1 00:00:02,240 --> 00:00:06,800 Speaker 1: This is Master's in Business with Barry Ridholts on Bloomberg Radio. 2 00:00:09,760 --> 00:00:12,760 Speaker 1: This week on the podcast, I have an extra special guest. 3 00:00:13,160 --> 00:00:15,760 Speaker 1: His name is John Chisholm, and you might not have 4 00:00:15,840 --> 00:00:19,360 Speaker 1: heard of him, despite the fact that he is the 5 00:00:19,560 --> 00:00:25,240 Speaker 1: co CEO and former Chief Investment Officer of Acadian Asset Management, 6 00:00:25,640 --> 00:00:29,720 Speaker 1: which runs nearly a hundred billion dollars in institutional money 7 00:00:30,440 --> 00:00:32,599 Speaker 1: UH all around the world. Most of it is here 8 00:00:32,600 --> 00:00:36,040 Speaker 1: in the US, but a healthy UH chunk about a 9 00:00:36,080 --> 00:00:41,440 Speaker 1: third is overseas money. He has a fascinating background, UH 10 00:00:41,479 --> 00:00:45,320 Speaker 1: an aspiring rocket scientist who worked at the m I 11 00:00:45,440 --> 00:00:50,960 Speaker 1: t um Instrument Labs before taking a gig at State Street, 12 00:00:51,159 --> 00:00:55,639 Speaker 1: and then eventually him and his partners launched Acadian about 13 00:00:55,800 --> 00:00:59,880 Speaker 1: thirty two years ago. UH. They are a quantitative shop 14 00:01:00,040 --> 00:01:04,960 Speaker 1: and have a very very UH interesting approach combining essentially 15 00:01:05,680 --> 00:01:12,520 Speaker 1: fundamental factor models into a quantitative UH system and it's 16 00:01:12,560 --> 00:01:15,959 Speaker 1: really very very interesting. They've put together quite a fascinating 17 00:01:15,959 --> 00:01:20,800 Speaker 1: track record over time. If you are at all interested 18 00:01:20,959 --> 00:01:27,920 Speaker 1: in quantitative approaches, factor based UH investing, big data, artificial intelligence, 19 00:01:27,959 --> 00:01:33,199 Speaker 1: the way to approach markets UH from a data driven perspective, 20 00:01:33,720 --> 00:01:37,800 Speaker 1: then I think you're gonna find this conversation absolutely fascinating. So, 21 00:01:37,920 --> 00:01:43,160 Speaker 1: with no further ado, my interview with Acadian Asset Managements 22 00:01:43,400 --> 00:01:51,200 Speaker 1: John Chisholm. My special guest this week is John Chisholm. 23 00:01:51,280 --> 00:01:56,160 Speaker 1: He is the co CEO of Acadian Asset Management. Previously 24 00:01:56,200 --> 00:02:00,920 Speaker 1: he was Chief Investment Officer. Acadian manages a six billion 25 00:02:01,000 --> 00:02:05,560 Speaker 1: dollars in almost seventy countries around the world. UH. He 26 00:02:05,640 --> 00:02:09,679 Speaker 1: began as an analyst at State Street Bank. Previous to that, 27 00:02:09,919 --> 00:02:15,760 Speaker 1: he was a systems engineer at Draper Laboratories, which really 28 00:02:16,000 --> 00:02:19,560 Speaker 1: is a great place to start. John Chisholm, Welcome to Bloomberg. 29 00:02:20,160 --> 00:02:22,919 Speaker 1: Hi Berry, Thanks, it's great to be here. So, systems 30 00:02:22,960 --> 00:02:26,640 Speaker 1: engineer at Draper Laboratories, which became known as the M 31 00:02:26,680 --> 00:02:30,120 Speaker 1: I T Instrumentation Lab. Is that right? How did you 32 00:02:30,280 --> 00:02:32,960 Speaker 1: find your way from M I T to uh, the 33 00:02:33,000 --> 00:02:36,799 Speaker 1: instrumentation Labs. When I went to college, my passion, what 34 00:02:36,880 --> 00:02:40,399 Speaker 1: I was excited about, was really building or designing spaceships. 35 00:02:41,200 --> 00:02:44,320 Speaker 1: This was in the early eighties, So so you were 36 00:02:44,360 --> 00:02:47,880 Speaker 1: a rocket science I was a lot of the aspiring 37 00:02:48,000 --> 00:02:52,040 Speaker 1: rocket scientists exactly. And so I got my undergraduate degree, 38 00:02:52,040 --> 00:02:54,840 Speaker 1: but I found my senior year I was gotten really 39 00:02:54,880 --> 00:02:57,080 Speaker 1: interested investing, and I was spending a lot of time 40 00:02:57,360 --> 00:02:59,880 Speaker 1: mostly just reading about investing, you know whatever. It was 41 00:03:00,080 --> 00:03:04,880 Speaker 1: journal business publications, journals and uh. When I decided, okay, 42 00:03:04,919 --> 00:03:06,480 Speaker 1: what do I want to do now? I thought, well, 43 00:03:06,480 --> 00:03:08,280 Speaker 1: I probably want to go back to grad school. Do 44 00:03:08,360 --> 00:03:12,040 Speaker 1: I want to do finance investing business or do I 45 00:03:12,120 --> 00:03:16,000 Speaker 1: want to do um aerospace? And uh. I had had 46 00:03:16,040 --> 00:03:19,080 Speaker 1: a an opportunity apply to several different programs, so I 47 00:03:19,080 --> 00:03:22,919 Speaker 1: had both. I had a finance opportunity and an aerospace opportunity, 48 00:03:23,000 --> 00:03:25,200 Speaker 1: and I thought, why don't I try to test both out. 49 00:03:25,600 --> 00:03:28,239 Speaker 1: I'll get a full time job here in Boston area. 50 00:03:28,320 --> 00:03:30,240 Speaker 1: The only place there's not a lot of airspace jobs 51 00:03:30,240 --> 00:03:33,120 Speaker 1: in Boston A Draper Labs is one that works on 52 00:03:33,160 --> 00:03:37,240 Speaker 1: guidance systems. So if you've got a satellite or a missile, 53 00:03:37,400 --> 00:03:39,240 Speaker 1: you try to figure out where's it's, where's it going 54 00:03:39,280 --> 00:03:42,120 Speaker 1: to go? How does it get there? Before GPS of 55 00:03:42,440 --> 00:03:46,160 Speaker 1: headed guidance system. So uh, so I worked there full time, 56 00:03:46,280 --> 00:03:48,240 Speaker 1: and I got a part time job, like sort of 57 00:03:48,280 --> 00:03:52,280 Speaker 1: after hours job, working with a fellow named Gary Bergstrom, 58 00:03:52,280 --> 00:03:54,640 Speaker 1: who was later one of my co founders at a Kadian. 59 00:03:55,120 --> 00:03:58,520 Speaker 1: He had been a portfolio manager at Putnam and UH 60 00:03:58,520 --> 00:04:01,080 Speaker 1: in the seventies and then he left sort of off 61 00:04:01,080 --> 00:04:04,800 Speaker 1: on his own, consulting for money managers consulted at the time. 62 00:04:04,840 --> 00:04:07,000 Speaker 1: As big project when I was working with them was 63 00:04:07,040 --> 00:04:10,680 Speaker 1: for State Street later State Street Global Advisors, and we 64 00:04:10,760 --> 00:04:15,880 Speaker 1: helped building design their first international index fund and then 65 00:04:15,960 --> 00:04:18,760 Speaker 1: later on some international active strategies. So that was sort 66 00:04:18,760 --> 00:04:21,760 Speaker 1: of a part time job. UM I went back to 67 00:04:22,160 --> 00:04:24,480 Speaker 1: that made me decide that was more interesting than the 68 00:04:24,520 --> 00:04:26,520 Speaker 1: aerospace stuff I was doing at the time. That made 69 00:04:26,520 --> 00:04:29,200 Speaker 1: me decide to go back. So that's what when you 70 00:04:29,240 --> 00:04:31,840 Speaker 1: said to go back, you really started. Your first full 71 00:04:31,839 --> 00:04:34,559 Speaker 1: time job in finance was as an analyst for State Street. 72 00:04:34,600 --> 00:04:37,159 Speaker 1: Is so, so the State Street job was a was 73 00:04:37,200 --> 00:04:39,080 Speaker 1: also a part time That was also while I was 74 00:04:39,120 --> 00:04:43,160 Speaker 1: at school um UH working for them for like there 75 00:04:43,200 --> 00:04:45,760 Speaker 1: was some time off in January and then the spring semester. 76 00:04:46,279 --> 00:04:49,520 Speaker 1: I worked for them as a potential employer. But in 77 00:04:49,600 --> 00:04:54,160 Speaker 1: the end Gary's goal was to launch an asset management firm. 78 00:04:54,520 --> 00:04:58,320 Speaker 1: UH myself and we had another colleague, Churchill Franklin, and 79 00:04:58,400 --> 00:05:01,440 Speaker 1: another colleague, Ron Frasier. They all came aboard. We all 80 00:05:01,480 --> 00:05:04,960 Speaker 1: came together about the same time around when I graduated 81 00:05:05,600 --> 00:05:08,680 Speaker 1: and uh and so we launched a Kadian as an 82 00:05:08,720 --> 00:05:11,440 Speaker 1: active money manager at that point. So that's thirty two 83 00:05:11,520 --> 00:05:16,039 Speaker 1: years ago. An active manager as well as a heavily 84 00:05:16,440 --> 00:05:21,000 Speaker 1: influenced by quantitative strategies? Is that affair the work? We're 85 00:05:21,000 --> 00:05:24,520 Speaker 1: a quantitative manager. We were all you know, my background 86 00:05:24,839 --> 00:05:31,360 Speaker 1: aerospace engineering, UM all all quantitative. Gary's background, Gary gotten 87 00:05:31,360 --> 00:05:33,960 Speaker 1: a PhD from m I t uh. So we were 88 00:05:34,000 --> 00:05:36,880 Speaker 1: all very quantitative. But quant at the time was not 89 00:05:36,960 --> 00:05:40,080 Speaker 1: as sophisticated as what quant today is. Right, there wasn't 90 00:05:40,120 --> 00:05:43,760 Speaker 1: any machine learning, there wasn't any big data. There was 91 00:05:43,839 --> 00:05:48,240 Speaker 1: you know, little data. There were statistics, right, so you 92 00:05:48,279 --> 00:05:52,359 Speaker 1: know what's the average payoff to value UM and ch 93 00:05:52,400 --> 00:05:54,560 Speaker 1: how do we build a portfolio that captures that payoff? 94 00:05:55,080 --> 00:05:58,120 Speaker 1: Very simple quantitative tools that we use back in the 95 00:05:58,120 --> 00:06:02,720 Speaker 1: middle eighties. So do you consider yourselves today an active 96 00:06:02,720 --> 00:06:06,600 Speaker 1: manager or quantitatively? Like I think about firms like um 97 00:06:06,839 --> 00:06:09,200 Speaker 1: D f A or any of the FAMA French based 98 00:06:09,880 --> 00:06:15,640 Speaker 1: UM factor models, and they're somewhere between active and a 99 00:06:15,720 --> 00:06:19,799 Speaker 1: quantitative screening approach. How how would you describe a Kadian? 100 00:06:20,279 --> 00:06:22,559 Speaker 1: Describe us as active? So most of what we're doing 101 00:06:22,839 --> 00:06:27,039 Speaker 1: is highly active, potentially high tracking our against a benchmark. 102 00:06:27,640 --> 00:06:29,880 Speaker 1: We we have the flexibility so we can build low 103 00:06:29,960 --> 00:06:34,520 Speaker 1: tracking our strategies. UM. This ties into this concept of capacity. 104 00:06:34,520 --> 00:06:37,599 Speaker 1: How much money can you manage and still expect to 105 00:06:37,640 --> 00:06:41,200 Speaker 1: add the value your clients are looking for? And typically 106 00:06:41,200 --> 00:06:43,520 Speaker 1: the more money you manage, the harder is to add value. 107 00:06:44,160 --> 00:06:47,400 Speaker 1: UM So at lower levels of active risk, lower expected 108 00:06:47,520 --> 00:06:50,320 Speaker 1: value added, you can manage more money. There's some clients 109 00:06:50,320 --> 00:06:54,320 Speaker 1: who are happy hiring managers for that. They're also usually 110 00:06:54,360 --> 00:06:56,680 Speaker 1: happy paying lower fees. Right, so you really have to 111 00:06:56,720 --> 00:07:00,160 Speaker 1: trade off both from perspective of adding value and from 112 00:07:00,200 --> 00:07:02,599 Speaker 1: perspective of running a business. Where do you want to be? 113 00:07:02,680 --> 00:07:04,520 Speaker 1: Most of our strategy is highly active, but we have 114 00:07:04,600 --> 00:07:09,880 Speaker 1: some that are shading more towards UM enhanced index. When 115 00:07:09,920 --> 00:07:13,160 Speaker 1: you say enhanced index, you're taking a basic index and 116 00:07:13,160 --> 00:07:16,040 Speaker 1: then adding a little flavoring to it to move it 117 00:07:16,080 --> 00:07:20,960 Speaker 1: away from the benchmark. Yeah, we're so, for example, we 118 00:07:21,080 --> 00:07:22,880 Speaker 1: might say enhanced. The next would be if we have 119 00:07:23,280 --> 00:07:25,240 Speaker 1: tracking or of less than two percent, if we have 120 00:07:25,280 --> 00:07:27,840 Speaker 1: one and a half percent. Tracking are just means what's 121 00:07:27,880 --> 00:07:30,640 Speaker 1: the standard deviation of the expected returns versus the benchmark? 122 00:07:31,160 --> 00:07:33,400 Speaker 1: UM one and a half percent tracking er would be 123 00:07:33,520 --> 00:07:36,440 Speaker 1: enhanced index strategy, you might only expect to get one 124 00:07:36,480 --> 00:07:39,760 Speaker 1: and a half percent UM excess return associated with that 125 00:07:40,200 --> 00:07:43,160 Speaker 1: net of fees. If we had a more active strategy, 126 00:07:43,520 --> 00:07:46,480 Speaker 1: we might expect we might see four percent tracking er. 127 00:07:46,920 --> 00:07:48,840 Speaker 1: We'd expect to get about two and a half percent 128 00:07:48,920 --> 00:07:54,160 Speaker 1: active return neta fees. How do you avoid the challenge, 129 00:07:54,320 --> 00:07:59,920 Speaker 1: as as Bill Miller described it, of UM active managers 130 00:08:00,080 --> 00:08:04,160 Speaker 1: TUBJE active fees but are effectively our closet indexers. How 131 00:08:04,160 --> 00:08:08,160 Speaker 1: do you clearly differentiate yourself from that group. So, so 132 00:08:08,200 --> 00:08:09,880 Speaker 1: there's two parts to it. One is what what's under 133 00:08:09,920 --> 00:08:12,760 Speaker 1: our control? What we can do. We can build portfolios 134 00:08:12,800 --> 00:08:15,120 Speaker 1: that are active in the sense that they are very different, 135 00:08:15,120 --> 00:08:17,960 Speaker 1: they look different from the benchmark, they have UM high 136 00:08:18,080 --> 00:08:22,040 Speaker 1: higher levels of tracking, or they have high active share UM. 137 00:08:22,200 --> 00:08:24,280 Speaker 1: The other part of that isn't is the client's job. 138 00:08:24,400 --> 00:08:27,680 Speaker 1: So if the client hires twenty managers like that, they're 139 00:08:27,680 --> 00:08:30,880 Speaker 1: still getting close to back back to an index. Let's 140 00:08:30,960 --> 00:08:35,200 Speaker 1: talk a little bit about your quantitative approach, and I 141 00:08:35,240 --> 00:08:41,200 Speaker 1: was noticing on your website you describe a fourth step process, 142 00:08:41,240 --> 00:08:45,720 Speaker 1: and really what that is is strategy signal generation signal 143 00:08:45,800 --> 00:08:49,360 Speaker 1: consumption and then process can can you explain what that 144 00:08:49,440 --> 00:08:53,319 Speaker 1: means to to the perhaps the lay person who may 145 00:08:53,360 --> 00:08:56,559 Speaker 1: not be familiar with a quantitative approach. Absolutely, let me 146 00:08:56,640 --> 00:08:59,440 Speaker 1: let me start with a signal generation part, because that's 147 00:08:59,440 --> 00:09:01,760 Speaker 1: maybe the part that will be easiest for for people 148 00:09:01,800 --> 00:09:06,880 Speaker 1: to start with the basic ideas. There's different characteristics companies have. 149 00:09:07,360 --> 00:09:11,760 Speaker 1: Those characteristics can be on average predictive of returns. So, 150 00:09:11,880 --> 00:09:14,480 Speaker 1: for example, one characteristic is just is how expensive as 151 00:09:14,520 --> 00:09:17,840 Speaker 1: a company look on whatever metric P ratio? Right, So 152 00:09:17,880 --> 00:09:19,520 Speaker 1: you've got a company that has a P ratio of 153 00:09:19,559 --> 00:09:21,600 Speaker 1: eight and one that has a P ratio of forty. 