1 00:00:02,480 --> 00:00:05,480 Speaker 1: This is Bloomberg Crypto, a daily Bloomberg I Heart podcast, 2 00:00:05,680 --> 00:00:08,559 Speaker 1: and I'm Stacy Marie Ishmael, Managing editor of Crypto for 3 00:00:08,600 --> 00:00:27,120 Speaker 1: Bloomberg News. It's Monday, November. Well, now, there's been a 4 00:00:27,160 --> 00:00:30,520 Speaker 1: lot going on in crypto in just the last few days. 5 00:00:31,120 --> 00:00:34,640 Speaker 1: Sam bank Win Freed's global empire has come crumbling down 6 00:00:34,680 --> 00:00:39,199 Speaker 1: around him. Multiple of his companies have filed for bankruptcy protection. 7 00:00:39,880 --> 00:00:43,839 Speaker 1: Various wallets associated with his exchanges were drained of their funds. 8 00:00:44,479 --> 00:00:48,120 Speaker 1: Sam himself was questioned by police and regulators in the Bahamas, 9 00:00:48,560 --> 00:00:51,879 Speaker 1: where FTX was based. How did it all come to this? 10 00:00:52,680 --> 00:00:54,840 Speaker 1: You'll hear more about what's going on and how we 11 00:00:54,920 --> 00:00:57,960 Speaker 1: got here on some special episodes of the Bloomberg Crypto 12 00:00:58,040 --> 00:01:01,840 Speaker 1: podcast this week. On Tuesday, my colleagues Vildanna Harrick and 13 00:01:01,920 --> 00:01:05,480 Speaker 1: Katie Greifeld will discuss the very latest developments in the 14 00:01:05,680 --> 00:01:11,000 Speaker 1: SPF FTX Ala Mina universe. But for today's episode, which 15 00:01:11,000 --> 00:01:14,080 Speaker 1: we recorded before the shenanigans of the last several days, 16 00:01:14,600 --> 00:01:17,959 Speaker 1: we're going to talk about Mango. No, not the fruit, 17 00:01:18,640 --> 00:01:21,440 Speaker 1: the de Fi protocol one that was hit by a 18 00:01:21,480 --> 00:01:26,480 Speaker 1: one hundred million dollar exploit recently. Mango experienced a type 19 00:01:26,600 --> 00:01:30,200 Speaker 1: of exploits that's really raising eyebrows and crypto these days. 20 00:01:30,760 --> 00:01:34,920 Speaker 1: It's called a price manipulation attack, and it involves taking 21 00:01:34,959 --> 00:01:38,160 Speaker 1: advantage of how de fi platforms are supposed to work. 22 00:01:39,200 --> 00:01:42,000 Speaker 1: In this episode, I'll be joined by Bloomberg report to 23 00:01:42,160 --> 00:01:48,800 Speaker 1: Muchen you Never Sleep, and by Evgeny gave a NASA 24 00:01:48,840 --> 00:01:51,240 Speaker 1: experience was a hack back and back in the summer 25 00:01:51,400 --> 00:01:54,880 Speaker 1: is Optimism, the CEO and founder of winter Mute, a 26 00:01:54,920 --> 00:01:58,040 Speaker 1: trading platform that was itself hacked for a hundred and 27 00:01:58,080 --> 00:02:07,520 Speaker 1: sixty million dollars back in September. We are what's been 28 00:02:07,560 --> 00:02:10,880 Speaker 1: going on with DeFi and specifically with Mango that has 29 00:02:10,919 --> 00:02:14,760 Speaker 1: folks a bit stressed right now. I think it's really 30 00:02:14,919 --> 00:02:19,360 Speaker 1: all started of this us being at this stage of 31 00:02:19,360 --> 00:02:23,160 Speaker 1: the market, a lot of tokens are not as liquid 32 00:02:23,240 --> 00:02:26,800 Speaker 1: as used to be, as there's a less retail interest 33 00:02:27,120 --> 00:02:31,360 Speaker 1: in the space and there's also less assuming institutional interests 34 00:02:31,360 --> 00:02:34,639 Speaker 1: in the space. So as a result, a lot of tokens, 35 00:02:34,960 --> 00:02:37,680 Speaker 1: as we know in the past, especially in the bull market, 36 00:02:37,760 --> 00:02:41,640 Speaker 1: there's a hundreds of tokens that's been created now because 37 00:02:41,639 --> 00:02:44,720 Speaker 1: there's less interests, there's less money in the space a 38 00:02:44,720 --> 00:02:47,200 Speaker 1: lot of tokens. They are not as liquid as used 39 00:02:47,200 --> 00:02:50,360 Speaker 1: to be. Therefore, it's easier for people to sort of 40 00:02:50,520 --> 00:02:54,800 Speaker 1: manipulate the prices of these tokens by singlely just like 41 00:02:54,880 --> 00:02:57,359 Speaker 1: a one trade or a few trades, so they can 42 00:02:57,600 --> 00:03:01,639 Speaker 1: move the price either up dramatically or down dramatically easily. 