WEBVTT - Keeping Your Information Secure Online

0:00:05.519 --> 0:00:09.440
<v Speaker 1>Uh, welcome to It Could Happen here, a podcast about

0:00:09.520 --> 0:00:12.920
<v Speaker 1>things falling apart and how to deal with that and

0:00:13.000 --> 0:00:17.000
<v Speaker 1>hopefully take care of yourself and your people. Um. Today

0:00:17.120 --> 0:00:21.920
<v Speaker 1>we have a returning guest, Carl Casarda from Enranged TV. UM. Now, Carl,

0:00:22.079 --> 0:00:25.400
<v Speaker 1>every time you and I have chatted on a show together,

0:00:25.440 --> 0:00:28.479
<v Speaker 1>it has been about firearms, which is obviously your passion

0:00:28.560 --> 0:00:31.000
<v Speaker 1>and specialty, well one of your specialties. But today we're

0:00:31.000 --> 0:00:33.680
<v Speaker 1>not talking at all about guns. Um. I mean maybe

0:00:33.720 --> 0:00:36.120
<v Speaker 1>here and there, but today we're talking about the thing

0:00:36.159 --> 0:00:40.000
<v Speaker 1>that is has been your your career, uh for what

0:00:40.040 --> 0:00:43.400
<v Speaker 1>most of your working life. Fair to say, Um, you

0:00:43.400 --> 0:00:45.160
<v Speaker 1>want to kind of walk through your background here because

0:00:45.159 --> 0:00:47.640
<v Speaker 1>we're gonna be talking about information security and like sort

0:00:47.680 --> 0:00:50.120
<v Speaker 1>of the future of threats that are going to be

0:00:50.760 --> 0:00:54.520
<v Speaker 1>like coming uh throughout like the next few years of

0:00:54.560 --> 0:00:57.120
<v Speaker 1>our lives. Obviously, this year in particular, there's been a

0:00:57.120 --> 0:01:00.000
<v Speaker 1>bunch of stories about like Russian attacks on digital infrastry

0:01:00.080 --> 0:01:03.000
<v Speaker 1>sure and vice versa. And that's always like pretty much

0:01:03.000 --> 0:01:05.679
<v Speaker 1>has been something that's in everybody's backburter since we got

0:01:05.680 --> 0:01:11.120
<v Speaker 1>the Internet, usually through like Questionable films with Sandra Bullock. UM,

0:01:11.160 --> 0:01:14.199
<v Speaker 1>I think net that was net right, Um, the net,

0:01:14.520 --> 0:01:17.560
<v Speaker 1>the net, yes exactly, Yes, where they somehow hacked a

0:01:17.560 --> 0:01:20.600
<v Speaker 1>car and nineteen ninety eight or something. You gotta do

0:01:20.640 --> 0:01:22.960
<v Speaker 1>that when you're flying through cyberspace with your VR comment

0:01:23.040 --> 0:01:26.320
<v Speaker 1>on and your gloves right yea, um, but yeah, you

0:01:26.360 --> 0:01:28.280
<v Speaker 1>want to walk everyone through kind of what your actual

0:01:28.280 --> 0:01:31.760
<v Speaker 1>background is in this industry first. Yeah, totally. So if

0:01:31.800 --> 0:01:33.840
<v Speaker 1>anyone watches En Rangers, watched it for a long time,

0:01:33.880 --> 0:01:35.959
<v Speaker 1>you'll see this reflected in some of my content because

0:01:35.959 --> 0:01:38.520
<v Speaker 1>I do deal with some of this intermittently on the channel,

0:01:38.520 --> 0:01:41.520
<v Speaker 1>and it's definitely influenced how I approach my work there

0:01:41.520 --> 0:01:44.600
<v Speaker 1>with the social media and all that. But so way

0:01:44.600 --> 0:01:46.320
<v Speaker 1>back when I was like one of those kids that

0:01:46.440 --> 0:01:48.520
<v Speaker 1>was in the hacker space, and I grew up like

0:01:48.560 --> 0:01:50.840
<v Speaker 1>trying to make computers and technology do what it wasn't

0:01:50.880 --> 0:01:52.520
<v Speaker 1>designed to do, and learn to make it do things

0:01:52.520 --> 0:01:55.080
<v Speaker 1>it shouldn't have done for my own interests or others

0:01:55.120 --> 0:01:57.120
<v Speaker 1>around me, not not in any really negative way, but

0:01:57.200 --> 0:01:59.960
<v Speaker 1>like just a deep curiosity and how does this stuff work?

0:02:00.040 --> 0:02:02.920
<v Speaker 1>And being part of the early online community. We're talking

0:02:02.920 --> 0:02:05.520
<v Speaker 1>pre Internet, where you have like an acoustic coupling jack

0:02:05.560 --> 0:02:08.160
<v Speaker 1>modem and you would dial in like war games. Yeah,

0:02:08.720 --> 0:02:11.600
<v Speaker 1>literally plug your headset into the fad. I was on

0:02:11.639 --> 0:02:14.280
<v Speaker 1>boards like that way back when we never should have

0:02:14.320 --> 0:02:17.760
<v Speaker 1>gone past those days doing things wirelessly with such a mistake,

0:02:18.120 --> 0:02:20.359
<v Speaker 1>Like I'm so piste off that when I like sit

0:02:20.440 --> 0:02:23.280
<v Speaker 1>down to research, I'm not like jacking into a gigantic

0:02:23.360 --> 0:02:26.480
<v Speaker 1>box um like it that makes me live it, Like

0:02:26.560 --> 0:02:29.320
<v Speaker 1>shadow Run promised me that I was going to be

0:02:29.360 --> 0:02:34.120
<v Speaker 1>like using one hand to shoot at the approaching corporate

0:02:34.160 --> 0:02:36.880
<v Speaker 1>security guards and have another hand on my like keyboard

0:02:36.960 --> 0:02:39.040
<v Speaker 1>that I wear around my neck that I like plug

0:02:39.080 --> 0:02:42.280
<v Speaker 1>into the wall to hack buildings. But well, hey, maybe

0:02:42.280 --> 0:02:45.360
<v Speaker 1>someday we'll have neurological implants or wet wire implants brought

0:02:45.360 --> 0:02:48.200
<v Speaker 1>to us by Monsanto Li. The rmum will just get

0:02:48.200 --> 0:02:50.280
<v Speaker 1>shut off in our own rooms, right from their mouth

0:02:50.400 --> 0:02:53.520
<v Speaker 1>to God's ears. Carl absolutely, who doesn't want that? Who

0:02:53.560 --> 0:02:56.360
<v Speaker 1>doesn't want my neural tissue tied directly to a corporation?

0:02:56.639 --> 0:03:00.400
<v Speaker 1>But that? Fuck yes? But anyway, so I grew up

0:03:00.400 --> 0:03:03.560
<v Speaker 1>in that space, and it actually back then it naturally

0:03:03.639 --> 0:03:05.960
<v Speaker 1>turned into a career. It wasn't like now nowadays, you

0:03:05.960 --> 0:03:08.559
<v Speaker 1>pretty much have to go get a bunch of certificates

0:03:08.560 --> 0:03:10.720
<v Speaker 1>and a college degree to even start looking at an

0:03:10.760 --> 0:03:13.440
<v Speaker 1>infrazet career. But back then, if you kind of had

0:03:13.480 --> 0:03:16.720
<v Speaker 1>like skills with a Z at the end of you

0:03:16.720 --> 0:03:18.520
<v Speaker 1>could get a job. And I ended up doing like

0:03:18.560 --> 0:03:21.280
<v Speaker 1>help desk at this one company landed up they noticed

0:03:21.320 --> 0:03:23.040
<v Speaker 1>that that's where my interests were, and I ended up

0:03:23.080 --> 0:03:25.919
<v Speaker 1>becoming their information security architect over a couple of years,

0:03:26.200 --> 0:03:29.480
<v Speaker 1>and that turned into a multiple decade career pretty much

0:03:29.520 --> 0:03:32.560
<v Speaker 1>culminating and working at a Tier one Internet backbone provider

0:03:32.919 --> 0:03:37.280
<v Speaker 1>doing sub seed fiber optic like routing, networking and de

0:03:37.440 --> 0:03:40.560
<v Speaker 1>dos mitigation and bought net control, search and destroy, So

0:03:40.720 --> 0:03:43.720
<v Speaker 1>it really turned into a really wide career, not only

0:03:43.760 --> 0:03:47.760
<v Speaker 1>like when I started off backbone internet, but like encryption, firewalls,

0:03:47.800 --> 0:03:51.480
<v Speaker 1>application layer controls across the board for multiple corporations. So

0:03:51.800 --> 0:03:54.200
<v Speaker 1>it was a weird and interesting space. But I don't

0:03:54.200 --> 0:03:57.000
<v Speaker 1>really do that much anymore except on the side, but

0:03:57.080 --> 0:04:01.240
<v Speaker 1>I've had a pretty exciting career with it. So I

0:04:01.240 --> 0:04:03.400
<v Speaker 1>think probably a good place to start is just in general,

0:04:03.440 --> 0:04:05.880
<v Speaker 1>because folks are always interested about this, what what do

0:04:05.920 --> 0:04:07.920
<v Speaker 1>you what is your recommendation for people ask like what

0:04:07.960 --> 0:04:10.800
<v Speaker 1>should I be doing to kind of protect myself as

0:04:10.840 --> 0:04:16.240
<v Speaker 1>I forced my head under the constant stream of sewer

0:04:16.279 --> 0:04:19.039
<v Speaker 1>water that is social media these days. Well, yeah, you know,

0:04:19.080 --> 0:04:22.280
<v Speaker 1>the simplest thing and everything. An infosec is always controversial,

0:04:22.360 --> 0:04:25.600
<v Speaker 1>just like anything, Like any any recommendation makes someone's gonna

0:04:25.600 --> 0:04:28.480
<v Speaker 1>be like, but otherwise or anyways, or there's a better solution,

0:04:28.760 --> 0:04:31.200
<v Speaker 1>and there always is a better solution. But the realistic

0:04:31.240 --> 0:04:33.599
<v Speaker 1>thing is when you talk to the average person, the

0:04:33.600 --> 0:04:36.320
<v Speaker 1>average person isn't gonna sit there and hack a Linux

0:04:36.320 --> 0:04:39.080
<v Speaker 1>box to have a better social media experience. That's that's

0:04:39.120 --> 0:04:42.640
<v Speaker 1>not realistic. So the best thing anyone can do, the simplest,

0:04:42.720 --> 0:04:46.160
<v Speaker 1>best thing, is to get one of the trusted password managers.

0:04:46.400 --> 0:04:47.719
<v Speaker 1>There's a number of them out there. I'm not going

0:04:47.760 --> 0:04:50.240
<v Speaker 1>to recommend an individual one right now, because anyone I

0:04:50.279 --> 0:04:52.760
<v Speaker 1>recommend someone's gonna go. But there's another one, but there's

0:04:52.760 --> 0:04:55.160
<v Speaker 1>a few of them out there. Having a password manager

0:04:55.200 --> 0:05:00.000
<v Speaker 1>and having a unique, difficult, complex password for every account

0:05:00.040 --> 0:05:03.159
<v Speaker 1>you log in onto on the internet is the first

0:05:03.360 --> 0:05:05.640
<v Speaker 1>number one thing you can do as an individual to

0:05:05.720 --> 0:05:07.960
<v Speaker 1>protect your interest, because if you're logging in with the

0:05:08.000 --> 0:05:12.400
<v Speaker 1>same password monkey to Facebook, Twitter, and your bank account,

0:05:12.600 --> 0:05:14.680
<v Speaker 1>that is a disaster. Waiting to happen. So the first

0:05:14.680 --> 0:05:18.600
<v Speaker 1>thing you can do password manager passwords you yourself can't remember.

0:05:18.640 --> 0:05:21.120
<v Speaker 1>As a result, I allow the password manager to generate

0:05:21.120 --> 0:05:25.039
<v Speaker 1>like twenty four character long alpha numeric crypto. Nonsense. You

0:05:25.080 --> 0:05:26.400
<v Speaker 1>put a gun on my mouth to say, what's your

0:05:26.400 --> 0:05:28.640
<v Speaker 1>password to your bank and I don't know. I can't

0:05:28.640 --> 0:05:30.920
<v Speaker 1>give it. You have no idea. And so that right

0:05:30.920 --> 0:05:33.800
<v Speaker 1>there is the first thing any basic individual can do

0:05:33.880 --> 0:05:38.760
<v Speaker 1>to protect themselves on the Internet that, uh is totally sensible. Um,

0:05:38.839 --> 0:05:41.080
<v Speaker 1>I don't I'm not great at password managers, but I

0:05:41.120 --> 0:05:43.360
<v Speaker 1>never know what my passwords are and they're all different,

0:05:43.400 --> 0:05:45.440
<v Speaker 1>and so my life is this constant stream of like

0:05:45.960 --> 0:05:49.520
<v Speaker 1>needing to figure out what my password was, failing and

0:05:49.560 --> 0:05:53.680
<v Speaker 1>resetting it. But it does mean that I change passwords regularly. Right,

0:05:53.720 --> 0:05:55.840
<v Speaker 1>But what's so great about password managers. You can have

0:05:55.880 --> 0:05:58.120
<v Speaker 1>passwords that you could never human remember, and you can

0:05:58.160 --> 0:06:01.120
<v Speaker 1>have weak ones per website, every website you log in,

0:06:01.200 --> 0:06:03.120
<v Speaker 1>you can be unique, and by having it in this

0:06:03.200 --> 0:06:06.320
<v Speaker 1>database that's properly encrypted with a key phrase or even

0:06:06.360 --> 0:06:08.880
<v Speaker 1>dual factor, then at that point means you literally just

0:06:08.920 --> 0:06:11.440
<v Speaker 1>can cut and paste your passwords into things you don't

0:06:11.480 --> 0:06:14.600
<v Speaker 1>yourself know what they are and if depending on your

0:06:14.680 --> 0:06:17.880
<v Speaker 1>privacy levels, you can do that locally with local solutions

0:06:17.880 --> 0:06:21.080
<v Speaker 1>with files like on your own machine. But frankly a

0:06:21.080 --> 0:06:22.840
<v Speaker 1>couple of the cloud based solutions, as much as the

0:06:22.839 --> 0:06:25.160
<v Speaker 1>cloud freaks people out, is the better one because it

0:06:25.160 --> 0:06:27.640
<v Speaker 1>will work on your phone, it'll work on your black top,

0:06:27.920 --> 0:06:31.839
<v Speaker 1>it'll work on everything everywhere. That makes total sense, um

0:06:31.880 --> 0:06:33.560
<v Speaker 1>I think. Another good thing to get into while we're

0:06:33.600 --> 0:06:35.960
<v Speaker 1>on this subject, we just started talking about passwords, and

0:06:36.000 --> 0:06:39.960
<v Speaker 1>obviously it is important to keep and secure those. Um.