154 00:09:21,920 --> 00:09:24,640 Speaker 1: That's all you knew about those companies? Which one would 155 00:09:24,640 --> 00:09:27,080 Speaker 1: you want to own? If you look at the last 156 00:09:27,120 --> 00:09:29,800 Speaker 1: fifty or sixty years globally, you'd say, I want to 157 00:09:29,800 --> 00:09:31,880 Speaker 1: own the P eight company right on average is going 158 00:09:31,960 --> 00:09:34,199 Speaker 1: to do better. The problem with that is you can 159 00:09:34,280 --> 00:09:36,800 Speaker 1: have a ten year stretch where the P forty company 160 00:09:36,920 --> 00:09:39,000 Speaker 1: kills the P A company like we've just had. We've 161 00:09:39,000 --> 00:09:42,319 Speaker 1: had you know, what would you rather own right the 162 00:09:42,360 --> 00:09:44,400 Speaker 1: last ten years? We'd rather row on Amazon or would 163 00:09:44,840 --> 00:09:47,679 Speaker 1: rather own P G n E? Right? I mean, so 164 00:09:47,880 --> 00:09:50,080 Speaker 1: those are the two biggest streames you can you can 165 00:09:50,160 --> 00:09:52,240 Speaker 1: really sorry I picked those out of it. Not hopefully 166 00:09:52,240 --> 00:09:55,640 Speaker 1: it's not quite, but it's true. Generally growth stocks have 167 00:09:55,679 --> 00:09:58,160 Speaker 1: done very well. Value stocks and stuff that joined up 168 00:09:58,160 --> 00:10:01,079 Speaker 1: for a decade. So how do you it around that? UM? 169 00:10:01,120 --> 00:10:03,120 Speaker 1: So let's say you believe on average, value is going 170 00:10:03,160 --> 00:10:05,000 Speaker 1: to outperform, like some people might not believe that. But 171 00:10:05,040 --> 00:10:07,800 Speaker 1: let's say I do. I want value in my portfolio, 172 00:10:07,840 --> 00:10:09,719 Speaker 1: but I don't want to underperform for ten years in 173 00:10:09,760 --> 00:10:12,680 Speaker 1: a row. What can I do? I can take other 174 00:10:12,800 --> 00:10:15,720 Speaker 1: characteristics that I believe are also predictive of return and 175 00:10:15,760 --> 00:10:19,160 Speaker 1: combine those with value. So I might say, for example, 176 00:10:19,679 --> 00:10:22,760 Speaker 1: UM quality measures, right, I want companies that are well managed. 177 00:10:22,760 --> 00:10:25,920 Speaker 1: How do you define well managed? Well? As a dozen definitions, 178 00:10:25,920 --> 00:10:29,040 Speaker 1: But let's say one definition is inventory turnover. Do you 179 00:10:29,040 --> 00:10:32,760 Speaker 1: have companies that turn over their inventory uh more frequently 180 00:10:32,800 --> 00:10:35,680 Speaker 1: than companies in the same industry? Right? And maybe that's 181 00:10:35,679 --> 00:10:38,400 Speaker 1: a signal that on average has some payoffs associated with 182 00:10:38,400 --> 00:10:41,880 Speaker 1: it for companies in many industries. So now I've got 183 00:10:41,960 --> 00:10:44,640 Speaker 1: value and I've got this. Let's say I think people 184 00:10:44,640 --> 00:10:47,600 Speaker 1: talk about a lot in markets as momentum, So I've 185 00:10:47,600 --> 00:10:51,360 Speaker 1: got momentum. Companies have good momentum um, they've been performing, 186 00:10:51,360 --> 00:10:54,040 Speaker 1: they've been performing their peers for the last you know, 187 00:10:54,120 --> 00:10:57,840 Speaker 1: six to twelve months. Maybe that's indicative that on average 188 00:10:57,840 --> 00:11:00,240 Speaker 1: in the future, they're likely outperformed for the next, say, 189 00:11:00,240 --> 00:11:02,720 Speaker 1: one to three months. I want to wrap that in. 190 00:11:03,000 --> 00:11:06,480 Speaker 1: So you combine all these different signals and you've got 191 00:11:06,559 --> 00:11:10,040 Speaker 1: what you historically people call a multi factor model. Right, 192 00:11:10,120 --> 00:11:13,520 Speaker 1: and so now, even if value does badly, maybe momentum 193 00:11:13,840 --> 00:11:17,080 Speaker 1: and quality and these other things do well enough to 194 00:11:17,200 --> 00:11:21,040 Speaker 1: allow you to still outperform, which is always the goal, 195 00:11:21,320 --> 00:11:25,160 Speaker 1: uh for for us and for our clients, and and 196 00:11:25,240 --> 00:11:28,680 Speaker 1: so that that's sort of the the genesis of signals. 197 00:11:28,720 --> 00:11:31,120 Speaker 1: It's just there are different types of characteristics that we 198 00:11:31,240 --> 00:11:34,880 Speaker 1: use to help predict company returns, and we then combine them. 199 00:11:35,040 --> 00:11:37,400 Speaker 1: So when you say signal consumption, a couple of pieces 200 00:11:37,440 --> 00:11:39,319 Speaker 1: of that One is how do you combine these things? Right? 201 00:11:39,840 --> 00:11:42,880 Speaker 1: Is the payoff to value the same as the payoff 202 00:11:42,960 --> 00:11:45,800 Speaker 1: to quality will probably not um. So you have to 203 00:11:45,840 --> 00:11:48,319 Speaker 1: figure out what do I expect to get If I'm 204 00:11:48,360 --> 00:11:50,280 Speaker 1: looking at it doesn't differ by the type of company 205 00:11:50,320 --> 00:11:52,880 Speaker 1: I'm looking at, is a tech company, maybe it has 206 00:11:52,960 --> 00:11:56,920 Speaker 1: different drivers overturn than a utility, And so I have 207 00:11:57,080 --> 00:11:59,560 Speaker 1: to mix the weight on those signals depending on what 208 00:11:59,640 --> 00:12:03,080 Speaker 1: kind of opening I'm evaluating. Uh, And so that's part 209 00:12:03,080 --> 00:12:05,240 Speaker 1: of consumption. Then the second part of consumption is how 210 00:12:05,240 --> 00:12:08,200 Speaker 1: do you implement that in a portfolio? Right, So, ultimately 211 00:12:08,200 --> 00:12:11,800 Speaker 1: I'm gonna hold stocks and a portfolio, I'll hold Amazon 212 00:12:11,880 --> 00:12:14,199 Speaker 1: or I won't. I'll hold pg n E or I won't. 213 00:12:15,040 --> 00:12:17,040 Speaker 1: What's my weight going to be? Hopefully it will be 214 00:12:17,400 --> 00:12:19,920 Speaker 1: last ten years, hopefully high on Amazon, lower zero. And 215 00:12:20,559 --> 00:12:22,480 Speaker 1: But but the idea is you've got to then turn 216 00:12:22,559 --> 00:12:25,720 Speaker 1: those expected returns that you're getting from the signal generation 217 00:12:25,800 --> 00:12:30,000 Speaker 1: part of your process into portfolio positions. At Acadian, we 218 00:12:30,120 --> 00:12:32,960 Speaker 1: use a pretty quantitative approach to do that as well. 219 00:12:33,360 --> 00:12:36,760 Speaker 1: We use what's called an optimizer that basically trades off 220 00:12:36,840 --> 00:12:39,480 Speaker 1: the return expectations we come up with from the signals 221 00:12:40,080 --> 00:12:43,199 Speaker 1: into and maps those into portfolio positions by trading those 222 00:12:43,200 --> 00:12:48,400 Speaker 1: off against transaction costs. So, if I'm trading again Amazon, Samsung, 223 00:12:48,960 --> 00:12:52,679 Speaker 1: a big liquid company, transaction costs are probably gonna be 224 00:12:52,679 --> 00:12:56,600 Speaker 1: pretty low, almost negligible. But if I'm trading a less 225 00:12:56,640 --> 00:12:59,400 Speaker 1: liquid company, that may be more efficiently priced than the 226 00:12:59,520 --> 00:13:02,200 Speaker 1: return up tratunity may be much greater. But I need 227 00:13:02,240 --> 00:13:04,120 Speaker 1: to now account for what's it going to cost to 228 00:13:04,120 --> 00:13:06,400 Speaker 1: get in the position and what's it going to cost 229 00:13:06,400 --> 00:13:09,200 Speaker 1: to get out of the position someday. So what you're 230 00:13:09,240 --> 00:13:14,439 Speaker 1: describing sounds a lot like traditional factor based investing. You're 231 00:13:14,520 --> 00:13:19,480 Speaker 1: describing um value, describing a momentum quality. When we talk 232 00:13:19,520 --> 00:13:22,600 Speaker 1: about liquidity, I always think about cap size. How does 233 00:13:22,679 --> 00:13:26,600 Speaker 1: your approach differ from factor investing? Or am I asking 234 00:13:26,600 --> 00:13:31,520 Speaker 1: that question wrong? Are you effectively a farmer French factor 235 00:13:31,520 --> 00:13:35,560 Speaker 1: type investor? Now that's it's a great question. Uh. And 236 00:13:35,440 --> 00:13:38,840 Speaker 1: in some ways our approach is very much like factor investing. 237 00:13:38,960 --> 00:13:41,760 Speaker 1: In other words, we consider these different signals. We consider 238 00:13:41,800 --> 00:13:45,240 Speaker 1: them to be types of factors um. What's different is 239 00:13:45,520 --> 00:13:48,880 Speaker 1: that we integrate the factors. So, for example, let's suppose 240 00:13:48,880 --> 00:13:52,360 Speaker 1: you've just been on momentum factor by itself. There's some 241 00:13:52,400 --> 00:13:54,600 Speaker 1: periods if you built a portfolio that has the most 242 00:13:54,600 --> 00:13:58,319 Speaker 1: attractive whatever it is, ten percent of uh, let's say 243 00:13:58,360 --> 00:14:00,280 Speaker 1: us amentum stocks and then the least to try active 244 00:14:00,400 --> 00:14:03,000 Speaker 1: or shorts, or you just went long the most attractive 245 00:14:03,000 --> 00:14:06,520 Speaker 1: ten percent, there are some periods where your portfolio beta. 246 00:14:06,600 --> 00:14:10,920 Speaker 1: Your sensitivity to market movements might be might be two, 247 00:14:11,000 --> 00:14:13,199 Speaker 1: so you might have a huge amount of volatility in 248 00:14:13,200 --> 00:14:16,640 Speaker 1: the portfolio. And there's other times when your sensitivity to 249 00:14:16,720 --> 00:14:19,720 Speaker 1: market movements might be very low, might be a bet 250 00:14:19,720 --> 00:14:22,520 Speaker 1: of point five um. Why does that matter? It impacts 251 00:14:22,560 --> 00:14:24,440 Speaker 1: how you can control risk. If you're doing these single 252 00:14:24,520 --> 00:14:28,360 Speaker 1: factor portfolios, for example, unless you're very careful about how 253 00:14:28,400 --> 00:14:31,000 Speaker 1: you build them, you are likely to take on all 254 00:14:31,080 --> 00:14:34,479 Speaker 1: kinds of unexpected risks in the construction of those portfolios. 255 00:14:35,000 --> 00:14:38,680 Speaker 1: With a multi factor approach, you're not beholding any one factor. 256 00:14:38,720 --> 00:14:41,240 Speaker 1: You've got all these different characteristics you can emphasize in 257 00:14:41,240 --> 00:14:43,920 Speaker 1: the portfolio, and you can trade them off, and it 258 00:14:43,960 --> 00:14:48,680 Speaker 1: allows you to manage risk better. Portfolio construction can be 259 00:14:48,720 --> 00:14:50,440 Speaker 1: a lot better than what people do when they're doing 260 00:14:50,440 --> 00:14:53,080 Speaker 1: When people talk about factor investing, if you look at 261 00:14:53,080 --> 00:14:56,880 Speaker 1: a typical factor e. T f UM, it's not built 262 00:14:56,920 --> 00:14:59,640 Speaker 1: in a very efficient way. It's more costly to investors 263 00:15:00,040 --> 00:15:02,400 Speaker 1: in ways that the investors can't see things like how 264 00:15:02,400 --> 00:15:05,480 Speaker 1: they trade the portfolio. So they simply take a rank 265 00:15:05,640 --> 00:15:09,520 Speaker 1: order of companies based on some factor, and they rebalanced. 266 00:15:09,560 --> 00:15:11,800 Speaker 1: They buy some of the most attractive ones that have 267 00:15:11,840 --> 00:15:13,800 Speaker 1: just gotten into that list and sell some of the 268 00:15:13,840 --> 00:15:15,920 Speaker 1: ones that have fallen out. That can be a lot 269 00:15:15,920 --> 00:15:18,880 Speaker 1: of turnover. And there may be times when you want 270 00:15:18,880 --> 00:15:22,160 Speaker 1: to hold onto something that's become less attractive because it 271 00:15:22,240 --> 00:15:24,200 Speaker 1: might be expensive to trade out of it and it 272 00:15:24,240 --> 00:15:27,400 Speaker 1: hasn't fallen that far right, So it's important to do 273 00:15:27,640 --> 00:15:30,280 Speaker 1: to be smart about how you use these factors. And 274 00:15:30,280 --> 00:15:32,680 Speaker 1: I'd say the keep one of the key things we 275 00:15:32,720 --> 00:15:35,520 Speaker 1: do is we worry a lot about the engineering of 276 00:15:35,520 --> 00:15:38,520 Speaker 1: our process. How do you put these factors together? How 277 00:15:38,560 --> 00:15:41,920 Speaker 1: do you minimize the slippage the transaction costs while still 278 00:15:41,920 --> 00:15:45,800 Speaker 1: getting exposure to the underlying factor in the portfolio? Quite fascinating. 279 00:15:46,320 --> 00:15:49,040 Speaker 1: Let's talk a little bit about what it's like to 280 00:15:49,840 --> 00:15:55,320 Speaker 1: run a global organization. You're headquartered in Boston. Congratulations on 281 00:15:55,320 --> 00:15:58,120 Speaker 1: the Patriots. Thank you. Um, you were at the game 282 00:15:58,600 --> 00:16:01,880 Speaker 1: you mentioned, Uh, I was at the game, first time 283 00:16:01,920 --> 00:16:04,200 Speaker 1: I've ever gone. So you don't know how long the 284 00:16:04,200 --> 00:16:06,160 Speaker 1: Patriots that this might be their last Super Bowl in 285 00:16:06,200 --> 00:16:09,160 Speaker 1: a while. Good idea to go. Yeah, now that makes 286 00:16:09,160 --> 00:16:13,040 Speaker 1: perfect sense. Um, you have affiliates in London and Singapore 287 00:16:13,040 --> 00:16:16,040 Speaker 1: and Tokyo and Sydney. What other countries are you located 288 00:16:16,080 --> 00:16:19,280 Speaker 1: in I mean, I know you have clients in We've 289 00:16:19,320 --> 00:16:22,560 Speaker 1: got clients probably thirty thirty five countries, but really they 290 00:16:22,840 --> 00:16:27,480 Speaker 1: coverage of Singapore, Sydney, Tokyo, London. We are thinking, because 291 00:16:27,520 --> 00:16:31,800 Speaker 1: it breaksit, we may need to open an office in Dublin, UM, 292 00:16:31,840 --> 00:16:35,440 Speaker 1: perhaps Amsterdam, but there's enough uncertainty there that we haven't 293 00:16:35,440 --> 00:16:38,640 Speaker 1: actually pulled the trigger yet Amsterdam. So so if people 294 00:16:39,040 --> 00:16:41,440 Speaker 1: I keep asking this, and I'm getting very different answers 295 00:16:41,480 --> 00:16:45,840 Speaker 1: from very different people. If Brexit happens hard or soft, 296 00:16:46,280 --> 00:16:52,640 Speaker 1: and London is no longer the central finance location for Europe, 297 00:16:53,720 --> 00:16:57,320 Speaker 1: where where does it go? Amsterdam doesn't really seem seem 298 00:16:57,400 --> 00:17:00,960 Speaker 1: like the place UM Geneva stud guard. I mean, I 299 00:17:01,480 --> 00:17:04,080 Speaker 1: can't Paris. Some people have floated, none of them seem 300 00:17:04,119 --> 00:17:07,560 Speaker 1: to make sense. I think Frankfort's got the economic in 301 00:17:07,600 --> 00:17:09,840 Speaker 1: many ways the commercial center of Europe. A lot of 302 00:17:09,880 --> 00:17:12,960 Speaker 1: people don't love Frankfort. Because I live near Frankfort for 303 00:17:13,000 --> 00:17:16,359 Speaker 1: a bunch of years. It's not always um doesn't have 304 00:17:16,359 --> 00:17:20,200 Speaker 1: the cultural reputation that Paris does. For example. That being said, 305 00:17:20,280 --> 00:17:23,080 Speaker 1: it's a very comfortable city to live in. So I 306 00:17:23,080 --> 00:17:26,119 Speaker 1: think Frankfort will do well. That all being said, you know, 307 00:17:26,200 --> 00:17:28,800 Speaker 1: if if we did something with another office, we're we're 308 00:17:28,840 --> 00:17:32,400 Speaker 1: just basically opening up an office to meet the regulatory requirements. 