WEBVTT - Bonus: The Crypto Story by Matt Levine - Part 6

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<v Speaker 1>This is Bloomberg Crypto, a daily Bloomberg I Heard podcast,

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<v Speaker 1>and I'm Stacy Marie Ishmael, Managing editor of Crypto for

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<v Speaker 1>Bloomberg News. Let me cut to the chase. Matt Levine,

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<v Speaker 1>my colleague on the Bloomberg Opinion side of the house,

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<v Speaker 1>is perhaps the greatest finance blogger ever to do it,

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<v Speaker 1>and in what is both a flex and a service,

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<v Speaker 1>He's just written tens of thousands of words on the

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<v Speaker 1>subject of crypto for a special issue of Bloomberg Business Week.

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<v Speaker 1>Matt's gone deep into the blockchain to break down its origins,

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<v Speaker 1>it's possible, futures, and the current state of a technology

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<v Speaker 1>that's showing up everywhere in industries ranging from finance to

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<v Speaker 1>shipping too, of course video games. And we're going to

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<v Speaker 1>be bringing his exploration to you in audio form thanks

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<v Speaker 1>to the talents of Bloomberg editor and professional voice actor

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<v Speaker 1>Mark Ledoff. You'll get weekly chapters of the special Crypto

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<v Speaker 1>issue of Bloomberg Business Week. Welcome to the sixth chapter

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<v Speaker 1>of the special audio edition of the Bloomberg Business Week

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<v Speaker 1>Crypto issue, written by Matt Levine and narrated by Mark Ledoff. Mr.

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<v Speaker 1>Previous chapter and need to catch up. You can find

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<v Speaker 1>previous episodes right here in the Bloomberg Crypto podcast feed

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<v Speaker 1>d Defy. The thing about centralized crypto exchanges is that

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<v Speaker 1>they're centralized. Broadly speaking, you have to trust the people

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<v Speaker 1>running the exchange to run it in a good way,

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<v Speaker 1>not to steal customer money, not to get hacked, not

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<v Speaker 1>to take advantage of their knowledge of customer orders to

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<v Speaker 1>trade ahead, not to blow up by allowing too much leverage,

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<v Speaker 1>et cetera. Sometimes that trust is misplaced and the exchange

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<v Speaker 1>does steal the money. Sometimes the exchange is honest, careful,

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<v Speaker 1>and well regulated by the responsible national authorities. But still,

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<v Speaker 1>you're in crypto. You want to avoid trusting centralized intermediaries

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<v Speaker 1>and national regulation. Also, you're in crypto you want smart contracts.

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<v Speaker 1>A financial products exchange can be thought of as a

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<v Speaker 1>computer program. Most stock exchanges long ago got rid of

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<v Speaker 1>trading floors with human traders and are now just computer

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<v Speaker 1>servers matching electronic buy and sell orders. Certainly every crypto

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<v Speaker 1>exchange works like that. A centralized crypto exchange is fully electronic.

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<v Speaker 1>It has computers that keep ledgers of customer assets and

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<v Speaker 1>run the programs, matching orders and moving assets between customers.

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<v Speaker 1>The blockchain is already designed to keep a ledger of

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<v Speaker 1>customer assets, so why keep your assets on an exchanges ledger?

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<v Speaker 1>And you can on computer programs on Athereum or most

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<v Speaker 1>other modern blockchains, why not run the exchange programs there?

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<v Speaker 1>A venue for trading tokens that isn't a company but

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<v Speaker 1>is instead a set of smart contracts on a blockchain

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<v Speaker 1>is called a decentralized exchange or d e X, and

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<v Speaker 1>the broader idea of having a financial system with lending

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<v Speaker 1>and derivatives and everything else that runs as smart contracts

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<v Speaker 1>on a blockchain is called decentralized finance or DEFY. A

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<v Speaker 1>few more points of terminology. Decentralized finance is DEFY, so

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<v Speaker 1>centralized finance, meaning specifically the bits of crypto that use

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<v Speaker 1>centralized trusted intermediaries, mainly exchanges and lenders, is c FI,

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<v Speaker 1>and I will sometimes refer to defy things as protocols.

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<v Speaker 1>A protocol is a set of smart contracts, the computer

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<v Speaker 1>programs that run on the blockchain and do stuff, or

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<v Speaker 1>at least a set of rules for creating them. A

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<v Speaker 1>decentralized ex change isn't an exchange in the traditional sense.

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<v Speaker 1>It certainly isn't a building in New York where traders

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<v Speaker 1>meet in person to shout orders at each other. And

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<v Speaker 1>it also isn't a data center in New Jersey where

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<v Speaker 1>an exchange company keeps its computer service to match orders

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<v Speaker 1>with each other. It's a protocol, a set of smart

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<v Speaker 1>contracts that let people move cryptocurrencies around. There might be

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<v Speaker 1>a company involved, and surely someone is making money somewhere,

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<v Speaker 1>But even if the company goes away, the smart contracts

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<v Speaker 1>will keep running as long as the blockchain does. One

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<v Speaker 1>some background on exchanges and market makers one clob Here's

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<v Speaker 1>what an exchange is. People send it orders buy one

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<v Speaker 1>hundred shares at one hundred, sell one hundred shares at

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<v Speaker 1>a hundred two dollars, etcetera. The exchange is, at its heart,

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<v Speaker 1>a system for matching those orders, finding a buyer for

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<v Speaker 1>each seller, and vice versa. The orders come in at

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<v Speaker 1>different times. When the exchange gets an order to buy

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<v Speaker 1>one hundred chairs at one hundred dollars, it puts the

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<v Speaker 1>order on its order book, just an electronic list of

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<v Speaker 1>orders that haven't been executed yet. When it gets its

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<v Speaker 1>next order to sell one hundred shares for a hundred

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<v Speaker 1>two dollars. It looks at its order book to see

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<v Speaker 1>if there are any orders to buy one hundred chairs

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<v Speaker 1>at one hundred two dollars. Nope, not yet. The one

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<v Speaker 1>hundred dollar buyer doesn't want to pay one hundred two

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<v Speaker 1>dollars and the one two dollars seller doesn't want to

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<v Speaker 1>accept one hundred dollars. It puts the cell order on

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<v Speaker 1>the order book to the one hundred dollar buy order,

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<v Speaker 1>and the one D two dollars cell order rest on

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<v Speaker 1>the order book. Then another order comes in to buy

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<v Speaker 1>a hundred shares at a hundred and two dollars. The

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<v Speaker 1>exchange sees in the order book that a ha, yes,

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<v Speaker 1>there's an order to sell a hundred shares at a

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<v Speaker 1>hundred and two dollars. So the matching engine matches the

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<v Speaker 1>one D two dollar buy and the one D two

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<v Speaker 1>dollars cell order. They pair off with each other and

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<v Speaker 1>do their trade, and then the orders are removed from

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<v Speaker 1>the order book they've been filled, and the exchange waits

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<v Speaker 1>for the next order. In general, a centralized exchange will

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<v Speaker 1>have lots of orders resting on its order book at

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<v Speaker 1>any time. All the resting by orders will have lower

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<v Speaker 1>prices than all the resting cell orders. If a buy

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<v Speaker 1>order has a higher price than arresting cell order, those

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<v Speaker 1>two orders will pair off and execute with each other.

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<v Speaker 1>If I want to pay one three dollars and you

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<v Speaker 1>will accept a hundred two dollars, the exchange has found

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<v Speaker 1>a mutually beneficial trade. And this way of running an

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<v Speaker 1>exchange is usually called a central limit order book or

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<v Speaker 1>c l OB. You could certainly build a smart contract

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<v Speaker 1>to do this on the blockchain. The contract would take orders,

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<v Speaker 1>keep them on a central limit order book, and execute

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<v Speaker 1>them against each other. And smart contracts like this do exist,

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<v Speaker 1>but most d x is don't work this way. Two

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<v Speaker 1>market makers. You may ask, where do all these resting

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<v Speaker 1>orders come from? Who's going around thinking up these specific

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<v Speaker 1>prices they want to pay for a stock or prices

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<v Speaker 1>they want to sell for. Ordinary people might not bother

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<v Speaker 1>with this. If they think a stock is a good investment,

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<v Speaker 1>they will often send in market orders just buy from whoever,

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<v Speaker 1>selling at whatever the best prices. Resting orders come mainly

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<v Speaker 1>from professional investors called market makers, who help make fast

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<v Speaker 1>and efficient trading possible. Their job is to sell stock

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<v Speaker 1>or crypto or whatever to people who want to buy

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<v Speaker 1>and buy from people who want to sell and collect

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<v Speaker 1>the spread, the difference between their bid or buying price

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<v Speaker 1>and their offer or selling price. If you send a

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<v Speaker 1>market order to buy, you buy immediately, but you pay

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<v Speaker 1>a bit of money the spread to the market maker

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<v Speaker 1>for that service. The market maker, meanwhile, is in the

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<v Speaker 1>business of providing that service and collecting that spread. It's

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<v Speaker 1>not really betting that prices will go up or down.

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<v Speaker 1>In modern stock and crypto markets, market makers are also

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<v Speaker 1>largely computer programs, and their programs are pretty simple. This

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<v Speaker 1>is oversimplified, but not by that much. One post a

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<v Speaker 1>bid and an offer for a stock. Two. If someone

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<v Speaker 1>sells you stock at your bid price, lower your bid

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<v Speaker 1>and offer slightly. If someone immediately hits your bid, then

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<v Speaker 1>you might worry that your bid was actually too high

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<v Speaker 1>and you could have paid less. Anyway, Now you own

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<v Speaker 1>some stock and want to get rid of it, so

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<v Speaker 1>you might as well put it on sale. Three, if

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<v Speaker 1>someone buy stock from you at your offer price, raise

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<v Speaker 1>your bid and offer slightly for similar reasons. For keep

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<v Speaker 1>doing this. The system is self correcting. The more stock

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<v Speaker 1>people want to sell you, the less you pay them

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<v Speaker 1>for it. The more they want to buy from you,

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<v Speaker 1>the more you charge them. Hopefully it all balances out

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<v Speaker 1>and you end up flat. You sell all the stock

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<v Speaker 1>you bought and buy all the stock you sold, and

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<v Speaker 1>you collect the spread along the way. Five. Also, you're

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<v Speaker 1>probably keeping an eye on general market conditions and raising

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<v Speaker 1>and lowering your bids and offers based on what's happening

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<v Speaker 1>in other markets. Market Makers in US stocks are often

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<v Speaker 1>called high frequency traders or sometimes even flashboys, and part

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<v Speaker 1>of what that means is that they're constantly changing the

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<v Speaker 1>prices of their orders as their information changes. And the

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<v Speaker 1>result is that when you want to buy a share

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<v Speaker 1>of stock, you can send in a market order and

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<v Speaker 1>you will quickly trade with a market maker at a

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<v Speaker 1>price that's pretty much the market price, one that's updated

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<v Speaker 1>continuously to reflect supply and demand and all available information. Three. Nope,

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<v Speaker 1>this doesn't work on the blockchain. The problem with the

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<v Speaker 1>blockchain is that it's a slow computer. Ethereum runs computer

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<v Speaker 1>programs by sending them to thousands of nodes to confirm transactions,

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<v Speaker 1>and that takes time. You wouldn't want to run a

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<v Speaker 1>self driving car on the Ethereum virtual machine. It turns out,