0:06:40.000 --> 0:06:42.880
<v Speaker 1>I think one thing folks don't often think about, especially

0:06:42.880 --> 0:06:46.479
<v Speaker 1>people who are activists UM who who may foresee or

0:06:46.520 --> 0:06:50.400
<v Speaker 1>have engaged in things that are legally questionable, don't think

0:06:50.400 --> 0:06:54.720
<v Speaker 1>about enough is social media networking um as and by

0:06:54.720 --> 0:06:57.200
<v Speaker 1>which I mean having social media that like It is

0:06:57.240 --> 0:07:00.520
<v Speaker 1>possible to find your other social media by like knowing

0:07:00.800 --> 0:07:03.000
<v Speaker 1>you know, like having the same name and Twitter and

0:07:03.040 --> 0:07:06.400
<v Speaker 1>on Instagram and stuff. Um Having social media that like

0:07:06.480 --> 0:07:09.400
<v Speaker 1>can be tracked across accounts um most people would be

0:07:09.440 --> 0:07:11.600
<v Speaker 1>surprised at how easy it is to do that, and

0:07:11.680 --> 0:07:16.080
<v Speaker 1>mellanct a huge amount of tracking nazis tracking even like

0:07:16.520 --> 0:07:19.400
<v Speaker 1>a ton of the what the work I did not do,

0:07:19.480 --> 0:07:23.040
<v Speaker 1>but my colleagues did to like doc docs Russian like

0:07:23.120 --> 0:07:26.720
<v Speaker 1>secret service agents and stuff. Was like, oh, we found

0:07:26.760 --> 0:07:30.600
<v Speaker 1>them in you know somebody their their bosses wedding, Like

0:07:30.680 --> 0:07:33.480
<v Speaker 1>they're tagged in this thing in v K and from

0:07:33.520 --> 0:07:36.760
<v Speaker 1>that we were able to like find their their account

0:07:36.840 --> 0:07:39.000
<v Speaker 1>on this other site and like from that, like now

0:07:39.040 --> 0:07:41.000
<v Speaker 1>we have this like map of everywhere they've been for

0:07:41.040 --> 0:07:42.760
<v Speaker 1>the last like three weeks, and we can like build

0:07:42.760 --> 0:07:46.000
<v Speaker 1>this social map of their entire life. Yeah. No, by list.

0:07:46.080 --> 0:07:49.480
<v Speaker 1>By just literally existing in modern space, you're constantly leaking

0:07:49.920 --> 0:07:52.600
<v Speaker 1>some form of metadata, right you are, You are always

0:07:52.680 --> 0:07:55.320
<v Speaker 1>leaking metadata, and the more of you allow to exist

0:07:55.320 --> 0:07:57.120
<v Speaker 1>in the world, the more that's the case. So, like

0:07:57.360 --> 0:07:59.400
<v Speaker 1>there's also you've got to think about what the threat

0:07:59.520 --> 0:08:01.360
<v Speaker 1>is and what the risk is. Right, there's the risk

0:08:01.400 --> 0:08:04.480
<v Speaker 1>of the individual having a para social relationship with the

0:08:04.520 --> 0:08:07.480
<v Speaker 1>Internet like I do as a content creator is one thing. People,

0:08:07.720 --> 0:08:09.920
<v Speaker 1>there's always someone that wants to delve into your private life.

0:08:09.920 --> 0:08:13.800
<v Speaker 1>But that's a very different risk than a nation state actor. Right,

0:08:13.840 --> 0:08:15.920
<v Speaker 1>those are two different things. And when it comes to

0:08:15.960 --> 0:08:19.360
<v Speaker 1>a nation state actor, quite honestly, unless you're real good

0:08:19.720 --> 0:08:21.160
<v Speaker 1>and I've been doing it for a long time. The

0:08:21.200 --> 0:08:26.520
<v Speaker 1>individual bluntly is kind of fucked word. As a general rule,

0:08:26.600 --> 0:08:29.400
<v Speaker 1>your best security as an individual in that situation is

0:08:29.960 --> 0:08:33.920
<v Speaker 1>the anonymity of the crowd. But when we're also not

0:08:33.960 --> 0:08:36.280
<v Speaker 1>talking about most people who are threatened to kind of

0:08:36.280 --> 0:08:38.520
<v Speaker 1>by the state and that situation are not being threatened

0:08:38.559 --> 0:08:41.240
<v Speaker 1>by the federal government. But they may have they may

0:08:41.280 --> 0:08:45.199
<v Speaker 1>like be attending protests and not want the Louisville Police

0:08:45.640 --> 0:08:47.960
<v Speaker 1>to like put together that they're in an affinity group

0:08:47.960 --> 0:08:49.440
<v Speaker 1>with people, and like, something you can do for that

0:08:49.559 --> 0:08:51.880
<v Speaker 1>is make sure you're not like if you have a

0:08:51.920 --> 0:08:54.560
<v Speaker 1>personal account that's under your name with your friends, that

0:08:54.600 --> 0:08:57.400
<v Speaker 1>account shouldn't be liking and sharing things from like a

0:08:57.400 --> 0:08:59.679
<v Speaker 1>political account that you have, or from the account of

0:08:59.679 --> 0:09:01.480
<v Speaker 1>like a a group that you're a part of or

0:09:01.520 --> 0:09:04.640
<v Speaker 1>something like that. Like just try to think about and

0:09:04.679 --> 0:09:08.480
<v Speaker 1>look at your your digital footprint from the outside and think,

0:09:08.559 --> 0:09:10.839
<v Speaker 1>is it possible to connect me to people I don't

0:09:10.880 --> 0:09:13.320
<v Speaker 1>want to be publicly connected to through this And the

0:09:13.360 --> 0:09:15.840
<v Speaker 1>minute you've breached that connection once it's gone forever. Right,

0:09:15.920 --> 0:09:18.360
<v Speaker 1>this is the forever. Yes. This is the same thing

0:09:18.400 --> 0:09:20.319
<v Speaker 1>as like with phones, like someone will have like their

0:09:20.360 --> 0:09:22.360
<v Speaker 1>regular phone which, by the way, all these smartphones are

0:09:22.400 --> 0:09:25.319
<v Speaker 1>just surveillance devices in our pocket. Right. Let's let's say

0:09:25.320 --> 0:09:27.160
<v Speaker 1>you go get a burner so that you don't want

0:09:27.160 --> 0:09:29.079
<v Speaker 1>to be connected to the device that you normally use

0:09:29.679 --> 0:09:32.160
<v Speaker 1>on on a level that's one step above the regular

0:09:32.200 --> 0:09:35.360
<v Speaker 1>individual level. If you ever have those two devices emanating

0:09:35.400 --> 0:09:37.719
<v Speaker 1>at the same time, they're now connected in a way that,

0:09:37.800 --> 0:09:41.000
<v Speaker 1>like let's say, the authorities can associate them together because

0:09:41.000 --> 0:09:44.480
<v Speaker 1>of triangulation and seeing a burner phone and your phone

0:09:44.679 --> 0:09:47.240
<v Speaker 1>coming from the same house, you've breached all the privacy

0:09:47.280 --> 0:09:50.040
<v Speaker 1>you would have had from your burner phone for example. Now, Carl,

0:09:50.080 --> 0:09:51.600
<v Speaker 1>do you have much to say on the subject of

0:09:51.600 --> 0:09:53.520
<v Speaker 1>because I know one thing I have seen people do

0:09:53.920 --> 0:09:57.520
<v Speaker 1>people who are you know, having conversations that they're concerned about,

0:09:57.600 --> 0:10:00.440
<v Speaker 1>is put bags in Faraday cages. And I've heard things

0:10:00.520 --> 0:10:04.120
<v Speaker 1>about how reliable Faraday bags and stuff are for actually

0:10:04.160 --> 0:10:06.160
<v Speaker 1>stopping signals. Do you have much to say on that matter?

0:10:06.440 --> 0:10:08.640
<v Speaker 1>My experience with that is not all not all bags

0:10:08.640 --> 0:10:11.040
<v Speaker 1>that you can just buy off the internet or made equally. Um,

0:10:11.080 --> 0:10:13.320
<v Speaker 1>So what you want to do is tested, and you

0:10:13.320 --> 0:10:14.960
<v Speaker 1>can only test it to a certain degree. But the

0:10:15.000 --> 0:10:17.360
<v Speaker 1>really simple tests are you put it in the bag

0:10:17.400 --> 0:10:19.040
<v Speaker 1>and you try to darn dial the darn thing or

0:10:19.120 --> 0:10:21.480
<v Speaker 1>use any WiFi connections to it. And that's a simple test.

0:10:21.559 --> 0:10:24.080
<v Speaker 1>Now is it as good as like? Is it as

0:10:24.120 --> 0:10:25.960
<v Speaker 1>good as not having the thing on you? Of course,

0:10:26.000 --> 0:10:28.760
<v Speaker 1>not leaving or else is always the best answer, but

0:10:28.880 --> 0:10:33.280
<v Speaker 1>it properly In my opinion, a properly built Faraday box

0:10:33.360 --> 0:10:36.679
<v Speaker 1>or cage or bag that you've put some testing into

0:10:36.840 --> 0:10:40.000
<v Speaker 1>is a pretty reliable solution. And it's you know, there

0:10:40.000 --> 0:10:43.079
<v Speaker 1>are so a problem that you might encounter, is um

0:10:43.160 --> 0:10:44.880
<v Speaker 1>or that I have so one thing I have heard

0:10:44.920 --> 0:10:47.000
<v Speaker 1>people talk about it is like, well, in order to

0:10:47.040 --> 0:10:49.560
<v Speaker 1>have kind of a private conversation, we like drove to

0:10:49.679 --> 0:10:52.440
<v Speaker 1>a specific location and we left our phones off in

0:10:52.520 --> 0:10:54.480
<v Speaker 1>the car and then went on a walk. And the

0:10:54.520 --> 0:10:56.240
<v Speaker 1>problem with that is that now you have both just

0:10:56.360 --> 0:10:58.880
<v Speaker 1>driven to a location with those phones, and those phones

0:10:58.920 --> 0:11:01.840
<v Speaker 1>are associated with each at it right right, Well, so

0:11:01.920 --> 0:11:03.200
<v Speaker 1>first of all, you got to think of a world

0:11:03.240 --> 0:11:05.840
<v Speaker 1>where all of this metadata is being collected at all times.

0:11:05.840 --> 0:11:09.600
<v Speaker 1>So these phones and their associations in physical proximity to

0:11:09.600 --> 0:11:12.880
<v Speaker 1>one another is stored somewhere at all times, whether or

0:11:12.880 --> 0:11:15.600
<v Speaker 1>not it's going to be resourced or accessible to the

0:11:15.640 --> 0:11:18.040
<v Speaker 1>powers that be when they wanted to be. It's all there,

0:11:18.280 --> 0:11:20.480
<v Speaker 1>my phone next to your phone, next to that guy's phone.

0:11:20.720 --> 0:11:23.600
<v Speaker 1>Those associations all exists. They're all talking to the same

0:11:23.679 --> 0:11:25.960
<v Speaker 1>cell phone towers in the same area, giving them not

0:11:26.040 --> 0:11:29.360
<v Speaker 1>only GPS coordinates but triangulation data, which, by the way,

0:11:29.360 --> 0:11:31.320
<v Speaker 1>if you go way back to the hacker Kevin Mitnick,

0:11:31.559 --> 0:11:33.160
<v Speaker 1>that stuff was going on back then before they had

0:11:33.200 --> 0:11:37.280
<v Speaker 1>gasiness triangulation data to get him right, So that stuff

0:11:37.320 --> 0:11:40.720
<v Speaker 1>is all still happening, and those associations occur. In regards

0:11:40.760 --> 0:11:43.320
<v Speaker 1>to saying I turned my phone off, how do you

0:11:43.360 --> 0:11:46.360
<v Speaker 1>know that's off? Most of these moderate phones, what does

0:11:46.440 --> 0:11:51.920
<v Speaker 1>off mean? And yeah, okay, pull the battery maybe, But

0:11:52.080 --> 0:11:55.280
<v Speaker 1>even then, I would not trust any of these devices

0:11:55.320 --> 0:11:58.760
<v Speaker 1>in the regards to them. Quote being off, especially things

0:11:58.840 --> 0:12:02.319
<v Speaker 1>like phones that have un or not removable batteries. Off

0:12:02.400 --> 0:12:06.400
<v Speaker 1>is more like sleep it is, right, Yeah, I mean,

0:12:06.440 --> 0:12:08.320
<v Speaker 1>I think one of the worst things that's happened for

0:12:08.520 --> 0:12:11.040
<v Speaker 1>personal security is the end of the phone where you

0:12:11.040 --> 0:12:15.680
<v Speaker 1>can remove the battery, like being unable to actually cut

0:12:15.720 --> 0:12:18.680
<v Speaker 1>power to it without you know, disassembling it is a

0:12:18.720 --> 0:12:21.400
<v Speaker 1>real issue. One could argue that there was like that

0:12:21.400 --> 0:12:23.680
<v Speaker 1>that's a much much more insidious reason they did that,

0:12:23.760 --> 0:12:25.600
<v Speaker 1>or one could argue that it was just one of

0:12:25.640 --> 0:12:28.719
<v Speaker 1>design and comfort, and it's like hard to say. It

0:12:28.760 --> 0:12:31.240
<v Speaker 1>doesn't really matter if it wasn't sidious or not. Reality

0:12:31.360 --> 0:12:34.319
<v Speaker 1>kind of a poor Kano Los dose situation right totally

0:12:34.320 --> 0:12:35.920
<v Speaker 1>is so well. Now that we're talking about phones, here's

0:12:35.920 --> 0:12:37.560
<v Speaker 1>another thing that's been near and dear, and I think

0:12:37.559 --> 0:12:40.439
<v Speaker 1>you've seen some posts for me about this. Um everybody

0:12:40.480 --> 0:12:43.720
<v Speaker 1>really likes the convenience of things like biometrics, thumb authentication,

0:12:43.800 --> 0:12:48.040
<v Speaker 1>fingerprint i D, facial identification. And here's the reality of that.