309 00:17:32,600 --> 00:17:35,080 Speaker 1: We still keep London, that would still be a major 310 00:17:35,200 --> 00:17:38,480 Speaker 1: center for portfolio management. Uh, you know, for our team, 311 00:17:38,520 --> 00:17:42,240 Speaker 1: for client service team. So your client base is uh 312 00:17:42,280 --> 00:17:47,880 Speaker 1: primarily institutional and public pension funds and other large investors. 313 00:17:48,320 --> 00:17:51,119 Speaker 1: Are they mostly US located? Are they around the world? 314 00:17:51,119 --> 00:17:54,400 Speaker 1: What what your mix so are right now? Are mixes 315 00:17:54,480 --> 00:17:59,040 Speaker 1: price seventy thirty um US non US? Uh? We we 316 00:17:59,280 --> 00:18:01,000 Speaker 1: from a business for spective you know, as a firm, 317 00:18:01,040 --> 00:18:03,760 Speaker 1: you want to be diversified, you know, so having a 318 00:18:03,800 --> 00:18:06,720 Speaker 1: fair amount of non US exposure with our clients is 319 00:18:06,760 --> 00:18:09,119 Speaker 1: something we strive for. We think there's a lot of 320 00:18:09,119 --> 00:18:12,639 Speaker 1: great growth opportunities in terms of just the the growth 321 00:18:12,640 --> 00:18:17,080 Speaker 1: of pension markets, of of institutional investor markets in Asia, 322 00:18:17,160 --> 00:18:21,520 Speaker 1: for example, there's still growth in Australia, um in in 323 00:18:21,680 --> 00:18:24,160 Speaker 1: Europe as well, there's pockets. You know, a few years 324 00:18:24,200 --> 00:18:28,600 Speaker 1: ago Germany really didn't have defined benefit pension plans. Slowly 325 00:18:28,800 --> 00:18:31,960 Speaker 1: evolving a little bit, So there's there's definitely opportunities. Don't 326 00:18:32,080 --> 00:18:35,199 Speaker 1: most of Europe or don't doesn't much of Europe have 327 00:18:36,119 --> 00:18:40,520 Speaker 1: UM some sort of retirement system covered by the government. 328 00:18:40,560 --> 00:18:43,160 Speaker 1: How do you operate around that or is that their 329 00:18:43,200 --> 00:18:45,879 Speaker 1: social security and it doesn't take the place of a 330 00:18:45,880 --> 00:18:48,320 Speaker 1: real retirement. Yeah, I mean there's a lot of variation, 331 00:18:48,400 --> 00:18:50,080 Speaker 1: but a lot of Europe, you know, like the UK, 332 00:18:50,240 --> 00:18:52,520 Speaker 1: for example, you've got public pension plans, just like in 333 00:18:52,520 --> 00:18:55,720 Speaker 1: the US you've got uh State of California cows, cowpers 334 00:18:55,720 --> 00:18:59,520 Speaker 1: and calsters. Well, in in UK you've got um local 335 00:18:59,520 --> 00:19:02,520 Speaker 1: authority pension plans UM and you can sort of think 336 00:19:02,520 --> 00:19:04,480 Speaker 1: of them as the equivalent of public plans. Here in 337 00:19:04,520 --> 00:19:07,800 Speaker 1: the US you've got large companies based in the UK 338 00:19:08,000 --> 00:19:11,560 Speaker 1: that have private pension plans, so there's some state provision. 339 00:19:11,720 --> 00:19:13,800 Speaker 1: But again, just like in the US, you have sort 340 00:19:13,800 --> 00:19:16,400 Speaker 1: of security, but that doesn't exclude all these other types 341 00:19:16,440 --> 00:19:19,240 Speaker 1: of pension plans. So in your list of countries, I 342 00:19:19,280 --> 00:19:21,960 Speaker 1: didn't hear a whole lot In China. Is Hong Kong 343 00:19:22,000 --> 00:19:25,800 Speaker 1: attractive or is mainland China possible or if it has, 344 00:19:25,800 --> 00:19:28,600 Speaker 1: the government made it too challenging to set up shop there. 345 00:19:28,800 --> 00:19:31,320 Speaker 1: Now the government's actually moving to liberalize, so it had 346 00:19:31,359 --> 00:19:35,440 Speaker 1: been very difficult for a non local investors to invest 347 00:19:35,520 --> 00:19:39,920 Speaker 1: in in in Chinese assets and manage money for Chinese institutions. UM. 348 00:19:40,000 --> 00:19:42,440 Speaker 1: We do manage money for Hong Kong clients, but that's 349 00:19:42,480 --> 00:19:45,840 Speaker 1: sort of separate stile, a separate um regulatory structure. Is 350 00:19:46,160 --> 00:19:48,520 Speaker 1: that why you're located in Sydney for that part of 351 00:19:48,520 --> 00:19:51,400 Speaker 1: the world. Singapore is is we're serving right now, we're 352 00:19:51,400 --> 00:19:54,760 Speaker 1: serving Asia extrapan out of Singapore. UM. But but China 353 00:19:54,800 --> 00:19:58,800 Speaker 1: is liberalizing and there's plenty of non local managers now 354 00:19:58,840 --> 00:20:02,240 Speaker 1: setting up shop to manage money for the Chinese institutions 355 00:20:02,240 --> 00:20:05,800 Speaker 1: in China. The challenges in China you need some scale. 356 00:20:05,840 --> 00:20:07,760 Speaker 1: You need a partner because you can't touch the retail 357 00:20:07,800 --> 00:20:10,960 Speaker 1: market without a local partner. And there's only really four 358 00:20:10,960 --> 00:20:13,600 Speaker 1: big institutions you know that you've got that are like 359 00:20:13,880 --> 00:20:17,720 Speaker 1: sort of the equivalent of Cowper's for example. UM. So 360 00:20:17,760 --> 00:20:20,679 Speaker 1: that that that market, the institutional markets very narrow and 361 00:20:20,680 --> 00:20:22,840 Speaker 1: the rest of the market, the retail market. You need 362 00:20:22,880 --> 00:20:25,600 Speaker 1: a partner. If we found the right partner, I think 363 00:20:25,600 --> 00:20:27,879 Speaker 1: would be very excited about doing something in China that 364 00:20:27,960 --> 00:20:31,320 Speaker 1: we're certainly doing some work there. We've we've had some 365 00:20:31,400 --> 00:20:34,199 Speaker 1: people not fully full time based there, but spending a 366 00:20:34,200 --> 00:20:37,320 Speaker 1: lot of time in the market. But that's something remains 367 00:20:37,359 --> 00:20:39,920 Speaker 1: to be seen whether we'll find the right opportunity to 368 00:20:40,240 --> 00:20:43,960 Speaker 1: really be a player there. So you previously were chief 369 00:20:44,000 --> 00:20:48,000 Speaker 1: Investment Officer and now you're co CEO. I have so 370 00:20:48,040 --> 00:20:51,399 Speaker 1: many questions about both. So are you still working in 371 00:20:51,480 --> 00:20:55,879 Speaker 1: a ce IO capacity as well? No, so, so I'm 372 00:20:56,000 --> 00:20:58,840 Speaker 1: I'm still interested. I still go to Investment Policy Committee meetings. 373 00:20:59,320 --> 00:21:01,480 Speaker 1: But you know, if you're if you're taking out a 374 00:21:01,480 --> 00:21:04,760 Speaker 1: new role and you've picked someone to succeed you in 375 00:21:04,880 --> 00:21:06,920 Speaker 1: your job, you really need to give them the ability 376 00:21:06,960 --> 00:21:10,600 Speaker 1: to run that function. I've got a great successor, my successor, 377 00:21:10,680 --> 00:21:13,720 Speaker 1: Brendan Bradley's or CEE i O UM started last year. 378 00:21:13,960 --> 00:21:15,679 Speaker 1: As see. I always been with it Katian for a 379 00:21:15,720 --> 00:21:19,600 Speaker 1: long time and got complete confidence in his ability to 380 00:21:19,640 --> 00:21:23,320 Speaker 1: manage the investment function UM. I still participate in some 381 00:21:23,359 --> 00:21:25,719 Speaker 1: of the meetings and I I'm interested in the research 382 00:21:25,760 --> 00:21:28,280 Speaker 1: and I talked talked to lots of the investment professionals. 383 00:21:28,400 --> 00:21:31,960 Speaker 1: It's part of my job as CEO is being in touch. 384 00:21:32,080 --> 00:21:34,240 Speaker 1: You know, what does an investment firm do? We invest 385 00:21:34,280 --> 00:21:38,000 Speaker 1: for our clients, So it's still important. But Brennan is 386 00:21:38,200 --> 00:21:42,440 Speaker 1: managing and leading the investment team and you're a co CEO, 387 00:21:42,720 --> 00:21:47,160 Speaker 1: which sounds like it has a whole lot of complications 388 00:21:47,200 --> 00:21:50,719 Speaker 1: and issues that would come out of that dual CEO role. 389 00:21:50,760 --> 00:21:53,159 Speaker 1: At least we've seen that with public companies. How do 390 00:21:53,200 --> 00:21:56,880 Speaker 1: you navigate that? Is there a clear distinction between who 391 00:21:56,960 --> 00:21:58,760 Speaker 1: is running what? Tell us a little bit about your 392 00:21:58,800 --> 00:22:01,240 Speaker 1: co absolutely? Let me let me you that, um, because 393 00:22:01,240 --> 00:22:04,040 Speaker 1: it is a great question. Uh. We we went through 394 00:22:04,080 --> 00:22:07,240 Speaker 1: a succession process. Our former CEO was stepping down, was 395 00:22:07,280 --> 00:22:11,439 Speaker 1: retiring from the CEO role, and so myself and one 396 00:22:11,480 --> 00:22:14,720 Speaker 1: of my colleagues rosted out were internal candidates for the role. 397 00:22:15,440 --> 00:22:18,200 Speaker 1: We have a selection process where we had an equivalent 398 00:22:18,240 --> 00:22:21,680 Speaker 1: of executive committee. Essentially you think of as eight individuals 399 00:22:21,720 --> 00:22:24,920 Speaker 1: running the firm making that decision. We were two members 400 00:22:24,960 --> 00:22:28,840 Speaker 1: of that group, UM, and we we both shared our 401 00:22:28,920 --> 00:22:31,800 Speaker 1: views on what's our vision for a Kadian, where do 402 00:22:31,840 --> 00:22:33,600 Speaker 1: we want the firm to go, what would we like 403 00:22:33,640 --> 00:22:37,560 Speaker 1: to do differently with with our executive committee, UM, it 404 00:22:37,600 --> 00:22:40,360 Speaker 1: turned out what we were very well aligned in terms 405 00:22:40,400 --> 00:22:42,399 Speaker 1: of where we wanted a Katie and to go. So 406 00:22:42,520 --> 00:22:45,760 Speaker 1: when we looked at UM sort of are there situations 407 00:22:45,800 --> 00:22:48,200 Speaker 1: I have a lot of respect for Ross, my current 408 00:22:48,240 --> 00:22:49,800 Speaker 1: co CEO, he has I think a lot of respect 409 00:22:49,840 --> 00:22:52,639 Speaker 1: for me. He comes from a marketing client service background. 410 00:22:52,960 --> 00:22:56,520 Speaker 1: I come from the investment background. And we we both 411 00:22:56,600 --> 00:22:59,400 Speaker 1: wanted each other to remain at the firm, thought about 412 00:22:59,440 --> 00:23:02,280 Speaker 1: how can we do that, and we looked at examples 413 00:23:02,280 --> 00:23:04,280 Speaker 1: where there have been co CEO structures in the past 414 00:23:04,280 --> 00:23:08,520 Speaker 1: and other firms, the ones that worked relatively well. UM, 415 00:23:08,560 --> 00:23:11,680 Speaker 1: and there are some Um generally you had co CEOs 416 00:23:11,680 --> 00:23:15,880 Speaker 1: with highly aligned visions and that we're able to work 417 00:23:15,920 --> 00:23:18,879 Speaker 1: together to provide a single voice of the firm. Right, 418 00:23:18,920 --> 00:23:21,879 Speaker 1: So you don't want somebody coming to Ross getting one 419 00:23:21,880 --> 00:23:23,960 Speaker 1: answer and then coming to me and getting a different answer. 420 00:23:24,680 --> 00:23:27,040 Speaker 1: And we we thought, given the fact that we in 421 00:23:27,119 --> 00:23:29,679 Speaker 1: fact do have highly lined visions, we do have areas 422 00:23:29,680 --> 00:23:32,879 Speaker 1: of expertise that are complementary to each other. Uh, we 423 00:23:33,000 --> 00:23:35,080 Speaker 1: thought this is something that not only could we pull 424 00:23:35,119 --> 00:23:37,480 Speaker 1: it off, but it would actually be beneficial for Acadian. 425 00:23:38,280 --> 00:23:42,399 Speaker 1: So we're now a little over a year into the role. UM, 426 00:23:42,440 --> 00:23:46,000 Speaker 1: we think we're managing the firm effectively. We're getting feedback 427 00:23:46,080 --> 00:23:49,800 Speaker 1: from our team, UM that that's the case and UH 428 00:23:49,880 --> 00:23:53,200 Speaker 1: and I think it's working extremely well so far. UM. 429 00:23:53,240 --> 00:23:57,600 Speaker 1: We What we typically do is issue comes up, we 430 00:23:57,680 --> 00:24:00,760 Speaker 1: will discuss it together. We'll figure out where are we 431 00:24:00,880 --> 00:24:03,639 Speaker 1: what are we looking to do? Um. And there are 432 00:24:03,640 --> 00:24:05,760 Speaker 1: times when you know it's an area. Ross has a 433 00:24:05,760 --> 00:24:09,120 Speaker 1: lot of expertise in the fern him more, Um, there's 434 00:24:09,160 --> 00:24:10,520 Speaker 1: times when it's an area. I've got a lot of 435 00:24:10,520 --> 00:24:14,040 Speaker 1: expertise in the for me more. It's great when we 436 00:24:14,080 --> 00:24:15,760 Speaker 1: do need to be in two places at once. Right, 437 00:24:15,800 --> 00:24:18,479 Speaker 1: he can be in Tokyo and I can be in Boston, 438 00:24:19,000 --> 00:24:21,800 Speaker 1: or vice versa. UM. One of us can be doing 439 00:24:21,960 --> 00:24:24,200 Speaker 1: to meeting with some of our clients, another one can 440 00:24:24,240 --> 00:24:28,120 Speaker 1: be running internal meetings. So it really helps us, I think, 441 00:24:28,600 --> 00:24:31,440 Speaker 1: be do a more effective job of managing the firm 442 00:24:31,520 --> 00:24:34,440 Speaker 1: to have the structure we have. Quite interesting. So let's 443 00:24:34,480 --> 00:24:36,320 Speaker 1: talk a little bit about what's going on in the 444 00:24:36,359 --> 00:24:40,360 Speaker 1: marketplace today. Are you still seeing the same sort of 445 00:24:40,400 --> 00:24:45,359 Speaker 1: miss pricings and securities that perhaps we're so abundant a 446 00:24:45,440 --> 00:24:49,280 Speaker 1: decade ago? The miss prices have changed a lot. So 447 00:24:49,400 --> 00:24:52,359 Speaker 1: if we take any particular signal that we've used ten 448 00:24:52,440 --> 00:24:54,280 Speaker 1: years ago and we look at the payoff to that 449 00:24:54,320 --> 00:24:58,680 Speaker 1: signal today, it's lower today. Right. So typically, whether it's 450 00:24:59,359 --> 00:25:02,679 Speaker 1: inefficiency is being squeeze out of the market, it's arbitraged 451 00:25:02,760 --> 00:25:05,119 Speaker 1: by different types of investors, whatever it is. You know, 452 00:25:05,200 --> 00:25:08,879 Speaker 1: Typically the payoff to these characteristics decreases over time. So 453 00:25:08,920 --> 00:25:11,520 Speaker 1: as a result, we're in a way, we're on a treadmill. 