43 00:03:02,720 --> 00:03:09,320 Speaker 1: This doesn't seem to be technically or practically illegal as 44 00:03:09,400 --> 00:03:12,840 Speaker 1: far as any of the various lawyers that we've spoken to, 45 00:03:12,960 --> 00:03:17,639 Speaker 1: just kind of in principle, it's very obsetting, right, you 46 00:03:17,680 --> 00:03:20,560 Speaker 1: are the owner of a platform, or you are people 47 00:03:20,560 --> 00:03:23,639 Speaker 1: who are affected by this thing, and someone comes in 48 00:03:23,760 --> 00:03:28,040 Speaker 1: and is able to take advantage of price movements that 49 00:03:28,080 --> 00:03:31,640 Speaker 1: they may themselves be triggering to you know, buy or sell, 50 00:03:31,919 --> 00:03:34,120 Speaker 1: or both buy and sell in a way that allows 51 00:03:34,120 --> 00:03:37,920 Speaker 1: them to walk away with a significant amount of money. 52 00:03:37,960 --> 00:03:40,520 Speaker 1: But again, as somebody who has been sort of on 53 00:03:40,560 --> 00:03:45,040 Speaker 1: the other side of these kinds of exploits that exist 54 00:03:45,080 --> 00:03:47,760 Speaker 1: in the legal gray area, what is it like to 55 00:03:47,800 --> 00:03:52,760 Speaker 1: go through it? Basically, I was I'm encryptophor over five 56 00:03:52,840 --> 00:03:56,880 Speaker 1: years now, but before that I was in normal traditional finance, 57 00:03:57,520 --> 00:04:01,680 Speaker 1: and I would say those kind of tradings allages, quote unquote, 58 00:04:02,080 --> 00:04:04,560 Speaker 1: it would be very much illegal and traditional markets, like 59 00:04:04,600 --> 00:04:07,280 Speaker 1: if somebody would keeps up like this on I know, 60 00:04:07,440 --> 00:04:09,720 Speaker 1: see me and nicely for examples, they would get into 61 00:04:09,760 --> 00:04:12,680 Speaker 1: a lot of trouble. So to me, it's a very 62 00:04:12,800 --> 00:04:16,160 Speaker 1: very much illegal what happened to be honest people who 63 00:04:16,160 --> 00:04:18,680 Speaker 1: are engaging in these kinds of exploits. And there is 64 00:04:18,839 --> 00:04:22,440 Speaker 1: one in particular as it relates to Mango, who has 65 00:04:22,920 --> 00:04:28,239 Speaker 1: sort of publicly been talking on Twitter on discord saying well, 66 00:04:28,279 --> 00:04:30,839 Speaker 1: you know this isn't illegal. Your contracts allow me to 67 00:04:30,880 --> 00:04:33,839 Speaker 1: do this kind of stuff. I'm going to do this 68 00:04:33,960 --> 00:04:37,839 Speaker 1: kind of stuff. And to our knowledge, he has not 69 00:04:38,000 --> 00:04:41,640 Speaker 1: been charged with any crimes. He's definitely not been arrested. 