0:12:48.120 --> 0:12:50.520
<v Speaker 1>We know this already and there's legal this exists in

0:12:50.600 --> 0:12:52.920
<v Speaker 1>legal space already. But the reality is that you can

0:12:52.960 --> 0:12:57.000
<v Speaker 1>be coerced to provide biometric data against your will. So

0:12:57.040 --> 0:12:59.320
<v Speaker 1>if your phone is authenticated to with a fingerprint i

0:12:59.360 --> 0:13:01.720
<v Speaker 1>D or your face i D, they can pretty much

0:13:01.760 --> 0:13:04.840
<v Speaker 1>say you must give us your thumb to unlock this phone,

0:13:05.000 --> 0:13:07.200
<v Speaker 1>or for that matter, frankly, they could hold the phone

0:13:07.200 --> 0:13:10.120
<v Speaker 1>in front of your face in certain circumstract circumstances, even

0:13:10.160 --> 0:13:12.520
<v Speaker 1>against your will, and it will unlock the device. And

0:13:12.520 --> 0:13:15.160
<v Speaker 1>that is considered not a violation of your rights. So

0:13:15.200 --> 0:13:18.320
<v Speaker 1>for example, if you had a long, strong password on

0:13:18.360 --> 0:13:20.440
<v Speaker 1>the phone, they cannot coerce you to give that up

0:13:20.480 --> 0:13:22.720
<v Speaker 1>because that would be a violation of your own rights

0:13:22.760 --> 0:13:26.400
<v Speaker 1>and Fifth Amendment, which is interesting, um so. But at

0:13:26.440 --> 0:13:28.959
<v Speaker 1>the same time, one could also argue that a certain

0:13:29.000 --> 0:13:31.200
<v Speaker 1>circumstances where there's a lot of cameras that are not

0:13:31.360 --> 0:13:34.760
<v Speaker 1>necessarily watching everything you do. But you could also consider

0:13:34.800 --> 0:13:37.400
<v Speaker 1>that pass phrases could be dangerous, like saying an airport,

0:13:37.679 --> 0:13:39.960
<v Speaker 1>because all those cameras could see you plugging in your

0:13:40.000 --> 0:13:42.320
<v Speaker 1>pass code. So it's a matter of if, when and

0:13:42.360 --> 0:13:45.160
<v Speaker 1>where right, So what's the right solution at the best time.

0:13:45.160 --> 0:13:46.560
<v Speaker 1>But I would say that if you were going to

0:13:46.559 --> 0:13:49.760
<v Speaker 1>be in a place that was contentious, um it is

0:13:49.800 --> 0:13:52.280
<v Speaker 1>almost always better to make sure you do not allow

0:13:52.360 --> 0:13:55.880
<v Speaker 1>for any biometric authentication on device. Yes, I never like

0:13:56.000 --> 0:13:58.440
<v Speaker 1>never turn on don't even like ever have had it

0:13:58.480 --> 0:14:01.560
<v Speaker 1>in the like ideally you have never turned on facial

0:14:01.559 --> 0:14:05.199
<v Speaker 1>recognition on your phone, like even if you like deactivated.

0:14:05.280 --> 0:14:08.480
<v Speaker 1>I don't know, I don't I really that was that

0:14:08.520 --> 0:14:09.760
<v Speaker 1>was one of the first I used to be in

0:14:09.760 --> 0:14:11.960
<v Speaker 1>tech journalism, right, obviously I'm not an expert on any

0:14:12.000 --> 0:14:15.920
<v Speaker 1>of this. But like the worst thing in terms of

0:14:15.920 --> 0:14:18.360
<v Speaker 1>like my personal comfort with devices was when they were

0:14:18.400 --> 0:14:21.920
<v Speaker 1>like everything's gonna read faces and fingerprints. Now I don't.

0:14:22.320 --> 0:14:27.160
<v Speaker 1>I don't love that, um, but you know it's it's inevitable, right,

0:14:27.160 --> 0:14:30.080
<v Speaker 1>because it is and I had in the past. I

0:14:30.360 --> 0:14:33.560
<v Speaker 1>did a fingerprint unlock earlier in my life, and I

0:14:33.600 --> 0:14:35.840
<v Speaker 1>do not have any devices that unlocked that way anymore.

0:14:35.840 --> 0:14:37.720
<v Speaker 1>But you do like that it is more convenient, right,

0:14:37.720 --> 0:14:39.520
<v Speaker 1>You miss it when you need to get to your

0:14:39.520 --> 0:14:42.080
<v Speaker 1>phone quickly and you can't do it. But like, I

0:14:42.120 --> 0:14:43.800
<v Speaker 1>don't even I don't even let my phone have just

0:14:43.880 --> 0:14:47.320
<v Speaker 1>like a four phrase like password anymore. Like it's eight

0:14:47.400 --> 0:14:49.120
<v Speaker 1>characters for me. It's a little bit of a pain

0:14:49.160 --> 0:14:52.360
<v Speaker 1>in the ass, but it comes with fewer risks. And

0:14:52.440 --> 0:14:54.920
<v Speaker 1>one of the things that's challenging to every individuals they

0:14:54.920 --> 0:14:57.240
<v Speaker 1>have to look at what their threat profile is, right,

0:14:57.360 --> 0:15:01.240
<v Speaker 1>So like, for example, um, soccer mom driving her kids

0:15:01.240 --> 0:15:03.640
<v Speaker 1>to school and stuff, she might be really good, well

0:15:03.680 --> 0:15:06.800
<v Speaker 1>off with a biometric authentication on her phone, frankly, because

0:15:06.840 --> 0:15:08.680
<v Speaker 1>if she didn't use that, maybe she wouldn't even use

0:15:08.680 --> 0:15:10.920
<v Speaker 1>a proper four character pass phrase. And if she's not

0:15:10.960 --> 0:15:13.920
<v Speaker 1>concerned about being at a protest, for example, and having

0:15:13.960 --> 0:15:16.880
<v Speaker 1>some authoritarian take her phone away from her and authenticate

0:15:16.920 --> 0:15:19.520
<v Speaker 1>to it. Maybe she doesn't need to worry about that.

0:15:19.560 --> 0:15:21.040
<v Speaker 1>But for a lot of us in the world's we

0:15:21.080 --> 0:15:23.560
<v Speaker 1>live in, that's a different risk profile. Right, We've got

0:15:23.560 --> 0:15:26.280
<v Speaker 1>to think about what our risks are as individuals and

0:15:26.360 --> 0:15:28.560
<v Speaker 1>what makes sense. So if your passphrase is going to

0:15:28.640 --> 0:15:31.000
<v Speaker 1>be one, two, three, four or use a thumb print

0:15:31.040 --> 0:15:33.040
<v Speaker 1>I D. For most people, they'd be better with the

0:15:33.080 --> 0:15:35.800
<v Speaker 1>thumb print I D. But for someone like myself, no,

0:15:36.000 --> 0:15:39.560
<v Speaker 1>it's not a good idea. Yeah, and that's UM. Yeah,

0:15:39.720 --> 0:15:43.160
<v Speaker 1>I think that kind of brings us to uh, probably

0:15:43.200 --> 0:15:45.800
<v Speaker 1>the last part of this, which is um, do you

0:15:45.800 --> 0:15:49.440
<v Speaker 1>have specific advice on like VPNs UM. Obviously I recommend

0:15:49.480 --> 0:15:54.080
<v Speaker 1>everybody you signal I I justform messages in general, but

0:15:54.200 --> 0:15:57.280
<v Speaker 1>like a specially stuff that is secure. Don't if you

0:15:57.560 --> 0:16:00.720
<v Speaker 1>if you like Number one first rule of any kind

0:16:00.760 --> 0:16:05.680
<v Speaker 1>of this sort of security. Don't ever put anything on

0:16:05.720 --> 0:16:09.160
<v Speaker 1>your phone ever that's legally questionable if you can avoid it,

0:16:09.280 --> 0:16:12.880
<v Speaker 1>like conversationally, like right, do not don't send it over

0:16:12.960 --> 0:16:16.000
<v Speaker 1>a phone if it's something you would not be able

0:16:16.040 --> 0:16:19.680
<v Speaker 1>to survive. Having read D you in a courtroom. Yeah,

0:16:19.920 --> 0:16:21.440
<v Speaker 1>so for the audience, a lot of the audience may

0:16:21.440 --> 0:16:23.640
<v Speaker 1>not know what signal even is, right, So signal ism

0:16:23.720 --> 0:16:26.840
<v Speaker 1>is a is a text messaging alternative. So like for example,

0:16:26.840 --> 0:16:28.360
<v Speaker 1>on your phone, you've got regular text or if you've

0:16:28.360 --> 0:16:31.520
<v Speaker 1>got an iPhone, you've got I message. Signal is an

0:16:31.720 --> 0:16:34.880
<v Speaker 1>end end encrypted solution that you install as an app.

0:16:35.520 --> 0:16:37.960
<v Speaker 1>And because it's end end encryption, it means that it

0:16:38.000 --> 0:16:41.760
<v Speaker 1>passes the wire in theory not decryptable by the parties

0:16:41.760 --> 0:16:44.440
<v Speaker 1>that are passing the data packets in the middle, So

0:16:44.480 --> 0:16:46.240
<v Speaker 1>that's a man in the middle the decryption. Right, So

0:16:46.280 --> 0:16:49.800
<v Speaker 1>for example, I message is encrypted theoretically end to end,

0:16:49.840 --> 0:16:53.480
<v Speaker 1>but Apple ultimately has the cryptographic keys, so there is well,

0:16:53.560 --> 0:16:56.560
<v Speaker 1>they might say one thing, there is nothing really preventing

0:16:56.600 --> 0:16:58.240
<v Speaker 1>them from being man in the middle and being able

0:16:58.280 --> 0:17:01.280
<v Speaker 1>to read the message in transit from a to be.

0:17:01.960 --> 0:17:04.280
<v Speaker 1>But if the keys are stored on your device, which

0:17:04.280 --> 0:17:07.399
<v Speaker 1>are then protected with your passphrase or whatever your authentication

0:17:07.400 --> 0:17:10.480
<v Speaker 1>mechanism is, and those keys are not archived or kept

0:17:10.480 --> 0:17:14.200
<v Speaker 1>by some hierarchical man in the middle authority, if it's

0:17:14.240 --> 0:17:17.600
<v Speaker 1>done right, which signal is done pretty well, it means

0:17:17.600 --> 0:17:21.479
<v Speaker 1>that your data in transit is probably not decryptible, and

0:17:21.480 --> 0:17:23.280
<v Speaker 1>that's why Signal is a good solution, and it's a

0:17:23.280 --> 0:17:26.199
<v Speaker 1>good one for the average person. Install the app. It

0:17:26.280 --> 0:17:29.000
<v Speaker 1>works just like test text messaging, but you can have

0:17:29.119 --> 0:17:32.440
<v Speaker 1>a pretty good level of knowledge that the data you're

0:17:32.480 --> 0:17:36.359
<v Speaker 1>passing is not being decrypted or caught in transmission or

0:17:36.400 --> 0:17:50.840
<v Speaker 1>in the path. So I would say get get signal. Um,

0:17:50.840 --> 0:17:53.880
<v Speaker 1>it's it's your best bet, right Like, and again we said,

0:17:54.080 --> 0:17:56.640
<v Speaker 1>I said, you know, you don't want to ever say

0:17:56.640 --> 0:17:59.760
<v Speaker 1>anything over a phone. That is something that can get

0:17:59.760 --> 0:18:02.600
<v Speaker 1>you in trouble. But also like, life is life, and

0:18:02.760 --> 0:18:06.840
<v Speaker 1>that's not always realistic for people in certain situations. So again,

0:18:07.040 --> 0:18:10.840
<v Speaker 1>signal is your best bet. Nothing is perfect. And again

0:18:10.880 --> 0:18:13.040
<v Speaker 1>if you're putting it on your phone, there's a number

0:18:13.080 --> 0:18:15.040
<v Speaker 1>of things that could go wrong every single time you

0:18:15.080 --> 0:18:18.320
<v Speaker 1>do that. But um, that that's one of your better

0:18:18.600 --> 0:18:20.040
<v Speaker 1>things that you could do. And then of course we

0:18:20.080 --> 0:18:24.520
<v Speaker 1>talk about VPNs. Yeah, so so VPN to those like,

0:18:24.560 --> 0:18:26.080
<v Speaker 1>I'm just gonna go with the basic levels because I

0:18:26.080 --> 0:18:29.240
<v Speaker 1>don't necessarily know the level of knowledge that people are listening.