454 00:25:11,560 --> 00:25:14,440 Speaker 1: We need to keep on finding new ideas to replace 455 00:25:14,480 --> 00:25:17,040 Speaker 1: the old ideas that aren't working as well anymore. So 456 00:25:17,480 --> 00:25:21,360 Speaker 1: when you say these the payoffs to these ideas um 457 00:25:21,760 --> 00:25:25,240 Speaker 1: decline over time, is that all these ideas? Is that 458 00:25:25,320 --> 00:25:27,879 Speaker 1: a function of we had a giant reset with the 459 00:25:27,880 --> 00:25:32,280 Speaker 1: financial crisis. Hey, anytime the markets lose of the value, 460 00:25:32,840 --> 00:25:35,320 Speaker 1: you have to think that some value is going to 461 00:25:35,400 --> 00:25:37,760 Speaker 1: be created and a lot of babies get thrown out 462 00:25:37,800 --> 00:25:40,480 Speaker 1: with the bathwater. Or is it just the nature of 463 00:25:40,560 --> 00:25:44,160 Speaker 1: every good idea eventually runs its course. I think it's 464 00:25:44,200 --> 00:25:46,800 Speaker 1: really a little bit of the reset idea. So there's 465 00:25:46,840 --> 00:25:49,560 Speaker 1: no there's there's definitely a pattern that differs a little 466 00:25:49,560 --> 00:25:52,000 Speaker 1: bit the rate of the client. And some of these 467 00:25:52,040 --> 00:25:55,880 Speaker 1: things accelerated during the financial crisimmediately after the financial crisis, 468 00:25:56,480 --> 00:25:59,560 Speaker 1: and the payoff to value is the biggest one where 469 00:25:59,560 --> 00:26:02,560 Speaker 1: it's clear really been the worst ten year period for 470 00:26:02,680 --> 00:26:07,360 Speaker 1: value globally post GFC that we've seen in the long 471 00:26:07,440 --> 00:26:09,840 Speaker 1: term history, whether it's the U S history or longer 472 00:26:09,880 --> 00:26:12,720 Speaker 1: history that's different. That all being said, a lot of 473 00:26:12,720 --> 00:26:15,680 Speaker 1: the factors, it's an average thing, right. There's some signals 474 00:26:15,720 --> 00:26:18,719 Speaker 1: that still work, you know today, not much worse than 475 00:26:18,760 --> 00:26:21,600 Speaker 1: they worked ten years ago, but the average signal, the 476 00:26:21,640 --> 00:26:25,520 Speaker 1: payoff decreases a little bit every year. M that's quite interesting. 477 00:26:26,240 --> 00:26:29,560 Speaker 1: Quant has been around for thirty forty years or so. 478 00:26:30,320 --> 00:26:33,159 Speaker 1: Do you think things are very different based on the 479 00:26:33,280 --> 00:26:36,480 Speaker 1: rise of you mentioned earlier, big data and artificial intelligence. 480 00:26:36,800 --> 00:26:42,000 Speaker 1: How has that affected how Acadian approaches quant investing or 481 00:26:42,080 --> 00:26:46,840 Speaker 1: is that just something that is a background noise that 482 00:26:46,880 --> 00:26:50,800 Speaker 1: affects the market overall. Yeah, I think there's um there's 483 00:26:51,080 --> 00:26:54,560 Speaker 1: no question that the machine learning, art and big data, 484 00:26:54,680 --> 00:26:58,320 Speaker 1: artificial intelligence, those are early days, right. Those things are 485 00:26:58,480 --> 00:27:02,240 Speaker 1: starting to impact investors and how people invest. But we're 486 00:27:02,240 --> 00:27:04,719 Speaker 1: still in the early days of that in quant, let 487 00:27:04,760 --> 00:27:07,240 Speaker 1: alone in finance in general. And there's a lot more 488 00:27:07,280 --> 00:27:09,760 Speaker 1: to come. But I would say things have changed a 489 00:27:09,800 --> 00:27:13,919 Speaker 1: lot since the eighties and nineties, the the cerphification, the 490 00:27:14,280 --> 00:27:17,200 Speaker 1: not not so much big data, but just any kind 491 00:27:17,240 --> 00:27:19,679 Speaker 1: of data now is a lot more available than it 492 00:27:19,760 --> 00:27:21,959 Speaker 1: was then, So we have a lot more information and 493 00:27:22,040 --> 00:27:25,040 Speaker 1: quants can do things today that they couldn't do twenty 494 00:27:25,119 --> 00:27:27,439 Speaker 1: years ago. Fundamental investors could maybe do them for a 495 00:27:27,440 --> 00:27:30,960 Speaker 1: small group of companies, quants couldn't. Today we can look 496 00:27:31,000 --> 00:27:34,680 Speaker 1: at all these like we have industry specific information about 497 00:27:34,800 --> 00:27:36,800 Speaker 1: lots of companies that we just didn't have access to 498 00:27:36,920 --> 00:27:41,080 Speaker 1: twenty years ago. Is it the technology and database or 499 00:27:41,119 --> 00:27:44,880 Speaker 1: is it actually the specifics of the data itself that's 500 00:27:44,960 --> 00:27:47,600 Speaker 1: changed so much. It's both. So the technolog no question, 501 00:27:47,640 --> 00:27:51,240 Speaker 1: the technology and the database access um, the power and 502 00:27:51,280 --> 00:27:55,240 Speaker 1: speed of databases and of software and processing in general 503 00:27:55,280 --> 00:27:58,119 Speaker 1: has increased tremendously. That makes a lot of things easier 504 00:27:58,119 --> 00:28:02,960 Speaker 1: to do. Machine learning, those algorithms can be very computationally intensive, 505 00:28:03,520 --> 00:28:07,000 Speaker 1: and you hardware you had five years ago, you couldn't 506 00:28:07,000 --> 00:28:09,280 Speaker 1: do these things today. Today you can do them on 507 00:28:09,320 --> 00:28:11,520 Speaker 1: your on your laptop. In some cases might take a while, 508 00:28:11,640 --> 00:28:13,720 Speaker 1: but there's things you can do on your laptop. If not, 509 00:28:14,080 --> 00:28:16,960 Speaker 1: you go to Amazon Web Services and scale up processing 510 00:28:16,960 --> 00:28:19,800 Speaker 1: power and you've got everything you need in terms of 511 00:28:19,840 --> 00:28:23,840 Speaker 1: the sort of the processing computational aspect of things. So 512 00:28:23,920 --> 00:28:27,040 Speaker 1: that's changed a lot, but also the data itself today 513 00:28:27,119 --> 00:28:30,080 Speaker 1: is much broader than it was. I got started. You 514 00:28:30,160 --> 00:28:33,040 Speaker 1: got a p you gotta p B, you got a 515 00:28:33,080 --> 00:28:35,719 Speaker 1: price to cash flow. You've got a market cap, a price, 516 00:28:36,320 --> 00:28:38,240 Speaker 1: and maybe a divident deal thrown in, and that's there. 517 00:28:38,280 --> 00:28:41,880 Speaker 1: That's that was your data. That was like four ish 518 00:28:41,960 --> 00:28:45,640 Speaker 1: and then UM, shortly after you started getting analyst data electronically. 519 00:28:46,080 --> 00:28:48,280 Speaker 1: What what do you think about some of these alternative 520 00:28:48,360 --> 00:28:53,280 Speaker 1: data points that people are pulling from either satellite data, Hey, 521 00:28:53,320 --> 00:28:56,920 Speaker 1: here's all the ships moving oil around the world, UM, 522 00:28:57,040 --> 00:29:00,360 Speaker 1: or parking lot activity to determine how well read tailors 523 00:29:00,400 --> 00:29:05,440 Speaker 1: are doing. Is is any of that potentially useful and 524 00:29:05,520 --> 00:29:09,160 Speaker 1: valuable to investors? Or is it just um a bunch 525 00:29:09,240 --> 00:29:13,160 Speaker 1: of of geeks playing with some new tech toys and 526 00:29:13,160 --> 00:29:15,160 Speaker 1: and kind of having fun with it. It's both, so 527 00:29:15,200 --> 00:29:17,040 Speaker 1: that on the latter point, you know, we we have 528 00:29:17,080 --> 00:29:19,520 Speaker 1: an analyst, and if we have a satellite data project, 529 00:29:20,120 --> 00:29:22,160 Speaker 1: we have no problem getting somebody volunteer, put their hand 530 00:29:22,240 --> 00:29:23,440 Speaker 1: up and say I'd like to work on this. This 531 00:29:23,440 --> 00:29:27,440 Speaker 1: will be fun, right, So that's true. It's potentially valuable. Now, 532 00:29:27,520 --> 00:29:31,080 Speaker 1: whether it's actually valuable to any individual in any particular 533 00:29:31,080 --> 00:29:34,600 Speaker 1: investment firm depends on their style and their process. So 534 00:29:34,680 --> 00:29:36,720 Speaker 1: let me let me tell you what I mean by that. UM. 535 00:29:36,760 --> 00:29:39,400 Speaker 1: If you've got a satellite data, let's say you're getting 536 00:29:39,600 --> 00:29:43,280 Speaker 1: your parking lot, your infrared images UM, and you're getting 537 00:29:43,320 --> 00:29:47,520 Speaker 1: information about you know, parking lots UM. And that's if 538 00:29:47,520 --> 00:29:51,640 Speaker 1: you're following retailers and UM. Investing in retailers is a 539 00:29:51,680 --> 00:29:55,000 Speaker 1: big part of what you do that can be useful 540 00:29:55,040 --> 00:29:58,560 Speaker 1: in predicting over the short run revenues. You've got to 541 00:29:58,560 --> 00:30:00,680 Speaker 1: have a lot of infrastructure, you gotta know all the locations. 542 00:30:01,000 --> 00:30:03,560 Speaker 1: You've got to be able to aggregate that in quasi 543 00:30:03,640 --> 00:30:08,920 Speaker 1: real time, and satellite coverage at high resolution at a 544 00:30:09,400 --> 00:30:13,720 Speaker 1: quick successive short time intervals is still expensive. UM. So 545 00:30:13,720 --> 00:30:15,280 Speaker 1: you've got to figure out is it worth it to 546 00:30:15,320 --> 00:30:17,640 Speaker 1: your process to do that. If you only one percent 547 00:30:17,640 --> 00:30:20,880 Speaker 1: of the portfolio have that you have invested in retailers, 548 00:30:21,640 --> 00:30:24,080 Speaker 1: maybe it's not really going to move the needle that much, right, 549 00:30:25,080 --> 00:30:27,920 Speaker 1: So so let's talk about some other things that don't 550 00:30:27,920 --> 00:30:33,080 Speaker 1: involve satellites. This has been a let's call it a 551 00:30:33,280 --> 00:30:37,160 Speaker 1: typical UM political environment for the past couple of years, 552 00:30:37,200 --> 00:30:42,520 Speaker 1: not just the Trump presidency, but Brexit and the financial 553 00:30:42,600 --> 00:30:45,600 Speaker 1: crisis and the rise of the tea party. How does 554 00:30:45,640 --> 00:30:51,440 Speaker 1: a quant shop manage those sorts of non market inputs 555 00:30:51,640 --> 00:30:53,920 Speaker 1: or does it all just come out in the wash 556 00:30:54,040 --> 00:30:56,920 Speaker 1: and it's not really all that important. There's there's two 557 00:30:57,000 --> 00:30:59,560 Speaker 1: sides of this. One side is what I call risk management. 558 00:30:59,680 --> 00:31:02,880 Speaker 1: Right can you if you can observe some of these 559 00:31:03,000 --> 00:31:05,400 Speaker 1: risks and you don't observe them in a standard quant 560 00:31:05,480 --> 00:31:08,440 Speaker 1: risk model because they're the quant risk models are typically 561 00:31:08,480 --> 00:31:11,240 Speaker 1: backward looking. They're not forward looking. So you've got to, 562 00:31:11,400 --> 00:31:14,480 Speaker 1: as a professional investor, think, what are some of these 563 00:31:14,560 --> 00:31:17,080 Speaker 1: risks that maybe aren't priced into the risk models that 564 00:31:17,120 --> 00:31:20,240 Speaker 1: are looking at the historical data, but that could impact 565 00:31:20,240 --> 00:31:23,080 Speaker 1: the portfolio UM and let me give you an example 566 00:31:23,080 --> 00:31:27,560 Speaker 1: of such a risk. One one risk is UM. We 567 00:31:27,560 --> 00:31:30,760 Speaker 1: we managed one strategy that's a low volatility equity strategy. 568 00:31:30,760 --> 00:31:33,000 Speaker 1: So we're trying to do there is reduce the risk 569 00:31:33,040 --> 00:31:37,320 Speaker 1: of equity markets UM capuited benchmark. Let's say in the US, 570 00:31:37,400 --> 00:31:39,880 Speaker 1: it might have a twelve or fourteen vol and we 571 00:31:39,960 --> 00:31:43,000 Speaker 1: might want to produce a ten vol for example UM 572 00:31:43,360 --> 00:31:46,640 Speaker 1: and what that means is somebody gets the same risk 573 00:31:46,680 --> 00:31:49,000 Speaker 1: returned that that they get on count a capuited benchmark, 574 00:31:49,080 --> 00:31:51,240 Speaker 1: but they get it with less risk. That's very helpful 575 00:31:51,240 --> 00:31:54,720 Speaker 1: from asta allocation perspective. When you do that today, though, 576 00:31:54,720 --> 00:31:56,440 Speaker 1: what you're doing is you're taking on a lot of 577 00:31:56,480 --> 00:31:59,760 Speaker 1: interest rate risk because these lower risk companies typically tend 578 00:31:59,760 --> 00:32:02,640 Speaker 1: to be higher dividend companies. Companies are more sensitive to 579 00:32:02,680 --> 00:32:05,280 Speaker 1: interest rates. So if you're worried about a rising interest 580 00:32:05,360 --> 00:32:09,320 Speaker 1: rate environment, your historical risk model wouldn't say, constrain your 581 00:32:09,360 --> 00:32:13,320 Speaker 1: exposure to interest rates your sensitivity interest rates. But going 582 00:32:13,440 --> 00:32:16,480 Speaker 1: forward you might want to do that um in a 583 00:32:16,520 --> 00:32:20,440 Speaker 1: low volatility portfolio so that your volatility doesn't come out 584 00:32:20,640 --> 00:32:22,479 Speaker 1: much higher than you expect or your return is much 585 00:32:22,520 --> 00:32:24,960 Speaker 1: lower than you expect if interest rates do in fact 586 00:32:25,000 --> 00:32:29,760 Speaker 1: continue rising. So that's the risk management piece. You want 587 00:32:29,800 --> 00:32:32,280 Speaker 1: to anticipate certain risks and build that into your risk 588 00:32:32,320 --> 00:32:36,040 Speaker 1: controls that you apply to your strategies. The second pieces 589 00:32:36,240 --> 00:32:38,640 Speaker 1: can you use are there are other signals that help 590 00:32:38,680 --> 00:32:43,400 Speaker 1: you navigate from a return perspective, These kinds of you know, 591 00:32:43,480 --> 00:32:47,520 Speaker 1: macro events and uh you know, for example, volatility itself 592 00:32:47,520 --> 00:32:51,680 Speaker 1: can be an earlier warning signal. Right, every major devaluation 593 00:32:51,960 --> 00:32:56,560 Speaker 1: of currencies and emerging markets and many market breaks were 594 00:32:56,600 --> 00:33:00,320 Speaker 1: preceded by periods of rising volatility, rising by untill. He 595 00:33:00,320 --> 00:33:03,960 Speaker 1: also sometimes predicts more benign environments. But the point is, 596 00:33:04,320 --> 00:33:06,719 Speaker 1: if there's a signal there, maybe there's ways to predict 597 00:33:06,720 --> 00:33:10,000 Speaker 1: these these environments, and so are the top down part 598 00:33:10,040 --> 00:33:12,400 Speaker 1: of what we do tries to look at these macro 599 00:33:12,520 --> 00:33:16,480 Speaker 1: events um or potential macro events and figure out how 600 00:33:16,520 --> 00:33:19,480 Speaker 1: can we anticipate those and how can we position the 601 00:33:19,520 --> 00:33:23,560 Speaker 1: portfolios based on that anticipation. So you mentioned a rising 602 00:33:23,720 --> 00:33:27,719 Speaker 1: rate environment. Lots of folks have been focused on the 603 00:33:27,720 --> 00:33:31,880 Speaker 1: Federal Reserve and focused on are we gonna take a pause? 