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Speaker 1: But knowledge to work and grow your business with c

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Speaker 1: i T. From transportation to healthcare to manufacturing. C i

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Speaker 1: T offers commercial lending, leasing, and treasury management services for

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Speaker 1: small and middle market businesses. Learn more at c i

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Speaker 1: T dot com put Knowledge to Work. Hello, and welcome

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Speaker 1: to another episode of the Odd Thoughts Podcast. I'm Tracy Alloway.

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Speaker 1: My normal co host Joe Wisenthal is away this episode,

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Speaker 1: but don't worry. I've found the perfect replacement. It is

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Speaker 1: Bloomberg reporter Sid Verma. So Sid, you're filling in for

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Speaker 1: Joe today. That means that we get to talk about

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Speaker 1: whatever we want basically, right, definitely, I mean, yeah, let's

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Speaker 1: be postmortem and talk about anything, all right. So, speaking

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Speaker 1: of postmodernism, I have a complaint, and it's it's aggrievance

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Speaker 1: of mine, which is, you know, you know, when other

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Speaker 1: people tell you that you should pursue your dreams. You'm

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Speaker 1: talking about the positivity industrial complex that runs America. The

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Speaker 1: same page. I wasn't quite talking about that, but you know, like,

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Speaker 1: if you want to be an actress, you should try

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Speaker 1: to be an actress, that's like the classic one. Or

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Speaker 1: if you want to be an astronaut, you should try

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Speaker 1: to be an astronaut, and then you always hear these

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Speaker 1: big success stories from all these people. Right, of course,

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Speaker 1: it's awful. There's a word for it though, Right. I

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Speaker 1: believe in managing expectations, So I wish that I fail,

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Speaker 1: and then if I succeed, I'm pleasantly surprised. Okay. But

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Speaker 1: the fact that we focus on all these celebrities who

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Speaker 1: have succeeded in life and they're sort of our base standard.

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Speaker 1: There's a concept that we use for that, and it's

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Speaker 1: called survivorship bias, right, And that's basically the mistake we

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Speaker 1: make that by concentrating on the people or things that

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Speaker 1: survived some certain process or situation that that's kind of

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Speaker 1: like the norm, right, just because they did it, they're there,

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Speaker 1: of course. Yeah, losers don't matter. That's that's how the

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Speaker 1: whole world is framed winners. Right. History also a classic example. Okay, so,

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Speaker 1: believe it or not, that concept can also be applied

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Speaker 1: to the markets. Yeah, I guess create a destruction of

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Speaker 1: capitalism is another way of putting it. I'm trying to

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Speaker 1: be really alpha male here and I'm gonna ask Simon,

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Speaker 1: why does it matter? You know? You know, survival of

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Speaker 1: the fittest destruction of capitalism. Why is this a problem?

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Speaker 1: That's what I'm going to be doing. Well, you just

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Speaker 1: give away our guest. We have the perfect person here

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Speaker 1: with us to talk about survivorship bias. It's Simon Hendrickson.

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Speaker 1: He works on the multi asset team of First State Investments,

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Speaker 1: and he has authored a fantastic paper all about this topic. Awesome,

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Speaker 1: should we bring him on? Definitely? You already be zump

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Speaker 1: to me. I scooped you. Okay, all right, Simon, thank

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Speaker 1: you so much for joining us today. Thank you for

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Speaker 1: having me. So I use that example about us focusing

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Speaker 1: on successful celebrities as the sort of baseline norm um.

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Speaker 1: Do you think that's the right way of looking at

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Speaker 1: survivorship bias. I think it's a pretty good way of

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Speaker 1: looking at it. In finance, you often hear things like

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Speaker 1: equities are going to do better in the long run,

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Speaker 1: and there are certain managers and fund managers who are

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Speaker 1: celebrated for their ability to beat the market. Well oftentimes

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Speaker 1: while we miss all these really really big events that

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Speaker 1: either destroy whole markets or as you say, sometimes people

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Speaker 1: are just lucky. So if we look at equities over

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Speaker 1: the long term, well, What people often mean is that

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Speaker 1: the US or the U K's equity markets or developed

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Speaker 1: markets have done really well. But what they don't necessarily

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Speaker 1: mean all the countries that didn't make it. Now, if

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Speaker 1: we talk about fund managers, well, imagine that you have

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Speaker 1: a hundred people were you gave the money and each

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Speaker 1: had to try to beat the market. Inevitably, at some

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Speaker 1: point you're going to have someone who's going to look

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Speaker 1: like a genius. But someone is always going to end

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Speaker 1: up looking like that. It's just chance. And it's really

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Speaker 1: important not to conflate luck with ability, but also really

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Speaker 1: important to be able to distinguish are we actually falling

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Speaker 1: for the survivorship bias in when we look at investments?