0:18:29.520 --> 0:18:32.160
<v Speaker 1>VPN is a virtual private network. So with that is

0:18:32.440 --> 0:18:35.680
<v Speaker 1>you connect to this virtual private network and it passes

0:18:35.720 --> 0:18:38.840
<v Speaker 1>your data through an encrypted tunnel to an exit point

0:18:38.920 --> 0:18:43.199
<v Speaker 1>somewhere else on the Internet in theory masking the source

0:18:43.240 --> 0:18:47.120
<v Speaker 1>and origin of your requests. So like, for example, let's

0:18:47.119 --> 0:18:48.800
<v Speaker 1>say you were looking up something on the Internet that

0:18:48.840 --> 0:18:51.800
<v Speaker 1>you didn't necessarily want people to know you're looking up. Yeah, Like,

0:18:51.880 --> 0:18:55.800
<v Speaker 1>let's say you're researching the truth about the assassination of

0:18:55.840 --> 0:18:59.679
<v Speaker 1>President John F. Kennedy by Bernard Montgomery Sanders Um. And

0:18:59.760 --> 0:19:01.879
<v Speaker 1>you know that the n s A is looking for

0:19:01.920 --> 0:19:05.119
<v Speaker 1>truth seekers who are who are finding out the reality

0:19:05.160 --> 0:19:07.560
<v Speaker 1>of that situation. You know, you don't necessarily want them

0:19:07.600 --> 0:19:11.560
<v Speaker 1>to know that you have have become pilled. Right, So

0:19:11.600 --> 0:19:13.840
<v Speaker 1>if you were to do this from your computer at home,

0:19:14.240 --> 0:19:16.040
<v Speaker 1>but what happen is to people that don't know how

0:19:16.040 --> 0:19:17.680
<v Speaker 1>this all works, you would be coming from an I

0:19:17.760 --> 0:19:21.159
<v Speaker 1>P address that's associated with your account that you're connecting to,

0:19:21.240 --> 0:19:25.000
<v Speaker 1>whether it's Verizon or Comcast or whatever. And you go

0:19:25.040 --> 0:19:27.159
<v Speaker 1>and search up that truth, and the n s A

0:19:27.359 --> 0:19:30.520
<v Speaker 1>finds you with a keyword search for jfk and the truth.

0:19:30.880 --> 0:19:33.600
<v Speaker 1>And therefore, because of that keyword search, they go to

0:19:33.680 --> 0:19:37.760
<v Speaker 1>Comcast or to Verizon and say, hey, we are requesting

0:19:37.760 --> 0:19:40.400
<v Speaker 1>you tell us who did this search, They will get

0:19:40.440 --> 0:19:43.600
<v Speaker 1>them essentially a request that's a legal request for information,

0:19:43.640 --> 0:19:46.320
<v Speaker 1>and then Comcast or Verizon will provide the n s

0:19:46.400 --> 0:19:48.480
<v Speaker 1>A this is the I P address and account of

0:19:48.480 --> 0:19:52.000
<v Speaker 1>the person that did that. What VPN does is you

0:19:52.040 --> 0:19:54.960
<v Speaker 1>connect to the vp and service. First, the connection from

0:19:54.960 --> 0:19:58.240
<v Speaker 1>your machine to the VPN services that encrypted. Now does

0:19:58.280 --> 0:20:02.320
<v Speaker 1>the VPN service no, your IP address, yes, But when

0:20:02.320 --> 0:20:04.359
<v Speaker 1>you actually type in that information or go to the

0:20:04.440 --> 0:20:07.000
<v Speaker 1>Internet to request that data, it actually goes through the

0:20:07.080 --> 0:20:10.800
<v Speaker 1>VPNs private tunneling network and egresses from somewhere else on

0:20:10.840 --> 0:20:15.600
<v Speaker 1>the Internet, thus masking your actual I P address and

0:20:15.920 --> 0:20:20.800
<v Speaker 1>in theory your origin of source. Now that's not true,

0:20:21.080 --> 0:20:23.240
<v Speaker 1>but what that does is mean that if someone if

0:20:23.280 --> 0:20:25.240
<v Speaker 1>say the n s A I wanted to know who's

0:20:25.280 --> 0:20:27.880
<v Speaker 1>doing this truth search, they would then find an eat

0:20:27.960 --> 0:20:32.679
<v Speaker 1>IP address that actually came out of let's say Joe's

0:20:32.760 --> 0:20:35.119
<v Speaker 1>VPN service, and they would have to go to Joe's

0:20:35.200 --> 0:20:39.080
<v Speaker 1>VPN service and go, we noticed this emanated from your network?

0:20:39.400 --> 0:20:42.200
<v Speaker 1>Who did this? At that point you have to trust

0:20:43.040 --> 0:20:47.000
<v Speaker 1>Joe's VPN service to not disclose their account information about you.

0:20:47.920 --> 0:20:50.119
<v Speaker 1>So what you've done is you've changed it. We know

0:20:50.200 --> 0:20:53.800
<v Speaker 1>the telecoms will communicate with the government or whoever if

0:20:53.840 --> 0:20:57.080
<v Speaker 1>they need to, they always will have. You don't necessarily

0:20:57.080 --> 0:21:00.480
<v Speaker 1>know if Joe's VPN service will You've changed your trust

0:21:00.520 --> 0:21:04.399
<v Speaker 1>model from your telecom to your VPN service. So if

0:21:04.400 --> 0:21:06.280
<v Speaker 1>you're gonna pick a VPN, you have to do a

0:21:06.320 --> 0:21:08.080
<v Speaker 1>little bit of research to know that it's a trustworthy

0:21:08.080 --> 0:21:11.440
<v Speaker 1>resource that won't just give you up at the lightest

0:21:11.520 --> 0:21:15.240
<v Speaker 1>form of interrogation. Yeah, and none of them again, there's

0:21:15.280 --> 0:21:18.639
<v Speaker 1>nothing perfect and often like we did find out what

0:21:18.720 --> 0:21:21.159
<v Speaker 1>was it last year that one of popular VPN was

0:21:21.240 --> 0:21:24.480
<v Speaker 1>like run by the FEDS, Like it's yeah, that's not

0:21:24.560 --> 0:21:27.399
<v Speaker 1>an impossible thing. Um. I know a lot of folks,

0:21:27.640 --> 0:21:31.240
<v Speaker 1>particularly journalists, use proton Um, which is i think based

0:21:31.240 --> 0:21:34.480
<v Speaker 1>in Switzerland, and you will get given up if you

0:21:34.760 --> 0:21:38.199
<v Speaker 1>if the Swiss government is angry at you. Right, you

0:21:38.359 --> 0:21:42.320
<v Speaker 1>brought up a very good point. Uh, Services that exist

0:21:42.440 --> 0:21:45.760
<v Speaker 1>outside of the KNUS the continental US mean that they

0:21:45.800 --> 0:21:49.000
<v Speaker 1>are under different legal jurisdiction than ones that exist wholly

0:21:49.000 --> 0:21:52.560
<v Speaker 1>within the CONUS. So as a result, if something from

0:21:52.600 --> 0:21:55.280
<v Speaker 1>the United States government comes as a request to the

0:21:55.320 --> 0:21:58.920
<v Speaker 1>Swiss company, there's a much like like higher chance of

0:21:58.960 --> 0:22:01.320
<v Speaker 1>a Swiss company would be like, we don't really care

0:22:01.359 --> 0:22:05.000
<v Speaker 1>about your reports. That's worth considering. Also, think about this,

0:22:05.000 --> 0:22:06.639
<v Speaker 1>This actually works in reverse. And I don't want to

0:22:06.640 --> 0:22:08.600
<v Speaker 1>get too deep into this, but when you're working at

0:22:08.600 --> 0:22:10.719
<v Speaker 1>a tier one Internet back one provider, you should know

0:22:11.440 --> 0:22:15.840
<v Speaker 1>that sometimes traffic strangely gets pushed offshore and then back

0:22:15.880 --> 0:22:18.159
<v Speaker 1>to the United States for analysis that would normally be

0:22:18.760 --> 0:22:22.760
<v Speaker 1>let's say, not necessarily constitutionally legal in the United States.

0:22:23.200 --> 0:22:28.320
<v Speaker 1>So there's a lot of shenanigans going on. Yeah, and again, like,

0:22:28.840 --> 0:22:31.320
<v Speaker 1>I think protons are generally a pretty good service. I've

0:22:31.359 --> 0:22:34.800
<v Speaker 1>had no problems with it. Um, But we should should

0:22:34.840 --> 0:22:37.040
<v Speaker 1>be clear hear. None of these are perfect solutions. There

0:22:37.119 --> 0:22:40.439
<v Speaker 1>is no perfect solution. The only perfect method of digital

0:22:40.440 --> 0:22:43.320
<v Speaker 1>security is not putting things on the Internet or like

0:22:43.400 --> 0:22:46.199
<v Speaker 1>through you know, the mobile networks and stuff like that. Is,

0:22:46.440 --> 0:22:49.879
<v Speaker 1>if it stays between you and someone else, Um, that

0:22:50.000 --> 0:22:53.040
<v Speaker 1>is your best bet of it not being you know,

0:22:53.119 --> 0:22:56.040
<v Speaker 1>intercepted or something. A conversation that you have in the

0:22:56.080 --> 0:22:59.240
<v Speaker 1>woods without phones anywhere near you is the most secure

0:22:59.320 --> 0:23:02.159
<v Speaker 1>kind of conversation station. Let me second on proton. I

0:23:02.160 --> 0:23:03.800
<v Speaker 1>agree it's a good service. There are others out there.

0:23:03.800 --> 0:23:05.520
<v Speaker 1>We're not trying to pick on one in particular or

0:23:05.520 --> 0:23:08.320
<v Speaker 1>pick against anyone in particularly. There's a bunch of work. Yeah,

0:23:08.720 --> 0:23:10.480
<v Speaker 1>another thing that you need to consider in this sort

0:23:10.520 --> 0:23:13.080
<v Speaker 1>of thing is also what you're dealing with. Like so,

0:23:13.119 --> 0:23:15.480
<v Speaker 1>for example, on I put up a post a while

0:23:15.480 --> 0:23:17.320
<v Speaker 1>back because there was a bunch of stuff going on

0:23:17.359 --> 0:23:20.960
<v Speaker 1>in Ukraine with with people posting photos that got their locations,

0:23:21.720 --> 0:23:24.199
<v Speaker 1>had things happen. I mean, that's and that has been

0:23:24.240 --> 0:23:27.080
<v Speaker 1>happening for a decade in that war, like well almost

0:23:27.080 --> 0:23:29.000
<v Speaker 1>a decade as long as it's been going on, And

0:23:29.040 --> 0:23:31.360
<v Speaker 1>I posted something about it. And one of the recommendations

0:23:31.359 --> 0:23:33.000
<v Speaker 1>I made on there was a contentious one, but I'm

0:23:33.000 --> 0:23:34.360
<v Speaker 1>gonna back it up in a minute. As I used,

0:23:34.320 --> 0:23:38.320
<v Speaker 1>I mentioned tour the Onion relay. So the tour is

0:23:38.480 --> 0:23:42.679
<v Speaker 1>essentially it was originally created as a as a way

0:23:42.720 --> 0:23:46.399
<v Speaker 1>to deal with the dark Web quote unquote and to

0:23:46.600 --> 0:23:49.760
<v Speaker 1>also relay traffic in a way to mask the origins,

0:23:49.920 --> 0:23:52.520
<v Speaker 1>very much like a VPN service. Now there are a

0:23:52.560 --> 0:23:54.040
<v Speaker 1>bunch of these, So what it was is there's these

0:23:54.080 --> 0:23:56.879
<v Speaker 1>Onion relay nodes all over the Internet, and when you

0:23:56.880 --> 0:23:59.960
<v Speaker 1>connect to the to the Onion network, your traffic bounces

0:24:00.040 --> 0:24:02.600
<v Speaker 1>through three, four, or five, six, seven of these nodes,

0:24:02.640 --> 0:24:04.960
<v Speaker 1>you can sort of dictate what you want depending on

0:24:04.960 --> 0:24:06.960
<v Speaker 1>the client you have. And so let's say you connect

0:24:06.960 --> 0:24:10.080
<v Speaker 1>to an Onion router network node in Arizona and then

0:24:10.119 --> 0:24:13.240
<v Speaker 1>you egress somewhere in France, and you've jumped through six

0:24:13.280 --> 0:24:15.760
<v Speaker 1>nodes in the process. Well, one of the things that's

0:24:15.760 --> 0:24:17.760
<v Speaker 1>a well known fact is that a number of these

0:24:17.800 --> 0:24:21.520
<v Speaker 1>Onion relay routing nodes are owned by nation state actors,

0:24:21.520 --> 0:24:25.080
<v Speaker 1>whether it's the United States or others. So, so one

0:24:25.080 --> 0:24:26.720
<v Speaker 1>of the things I got taken to task for, and

0:24:26.800 --> 0:24:28.320
<v Speaker 1>I want to explain this is people like, well, that's

0:24:28.320 --> 0:24:31.080
<v Speaker 1>not a compromise network. It doesn't mean that it's useful.