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<v Speaker 1>you wouldn't want to run a high free concete trading

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<v Speaker 1>platform there either centralized exchanges in traditional finance and in

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<v Speaker 1>crypto have lots of very fast computers with very fast

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<v Speaker 1>connections that allow market makers to constantly update their prices

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<v Speaker 1>in response to trades and new information. Traders build fancy

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<v Speaker 1>fiber optic lines to get their orders to the exchange

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<v Speaker 1>a few milliseconds faster than the competition speed matters, and

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<v Speaker 1>they update their orders many times a second. This is

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<v Speaker 1>harder when the computers are on the blockchain. It's also

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<v Speaker 1>more expensive. Every action in Ethereum requires gas fees, and

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<v Speaker 1>sending a message to a smart contract saying cancel my

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<v Speaker 1>buy order at one point oh one dollars and put

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<v Speaker 1>in a new order at one point two dollars would

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<v Speaker 1>use Ethereum's computer power and cost gas. It turns out

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<v Speaker 1>this is nearly fatal for clob market making. In Ethereum,

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<v Speaker 1>market making is very expensive. Vitallicquterian wrote as creating an

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<v Speaker 1>order and removing a order both take gas fees, even

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<v Speaker 1>if the orders are never finalized. Two automated market makers

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<v Speaker 1>one mechanics. So Vitallic proposed a different idea here. It

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<v Speaker 1>is the mechanism would be a smart contract that holds

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<v Speaker 1>A tokens of type T one and be tokens of

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<v Speaker 1>type T two, and maintains the invariant that A times

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<v Speaker 1>B equals K for some constant K. In the version

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<v Speaker 1>where people can invest, K can change, but only during

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<v Speaker 1>investment withdrawal transactions, not trades. Anyone can buy or sell

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<v Speaker 1>by selecting a new point on the X Y equals

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<v Speaker 1>K curve and supplying the missing A tokens and in

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<v Speaker 1>exchange receiving the extra B tokens, or vice versa. The

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<v Speaker 1>marginal price is simply the implicit derivative of the curve

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<v Speaker 1>x y equals K or y slash x. That's just

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<v Speaker 1>a comment that he wrote on Reddit. Later, a whole

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<v Speaker 1>business model grew out of it. Here's the simplified version.

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<v Speaker 1>I decided to be a market maker in some token pair,

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<v Speaker 1>say ethereum and U s d C. A dollar denominated

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<v Speaker 1>stable coin. Let's say one Ether currently trades for six

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<v Speaker 1>d U s d C six hundred dollars. I set

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<v Speaker 1>up a smart contract. Again, that's a computer program on

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<v Speaker 1>the blockchain, but in this case it might be easier

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<v Speaker 1>to think of it as a pot of money managed

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<v Speaker 1>by the computer program. I can deposit both ether and

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<v Speaker 1>USDC into this pot. Anyone who wants to buy ether

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<v Speaker 1>with U s DC or sell either for U s

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<v Speaker 1>DC can come to my smart contract and make that

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<v Speaker 1>trade with it, and the contract will adjust its prices

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<v Speaker 1>to reflect supply and demand. But it will do it

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<v Speaker 1>in an absurdly simple manner that doesn't require much in

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<v Speaker 1>the way of computation or updating prices. It will just

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<v Speaker 1>try to keep one number constant. When I set up

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<v Speaker 1>the contract, I deposited equal values of ether and U

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<v Speaker 1>s d C. If one ether was worth sixteen hundred

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<v Speaker 1>U s DC, I put in one hundred ether and

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<v Speaker 1>one hundred sixty thousand U s DC each set of

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<v Speaker 1>tokens worth a hundred and sixty thousand dollars. The program

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<v Speaker 1>multiplies those two numbers one hundred times one hundred sixty

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<v Speaker 1>thousand is sixteen million, and then it will just hold

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<v Speaker 1>that product constant. That is, the number of Ether multiplied

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<v Speaker 1>by the number of U s DC will always be

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<v Speaker 1>sixteen million. A trader will try to buy, say ten Ether,

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<v Speaker 1>that would leave ninety ether in the fund. Sixteen million

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<v Speaker 1>divided by ninety is one hundred seventy seven thousand, seven

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<v Speaker 1>hundred and seventy seven point seventy eight. The pot has

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<v Speaker 1>one hundred sixty thousand U s DC now, so it

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<v Speaker 1>will need seventeen thousand, seven hundred and seventy seven point

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<v Speaker 1>seventy eight more U s DC to keep the product constant.

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<v Speaker 1>That's what my smart contract charges. The trader has to

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<v Speaker 1>pay me seventeen thousand, seven hundred seventy seven point seventy

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<v Speaker 1>eight U s d c one thousand, seven seventy seven

0:14:03.320 --> 0:14:06.480
<v Speaker 1>point seven seventy eight U s DC per Ether to

0:14:06.640 --> 0:14:09.880
<v Speaker 1>do this trade. Someone wants to buy ether from my

0:14:10.000 --> 0:14:13.760
<v Speaker 1>smart contract, So my smart contract automatically raises its price

0:14:13.840 --> 0:14:16.840
<v Speaker 1>for Ether. But it doesn't have to go around constantly

0:14:16.920 --> 0:14:21.440
<v Speaker 1>updating prices and posting new prices on central limit order books.

0:14:21.800 --> 0:14:25.800
<v Speaker 1>It just advertises its constant product and that updates prices

0:14:25.840 --> 0:14:29.080
<v Speaker 1>on its own. It's a kind of automated market maker,

0:14:29.240 --> 0:14:33.680
<v Speaker 1>or a m M. That's cool. I don't know it's cool.

0:14:34.240 --> 0:14:37.320
<v Speaker 1>This isn't a thing that really exists in traditional finance.

0:14:37.720 --> 0:14:40.840
<v Speaker 1>It was developed almost by accident, as a workaround to

0:14:40.880 --> 0:14:44.680
<v Speaker 1>a novel problem that the computers are too expensive in

0:14:44.800 --> 0:14:49.600
<v Speaker 1>decentralized finance. You might be asking, wait, how do I

0:14:49.680 --> 0:14:52.840
<v Speaker 1>know the price charged by the smart contract is correct?

0:14:53.600 --> 0:14:57.040
<v Speaker 1>Is the computer program ever checking Ether's price quoted on say,

0:14:57.280 --> 0:15:00.520
<v Speaker 1>coin base to make sure it's price makes sense? No,

0:15:01.360 --> 0:15:04.440
<v Speaker 1>insofar as demand for ether by people interacting with the

0:15:04.480 --> 0:15:07.680
<v Speaker 1>contract reflects demand for either in the rest of the world,

0:15:08.000 --> 0:15:10.880
<v Speaker 1>than the price created by the contract is the price.

0:15:11.640 --> 0:15:15.600
<v Speaker 1>Sometimes different smart contracts and different centralized exchanges could have

0:15:15.680 --> 0:15:18.240
<v Speaker 1>different prices for ether, But if they get two out

0:15:18.280 --> 0:15:20.720
<v Speaker 1>of whack, people can try to buy ether where it's

0:15:20.800 --> 0:15:23.200
<v Speaker 1>cheap and sell it where it's expensive for a quick

0:15:23.200 --> 0:15:29.640
<v Speaker 1>profit and close that gap two LPs. In my description above,

0:15:30.000 --> 0:15:32.040
<v Speaker 1>I assume that I want to be a market maker

0:15:32.120 --> 0:15:34.880
<v Speaker 1>in some currency pair, so I set up a smart

0:15:34.920 --> 0:15:37.880
<v Speaker 1>contract to do it on my own. In reality, the

0:15:37.920 --> 0:15:41.080
<v Speaker 1>way d X is normally work is that a MM

0:15:41.160 --> 0:15:44.520
<v Speaker 1>smart contracts pool liquidity. If you want to be a

0:15:44.520 --> 0:15:47.240
<v Speaker 1>market maker in stocks, it helps to be a large

0:15:47.280 --> 0:15:50.960
<v Speaker 1>financial institution in crypto. Anyone who wants to be a

0:15:50.960 --> 0:15:53.520
<v Speaker 1>market maker in a pair of tokens can contribute that

0:15:53.600 --> 0:15:57.200
<v Speaker 1>pair to a liquidity pool and get back liquidity tokens

0:15:57.200 --> 0:16:01.480
<v Speaker 1>representing their stake in that pool. Their call liquidity providers.

0:16:01.960 --> 0:16:05.480
<v Speaker 1>They collect fees in crypto for providing liquidity in the pool.

0:16:06.360 --> 0:16:09.680
<v Speaker 1>There's a risk though in general, if you provide liquidity

0:16:09.720 --> 0:16:13.760
<v Speaker 1>in an asset in defy or centralized finance, in crypto

0:16:13.920 --> 0:16:17.840
<v Speaker 1>or otherwise, and the asset price steadily goes down, you'll

0:16:17.880 --> 0:16:20.320
<v Speaker 1>find yourself buying more and more of it, and it

0:16:20.320 --> 0:16:23.360
<v Speaker 1>will be worth less and less. In an a MM

0:16:23.480 --> 0:16:26.720
<v Speaker 1>liquidity pool, if the price of one token keeps going

0:16:26.840 --> 0:16:29.480
<v Speaker 1>up against the other token, the pool will have more

0:16:29.520 --> 0:16:32.320
<v Speaker 1>and more of the token worth less and less. This

0:16:32.440 --> 0:16:35.800
<v Speaker 1>is a risk that all market makers take in traditional finance,

0:16:35.840 --> 0:16:40.680
<v Speaker 1>it's sometimes called adverse selection. In defy, though it delights

0:16:40.680 --> 0:16:44.640
<v Speaker 1>in the name impermanent laws. I don't know why, but

0:16:44.720 --> 0:16:48.680
<v Speaker 1>I love it. There's nothing particularly impermanent about it unless

0:16:48.720 --> 0:16:51.800
<v Speaker 1>the price bounces back, of course, but that's what it's called.

0:16:52.440 --> 0:16:56.600
<v Speaker 1>Crypto is so optimistic. How can you not be charmed.

0:16:58.400 --> 0:17:00.720
<v Speaker 1>We'll be right back with more from Berg Business Week

0:17:00.760 --> 0:17:03.920
<v Speaker 1>special Crypto issue, written by Matt Levin a narrated by

0:17:03.920 --> 0:17:19.240
<v Speaker 1>Mark Ladoff. Three lending exchanges providing liquidity between different tokens

0:17:19.400 --> 0:17:22.240
<v Speaker 1>are a key function of defy, but there are others.

0:17:22.640 --> 0:17:28.080
<v Speaker 1>One important function is lending one secured. Most defied lending

0:17:28.160 --> 0:17:31.440
<v Speaker 1>is what you would call in traditional finance margin lending.

0:17:32.040 --> 0:17:35.280
<v Speaker 1>You have a volatile asset ether, say, and you want

0:17:35.280 --> 0:17:39.560
<v Speaker 1>to borrow some money a dollar like USDC stable coin, say,

0:17:39.840 --> 0:17:43.720
<v Speaker 1>using that volatile asset as collateral. Perhaps you're borrowing that

0:17:43.800 --> 0:17:47.119
<v Speaker 1>money to buy more volatile assets, or perhaps you're borrowing

0:17:47.160 --> 0:17:49.520
<v Speaker 1>against your ether to buy a sandwich or a house

0:17:49.600 --> 0:17:52.879
<v Speaker 1>without selling your either. If you went to a broker

0:17:52.960 --> 0:17:55.480
<v Speaker 1>for a margin loan against one d dollars of stock,

0:17:55.760 --> 0:17:59.920
<v Speaker 1>the broker might lend you fifty dollars. It's over collateralized

0:18:00.119 --> 0:18:02.680
<v Speaker 1>because the stock is worth more than the loan, which

0:18:02.680 --> 0:18:05.880
<v Speaker 1>makes the broker feel safe. If the stock then fell

0:18:05.960 --> 0:18:08.960
<v Speaker 1>to seventy dollars, the broker might send you a margin call.

