15:24,000
Speaker 1: brought some concerning information about Google Bard conversations. So it

252
00:15:24,080 --> 00:15:27,720
Speaker 1: turns out if someone has a conversation with google Bard,

253
00:15:27,840 --> 00:15:30,840
Speaker 1: which I'm just going to remind you that's Google's AI

254
00:15:31,040 --> 00:15:36,359
Speaker 1: powered chatbot. It's similar to Open AI's chat GPT, specifically,

255
00:15:36,720 --> 00:15:40,960
Speaker 1: as it is integrated with bing, well, if you then

256
00:15:41,080 --> 00:15:45,760
Speaker 1: share a link of that conversation with someone else, then

257
00:15:45,920 --> 00:15:51,720
Speaker 1: Google will actually index that conversation, which means that conversation

258
00:15:51,800 --> 00:15:55,240
Speaker 1: with google Bard can pop up in future search results.

259
00:15:55,640 --> 00:15:59,040
Speaker 1: So let's say that you and a coworker are using

260
00:15:59,080 --> 00:16:02,240
Speaker 1: google Bard to help develop a business plan and this

261
00:16:02,400 --> 00:16:04,720
Speaker 1: is something that you do not want to share outside

262
00:16:04,760 --> 00:16:08,960
Speaker 1: of your organization. When you share that conversational link to

263
00:16:09,000 --> 00:16:13,760
Speaker 1: your coworker, the link itself becomes indexable, and then Google's

264
00:16:13,760 --> 00:16:16,560
Speaker 1: web craller will index the conversation, and if someone else

265
00:16:16,640 --> 00:16:20,360
Speaker 1: uses the right search query, that conversation can potentially pop

266
00:16:20,480 --> 00:16:22,560
Speaker 1: up in those search results, and the information that you

267
00:16:22,680 --> 00:16:26,360
Speaker 1: intended to be private has now been made public. Now,

268
00:16:26,360 --> 00:16:30,040
Speaker 1: obviously there are all sorts of situations where indexing the

269
00:16:30,120 --> 00:16:33,120
Speaker 1: barred conversation could turn out to be a really bad thing.

270
00:16:33,960 --> 00:16:36,320
Speaker 1: It's not that different from when open Ai had an

271
00:16:36,360 --> 00:16:40,520
Speaker 1: issue with chat GPT, where the chatbot would occasionally give

272
00:16:40,720 --> 00:16:46,320
Speaker 1: users access to other users chat histories with the chatbot. Now,

273
00:16:46,800 --> 00:16:49,560
Speaker 1: in the Google case, we're not talking about a bug,

274
00:16:50,000 --> 00:16:53,160
Speaker 1: we're talking about a feature. Because Gotra had an exchange

275
00:16:53,560 --> 00:16:58,200
Speaker 1: with Google research scientist Peter Lieu, and Peter pointed out

276
00:16:58,400 --> 00:17:01,520
Speaker 1: that the search engine will only end conversations if someone

277
00:17:01,520 --> 00:17:05,000
Speaker 1: has clicked on the share button, and Goscher's reply was

278
00:17:05,040 --> 00:17:08,040
Speaker 1: the same one I would have made. Namely, I think

279
00:17:08,080 --> 00:17:11,440
Speaker 1: most users would just assume that share just means you've

280
00:17:11,440 --> 00:17:15,040
Speaker 1: elected to share that conversation with someone in particular not

281
00:17:15,320 --> 00:17:19,480
Speaker 1: the whole world in general, but that appears to be

282
00:17:19,600 --> 00:17:23,600
Speaker 1: the case. Once upon a time, when chat GPT first

283
00:17:23,600 --> 00:17:27,080
Speaker 1: splashed on the scene, the chatbot could only draw information

284
00:17:27,240 --> 00:17:31,840
Speaker 1: from before September twenty twenty one. It didn't have access

285
00:17:32,000 --> 00:17:36,240
Speaker 1: to the real time web. It could not crawl the

286
00:17:36,240 --> 00:17:39,119
Speaker 1: web for current information. So you could not ask it

287
00:17:39,160 --> 00:17:42,600
Speaker 1: about breaking news or anything like that because it literally

288
00:17:42,640 --> 00:17:46,159
Speaker 1: just could not access those information sources. Now, back in

289
00:17:46,240 --> 00:17:50,200
Speaker 1: July of this year, OpenAI created a subscription based tier

290
00:17:50,240 --> 00:17:53,440
Speaker 1: of service that would let users rely on chat GPT

291
00:17:53,640 --> 00:17:57,639
Speaker 1: through bing searches to access current information. But that feature