0:24:31.400 --> 0:24:34.320
<v Speaker 1>Actually it does, because depending on what you're trying to

0:24:34.400 --> 0:24:37.880
<v Speaker 1>do may matter. If you're trying to mask the origin

0:24:38.040 --> 0:24:42.400
<v Speaker 1>of your data source or your upload or your search

0:24:42.760 --> 0:24:45.760
<v Speaker 1>for a short duration of time, this will still help

0:24:45.800 --> 0:24:48.320
<v Speaker 1>you jump through six nodes. They've got a relay back

0:24:48.480 --> 0:24:51.520
<v Speaker 1>six nodes to figure out the origin of the person

0:24:51.600 --> 0:24:55.080
<v Speaker 1>connecting to the relay network. And that's assuming that there

0:24:55.160 --> 0:24:58.080
<v Speaker 1>was a compromise node in the process. So that means

0:24:58.560 --> 0:25:01.040
<v Speaker 1>if you're passing data through a compromise No. Does that

0:25:01.080 --> 0:25:04.720
<v Speaker 1>mean the data in transit is safe? No? But is

0:25:04.760 --> 0:25:08.119
<v Speaker 1>the is the anonymity of the origin of the poster

0:25:08.640 --> 0:25:12.440
<v Speaker 1>safer for a longer duration of time? Yes. So these

0:25:12.440 --> 0:25:15.439
<v Speaker 1>things get really complex, real fast. And this is again

0:25:15.880 --> 0:25:17.840
<v Speaker 1>one of the best things you can do, because there's

0:25:17.880 --> 0:25:21.240
<v Speaker 1>no single perfect solution, but stacking, so not just going

0:25:21.280 --> 0:25:23.840
<v Speaker 1>through tour but also tour into VPN at the same time.

0:25:23.920 --> 0:25:26.720
<v Speaker 1>And you're I think one of the better ways to

0:25:26.720 --> 0:25:30.639
<v Speaker 1>think about security is kind of the way Sebastian Younger

0:25:30.680 --> 0:25:34.160
<v Speaker 1>describes how insurgent war works, which is it's all about

0:25:34.160 --> 0:25:37.560
<v Speaker 1>creating friction for anybody trying to spy on your ship.

0:25:38.000 --> 0:25:40.600
<v Speaker 1>There's no perfect answer, but the more things you can

0:25:40.600 --> 0:25:42.880
<v Speaker 1>make be a pain in the ass, the better your

0:25:42.880 --> 0:25:45.359
<v Speaker 1>odds that you will not have an issue. Right like,

0:25:45.480 --> 0:25:48.880
<v Speaker 1>That's all you can do is make it potentially more

0:25:48.880 --> 0:25:53.000
<v Speaker 1>annoying and more difficult for for whoever might be looking

0:25:53.119 --> 0:25:57.040
<v Speaker 1>right like it. The more friction you can create, broadly speaking,

0:25:57.040 --> 0:26:00.000
<v Speaker 1>the more secure you're going to be. Absolutely Now another

0:26:00.040 --> 0:26:01.640
<v Speaker 1>thing to think about, and we're getting kind of deep

0:26:01.640 --> 0:26:03.199
<v Speaker 1>in the weeds too. This is above and on the

0:26:03.240 --> 0:26:06.080
<v Speaker 1>average person, right, the average person get a password manager

0:26:06.280 --> 0:26:09.439
<v Speaker 1>don't use your same password everywhere, and don't use biometrics

0:26:09.480 --> 0:26:11.800
<v Speaker 1>unless you're forced, like pretty much have to and move

0:26:11.840 --> 0:26:14.440
<v Speaker 1>on with your life. But once you're beyond the average person,

0:26:14.640 --> 0:26:16.600
<v Speaker 1>this is what we're talking about now. So like if

0:26:16.600 --> 0:26:18.200
<v Speaker 1>you're if you have a computer and you use it

0:26:18.240 --> 0:26:21.240
<v Speaker 1>as your normal day to day operating system, talking to

0:26:21.280 --> 0:26:23.680
<v Speaker 1>your friends, doing dot dot dot dot dot, but then

0:26:23.720 --> 0:26:26.600
<v Speaker 1>also need to do something else a little more privacy inclined,

0:26:27.200 --> 0:26:29.800
<v Speaker 1>you should not trust that device. So at that point,

0:26:30.080 --> 0:26:32.919
<v Speaker 1>your web browser may have all sorts of cookies and

0:26:33.040 --> 0:26:35.800
<v Speaker 1>metadata and storage in it that, even if you're going

0:26:35.840 --> 0:26:38.720
<v Speaker 1>through a VPN, still may be able to reveal your

0:26:38.760 --> 0:26:42.040
<v Speaker 1>identity a spell as Mac addresses and other stuff. So

0:26:42.080 --> 0:26:43.879
<v Speaker 1>if you really want to get pretty into the weeds

0:26:43.880 --> 0:26:46.080
<v Speaker 1>with this, you have to do something like use an

0:26:46.080 --> 0:26:50.639
<v Speaker 1>ephemeral operating system, install that it has no legacy data

0:26:50.720 --> 0:26:53.000
<v Speaker 1>on it. One example of that that is it's a

0:26:53.040 --> 0:26:55.720
<v Speaker 1>Linux based when it's called TAILS, you essentially use it

0:26:55.760 --> 0:26:58.879
<v Speaker 1>like a live USB drive. You boot off of that only,

0:26:59.000 --> 0:27:01.000
<v Speaker 1>or you use a machine dead cared for this and

0:27:01.080 --> 0:27:03.920
<v Speaker 1>you burn the OS down every time you're done. Because

0:27:03.960 --> 0:27:08.040
<v Speaker 1>there's no legacy information or data that can be pulled

0:27:08.040 --> 0:27:10.800
<v Speaker 1>out of your web browser or your cookies or your

0:27:10.880 --> 0:27:14.520
<v Speaker 1>Mac dress information that can associate it with you, regardless

0:27:14.520 --> 0:27:17.120
<v Speaker 1>of if you've done everything right to mask your IP

0:27:17.200 --> 0:27:20.800
<v Speaker 1>address of origin. God, that's the hot girl shit. Um,

0:27:20.920 --> 0:27:22.919
<v Speaker 1>when you're when you're when you're doing when you when

0:27:22.960 --> 0:27:25.560
<v Speaker 1>you're doing that kind of stuff. Um. And again I

0:27:25.600 --> 0:27:27.600
<v Speaker 1>think at this point, I think, up through most of this,

0:27:27.680 --> 0:27:30.400
<v Speaker 1>it's been kind of like people being like, that's too much,

0:27:30.440 --> 0:27:32.520
<v Speaker 1>and people being like, Okay, yep, this is exactly what

0:27:32.560 --> 0:27:35.320
<v Speaker 1>I already am or need to be doing. Um, this

0:27:35.400 --> 0:27:38.520
<v Speaker 1>is probably very few people need to be concerned about

0:27:38.560 --> 0:27:41.119
<v Speaker 1>that sort of thing, but um, you know it it

0:27:41.600 --> 0:27:43.680
<v Speaker 1>is I I've know, I know. Like again, I worked

0:27:43.680 --> 0:27:46.120
<v Speaker 1>at Belling cat Um. I had a number of colleagues

0:27:46.119 --> 0:27:49.120
<v Speaker 1>who were like personal enemies of the Russian state who

0:27:50.280 --> 0:27:54.600
<v Speaker 1>had to do stuff like this. Um and it's you know, paranoia,

0:27:54.800 --> 0:27:57.400
<v Speaker 1>I mean, And here's the thing going above. So again

0:27:57.440 --> 0:27:59.560
<v Speaker 1>like if you're a normal person, you probably don't need

0:27:59.600 --> 0:28:03.000
<v Speaker 1>to be you know, doing stacking a VPN, you know,

0:28:03.400 --> 0:28:07.320
<v Speaker 1>getting signal and all this stuff. But also why not, right, like,

0:28:07.400 --> 0:28:10.040
<v Speaker 1>there's no harm in in the additional security. It is

0:28:10.080 --> 0:28:12.920
<v Speaker 1>a little bit frustrating. But here's one of the things

0:28:12.920 --> 0:28:15.520
<v Speaker 1>I think people don't often think about enough. You're not

0:28:16.200 --> 0:28:20.280
<v Speaker 1>engaging in that kind of security stuff purely because there's

0:28:20.280 --> 0:28:23.040
<v Speaker 1>a threat now, but in part because you don't know

0:28:23.080 --> 0:28:25.000
<v Speaker 1>what the future is going to bring. And one of

0:28:25.040 --> 0:28:27.439
<v Speaker 1>the things that I would point out for that is

0:28:27.840 --> 0:28:30.360
<v Speaker 1>a lot of people right now have been having for

0:28:30.480 --> 0:28:34.359
<v Speaker 1>years conversations about a thing that may soon legally be

0:28:34.480 --> 0:28:38.640
<v Speaker 1>murder on a federal level, you know, um abortion right,

0:28:39.080 --> 0:28:42.800
<v Speaker 1>And so it is possible that overnight an awful lot

0:28:42.840 --> 0:28:46.680
<v Speaker 1>of conversations a bunch of people have had legally will

0:28:46.680 --> 0:28:49.520
<v Speaker 1>suddenly be very illegal conversations. And then you may be

0:28:49.640 --> 0:28:52.840
<v Speaker 1>glad that you took greater care with your your personal

0:28:52.880 --> 0:28:55.240
<v Speaker 1>security prior to that point. Yeah, I mean, like so

0:28:55.360 --> 0:28:57.920
<v Speaker 1>think of the I mean, I'm not a person that menstrates,

0:28:57.920 --> 0:29:00.120
<v Speaker 1>but on menstruation tracking app it's very useful to a

0:29:00.120 --> 0:29:02.680
<v Speaker 1>lot of people who do. And those tracking apps now

0:29:03.240 --> 0:29:06.680
<v Speaker 1>that metadata in there, at some point could be extremely

0:29:06.760 --> 0:29:11.840
<v Speaker 1>dangerous or incriminalized or incrimin criminalizing, incriminating excuse me, to

0:29:12.080 --> 0:29:15.240
<v Speaker 1>someone who otherwise was doing nothing more than trying to

0:29:15.320 --> 0:29:18.120
<v Speaker 1>maintain their natural health. And so that is a really

0:29:18.200 --> 0:29:20.640
<v Speaker 1>dangerous concept. So at this point, I mean, within the

0:29:20.720 --> 0:29:23.239
<v Speaker 1>United States, I hate to say this, those apps are

0:29:23.280 --> 0:29:26.760
<v Speaker 1>probably dangerous to the individual because that data could be

0:29:26.800 --> 0:29:30.000
<v Speaker 1>easily used by a government resource to UH to do

0:29:30.080 --> 0:29:33.240
<v Speaker 1>something bad to someone who's done nothing wrong. So I

0:29:33.280 --> 0:29:34.920
<v Speaker 1>think we should move. I mean, at this point, I

0:29:34.920 --> 0:29:37.000
<v Speaker 1>think we've covered the basis that you could kind of

0:29:37.000 --> 0:29:40.240
<v Speaker 1>responsibly the advice you can responsibly give someone in a podcast,

0:29:40.280 --> 0:29:43.080
<v Speaker 1>and and folks should be able to let let me

0:29:43.120 --> 0:29:45.560
<v Speaker 1>throw one thing out real quickly. So you mentioned, like,

0:29:45.600 --> 0:29:47.720
<v Speaker 1>for example, we don't you don't necessarily have the risk

0:29:47.880 --> 0:29:50.520
<v Speaker 1>vector that requires using VPN or signal. But let me

0:29:50.520 --> 0:29:52.760
<v Speaker 1>say this, way back when, gosh, when I was doing

0:29:52.760 --> 0:29:57.120
<v Speaker 1>crypto work decades ago, I was what you mean, cryptography

0:29:57.160 --> 0:30:02.520
<v Speaker 1>and not we should specify these days, excuse me, cryptograencryption. Yeah, yeah,

0:30:02.600 --> 0:30:05.760
<v Speaker 1>I had the opportunity. We're with Phil Zimmerman of p

0:30:05.920 --> 0:30:08.960
<v Speaker 1>GP and actually PGP pretty Good Privacy, which was one

0:30:09.000 --> 0:30:13.040
<v Speaker 1>of the fundamental UH security project or projects way back when,

0:30:13.160 --> 0:30:15.560
<v Speaker 1>was actually written for human rights violations. He wrote it

0:30:15.600 --> 0:30:19.600
<v Speaker 1>because people were doing research of like warlords were getting

0:30:19.640 --> 0:30:21.760
<v Speaker 1>their laptops taken away and then finding out who spoke

0:30:21.800 --> 0:30:24.040
<v Speaker 1>to them and getting people killed. So PGP was like

0:30:24.080 --> 0:30:27.240
<v Speaker 1>this human rights thing right from the beginning. And cryptography

0:30:27.280 --> 0:30:29.800
<v Speaker 1>back when I was young and naive, I always thought

0:30:29.840 --> 0:30:31.720
<v Speaker 1>to myself, this is what we need. This is the

0:30:31.720 --> 0:30:35.240
<v Speaker 1>future when everyone gets proper crypto will blind the government

0:30:35.240 --> 0:30:38.640
<v Speaker 1>will blind the corporations. We're gonna have this crypto anarchist

0:30:38.720 --> 0:30:41.840
<v Speaker 1>future where the government and corporations can't get us. And

0:30:41.880 --> 0:30:44.920
<v Speaker 1>the reality is most of that God who served. And

0:30:45.000 --> 0:30:47.320
<v Speaker 1>the truth is cryptography is too hard for most people

0:30:47.360 --> 0:30:49.760
<v Speaker 1>to use, and as a result, we don't. But here's

0:30:49.760 --> 0:30:51.920
<v Speaker 1>what I will say. The more people that do something

0:30:51.960 --> 0:30:55.320
<v Speaker 1>simple like you signal or use a VPN just to

0:30:55.320 --> 0:30:58.000
<v Speaker 1>browse the Internet, not because they're doing anything to various

0:30:58.040 --> 0:31:02.080
<v Speaker 1>just because their privacy like conscious, Yeah, because it makes

0:31:02.080 --> 0:31:05.000
<v Speaker 1>it normalize. And that means that the person that's using

0:31:05.000 --> 0:31:07.600
<v Speaker 1>it because they need to for like, let's say, to

0:31:07.720 --> 0:31:10.920
<v Speaker 1>protect human rights doesn't stick out like a needle in

0:31:10.960 --> 0:31:14.080
<v Speaker 1>the haystack because everybody's already doing something sane in the

0:31:14.080 --> 0:31:19.880
<v Speaker 1>first place. Normalizing proper privacy and cryptography is better for everyone. Yes, yes,

0:31:20.080 --> 0:31:33.280
<v Speaker 1>absolutely agreed. This is a nice segue because you were

0:31:33.320 --> 0:31:36.760
<v Speaker 1>just talking about the past and how beautiful and bright

0:31:36.800 --> 0:31:39.600
<v Speaker 1>it seemed. Um, let's talk about what you see as

0:31:39.680 --> 0:31:44.880
<v Speaker 1>kind of the future of info security threats. Well, I mean,

0:31:44.920 --> 0:31:47.000
<v Speaker 1>so there's so many levels to that. First of all,

0:31:47.160 --> 0:31:50.000
<v Speaker 1>if we're talking nation state level, I personally strongly believe

0:31:50.040 --> 0:31:53.240
<v Speaker 1>that all of the big players have already compromised everyone's network.