0:18:09.480 --> 0:18:12.320
<v Speaker 1>Pay down fifteen dollars of this loan, or I'll liquidate

0:18:12.359 --> 0:18:15.640
<v Speaker 1>your stock. That way, it's less likely the broker will

0:18:15.720 --> 0:18:17.960
<v Speaker 1>end up holding the bag for your loss if the

0:18:18.000 --> 0:18:21.600
<v Speaker 1>stock keeps falling. If you failed to meet the margin call,

0:18:21.920 --> 0:18:25.679
<v Speaker 1>the broker would sell your stock clear, say sixty dollars

0:18:25.720 --> 0:18:28.479
<v Speaker 1>for it, keep enough money to repay the loan, and

0:18:28.520 --> 0:18:32.080
<v Speaker 1>give you what's left. This is pretty straightforward to automate

0:18:32.119 --> 0:18:36.200
<v Speaker 1>with smart contracts. There are robust. Defied lending systems such

0:18:36.240 --> 0:18:40.840
<v Speaker 1>as compound Lenders put up tokens and earn interest. Borrowers

0:18:40.920 --> 0:18:45.719
<v Speaker 1>borrow tokens overcollateralized by other tokens and pay interest. And

0:18:45.800 --> 0:18:48.760
<v Speaker 1>automatic liquidation provisions make sure that if the value of

0:18:48.760 --> 0:18:51.520
<v Speaker 1>the collateral goes down, it's sold to pay back the

0:18:51.560 --> 0:18:57.879
<v Speaker 1>loans two unsecured. What's much harder in defied are the

0:18:57.880 --> 0:19:03.080
<v Speaker 1>main businesses of traditional finance, unsecured lending and lending secured

0:19:03.080 --> 0:19:07.359
<v Speaker 1>by physical assets such as houses. Defy is good at

0:19:07.440 --> 0:19:12.040
<v Speaker 1>lending crypto secured by crypto. The collateral lives on the blockchain,

0:19:12.400 --> 0:19:15.760
<v Speaker 1>the loan lives on the blockchain. They're connected by smart

0:19:15.800 --> 0:19:19.960
<v Speaker 1>contracts on the blockchain. It's all pretty neat, but this

0:19:20.040 --> 0:19:23.880
<v Speaker 1>sort of lending crypto against crypto doesn't do much. It's

0:19:23.920 --> 0:19:28.560
<v Speaker 1>mostly useful for crypto speculation. You lend ether, get us

0:19:28.640 --> 0:19:32.800
<v Speaker 1>DC and use it to buy even more ether. By contrast,

0:19:33.000 --> 0:19:35.320
<v Speaker 1>a mortgage lets you buy a house and then pay

0:19:35.359 --> 0:19:38.640
<v Speaker 1>for it with your future income. An unsecured business loan

0:19:38.720 --> 0:19:40.720
<v Speaker 1>helps you build a business and then pay off the

0:19:40.760 --> 0:19:44.800
<v Speaker 1>loan with the business's future earnings. Finance at its heart

0:19:45.200 --> 0:19:48.200
<v Speaker 1>is about moving future wealth into the present by borrowing,

0:19:48.640 --> 0:19:52.320
<v Speaker 1>or moving present wealth into the future by saving. There

0:19:52.320 --> 0:19:55.679
<v Speaker 1>are deep philosophical reasons that crypto is bad at this.

0:19:56.480 --> 0:19:59.960
<v Speaker 1>An unsecured loan is essentially about trust. It's about the

0:20:00.080 --> 0:20:02.720
<v Speaker 1>lender trusting that she'll be repaid not out of a

0:20:02.760 --> 0:20:05.800
<v Speaker 1>pool of collateral, but out of the borrower's future income.

0:20:06.400 --> 0:20:09.040
<v Speaker 1>She has to trust that the borrower will have future

0:20:09.040 --> 0:20:13.200
<v Speaker 1>income and that he will pay. Relatedly, an unsecured loan

0:20:13.320 --> 0:20:17.159
<v Speaker 1>requires identity. You need to know who's borrowing the money,

0:20:17.440 --> 0:20:20.240
<v Speaker 1>what their payment history looks like, what their income is.

0:20:20.800 --> 0:20:24.600
<v Speaker 1>The default approach and much of crypto is pseudonymity. Anyone

0:20:24.720 --> 0:20:27.280
<v Speaker 1>can set up any number of crypto wallets or bitcoin

0:20:27.320 --> 0:20:30.400
<v Speaker 1>account numbers, and they're generally not tied to a name.

0:20:31.040 --> 0:20:34.280
<v Speaker 1>If you borrow money against crypto collateral, all your lender

0:20:34.320 --> 0:20:37.000
<v Speaker 1>needs to know is that the collateral is on the blockchain.

0:20:37.560 --> 0:20:40.720
<v Speaker 1>If you borrow money against your future income, your lender

0:20:40.800 --> 0:20:44.400
<v Speaker 1>needs to know who you are. That said, there's nothing

0:20:44.400 --> 0:20:48.120
<v Speaker 1>in principle to prevent unsecured lending in defy, and there

0:20:48.119 --> 0:20:51.440
<v Speaker 1>are projects such as Goldfinch that do it. You get

0:20:51.480 --> 0:20:54.680
<v Speaker 1>together a smart contract where people deposit money in exchange

0:20:54.680 --> 0:20:58.800
<v Speaker 1>for tokens and a DOW, a decentralized autonomous organization that

0:20:58.840 --> 0:21:01.840
<v Speaker 1>controls the money. The tokens give them a share in

0:21:01.880 --> 0:21:04.320
<v Speaker 1>the tao's profits and the right to vote on who

0:21:04.359 --> 0:21:09.000
<v Speaker 1>gets the money. People propose potential borrowers, token holders consider

0:21:09.080 --> 0:21:11.520
<v Speaker 1>them and vote, and if the holders vote yes, then

0:21:11.560 --> 0:21:14.719
<v Speaker 1>they make a loan. As with any dow, the token

0:21:14.720 --> 0:21:17.240
<v Speaker 1>holders can get together in a chat room and consider

0:21:17.400 --> 0:21:20.720
<v Speaker 1>off chain information. If they want, they could make the

0:21:20.760 --> 0:21:23.680
<v Speaker 1>borrowers send in a driver's license in two bank statements.

0:21:24.280 --> 0:21:27.480
<v Speaker 1>You can build some incentive mechanism to punish members for

0:21:27.560 --> 0:21:31.919
<v Speaker 1>proposing borrowers who default and reward them for proposing good borrowers.

0:21:32.560 --> 0:21:36.280
<v Speaker 1>Decentralized finance is made up of smart contracts, but it's

0:21:36.280 --> 0:21:38.600
<v Speaker 1>also made up of people, and if they want to

0:21:38.640 --> 0:21:42.800
<v Speaker 1>do unsecured lending, they can. We've talked about web three

0:21:42.880 --> 0:21:47.000
<v Speaker 1>as a source of online reputation about soul bound tokens

0:21:47.000 --> 0:21:49.920
<v Speaker 1>that could be used to verify a person's actions, connections,

0:21:49.920 --> 0:21:54.280
<v Speaker 1>and characteristics. A soul in this terminology is something close

0:21:54.320 --> 0:21:56.879
<v Speaker 1>to a credit report. It's a list of stuff that

0:21:56.920 --> 0:21:59.520
<v Speaker 1>a person has done that should make you trust them.

0:21:59.560 --> 0:22:03.760
<v Speaker 1>A decent centralized and blockchained source of reputation information. The

0:22:03.840 --> 0:22:06.879
<v Speaker 1>right assortment of degrees and endorsements might make you feel

0:22:06.880 --> 0:22:10.080
<v Speaker 1>good enough about a person or rather a soul an

0:22:10.080 --> 0:22:13.280
<v Speaker 1>address on the blockchain that you give them an unsecured loan,

0:22:14.000 --> 0:22:16.800
<v Speaker 1>and then I suppose if they default, you can take

0:22:16.840 --> 0:22:23.760
<v Speaker 1>their soul four token omics of defy. The basic mechanism

0:22:23.840 --> 0:22:26.159
<v Speaker 1>of defy is that you put some tokens up in

0:22:26.200 --> 0:22:29.679
<v Speaker 1>a smart contract to generate fees or interest. You put

0:22:29.720 --> 0:22:32.600
<v Speaker 1>your tokens in an automated market making contract to get

0:22:32.640 --> 0:22:35.879
<v Speaker 1>liquidity provider fees, You put your tokens in a lending

0:22:35.920 --> 0:22:40.080
<v Speaker 1>protocol to get interest, etcetera. Generally, this is referred to

0:22:40.160 --> 0:22:43.800
<v Speaker 1>as locking your tokens because they're being used for lending

0:22:43.920 --> 0:22:46.600
<v Speaker 1>or whatever, you can't get them back for some period,

0:22:47.080 --> 0:22:49.960
<v Speaker 1>and people often talk about defy protocols in terms of

0:22:49.960 --> 0:22:55.000
<v Speaker 1>their TVL or total value locked. Mechanically, the way this

0:22:55.119 --> 0:22:57.760
<v Speaker 1>generally works is that you send your tokens to the

0:22:57.800 --> 0:23:00.879
<v Speaker 1>smart contract and it sends you back other tokens that

0:23:00.920 --> 0:23:04.959
<v Speaker 1>are basically receipts for the tokens you locked up. Instead

0:23:05.000 --> 0:23:08.920
<v Speaker 1>of having ether or USDC, you have liquidity provider tokens.

0:23:08.960 --> 0:23:12.639
<v Speaker 1>Saying you've put some ether and USDC into a smart contract.

0:23:13.560 --> 0:23:17.480
<v Speaker 1>What do you do with those liquidity provider tokens. Well,

0:23:17.600 --> 0:23:20.240
<v Speaker 1>in theory, you hold them until you want your locked

0:23:20.280 --> 0:23:22.840
<v Speaker 1>tokens back, and then you hand them in and get

0:23:22.880 --> 0:23:26.639
<v Speaker 1>back the underlying tokens. The liquidity provider tokens are just

0:23:26.680 --> 0:23:30.200
<v Speaker 1>a receipt. But at some point people realized that those

0:23:30.240 --> 0:23:34.600
<v Speaker 1>tokens represent something of value. We can do something with them.

0:23:34.640 --> 0:23:36.720
<v Speaker 1>If you have a token representing a receipt on some

0:23:36.800 --> 0:23:39.720
<v Speaker 1>ether that you locked into a smart contract, then that's

0:23:39.880 --> 0:23:42.960
<v Speaker 1>almost as good as having some ether, and someone might

0:23:43.000 --> 0:23:45.840
<v Speaker 1>give you some money for it. Now you can borrow

0:23:45.920 --> 0:23:51.040
<v Speaker 1>against those receipt tokens and defied too. Everything is like this.