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Speaker 1: And does that mean that you have massive concentration risk

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Speaker 1: in your portfolio? Right? So, when you looked at survivorship

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Speaker 1: bias in the markets, where did you find the biggest

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Speaker 1: or the best example of this? You mentioned equities just then,

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Speaker 1: so I guess that's an obvious one. Well it is,

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Speaker 1: But if we look back, some of the some of

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Speaker 1: the really interesting event especially through history, has actually lippen

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Speaker 1: where you had catastrophic events. So my favorite is probably

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Speaker 1: back in nineteen seventeen where we had a revolution. Lennon

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Speaker 1: took over from this artist, and after when World War

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Speaker 1: One began the markets closed. Then if we look back

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Speaker 1: over the last fifty years before they actually closed, Russian

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Speaker 1: equity markets did remarkably well and they actually produced pretty

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Speaker 1: good returns. What what one happened? Equity market shot Everyone

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Speaker 1: thought that okay, when markets open, we're going to go

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Speaker 1: back to to the way they were. They opened up up.

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Speaker 1: You had two months of trading before the Russian Revolution

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Speaker 1: where where the communist expropriated all equity holders, so it

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Speaker 1: actually went to zero. I can imagine the investment bank

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Speaker 1: reports at that time where you have, by Russia, we

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Speaker 1: believe that the company's revolution will deliver stability, et cetera.

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Speaker 1: Do you think that's a problem about institutional memory? We

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Speaker 1: forget this um Financial market participants are basically forced to

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Speaker 1: be have unrealistic assumptions based on data that's effectively massaged.

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Speaker 1: I think it is because remember, at any point in time,

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Speaker 1: nobody actually knows what happens. So if you have a

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Speaker 1: let's say we know a probability of something happens, and

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Speaker 1: let's say it's seventy If you bet on the seventy

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Speaker 1: and it actually comes out, you're gonna look pretty smart.

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Speaker 1: But it doesn't mean that it was a good idea

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Speaker 1: not to protect against the last. So that just because

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Speaker 1: something happened doesn't mean that you were an idiot for

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Speaker 1: thinking the opposite. The problem is if you say things

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Speaker 1: like equities will always perform over the long run, you

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Speaker 1: end up having some thing's like Russia in your portfolio

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Speaker 1: if you don't know how to correct for that. I

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Speaker 1: hate to use these terms, but um, how would you

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Speaker 1: distinguish this concept from tail risk and black swan event?

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Speaker 1: Because I think a lot of people obviously very accustom

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Speaker 1: to those terms, um, and they were bandied around during

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Speaker 1: the financial crisis. But how is this conceptually different? I

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Speaker 1: would actually say that this is a property risk, a

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Speaker 1: proper catastrophic event which we don't know could happen. So

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Speaker 1: if we go back to our old friend Donald Rumsfeld

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Speaker 1: and the known knowns and unknown unknowns, if we look forward,

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Speaker 1: this is an unknown unknown something Where we look backwards

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Speaker 1: in terms of Russia, we knew that happened. But if

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Speaker 1: you remember, you need to correct for these type of things.

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Speaker 1: So say that you analyze a portfolio of world equity markets.

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Speaker 1: If you don't correct for all the constituencies that fall out,

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Speaker 1: all the companies that go bankrupt, you're going to have

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Speaker 1: a concentrated portfolio of all the really great companies. This

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Speaker 1: would be like if you knew that invest your money

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Speaker 1: with Berkshire had a way forty years ago, of course

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Speaker 1: you would do it, but at the time nobody really

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Speaker 1: knew this was a good idea. But I do think

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Speaker 1: that survivorship it is actually a proper, proper tail risk event,

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Speaker 1: and it's something where it's very hot to protect against

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Speaker 1: going forward. But if you and if you don't know

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Speaker 1: what to look for in the past, So this is

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Speaker 1: one of the areas where you can have a history

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Speaker 1: is really really important. But it's also important to have

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Speaker 1: very long time series. Yeah, so I think that's an

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Speaker 1: important point. And I really like the Russia example because

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Speaker 1: if you think about it, you know, if you were

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Speaker 1: a European investor in the early nineteen hundreds, Russia was

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Speaker 1: one of the great powers, So why wouldn't you invest

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Speaker 1: in that market? And you know, the idea that the

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Speaker 1: market was going to close down at some point was,

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Speaker 1: as you put it, a complete unknown unknown. But realistically

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Speaker 1: how do you protect yourself against that? Is it just

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Speaker 1: about having a wide variety of assets in your portfolio.

