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Speaker 1: Uh, welcome to It Could Happen here, a podcast about

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Speaker 1: things falling apart and how to deal with that and

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Speaker 1: hopefully take care of yourself and your people. Um. Today

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Speaker 1: we have a returning guest, Carl Casarda from Enranged TV. UM. Now, Carl,

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Speaker 1: every time you and I have chatted on a show together,

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Speaker 1: it has been about firearms, which is obviously your passion

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Speaker 1: and specialty, well one of your specialties. But today we're

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Speaker 1: not talking at all about guns. Um. I mean maybe

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Speaker 1: here and there, but today we're talking about the thing

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Speaker 1: that is has been your your career, uh for what

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Speaker 1: most of your working life. Fair to say, Um, you

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Speaker 1: want to kind of walk through your background here because

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Speaker 1: we're gonna be talking about information security and like sort

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Speaker 1: of the future of threats that are going to be

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Speaker 1: like coming uh throughout like the next few years of

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Speaker 1: our lives. Obviously, this year in particular, there's been a

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Speaker 1: bunch of stories about like Russian attacks on digital infrastry

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Speaker 1: sure and vice versa. And that's always like pretty much

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Speaker 1: has been something that's in everybody's backburter since we got

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Speaker 1: the Internet, usually through like Questionable films with Sandra Bullock. UM,

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Speaker 1: I think net that was net right, Um, the net,

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Speaker 1: the net, yes exactly, Yes, where they somehow hacked a

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Speaker 1: car and nineteen ninety eight or something. You gotta do

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Speaker 1: that when you're flying through cyberspace with your VR comment

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Speaker 1: on and your gloves right yea, um, but yeah, you

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Speaker 1: want to walk everyone through kind of what your actual

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Speaker 1: background is in this industry first. Yeah, totally. So if

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Speaker 1: anyone watches En Rangers, watched it for a long time,

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Speaker 1: you'll see this reflected in some of my content because

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Speaker 1: I do deal with some of this intermittently on the channel,

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Speaker 1: and it's definitely influenced how I approach my work there

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Speaker 1: with the social media and all that. But so way

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Speaker 1: back when I was like one of those kids that

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Speaker 1: was in the hacker space, and I grew up like

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Speaker 1: trying to make computers and technology do what it wasn't

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Speaker 1: designed to do, and learn to make it do things

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Speaker 1: it shouldn't have done for my own interests or others

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Speaker 1: around me, not not in any really negative way, but

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Speaker 1: like just a deep curiosity and how does this stuff work?

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Speaker 1: And being part of the early online community. We're talking

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Speaker 1: pre Internet, where you have like an acoustic coupling jack

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Speaker 1: modem and you would dial in like war games. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: literally plug your headset into the fad. I was on

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Speaker 1: boards like that way back when we never should have

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Speaker 1: gone past those days doing things wirelessly with such a mistake,

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Speaker 1: Like I'm so piste off that when I like sit

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Speaker 1: down to research, I'm not like jacking into a gigantic

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Speaker 1: box um like it that makes me live it, Like

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Speaker 1: shadow Run promised me that I was going to be

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Speaker 1: like using one hand to shoot at the approaching corporate

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Speaker 1: security guards and have another hand on my like keyboard

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Speaker 1: that I wear around my neck that I like plug

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Speaker 1: into the wall to hack buildings. But well, hey, maybe

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Speaker 1: someday we'll have neurological implants or wet wire implants brought

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Speaker 1: to us by Monsanto Li. The rmum will just get

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Speaker 1: shut off in our own rooms, right from their mouth

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Speaker 1: to God's ears. Carl absolutely, who doesn't want that? Who

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Speaker 1: doesn't want my neural tissue tied directly to a corporation?

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Speaker 1: But that? Fuck yes? But anyway, so I grew up

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Speaker 1: in that space, and it actually back then it naturally

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Speaker 1: turned into a career. It wasn't like now nowadays, you

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Speaker 1: pretty much have to go get a bunch of certificates

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Speaker 1: and a college degree to even start looking at an

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Speaker 1: infrazet career. But back then, if you kind of had

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Speaker 1: like skills with a Z at the end of you

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Speaker 1: could get a job. And I ended up doing like

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Speaker 1: help desk at this one company landed up they noticed

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Speaker 1: that that's where my interests were, and I ended up

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Speaker 1: becoming their information security architect over a couple of years,

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Speaker 1: and that turned into a multiple decade career pretty much

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Speaker 1: culminating and working at a Tier one Internet backbone provider

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Speaker 1: doing sub seed fiber optic like routing, networking and de

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Speaker 1: dos mitigation and bought net control, search and destroy, So

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Speaker 1: it really turned into a really wide career, not only

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Speaker 1: like when I started off backbone internet, but like encryption, firewalls,

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Speaker 1: application layer controls across the board for multiple corporations. So

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Speaker 1: it was a weird and interesting space. But I don't

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Speaker 1: really do that much anymore except on the side, but

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Speaker 1: I've had a pretty exciting career with it. So I

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Speaker 1: think probably a good place to start is just in general,

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Speaker 1: because folks are always interested about this, what what do

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Speaker 1: you what is your recommendation for people ask like what

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Speaker 1: should I be doing to kind of protect myself as

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Speaker 1: I forced my head under the constant stream of sewer

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Speaker 1: water that is social media these days. Well, yeah, you know,

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Speaker 1: the simplest thing and everything. An infosec is always controversial,

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Speaker 1: just like anything, Like any any recommendation makes someone's gonna

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Speaker 1: be like, but otherwise or anyways, or there's a better solution,

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Speaker 1: and there always is a better solution. But the realistic

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Speaker 1: thing is when you talk to the average person, the

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Speaker 1: average person isn't gonna sit there and hack a Linux

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Speaker 1: box to have a better social media experience. That's that's

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Speaker 1: not realistic. So the best thing anyone can do, the simplest,

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Speaker 1: best thing, is to get one of the trusted password managers.