70 00:04:42,600 --> 00:04:46,840 Speaker 1: But what has been happening is a sort of how 71 00:04:46,880 --> 00:04:51,360 Speaker 1: shall I say, rage from from folks in the defied 72 00:04:51,360 --> 00:04:54,320 Speaker 1: community that he does have this degree of impunity to 73 00:04:54,360 --> 00:04:55,919 Speaker 1: sort of say well, yeah, I'm going to do this 74 00:04:55,960 --> 00:04:58,520 Speaker 1: thing and you can't do anything about it. And specifically 75 00:04:59,000 --> 00:05:01,400 Speaker 1: when he was first able to do this exploit with Mango, 76 00:05:01,560 --> 00:05:04,840 Speaker 1: and the initial amounts that he was able to, you know, 77 00:05:04,960 --> 00:05:08,279 Speaker 1: manipulate in his favor was a hundred million. Eventually it 78 00:05:08,360 --> 00:05:12,360 Speaker 1: was cut to about half. We are what happened between 79 00:05:12,360 --> 00:05:14,440 Speaker 1: that hundred million and that fifty million, Like, what were 80 00:05:14,440 --> 00:05:18,560 Speaker 1: the conversations between Mango and this person that reduced the 81 00:05:18,640 --> 00:05:21,320 Speaker 1: amounts that was lost? I mean, correct me if I 82 00:05:21,360 --> 00:05:23,679 Speaker 1: were on what I was hurt? Is that what happens 83 00:05:24,000 --> 00:05:28,960 Speaker 1: they he posed a statement about what happened, and again 84 00:05:29,040 --> 00:05:32,560 Speaker 1: he says everything he did was totally illegal, But he 85 00:05:32,640 --> 00:05:36,440 Speaker 1: had a conversation with the Mango team. Eventually they made 86 00:05:36,440 --> 00:05:39,359 Speaker 1: a deal that he would have returned part of the 87 00:05:39,400 --> 00:05:42,640 Speaker 1: money back to the Mango Markets team just because what 88 00:05:42,760 --> 00:05:45,839 Speaker 1: happens Mango as a result is that the whole project 89 00:05:45,880 --> 00:05:49,000 Speaker 1: we can't sort of insolvent and they had no money, 90 00:05:49,160 --> 00:05:51,800 Speaker 1: low liquidity, and a lot of users are trapped with 91 00:05:52,400 --> 00:05:57,080 Speaker 1: the fact that there's no money left there now. If Geinny, 92 00:05:57,120 --> 00:05:59,839 Speaker 1: I've got to ask you this question, right like winter, 93 00:06:00,040 --> 00:06:02,640 Speaker 1: you was affected by an exploit in September to the 94 00:06:02,680 --> 00:06:07,400 Speaker 1: tune of sixty million dollars. What did you learn going 95 00:06:07,560 --> 00:06:09,440 Speaker 1: through that and what are you doing? How are you 96 00:06:09,480 --> 00:06:13,320 Speaker 1: thinking about the space differently as a result. Honestly, not 97 00:06:13,520 --> 00:06:15,839 Speaker 1: much changed, I guess in my in my thinking like 98 00:06:15,960 --> 00:06:21,760 Speaker 1: it's I see those hacks exploits as basical cost of 99 00:06:21,800 --> 00:06:24,040 Speaker 1: doing business in a way. But it's I wouldn't say 100 00:06:24,040 --> 00:06:28,240 Speaker 1: it's inevitable, but it's something well. As an operator in 101 00:06:28,279 --> 00:06:31,760 Speaker 1: the space, you basically have to accept that's that's a 102 00:06:31,800 --> 00:06:35,039 Speaker 1: possibility for in the training strategies you do that as 103 00:06:35,080 --> 00:06:37,080 Speaker 1: there is a possibility of a hack of exploit, of 104 00:06:37,480 --> 00:06:40,120 Speaker 1: something going wrong with the protocol, you own no productol 105 00:06:40,160 --> 00:06:44,480 Speaker 1: your trade off. So for us as a firm, nothing 106 00:06:44,640 --> 00:06:47,800 Speaker 1: changed in terms of a strategy. Like we obviously learned 107 00:06:47,920 --> 00:06:50,800 Speaker 1: quite a bit on this event, we will we will 108 00:06:50,839 --> 00:06:54,680 Speaker 1: approach trading going forward in a much safer way, But 109 00:06:55,040 --> 00:06:59,560 Speaker 1: nothing changed in terms of our well, in terms of 110 00:06:59,640 --> 00:07:02,120 Speaker 1: us being really interested in the space, in terms so 111 00:07:02,200 --> 00:07:05,480 Speaker 1: far as being really invested in the space and basically 112 00:07:05,560 --> 00:07:11,880 Speaker 1: asked continuously working too, Yeah, continue trading, continue moving the 113 00:07:11,920 --> 00:07:16,360 Speaker 1: space forward. Is there actually a way to design a seatbelt? 