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Speaker 1: It's about having a lot of different risk drivers and

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Speaker 1: making sure that when you look at your portfolio that

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Speaker 1: you don't just look over a short horizon, but you

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Speaker 1: so look at what can actually happen. So, say the

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Speaker 1: idea of having what has been very popular over the

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Speaker 1: last sixty forty years, having a portfolio which is six

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Speaker 1: equities and bonds. Now, this has been a uniquely optimized

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Speaker 1: portfolio over the last forty years, and market conditions have

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Speaker 1: been great because one you started from a valuation point

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Speaker 1: where equities were really cheap and bonds were really cheap,

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Speaker 1: so you wrote the cycle. You also had the added

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Speaker 1: benefit of having negative correlation between the two. So when

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Speaker 1: equity fell, equities fell, which would be seven, you had

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Speaker 1: the dot com bubble, you had the Great Financial Crisis,

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Speaker 1: you actually saw bonds doing really well. That has not

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Speaker 1: been the case historically. So if you go back and

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Speaker 1: take England, and England is one of the good examples

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Speaker 1: because we actually have great data going back almost five years,

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Speaker 1: because the Bank of England is it's good at collecting data.

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Speaker 1: Then for three D and fifty out of the last

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Speaker 1: four hundred years you actually saw a positive correlation between

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Speaker 1: bondson and equities. So all the times of say wars

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Speaker 1: both actually behave like risk assets and they were not

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Speaker 1: good offsets. That's something that's hard for people to get

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Speaker 1: if all you've lived through, like me, were the last

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Speaker 1: twenty years of time where it was conventional system that

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Speaker 1: bonds and equities are good offsets. But knowledge to work

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Speaker 1: and grow your business with c i T from transportation

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Speaker 1: to healthcare to manufacturing. C i T offers commercial lending, leasing,

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Speaker 1: and treasury management services for small and middle market businesses.

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Speaker 1: Learn more at c i T dot com put knowledge

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Speaker 1: to work UM. Obviously, you know in the emerging market space,

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Speaker 1: if fuel you get, you fall out of benchmark industries,

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Speaker 1: if you don't have what the rating agencies want you

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Speaker 1: to have, if they look at institutional strengths and so forth.

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Speaker 1: So if you look at all those indicries, a lot

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Speaker 1: of those sovereigns are those were strong institutions UM, and

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Speaker 1: so you forget that. Actually there are a lot of

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Speaker 1: reasons why strong corporate structures matter for equities. That actually

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Speaker 1: matters to have a rule of law, and it seems

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Speaker 1: like institutional memory. Just to heart back on my my point,

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Speaker 1: because um, it seems to be forgotten by a lot

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Speaker 1: of investors. UM. So I guess it's just really hard

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Speaker 1: to kind of correct that impression because on day to

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Speaker 1: day trading, UM, you could go mad if you have

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Speaker 1: to revisit every single prior that you have. So I

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Speaker 1: think that's a very good point because what we've had

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Speaker 1: in terms of survivorship bias here is that the countries

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Speaker 1: that have done very well have in general been the

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Speaker 1: countries that have had strong institutions. There's a whole strand

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Speaker 1: of literature in the economic history body where the overarching

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Speaker 1: theme is that institutions really matter. And I tend to

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Speaker 1: make fun of them a little bit because it seems

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Speaker 1: a little bit simplified and well because obviously they do,

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Speaker 1: but they actually do. And this is obviously pretty important

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Speaker 1: as we look forward in terms of countries where we

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Speaker 1: now have big institutional changes. So think about Trump. Is

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Speaker 1: this just something that's going to happen and he's going

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Speaker 1: to disappear in four years? It might be. It also

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Speaker 1: might be that the institutions have dramatically changed, and this

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Speaker 1: is a structural break is the fact that Brexit is

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Speaker 1: going to happen a structural break for the ur Zone,

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Speaker 1: which as far as we can remember back has moved

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Speaker 1: forward in terms of integration. If this is a break,

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Speaker 1: then are we starting to having to look back to

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Speaker 1: history where European countries weren't trying to help each other,

