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Speaker 1: Now here's a highlight from Coast to Coast AM on

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Speaker 1: iHeartRadio and welcome back to Coast to Coast. Brandon Wike

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Speaker 1: hurts with us. We're talking about his work Winning Space

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Speaker 1: And where do people get your book? Brandon? Oh, you

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Speaker 1: can get it on any online realtor retailer Amazon. It's

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Speaker 1: coming out in September fifteenth, but it's available for pre

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Speaker 1: order now. Now, the Space Force itself, if we had

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Speaker 1: ten thousand members, they're not all going to be up

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Speaker 1: at space at one time. What do we need them for? Well, basically,

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Speaker 1: right now, we're no, no, no member of Space Force

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Speaker 1: or any other branch unless they're in NASAs, is going

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Speaker 1: to be physically in space. Inevitably. Right now, they're doing

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Speaker 1: all the remote sort of you know, monitoring of satellites

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Speaker 1: and whatnot and ground stations. But inevitably, as I argue

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Speaker 1: in the book, we're going to need to adapt a

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Speaker 1: strategy for actually having They haven't quite I don't think

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Speaker 1: they've quite decided on the term yet, either spacers or

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Speaker 1: space troopers. We're going to need to develop a strategy

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Speaker 1: for putting actual Space Force members in orbit to man

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Speaker 1: military space stations. The Defense Innovation Unit over at the

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Speaker 1: Pentagon has already begun putting feelers out for the last

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Speaker 1: year and a half for proposals for military space stations,

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Speaker 1: which would be used to sort of how's personnel as

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Speaker 1: well as to allow for sort of trip wires in space,

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Speaker 1: put them near sensitive systems and make it harder for

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Speaker 1: China or Russia to knock out our satellites. It's sort

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Speaker 1: of like NATO where we put our forces right in

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Speaker 1: the kind of crosshairs of Russia or back in the

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Speaker 1: day of the Soviet Union, with the logic being that

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Speaker 1: they're going to be a little less likely unless there's

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Speaker 1: a real crisis to take a shot at our people.

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Speaker 1: Right now, it's a low cost endeavor, relatively speaking, for

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Speaker 1: China or Russia to target on man systems in orbit.

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Speaker 1: But if you put military space stations command centers up

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Speaker 1: in orbit and you create sort of you know, swarms

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Speaker 1: of satellite commanded by those space stations, you'll have line

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Speaker 1: of sight will be much better than it is from

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Speaker 1: Earth to space. It'll be line of sight from the

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Speaker 1: military space station to the potential satellite swarms. You'll have

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Speaker 1: c two functions that'll be better and so that's inevitably

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Speaker 1: where we want to get to, I think, is having

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Speaker 1: actual personnel in space as well as being able to

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Speaker 1: deploy personnel from space drop them into a combat zone.

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Speaker 1: These are things that this was a sustained program that

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Speaker 1: the Marine Corps and Special Forces were in two thousand

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Speaker 1: and two very interested in, and now I think they're

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Speaker 1: starting to look back into that program again, using a

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Speaker 1: space plane from similar to what Branson is using with

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Speaker 1: the Virgin Galactic, weaponizing it and using it to deploy

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Speaker 1: kind of hunter killer team on special Forces missions, sort

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Speaker 1: of to avoid some of the legal issues that come

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Speaker 1: with overflight rights as they currently exist, uh in dealing

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Speaker 1: with the War on Terror for instance. And so these

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Speaker 1: are these are things that are in the very early

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Speaker 1: stages of discussion right now at a doctrinal level for

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Speaker 1: Space Force, and I think that's where we're going to go.

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Speaker 1: But in terms of where we are now, Space Force

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Speaker 1: really is just manning sort of terminals at military stations

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Speaker 1: in Colorado and California, and they're they're doing everything remotely,

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Speaker 1: but eventually we're going to need the infrastructure to be

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Speaker 1: able to support actual military operations with military personnel in space.

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Speaker 1: Brandon take us through a hypothetical space war what's actually happening.

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Speaker 1: So it would be not as as sexy as it

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Speaker 1: appears in either Star Track or Star Wars on you know, unfortunately,

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Speaker 1: but it would be very lethal in terms of the

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Speaker 1: ramifications for us here on Earth. Basic one day, we

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Speaker 1: could wake up and no no cell service, no cell service,

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Speaker 1: no no ability to call nine one one, no ability

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Speaker 1: to nothing. I mean, you're anything electronic that requires a

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Speaker 1: signal will be disrupted. It will at the very least

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Speaker 1: be laggy, but it would probably be totally disrupted because

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Speaker 1: the system would become overloaded. I have friends of the

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Speaker 1: Navy who say, yeah, but we have undersea cables that

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Speaker 1: we could offload a lot of the operations onto, and