0:31:54.080 --> 0:31:58.960
<v Speaker 1>Everybody got everybody's got us, China's got us, we got China,

0:31:59.240 --> 0:32:01.440
<v Speaker 1>anybody right now it could go in and pretty much

0:32:01.440 --> 0:32:04.560
<v Speaker 1>funk up the grid on someone else like that, And

0:32:04.560 --> 0:32:08.120
<v Speaker 1>there's yeah, and that's not actually the least that's that's

0:32:08.160 --> 0:32:11.400
<v Speaker 1>safer than other possibilities, like because there is the level

0:32:11.400 --> 0:32:14.200
<v Speaker 1>of of mutually a shared destruction there where it's like, yeah, man,

0:32:14.280 --> 0:32:16.680
<v Speaker 1>Russia could take down the grid, but like that wouldn't

0:32:16.680 --> 0:32:19.760
<v Speaker 1>be good for them, and vice versa. You know, Yeah, no, true.

0:32:19.840 --> 0:32:22.400
<v Speaker 1>So the reality is, though everybody's and everybody's network, those

0:32:22.440 --> 0:32:25.560
<v Speaker 1>days are over. Um, when it comes to the individual

0:32:25.640 --> 0:32:28.960
<v Speaker 1>and I'm gonna have a the audience, there might be

0:32:28.960 --> 0:32:30.800
<v Speaker 1>people in the audience to feel differently, and it still

0:32:30.800 --> 0:32:32.440
<v Speaker 1>doesn't mean that we don't try. So one of the

0:32:32.440 --> 0:32:34.440
<v Speaker 1>things I want to say is you're gonna hear some

0:32:34.560 --> 0:32:36.520
<v Speaker 1>skepticism here because I've been doing this career for a

0:32:36.560 --> 0:32:39.640
<v Speaker 1>long time and I've seen things go wrong more than right,

0:32:39.960 --> 0:32:42.560
<v Speaker 1>and so in that regard, this is gonna sound kind

0:32:42.560 --> 0:32:44.480
<v Speaker 1>of cynical. But when it comes to the idea of

0:32:45.400 --> 0:32:49.040
<v Speaker 1>individual privacy, in my opinion, with the exception of when

0:32:49.080 --> 0:32:52.600
<v Speaker 1>you're taking a very active effort in something very specific

0:32:52.640 --> 0:32:55.000
<v Speaker 1>that you want to keep private because that's something you're

0:32:55.040 --> 0:32:59.080
<v Speaker 1>working on personally, the reality is individual privacy is dead

0:32:59.120 --> 0:33:03.880
<v Speaker 1>and gone, and we're just starting to smell that corpse um.

0:33:04.120 --> 0:33:08.600
<v Speaker 1>Whether it is credit card data transactions, your cell phone history,

0:33:08.680 --> 0:33:11.200
<v Speaker 1>your phone numbers, what you've done on the internet, what

0:33:11.320 --> 0:33:13.840
<v Speaker 1>you've done on social media or not done on social media,

0:33:14.040 --> 0:33:16.000
<v Speaker 1>whether you have an account on Facebook or not, doesn't

0:33:16.000 --> 0:33:19.120
<v Speaker 1>even matter. The metadata and the trailer you're leaving behind

0:33:19.160 --> 0:33:23.240
<v Speaker 1>you is all aggregated, all of it behind big data corporations,

0:33:23.480 --> 0:33:26.840
<v Speaker 1>all of it compromised, all of it searchable. Even stuff

0:33:26.840 --> 0:33:30.160
<v Speaker 1>the government has on you has been sold to large corporations.

0:33:30.160 --> 0:33:32.280
<v Speaker 1>Because I can tell you that some of the data

0:33:32.320 --> 0:33:34.480
<v Speaker 1>that they kept for like let's say D m V

0:33:34.680 --> 0:33:37.200
<v Speaker 1>or m v D, they decided to sell it off

0:33:37.240 --> 0:33:40.080
<v Speaker 1>to a corporation and they themselves access it through a

0:33:40.160 --> 0:33:43.360
<v Speaker 1>third party when doing research on you. So all of

0:33:43.360 --> 0:33:45.560
<v Speaker 1>that big data, there's a law of physics. The more

0:33:45.640 --> 0:33:52.320
<v Speaker 1>you aggregate, the mortal get compromised. Um, geez, I'm sorry,

0:33:52.360 --> 0:33:54.520
<v Speaker 1>that's the truth. No, no, no, I mean yeah, you're

0:33:54.560 --> 0:34:01.840
<v Speaker 1>you're you're like it's this Uh, there's this frustration because

0:34:01.840 --> 0:34:07.400
<v Speaker 1>I can remember the days when the privacy hounds. And

0:34:07.400 --> 0:34:09.360
<v Speaker 1>I don't say that in a negative term. We're like

0:34:09.440 --> 0:34:12.719
<v Speaker 1>warning everybody about, Hey, you don't want to be aggregating

0:34:12.719 --> 0:34:14.719
<v Speaker 1>all of these different social media things together. Hey you

0:34:14.719 --> 0:34:16.400
<v Speaker 1>don't want to be using all of these services. Hey

0:34:16.440 --> 0:34:19.480
<v Speaker 1>there's actually some like real downsides like all of what's happening.

0:34:19.560 --> 0:34:22.000
<v Speaker 1>Like part of why things are so cheap on Amazon

0:34:22.160 --> 0:34:24.160
<v Speaker 1>is you know that that your data there is is

0:34:24.239 --> 0:34:27.799
<v Speaker 1>one of the assets that they have. And um, those

0:34:27.800 --> 0:34:31.920
<v Speaker 1>people were absolutely right, and they lost harder than anyone

0:34:31.920 --> 0:34:35.400
<v Speaker 1>has ever lost at anything. Like So, Like when I

0:34:35.480 --> 0:34:38.040
<v Speaker 1>was back there at that company doing all that cryptography work,

0:34:38.440 --> 0:34:40.719
<v Speaker 1>we were trying to give crypto like to the average

0:34:40.840 --> 0:34:43.680
<v Speaker 1>general population of the Internet. I had this, like I said,

0:34:43.719 --> 0:34:46.160
<v Speaker 1>this naive view of like the future that was gonna

0:34:46.200 --> 0:34:47.879
<v Speaker 1>be this place where we're gonna have the Internet where

0:34:47.880 --> 0:34:50.120
<v Speaker 1>everyone was connected, and it was gonna be not only

0:34:50.120 --> 0:34:52.680
<v Speaker 1>would we have personal privacy through cryptography, but we would

0:34:52.719 --> 0:34:55.120
<v Speaker 1>be able to transfer information to one another in a

0:34:55.160 --> 0:34:58.279
<v Speaker 1>way that would make the Shenanigans impossible. Well, to some

0:34:58.360 --> 0:35:00.719
<v Speaker 1>degree that's been true, we've seen some of that, but

0:35:00.880 --> 0:35:04.760
<v Speaker 1>to another degree, we also have Snowdon dropping the bomb

0:35:04.800 --> 0:35:07.319
<v Speaker 1>on revelations about what the government has done to the

0:35:07.360 --> 0:35:10.279
<v Speaker 1>individual and how they've broken the law with all of

0:35:10.320 --> 0:35:13.640
<v Speaker 1>our privacy and data and what came of that a

0:35:13.680 --> 0:35:18.840
<v Speaker 1>man in exile in Russia and pretty much fucking nothing, Yeah, right, nothing?

0:35:19.239 --> 0:35:22.959
<v Speaker 1>And um I was sitting at a Defcon presentation where

0:35:23.040 --> 0:35:26.160
<v Speaker 1>General Alexander was on the screen talking about what they

0:35:26.160 --> 0:35:30.360
<v Speaker 1>weren't doing while Snowden was dropping revelations proving him to

0:35:30.400 --> 0:35:34.000
<v Speaker 1>be lying. And nothing comes of it, right, nothing really

0:35:34.040 --> 0:35:37.200
<v Speaker 1>comes of it. And one of the things that's so real.

0:35:37.520 --> 0:35:41.320
<v Speaker 1>And so whether it's the tribal level, your neighbors across

0:35:41.360 --> 0:35:45.120
<v Speaker 1>the street or the internet tribe, we as a people

0:35:45.200 --> 0:35:48.879
<v Speaker 1>in the aggregate are always willing to give up our

0:35:49.000 --> 0:35:52.160
<v Speaker 1>rights to something bigger for convenience. And we've done that

0:35:52.200 --> 0:35:56.120
<v Speaker 1>and it's called Facebook and Twitter and social media and

0:35:56.200 --> 0:35:58.680
<v Speaker 1>in the process, what was going to be an amazing

0:35:58.760 --> 0:36:05.359
<v Speaker 1>resource has become the trap. Uh, it's such a it's

0:36:05.360 --> 0:36:08.279
<v Speaker 1>because you know, you know Garrison, I I my my

0:36:08.440 --> 0:36:11.720
<v Speaker 1>friend who is much younger than me, UM has grown

0:36:11.800 --> 0:36:15.919
<v Speaker 1>up with the Internet being being what it is now

0:36:16.120 --> 0:36:18.840
<v Speaker 1>right like this this kind of like nightmare trap. You

0:36:18.880 --> 0:36:21.240
<v Speaker 1>know that that's sucking us all in this like giant

0:36:21.360 --> 0:36:24.800
<v Speaker 1>squid that has us in its tentacles. Um. And it's

0:36:24.840 --> 0:36:27.560
<v Speaker 1>I get I sometimes like dissociate talking with them about

0:36:27.600 --> 0:36:30.920
<v Speaker 1>certain Internet things because in my heart it's still the

0:36:30.920 --> 0:36:34.759
<v Speaker 1>promised land. Yeah, I wish I I guess my I

0:36:35.000 --> 0:36:36.560
<v Speaker 1>wish I felt that way. It doesn't feel like that

0:36:36.600 --> 0:36:38.319
<v Speaker 1>way to me anymore, to be honest, I mean it's

0:36:38.400 --> 0:36:40.920
<v Speaker 1>it's not right like and what I mean that in

0:36:41.000 --> 0:36:44.080
<v Speaker 1>like sort of I have this I don't know. I've

0:36:44.080 --> 0:36:46.120
<v Speaker 1>never entirely been able to like let go of the

0:36:46.200 --> 0:36:47.960
<v Speaker 1>vision of like, oh it could have been There's so

0:36:48.000 --> 0:36:50.239
<v Speaker 1>many things that could have been. Well, it's like, you know,

0:36:50.280 --> 0:36:53.560
<v Speaker 1>it's like all technology, anything can be remonized, right right,

0:36:53.640 --> 0:36:55.879
<v Speaker 1>Like an a R fifteen can be used for good

0:36:56.200 --> 0:36:58.319
<v Speaker 1>or for evil. A knife can be used to make

0:36:58.360 --> 0:37:00.719
<v Speaker 1>a beautiful meal or to commit a murder. And the

0:37:00.760 --> 0:37:03.359
<v Speaker 1>Internet is technology and it has been weaponized. It's been

0:37:03.360 --> 0:37:06.000
<v Speaker 1>weaponized against us. But at the same time, if we

0:37:06.080 --> 0:37:08.239
<v Speaker 1>just turn a blind eye to it and then not

0:37:08.360 --> 0:37:10.960
<v Speaker 1>learn how to use this technology to our advantage, we're

0:37:11.000 --> 0:37:13.480
<v Speaker 1>allowing them to do that unabated. And that's where like

0:37:13.480 --> 0:37:15.400
<v Speaker 1>the kind of hacker mindset comes from, which is like,

0:37:15.520 --> 0:37:17.600
<v Speaker 1>how do I make this thing do what I wanted

0:37:17.640 --> 0:37:20.120
<v Speaker 1>to do for me while not letting someone else do

0:37:20.160 --> 0:37:23.000
<v Speaker 1>it for them. And unless we take control of the

0:37:23.040 --> 0:37:26.960
<v Speaker 1>technology for ourselves, like I said earlier, normalizing using signal

0:37:27.280 --> 0:37:31.000
<v Speaker 1>and even basic VPN and cryptography, then we're just giving

0:37:31.000 --> 0:37:33.239
<v Speaker 1>it up. We're not even making it a challenge. We're

0:37:33.280 --> 0:37:36.000
<v Speaker 1>just like, here, you go have it. And uh, that's

0:37:36.000 --> 0:37:38.120
<v Speaker 1>something that I think that's more important as a community.