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Speaker 1: but we're actually in conflict. And that's the sort of

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Speaker 1: thing where it's very important to know history. It's very

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Speaker 1: important to know that if you don't take these things

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Speaker 1: into account when you build a portfolio, oftentimes you end

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Speaker 1: up with concentration risk. And it's not enough just to say, well,

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Speaker 1: US has outperformed US equities have outperformed basically everything else

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Speaker 1: over the last hundred years. Well, yes they have, because

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Speaker 1: they were the best, most democratic, most best well functioning

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Speaker 1: country that has been there. So you end up having

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Speaker 1: to look at a variety of things. And one of

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Speaker 1: the things if you go from backward looking forward looking

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Speaker 1: is well, these type of things rule of law, it

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Speaker 1: really matters, and especially when you look at em we

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Speaker 1: know that it matters for equity returns, for bond returns,

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Speaker 1: and should we think about this where we live now.

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Speaker 1: I mean, if you look at Venezuela. It's everyone knows

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Speaker 1: that you're going to have to take appropriation risk that

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Speaker 1: they're actually not gonna gonna pay you back, or they

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Speaker 1: might not just expropriate some of the assets in the country. Well,

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Speaker 1: it's not really something that people have done. Developed markets

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Speaker 1: only think about. And one of the things that worries

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Speaker 1: me is that the people who were really really worried

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Speaker 1: about what has happened over the last year I tend

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Speaker 1: people who tend to do emerging markets or history. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: so that reminds me. But we did see at least

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Speaker 1: one rating agency talking about developed countries exhibiting more emerging

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Speaker 1: market risks, right, said, I seem to remember you writing

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Speaker 1: a story about that. Yeah, I mean, it was an

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Speaker 1: interesting statement from SMP stating the fact that institutional strength

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Speaker 1: has been one of the biggest anchors for high sovereign

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Speaker 1: ratings amongst developed markets, along with you know, strong capital markets, um,

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Speaker 1: et cetera. But now they say the strength of institutions

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Speaker 1: and the rule of law is now under question because

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Speaker 1: of this rise and populism. Um. I think your point

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Speaker 1: of earlier kind of really struck homes to me because

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Speaker 1: it seems that emerging market investors get much more concerned

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Speaker 1: about developed market risk than vice versa. And it seems

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Speaker 1: um like, yeah, that's part of that point, the survivorship,

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Speaker 1: but it seems to be extremely important. If you have

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Speaker 1: that perspectively, you understand the historic anchors for capital market performance.

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Speaker 1: And I think it's important to say that I don't

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Speaker 1: know what's going to happen, but I know which risks

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Speaker 1: are important to look for. So it might be that

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Speaker 1: the next hundred years are going to see amazing US

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Speaker 1: equities returns. But the situation is different, and just because

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Speaker 1: something happened over the last hundred years doesn't mean that

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Speaker 1: it's going to continue because, as we know, US were

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Speaker 1: the hedgemon and they actually won. Whereas if we are

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Speaker 1: in a situation where we've seen lots of these things

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Speaker 1: happen over time. So another one of my favorites is

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Speaker 1: back in the French Revolution when the Jacobeans came in

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Speaker 1: and they exprobriate a lot of church land. You have

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Speaker 1: other episodes in the twentieth century in Shanghai the communists

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Speaker 1: expropriated all of the equities as well, and you do

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Speaker 1: see these types of events. Well, what strikes me is

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Speaker 1: the fact that just looking at some of the data,

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Speaker 1: US assets have outperformed in real terms, nominal terms, risk

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Speaker 1: adjusted returns for the last one hundred years. So this

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Speaker 1: is American exceptionalism in capitalism. And how dare you question

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Speaker 1: American exceptionalism? Would be the naysayers to your narrative, which

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Speaker 1: is fair. But what I would say is try and

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Speaker 1: wind back a hundred years, who were going to be

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Speaker 1: the world hedgemon at the time. And then if you

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Speaker 1: look at returns for Germany versus the UK versus Soviet Union,

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Speaker 1: you end up with a discrepancy that is so big

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Speaker 1: that it's actually a hard to measure because there can

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Speaker 1: only be one winner. And over the last hundred years

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Speaker 1: German bonds you would have been returned basically nothing in

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Speaker 1: real terms, whereas you've had really good performance in in

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Speaker 1: the US. So the thing is, I'm not actually questioning

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Speaker 1: what has happened and the conventional wisdom as a world

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Speaker 1: over the last hundred years, just saying that it's very