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Speaker 1: I just think that's a laughable content. First of all,

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Speaker 1: they can nowhere near handle the load of a modern

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Speaker 1: society like ours. And second of all, everyone in the world,

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Speaker 1: all the intelligence agencies know where those lines are, and

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Speaker 1: the Cold War, both we am the Russians were experts

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Speaker 1: at tapping in and cutting those lines. The Chinese have

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Speaker 1: the same capability with submersibles. So that's not a really

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Speaker 1: good backup plan. We can't rely too much on drones

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Speaker 1: because they're not as effective as satellites with handling the

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Speaker 1: load long term, so we would be deaf, dumb, and

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Speaker 1: blind as a society. They could use lasers to blind

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Speaker 1: satellites temporarily, they could use traditional anti satellite killer vehicles. Basically,

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Speaker 1: think of a missile launched up from the Earth tracks

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Speaker 1: the satellite in orbit, knocks it out, creates a debris field,

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Speaker 1: of course, and that could cause a lot of secondary

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Speaker 1: and third tier damage to nearby satellites. That's the Kessler syndrome.

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Speaker 1: Basically creates a ricochet of debris that knocks out everything

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Speaker 1: in orbit, and then you've got a real catastrophe on

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Speaker 1: your hands. Or they could use what I was talking

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Speaker 1: about earlier, which were the space stalkers the co orbital

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Speaker 1: satellites to physically push our satellites out of orbit. And

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Speaker 1: I actually think that is the most likely method of

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Speaker 1: attack because I think that has the least chance for

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Speaker 1: unintended damage. The whole thing about a space pearl harbor,

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Speaker 1: as I talk about of the book, is for Russia

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Speaker 1: or China, they're gonna want to minimize secondary damage. They're

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Speaker 1: not going to necessarily want to take out satellites that

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Speaker 1: belong to countries other than the United States and our allies. Well,

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Speaker 1: we have a we have an international registry. So the

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Speaker 1: UN maintains an international registry of all satellites in orbits,

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Speaker 1: like two thousand satellites up there, right, yeah, yeah, they

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Speaker 1: and and they they have there's a federal there's a

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Speaker 1: national registry than the FAA. Also there's government federal government

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Speaker 1: also has has registries and basically it's it is. It

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Speaker 1: is not that difficult for a foreign rival to figure

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Speaker 1: out where our systems are. Uh. But five or six

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Speaker 1: years ago, the Russians took great joy in publishing photos.

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Speaker 1: They took a very sensitive what we're at the time

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Speaker 1: newer UH surveillance satellites that we had just put up,

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Speaker 1: and they they found them within no time. It's not

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Speaker 1: difficult for a dedicated enemy with the kind of capabilities

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Speaker 1: that Russia, China or are selves have to be able

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Speaker 1: to track and sort of figure out what our satellites

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Speaker 1: are doing. Even when we don't publish exactly what their

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Speaker 1: their mission is, it's pretty obvious you can determine from

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Speaker 1: the orbit and sort of what they're focused on, what

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Speaker 1: exactly the satellite mission set is and how sensitive or

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Speaker 1: important it is. Satellites in geosynchronous orbit, which is the

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Speaker 1: furthest orbit away from Earth. We those are where our

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Speaker 1: most sensitive satellites and most vulnerable satellites are. Those are

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Speaker 1: where the early missile warning satellites are. That's where a

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Speaker 1: lot of the the the MUOS constellation I talked about

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Speaker 1: for the Navy, it's where the wide band global SATCOM

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Speaker 1: consolation is. For the Army. You've got surveillance satellites up there.

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Speaker 1: A lot of things that can go can be very

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Speaker 1: bad for us if we lost are up there. And

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Speaker 1: by the way, in twenty thirteen, the Chinese, under the

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Speaker 1: guise of a scientific mission, they began testing systems that

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Speaker 1: can actually reach in to geosynchronous orbit and obviously threaten

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Speaker 1: our systems there. And the Russians have the same case.

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Speaker 1: They even blew up one of theirs, and we were

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Speaker 1: concerned about the parts, sitting thes and everything. Absolutely. Well,

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Speaker 1: you're talking about two thousand and seven Chinese a SAT tests,

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Speaker 1: which I identify as being year zero. Two thousand and

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Speaker 1: seven is year zero in the New Space Race. That

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Speaker 1: was the year that they the Chinese, out of the blue,

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Speaker 1: did this very dangerous, very sloppy test where they launched

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Speaker 1: in the anti satellite missile up at one of their derelicts.