604 00:33:32,240 --> 00:33:36,440 Speaker 1: I imagine that your shop doesn't spend a whole lot 605 00:33:36,480 --> 00:33:39,600 Speaker 1: of time struggling with that that it should end up 606 00:33:39,640 --> 00:33:41,600 Speaker 1: in the data, and it's not the sort of thing 607 00:33:42,000 --> 00:33:44,560 Speaker 1: that you have to play macro tourists or or am 608 00:33:44,600 --> 00:33:46,600 Speaker 1: I giving you guys too much credit? No, you know 609 00:33:46,680 --> 00:33:48,840 Speaker 1: you're giving us just the right amount of credit here 610 00:33:48,880 --> 00:33:52,040 Speaker 1: the very the you need to play the game that 611 00:33:52,080 --> 00:33:54,840 Speaker 1: you're good at um and so we don't want to 612 00:33:54,880 --> 00:33:57,080 Speaker 1: do we don't want to try to do things that 613 00:33:57,120 --> 00:33:59,680 Speaker 1: we've got other people who are much better at it 614 00:33:59,680 --> 00:34:04,120 Speaker 1: than we are and predicting UM rates using it the 615 00:34:04,160 --> 00:34:06,320 Speaker 1: FED what what's the FED going to do? That's not 616 00:34:06,360 --> 00:34:08,560 Speaker 1: all as a quant manager, that's not really what we're 617 00:34:08,600 --> 00:34:11,000 Speaker 1: good at, right, So you're absolutely right there. What we 618 00:34:11,040 --> 00:34:12,640 Speaker 1: would do is we would say, let's just look at 619 00:34:12,920 --> 00:34:16,000 Speaker 1: what's happening with you know, the short term rates, long 620 00:34:16,080 --> 00:34:18,239 Speaker 1: term rates, what's happening with the yield curve. Those can 621 00:34:18,280 --> 00:34:20,560 Speaker 1: be signals that we use in a model, but we're 622 00:34:20,560 --> 00:34:23,720 Speaker 1: not trying to really forecast the direction of interest rates 623 00:34:24,040 --> 00:34:27,200 Speaker 1: per se through FED statements or through other kinds of 624 00:34:27,680 --> 00:34:31,040 Speaker 1: actions like that. Um, it just means trying to do 625 00:34:31,239 --> 00:34:33,719 Speaker 1: what what where we think our edges and really trying 626 00:34:33,719 --> 00:34:35,840 Speaker 1: to focus on that in terms of the things we 627 00:34:35,880 --> 00:34:38,640 Speaker 1: actively do in the portfolio. So you mentioned your models. 628 00:34:38,800 --> 00:34:42,040 Speaker 1: When I was perusing the various offerings you have for 629 00:34:42,120 --> 00:34:47,520 Speaker 1: institutional clients, there are thirty something different models, maybe even more. 630 00:34:48,160 --> 00:34:50,960 Speaker 1: How do you develop different ideas? How do you express 631 00:34:51,040 --> 00:34:55,920 Speaker 1: them in a portfolio? Is it strictly math or there 632 00:34:55,960 --> 00:34:59,160 Speaker 1: are other guiding principles that affect that. The first first 633 00:34:59,160 --> 00:35:02,000 Speaker 1: step is always is there a you think it as 634 00:35:02,040 --> 00:35:06,480 Speaker 1: a story, it's really hypothesis of why a particular characteristics 635 00:35:06,520 --> 00:35:08,440 Speaker 1: related to return? Why is it? How can it be used? 636 00:35:08,480 --> 00:35:11,200 Speaker 1: To predict returns. What is it? What's the inefficiency that 637 00:35:11,239 --> 00:35:15,759 Speaker 1: we're capturing? And if we have that, then the next 638 00:35:15,760 --> 00:35:18,279 Speaker 1: step is, okay, now let's spend some time looking at 639 00:35:18,280 --> 00:35:21,000 Speaker 1: the data and figuring out how do we best um 640 00:35:21,440 --> 00:35:23,520 Speaker 1: create how do we best capture that inefficiency, how do 641 00:35:23,560 --> 00:35:26,960 Speaker 1: we best measure it? Uh, So, you know, we might 642 00:35:26,960 --> 00:35:30,480 Speaker 1: have an efficiency related to momentum um. And back in 643 00:35:30,760 --> 00:35:32,719 Speaker 1: the seven back in the eighties, you know, you had 644 00:35:32,719 --> 00:35:36,959 Speaker 1: some papers about price momentum and they basically said, Okay, 645 00:35:37,000 --> 00:35:39,640 Speaker 1: the best way to capture price momentum at the time 646 00:35:40,320 --> 00:35:44,360 Speaker 1: is uh, sort of a twelve month trailing risk adjusted 647 00:35:44,600 --> 00:35:48,680 Speaker 1: return price return. That's your best momentum measure. Since then, 648 00:35:49,000 --> 00:35:50,839 Speaker 1: a lot of things have changed. We've got a lot 649 00:35:50,880 --> 00:35:53,520 Speaker 1: better understanding what drives momentum, you know, what's what are 650 00:35:53,520 --> 00:35:57,560 Speaker 1: the inefficiencies we're capturing with it, and a lot more 651 00:35:57,600 --> 00:36:01,320 Speaker 1: ability to um turn that into different kinds of signals. 652 00:36:01,960 --> 00:36:04,560 Speaker 1: And today, in addition, we've got machine learning, so we 653 00:36:04,600 --> 00:36:07,200 Speaker 1: can put in all the historical prices and say, okay, 654 00:36:07,400 --> 00:36:11,320 Speaker 1: machine learning algorithm, what do you think the best predictor 655 00:36:11,520 --> 00:36:15,719 Speaker 1: of return is based on past price moves? And when 656 00:36:15,760 --> 00:36:18,080 Speaker 1: you do that, you have to be careful because machine 657 00:36:18,160 --> 00:36:20,760 Speaker 1: learning is one way to do what's called overfitting a problem, 658 00:36:20,880 --> 00:36:22,400 Speaker 1: you know, where you you have a great solution of 659 00:36:22,440 --> 00:36:24,839 Speaker 1: the past, but it doesn't work in the future. UM. 660 00:36:24,920 --> 00:36:28,680 Speaker 1: One of my colleagues, Michael bat Nick, once observed, the 661 00:36:28,760 --> 00:36:31,879 Speaker 1: best track record of any model is the last ten 662 00:36:32,000 --> 00:36:35,000 Speaker 1: years something something to that effect. Does that sound about 663 00:36:35,400 --> 00:36:40,279 Speaker 1: So every model, you know, every model implicitly has some 664 00:36:40,360 --> 00:36:43,719 Speaker 1: potential for some degree of overfitting associated with it. We 665 00:36:43,760 --> 00:36:46,040 Speaker 1: try to guard against that. We have various, you know, 666 00:36:46,080 --> 00:36:50,160 Speaker 1: statistical procedures that we follow, UM in various research procedures 667 00:36:50,160 --> 00:36:52,040 Speaker 1: we followed to try to avoid that, but it does 668 00:36:52,120 --> 00:36:55,800 Speaker 1: creep in no question about that. We have been speaking 669 00:36:55,800 --> 00:36:59,880 Speaker 1: with John Chisholm. He is the co CEO and former 670 00:37:00,040 --> 00:37:04,919 Speaker 1: Chief Investment Officer for Acadian Asset Management. If you enjoy 671 00:37:05,000 --> 00:37:07,480 Speaker 1: this conversation, we'll be sure and come back and check 672 00:37:07,520 --> 00:37:10,040 Speaker 1: out the podcast extras, where we keep the tape rolling 673 00:37:10,320 --> 00:37:14,080 Speaker 1: and continue to discuss all things quant You can find 674 00:37:14,120 --> 00:37:19,440 Speaker 1: that at iTunes, overcast, Stitcher, Bloomberg dot com, wherever final 675 00:37:19,520 --> 00:37:23,520 Speaker 1: podcasts are sold. We love your comments, feedback and suggestions 676 00:37:23,800 --> 00:37:27,520 Speaker 1: right to us at m IB podcast at Bloomberg dot net. 677 00:37:28,000 --> 00:37:30,560 Speaker 1: You can check out my daily column on Bloomberg dot 678 00:37:30,560 --> 00:37:34,000 Speaker 1: com slash Opinion. Follow me on Twitter at rit Halts. 679 00:37:34,440 --> 00:37:37,360 Speaker 1: I'm Barry Ri Halts. You're listening to Masters in Business 680 00:37:37,520 --> 00:37:53,400 Speaker 1: on Bloomberg Radio. Welcome to the podcast. John, Thank you 681 00:37:53,440 --> 00:37:55,200 Speaker 1: so much for doing this. I've been looking forward to 682 00:37:55,239 --> 00:37:58,600 Speaker 1: this for a while. We were having a conversation in 683 00:37:58,680 --> 00:38:01,320 Speaker 1: my office and on the way out the door, someone 684 00:38:01,360 --> 00:38:05,279 Speaker 1: said who you who you say interviewing today? I said, oh, 685 00:38:05,360 --> 00:38:09,480 Speaker 1: John Chiselm of a Kadian asset management and the person said, oh, 686 00:38:09,480 --> 00:38:12,400 Speaker 1: I've never heard of them. Uh do they manage any money? 687 00:38:12,440 --> 00:38:15,279 Speaker 1: And my auntswer was spitting distance from a hundred billion 688 00:38:15,360 --> 00:38:21,440 Speaker 1: dollars and that sort of shock some people. How do you, um, 689 00:38:21,520 --> 00:38:24,200 Speaker 1: how do you feel about being a little below the 690 00:38:24,320 --> 00:38:26,640 Speaker 1: radar and why are you sort of poking your head 691 00:38:26,640 --> 00:38:29,600 Speaker 1: out from from below the radar? So in general, it's 692 00:38:29,719 --> 00:38:31,439 Speaker 1: we think it's good to run a little bit below 693 00:38:31,480 --> 00:38:34,640 Speaker 1: the radar. Right. There's there's elements of First of all, 694 00:38:34,640 --> 00:38:36,720 Speaker 1: you can only manage so much money and still add value. 695 00:38:37,040 --> 00:38:40,600 Speaker 1: You just have to be careful managing capacity. Um. And 696 00:38:41,239 --> 00:38:45,560 Speaker 1: we also if you're a big name in the industry, uh, 697 00:38:45,760 --> 00:38:48,840 Speaker 1: you get more press attention. That's in one way that's good, 698 00:38:49,200 --> 00:38:51,640 Speaker 1: but in another way it can also be detrimental depending 699 00:38:51,640 --> 00:38:54,239 Speaker 1: on what's the type of attention. UM and a lot 700 00:38:54,239 --> 00:38:57,880 Speaker 1: of investors, a lot of institutions especially, want managers that 701 00:38:57,920 --> 00:39:01,240 Speaker 1: are very careful to focus us on maintaining their ability 702 00:39:01,239 --> 00:39:03,960 Speaker 1: to add value for clients by not getting too big. Right. 703 00:39:03,960 --> 00:39:06,360 Speaker 1: We all know managers that have grown and grown and 704 00:39:06,400 --> 00:39:08,800 Speaker 1: then at some point they just couldn't add value anymore. 705 00:39:08,800 --> 00:39:10,840 Speaker 1: They just got too big to happen. Then they shrink 706 00:39:10,840 --> 00:39:14,880 Speaker 1: and shrink, as we've seen with a number of famous 707 00:39:14,880 --> 00:39:18,080 Speaker 1: hedge fund managers the past decade or so. Exactly. We 708 00:39:18,080 --> 00:39:20,399 Speaker 1: we just like to be maybe a little bit um 709 00:39:20,640 --> 00:39:22,640 Speaker 1: less volatile in terms of our business than that. And 710 00:39:22,640 --> 00:39:25,000 Speaker 1: it's just best. It's best for our team, it's best 711 00:39:25,040 --> 00:39:27,799 Speaker 1: for our clients. UM. And those are really the key 712 00:39:27,840 --> 00:39:31,480 Speaker 1: considerations typically. Now sticking the head out part is it 713 00:39:31,560 --> 00:39:33,600 Speaker 1: is important, I think to have some degree in name 714 00:39:33,640 --> 00:39:38,480 Speaker 1: recognition because a we want talented people, and if your 715 00:39:38,760 --> 00:39:41,759 Speaker 1: potential employees don't know you are who you are, then 716 00:39:41,840 --> 00:39:46,479 Speaker 1: you may not be their first place of employment of choice. UM. 717 00:39:46,560 --> 00:39:48,520 Speaker 1: When there's an opportunity that might be a great fit 718 00:39:48,560 --> 00:39:51,719 Speaker 1: for them. So there's an element of that, and also 719 00:39:51,800 --> 00:39:54,000 Speaker 1: we're doing a number of new things that we haven't 720 00:39:54,040 --> 00:39:57,320 Speaker 1: been doing before. One of them is we've built a 721 00:39:57,440 --> 00:40:01,440 Speaker 1: multi asset strategy. So historically we've been primarily an equity firm. 722 00:40:01,760 --> 00:40:04,480 Speaker 1: We have a multi as strategy today that has about 723 00:40:04,520 --> 00:40:07,520 Speaker 1: a little over a year live track record. It's done 724 00:40:07,640 --> 00:40:11,000 Speaker 1: very well relative to many of its peers. It's a 725 00:40:11,080 --> 00:40:14,400 Speaker 1: very quantitative approach, is very consistent with our philosophy, but 726 00:40:14,480 --> 00:40:20,160 Speaker 1: it invests in equities, fixed income, currency, commodities, and options, 727 00:40:20,680 --> 00:40:24,080 Speaker 1: and the goal there is to create a income return 728 00:40:24,160 --> 00:40:26,319 Speaker 1: stream that's much more stable than what you get from 729 00:40:26,360 --> 00:40:29,000 Speaker 1: an equity market beta. You know, that doesn't go up 730 00:40:29,000 --> 00:40:31,000 Speaker 1: and down every time the market equity markets go up 731 00:40:31,000 --> 00:40:35,480 Speaker 1: and down, but that provides a fairly consistent typically, for example, 732 00:40:35,520 --> 00:40:39,480 Speaker 1: one version of strategy cash plus five return. So not 733 00:40:39,600 --> 00:40:42,920 Speaker 1: quite risk parity, but it's not risk parity because we're 734 00:40:42,920 --> 00:40:46,440 Speaker 1: not necessarily investing in equal risk proportions. It's it's really 735 00:40:46,719 --> 00:40:49,200 Speaker 1: you can think of it more as it's related to 736 00:40:49,239 --> 00:40:52,560 Speaker 1: this concept that there's certain efficiencies that operate not just 737 00:40:52,600 --> 00:40:56,759 Speaker 1: inequities but also in in other asset classes um but 738 00:40:56,800 --> 00:40:59,760 Speaker 1: it also relates to specific expertise in these other asset 739 00:40:59,760 --> 00:41:03,920 Speaker 1: class is that there's individual drivers saying commodities UM that 740 00:41:04,000 --> 00:41:07,279 Speaker 1: are fairly unique there and there you can capture them 741 00:41:07,280 --> 00:41:10,560 Speaker 1: through these return models and in turn gets some significant 742 00:41:10,640 --> 00:41:13,480 Speaker 1: value added from that area, which you don't get in 743 00:41:13,560 --> 00:41:16,440 Speaker 1: a lot of these so called alternative risk premium strategies. 