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Speaker 1: important to look at these big episodes, whether it's going

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Speaker 1: to be political revolutions or hyper inflation, currency mismanagement, or

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Speaker 1: potentially wars. Look at those see what did capital markets

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Speaker 1: do in those type of situations, and how does that

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Speaker 1: actually affect affect the portfolio. And this is not something

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Speaker 1: that is likely to happen, but it's a useful exercise

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Speaker 1: for your mind to say, well, let's assume that the

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Speaker 1: world is not gonna be like it was over the

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Speaker 1: last ten years, what actually happens and do we have

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Speaker 1: too much risk into one scenario. It's kind of like, um,

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Speaker 1: a gloomy scenario though, isn't it, Because if you're taking

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Speaker 1: a really really long historical time frame of the world,

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Speaker 1: then you're almost ignoring whatever progress you might claim to

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Speaker 1: have been made over the past, you know, fifty years

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Speaker 1: or a hundred years. Is it's almost mean reversion to

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Speaker 1: what the Middle Ages. I don't know absolutely, if you

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Speaker 1: read someone like Pickeoty, you would actually say that the

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Speaker 1: last fifty years worth the anomaly, and that over time

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Speaker 1: we've generally seen that it is the high owners who

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Speaker 1: take most of their money home and you have massive inequality.

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Speaker 1: Now I'm not a massive fan of his theories, but

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Speaker 1: his data is really good and if you go back

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Speaker 1: and and see through history, we actually have had it

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Speaker 1: very well over the last hundred years. I mean, I

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Speaker 1: find this framework really useful, not just for thinking about

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Speaker 1: big global macro events and big terrorists, but just on

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Speaker 1: the simple concept of unrealistic assumptions. I mean, you've got

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Speaker 1: pension funds that are targeting, you know, UM, high inflation

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Speaker 1: adjusted returns UM, and they're complaining that they can't fulfill

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Speaker 1: these return targets. But it's not just because government born

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Speaker 1: yields are are low UM. It's because UM that it's

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Speaker 1: all based on benchmarks only UM cover the winners UM

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Speaker 1: and the losers always consigned to the dustbin of history

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Speaker 1: firstily and if we make it a little bit more tangible.

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Speaker 1: A lot of people have said that global financial crisis

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Speaker 1: looked a lot like the Great Depression. I think that's

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Speaker 1: a fair comparison if you go back and look at

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Speaker 1: as it returns. Let's assume that the UK and the

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Speaker 1: US are actually the template going forward. Bond returns were

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Speaker 1: really bad in nineteen fifties. You came from really really

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Speaker 1: low yield and they rose, which meant that equities did very,

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Speaker 1: very well the bonds didn't. We live in a world

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Speaker 1: where we've been used to double digit bond returns, and

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Speaker 1: at these levels, it's just not possible. Now, I don't

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Speaker 1: think we're gonna necessarily see bond deals that are going

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Speaker 1: to be double digit any anytime soon, but just the

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Speaker 1: return assumptions from say, pension funds, as you said it,

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Speaker 1: it's a little bit hard to imagine those actually coming

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Speaker 1: to fruit. Do you have any simple the for people

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Speaker 1: who mount the classic argument that this time is different,

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Speaker 1: you know, like secular stagnation will change bond returns or

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Speaker 1: alter portfolio balance, any sympathy at all for them. Now,

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Speaker 1: I'm a historian economic historian by education, and most things

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Speaker 1: have actually happened before. At any point in time, you

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Speaker 1: usually had people saying this time is different. Sometimes it's true.

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Speaker 1: Mostly those can be found in terms of technological progress,

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Speaker 1: in terms of political cycles, economic cycles. Things have a

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Speaker 1: tendency to repeat themselves. And when people say that this

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Speaker 1: time is different, well, this time was actually not that different.

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Speaker 1: You had the Great Depression, which was a pretty good

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Speaker 1: way of looking at the global financial crisis. Bond yills

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Speaker 1: did more or less what we would expect them to do,

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Speaker 1: and you have so many countries in the world that

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Speaker 1: it's not unlikely that we're going to see hyper inflation

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Speaker 1: going forward. Is not unlikely that we're going to see revolution.