0:37:38.160 --> 0:37:41.120
<v Speaker 1>Maybe as people grow up on the Internet versus seeing

0:37:41.120 --> 0:37:45.160
<v Speaker 1>it becoming something that I saw become something maybe either

0:37:45.239 --> 0:37:48.040
<v Speaker 1>a they'll just accept which I hope isn't the case

0:37:48.080 --> 0:37:50.600
<v Speaker 1>that the reality is privacy is dead, or maybe they'll

0:37:50.640 --> 0:37:54.040
<v Speaker 1>approach the Internet differently than say someone at my age did.

0:37:54.520 --> 0:37:56.680
<v Speaker 1>We're frankly, we kind of messed up and we didn't

0:37:56.719 --> 0:38:01.440
<v Speaker 1>realize that Primrose Path was actually trap and that's a

0:38:01.640 --> 0:38:04.239
<v Speaker 1>like that was a mistake and maybe we can kind

0:38:04.239 --> 0:38:07.359
<v Speaker 1>of like evolve beyond that. But like you're asking, where

0:38:07.400 --> 0:38:10.120
<v Speaker 1>is info set going now? I I don't have good

0:38:10.160 --> 0:38:12.040
<v Speaker 1>notes for that. Like when I first started working in

0:38:12.040 --> 0:38:14.319
<v Speaker 1>the career, it really felt like a great thing. We

0:38:14.320 --> 0:38:17.080
<v Speaker 1>were doing important stuff. We were doing the DOOS mitigation.

0:38:17.160 --> 0:38:19.680
<v Speaker 1>We were going into hospitals and making sure that insulin

0:38:19.760 --> 0:38:23.600
<v Speaker 1>pumps weren't compromised as a DIDOS host. Believe it or not,

0:38:23.960 --> 0:38:27.640
<v Speaker 1>hospitals are INFOSECT nightmares. And we were doing stuff that

0:38:27.680 --> 0:38:30.560
<v Speaker 1>felt good. And then later in the career I realized,

0:38:30.920 --> 0:38:33.280
<v Speaker 1>wait a minute, I'm not doing anything to secure anybody's

0:38:33.320 --> 0:38:36.440
<v Speaker 1>personal information or make the Internet safer. I was just

0:38:36.520 --> 0:38:40.239
<v Speaker 1>protecting some corporate coffer And the reality was that the

0:38:40.280 --> 0:38:43.680
<v Speaker 1>private information that we were supposedly protecting the debate would

0:38:43.719 --> 0:38:47.360
<v Speaker 1>turn into calls, which was what's more expensive losing the

0:38:47.440 --> 0:38:51.040
<v Speaker 1>data or the lawsuit for losing the data. Literally, those

0:38:51.080 --> 0:38:54.000
<v Speaker 1>were the conversations and corporations, and those are the conversations

0:38:54.040 --> 0:38:56.880
<v Speaker 1>that corporations have now about each and every one of

0:38:56.880 --> 0:39:02.080
<v Speaker 1>ours personal information. Now when you when you think about

0:39:02.800 --> 0:39:06.360
<v Speaker 1>because so I obviously I'm in a different it was

0:39:06.400 --> 0:39:08.279
<v Speaker 1>in a different field. But when I was doing a

0:39:08.280 --> 0:39:10.480
<v Speaker 1>lot of the research on terrorism that I was doing,

0:39:10.920 --> 0:39:12.920
<v Speaker 1>I had these things that were like sort of the

0:39:13.680 --> 0:39:15.719
<v Speaker 1>this kind of attack is going to happen at something

0:39:15.719 --> 0:39:18.319
<v Speaker 1>I feel that very much about, Like drones. There's going

0:39:18.360 --> 0:39:21.440
<v Speaker 1>to be like a mass killing of civilians not in

0:39:21.480 --> 0:39:24.640
<v Speaker 1>a war zone by a civilian weaponized drone at some

0:39:24.719 --> 0:39:26.799
<v Speaker 1>point in the not too distant features going to happen.

0:39:26.800 --> 0:39:31.120
<v Speaker 1>It's going to be done. It's absolutely in an inevitability. Um,

0:39:31.160 --> 0:39:32.920
<v Speaker 1>that kind of stuff. Do you what are you when

0:39:33.000 --> 0:39:35.920
<v Speaker 1>you think about kind of the the digital equivalence of that,

0:39:35.960 --> 0:39:40.600
<v Speaker 1>Like what are you looking towards? Well, I agree with

0:39:40.640 --> 0:39:42.720
<v Speaker 1>you about the drone, Like you can see God, Yes,

0:39:42.960 --> 0:39:44.680
<v Speaker 1>you plot the you plot the dots and you know

0:39:44.719 --> 0:39:46.600
<v Speaker 1>what's going to occur, right, It's it's not it's not

0:39:46.680 --> 0:39:49.920
<v Speaker 1>possible to avoid. We unleashed that out of the cage

0:39:49.920 --> 0:39:53.040
<v Speaker 1>and it's going to happen. Um. Quite honestly, I think

0:39:53.080 --> 0:39:57.040
<v Speaker 1>we're seeing it already. We're seeing we're seeing the level

0:39:57.080 --> 0:40:00.600
<v Speaker 1>of privacy invasion that I don't think people already know

0:40:00.800 --> 0:40:03.160
<v Speaker 1>has happened. Like I know some of us realize that

0:40:03.239 --> 0:40:05.319
<v Speaker 1>we talked about it, we rant about it, but like,

0:40:05.880 --> 0:40:09.080
<v Speaker 1>I don't think people realize the level of the incursion

0:40:09.120 --> 0:40:12.719
<v Speaker 1>that has occurred to the point where all of this

0:40:12.840 --> 0:40:15.560
<v Speaker 1>data aggregated to the point they know what toilet paper

0:40:15.640 --> 0:40:18.480
<v Speaker 1>you prefer to buy. Like I'm talking like people like

0:40:18.520 --> 0:40:22.640
<v Speaker 1>Facebook knowing that um or the size of the corporate

0:40:22.680 --> 0:40:25.600
<v Speaker 1>oligarchy that controls the Internet, whether it's the small like

0:40:25.880 --> 0:40:30.480
<v Speaker 1>Alphabet Court, Facebook, Apple, Microsoft's becoming a smaller player weirdly,

0:40:30.600 --> 0:40:34.080
<v Speaker 1>but when you think about those big names, they kind

0:40:34.120 --> 0:40:38.360
<v Speaker 1>of like control everything in every piece of data about

0:40:38.400 --> 0:40:41.960
<v Speaker 1>you and everything you move, and say that, I think,

0:40:42.000 --> 0:40:43.640
<v Speaker 1>I think what's the end of that? I don't think

0:40:43.680 --> 0:40:45.799
<v Speaker 1>we got to the end game of that, but I

0:40:45.880 --> 0:40:48.480
<v Speaker 1>don't know how we roll it back. And that's the thing.

0:40:48.920 --> 0:40:52.439
<v Speaker 1>So what's the prediction. My prediction is it's gonna get

0:40:52.440 --> 0:40:54.960
<v Speaker 1>worse and we're gonna get to the point where there

0:40:55.080 --> 0:40:59.480
<v Speaker 1>isn't room to move without that surveillance tracking you and

0:40:59.560 --> 0:41:01.880
<v Speaker 1>like so for example, you think of things like Sci

0:41:01.920 --> 0:41:04.560
<v Speaker 1>Fi Minority Report, you walk to the mall and there's

0:41:04.640 --> 0:41:08.560
<v Speaker 1>facial idea happening everywhere you go with targeted advertising at

0:41:08.600 --> 0:41:12.640
<v Speaker 1>the mall. Oh that's coming I guarantee that's coming, and

0:41:13.200 --> 0:41:16.680
<v Speaker 1>all of that's happening already, and that facial recognition stuff

0:41:16.680 --> 0:41:20.040
<v Speaker 1>that's going on is happening currently now we're just not

0:41:20.160 --> 0:41:23.640
<v Speaker 1>that aware of it happening. The cop cars driving down

0:41:23.640 --> 0:41:27.319
<v Speaker 1>the road and every license plate is being measured with

0:41:27.360 --> 0:41:31.160
<v Speaker 1>the cameras being O CRD optical character recognition, and that's

0:41:31.160 --> 0:41:34.120
<v Speaker 1>coming back, and they're tracking every car they're driving by

0:41:34.120 --> 0:41:36.760
<v Speaker 1>on the highway even though there's not a GPS unit

0:41:36.840 --> 0:41:43.000
<v Speaker 1>on your car. The ability to not be tracked will

0:41:43.080 --> 0:41:48.920
<v Speaker 1>soon be impossible. How's that yeah? I mean allegedly, when

0:41:48.960 --> 0:41:53.400
<v Speaker 1>I was younger, they were like certain stupid petty crimes

0:41:53.440 --> 0:41:55.920
<v Speaker 1>I would commit just because like, people will not be

0:41:56.000 --> 0:41:58.000
<v Speaker 1>able to do this in the future, and I have

0:41:58.040 --> 0:42:00.919
<v Speaker 1>a moral responsibility to steal the bulbs from in front

0:42:00.920 --> 0:42:02.680
<v Speaker 1>of this bar and throw them in my threads, Like

0:42:02.760 --> 0:42:04.839
<v Speaker 1>what one day that will be a thing that people

0:42:04.960 --> 0:42:07.160
<v Speaker 1>can't do without getting caught, And so like I just

0:42:07.239 --> 0:42:10.800
<v Speaker 1>I had to. You know, there are like some bright spots,

0:42:10.840 --> 0:42:13.200
<v Speaker 1>because I think you're absolutely right, there's no on like

0:42:13.320 --> 0:42:16.520
<v Speaker 1>a broader scale, there's no turning back the clock for

0:42:16.560 --> 0:42:19.000
<v Speaker 1>stuff like facial recognition and how funked up. It's going

0:42:19.040 --> 0:42:21.080
<v Speaker 1>to get There are states like where I live in Oregon,

0:42:21.080 --> 0:42:23.160
<v Speaker 1>where like they have passed laws that are just like you,

0:42:23.400 --> 0:42:26.240
<v Speaker 1>public facial recognition is not a thing that is legal

0:42:26.280 --> 0:42:30.880
<v Speaker 1>in this state. Um. And I definitely support more attempts

0:42:30.960 --> 0:42:33.799
<v Speaker 1>like that, because again, anything you can do to sty

0:42:33.920 --> 0:42:36.080
<v Speaker 1>me them, to reduce the spread of the grid, to

0:42:36.520 --> 0:42:39.280
<v Speaker 1>reduce the profitability of these things, even though it's again

0:42:39.719 --> 0:42:43.680
<v Speaker 1>overall a doomed cause. Right, Um yeah, I don't know.

0:42:43.920 --> 0:42:46.319
<v Speaker 1>I mean I obviously I think that that's a good law,

0:42:46.360 --> 0:42:48.719
<v Speaker 1>but I don't know that laws stop corporations when the

0:42:48.800 --> 0:42:53.719
<v Speaker 1>corporations have more power than law. Yes, of course. Um.

0:42:53.719 --> 0:42:56.239
<v Speaker 1>And it's like I mean, obviously you can you can

0:42:56.400 --> 0:42:58.959
<v Speaker 1>ban it for police to use and stuff, which does

0:42:59.000 --> 0:43:02.040
<v Speaker 1>something to the extent that you know they follow the law,

0:43:02.160 --> 0:43:04.440
<v Speaker 1>but um, none of this is I don't know, Like

0:43:04.719 --> 0:43:07.680
<v Speaker 1>I That's one of the things that makes me most

0:43:08.560 --> 0:43:13.200
<v Speaker 1>depressed about the future is the thought that like the

0:43:13.680 --> 0:43:16.560
<v Speaker 1>space for this is not like a major issue, I guess,

0:43:16.560 --> 0:43:18.560
<v Speaker 1>but like the space for kids just like funk around

0:43:19.640 --> 0:43:21.920
<v Speaker 1>and do dumb ship when they're nineteen is going to

0:43:21.960 --> 0:43:23.839
<v Speaker 1>get so much smaller. I mean, I would say. I mean,

0:43:23.840 --> 0:43:26.560
<v Speaker 1>I think the thing is like, as a natural human being,

0:43:26.560 --> 0:43:29.359
<v Speaker 1>whether you're doing anything wrong, even if you're not doing

0:43:29.400 --> 0:43:32.319
<v Speaker 1>anything wrong, the nature to feel like you have a

0:43:32.360 --> 0:43:36.080
<v Speaker 1>private space that's to your private community space. I'm not

0:43:36.120 --> 0:43:37.839
<v Speaker 1>even talking about wrong or right here. We're just talking

0:43:37.880 --> 0:43:41.080
<v Speaker 1>about just that feeling that at this moment, this is

0:43:41.120 --> 0:43:44.880
<v Speaker 1>my space where I'm not being watched. Is a natural,

0:43:45.040 --> 0:43:51.960
<v Speaker 1>healthy need of the human orgasm or organism. Um and interesting,

0:43:52.080 --> 0:43:55.319
<v Speaker 1>Uh yeah, but no, it's it's a it's a human need.

0:43:55.680 --> 0:43:59.160
<v Speaker 1>And I think we're gonna find those spaces become smaller

0:43:59.200 --> 0:44:02.000
<v Speaker 1>and small. And I think when you said, what's your prediction,

0:44:02.040 --> 0:44:03.520
<v Speaker 1>I hate to say it, but I think the prediction

0:44:03.600 --> 0:44:06.840
<v Speaker 1>is it will become impossible to not be tracked. Now,

0:44:07.400 --> 0:44:09.279
<v Speaker 1>the bright spide of that, the bright side of that,

0:44:09.360 --> 0:44:12.600
<v Speaker 1>maybe maybe there's a bright side. Maybe at some point

0:44:13.360 --> 0:44:16.279
<v Speaker 1>when that's the reality, it could somehow also affect the

0:44:16.320 --> 0:44:20.240
<v Speaker 1>people that are powerful and the people that are small.