744 00:41:16,840 --> 00:41:21,200 Speaker 1: So you mentioned capacity, you're at eight six billion. How 745 00:41:21,280 --> 00:41:24,920 Speaker 1: much more capacity is there? You are you in broad 746 00:41:25,080 --> 00:41:29,040 Speaker 1: areas and equities and countries that have a lot of 747 00:41:29,080 --> 00:41:31,439 Speaker 1: a lot more headroom or do you do you see 748 00:41:31,480 --> 00:41:34,279 Speaker 1: limitations not too far down the road. It varies. So 749 00:41:34,600 --> 00:41:38,880 Speaker 1: the emerging markets, for example, strategies is closed new clients 750 00:41:38,960 --> 00:41:41,759 Speaker 1: when if we if a client withdraw some money, will 751 00:41:41,960 --> 00:41:45,320 Speaker 1: add some money for any existing client more capability to invest, 752 00:41:45,800 --> 00:41:49,880 Speaker 1: but we're closed their frontier markets is closed. Emerging markets 753 00:41:49,920 --> 00:41:53,480 Speaker 1: small cap is closed. Are non US small cap again 754 00:41:53,640 --> 00:41:57,920 Speaker 1: subject to some reallocation when there's flows out UM is 755 00:41:57,960 --> 00:42:01,719 Speaker 1: also closed UM. But we have capacity in areas like 756 00:42:01,760 --> 00:42:06,440 Speaker 1: global like our manage of volatility strategies, this multi asset strategy. 757 00:42:06,640 --> 00:42:08,200 Speaker 1: So we what we do is we have a very 758 00:42:08,239 --> 00:42:10,960 Speaker 1: specific process to measure how much money can we invest 759 00:42:11,239 --> 00:42:14,359 Speaker 1: and still meet our investment objective in each strategy, and 760 00:42:14,400 --> 00:42:17,000 Speaker 1: when we hit that number, we close the strategy. If 761 00:42:17,040 --> 00:42:19,239 Speaker 1: we've got headroom, we tell the clients here's how much 762 00:42:19,239 --> 00:42:21,480 Speaker 1: headroom we have. There's how much we expect to be 763 00:42:21,520 --> 00:42:23,760 Speaker 1: able to add before we have to close the strategy. 764 00:42:24,040 --> 00:42:28,240 Speaker 1: And I've seen, um, some of your long short UH 765 00:42:28,360 --> 00:42:32,359 Speaker 1: portfolios are one ninety over thirty or something like that. 766 00:42:32,719 --> 00:42:34,879 Speaker 1: Am I? Am I getting that more or less right? Yeah, 767 00:42:34,880 --> 00:42:36,640 Speaker 1: we have a variety. We have some that are pure 768 00:42:37,120 --> 00:42:40,480 Speaker 1: um market neutral, so they're equal sides long short. We 769 00:42:40,520 --> 00:42:45,080 Speaker 1: have some that are one thirty thirty so d long short, 770 00:42:45,680 --> 00:42:48,520 Speaker 1: and then we have some other variations as well. We 771 00:42:48,600 --> 00:42:51,239 Speaker 1: have a we call it diverse fight Alpha strategy that's 772 00:42:51,239 --> 00:42:55,719 Speaker 1: a slightly different ratio as well. But essentially, all these 773 00:42:55,760 --> 00:42:59,400 Speaker 1: strategies the ideas take advantage of the inefficiencies on the 774 00:42:59,400 --> 00:43:03,200 Speaker 1: short side and the unattractive companies that we follow. And alright, 775 00:43:03,200 --> 00:43:06,640 Speaker 1: so one thirty thirty is the long short as opposed 776 00:43:06,680 --> 00:43:13,760 Speaker 1: to fully market neutral, which is its leveraged. So effectively, 777 00:43:13,760 --> 00:43:16,360 Speaker 1: we have a global leverage market neutral strategy that's about 778 00:43:16,640 --> 00:43:22,839 Speaker 1: two long short. Quite quite interesting. Um, let me go 779 00:43:22,960 --> 00:43:26,000 Speaker 1: through some of the questions we didn't get at get 780 00:43:26,040 --> 00:43:30,240 Speaker 1: to during the broadcast portion before I get to my 781 00:43:30,400 --> 00:43:34,120 Speaker 1: favorite questions, UM, And there was one that I thought 782 00:43:34,200 --> 00:43:36,600 Speaker 1: was kind of interesting, and I pulled this off of 783 00:43:37,280 --> 00:43:41,440 Speaker 1: either your website or something you had written. Quote documented 784 00:43:41,719 --> 00:43:48,160 Speaker 1: recurring behavioral errors drive irrational actions in financial markets, behaviors 785 00:43:48,160 --> 00:43:53,120 Speaker 1: that are often contrary to investors best interests. How does 786 00:43:53,160 --> 00:43:56,879 Speaker 1: your firm uh use your understanding of this to help 787 00:43:56,920 --> 00:44:00,880 Speaker 1: manage money? So this goes back to how do we 788 00:44:01,600 --> 00:44:04,760 Speaker 1: come up with these signals? So, for example, one behavior 789 00:44:04,880 --> 00:44:08,400 Speaker 1: Lewer is investors typically are overconfident in their ability to 790 00:44:08,400 --> 00:44:12,720 Speaker 1: predict future growth rates. So if you're buying growth stocks 791 00:44:12,719 --> 00:44:15,640 Speaker 1: in the tech bubble, UH, and you're looking at companies 792 00:44:15,680 --> 00:44:20,040 Speaker 1: that are growing their earnings at or more a year 793 00:44:20,080 --> 00:44:24,600 Speaker 1: or higher UM, those companies were trading in some cases 794 00:44:24,600 --> 00:44:28,000 Speaker 1: at multiples north of hundred on earnings on current earnings. 795 00:44:28,680 --> 00:44:31,840 Speaker 1: And if those companies had continued growing their earnings at 796 00:44:31,880 --> 00:44:35,840 Speaker 1: those very high rates for twenty years, that would have 797 00:44:35,840 --> 00:44:39,320 Speaker 1: been a reasonable price to pay. What happened is investors 798 00:44:39,320 --> 00:44:41,880 Speaker 1: didn't realize that, yeah, they can grow their earnings at 799 00:44:41,920 --> 00:44:44,920 Speaker 1: that rate maybe for one year, three years, four years, 800 00:44:45,360 --> 00:44:48,719 Speaker 1: it's very hard to do that for twenty years UM, 801 00:44:48,840 --> 00:44:52,279 Speaker 1: and so that overconfidence, I think is one of the 802 00:44:52,320 --> 00:44:54,480 Speaker 1: key drivers of why you see in the law term 803 00:44:54,640 --> 00:44:58,719 Speaker 1: value UM working effectively. What's happened the last ten years 804 00:44:58,719 --> 00:45:01,799 Speaker 1: that's interesting is two things. One is that actually there 805 00:45:01,840 --> 00:45:04,200 Speaker 1: were some companies that actually did grow their earnings for 806 00:45:04,400 --> 00:45:06,960 Speaker 1: at really high rates for a long time. So typically 807 00:45:06,960 --> 00:45:10,640 Speaker 1: people think of the Internet services, you know, the Googles 808 00:45:10,640 --> 00:45:14,200 Speaker 1: and Amazons and so on. Those companies have been tremendously 809 00:45:14,239 --> 00:45:17,200 Speaker 1: successful for a while. Albeit you're starting to see a 810 00:45:17,200 --> 00:45:20,200 Speaker 1: few cracks in those growth rates now for some of 811 00:45:20,200 --> 00:45:22,799 Speaker 1: these some of these companies. And the other thing that's 812 00:45:22,840 --> 00:45:27,960 Speaker 1: happened is just a general repricing within valuation. So UM 813 00:45:28,120 --> 00:45:31,319 Speaker 1: you had a certain level of dispersion where value was 814 00:45:31,360 --> 00:45:35,160 Speaker 1: so successful from say two thousand one to two thousand seven, 815 00:45:35,840 --> 00:45:40,880 Speaker 1: that the dispersion of valuation multiple shrank and as a result, 816 00:45:41,320 --> 00:45:43,480 Speaker 1: you didn't the expensive companies weren't really that much more 817 00:45:43,480 --> 00:45:47,759 Speaker 1: expensive then the slower growing and expensive companies, and that 818 00:45:47,800 --> 00:45:51,320 Speaker 1: gave a little bit of tail wind growth over that period. 819 00:45:51,640 --> 00:45:54,439 Speaker 1: I think we've pretty much worked off all that, all 820 00:45:54,480 --> 00:45:58,680 Speaker 1: that dispersion UH, or rather the tightening of dispersion, so 821 00:45:58,719 --> 00:46:02,120 Speaker 1: we're back to more normal level dispersion now, so at 822 00:46:02,120 --> 00:46:04,879 Speaker 1: a kadie and we'd expect going forward that you're more 823 00:46:05,000 --> 00:46:08,239 Speaker 1: likely to have at some point soon whether soon as 824 00:46:08,280 --> 00:46:11,040 Speaker 1: you know, next month, next year, but not not in 825 00:46:11,080 --> 00:46:13,760 Speaker 1: six or seven years. Sometimes sooner than that. We expect 826 00:46:13,760 --> 00:46:17,319 Speaker 1: to see value reassert itself, and so we continue to 827 00:46:17,520 --> 00:46:21,280 Speaker 1: have some component of our of our factors focused on valuation. 828 00:46:21,560 --> 00:46:28,160 Speaker 1: So q FO fair to say that was value reasserting itself. Yeah, 829 00:46:28,239 --> 00:46:32,120 Speaker 1: I think actually a Q four was just for us 830 00:46:32,160 --> 00:46:35,080 Speaker 1: for a Kadian particular or not a great quarter um 831 00:46:35,160 --> 00:46:38,720 Speaker 1: And it was partly that actually value in some markets 832 00:46:38,760 --> 00:46:42,239 Speaker 1: didn't pay off well, but it was also partly um uh. 833 00:46:42,440 --> 00:46:45,560 Speaker 1: Smaller companies in general, especially in the US and emerging 834 00:46:45,600 --> 00:46:49,960 Speaker 1: markets did poorly the relative larger companies. And we have 835 00:46:50,120 --> 00:46:54,120 Speaker 1: in our portfolios a fair amount of exposure too smaller 836 00:46:54,120 --> 00:46:56,919 Speaker 1: and medium sized companies because typically that's where we see 837 00:46:56,920 --> 00:47:00,600 Speaker 1: the general inefficiencies any kind of fact or we see 838 00:47:00,600 --> 00:47:03,359 Speaker 1: those as being greater in that area than they are 839 00:47:03,360 --> 00:47:05,880 Speaker 1: in the very large cap companies. So what hurt us 840 00:47:05,880 --> 00:47:08,640 Speaker 1: in the fourth quarter a little bit of value, but 841 00:47:08,719 --> 00:47:13,000 Speaker 1: primarily just the risk of small versus large, biting us 842 00:47:13,800 --> 00:47:17,600 Speaker 1: you hinted earlier at E T F s UM sometimes 843 00:47:17,600 --> 00:47:23,400 Speaker 1: being less efficient than other ways of expressing the same strategies. However, 844 00:47:23,440 --> 00:47:25,800 Speaker 1: go back a decade or two and there were certain 845 00:47:25,800 --> 00:47:30,600 Speaker 1: strategies that you can only get through expensive alternative investments. 846 00:47:30,640 --> 00:47:33,640 Speaker 1: You're paying two and twenty for certain strategies that you 847 00:47:33,680 --> 00:47:36,759 Speaker 1: can now pay on a fifty basis points and an 848 00:47:36,760 --> 00:47:40,440 Speaker 1: eight dollar transaction fee. So what do you make of 849 00:47:40,480 --> 00:47:45,160 Speaker 1: this landscape and what does this mean for quantitative strategies 850 00:47:45,200 --> 00:47:48,800 Speaker 1: eventually migrating to some of these low cost products. I 851 00:47:49,400 --> 00:47:51,520 Speaker 1: think that we've seen that trend and there's a good 852 00:47:51,560 --> 00:47:54,840 Speaker 1: reason for it. Right. Investors should be looking for what's 853 00:47:54,880 --> 00:47:57,120 Speaker 1: the if I want to get a certain return and 854 00:47:57,160 --> 00:47:59,480 Speaker 1: risk stream, what's the least expensive way for me to 855 00:47:59,520 --> 00:48:02,359 Speaker 1: do that? And it's been great for investors the fact 856 00:48:02,400 --> 00:48:06,480 Speaker 1: that there has been pricing pressure on the esset management 857 00:48:06,520 --> 00:48:09,839 Speaker 1: side of the business. That's actually a great thing for investors, right. 858 00:48:09,920 --> 00:48:12,520 Speaker 1: It forces the investment managers to be more efficient, It 859 00:48:12,640 --> 00:48:16,399 Speaker 1: pushes the overpriced products away from you know, it makes 860 00:48:16,400 --> 00:48:19,960 Speaker 1: them less viable, and it allows strategies that can be 861 00:48:20,040 --> 00:48:24,120 Speaker 1: run inexpensively. But still provide value to do well in 862 00:48:24,120 --> 00:48:27,960 Speaker 1: the marketplace. So great for investors, tougher for asset managers. 863 00:48:28,080 --> 00:48:29,720 Speaker 1: Is not as easy to make money now as asset 864 00:48:29,760 --> 00:48:32,080 Speaker 1: manager as it was, you know, ten or fifteen years ago. 865 00:48:32,120 --> 00:48:35,960 Speaker 1: We've seen margins for the esset management business gets squeezed 866 00:48:36,000 --> 00:48:38,960 Speaker 1: a little bit over the last few years, no, no 867 00:48:39,000 --> 00:48:41,880 Speaker 1: doubt about that. What as long as we're talking about 868 00:48:42,120 --> 00:48:45,520 Speaker 1: UM indexes and ETFs and price squeezes, what do you 869 00:48:45,560 --> 00:48:49,520 Speaker 1: make of the argument that some of this movement away 870 00:48:49,520 --> 00:48:54,399 Speaker 1: from active management into passive is distorting prices. I don't 871 00:48:54,400 --> 00:48:58,000 Speaker 1: think we're there yet, UM, in terms I do believe. Look, 872 00:48:58,000 --> 00:49:00,400 Speaker 1: there's a value to price discovery. If you had a 873 00:49:00,440 --> 00:49:04,520 Speaker 1: hundred percent of of every know, all assets were pastively managed, UM, 874 00:49:04,560 --> 00:49:06,920 Speaker 1: you wouldn't have a mechanism of price discovery. But you 875 00:49:06,920 --> 00:49:10,120 Speaker 1: don't need you don't need, you know, as assets active 876 00:49:10,120 --> 00:49:13,000 Speaker 1: management to get the price discovery process to work. UM. 877 00:49:13,040 --> 00:49:16,160 Speaker 1: I think there's been various academic work on this. Andrew 878 00:49:16,200 --> 00:49:19,440 Speaker 1: Low right in your backyard, and and there's folks at 879 00:49:19,440 --> 00:49:23,040 Speaker 1: Harvard and and generally they what they come up with 880 00:49:23,760 --> 00:49:27,440 Speaker 1: is that you can have a greater level of passive 881 00:49:27,440 --> 00:49:30,680 Speaker 1: management than we have today and still get the you know, 882 00:49:30,719 --> 00:49:34,520 Speaker 1: the social benefits if you will, of the price discovery process. 