292
00:17:57,920 --> 00:18:01,600
Speaker 1: soon went away. Why because users figured out that they

293
00:18:01,600 --> 00:18:05,680
Speaker 1: could use this particular feature to bypass paywalls and get

294
00:18:05,720 --> 00:18:07,639
Speaker 1: to content that normally you would have to pay a

295
00:18:07,680 --> 00:18:11,879
Speaker 1: subscription to access. That's not exactly something that either open

296
00:18:11,920 --> 00:18:15,760
Speaker 1: ai or Microsoft wants to deal with, so the feature

297
00:18:15,760 --> 00:18:20,000
Speaker 1: went offline. But now it's come back. OpenAI announced yesterday

298
00:18:20,040 --> 00:18:23,480
Speaker 1: that through bing, it will let users access real time

299
00:18:23,520 --> 00:18:28,439
Speaker 1: information using the chatbot, and it calls this authoritative. Now.

300
00:18:28,480 --> 00:18:31,919
Speaker 1: I personally find that designation questionable given how chatbots like

301
00:18:32,000 --> 00:18:37,240
Speaker 1: chat GPT are prone to producing hallucinations or confabulations, which

302
00:18:37,280 --> 00:18:40,800
Speaker 1: just means sometimes they make stuff up. So I'm not

303
00:18:40,840 --> 00:18:44,600
Speaker 1: sure how authoritative you can actually claim to be. If

304
00:18:44,640 --> 00:18:47,560
Speaker 1: you've been following the union strikes in Hollywood, you likely

305
00:18:47,640 --> 00:18:50,520
Speaker 1: know that the Writer's Guild of America or WGA, has

306
00:18:50,560 --> 00:18:53,760
Speaker 1: reached a provisional agreement with the Alliance of Motion Pictures

307
00:18:53,760 --> 00:18:58,320
Speaker 1: and Television Producers aka the AMPTP. A lot of the

308
00:18:58,560 --> 00:19:02,600
Speaker 1: WGA's concerns relate to tech, ranging from how streaming companies

309
00:19:02,600 --> 00:19:06,159
Speaker 1: determine payouts like residuals, to the role of artificial intelligence

310
00:19:06,600 --> 00:19:10,800
Speaker 1: should play in film and television. The agreement, which WGA

311
00:19:10,880 --> 00:19:13,480
Speaker 1: members will have to ratify in a vote, essentially says

312
00:19:13,520 --> 00:19:15,919
Speaker 1: that the studios will not be able to compel writers

313
00:19:15,960 --> 00:19:19,280
Speaker 1: to use AI, that any content that does involve generative

314
00:19:19,320 --> 00:19:22,160
Speaker 1: AI has to be labeled as such, and that AI

315
00:19:22,320 --> 00:19:24,560
Speaker 1: is not eligible to get a writing credit. Now that's

316
00:19:24,600 --> 00:19:27,119
Speaker 1: important when it comes to things like payments and residuals

317
00:19:27,160 --> 00:19:30,480
Speaker 1: and so on, Considering the US courts have recently found

318
00:19:30,480 --> 00:19:33,679
Speaker 1: that AI generated material is not eligible for copyright, I

319
00:19:33,720 --> 00:19:36,960
Speaker 1: think these changes are ultimately of benefit to both the

320
00:19:36,960 --> 00:19:42,240
Speaker 1: writers and the producers. Meanwhile, the actor strike still goes on. Okay,

321
00:19:42,760 --> 00:19:46,960
Speaker 1: that's it for the news for today Thursday, September twenty eighth,

322
00:19:47,320 --> 00:19:51,000
Speaker 1: twenty twenty three. Next week, I'll be back in Atlanta

323
00:19:51,480 --> 00:19:54,560
Speaker 1: and episodes will return as normal. They'll probably sound more

324
00:19:54,640 --> 00:19:58,000
Speaker 1: like the older episodes and not weird because I'm recording

325
00:19:58,040 --> 00:20:01,040
Speaker 1: in some hotel room in Las Vegas. So I hope

326
00:20:01,160 --> 00:20:03,480
Speaker 1: you are all well, and I'll talk to you again

327
00:20:04,240 --> 00:20:13,960
Speaker 1: really soon. Tech Stuff is an iHeartRadio production. For more

328
00:20:14,000 --> 00:20:18,760
Speaker 1: podcasts from iHeartRadio, visit the iHeartRadio app, Apple Podcasts, or

329
00:20:18,800 --> 00:20:20,719
Speaker 1: wherever you listen to your favorite shows.