0:44:20.640 --> 0:44:23.720
<v Speaker 1>And we all realize that humans are humans and therefore

0:44:24.280 --> 0:44:27.360
<v Speaker 1>the failings that sometimes we have as all human beings

0:44:27.560 --> 0:44:29.839
<v Speaker 1>we just kind of acknowledge and be like, oh, yeah,

0:44:29.840 --> 0:44:32.759
<v Speaker 1>of course that's just what people do. Like maybe we

0:44:32.880 --> 0:44:35.359
<v Speaker 1>just realize people are people. But the idea that there's

0:44:35.400 --> 0:44:37.600
<v Speaker 1>never going to be a space to not get tracked,

0:44:37.960 --> 0:44:41.200
<v Speaker 1>I don't know. To me, I find darkly disturbing. It

0:44:41.360 --> 0:44:43.920
<v Speaker 1>is disturbing. I do think it kind of to pivot

0:44:43.920 --> 0:44:45.600
<v Speaker 1>off of what you were saying. The other aspect of

0:44:45.600 --> 0:44:49.440
<v Speaker 1>that that is more positive is that all of this stuff,

0:44:49.960 --> 0:44:53.799
<v Speaker 1>all of this surveillance ship um or at least not all,

0:44:53.800 --> 0:44:57.279
<v Speaker 1>but quite a bit of it is you know, in

0:44:57.320 --> 0:44:59.439
<v Speaker 1>a way, it's like a knife fight. There's no way

0:44:59.480 --> 0:45:01.719
<v Speaker 1>that both parties don't get cut, and you know, the

0:45:01.760 --> 0:45:04.520
<v Speaker 1>ones wielding the knife might get cut less, but they're

0:45:04.520 --> 0:45:06.560
<v Speaker 1>still going to get cut. And part of what that

0:45:06.640 --> 0:45:10.560
<v Speaker 1>means in this situation is that the prevalence of all

0:45:10.560 --> 0:45:13.840
<v Speaker 1>of these different ways to surveil and track also allows

0:45:14.680 --> 0:45:18.080
<v Speaker 1>us to track in the same way that like police

0:45:18.360 --> 0:45:21.319
<v Speaker 1>law enforcement watches people through their phones, but also a

0:45:21.320 --> 0:45:23.120
<v Speaker 1>hell of a lot of cops are getting filmed doing

0:45:23.160 --> 0:45:29.120
<v Speaker 1>fucked up ship now right now. Again, the balance of

0:45:29.160 --> 0:45:30.960
<v Speaker 1>the cuts I don't think is going to be work

0:45:31.000 --> 0:45:32.640
<v Speaker 1>out in our favor, but it's not going to be

0:45:32.760 --> 0:45:35.080
<v Speaker 1>nothing on them either. And and and you're right, I

0:45:35.080 --> 0:45:37.600
<v Speaker 1>think there are there are some things that we will

0:45:37.840 --> 0:45:40.360
<v Speaker 1>learn in the future about the people in power in

0:45:40.400 --> 0:45:42.600
<v Speaker 1>the world that would it wouldn't have been possible for

0:45:42.680 --> 0:45:44.319
<v Speaker 1>us to learn in the past, or may not be

0:45:44.360 --> 0:45:48.160
<v Speaker 1>possibly even right now, And that could be And if

0:45:48.160 --> 0:45:50.040
<v Speaker 1>we learned that about people in power, then they can't

0:45:50.040 --> 0:45:53.200
<v Speaker 1>weaponize it as much against the people that aren't in power. Right. Yeah, yeah,

0:45:53.280 --> 0:45:55.600
<v Speaker 1>you know one thing that I'm because I'm thinking a

0:45:55.640 --> 0:45:57.839
<v Speaker 1>lot about the fact that a bunch of folks in

0:45:57.880 --> 0:46:03.000
<v Speaker 1>the reproductive healthcare industry have pointed out that right wingers

0:46:03.000 --> 0:46:07.640
<v Speaker 1>have started using drones uh to follow people home from

0:46:07.640 --> 0:46:09.560
<v Speaker 1>like planted parrot hoods and followed them to their cards

0:46:09.560 --> 0:46:11.680
<v Speaker 1>to build databases of the people who are going to

0:46:11.920 --> 0:46:16.080
<v Speaker 1>places to potentially like do that kind of reproductive healthcare

0:46:16.160 --> 0:46:19.560
<v Speaker 1>that these folks don't think should exist. Um. The other

0:46:19.600 --> 0:46:22.839
<v Speaker 1>side of it, though, is that, um, it is also

0:46:23.440 --> 0:46:27.440
<v Speaker 1>possible to surveil them, um, and it will be possible

0:46:27.480 --> 0:46:30.719
<v Speaker 1>to track the people doing that sort of thing, and

0:46:30.719 --> 0:46:32.520
<v Speaker 1>it will be possible to do that in terms of

0:46:32.520 --> 0:46:34.560
<v Speaker 1>like legal accountability, and it will be possible to do

0:46:34.600 --> 0:46:39.520
<v Speaker 1>that for the people who embrace uh questionably legal tactics

0:46:39.719 --> 0:46:44.200
<v Speaker 1>for for frustrating those efforts um or illegal tactics for

0:46:44.200 --> 0:46:47.680
<v Speaker 1>frustrating those efforts. They have access to the same technology.

0:46:47.800 --> 0:46:50.520
<v Speaker 1>Um And again it's it's it is a knife that

0:46:50.800 --> 0:46:54.759
<v Speaker 1>will cut everybody. Um And I guess that's better than

0:46:54.800 --> 0:46:58.000
<v Speaker 1>just one person getting cut in this situation. That's that's

0:46:58.040 --> 0:46:59.759
<v Speaker 1>the concern I have, right, I agree with that like

0:46:59.800 --> 0:47:02.280
<v Speaker 1>I that technology goes it's a weapon and its weaponized

0:47:02.280 --> 0:47:03.920
<v Speaker 1>in all directions, depending on how to use it for

0:47:03.920 --> 0:47:06.160
<v Speaker 1>good over bad. And so this is the same place

0:47:06.200 --> 0:47:08.320
<v Speaker 1>I come to when it comes to the gun control argument.

0:47:08.360 --> 0:47:14.640
<v Speaker 1>I mean, we can do no, no, no, the same problem, right,

0:47:14.880 --> 0:47:19.279
<v Speaker 1>because if we allow only one side to have all

0:47:19.320 --> 0:47:21.880
<v Speaker 1>of the control and power and understanding of the technology,

0:47:22.080 --> 0:47:24.480
<v Speaker 1>then we at ourselves are at a huge deficit. We

0:47:24.560 --> 0:47:27.960
<v Speaker 1>cannot defend ourselves or fight back. So when it comes

0:47:28.040 --> 0:47:30.640
<v Speaker 1>to this kind of data and technology, knowing the basic

0:47:30.640 --> 0:47:33.360
<v Speaker 1>fundamentals of what you can do to protect yourself, understand

0:47:33.400 --> 0:47:36.879
<v Speaker 1>the reality of what the surveillance state or corporation is,

0:47:37.160 --> 0:47:39.160
<v Speaker 1>and then doing your best to not make it easy

0:47:39.239 --> 0:47:41.640
<v Speaker 1>for them is at least one step forward. But if

0:47:41.680 --> 0:47:44.719
<v Speaker 1>we don't own this technology, if we don't own the tech,

0:47:45.239 --> 0:47:48.000
<v Speaker 1>someone else will and they will use it against us.

0:47:48.000 --> 0:47:50.680
<v Speaker 1>It's as simple as that, and like they're super simple

0:47:50.719 --> 0:47:52.120
<v Speaker 1>stuff like I was gonna bring us up with like

0:47:52.680 --> 0:47:54.440
<v Speaker 1>you can't see video because it's a podcast, but like

0:47:54.480 --> 0:47:57.960
<v Speaker 1>there's these cool glasses from doctor are called reflectacles that

0:47:58.040 --> 0:48:01.319
<v Speaker 1>I'm showing you Robert, and look like regular sunglasses, but

0:48:01.320 --> 0:48:04.880
<v Speaker 1>when you put them on, they do they reflect I

0:48:05.160 --> 0:48:08.879
<v Speaker 1>R light and actually mess with cameras in a way

0:48:08.920 --> 0:48:11.279
<v Speaker 1>that your turns are diet facing a ball of light.

0:48:11.520 --> 0:48:14.160
<v Speaker 1>So you can wear these, You can wear their cold reflectacles.

0:48:14.200 --> 0:48:15.960
<v Speaker 1>You can wear them and just walk around the mall

0:48:16.360 --> 0:48:18.480
<v Speaker 1>and all the cameras get blown out by your by

0:48:18.480 --> 0:48:21.960
<v Speaker 1>your glasses. Like doing that just because you can. It's

0:48:22.040 --> 0:48:24.919
<v Speaker 1>kind of fun. That's the hot ship. That's the ship.

0:48:25.040 --> 0:48:28.200
<v Speaker 1>I was promised that that at least does exist. It's

0:48:28.239 --> 0:48:31.160
<v Speaker 1>not everything I had hoped it would be in terms

0:48:31.160 --> 0:48:33.080
<v Speaker 1>of its ability, but it is like that kind of

0:48:33.080 --> 0:48:35.200
<v Speaker 1>stuff rules and I will be picking up a pair

0:48:35.239 --> 0:48:37.800
<v Speaker 1>of those. Um, well, we should probably close out. I

0:48:37.840 --> 0:48:40.080
<v Speaker 1>didn't want to note because I mentioned this. UM I

0:48:40.120 --> 0:48:41.720
<v Speaker 1>got something a little wrong when I was talking about

0:48:41.719 --> 0:48:45.160
<v Speaker 1>the facial recognition ban. UM. It is in an ordinance

0:48:45.160 --> 0:48:48.680
<v Speaker 1>in the City of Portland itself, Um, it's the first

0:48:48.760 --> 0:48:51.120
<v Speaker 1>city that has done this, and it prohibits the use

0:48:51.239 --> 0:48:55.400
<v Speaker 1>of public facial recognition technology by all private businesses in

0:48:55.440 --> 0:48:58.680
<v Speaker 1>the city. UM. So that is the scope of the

0:48:58.719 --> 0:49:00.920
<v Speaker 1>band that a band that exists in Portland. I recommend

0:49:00.920 --> 0:49:02.560
<v Speaker 1>looking it up. It is the kind of thing that

0:49:02.600 --> 0:49:06.480
<v Speaker 1>I would support everyone pushing forward in their city. UM.

0:49:06.560 --> 0:49:09.600
<v Speaker 1>Because again, the more holes you can make in this thing,

0:49:09.760 --> 0:49:11.799
<v Speaker 1>the better. Yeah. I don't want to put that down.

0:49:11.800 --> 0:49:13.520
<v Speaker 1>That's a good thing. But the challenge of this is

0:49:13.560 --> 0:49:15.680
<v Speaker 1>just like I mentioned earlier, moving the data out of

0:49:15.719 --> 0:49:18.759
<v Speaker 1>the konas and back the minute photos from like I

0:49:18.800 --> 0:49:20.920
<v Speaker 1>take my iPhone and scan the crowd and then put

0:49:20.960 --> 0:49:24.320
<v Speaker 1>that picture up on the internet, not under their jurisdiction,

0:49:24.360 --> 0:49:27.640
<v Speaker 1>and all that facial recondition happens on every face in

0:49:27.719 --> 0:49:31.440
<v Speaker 1>that yep. And that is again, well, we'll do another

0:49:31.480 --> 0:49:33.480
<v Speaker 1>episode at some point about things that you can do

0:49:33.560 --> 0:49:36.399
<v Speaker 1>to just get like there. That's a whole different bag

0:49:36.440 --> 0:49:38.880
<v Speaker 1>of tricks. Um. But this has been really useful and

0:49:38.920 --> 0:49:41.160
<v Speaker 1>really valuable. Carl, do you want to plug anything before

0:49:41.160 --> 0:49:43.839
<v Speaker 1>we roll out here? Not much, just my normal thing

0:49:43.880 --> 0:49:45.520
<v Speaker 1>if you're interested in this kind of content, but with

0:49:45.560 --> 0:49:47.680
<v Speaker 1>a more firearms oriented thing. You can find me an

0:49:47.680 --> 0:49:50.800
<v Speaker 1>in range dot tv. But you'll also find some information

0:49:50.840 --> 0:49:53.680
<v Speaker 1>security stuff there as well. I cover that intermittently when

0:49:53.719 --> 0:49:56.880
<v Speaker 1>it applies to both topics. So if you, if you

0:49:57.480 --> 0:49:59.799
<v Speaker 1>even if you disagree, but appreciate my approach to this,

0:50:00.320 --> 0:50:03.920
<v Speaker 1>come check me out. I appreciate it awesome. Check out Carl,

0:50:04.040 --> 0:50:07.520
<v Speaker 1>check out in range tv, and continue to listen to

0:50:07.640 --> 0:50:13.320
<v Speaker 1>podcasts because the only thing that will save us is podcasts.

0:50:13.760 --> 0:50:16.440
<v Speaker 1>When I think the same, right, but good for business.

0:50:21.239 --> 0:50:23.600
<v Speaker 1>It could happen here is a production of cool Zone Media.

0:50:23.840 --> 0:50:26.520
<v Speaker 1>For more podcasts from cool Zone Media, visit our website

0:50:26.520 --> 0:50:28.640
<v Speaker 1>cool zone media dot com, or check us out on

0:50:28.680 --> 0:50:31.239
<v Speaker 1>the I Heart Radio app, Apple Podcasts, or wherever you

0:50:31.280 --> 0:50:34.080
<v Speaker 1>listen to podcasts. You can find sources for It could

0:50:34.080 --> 0:50:37.080
<v Speaker 1>Happen here, updated monthly at cool zone media dot com

0:50:37.120 --> 0:50:39.040
<v Speaker 1>slash sources. Thanks for listening.