883 00:49:35,080 --> 00:49:37,239 Speaker 1: Quite quite interesting. I know I only have you for 884 00:49:37,320 --> 00:49:40,040 Speaker 1: a limited amount of time. Let me jump to some 885 00:49:40,120 --> 00:49:43,279 Speaker 1: of my favorite questions we ask all our guests. UM, 886 00:49:43,400 --> 00:49:47,040 Speaker 1: tell us the most important thing that people don't know about, 887 00:49:47,120 --> 00:49:53,920 Speaker 1: John Chisholm. Wow. Um, that's a tough one. And you 888 00:49:53,920 --> 00:49:56,759 Speaker 1: know it's funny because I know you gave me the 889 00:49:56,840 --> 00:49:59,520 Speaker 1: questions in advance. So that's that's the one where I 890 00:49:59,560 --> 00:50:00,960 Speaker 1: looked at and I was like, I don't know if 891 00:50:00,960 --> 00:50:02,840 Speaker 1: I have anything there, and I skipped it. So I 892 00:50:02,880 --> 00:50:05,520 Speaker 1: did not pre didn't think. I did not come up 893 00:50:05,560 --> 00:50:08,799 Speaker 1: with an answer to that that particular question. UM. I 894 00:50:08,800 --> 00:50:12,560 Speaker 1: would say a couple of things. One is, um, I 895 00:50:12,640 --> 00:50:15,480 Speaker 1: love I love asset management. That's probably I love investing. 896 00:50:15,719 --> 00:50:18,880 Speaker 1: That's probably not a that's something that's some of the 897 00:50:18,920 --> 00:50:21,640 Speaker 1: people who work with me know pretty well. But it 898 00:50:21,719 --> 00:50:24,160 Speaker 1: may be something that you know, the you're listening audience 899 00:50:24,200 --> 00:50:28,160 Speaker 1: maybe doesn't appreciate as much. Uh. And um. The other 900 00:50:28,200 --> 00:50:30,640 Speaker 1: thing that maybe it's something that's maybe not really directly 901 00:50:30,680 --> 00:50:35,920 Speaker 1: work related is um. Uh. Two things in terms of 902 00:50:35,960 --> 00:50:39,040 Speaker 1: leisure activities, I love ultimate frisbee. Ultimate frisbee is a 903 00:50:39,040 --> 00:50:40,359 Speaker 1: great sport. I don't know if you know what it is. 904 00:50:40,480 --> 00:50:42,919 Speaker 1: Of course I know. I went to college at stony Brook. 905 00:50:43,440 --> 00:50:46,960 Speaker 1: Ultimate frisbie was a huge thing on campus back in 906 00:50:47,080 --> 00:50:50,959 Speaker 1: the nineteen hundreds when I went to school, so so same. 907 00:50:51,080 --> 00:50:53,880 Speaker 1: You know, I actually went to high school at Bronx 908 00:50:53,880 --> 00:50:58,080 Speaker 1: Science and the Bronx here, and uh it was it wasn't. 909 00:50:58,120 --> 00:50:59,480 Speaker 1: I was not the Ultimate team, but that's where I 910 00:50:59,480 --> 00:51:01,200 Speaker 1: started playing with some of the guys on the team. 911 00:51:01,239 --> 00:51:02,959 Speaker 1: And then I played a little bit in college, played 912 00:51:02,960 --> 00:51:06,040 Speaker 1: after college, and you know, now there's a over in 913 00:51:06,080 --> 00:51:08,120 Speaker 1: Boston area. There's no over forty league. I still get 914 00:51:08,120 --> 00:51:09,520 Speaker 1: a chance to go out and play every now and then. 915 00:51:10,160 --> 00:51:13,839 Speaker 1: It's not a contact sports, so you know, it's not 916 00:51:13,920 --> 00:51:16,799 Speaker 1: like rugby exactly. That's that's the beauty of it, I think, 917 00:51:16,880 --> 00:51:18,920 Speaker 1: is that you get a great exercise. It's a lot 918 00:51:18,960 --> 00:51:22,120 Speaker 1: of fun, it's very social and um and you don't 919 00:51:22,239 --> 00:51:24,960 Speaker 1: kill yourself. It's not like I played basketball typically once 920 00:51:24,960 --> 00:51:29,240 Speaker 1: a week as well. And I'll tell you after alsop 921 00:51:29,280 --> 00:51:31,520 Speaker 1: and left and right, I'm limping, you know, for like 922 00:51:31,560 --> 00:51:33,359 Speaker 1: three or four days, so I can start walking well 923 00:51:33,400 --> 00:51:36,080 Speaker 1: again and that does not happen after ultimate that. That's 924 00:51:36,200 --> 00:51:39,160 Speaker 1: very funny. So the next question was a question I 925 00:51:39,239 --> 00:51:41,799 Speaker 1: used to use as a throwaway to just do a 926 00:51:41,840 --> 00:51:45,520 Speaker 1: mic check, but the answers have been so interesting I 927 00:51:45,560 --> 00:51:49,239 Speaker 1: decided to ask it while we were recording. Tell us 928 00:51:49,560 --> 00:51:53,680 Speaker 1: what was your first car? The make, model, and year. 929 00:51:54,239 --> 00:51:58,040 Speaker 1: If I'm not a car guy, but I do remember, 930 00:51:58,080 --> 00:52:01,560 Speaker 1: it was a Mazda GLC cost about used to cost 931 00:52:01,640 --> 00:52:04,840 Speaker 1: about seven eight hundred dollars and it ran about like 932 00:52:04,880 --> 00:52:06,920 Speaker 1: it cost seven or eight hundred dollars. This is probably 933 00:52:07,480 --> 00:52:11,399 Speaker 1: eight four ish. Um. It had a nice little stick 934 00:52:11,440 --> 00:52:14,920 Speaker 1: shift in the wherever and we call those, by the 935 00:52:14,920 --> 00:52:20,040 Speaker 1: way today those are millennial anti theft devices. I like that. 936 00:52:20,120 --> 00:52:22,560 Speaker 1: I like that description. Um. And it was probably I 937 00:52:22,600 --> 00:52:24,560 Speaker 1: was probably because I had an eighty four is already used. 938 00:52:24,560 --> 00:52:26,480 Speaker 1: It's probably like a nineteen eight. I don't I don't 939 00:52:26,480 --> 00:52:28,600 Speaker 1: even know, but probably nineteen eighty or something like that 940 00:52:28,719 --> 00:52:32,080 Speaker 1: or seventy nine. That's interesting. Um, tell us about some 941 00:52:32,120 --> 00:52:35,359 Speaker 1: of your mentors who helped guide your career. Yeah, I'd 942 00:52:35,400 --> 00:52:37,400 Speaker 1: have to say there's there's really some of some of 943 00:52:37,440 --> 00:52:39,400 Speaker 1: my partners at a Katie and some of my co founders, 944 00:52:39,400 --> 00:52:43,920 Speaker 1: so Gary Brookstrom. Um, you know he Uh I started 945 00:52:44,280 --> 00:52:46,680 Speaker 1: my first part time job in asset management was working 946 00:52:46,719 --> 00:52:50,560 Speaker 1: with him, and uh so he was very important. We 947 00:52:50,560 --> 00:52:53,640 Speaker 1: were a development stage company, so there were lots of 948 00:52:54,040 --> 00:52:55,839 Speaker 1: you know, syncratic things we didn't have, like an HR 949 00:52:55,920 --> 00:52:58,480 Speaker 1: department we didn't have. But but Gary was really was 950 00:52:58,520 --> 00:53:01,799 Speaker 1: also really passionate about investing. Um. He's retired now, but 951 00:53:01,800 --> 00:53:05,600 Speaker 1: he's still invests. So I would say Gary. My other colleague, 952 00:53:05,680 --> 00:53:08,160 Speaker 1: Ron Fraser, who was a portfolio manager at Putnam before 953 00:53:08,160 --> 00:53:10,200 Speaker 1: he came to join us as one of the fourth 954 00:53:10,280 --> 00:53:14,520 Speaker 1: Health co founders. Ron is a true gentleman, an investment professional. 955 00:53:15,280 --> 00:53:19,160 Speaker 1: Taught me a lot about how to treat other people. UM, 956 00:53:19,239 --> 00:53:21,400 Speaker 1: And so I would say that would be another another 957 00:53:21,480 --> 00:53:23,319 Speaker 1: one of the folks that I learned a lot from 958 00:53:23,320 --> 00:53:26,840 Speaker 1: when I first came into the business. Quite quite intriguing. Um. 959 00:53:26,920 --> 00:53:30,480 Speaker 1: What about investors who influenced the way you approached the 960 00:53:30,520 --> 00:53:34,399 Speaker 1: world of investment? I think Ben Graham, you know, sort 961 00:53:34,400 --> 00:53:36,879 Speaker 1: of the value part of that at Principle and again 962 00:53:36,920 --> 00:53:39,680 Speaker 1: even though value hasn't been great the last ten years, UM, 963 00:53:39,760 --> 00:53:42,160 Speaker 1: just the way he thought about, Um, how do you 964 00:53:42,200 --> 00:53:44,400 Speaker 1: make an investment decision? Uh, you know, a lot of 965 00:53:44,440 --> 00:53:49,680 Speaker 1: things came from Ben Graham. Um, I'd say he's important, Um, 966 00:53:49,760 --> 00:53:52,279 Speaker 1: and then I would say there's people outside of investment, 967 00:53:52,640 --> 00:53:55,320 Speaker 1: outside invest Mary who but who have lessons for investing. 968 00:53:55,400 --> 00:53:57,600 Speaker 1: So Michael Lewis, you know when he wrote back in 969 00:53:57,640 --> 00:54:01,560 Speaker 1: the eighties, he wrote Liars Poker, and and uh, that 970 00:54:01,600 --> 00:54:04,319 Speaker 1: book actually, even though it's not technically an investing book, 971 00:54:04,320 --> 00:54:06,360 Speaker 1: it's certainly not a textbook, but has a lot of 972 00:54:06,400 --> 00:54:10,480 Speaker 1: interesting information that someone who's coming into the investment industry 973 00:54:10,520 --> 00:54:12,719 Speaker 1: for the first time, you know, it's a great book 974 00:54:12,719 --> 00:54:14,439 Speaker 1: to read, or was certainly at the time a great 975 00:54:14,480 --> 00:54:17,480 Speaker 1: book to read. So I found that that's another example 976 00:54:17,520 --> 00:54:19,279 Speaker 1: of something where you can learn a lot even though 977 00:54:19,320 --> 00:54:23,439 Speaker 1: it's not technically an investment book. Speaking of books, let's 978 00:54:23,440 --> 00:54:25,319 Speaker 1: talk about some of your favorite books. What do you 979 00:54:25,360 --> 00:54:28,040 Speaker 1: read for fun? What do you read for work? Investing? 980 00:54:28,080 --> 00:54:32,080 Speaker 1: Non investing? Fiction? Nonfiction? Yeah, so I like two days 981 00:54:32,200 --> 00:54:35,560 Speaker 1: nonfiction books can be great. Um. I mentioned Michael Lewis 982 00:54:35,719 --> 00:54:39,040 Speaker 1: Liars Poker. His new book is a book about actually 983 00:54:39,080 --> 00:54:43,640 Speaker 1: the transfer power between them you know it. Okay, So 984 00:54:43,880 --> 00:54:47,239 Speaker 1: I've read that and again that's the stories there. It's 985 00:54:47,239 --> 00:54:50,319 Speaker 1: just it's interesting because it's his way. He has this 986 00:54:50,440 --> 00:54:52,399 Speaker 1: way of getting into you know, sort of getting into 987 00:54:52,440 --> 00:54:55,359 Speaker 1: the detail situation learning it's enough about the milieu and 988 00:54:55,640 --> 00:54:58,880 Speaker 1: talking to enough people, and then it's both humorous and 989 00:54:58,960 --> 00:55:01,680 Speaker 1: as you say, har flank, but it's it's educational too. 990 00:55:01,760 --> 00:55:03,560 Speaker 1: You know, you've learn a lot. So so that that 991 00:55:03,560 --> 00:55:06,399 Speaker 1: would be an example of a nonfiction type of nonfiction book. 992 00:55:06,600 --> 00:55:11,000 Speaker 1: I love the way he finds these eclectic characters and 993 00:55:11,040 --> 00:55:14,520 Speaker 1: the story is always unwound through these unusual people, the 994 00:55:14,560 --> 00:55:17,319 Speaker 1: person from the weather channel, and it's just that's a 995 00:55:17,320 --> 00:55:20,879 Speaker 1: fascinating book. And then the the personal stuff, I would 996 00:55:20,920 --> 00:55:27,040 Speaker 1: say would be UM. I read some occasionally, not not 997 00:55:27,760 --> 00:55:30,960 Speaker 1: it's not a huge volume nowadays, but consistently over the 998 00:55:31,040 --> 00:55:34,600 Speaker 1: last years. I'll try to find some science fiction stories. 999 00:55:34,640 --> 00:55:37,000 Speaker 1: And by sense fiction I mean not um fantasy. I 1000 00:55:37,000 --> 00:55:39,279 Speaker 1: guess this is the aerospace engineering me not sort of 1001 00:55:39,320 --> 00:55:42,239 Speaker 1: the fantasy version, but the sort of hard science like 1002 00:55:42,280 --> 00:55:48,000 Speaker 1: the three that would be one or um Alice. Redemption. 1003 00:55:48,160 --> 00:55:52,480 Speaker 1: There's a Redemption Space series that I'm currently reading, Redemption Space. 1004 00:55:52,480 --> 00:55:57,879 Speaker 1: Who's the author there? Okay, you Alistair, So I've I've 1005 00:55:57,920 --> 00:55:59,800 Speaker 1: just finished the first one of the series. There's a 1006 00:55:59,840 --> 00:56:03,120 Speaker 1: but about a six book series, and I'm embarked on 1007 00:56:03,120 --> 00:56:05,120 Speaker 1: the second and I'll have to get back to you 1008 00:56:05,200 --> 00:56:10,879 Speaker 1: on Alice. Uh if you could do Redemption. Uh, let's 1009 00:56:10,920 --> 00:56:14,400 Speaker 1: see what Google has to say about this Redemption arc 1010 00:56:15,160 --> 00:56:19,279 Speaker 1: by Alistair Reynolds. Reynolds, sorry Reynolds, the second book in 1011 00:56:19,320 --> 00:56:23,520 Speaker 1: the Revelation Space series. Revelation Space is the name of 1012 00:56:23,520 --> 00:56:26,840 Speaker 1: this series. Okay, absolutely, And so you're going to go 1013 00:56:26,880 --> 00:56:31,360 Speaker 1: sci fi a feeling very predictable that that would be 1014 00:56:31,400 --> 00:56:35,080 Speaker 1: an example of that's when I'm reading it's a dollar series. 1015 00:56:35,080 --> 00:56:38,200 Speaker 1: I think they started. I started writing those around you know, 1016 00:56:38,320 --> 00:56:40,520 Speaker 1: twenty years ago or eighteen years ago. But that's an 1017 00:56:40,520 --> 00:56:42,600 Speaker 1: example of the kind of sort of it's a little 1018 00:56:42,600 --> 00:56:44,920 Speaker 1: bit harder science fiction with a lot of speculative stuff, 1019 00:56:45,360 --> 00:56:48,120 Speaker 1: and it's kind of fun um to just think about 1020 00:56:48,360 --> 00:56:51,239 Speaker 1: technology and the impact technology can have in the very 1021 00:56:51,239 --> 00:56:54,520 Speaker 1: long term. And I find certain types of science fiction writers. 1022 00:56:54,560 --> 00:56:56,520 Speaker 1: Another example would be that's a little older, would be 1023 00:56:56,960 --> 00:57:02,719 Speaker 1: Larry because I knew you could things exactly. Uh, those 1024 00:57:02,800 --> 00:57:07,720 Speaker 1: those books, the whole series of Ringworld, um from Niven. 1025 00:57:08,239 --> 00:57:10,840 Speaker 1: He was amazing. Yeah. I had a great way of 1026 00:57:10,880 --> 00:57:13,280 Speaker 1: coming up with these ideas and then sort of making 1027 00:57:13,600 --> 00:57:17,200 Speaker 1: I mean, I think the quality of the of his 1028 00:57:17,280 --> 00:57:19,800 Speaker 1: writing over time varied a little bit, but certainly the 1029 00:57:19,920 --> 00:57:23,160 Speaker 1: examples like Ring World, um, A Moot in God's Eye 1030 00:57:23,520 --> 00:57:25,800 Speaker 1: that you co wrote with Jerry Purnell, those are examples 1031 00:57:25,800 --> 00:57:28,080 Speaker 1: of books that, uh, you know, there's a lot of 1032 00:57:28,080 --> 00:57:31,240 Speaker 1: creative thinking, and they're entertaining stories as well. They start 1033 00:57:31,280 --> 00:57:33,560 Speaker 1: with the framework and then the characters and the and 1034 00:57:33,640 --> 00:57:35,920 Speaker 1: the plot really move along. Any other ones do you 1035 00:57:35,960 --> 00:57:38,160 Speaker 1: want to mention before we move on that that's a 1036 00:57:38,320 --> 00:57:41,320 Speaker 1: that's a really good collection. I'm a giant Larry Niven face, 1037 00:57:41,760 --> 00:57:43,440 Speaker 1: and I had a feeling. I had a feeling you 1038 00:57:43,480 --> 00:57:48,840 Speaker 1: were you were heading in that direction. Um, so what 1039 00:57:48,840 --> 00:57:50,680 Speaker 1: what excites you right now? What about the world of 1040 00:57:50,720 --> 00:57:54,920 Speaker 1: investing has you really enthusiastic looking forward to the future. 