0:23:51.720 --> 0:23:54.760
<v Speaker 1>In proof of steak ethereum, you can steak ether to

0:23:54.920 --> 0:23:59.200
<v Speaker 1>earn staking rewards. A protocol called Leedo runs a big

0:23:59.240 --> 0:24:02.679
<v Speaker 1>steaking pool. If you stake your ether with Lido, it

0:24:02.720 --> 0:24:04.800
<v Speaker 1>will give you back a token called s t e

0:24:04.960 --> 0:24:08.720
<v Speaker 1>t H, basically a receipt for your staked ether. The

0:24:08.800 --> 0:24:11.760
<v Speaker 1>ether that you staked with Ledo will earn staking rewards,

0:24:12.000 --> 0:24:14.280
<v Speaker 1>while the st E t H that you get back

0:24:14.560 --> 0:24:17.560
<v Speaker 1>can be sold or invested in other defied protocols to

0:24:17.680 --> 0:24:21.800
<v Speaker 1>earn more money. More broadly, the business of DeFi is

0:24:21.840 --> 0:24:25.880
<v Speaker 1>about reusing tokens as much as possible. You have some tokens,

0:24:26.119 --> 0:24:28.280
<v Speaker 1>you lock them up in a smart contract that does

0:24:28.280 --> 0:24:31.160
<v Speaker 1>a thing and pays you a return. The smart contract

0:24:31.200 --> 0:24:33.720
<v Speaker 1>gives you some sort of receipt token, and you turn

0:24:33.800 --> 0:24:36.440
<v Speaker 1>around and lock up those receipt tokens in another smart

0:24:36.480 --> 0:24:39.160
<v Speaker 1>contract that does another thing and pays you some more.

0:24:39.760 --> 0:24:43.840
<v Speaker 1>People talk about yield farming, the process of bouncing between

0:24:43.920 --> 0:24:47.760
<v Speaker 1>DeFi protocols to try to earn the maximum yield reusing

0:24:47.800 --> 0:24:51.120
<v Speaker 1>tokens and getting paid in protocols own tokens to make

0:24:51.160 --> 0:24:54.600
<v Speaker 1>as much money as possible. This can create a self

0:24:54.680 --> 0:24:58.520
<v Speaker 1>reinforcing cycle, by which I kind of mean a ponzi.

0:24:59.000 --> 0:25:02.720
<v Speaker 1>It goes like this. One there's a protocol that does

0:25:02.760 --> 0:25:06.879
<v Speaker 1>some stuff with ether or stable coins or whatever. Two,

0:25:07.040 --> 0:25:09.439
<v Speaker 1>if you put your ether or stable coins or whatever

0:25:09.520 --> 0:25:13.159
<v Speaker 1>into the protocol for lending or liquidity provision or whatever,

0:25:13.560 --> 0:25:16.280
<v Speaker 1>it will give you some of its own tokens. This

0:25:16.359 --> 0:25:19.320
<v Speaker 1>is no problem. It can print those tokens for free.

0:25:19.840 --> 0:25:23.119
<v Speaker 1>Three if you put those tokens back into the protocol,

0:25:23.440 --> 0:25:25.960
<v Speaker 1>locking them up rather than selling them it will give

0:25:26.000 --> 0:25:28.880
<v Speaker 1>you even more of those tokens. It'll pay you ten

0:25:28.920 --> 0:25:32.119
<v Speaker 1>percent interest every hour if you want. Who cares? The

0:25:32.160 --> 0:25:35.960
<v Speaker 1>tokens are free for by this token. It pays ten

0:25:36.000 --> 0:25:38.920
<v Speaker 1>percent interest every hour. The promoters of the protocol can

0:25:38.960 --> 0:25:42.199
<v Speaker 1>say more or less accurately. They can quote an a

0:25:42.320 --> 0:25:46.560
<v Speaker 1>p y an annual percentage yield, a normal finance concept

0:25:46.600 --> 0:25:50.040
<v Speaker 1>that's much beloved and defied, yield farming with an enormous

0:25:50.119 --> 0:25:54.560
<v Speaker 1>number of digits, and people will get very excited. Five,

0:25:54.960 --> 0:25:57.040
<v Speaker 1>So they'll buy the token and it will go up.

0:25:57.480 --> 0:25:59.800
<v Speaker 1>Or they'll put their ether or stable coins into the

0:25:59.800 --> 0:26:02.439
<v Speaker 1>pro a call to earn its tokens, and the protocol's

0:26:02.480 --> 0:26:07.040
<v Speaker 1>total value locked will go up. Six. Look at this protocol.

0:26:07.280 --> 0:26:10.880
<v Speaker 1>Its tv L is huge and rising. It's token has

0:26:10.960 --> 0:26:14.040
<v Speaker 1>doubled in price this week, people will say, and they'll

0:26:14.080 --> 0:26:18.000
<v Speaker 1>buy more of it. Seven. People keep getting paid comical

0:26:18.080 --> 0:26:20.920
<v Speaker 1>interest rates in the token, which is fine as long

0:26:20.960 --> 0:26:23.640
<v Speaker 1>as the token price keeps going up or stays flat,

0:26:23.920 --> 0:26:26.360
<v Speaker 1>or goes down at a slower rate than the interest rate.

0:26:26.920 --> 0:26:29.919
<v Speaker 1>Even though the market is being flooded with tokens, people

0:26:30.000 --> 0:26:32.440
<v Speaker 1>still seem to be making money and will do so

0:26:32.560 --> 0:26:36.080
<v Speaker 1>as long as new money comes in eight, the amount

0:26:36.119 --> 0:26:40.240
<v Speaker 1>of tokens issued rises inexorably toward infinity, the amount of

0:26:40.280 --> 0:26:45.679
<v Speaker 1>new money coming in does not, and tragedy ensues. The

0:26:45.720 --> 0:26:48.800
<v Speaker 1>greatest of these protocols is probably Olympus Dow, which is

0:26:48.880 --> 0:26:53.880
<v Speaker 1>run by a pseudonymous founder called Zeus Colorful Character, has

0:26:53.880 --> 0:26:57.120
<v Speaker 1>a group of loyal investors called Omi's, and at its

0:26:57.160 --> 0:27:00.600
<v Speaker 1>peak offered yields of seven thousand percent and was worth

0:27:00.640 --> 0:27:04.200
<v Speaker 1>three billion dollars. According to a coin Desk article titled

0:27:04.320 --> 0:27:07.359
<v Speaker 1>Olympus Dow might be the future of money, or it

0:27:07.440 --> 0:27:12.359
<v Speaker 1>might be a ponzi. Since then it's lost about its value,

0:27:12.800 --> 0:27:16.480
<v Speaker 1>so there's your answer. Olympus Dow also sparked an even

0:27:16.560 --> 0:27:21.280
<v Speaker 1>funnier copycat called Wonderland on the Avalanche blockchain, which offered

0:27:21.320 --> 0:27:24.760
<v Speaker 1>yields of more than eighty percent and was partly run

0:27:24.760 --> 0:27:28.000
<v Speaker 1>by a pseudonymous person who it turned out, also co

0:27:28.160 --> 0:27:33.719
<v Speaker 1>founded quadriga colorful Character. Last year, I needed physical therapy

0:27:33.800 --> 0:27:36.080
<v Speaker 1>from my knee, and I ended up bonding with my

0:27:36.160 --> 0:27:40.760
<v Speaker 1>therapist by talking about crypto. He was heavily invested in Wonderland,

0:27:40.800 --> 0:27:43.639
<v Speaker 1>which he cheerfully described as a ponzi, but one that

0:27:43.680 --> 0:27:47.440
<v Speaker 1>was making him a lot of money. Olympus became particularly

0:27:47.480 --> 0:27:50.680
<v Speaker 1>famous for the three three meme, based on the notation

0:27:50.720 --> 0:27:53.919
<v Speaker 1>of game theory. The idea is that the payoff in

0:27:53.960 --> 0:27:57.480
<v Speaker 1>a two player game can be written as X Y,

0:27:57.480 --> 0:27:59.679
<v Speaker 1>where X is what I get and why is what

0:27:59.760 --> 0:28:03.320
<v Speaker 1>you get. These outcomes could be dollars, but often they're

0:28:03.359 --> 0:28:08.120
<v Speaker 1>written as abstract utility numbers. A payoff of three three

0:28:08.240 --> 0:28:10.199
<v Speaker 1>is better for both of us than a payoff of

0:28:10.520 --> 0:28:14.000
<v Speaker 1>two negative one without worrying too much about what those

0:28:14.080 --> 0:28:18.040
<v Speaker 1>numbers mean. Olympus Is pitch was that if everybody buys

0:28:18.080 --> 0:28:21.119
<v Speaker 1>home and locks it up, then everybody's payoff will be

0:28:21.200 --> 0:28:25.200
<v Speaker 1>good i e. Three three, while if everybody does bad

0:28:25.200 --> 0:28:28.719
<v Speaker 1>things like sell their home, then everybody's payoff will be

0:28:28.960 --> 0:28:33.400
<v Speaker 1>negative three negative three. Those numbers are abstract and unitless,

0:28:33.640 --> 0:28:40.480
<v Speaker 1>and actually the payoff was negative negative. This, of course,

0:28:40.600 --> 0:28:44.680
<v Speaker 1>exactly describes any PONDSI. As long as people keep investing

0:28:44.720 --> 0:28:47.920
<v Speaker 1>new money and not withdrawing it, everyone will get richer

0:28:48.320 --> 0:28:51.560
<v Speaker 1>on paper, but it will unravel when people start taking

0:28:51.560 --> 0:28:55.800
<v Speaker 1>their money out. Olympus always struck me as charmingly forthright

0:28:55.880 --> 0:28:58.880
<v Speaker 1>about what it was up to. It's the future of money,

0:28:58.920 --> 0:29:01.160
<v Speaker 1>because as long as every one keeps buying, it will

0:29:01.240 --> 0:29:08.440
<v Speaker 1>keep going up. People have tried that one before. Five

0:29:08.920 --> 0:29:13.560
<v Speaker 1>Some arbitrages in traditional finance. People devote their careers to

0:29:13.640 --> 0:29:17.479
<v Speaker 1>finding arbitrages circumstances in which they can buy something at

0:29:17.480 --> 0:29:20.440
<v Speaker 1>a low price and instantly sell the same thing at

0:29:20.440 --> 0:29:24.200
<v Speaker 1>a high price. This is hard to do because traditional

0:29:24.240 --> 0:29:27.880
<v Speaker 1>finance is very competitive and people aren't regularly leaving twenty

0:29:27.960 --> 0:29:31.000
<v Speaker 1>dollar bills on the sidewalk. Even if you think you've

0:29:31.040 --> 0:29:34.200
<v Speaker 1>spotted an arbitrage the same thing trading at different prices

0:29:34.240 --> 0:29:37.240
<v Speaker 1>in different places, you have to worry about some legal

0:29:37.360 --> 0:29:41.320
<v Speaker 1>or operational reason that you can't actually move between those places.