114 00:07:16,520 --> 00:07:18,400 Speaker 1: Is there a way to get this be from a 115 00:07:18,520 --> 00:07:22,520 Speaker 1: cost of doing business to something that is unattractive to 116 00:07:22,800 --> 00:07:26,680 Speaker 1: potential exploits. Look, it's it's always possible to make it 117 00:07:26,880 --> 00:07:29,480 Speaker 1: super safe, and I guess that's that's what the whole 118 00:07:29,760 --> 00:07:33,440 Speaker 1: ecosystem defied community is working towards and ultimately as they 119 00:07:33,440 --> 00:07:36,840 Speaker 1: will arrive, like if you look at battle tested protocols 120 00:07:36,840 --> 00:07:40,240 Speaker 1: like Halba for example, it looks like it's it's pretty 121 00:07:40,240 --> 00:07:42,600 Speaker 1: safe to use and there are like billions of assets 122 00:07:42,600 --> 00:07:46,600 Speaker 1: and in protocols like this, but it does take time 123 00:07:46,640 --> 00:07:50,640 Speaker 1: to arrive to the stage where like protocols like Holbor 124 00:07:50,800 --> 00:07:53,920 Speaker 1: like unit small for example, are pattal tested and it's 125 00:07:53,960 --> 00:07:59,160 Speaker 1: basically as a run or exploits possible like for those 126 00:07:59,160 --> 00:08:03,160 Speaker 1: particular protocols, but the main challenge always arises when there 127 00:08:03,200 --> 00:08:05,960 Speaker 1: is an interception between different protocols, which is the coolest 128 00:08:05,960 --> 00:08:09,440 Speaker 1: thing about defining general when when the protocols can coexist 129 00:08:09,480 --> 00:08:11,800 Speaker 1: with each other and like built on top of each other, 130 00:08:12,360 --> 00:08:16,320 Speaker 1: and like in case of Manga specifically as the oracles, 131 00:08:16,400 --> 00:08:18,880 Speaker 1: and from what we saw from a lot of exploits 132 00:08:18,920 --> 00:08:21,160 Speaker 1: in the space, and not not just Maga but but 133 00:08:21,320 --> 00:08:26,280 Speaker 1: other ones, oracles are typically is the most vulnerable vulnerable 134 00:08:26,320 --> 00:08:30,160 Speaker 1: point because like that's that's where the manipulation can potentially happen. 135 00:08:30,720 --> 00:08:34,960 Speaker 1: And if you design your protocol as something that has 136 00:08:35,000 --> 00:08:37,839 Speaker 1: to rely on oracle, yes, that's that's that's ultimately can 137 00:08:37,880 --> 00:08:39,840 Speaker 1: be a point of failure. Now, when we talk about 138 00:08:39,880 --> 00:08:42,120 Speaker 1: oracles and defy, we don't just mean some like all 139 00:08:42,160 --> 00:08:47,439 Speaker 1: seeing entity. We what we're describing are the pricing systems 140 00:08:47,480 --> 00:08:50,720 Speaker 1: that folks use to say, oh, yes, this token is 141 00:08:50,720 --> 00:08:53,200 Speaker 1: actually treading at x y z price. And it sounds 142 00:08:53,240 --> 00:08:55,920 Speaker 1: like what you're describing is the fact that these automated 143 00:08:55,960 --> 00:08:59,920 Speaker 1: systems that assume a price that exists is valid is 144 00:09:00,080 --> 00:09:03,280 Speaker 1: point of vulnerability because that price might have been manipulated 145 00:09:03,320 --> 00:09:08,240 Speaker 1: five seconds before exactly and basically, in traditional finance as 146 00:09:08,240 --> 00:09:12,680 Speaker 1: price manipulation would be illegal, while encrypto at the moment, 147 00:09:12,760 --> 00:09:18,520 Speaker 1: it's not. Well, you started by saying, you know, one 148 00:09:18,600 --> 00:09:22,040 Speaker 1: of the reasons this type of exploit has been possible 149 00:09:22,160 --> 00:09:26,079 Speaker 1: is because of the