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Speaker 1: We have wars all over, so I have sympathy that

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Speaker 1: things are not going to be the exact same, and

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Speaker 1: you need to be very careful how you actually look

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Speaker 1: at history and use it as a guide. But in

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Speaker 1: terms of things are great, and we are now in

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Speaker 1: the most peaceful time. As one author put it when

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Speaker 1: he said that we haven't seen a big war in

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Speaker 1: since the Second World War, I think that's misunderstanding what

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Speaker 1: it has actually driven history. And if we want to

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Speaker 1: tie this back to survivorship bias, one thing that I

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Speaker 1: haven't mentioned is that the most dangerous thing is that

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Speaker 1: all the things in history which we can't measure, so

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Speaker 1: oftentimes the thing that really drives survivorship bias are either

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Speaker 1: records that are lost, people who have died, or people

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Speaker 1: have disappeared. All well used to say that history is

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Speaker 1: written by the winners. This is very, very true. There

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Speaker 1: is not really any way to measure whether a conquering

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Speaker 1: country three back three years expropriated um, expropriated some assets

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Speaker 1: and never told anyone about it. Now we have a

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Speaker 1: lot of these stories, but I'm sure there are many more,

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Speaker 1: simply because nobody is really left to tell them and

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Speaker 1: if nobody documented them, well, even if they did. Try

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Speaker 1: to tell your friend a story and then see when

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Speaker 1: that story comes back to you from another friend how

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Speaker 1: much has changed. It's changed quite a bit. Usually, Well,

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Speaker 1: should we leave it on that? I feel like we

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Speaker 1: go into a dark place when Joe isn't around. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: I'm actually too scared to ask a follow up question

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Speaker 1: to Simon because I'm I'm worried about We can leave things,

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Speaker 1: but it's probably gonna be okay. It's just important to

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Speaker 1: be be like knowledgeable about these risks. And I'm not

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Speaker 1: saying that we're going to see a world things world

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Speaker 1: extinction event, but managing history. History has told us that

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Speaker 1: managing expectation is is not the worst thing you can do. Okay,

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Speaker 1: Simon Hendrickson from First State Investments, thank you so much

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Speaker 1: for joining us, so said, Have I scared you away

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Speaker 1: from the ad Thoughts podcast forever? Yeah? Maybe, I'm pretty

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Speaker 1: I think this is a useful framework to think about

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Speaker 1: the end of the world. Stroke tail risk, stroke equity market, stroke,

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Speaker 1: mutual fund performance UM. And I was very skeptical when

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Speaker 1: I heard of the concept because, as I said at

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Speaker 1: the you know, the outside. I wanted to be really

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Speaker 1: alpha about it and say, why do you lose this matter?

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Speaker 1: This is what makes capitavism is great. But yeah, you

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Speaker 1: realize that history really does matter, and it really flatters

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Speaker 1: the winners. It does make you think about core concepts

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Speaker 1: in investing, such as you know, if you're sat in

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Speaker 1: a developed market, you're probably mostly buying developed market assets

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Speaker 1: and should that be the case, And if you really

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Speaker 1: want to catch onto the next big thing, it might

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Speaker 1: not be the current big thing, right, Yeah, and that

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Speaker 1: totally can change. But if you look at the data

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Speaker 1: over the long haul UM, it will massage and airbrush

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Speaker 1: out all those lessons. And I thought that Simon's point

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Speaker 1: that we don't really know what happened. We don't know

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Speaker 1: which sovereign exprose created what assets, we don't know which

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Speaker 1: companies have failed because of all of the data. When

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Speaker 1: you look at it over the long haul, UM doesn't

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Speaker 1: provide those lessons. And I feel like institutional memory about

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Speaker 1: the importance of governance and structure and so forth is

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Speaker 1: it falls by the wayside. So yeah, it's a really

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Speaker 1: great framework. Actually, I'm going to think about this much more. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: and maybe there's like a holy grail historical documents somewhere

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Speaker 1: that would turn our entire viewpoint of markets and finance

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Speaker 1: on its head. But it's hidden away in you know,

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Speaker 1: like some ancient temple. Oh, you're saying that yield stone

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Speaker 1: don't move inversely tour prices and bond markets. I think

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Speaker 1: we're going to go and have to search for that

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Speaker 1: ancient text. All right, let's leave it there. I'm Tracy Allowit.

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Speaker 1: You can follow me on Twitter at Tracy Allowit, and

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Speaker 1: you can follow me on Twitter at under school sid Farma,

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00:25:24,720 --> 00:25:29,240
Speaker 1: and you can follow Simon Hendrickson at Simon h Underscore

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Speaker 1: d K. Put knowledge to work and grow your business

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00:25:46,040 --> 00:25:50,119
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