0:29:41.960 --> 0:29:44.400
<v Speaker 1>Maybe there's a five percent tax to move the stock

0:29:44.440 --> 0:29:49.280
<v Speaker 1>off shore, maybe short selling isn't allowed, etcetera. Most of

0:29:49.280 --> 0:29:53.000
<v Speaker 1>what people call arbitrage in traditional finance is buying one

0:29:53.080 --> 0:29:56.960
<v Speaker 1>thing at a low price, simultaneously selling a slightly different

0:29:56.960 --> 0:29:59.680
<v Speaker 1>thing at a higher price and hoping they turn out

0:29:59.680 --> 0:30:02.320
<v Speaker 1>to be the same thing, or buying one thing at

0:30:02.320 --> 0:30:04.560
<v Speaker 1>a low price, selling the same thing a bit later

0:30:04.840 --> 0:30:08.320
<v Speaker 1>and hoping it turns out to be at a higher price. Meanwhile,

0:30:08.560 --> 0:30:12.040
<v Speaker 1>the centralized finance is new enough that pricing anomalies exist,

0:30:12.320 --> 0:30:15.280
<v Speaker 1>but efficient enough that everything happens visibly on a virtual

0:30:15.320 --> 0:30:20.080
<v Speaker 1>computer running public code, so you can reliably exploit them.

0:30:20.120 --> 0:30:26.720
<v Speaker 1>There are magical possibilities one flash loans. Let's say you're

0:30:26.760 --> 0:30:30.280
<v Speaker 1>a smart young person and you discover an arbitrage stock

0:30:30.440 --> 0:30:32.920
<v Speaker 1>x y z is trading at ten dollars on Exchange

0:30:33.000 --> 0:30:36.400
<v Speaker 1>A and eleven dollars on Exchange B. You can buy

0:30:36.400 --> 0:30:38.440
<v Speaker 1>it on Exchange A for ten dollars and sell it

0:30:38.480 --> 0:30:41.360
<v Speaker 1>on Exchange B for eleven dollars, making an easy one

0:30:41.440 --> 0:30:45.760
<v Speaker 1>dollar profit. That's fine. Now you have one dollar. But

0:30:45.880 --> 0:30:48.680
<v Speaker 1>you want to buy ten million shares on Exchange A

0:30:48.840 --> 0:30:51.680
<v Speaker 1>for one hundred million dollars and sell ten million on

0:30:51.760 --> 0:30:55.120
<v Speaker 1>Exchange B for one ten million dollars. Then you'd have

0:30:55.280 --> 0:30:59.120
<v Speaker 1>ten million dollars, which is much more worth doing. The

0:30:59.160 --> 0:31:01.920
<v Speaker 1>only problem with this plan is, while you're a smart

0:31:01.960 --> 0:31:06.200
<v Speaker 1>young person, you don't have one million dollars. Why would you.

0:31:06.840 --> 0:31:10.080
<v Speaker 1>In financial theory, the solution is simple. You borrow the

0:31:10.080 --> 0:31:12.440
<v Speaker 1>one hundred million dollars at the market rate of interest

0:31:12.640 --> 0:31:15.360
<v Speaker 1>by the stock, sell it, pay back a little interest,

0:31:15.400 --> 0:31:18.920
<v Speaker 1>and keep your profits. In practice, no one is going

0:31:19.000 --> 0:31:22.440
<v Speaker 1>to lend you one million dollars. I mean If you

0:31:22.520 --> 0:31:25.640
<v Speaker 1>really have found a perfect arbitrage, maybe you'll be able

0:31:25.640 --> 0:31:29.080
<v Speaker 1>to raise one million dollars. You can work your connections,

0:31:29.200 --> 0:31:32.440
<v Speaker 1>cold call some hedge funds, maybe get some meetings where

0:31:32.440 --> 0:31:36.040
<v Speaker 1>you present your strategy and say, see, it's a perfect arbitrage.

0:31:36.360 --> 0:31:38.840
<v Speaker 1>I just need a hundred billion dollars. Are you in

0:31:39.560 --> 0:31:41.960
<v Speaker 1>and they'll just do the strategy and leave you out.

0:31:42.560 --> 0:31:45.920
<v Speaker 1>Maybe they'll pay you a small finders fee, Or you

0:31:45.960 --> 0:31:49.960
<v Speaker 1>could start small. Do your arbitrage for one thousand dollars,

0:31:50.160 --> 0:31:53.680
<v Speaker 1>make a hundred dollars, do it again for eleven dollars, etcetera.

0:31:54.120 --> 0:31:56.880
<v Speaker 1>Until you have a huge bank roll. But that's not

0:31:56.960 --> 0:32:00.160
<v Speaker 1>great either. The longer it takes you, the more likely

0:32:00.200 --> 0:32:03.720
<v Speaker 1>it is that the clever arbitrage you've spotted will go away.

0:32:03.800 --> 0:32:06.680
<v Speaker 1>In particular, the more you do the trade, the more

0:32:06.720 --> 0:32:09.000
<v Speaker 1>likely someone else is to notice and do it in

0:32:09.040 --> 0:32:12.480
<v Speaker 1>a big size and make the arbitrage go away. In

0:32:12.600 --> 0:32:16.560
<v Speaker 1>crypto finance, the situation is different. If say you spot

0:32:16.600 --> 0:32:20.600
<v Speaker 1>ether trading at two different prices on two different decentralized exchanges,

0:32:21.000 --> 0:32:23.280
<v Speaker 1>you can just write a program that does the following.

0:32:23.840 --> 0:32:28.000
<v Speaker 1>One borrows a hundred million dollars from some decentralized lending protocol,

0:32:28.160 --> 0:32:32.200
<v Speaker 1>such as A two uses the hundred million dollars to

0:32:32.200 --> 0:32:36.520
<v Speaker 1>buy a token on decentralized exchange. A three sells the

0:32:36.560 --> 0:32:40.240
<v Speaker 1>token on decentralized exchange B for hundred ten million dollars.

0:32:40.720 --> 0:32:43.960
<v Speaker 1>Four returns the hundred million dollars to the lending protocol

0:32:44.080 --> 0:32:47.880
<v Speaker 1>plus a small fee. Five sends the leftover ten million

0:32:47.920 --> 0:32:52.440
<v Speaker 1>dollars to you. Six, all in the same transaction that

0:32:52.600 --> 0:32:57.080
<v Speaker 1>executes all at once. The lender in step one can

0:32:57.120 --> 0:32:59.720
<v Speaker 1>make the return in step four a condition of the loan.

0:33:00.280 --> 0:33:03.840
<v Speaker 1>The loan and the payback occur simultaneously in the same

0:33:03.880 --> 0:33:07.040
<v Speaker 1>computer program, executing in the same block of the blockchain.

0:33:07.800 --> 0:33:10.360
<v Speaker 1>As far as the lending protocol is concerned, there's no

0:33:10.440 --> 0:33:13.800
<v Speaker 1>credit risk. If any of the intermediate steps fail, if

0:33:13.840 --> 0:33:16.400
<v Speaker 1>it turns out you're wrong about the arbitrage and you

0:33:16.480 --> 0:33:19.160
<v Speaker 1>can't sell the token for more than you paid for it, etcetera,

0:33:19.320 --> 0:33:22.080
<v Speaker 1>then the whole thing never happens and the loan isn't made.

0:33:22.800 --> 0:33:26.280
<v Speaker 1>The lending protocol isn't evaluating your credit worthiness, your resume,

0:33:26.440 --> 0:33:29.520
<v Speaker 1>or your track record as an investor. It's just making

0:33:29.560 --> 0:33:33.400
<v Speaker 1>sure that the code works. This is clever and neat

0:33:33.520 --> 0:33:36.560
<v Speaker 1>and feels like a good way to build a financial system.

0:33:36.600 --> 0:33:41.640
<v Speaker 1>It's an egalitarian, decentralized, permissionless, computerized way for anyone who

0:33:41.720 --> 0:33:45.440
<v Speaker 1>spots an arbitrage to be able to exploit and close it.

0:33:45.440 --> 0:33:48.920
<v Speaker 1>It should make markets more efficient and prices more accurate.

0:33:49.640 --> 0:33:53.640
<v Speaker 1>The problem is, in crypto an arbitrage often means a

0:33:53.720 --> 0:33:57.640
<v Speaker 1>mistake in a smart contract. Of course, this is true

0:33:57.640 --> 0:34:01.000
<v Speaker 1>and traditional finance to some do he notices a flaw

0:34:01.080 --> 0:34:04.680
<v Speaker 1>in a loan agreement or credit default swap contract, buys

0:34:04.760 --> 0:34:07.160
<v Speaker 1>up a bunch of the bond or CDs, then goes

0:34:07.200 --> 0:34:09.399
<v Speaker 1>to court to try to extract money from the person

0:34:09.440 --> 0:34:13.120
<v Speaker 1>who wrote the contract wrong. This, however, is a lengthy

0:34:13.160 --> 0:34:15.719
<v Speaker 1>and risky process, and one of the main risks is

0:34:15.760 --> 0:34:18.319
<v Speaker 1>that the court will say, oh, come on, that's not

0:34:18.360 --> 0:34:21.720
<v Speaker 1>what they meant. Get out of here, whereas a smart

0:34:21.760 --> 0:34:25.360
<v Speaker 1>contract will never say that. Somebody writes some contract that

0:34:25.400 --> 0:34:28.319
<v Speaker 1>has some bug that occasionally lets a user put in

0:34:28.400 --> 0:34:32.040
<v Speaker 1>one token and get back to Then somebody notices and

0:34:32.040 --> 0:34:34.560
<v Speaker 1>writes a program to use flash loans to put in

0:34:34.640 --> 0:34:37.560
<v Speaker 1>one billion tokens and get back two billion tokens and

0:34:37.600 --> 0:34:42.040
<v Speaker 1>blow up the smart contract Entirely. People sometimes leave money

0:34:42.120 --> 0:34:45.720
<v Speaker 1>lying around in crypto, and crypto has built very efficient

0:34:45.719 --> 0:34:48.960
<v Speaker 1>ways for other people to take their money. It's not

0:34:49.000 --> 0:34:51.200
<v Speaker 1>clear that that is a good way to build a

0:34:51.200 --> 0:34:58.160
<v Speaker 1>financial system. Two m e v. It gets stranger. Let's

0:34:58.200 --> 0:35:00.439
<v Speaker 1>say you notice that a token is trading at ten

0:35:00.480 --> 0:35:04.920
<v Speaker 1>dollars on decentralized exchange A and eleven dollars on decentralized

0:35:04.920 --> 0:35:08.000
<v Speaker 1>exchange B. So you send an order to exchange A

0:35:08.239 --> 0:35:11.200
<v Speaker 1>to buy one thousand tokens for ten thousand dollars, and

0:35:11.239 --> 0:35:14.440
<v Speaker 1>a simultaneous order to sell one thousand tokens for eleven

0:35:14.480 --> 0:35:18.359
<v Speaker 1>thousand dollars. What happens to those orders in the US

0:35:18.440 --> 0:35:21.640
<v Speaker 1>stock market, Whole books have been written about that question.