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Speaker 1: Weather satellites blew it up and created and it's still

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Speaker 1: in orbit today. It created the largest debris cluster in

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Speaker 1: the history of human And you don't need a big

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Speaker 1: piece to damage something, right. Think of the film You're Right,

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Speaker 1: And think of the film Gravity with Sandra Bullock and

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Speaker 1: George Clooney. Oh, the whole story of that film was

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Speaker 1: that the Russians woke up one day and decided to

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Speaker 1: randomly test an a SAT weapon which accidentally created this

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Speaker 1: cascade of destruction which knocked out the entire global satellite

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Speaker 1: constellations and of course created all kinds of problems for

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Speaker 1: the characters in that movie. But the point is is

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Speaker 1: that that is based on the Kessler syndrome. That is

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Speaker 1: a real risk that we're running today and which is why,

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Speaker 1: and the Russians and Chinese are aware of that. And

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Speaker 1: I think particularly the Russians, if they were going to

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Speaker 1: do a surprise attack, would probably prefer a co orbital

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Speaker 1: satellite attack. The Chinese with their two thousand and seven

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Speaker 1: a sate attack. Though we're sending a signal to the

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Speaker 1: Americans that A they can do this, and B if

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Speaker 1: need be, they'll risk taking out the world satellites because

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Speaker 1: right now there's a there's an asymmetrical there's an imbalance

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Speaker 1: in the ability in our ability to rely on satellites. Basically,

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Speaker 1: we rely disproportionately on satellites more so than our enemies do. Now.

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Speaker 1: That could change over the next decade, especially as China

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Speaker 1: is becoming more advanced, but until the next decade, there's

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Speaker 1: really going to be an imbalance in the way that

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Speaker 1: we rely on satellite it's relative to how our enemies do.

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Speaker 1: Is it an active war? Do you think to take

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Speaker 1: out a satellite? I would argue that it is. There

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Speaker 1: is some gray area, especially especially we're talking about things

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Speaker 1: like a laser attack which temporarily blinds a satellite. My

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Speaker 1: understanding is basically, a laser fired at the optical gear

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Speaker 1: of a satellite that temporarily shuts down a satellite doesn't

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Speaker 1: necessarily permanently destroy. It makes attribution more difficult, and the

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Speaker 1: satellite basically shuts down and kind of opens its solar

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Speaker 1: energy cells up to the sun to recharge, and you

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Speaker 1: basically have to hope that the ground operators can reconnect

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Speaker 1: with it, and in the meantime that creates a gap

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Speaker 1: in our surveillance communications, you know, early missile warning systems,

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Speaker 1: which would give the Chinese or the Russians a window

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Speaker 1: of opportunities to exploit and surge their forces into a

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Speaker 1: contested part of the Earth. And that's sort of the

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Speaker 1: basis of a counterspace attack render the Americans plant. So

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Speaker 1: it's hard to be able to send some cases, to

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Speaker 1: be able to attribute the attack, and it would be

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Speaker 1: difficult for us to say it's an active war. But yes,

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Speaker 1: technically I believe it is an active war. Yes, but

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Speaker 1: who do you blame? How do you blame? If the

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Speaker 1: Chinese say we didn't do what the Russians day, then

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Speaker 1: vice versa. Absolutely, and that's the key. We do have

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Speaker 1: the ability though to basically backtrace and figure out it

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Speaker 1: would just take time. A laser attack would be very

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Speaker 1: hard for us to determine what. We would figure it out,

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Speaker 1: and we can especially figure it out because the Chinese

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Speaker 1: have been extremely hot and heavy in laser technology for

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Speaker 1: counterspace operations development, and so we have ways. It's just

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Speaker 1: like with cyber attacks, there's a myth out there that

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Speaker 1: we have no ability to know exactly where a cyber

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Speaker 1: attack comes from, which I have friends at work in

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Speaker 1: the NSA and they laugh whenever they hear that in

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Speaker 1: the news. We have the ability to attribute these things.

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Speaker 1: It just takes a little bit of time, but we

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Speaker 1: can figure it out. It's it's not impossible. Something like

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Speaker 1: a co orbital satellite attack I think would be more

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Speaker 1: effective against our systems, But of course that makes attribution

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Speaker 1: a bit easier for us, and an a test as

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Speaker 1: well should at least theoretically be easier for us, because

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Speaker 1: there's only a handful of countries that have this capability,

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Speaker 1: and really too China and Russia that have a purpose

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Speaker 1: and reason for doing such an attack. I learned after

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Speaker 1: nine years in the Navy, Brandon, that our big deterrent

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Speaker 1: was our nuclear submarine systems. Yeah, those were the ones.