relative lack of liquidity. In an 150 00:09:26,160 --> 00:09:29,800 Speaker 1: environment with less liquidity, it's a lot easier to make 151 00:09:29,840 --> 00:09:33,160 Speaker 1: these sorts of dramatic price moves that allow the sorts 152 00:09:33,160 --> 00:09:37,040 Speaker 1: of trading strategies that folks are using to make these 153 00:09:37,080 --> 00:09:39,960 Speaker 1: kinds of profits. There have been a couple of platforms 154 00:09:40,000 --> 00:09:42,680 Speaker 1: and thinking and protocols I'm thinking about, like Compound and 155 00:09:42,760 --> 00:09:45,120 Speaker 1: a couple of others that said, okay, for like less 156 00:09:45,160 --> 00:09:47,679 Speaker 1: liquid tokens, we're going to take certain types of steps 157 00:09:47,960 --> 00:09:50,640 Speaker 1: to make them less prone to this kind of manipulation. 158 00:09:51,200 --> 00:09:53,880 Speaker 1: What other things have you seen or are you talking 159 00:09:53,920 --> 00:09:56,600 Speaker 1: to people about that they're also considering as a way 160 00:09:56,640 --> 00:10:00,400 Speaker 1: to mitigate the risks here. A big part of of 161 00:10:00,480 --> 00:10:03,439 Speaker 1: what happened with the Mango markets and the similar attacks 162 00:10:03,640 --> 00:10:07,760 Speaker 1: was what kind of collaterals you can use to borrow 163 00:10:07,920 --> 00:10:11,200 Speaker 1: money in the space. I think when projects in general 164 00:10:11,240 --> 00:10:15,000 Speaker 1: consider what are the tokens that we except as collateral 165 00:10:15,240 --> 00:10:18,679 Speaker 1: is very important. I think sort of due diligence around 166 00:10:18,760 --> 00:10:22,920 Speaker 1: each token and about technical details and and everything else 167 00:10:23,000 --> 00:10:27,000 Speaker 1: around the token and the project is very important, you know, 168 00:10:27,120 --> 00:10:31,400 Speaker 1: like as Crypto seven it never sleeps. It's also very 169 00:10:31,400 --> 00:10:35,959 Speaker 1: important to having established or integrate sort of own chair 170 00:10:36,080 --> 00:10:39,720 Speaker 1: analysis and monitor around your project, just to make sure 171 00:10:40,240 --> 00:10:43,720 Speaker 1: that you know, if something bad happens, you can detect 172 00:10:43,760 --> 00:10:47,000 Speaker 1: it early on and being able at least having time 173 00:10:47,040 --> 00:10:51,400 Speaker 1: to fix it or or to save it. Afghani as 174 00:10:51,400 --> 00:10:56,160 Speaker 1: somebody who is in the position of having to convince 175 00:10:57,360 --> 00:11:00,840 Speaker 1: borrowers lenders that they should continue to be using you know, 176 00:11:00,880 --> 00:11:03,000 Speaker 1: not just like your protocol, your platform, but like defy 177 00:11:03,080 --> 00:11:06,160 Speaker 1: in general. What are you saying to folks out there 178 00:11:06,160 --> 00:11:07,920 Speaker 1: who are looking at this under the like is my 179 00:11:07,960 --> 00:11:11,199 Speaker 1: money at risk? If I am you know investing or 180 00:11:11,240 --> 00:11:14,839 Speaker 1: in any way involved in defy. Right now, I think 181 00:11:14,920 --> 00:11:18,280 Speaker 1: one once something to considers just hot transparent it is. 182 00:11:18,480 --> 00:11:21,720 Speaker 1: And I think, like I'm coming from, like very basic 183 00:11:21,760 --> 00:11:25,679 Speaker 1: example is lending protocols. We've seen this here is that 184 00:11:26,000 --> 00:11:30,880 Speaker 1: well Salsus collapsed companies like Block Fine, Voyager or head Issues, 185 00:11:31,480 --> 00:11:34,640 Speaker 1: and like one unified seam around all of those is 186 00:11:35,240 --> 00:11:37,280 Speaker 1: like you could put your money