0:35:22.280 --> 0:35:25.319
<v Speaker 1>People get really mad about it. Your order goes to

0:35:25.360 --> 0:35:28.280
<v Speaker 1>your broker, who routes it to different exchanges at different

0:35:28.280 --> 0:35:32.239
<v Speaker 1>times through different pipes. High frequency electronic traders who see

0:35:32.280 --> 0:35:35.200
<v Speaker 1>your order execute on one exchange might raise ahead to

0:35:35.239 --> 0:35:39.000
<v Speaker 1>another exchange to push up the prices. There are controversies

0:35:39.040 --> 0:35:43.040
<v Speaker 1>about colocation, where the high frequency traders pay fees to

0:35:43.080 --> 0:35:45.839
<v Speaker 1>the stock exchanges to keep their computers in the same

0:35:45.920 --> 0:35:48.520
<v Speaker 1>room as the exchanges computers so they can get a

0:35:48.560 --> 0:35:51.560
<v Speaker 1>tiny speed advantage by connecting to the exchange through a

0:35:51.600 --> 0:35:56.040
<v Speaker 1>fairly short wire. In crypto, the answer is different. It's

0:35:56.120 --> 0:35:58.960
<v Speaker 1>easiest to understand if you start with how trades worked

0:35:58.960 --> 0:36:02.480
<v Speaker 1>on Ethereum before the switch to proof of steak. When

0:36:02.480 --> 0:36:05.600
<v Speaker 1>you made a trade, your transaction would be broadcast out

0:36:05.640 --> 0:36:08.319
<v Speaker 1>to the entire network and included in the list of

0:36:08.360 --> 0:36:12.000
<v Speaker 1>transactions that miners were working on executing but that hadn't

0:36:12.080 --> 0:36:15.560
<v Speaker 1>yet made it into a block. When a block was finalized,

0:36:15.840 --> 0:36:19.120
<v Speaker 1>miners would include your transaction in the block. But the

0:36:19.160 --> 0:36:22.319
<v Speaker 1>miners decided which transactions got included in a block and

0:36:22.400 --> 0:36:25.200
<v Speaker 1>in what order, and they also earned gas fees for

0:36:25.320 --> 0:36:29.600
<v Speaker 1>executing transactions. Users could specify how much they wanted to

0:36:29.680 --> 0:36:32.799
<v Speaker 1>pay for gas, and transactions with higher gas fees were

0:36:32.880 --> 0:36:38.040
<v Speaker 1>usually prioritized. This created a trade. One you find an

0:36:38.120 --> 0:36:41.319
<v Speaker 1>arbitrage and send some orders to decentralized exchanges to do

0:36:41.360 --> 0:36:45.360
<v Speaker 1>that arbitrage. Two, I see those orders on the network

0:36:45.360 --> 0:36:49.000
<v Speaker 1>and think, hey, that's a good trade. Three I send

0:36:49.040 --> 0:36:52.279
<v Speaker 1>the same orders to the exchanges to do the same transaction.

0:36:53.040 --> 0:36:56.120
<v Speaker 1>For I pay a higher gas fee to get priority

0:36:56.160 --> 0:36:58.400
<v Speaker 1>over you so that I can do the trade ahead

0:36:58.440 --> 0:37:01.680
<v Speaker 1>of you. Five. By the time you get to do

0:37:01.760 --> 0:37:05.080
<v Speaker 1>the trade, it's no longer available. I bought everything available

0:37:05.120 --> 0:37:09.920
<v Speaker 1>at the good price. Hah ah. This is usually called

0:37:10.120 --> 0:37:14.360
<v Speaker 1>m e V, which originally stood for minor extractable value,

0:37:14.800 --> 0:37:17.480
<v Speaker 1>because one winner in this scenario was the miner, who

0:37:17.520 --> 0:37:20.240
<v Speaker 1>got to charge higher gas prices to people who wanted

0:37:20.280 --> 0:37:23.560
<v Speaker 1>to front run trades or avoid getting front run. It's

0:37:23.600 --> 0:37:26.600
<v Speaker 1>the subject of a twenty nineteen paper by Philip dion

0:37:26.800 --> 0:37:30.719
<v Speaker 1>at All titled Flashboys two point oh, a reference to

0:37:30.719 --> 0:37:34.080
<v Speaker 1>the high frequency traders in US stock markets who purportedly

0:37:34.200 --> 0:37:38.160
<v Speaker 1>raise ahead of other traders orders to extract value from them.

0:37:38.360 --> 0:37:42.439
<v Speaker 1>Rather than solve this concern about traditional markets, crypto made

0:37:42.440 --> 0:37:46.760
<v Speaker 1>it explicit. Time priority was subject to an explicit gas

0:37:46.800 --> 0:37:50.360
<v Speaker 1>auction where whoever paid the most to the transaction orderers

0:37:50.440 --> 0:37:54.120
<v Speaker 1>got to go first. Sure, yes, in crypto you could

0:37:54.120 --> 0:37:57.920
<v Speaker 1>get front run all the time by more sophisticated electronic traders,

0:37:58.120 --> 0:38:02.440
<v Speaker 1>but in a transparent and descent realized way. As Ethereum

0:38:02.440 --> 0:38:05.640
<v Speaker 1>moved to proof of steak, m e V was rebranded

0:38:05.800 --> 0:38:10.279
<v Speaker 1>maximal extractable value. There's still money to be squeezed from

0:38:10.320 --> 0:38:13.360
<v Speaker 1>traders by the people maintaining the network, but the mechanics

0:38:13.440 --> 0:38:16.960
<v Speaker 1>have changed in today's ethereum. There's a division of labor

0:38:17.000 --> 0:38:21.760
<v Speaker 1>between block builders who compile and order transactions and validators,

0:38:21.800 --> 0:38:24.520
<v Speaker 1>the replacement for minors who do the proof of steakwork

0:38:24.600 --> 0:38:28.080
<v Speaker 1>to make blocks official. And if you're doing arbitrages, you

0:38:28.120 --> 0:38:31.920
<v Speaker 1>can send your transactions privately to block builders. You can

0:38:31.920 --> 0:38:34.839
<v Speaker 1>still pay for speed and priority, but you can't see

0:38:34.880 --> 0:38:38.839
<v Speaker 1>everyone else's trades to front run though. Coming up next,

0:38:38.960 --> 0:38:41.920
<v Speaker 1>you'll hear more from Matt Levine's special Crypto issue of

0:38:41.920 --> 0:38:56.680
<v Speaker 1>Bloomberg Business Week, narrated by Mark leadoff E Reinventing two

0:38:56.719 --> 0:39:01.319
<v Speaker 1>thousand and eight. In two thousand and eight, Stoshi Nakamoto

0:39:01.400 --> 0:39:05.120
<v Speaker 1>invented bitcoin. One thing that seems to have motivated him

0:39:05.160 --> 0:39:09.319
<v Speaker 1>was a distrust of banks and financial intermediaries. This was

0:39:09.480 --> 0:39:13.720
<v Speaker 1>understandable because it was two thousand and eight. The modern

0:39:13.760 --> 0:39:17.240
<v Speaker 1>banking system was at a low EBB. Banks had taken

0:39:17.360 --> 0:39:21.400
<v Speaker 1>risks that few people understood and ended up losing tons

0:39:21.440 --> 0:39:25.680
<v Speaker 1>of money on supposedly safe investments. High levels of leverage

0:39:25.680 --> 0:39:28.360
<v Speaker 1>in the banking system and in the more opaque and

0:39:28.480 --> 0:39:33.360
<v Speaker 1>less regulated shadow banking system made those systems fragile. A

0:39:33.400 --> 0:39:36.319
<v Speaker 1>bank that borrowed thirty dollars for every one dollar of

0:39:36.360 --> 0:39:39.480
<v Speaker 1>shareholders equity would go bust if the value of its

0:39:39.480 --> 0:39:43.959
<v Speaker 1>assets fell for the high leverage and lack of transparency

0:39:44.000 --> 0:39:48.440
<v Speaker 1>caused contagion, an assets price would fall. The highly leveraged

0:39:48.480 --> 0:39:51.320
<v Speaker 1>banks and funds that held it would get margin calls

0:39:51.640 --> 0:39:53.960
<v Speaker 1>and they'd have to sell whatever they had on hand.

0:39:54.600 --> 0:39:57.399
<v Speaker 1>That would cause more prices to fall, which would lead

0:39:57.440 --> 0:40:00.400
<v Speaker 1>to more margin calls, which would bankrupt some the banks

0:40:00.440 --> 0:40:03.359
<v Speaker 1>and funds, which would lead to more fire sales and

0:40:03.440 --> 0:40:07.200
<v Speaker 1>more price jobs. Meanwhile, the lenders to those banks and

0:40:07.280 --> 0:40:10.520
<v Speaker 1>funds who thought their money was safe would have losses.

0:40:11.120 --> 0:40:14.799
<v Speaker 1>Many were also highly leveraged and might go bust. All

0:40:14.840 --> 0:40:17.760
<v Speaker 1>of this was opaque enough that even banks and funds

0:40:17.800 --> 0:40:20.840
<v Speaker 1>that hadn't taken big risks or lost a lot of

0:40:20.880 --> 0:40:24.439
<v Speaker 1>money were treated with suspicion by lenders, which could cause

0:40:24.480 --> 0:40:28.200
<v Speaker 1>them to fail to Ultimately, the banking system was bailed

0:40:28.200 --> 0:40:32.560
<v Speaker 1>out by massive infusions of money from central banks. All

0:40:32.640 --> 0:40:36.279
<v Speaker 1>of this was gross. Satoshi didn't like it, and he

0:40:36.360 --> 0:40:39.080
<v Speaker 1>built a new payment mechanism that escaped the need to

0:40:39.120 --> 0:40:44.680
<v Speaker 1>trust banks. It was irreversible and decentralized. Everyone was responsible

0:40:44.719 --> 0:40:47.239
<v Speaker 1>for their own mistakes. No one could be bailed out

0:40:47.239 --> 0:40:51.719
<v Speaker 1>by central banks printing money. It was transparent, Every transaction

0:40:51.800 --> 0:40:55.080
<v Speaker 1>was recorded on the blockchain. There were no hidden chains

0:40:55.120 --> 0:40:58.759
<v Speaker 1>of leverage. In a deep sense, it wasn't built on

0:40:58.960 --> 0:41:02.680
<v Speaker 1>debt at all. To some bitcoiners, the central sin of

0:41:02.680 --> 0:41:06.319
<v Speaker 1>the banking system is that every bank deposit is a liability.

0:41:06.760 --> 0:41:09.719
<v Speaker 1>It's a debt payable on demand from the bank to

0:41:09.760 --> 0:41:12.719
<v Speaker 1>its depositors, and so every dollar that you keep in

0:41:12.760 --> 0:41:16.600
<v Speaker 1>the bank necessarily adds to the leverage of the system.

0:41:16.680 --> 0:41:20.080
<v Speaker 1>This complaint is not limited to bitcoiners. After the two

0:41:20.080 --> 0:41:22.560
<v Speaker 1>thousand and eight crisis, there was a lot of interest

0:41:22.600 --> 0:41:26.040
<v Speaker 1>in the Chicago plan of narrow banking, where every bank

0:41:26.080 --> 0:41:30.360
<v Speaker 1>deposit would be backed by real dollars reserves at the

0:41:30.400 --> 0:41:34.520
<v Speaker 1>Federal Reserve, and lending financed out of equity. But in

0:41:34.560 --> 0:41:40.160
<v Speaker 1>today's world, dollars are debt. Meanwhile, bitcoin are not debt.