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Speaker 1: I mean, we've had them parked right off the coasts

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Speaker 1: of those countries and we could hit them in a

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Speaker 1: matter of minutes. Yes, that's right, that's right. And of

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Speaker 1: course the downsite is though they're so dependent on satellite satellites, absolutely,

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Speaker 1: and you know, so the concern I mean, we also

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Speaker 1: have a problem with spoofing, and so that's where basically

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Speaker 1: a third party can come in and pretend can highchack

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Speaker 1: the signal from satellite to the downlink signal from the

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Speaker 1: satellite to in this case, say the submarine, and can

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Speaker 1: either send it off core. So we see a lot

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Speaker 1: of attempts of spoofing of the American Global Positioning System

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Speaker 1: satellite network. We see this a lot in Russia and China.

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Speaker 1: Both have been very heavily invested. So you could have

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Speaker 1: an instance, for example, where the Chinese can track our subs.

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Speaker 1: We can track there's of course, but the Chinese this

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Speaker 1: is a little known in fact, but they can track

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Speaker 1: our subs. And so the Chinese could track a US

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Speaker 1: nuclear submarine coming into their part of the world, and

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Speaker 1: they could spoof signals coming down to the sub for

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Speaker 1: navigation and send it, you know, running ashore, or send

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Speaker 1: it crashing into a reef and sink it without ever

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Speaker 1: getting close to the area of operations. And so this

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Speaker 1: is a threat that we have to deal with, and

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Speaker 1: we are not really quite there yet with addressing it.

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Speaker 1: We're starting to, but we've seen a lot of outages

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Speaker 1: that I've often wondered outages in the GPS system over

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Speaker 1: the last few years that I've often wondered, are actually

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Speaker 1: the Air Force attempting to mitigate what are spoofing attempts

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Speaker 1: from our rivals? And they'd never admitted in public. But

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Speaker 1: that's just some suspicion that I've had on a certain issue.

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Speaker 1: And I believe our subs have been told if you

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Speaker 1: do not hear from us, that's US being the United

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Speaker 1: States of the mainland. At a certain given times, you launch. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: that used to be the hair trigger. Yeah, that used

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Speaker 1: to be how it is that it was during the

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Speaker 1: Cold War. I'm not exactly certain with the Navy on

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Speaker 1: I know there are redundancies now built in yeah, but

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Speaker 1: you know, I don't trust the redundancy because everything ultimately

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Speaker 1: goes back to the satellites, and if an enemy is

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Speaker 1: manipulating the satellites or has deprived US of satellites, you

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Speaker 1: know there there, it causes a lot of problems. If

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Speaker 1: nobody launches, well, that also then mitigate that that makes

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Speaker 1: our nuclear deterret not very effective, because what happens if

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Speaker 1: the Chinese, for instance, know that our nuclear deterret has

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Speaker 1: been rendered ineffective, well, that's going to make them more

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Speaker 1: likely to just go rough shot on launching their own

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Speaker 1: systems knowing that, hey, then Americans are unlikely to be

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Speaker 1: able to respond, and then the balance of terror is

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Speaker 1: law Brendon. Why can't we just all get get together

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Speaker 1: and be good with each other and have a great life.

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Speaker 1: Why can't they do that? You know, it's human nature.

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Speaker 1: It's I think it was Adam Smith who observed human

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Speaker 1: nature is flawed but fixed. And that question has kind

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Speaker 1: of been the basis of my academic career. And that's

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Speaker 1: why I study international relations in foreign policy because I'm

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Speaker 1: fascinated by the fact that we live in a world

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Speaker 1: of abundance. I mean, we live in the I mean,

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Speaker 1: that was the best time, even with COVID. Now is

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Speaker 1: the best time to be alive, and yet we're at

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Speaker 1: each other's throats and it's just it's crazy. I mean,

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Speaker 1: I would try to build the best defense system in

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Speaker 1: the planet, in the world with the hopes of never

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Speaker 1: having to use it. That's right. Well, that's the Reagan model.

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Speaker 1: That's the model that I prefer, and that's why I

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Speaker 1: support not only protecting our satellites, but I support the

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Speaker 1: space Force eventually being able to actually deploy Reagan dream

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Speaker 1: of the strategic defense initiative because not just Russia and China,

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Speaker 1: but they ran and North Korea. The nuclear rogue states

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Speaker 1: are a problem and we can't rely on anyone else

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Speaker 1: to protect us from those nuclear arming threats. And the

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Speaker 1: best deterrence would be putting up an actual viable space

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Speaker 1: based missile defense system that we could save to pyeong

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Speaker 1: Yang and Tehran. You know what, you can build all

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Speaker 1: the nukes you want, but guess what, they're not going

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Speaker 1: to ever leave the earth, because if they do, we're

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Speaker 1: going to knock them out of the sky before they

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Speaker 1: ever right. They're coming right down, crashing on you folks.

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Speaker 1: That's right. Absolutely. Listen to more Coast to Coast AM

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Speaker 1: every weeknight at one am Eastern and go to Coast

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Speaker 1: to Coast am dot com for more