1041 00:57:55,280 --> 00:57:57,840 Speaker 1: I think I mentioned earlier were early days with respect 1042 00:57:57,840 --> 00:58:00,320 Speaker 1: to things like machine learning and big data, and I 1043 00:58:00,360 --> 00:58:04,000 Speaker 1: think there's a potential for significant transformation. So you've got 1044 00:58:04,000 --> 00:58:07,720 Speaker 1: this historical division of quant and you know traditional or 1045 00:58:07,720 --> 00:58:11,920 Speaker 1: fundamental investors, where the quants go broad but maybe not 1046 00:58:12,000 --> 00:58:15,120 Speaker 1: that deep, and the traditional investors go very deep but 1047 00:58:15,160 --> 00:58:18,120 Speaker 1: they may not be quite as broad. Um. I think 1048 00:58:18,160 --> 00:58:19,880 Speaker 1: we're at a point where we're gonna be able to 1049 00:58:19,920 --> 00:58:24,479 Speaker 1: start going broad and deep because of these these kinds 1050 00:58:24,560 --> 00:58:26,240 Speaker 1: of both the on the data side and then the 1051 00:58:26,280 --> 00:58:29,000 Speaker 1: ability to interpret the data using machine learning. You have 1052 00:58:29,040 --> 00:58:32,080 Speaker 1: to be very careful with machine learning. It's prone to overfitting, 1053 00:58:32,160 --> 00:58:35,520 Speaker 1: so you've got to build in some safeguards to avoid that. 1054 00:58:35,920 --> 00:58:38,240 Speaker 1: And we're still learning best practices. You know, what are 1055 00:58:38,280 --> 00:58:42,560 Speaker 1: what are the best techniques to use UM in driverless cars? 1056 00:58:42,680 --> 00:58:46,960 Speaker 1: People talk about neural nets. Neural nets you know, can 1057 00:58:47,000 --> 00:58:51,320 Speaker 1: easily find the best fit to historic data UM, but 1058 00:58:51,560 --> 00:58:55,960 Speaker 1: not always guaranteed to outperform UM just a standard linear 1059 00:58:56,000 --> 00:59:00,560 Speaker 1: statistical model historic with with future data. And so I 1060 00:59:00,560 --> 00:59:03,120 Speaker 1: think there's a lot of opportunity there for us to 1061 00:59:03,120 --> 00:59:05,120 Speaker 1: to learn and do better in that area, and that 1062 00:59:05,120 --> 00:59:07,800 Speaker 1: that kind of stuff is very exciting both for me 1063 00:59:07,880 --> 00:59:10,960 Speaker 1: and it turns out when you talk to young people 1064 00:59:10,960 --> 00:59:14,200 Speaker 1: coming into the quantitative research area, that's that those are 1065 00:59:14,200 --> 00:59:16,320 Speaker 1: the kinds of things they're excited and working on. I 1066 00:59:16,320 --> 00:59:19,160 Speaker 1: can imagine. So tell us about a time you failed 1067 00:59:19,400 --> 00:59:22,160 Speaker 1: and what you learned from the experience. Yeah, I mean, 1068 00:59:22,200 --> 00:59:25,280 Speaker 1: there's there's probably plenty of plenty of areas. One area 1069 00:59:25,600 --> 00:59:27,960 Speaker 1: would be uh in many ways. I was kind of lucky. 1070 00:59:28,640 --> 00:59:31,760 Speaker 1: I went to a good school. Um, I was good 1071 00:59:31,800 --> 00:59:35,760 Speaker 1: at taking exams. UM got a job that you know, 1072 00:59:35,800 --> 00:59:39,120 Speaker 1: we had the aerospace job, but the investment job, and 1073 00:59:39,160 --> 00:59:41,800 Speaker 1: that turned into a company. And I've been very fortunate 1074 00:59:41,840 --> 00:59:43,959 Speaker 1: in the people I've worked with, so I've always things 1075 00:59:43,960 --> 00:59:47,680 Speaker 1: are kind of work, been kind of successful. And when 1076 00:59:47,760 --> 00:59:53,400 Speaker 1: it came time to go through the CEO search process, UM, 1077 00:59:53,440 --> 00:59:54,920 Speaker 1: you know, one of the things we did is we 1078 00:59:54,960 --> 00:59:58,280 Speaker 1: took these I guess you administer different kinds of not 1079 00:59:58,320 --> 01:00:00,520 Speaker 1: just personality exams, but they're sort of invent tories of 1080 01:00:00,560 --> 01:00:04,680 Speaker 1: your managerial leadership capabilities, and so what when you take 1081 01:00:04,680 --> 01:00:06,840 Speaker 1: one of these, they ask you to rate yourself, and 1082 01:00:06,840 --> 01:00:08,680 Speaker 1: then all your peers and all your colleagues at the 1083 01:00:08,680 --> 01:00:11,080 Speaker 1: company do the same thing and even sort of compare. 1084 01:00:11,120 --> 01:00:14,160 Speaker 1: Here's where I think I am. And I'm doing this 1085 01:00:14,200 --> 01:00:15,840 Speaker 1: as a gesture, but I'll explain in a minute for 1086 01:00:15,880 --> 01:00:18,400 Speaker 1: your audience, here's where everybody else thinks I am. So 1087 01:00:18,480 --> 01:00:20,760 Speaker 1: it's very humbling to find out I had a very 1088 01:00:20,840 --> 01:00:25,600 Speaker 1: high opinion of my strategic thinking and UM, my ability 1089 01:00:25,680 --> 01:00:28,959 Speaker 1: to bring people to a consensus or to pull behind 1090 01:00:28,960 --> 01:00:32,480 Speaker 1: a decision, and UM, some of my colleagues observed that 1091 01:00:33,040 --> 01:00:35,440 Speaker 1: there were aspects of my decision making that, you know, 1092 01:00:35,640 --> 01:00:38,760 Speaker 1: they didn't appreciate as much potentially as I would have 1093 01:00:38,760 --> 01:00:41,680 Speaker 1: thought they might have. Um And so that was humbling, 1094 01:00:41,760 --> 01:00:44,520 Speaker 1: but it was also great because you know, really hearing 1095 01:00:44,600 --> 01:00:48,880 Speaker 1: other people's honest feedback is something that not everybody gets easily. 1096 01:00:49,240 --> 01:00:51,120 Speaker 1: And this is sort of an anonymous process, so it's 1097 01:00:51,120 --> 01:00:54,200 Speaker 1: a little filtered, but I can sort of see, here 1098 01:00:54,200 --> 01:00:56,000 Speaker 1: are some areas where I actually, you know, could be 1099 01:00:56,040 --> 01:00:58,720 Speaker 1: doing better than I than I was. UM. So I 1100 01:00:59,360 --> 01:01:01,080 Speaker 1: an area where I what I think of as failed 1101 01:01:01,120 --> 01:01:05,800 Speaker 1: as um my self image was miscalibrated relative to where 1102 01:01:05,800 --> 01:01:09,360 Speaker 1: everybody else was. On the plus side, that's a that's 1103 01:01:09,360 --> 01:01:13,280 Speaker 1: a learning opportunity because you can say, Okay, here's some 1104 01:01:13,320 --> 01:01:15,040 Speaker 1: things I could work on. I can try to do better. 1105 01:01:15,520 --> 01:01:17,640 Speaker 1: And if even if I can't do better, because I 1106 01:01:17,680 --> 01:01:19,520 Speaker 1: am who I am, maybe it's good to have an 1107 01:01:19,520 --> 01:01:22,840 Speaker 1: appreciation for some of my shortcomings. I love the way 1108 01:01:22,880 --> 01:01:26,680 Speaker 1: you phrase that, as an engineer would my self image 1109 01:01:26,720 --> 01:01:30,480 Speaker 1: was miscalibrated with the with the rest of the rest 1110 01:01:30,480 --> 01:01:33,200 Speaker 1: of the office. That's funny. Um So, if a millennial 1111 01:01:33,320 --> 01:01:35,440 Speaker 1: or recent college grad came to you and said they 1112 01:01:35,440 --> 01:01:39,840 Speaker 1: were considering a career in either quantitative research or asset management. 1113 01:01:40,200 --> 01:01:43,040 Speaker 1: What sort of advice would you give them. I'd say, 1114 01:01:43,640 --> 01:01:45,840 Speaker 1: if you're if this is something that you're excited and 1115 01:01:45,880 --> 01:01:50,360 Speaker 1: you're interested in, Absolutely it can still be a tremendously exciting, 1116 01:01:50,400 --> 01:01:53,880 Speaker 1: rewarding career. I do think it's very different than the 1117 01:01:54,000 --> 01:01:57,560 Speaker 1: environment that I faced three years ago. Right when you're 1118 01:01:57,680 --> 01:02:00,600 Speaker 1: entering something that's sort of new and green field, you know, 1119 01:02:00,640 --> 01:02:03,600 Speaker 1: there's not a lot of established players. Um, you've got 1120 01:02:03,640 --> 01:02:06,840 Speaker 1: a lot of opportunity. I mean, it could go completely astray, 1121 01:02:06,920 --> 01:02:08,640 Speaker 1: in which case you have to go to Plan B. 1122 01:02:09,280 --> 01:02:12,160 Speaker 1: But um, you've got a lot of opportunity. We've got 1123 01:02:12,200 --> 01:02:15,520 Speaker 1: a more mature industry now, there's lots of established competitors, 1124 01:02:16,160 --> 01:02:18,800 Speaker 1: and so it's harder to come in and have an immediate, 1125 01:02:18,960 --> 01:02:23,240 Speaker 1: big impact on a firm or established investment process. Um. 1126 01:02:23,520 --> 01:02:25,080 Speaker 1: You know, it's going to take more work and it's 1127 01:02:25,120 --> 01:02:27,800 Speaker 1: gonna take some time. UM, so you've got to be 1128 01:02:27,800 --> 01:02:30,200 Speaker 1: prepared for that. You know, if if you're if you 1129 01:02:30,240 --> 01:02:33,400 Speaker 1: want to, um, you know, develop the next great idea, 1130 01:02:33,480 --> 01:02:36,520 Speaker 1: there's still scope to do that, but um, you're doing 1131 01:02:36,520 --> 01:02:39,160 Speaker 1: it within the context typically of of a bigger existing 1132 01:02:39,760 --> 01:02:44,160 Speaker 1: process and firm. Another area though, might be fintech. So fintech, 1133 01:02:44,200 --> 01:02:48,000 Speaker 1: you know, the retail investors I think still are not sure. 1134 01:02:48,320 --> 01:02:50,959 Speaker 1: Fees have come down somewhat. You've got lots of index funds, 1135 01:02:51,000 --> 01:02:53,200 Speaker 1: you've got a t f s, but they're still not 1136 01:02:53,280 --> 01:02:55,680 Speaker 1: served as well in terms of the sort of advice 1137 01:02:56,000 --> 01:03:00,560 Speaker 1: and planning portion as they potentially could be. And so 1138 01:03:00,880 --> 01:03:04,000 Speaker 1: you know, some of these fintech companies, I think there 1139 01:03:04,040 --> 01:03:07,520 Speaker 1: there are some potentially disruptive ideas that either we are 1140 01:03:07,560 --> 01:03:09,320 Speaker 1: seeing or some of them may pan out, some of 1141 01:03:09,320 --> 01:03:11,360 Speaker 1: them may not, but that may be an interesting area 1142 01:03:11,360 --> 01:03:15,120 Speaker 1: as well to consider beyond pure investment management. Quite quite intriguing. 1143 01:03:15,720 --> 01:03:18,480 Speaker 1: UH and our final question, what do you know about 1144 01:03:18,480 --> 01:03:22,440 Speaker 1: the world of quantitative investing today? You wish you knew 1145 01:03:22,480 --> 01:03:25,520 Speaker 1: when you were starting out thirty years ago. There's a 1146 01:03:25,520 --> 01:03:28,280 Speaker 1: couple of lessons. One is the importance of risk control. 1147 01:03:28,440 --> 01:03:31,920 Speaker 1: I mentioned um, if you're just betting on a single factor, 1148 01:03:31,960 --> 01:03:34,800 Speaker 1: single signal, there could be a lot of risk associated 1149 01:03:35,360 --> 01:03:38,560 Speaker 1: with that exposure and a portfolio you need to manage 1150 01:03:38,600 --> 01:03:41,800 Speaker 1: that risk effectively. That's really important. A second thing is 1151 01:03:42,320 --> 01:03:46,080 Speaker 1: the payoffs to factors can change a lot over time. 1152 01:03:46,760 --> 01:03:49,840 Speaker 1: I think I intellectually, I think my I and my 1153 01:03:49,880 --> 01:03:53,720 Speaker 1: colleagues appreciated that. But there may be ways to manage 1154 01:03:53,760 --> 01:03:58,240 Speaker 1: those uh, the expectation of those payoffs using models that 1155 01:03:58,280 --> 01:04:01,600 Speaker 1: help predict how well values going work or quality or 1156 01:04:01,760 --> 01:04:05,160 Speaker 1: momentum is going to work and uh. And so the 1157 01:04:05,200 --> 01:04:08,400 Speaker 1: importance of having such models and incorporating them into your 1158 01:04:08,440 --> 01:04:12,560 Speaker 1: process is something I'd love to appreciate, Say before two 1159 01:04:12,560 --> 01:04:17,280 Speaker 1: thousand eight, for example, quite fascinating. Thank you, John for 1160 01:04:17,360 --> 01:04:20,520 Speaker 1: being so generous with your time. We have been speaking 1161 01:04:20,520 --> 01:04:24,600 Speaker 1: with John Chisholm. He is the co CEO and former 1162 01:04:24,680 --> 01:04:29,440 Speaker 1: chief investment officer for a Kadian asset Management. If you 1163 01:04:29,520 --> 01:04:32,040 Speaker 1: enjoyed this conversation, we'll be sure to look up an 1164 01:04:32,040 --> 01:04:36,560 Speaker 1: inch or down an inch on Apple iTunes or wherever 1165 01:04:36,840 --> 01:04:39,680 Speaker 1: final podcasts are sold and you can see the other 1166 01:04:40,000 --> 01:04:43,000 Speaker 1: let's call it two hundred and thirty or so such 1167 01:04:43,080 --> 01:04:47,360 Speaker 1: conversations we've had. We love your comments, feedback and suggestions. 1168 01:04:47,400 --> 01:04:50,960 Speaker 1: Please write to us at m IB podcast at Bloomberg 1169 01:04:51,000 --> 01:04:54,280 Speaker 1: dot net. If you enjoy this conversation, go to Apple 1170 01:04:54,360 --> 01:04:57,520 Speaker 1: iTunes and be sure to give us a five star rating. UH. 1171 01:04:57,720 --> 01:05:01,280 Speaker 1: Check out my daily column on Bomberg dot Com. Follow 1172 01:05:01,320 --> 01:05:04,160 Speaker 1: me on Twitter at rid Halts. I would be remiss 1173 01:05:04,240 --> 01:05:07,080 Speaker 1: if I did not thank the crack staff who helps 1174 01:05:07,120 --> 01:05:11,000 Speaker 1: put together this conversation each week. Medina Partwana is our 1175 01:05:11,040 --> 01:05:15,280 Speaker 1: producer and Charles Volmer is our returning audio engineer an 1176 01:05:15,280 --> 01:05:19,400 Speaker 1: all time champion. Taylor Riggs is our booker slash producer. 1177 01:05:19,960 --> 01:05:24,200 Speaker 1: Uh Attica val Brunn is our project manager. Michael Batnick 1178 01:05:24,280 --> 01:05:27,600 Speaker 1: is my head of research. I'm Barry Ridholts. You've been 1179 01:05:27,640 --> 01:05:30,640 Speaker 1: listening to Masters in Business on Bloomberg Radio