in Celsius, but you 187 00:11:37,280 --> 00:11:39,040 Speaker 1: would have no idea where as a where as a 188 00:11:39,120 --> 00:11:42,839 Speaker 1: yield that's coming from defied, it's very much transparent to 189 00:11:42,960 --> 00:11:45,680 Speaker 1: clear whereas the yield is coming from, like whether you 190 00:11:45,720 --> 00:11:48,200 Speaker 1: put it on another or you put it on on 191 00:11:48,280 --> 00:11:50,600 Speaker 1: Maple for example, you know exactly where as the yield 192 00:11:50,679 --> 00:11:54,760 Speaker 1: is coun from. And that's that's a very big shift 193 00:11:54,840 --> 00:12:00,600 Speaker 1: from very intransparent like traditional centralized player. That's a centralized 194 00:12:00,679 --> 00:12:03,319 Speaker 1: kind of place. Coming up more from Bloomberg report of 195 00:12:03,400 --> 00:12:07,040 Speaker 1: Muyashen and from Winter Mute CEO of Guinea, Guy Avoid 196 00:12:07,480 --> 00:12:09,800 Speaker 1: on how the recent attack on Mango is shaking up 197 00:12:09,840 --> 00:12:23,760 Speaker 1: the crypto industry. Now, in the immediate aftermath of the 198 00:12:23,760 --> 00:12:27,760 Speaker 1: hack that affected Winter Mute, you know, you tweeted that 199 00:12:27,800 --> 00:12:30,920 Speaker 1: you were willing to offer a ten percent bounty to 200 00:12:31,640 --> 00:12:34,959 Speaker 1: the hacker if they returned the funds. How have your 201 00:12:34,960 --> 00:12:37,520 Speaker 1: feelings on bounties evolved over time? Do you think that 202 00:12:37,600 --> 00:12:40,480 Speaker 1: these are effective? Do you think that something like a 203 00:12:40,520 --> 00:12:44,559 Speaker 1: cap makes sense? I think it's ultimately up to every 204 00:12:44,600 --> 00:12:47,079 Speaker 1: protocol what to do with it or every company what 205 00:12:47,160 --> 00:12:50,560 Speaker 1: to do with it. To me, something between like five 206 00:12:50,640 --> 00:12:55,760 Speaker 1: to generally makes sense. Put in a cap one might 207 00:12:55,880 --> 00:12:59,200 Speaker 1: make sense as well, like we had. Another another experience 208 00:12:59,280 --> 00:13:02,360 Speaker 1: was a hack back back in the summer with with Optimism, 209 00:13:02,440 --> 00:13:07,840 Speaker 1: where it ended up successfully where hacker did accept and bounty. 210 00:13:08,440 --> 00:13:12,440 Speaker 1: I personally think tund sounds fine. Limited to five million 211 00:13:12,480 --> 00:13:16,240 Speaker 1: dollars can also work, I guess yes, but in general 212 00:13:16,320 --> 00:13:18,679 Speaker 1: like it. I think it's it's a great saying if 213 00:13:18,720 --> 00:13:22,360 Speaker 1: we have some kind of standard sets in place so that, 214 00:13:23,920 --> 00:13:27,400 Speaker 1: like every protocol or every company doesn't have to keep 215 00:13:27,440 --> 00:13:30,920 Speaker 1: reinventing it every time something like this happens. The thing 216 00:13:31,000 --> 00:13:32,760 Speaker 1: is that every time you like, at least what I 217 00:13:32,760 --> 00:13:34,440 Speaker 1: talked to somebody in defy and I start saying where 218 00:13:34,440 --> 00:13:36,880 Speaker 1: it's like agreed standards, They're like, no, that is the 219 00:13:36,880 --> 00:13:41,080 Speaker 1: opposite of decentralization. You know this, How how do you 220 00:13:41,120 --> 00:13:44,920 Speaker 1: square those things. Yes, I think that there was actually 221 00:13:45,000 --> 00:13:50,040 Speaker 1: a recently debate between SBF and Erica or HISS and 222 00:13:50,440 --> 00:13:53,079 Speaker 1: Eric and his post. He basically like there is a 223 00:13:53,120 --> 00:13:56,440 Speaker 1: difference between regulation and standards, and regulation