0:41:40.640 --> 0:41:44.839
<v Speaker 1>They're just bitcoin. They exist in themselves on the block chain,

0:41:45.280 --> 0:41:49.200
<v Speaker 1>rather than being liabilities of banks. In early two thousand

0:41:49.200 --> 0:41:53.720
<v Speaker 1>and nine, when Satoshi mind Bitcoin's genesis block, this message

0:41:53.760 --> 0:41:57.160
<v Speaker 1>resonated with a lot of people. A new financial system

0:41:57.200 --> 0:42:01.560
<v Speaker 1>with transparent and irreversible transactions, with no special power for

0:42:01.600 --> 0:42:05.919
<v Speaker 1>governments or big banks had an appeal Over time, though

0:42:05.960 --> 0:42:09.919
<v Speaker 1>there was another, much more obvious appeal to bitcoin. It's

0:42:10.040 --> 0:42:13.600
<v Speaker 1>price kept going up. If you bought a bitcoin for

0:42:13.600 --> 0:42:16.040
<v Speaker 1>a hundred dollars, you could soon sell it for a

0:42:16.080 --> 0:42:19.880
<v Speaker 1>thousand dollars. This got a lot of people very interested

0:42:19.920 --> 0:42:24.200
<v Speaker 1>in crypto, not for philosophical or monetary structure reasons, but

0:42:24.360 --> 0:42:28.040
<v Speaker 1>because getting rich is nice. Many of these people came

0:42:28.080 --> 0:42:32.399
<v Speaker 1>from traditional finance because they saw that crypto finance was fun.

0:42:32.800 --> 0:42:36.440
<v Speaker 1>It was wide open, it allowed for permissionless innovation, and

0:42:36.560 --> 0:42:40.359
<v Speaker 1>everyone was getting rich. These people, the people who left

0:42:40.360 --> 0:42:43.600
<v Speaker 1>trad vi for crypto because the money was better, didn't

0:42:43.600 --> 0:42:47.720
<v Speaker 1>necessarily have strong philosophical commitments to all that Setoshi stuff.

0:42:48.120 --> 0:42:51.719
<v Speaker 1>They weren't like leverage is bad banks or evil. Monetary

0:42:51.760 --> 0:42:56.120
<v Speaker 1>soundness is what matters. Some came from banks. They were

0:42:56.120 --> 0:42:58.920
<v Speaker 1>there to make money. One way to make money is

0:42:58.960 --> 0:43:02.440
<v Speaker 1>by finding good trade aids, finding cheap ways to borrow money,

0:43:02.640 --> 0:43:05.040
<v Speaker 1>and then borrowing as much as possible to put into

0:43:05.120 --> 0:43:09.560
<v Speaker 1>those trades. And so somehow crypto had itself a two

0:43:09.600 --> 0:43:14.279
<v Speaker 1>thousand and eight. In two the crypto financial system rediscovered

0:43:14.280 --> 0:43:17.240
<v Speaker 1>what the traditional system had discovered in two thousand and eight.

0:43:17.760 --> 0:43:25.200
<v Speaker 1>It was honestly kind of impressive. One Terra in two

0:43:25.360 --> 0:43:30.520
<v Speaker 1>you'll recall the algorithmic stable coin Terra USD collapsed. If

0:43:30.560 --> 0:43:33.520
<v Speaker 1>you had money in Terra Luna, odds are that you

0:43:33.719 --> 0:43:36.879
<v Speaker 1>lost roughly all of it. Many of the people who

0:43:36.960 --> 0:43:39.800
<v Speaker 1>lost money were regular retail savers who had been suckered

0:43:39.840 --> 0:43:43.000
<v Speaker 1>by Terra usd s promises of stability and of a

0:43:43.080 --> 0:43:48.440
<v Speaker 1>safe interest rate, or regular retail cryptocurrency investors who speculated

0:43:48.480 --> 0:43:52.279
<v Speaker 1>on Luna and lost, but not all of them. One

0:43:52.400 --> 0:43:54.879
<v Speaker 1>victim of the Terra collapse was a hedge fund called

0:43:55.040 --> 0:43:58.799
<v Speaker 1>Three Arrows Capital, run by two former Credit Suite Group

0:43:58.880 --> 0:44:03.880
<v Speaker 1>currency traders colorful characters and also former trad FI guys.

0:44:05.200 --> 0:44:09.000
<v Speaker 1>Speaking from an undisclosed location in July three, a c

0:44:09.160 --> 0:44:12.240
<v Speaker 1>S founders explained to Bloomberg News that what they'd failed

0:44:12.320 --> 0:44:15.000
<v Speaker 1>to realize was that Luna was capable of falling to

0:44:15.160 --> 0:44:18.120
<v Speaker 1>effective zero in a matter of days, and that this

0:44:18.200 --> 0:44:21.239
<v Speaker 1>would catalyze a credit squeeze across the industry that would

0:44:21.239 --> 0:44:26.240
<v Speaker 1>put significant pressure on all of our liquid positions. Meanwhile,

0:44:26.320 --> 0:44:30.520
<v Speaker 1>the Federal Reserve was raising rates and speculative assets generally

0:44:30.640 --> 0:44:34.640
<v Speaker 1>were losing value. It turns out that crypto is basically

0:44:34.719 --> 0:44:38.400
<v Speaker 1>a speculative asset and that it's not particularly a hedge

0:44:38.520 --> 0:44:44.040
<v Speaker 1>for stock market volatility. Everything in crypto went down. Bitcoin

0:44:44.160 --> 0:44:46.680
<v Speaker 1>was worth more than sixty seven thousand dollars at the

0:44:46.719 --> 0:44:51.319
<v Speaker 1>peak in October, it fell below twenty thousand dollars in June.

0:44:53.280 --> 0:44:56.000
<v Speaker 1>Ether went from forty eight hundred dollars to less than

0:44:56.040 --> 0:44:59.840
<v Speaker 1>a thousand dollars. The total market value of all cryptoc

0:45:00.120 --> 0:45:04.160
<v Speaker 1>enci's fell from about three trillion dollars in late to

0:45:04.320 --> 0:45:09.040
<v Speaker 1>about one trillion dollars in June two. Two thirds of

0:45:09.120 --> 0:45:14.960
<v Speaker 1>all crypto wealth just vanished. That's just a very traditional story,

0:45:15.360 --> 0:45:19.880
<v Speaker 1>isn't it. Leveraged hedge funds piled into crowded trades that seemed,

0:45:20.200 --> 0:45:22.760
<v Speaker 1>on the basis of a fairly short series of historical

0:45:22.920 --> 0:45:26.880
<v Speaker 1>data to be safe. This made the trades unsafe, so

0:45:27.000 --> 0:45:30.000
<v Speaker 1>the hedge funds lost money, so their lenders sent them

0:45:30.080 --> 0:45:32.759
<v Speaker 1>margin calls, so they were forced to sell off other

0:45:32.960 --> 0:45:36.320
<v Speaker 1>better assets, assets that were more liquid and could be

0:45:36.440 --> 0:45:39.439
<v Speaker 1>sold to meet the margin calls, which made those better

0:45:39.560 --> 0:45:43.960
<v Speaker 1>assets bad too. In a crisis, correlations go to one.

0:45:44.280 --> 0:45:49.000
<v Speaker 1>Traders say losses on bad trades force leveraged hedge funds

0:45:49.040 --> 0:45:52.840
<v Speaker 1>to sell good assets, and so everything goes down at once.

0:45:56.480 --> 0:46:02.040
<v Speaker 1>Two contagion. Three a C the leveraged hedge fund. When

0:46:02.080 --> 0:46:04.560
<v Speaker 1>it blew up, the people who loaned it money didn't

0:46:04.600 --> 0:46:07.440
<v Speaker 1>get their money back. Three a C went into a

0:46:07.600 --> 0:46:12.720
<v Speaker 1>complicated cross border insolvency process that will presumably eventually recover

0:46:13.000 --> 0:46:16.120
<v Speaker 1>some money for its creditors, but they'll lose at least

0:46:16.239 --> 0:46:18.240
<v Speaker 1>some of their money, and it will take a while

0:46:18.360 --> 0:46:23.040
<v Speaker 1>to get back the rest. Who are these creditors, Well,

0:46:23.680 --> 0:46:27.520
<v Speaker 1>a little of everyone, really. Documents filed in three a

0:46:27.640 --> 0:46:31.280
<v Speaker 1>c's insolvency process reveal that the hedge fund was borrowing

0:46:31.360 --> 0:46:34.440
<v Speaker 1>from de FI platforms, but also from an assortment of

0:46:34.560 --> 0:46:39.480
<v Speaker 1>big name centralized or c FI crypto lenders borrowing platforms

0:46:39.640 --> 0:46:44.279
<v Speaker 1>and exchanges. The de FI platforms mostly did fine. They

0:46:44.360 --> 0:46:49.240
<v Speaker 1>had collateral, they had automatic liquidation mechanisms, they liquidated the collateral,

0:46:49.480 --> 0:46:52.839
<v Speaker 1>and they got their money back. The centralized lenders did

0:46:52.960 --> 0:46:55.880
<v Speaker 1>less well. It turns out a lot were less strict

0:46:55.960 --> 0:46:59.320
<v Speaker 1>about demanding collateral than you might have wanted. Three a

0:46:59.440 --> 0:47:01.960
<v Speaker 1>C was one of the biggest and best known hedge

0:47:01.960 --> 0:47:05.040
<v Speaker 1>funds in crypto, working with three A C was a

0:47:05.120 --> 0:47:09.359
<v Speaker 1>stamp of approval for many lending platforms. It was prestigious

0:47:09.480 --> 0:47:13.759
<v Speaker 1>to say our customers include three arrows. Also, three A

0:47:13.920 --> 0:47:17.200
<v Speaker 1>C was viewed as a smart fund doing clever, low

0:47:17.320 --> 0:47:21.480
<v Speaker 1>volatility arbitrage trades with good risk management rather than taking

0:47:21.680 --> 0:47:25.040
<v Speaker 1>wild gambles. So if three A C came to a

0:47:25.120 --> 0:47:28.160
<v Speaker 1>lending platform and said, hey, we'd like to borrow five

0:47:28.600 --> 0:47:33.880
<v Speaker 1>million dollars unsecured, the platform might say yes, oh boy

0:47:34.200 --> 0:47:40.040
<v Speaker 1>did they. Voyager Digital, a crypto brokerage that let customers buy, sell, borrow,

0:47:40.160 --> 0:47:43.480
<v Speaker 1>and lend crypto, is a public company listed in Canada.

0:47:44.120 --> 0:47:47.040
<v Speaker 1>It had two point three billion dollars of assets at

0:47:47.080 --> 0:47:50.160
<v Speaker 1>the end of June, about six fifty million dollars of

0:47:50.200 --> 0:47:53.879
<v Speaker 1>which was unsecured loans of USDC and bitcoin to three

0:47:53.960 --> 0:47:59.800
<v Speaker 1>A C. Oops, it went bankrupt too. Celsius Network is

0:47:59.840 --> 0:48:03.680
<v Speaker 1>the same basic idea, but worse. It offered customers willing

0:48:03.760 --> 0:48:06.440
<v Speaker 1>to lend out their crypto up to eight percent interest

0:48:06.520 --> 0:48:10.120
<v Speaker 1>on deposits, with pretty vague descriptions on how it earned

0:48:10.160 --> 0:48:16.200
<v Speaker 1>that yield. CEO Alex Maschinsky, colorful character once explained to

0:48:16.239 --> 0:48:20.080
<v Speaker 1>Bloomberg Business Week that it's ridiculous that banks take deposits,

0:48:20.440 --> 0:48:23.400
<v Speaker 1>used them to make loans, and then don't pay eighteen

0:48:23.440 --> 0:48:28.359
<v Speaker 1>percent interest. Somebody is lying, Mashinsky said, either the bank

0:48:28.520 --> 0:48:32.880
<v Speaker 1>is lying or Celsius is lying. Only one possible answer.