is like close 224 00:13:56,480 --> 00:13:59,840 Speaker 1: and post on you and standards the sumpthing, Well, you 225 00:14:00,040 --> 00:14:04,240 Speaker 1: can agree to follow basically, and you follow the standards, 226 00:14:04,240 --> 00:14:06,640 Speaker 1: people will television more likely, but you don't have to, 227 00:14:06,880 --> 00:14:09,199 Speaker 1: Like you can say, yeah, I'm not gonna divide by 228 00:14:09,200 --> 00:14:11,840 Speaker 1: the standards. I'm gonna do my own saying. And that's fine. 229 00:14:12,760 --> 00:14:14,240 Speaker 1: We all you talked to a lot of folks and 230 00:14:14,320 --> 00:14:17,000 Speaker 1: defy kind of all day long. We've said on this 231 00:14:17,080 --> 00:14:19,520 Speaker 1: podcast over and over that one of the it's almost 232 00:14:19,520 --> 00:14:21,640 Speaker 1: like a meme at this point. If you are the 233 00:14:21,640 --> 00:14:23,920 Speaker 1: CEO of a big crypto exchange, you're like, we just 234 00:14:23,960 --> 00:14:26,880 Speaker 1: want regulatory clarity, like like we just want to know 235 00:14:26,960 --> 00:14:29,880 Speaker 1: what's going to happen. What is the vibe among the 236 00:14:30,360 --> 00:14:33,080 Speaker 1: other DeFi executives that you that you speak to as 237 00:14:33,080 --> 00:14:36,640 Speaker 1: it relates to this regulation and enforcement piece. I think 238 00:14:36,720 --> 00:14:39,080 Speaker 1: it's funny. I think when I first started covering crypt 239 00:14:39,200 --> 00:14:41,400 Speaker 1: or way back then, I mean saying way back then, 240 00:14:41,440 --> 00:14:43,840 Speaker 1: it's a little bit a little bit exaggerated because just 241 00:14:43,920 --> 00:14:47,000 Speaker 1: deify as being existing only for this this few years 242 00:14:47,000 --> 00:14:49,120 Speaker 1: in the past. You know, in the beginning when we 243 00:14:49,160 --> 00:14:52,440 Speaker 1: talked to Defy folks, and it's usually just those DJs, 244 00:14:52,480 --> 00:14:55,360 Speaker 1: you know, anymalous people on discord and trying to find 245 00:14:55,400 --> 00:14:58,520 Speaker 1: the alpha. Like now, like I think people are becoming 246 00:14:58,600 --> 00:15:01,480 Speaker 1: more realistic. Like a lot of folks when I talk 247 00:15:01,560 --> 00:15:04,440 Speaker 1: to them, they understand, you know, like for Defied two 248 00:15:04,440 --> 00:15:07,840 Speaker 1: really to grow, to really go bigger, you need bigger 249 00:15:07,880 --> 00:15:10,560 Speaker 1: money coming into the space. You need people to use 250 00:15:10,600 --> 00:15:14,040 Speaker 1: it for real life application, and you know, people can 251 00:15:14,120 --> 00:15:17,720 Speaker 1: borrow and landing like even real world assets in the space, 252 00:15:17,800 --> 00:15:21,360 Speaker 1: and you have to have regulations on that. I think 253 00:15:21,440 --> 00:15:24,760 Speaker 1: that's the sort of a general consensus as as I'm 254 00:15:24,800 --> 00:15:28,400 Speaker 1: getting from from people these days. But I think as 255 00:15:28,440 --> 00:15:31,840 Speaker 1: we just discussed it, it's really hard to tell how 256 00:15:31,880 --> 00:15:35,800 Speaker 1: we can get everyone together to have some sort of 257 00:15:35,880 --> 00:15:40,440 Speaker 1: agreement on how to regulate it and how can sort 258 00:15:40,480 --> 00:15:44,680 Speaker 1: of enforce people to follow the rules. Again, from your perspective, 259 00:15:45,440 --> 00:15:49,640 Speaker 1: what is kind of your ideal version of something like 260 00:15:49,680 --> 00:15:51,640 Speaker 1: that for Defy, Like if we ever get to this 261 00:15:51,760 --> 00:15:56,000 Speaker 1: sort of scale for Defy where the applications