0:48:33.560 --> 0:48:36.640
<v Speaker 1>Celsius had also loaned three A C money, though that

0:48:36.840 --> 0:48:38.880
<v Speaker 1>was the least of its problems, and it was in

0:48:39.000 --> 0:48:41.319
<v Speaker 1>some of the same trades as three A C, which

0:48:41.400 --> 0:48:45.080
<v Speaker 1>blew up. When three A C did, it also went bankrupt.

0:48:46.080 --> 0:48:50.000
<v Speaker 1>The leverage of these platforms is pretty astonishing. Celsius was

0:48:50.120 --> 0:48:54.400
<v Speaker 1>levered about nineteen to one. It had almost ninety dollars

0:48:54.480 --> 0:48:58.440
<v Speaker 1>of debt, mostly customer deposits, and about five dollars of

0:48:58.520 --> 0:49:02.360
<v Speaker 1>equity for every hundred dollars of assets. Voyager was levered

0:49:02.400 --> 0:49:06.080
<v Speaker 1>twenty three to one. A fairly small loss could wipe

0:49:06.080 --> 0:49:09.800
<v Speaker 1>it out entirely, and did that. Some banks were levered

0:49:09.920 --> 0:49:12.080
<v Speaker 1>thirty to one. Going into the two thousand and eight

0:49:12.120 --> 0:49:16.560
<v Speaker 1>financial crisis became a matter of intense scandal, and post

0:49:16.640 --> 0:49:21.120
<v Speaker 1>crisis reforms require much higher capital levels for banks. Also,

0:49:21.560 --> 0:49:25.239
<v Speaker 1>banks mostly invest in mortgages and stuff. These guys were

0:49:25.320 --> 0:49:29.279
<v Speaker 1>investing in crypto loans, hugely volatile stuff with nothing in

0:49:29.320 --> 0:49:32.040
<v Speaker 1>the way of long term through the cycle history, and

0:49:32.120 --> 0:49:37.040
<v Speaker 1>they were doing it with five percent capital ratios three

0:49:37.960 --> 0:49:42.320
<v Speaker 1>non contagion. In many ways, this looks like two thousand

0:49:42.400 --> 0:49:45.760
<v Speaker 1>and eight, but it's striking how little effect the loss

0:49:45.800 --> 0:49:49.160
<v Speaker 1>of two trillion dollars of crypto wealth had on anything else.

0:49:49.960 --> 0:49:52.040
<v Speaker 1>The two thousand and eight crisis in the banking and

0:49:52.120 --> 0:49:56.680
<v Speaker 1>shadow banking system led to a global recession, foreclosure, crisis,

0:49:56.760 --> 0:50:01.880
<v Speaker 1>and real political instability two crisis, and crypto seems to

0:50:01.920 --> 0:50:05.520
<v Speaker 1>have been pretty walled off from real world effects. Two

0:50:05.640 --> 0:50:09.279
<v Speaker 1>trillion dollars of market capitalization were lost without much of

0:50:09.320 --> 0:50:14.160
<v Speaker 1>a visible impact outside crypto. Why Part of the answer

0:50:14.280 --> 0:50:16.800
<v Speaker 1>is about who lost money and how they thought of

0:50:16.840 --> 0:50:19.520
<v Speaker 1>the money they lost. A lot of people who put

0:50:19.600 --> 0:50:23.080
<v Speaker 1>money into crypto, we're using their gambling money, and when

0:50:23.120 --> 0:50:25.840
<v Speaker 1>their bets didn't pay off, they thought, ah, well, that

0:50:26.080 --> 0:50:29.680
<v Speaker 1>was fun. Too bad. Almost everything about the world of

0:50:29.719 --> 0:50:32.839
<v Speaker 1>crypto screams high risk to anyone who knows at all

0:50:32.880 --> 0:50:35.600
<v Speaker 1>what to look out for. And so if you do

0:50:35.760 --> 0:50:38.320
<v Speaker 1>know what to look for, you take your crypto risks

0:50:38.400 --> 0:50:40.680
<v Speaker 1>with money that you can afford to lose, and in

0:50:40.760 --> 0:50:43.600
<v Speaker 1>ways that account for the risks, you don't take your

0:50:43.640 --> 0:50:46.760
<v Speaker 1>life savings lever them up ten to one and invest

0:50:46.840 --> 0:50:50.480
<v Speaker 1>everything in doge coin. The great lesson of two thousand

0:50:50.560 --> 0:50:53.160
<v Speaker 1>and eight is that the real systemic risk is in

0:50:53.280 --> 0:50:58.560
<v Speaker 1>the safest assets. The problem isn't banks and investors buying insane,

0:50:58.719 --> 0:51:02.719
<v Speaker 1>risky securities that promise returns and then go to zero.

0:51:03.440 --> 0:51:06.439
<v Speaker 1>The problem is banks and investors buying triple A rated

0:51:06.520 --> 0:51:08.920
<v Speaker 1>bonds that promise an extra point oh three percent of

0:51:09.040 --> 0:51:12.359
<v Speaker 1>yield and borrowing of the money they used to buy

0:51:12.440 --> 0:51:15.759
<v Speaker 1>those bonds, then finding out those securities shouldn't have been

0:51:15.840 --> 0:51:20.080
<v Speaker 1>rated triple A. People invest money they can't afford to lose,

0:51:20.480 --> 0:51:24.200
<v Speaker 1>and often money they borrowed in safe assets, and when

0:51:24.280 --> 0:51:29.239
<v Speaker 1>those assets lose money, the system breaks. By two the

0:51:29.320 --> 0:51:33.759
<v Speaker 1>crypto financial system was working on creating safe assets. That's

0:51:33.800 --> 0:51:37.000
<v Speaker 1>what Celsius and Voyager and tara U s D promised,

0:51:37.400 --> 0:51:40.160
<v Speaker 1>safe and stable ways to earn high returns without a

0:51:40.239 --> 0:51:44.480
<v Speaker 1>lot of volatility. But in crypto some people were taken

0:51:44.520 --> 0:51:48.000
<v Speaker 1>in by those promises and invested their life savings. Some

0:51:48.280 --> 0:51:51.440
<v Speaker 1>hedge funds bet on those promises and levered up those bets,

0:51:52.120 --> 0:51:56.160
<v Speaker 1>but mostly look the guy who promises eighteen percent yields

0:51:56.239 --> 0:51:59.640
<v Speaker 1>and says either the bank is lying or Celsius is lying,

0:52:00.160 --> 0:52:03.000
<v Speaker 1>isn't going to persuade that many people to entrust him

0:52:03.040 --> 0:52:06.279
<v Speaker 1>with their life savings. Part of the answer, though, is

0:52:06.320 --> 0:52:10.920
<v Speaker 1>about the traditional financial system. Traditional big financial companies have

0:52:11.239 --> 0:52:14.200
<v Speaker 1>been dipping their toe into crypto, but for the most part,

0:52:14.280 --> 0:52:17.560
<v Speaker 1>the traditional and crypto financial systems have stayed pretty separate.

0:52:18.320 --> 0:52:21.200
<v Speaker 1>You don't hear a lot about banks keeping of their

0:52:21.200 --> 0:52:24.799
<v Speaker 1>assets in bitcoin, and in fact, banking regulators have been

0:52:24.880 --> 0:52:28.880
<v Speaker 1>rather stern about letting banks own crypto, so when crypto

0:52:28.960 --> 0:52:33.680
<v Speaker 1>prices collapsed, banks and other financial institutions weren't particularly harmed.

0:52:34.719 --> 0:52:37.160
<v Speaker 1>This matters a lot. If you want to buy a

0:52:37.239 --> 0:52:39.520
<v Speaker 1>house or open a store, you go to a bank

0:52:39.640 --> 0:52:42.640
<v Speaker 1>for a loan. When banks are in crisis, as they

0:52:42.680 --> 0:52:44.920
<v Speaker 1>were in two thousand and eight, they will be less

0:52:45.080 --> 0:52:47.759
<v Speaker 1>likely to lend you money, so you won't buy a

0:52:47.840 --> 0:52:50.720
<v Speaker 1>house or open a store. There will be less credit,

0:52:51.080 --> 0:52:55.680
<v Speaker 1>less economic activity, less growth in the real economy. Government's

0:52:55.719 --> 0:52:58.280
<v Speaker 1>bailed out banks in two thousand and eight, not because

0:52:58.320 --> 0:53:01.319
<v Speaker 1>they love bankers, but because banks matter for the rest

0:53:01.360 --> 0:53:05.520
<v Speaker 1>of the economy. The crypto financial system is very fun

0:53:05.680 --> 0:53:08.640
<v Speaker 1>and cool and has invented a lot of interesting stuff,

0:53:09.160 --> 0:53:11.959
<v Speaker 1>but it's mostly not where people go to get money

0:53:12.040 --> 0:53:15.239
<v Speaker 1>to buy a house or open a store. Bitcoin and

0:53:15.360 --> 0:53:18.560
<v Speaker 1>ethereum and defy could all vanish tomorrow without a trace,

0:53:19.280 --> 0:53:22.200
<v Speaker 1>and most businesses that make stuff in the physical world

0:53:22.719 --> 0:53:26.640
<v Speaker 1>would be just fine. Thank you Matt Levine, and thank

0:53:26.680 --> 0:53:29.880
<v Speaker 1>you Mark Ledoff. As a reminder, if you're looking for

0:53:29.960 --> 0:53:32.239
<v Speaker 1>these episodes in the Crypto Feed, will be publishing them

0:53:32.320 --> 0:53:36.719
<v Speaker 1>every Sunday through December. If you'd like to read this

0:53:36.880 --> 0:53:39.239
<v Speaker 1>issue in print form, you can head on over to

0:53:39.320 --> 0:53:47.200
<v Speaker 1>Bloomberg dot com slash the Crypto story. This is Bloomberg Crypto,

0:53:47.440 --> 0:53:50.680
<v Speaker 1>a daily podcast from Bloomberg and I Heart Radio. For

0:53:50.800 --> 0:53:53.040
<v Speaker 1>more shows from I Heart Radio, visit the I Heart

0:53:53.120 --> 0:53:56.799
<v Speaker 1>Radio app, Apple Podcasts, or wherever you get your podcasts.

0:53:57.600 --> 0:54:00.200
<v Speaker 1>Send us your comments, questions, or suggestions for the show

0:54:00.360 --> 0:54:03.600
<v Speaker 1>to Crypto at Bloomberg dot net or find us on Twitter.

0:54:03.880 --> 0:54:08.920
<v Speaker 1>We're at Crypto. The supervising producer of Bloomberg Crypto is

0:54:09.000 --> 0:54:13.200
<v Speaker 1>Vicky Vergelina. Our senior producer is Janet Babin. Our producers

0:54:13.239 --> 0:54:16.759
<v Speaker 1>are Mohammed Farouk and Sharon Barriro. Our associate producers are

0:54:16.800 --> 0:54:20.320
<v Speaker 1>Ty Butler and Moses on Them. Desta wonder At is

0:54:20.360 --> 0:54:25.600
<v Speaker 1>our Engineer, original music by Leo Sidron. I'm Stacy Marie Schmaal.

0:54:25.880 --> 0:54:26.800
<v Speaker 1>We'll be back tomorrow.