are things 262 00:15:56,080 --> 00:15:59,760 Speaker 1: like you know, widespread availability of mortgages or you know 263 00:15:59,760 --> 00:16:02,920 Speaker 1: what our sorts of consumer finance people might need. What 264 00:16:03,040 --> 00:16:05,320 Speaker 1: does that look like for you? To me, the ideal 265 00:16:05,680 --> 00:16:09,040 Speaker 1: regulation aroundefined and maybe not maybe regulations not even the 266 00:16:09,080 --> 00:16:12,920 Speaker 1: right world worked here, But to me, the ideal would be, 267 00:16:13,080 --> 00:16:16,920 Speaker 1: for example, with SEC not saying the security is not security, 268 00:16:16,960 --> 00:16:19,720 Speaker 1: which they're not even saying to be honest, but it 269 00:16:19,720 --> 00:16:22,800 Speaker 1: would be saying, okay, guys, we looked into a syrium. 270 00:16:24,480 --> 00:16:26,480 Speaker 1: It can be like risky, but it's definitely not a 271 00:16:26,520 --> 00:16:31,800 Speaker 1: scamp something like this. So basically, instead of prosecuting protocols 272 00:16:31,800 --> 00:16:36,200 Speaker 1: for potentially being securities or not, basically making a list 273 00:16:36,240 --> 00:16:40,360 Speaker 1: of safe things to invest it, that to me would 274 00:16:40,400 --> 00:16:45,480 Speaker 1: be ideal because the world where like what especially American 275 00:16:45,520 --> 00:16:49,800 Speaker 1: investors are running into now or ordinary people really is well, 276 00:16:49,880 --> 00:16:54,520 Speaker 1: they cannot legally use a big portion of defied protocols 277 00:16:54,560 --> 00:16:58,320 Speaker 1: like divid X for example, because the ideas just IP 278 00:16:58,440 --> 00:17:01,680 Speaker 1: blocks US people because it doesn't want to deal with 279 00:17:01,760 --> 00:17:05,080 Speaker 1: the FTC or SEC because it doesn't want to break 280 00:17:05,119 --> 00:17:08,200 Speaker 1: the lot, which is very understandable, but it also means 281 00:17:08,240 --> 00:17:11,080 Speaker 1: that basically, big chunk of the market, big big chunk 282 00:17:11,080 --> 00:17:13,560 Speaker 1: of opportunity, which is open for the rest of the world, 283 00:17:13,680 --> 00:17:17,320 Speaker 1: is just really closed for normal retail people in Yes, well, 284 00:17:17,520 --> 00:17:18,960 Speaker 1: a pleasure to have you both on the show. Thank 285 00:17:19,000 --> 00:17:22,120 Speaker 1: you again for taking the time. Thank you, Thank you. 286 00:17:22,119 --> 00:17:25,119 Speaker 1: You can find more of Mooshan's repausing on the Bloomberg terminal, 287 00:17:25,160 --> 00:17:33,800 Speaker 1: on Bloomberg dot com and on Twitter. This is Bloomberg Crypto, 288 00:17:34,040 --> 00:17:37,320 Speaker 1: a daily podcast from Bloomberg and I Heart Radio. For 289 00:17:37,400 --> 00:17:39,640 Speaker 1: more shows from I Heart Radio, visit the I Heart 290 00:17:39,720 --> 00:17:43,400 Speaker 1: Radio app, Apple Podcasts, or wherever you get your podcasts. 291 00:17:44,200 --> 00:17:46,760 Speaker 1: Send us your comments, questions, or suggestions for the show 292 00:17:46,920 --> 00:17:53,119 Speaker 1: to Crypto at Bloomberg dot net. The supervising producer of 293 00:17:53,119 --> 00:17:56,560 Speaker 1: Bloomberg Crypto is Vicky very Galina. Our senior producer is 294 00:17:56,640 --> 00:18:00,440 Speaker 1: Janet Babin. Our producers are Mohammed Fruke and Sharon Barrio. 295 00:18:00,920 --> 00:18:03,720 Speaker 1: Our associate producers are Ty Butler and Moses on Them. 296 00:18:04,720 --> 00:18:08,680 Speaker 1: Desta wonder At is our engineer. Original music by Leo Sidrn. 297 00:18:10,280 --> 00:18:12,720 Speaker 1: I'm Stacy Maria Schmall. We'll be back tomorrow.