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Speaker 1: There's a number of them out there. I'm not going

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Speaker 1: to recommend an individual one right now, because anyone I

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Speaker 1: recommend someone's gonna go. But there's another one, but there's

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Speaker 1: a few of them out there. Having a password manager

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Speaker 1: and having a unique, difficult, complex password for every account

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Speaker 1: you log in onto on the internet is the first

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Speaker 1: number one thing you can do as an individual to

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Speaker 1: protect your interest, because if you're logging in with the

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Speaker 1: same password monkey to Facebook, Twitter, and your bank account,

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Speaker 1: that is a disaster. Waiting to happen. So the first

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Speaker 1: thing you can do password manager passwords you yourself can't remember.

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Speaker 1: As a result, I allow the password manager to generate

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Speaker 1: like twenty four character long alpha numeric crypto. Nonsense. You

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Speaker 1: put a gun on my mouth to say, what's your

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Speaker 1: password to your bank and I don't know. I can't

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Speaker 1: give it. You have no idea. And so that right

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Speaker 1: there is the first thing any basic individual can do

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Speaker 1: to protect themselves on the Internet that, uh is totally sensible. Um,

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Speaker 1: I don't I'm not great at password managers, but I

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Speaker 1: never know what my passwords are and they're all different,

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Speaker 1: and so my life is this constant stream of like

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Speaker 1: needing to figure out what my password was, failing and

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Speaker 1: resetting it. But it does mean that I change passwords regularly. Right,

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Speaker 1: But what's so great about password managers. You can have

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Speaker 1: passwords that you could never human remember, and you can

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Speaker 1: have weak ones per website, every website you log in,

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Speaker 1: you can be unique, and by having it in this

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Speaker 1: database that's properly encrypted with a key phrase or even

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Speaker 1: dual factor, then at that point means you literally just

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Speaker 1: can cut and paste your passwords into things you don't

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Speaker 1: yourself know what they are and if depending on your

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Speaker 1: privacy levels, you can do that locally with local solutions

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Speaker 1: with files like on your own machine. But frankly a

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Speaker 1: couple of the cloud based solutions, as much as the

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Speaker 1: cloud freaks people out, is the better one because it

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Speaker 1: will work on your phone, it'll work on your black top,

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Speaker 1: it'll work on everything everywhere. That makes total sense, um

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Speaker 1: I think. Another good thing to get into while we're

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Speaker 1: on this subject, we just started talking about passwords, and

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Speaker 1: obviously it is important to keep and secure those. Um.

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Speaker 1: I think one thing folks don't often think about, especially

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Speaker 1: people who are activists UM who who may foresee or

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Speaker 1: have engaged in things that are legally questionable, don't think

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Speaker 1: about enough is social media networking um as and by

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Speaker 1: which I mean having social media that like It is

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Speaker 1: possible to find your other social media by like knowing

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Speaker 1: you know, like having the same name and Twitter and

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Speaker 1: on Instagram and stuff. Um Having social media that like

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Speaker 1: can be tracked across accounts um most people would be

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Speaker 1: surprised at how easy it is to do that, and

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Speaker 1: mellanct a huge amount of tracking nazis tracking even like

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Speaker 1: a ton of the what the work I did not do,

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Speaker 1: but my colleagues did to like doc docs Russian like

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Speaker 1: secret service agents and stuff. Was like, oh, we found

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Speaker 1: them in you know somebody their their bosses wedding, Like

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Speaker 1: they're tagged in this thing in v K and from

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Speaker 1: that we were able to like find their their account

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Speaker 1: on this other site and like from that, like now

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Speaker 1: we have this like map of everywhere they've been for

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Speaker 1: the last like three weeks, and we can like build

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Speaker 1: this social map of their entire life. Yeah. No, by list.

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Speaker 1: By just literally existing in modern space, you're constantly leaking

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Speaker 1: some form of metadata, right you are, You are always

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Speaker 1: leaking metadata, and the more of you allow to exist

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Speaker 1: in the world, the more that's the case. So, like

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Speaker 1: there's also you've got to think about what the threat

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Speaker 1: is and what the risk is. Right, there's the risk

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Speaker 1: of the individual having a para social relationship with the

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Speaker 1: Internet like I do as a content creator is one thing. People,

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Speaker 1: there's always someone that wants to delve into your private life.

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Speaker 1: But that's a very different risk than a nation state actor. Right,

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Speaker 1: those are two different things. And when it comes to

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Speaker 1: a nation state actor, quite honestly, unless you're real good

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Speaker 1: and I've been doing it for a long time. The

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Speaker 1: individual bluntly is kind of fucked word. As a general rule,

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Speaker 1: your best security as an individual in that situation is

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Speaker 1: the anonymity of the crowd. But when we're also not

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Speaker 1: talking about most people who are threatened to kind of

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Speaker 1: by the state and that situation are not being threatened

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Speaker 1: by the federal government. But they may have they may

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Speaker 1: like be attending protests and not want the Louisville Police

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Speaker 1: to like put together that they're in an affinity group

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Speaker 1: with people, and like, something you can do for that

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Speaker 1: is make sure you're not like if you have a

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Speaker 1: personal account that's under your name with your friends, that

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Speaker 1: account shouldn't be liking and sharing things from like a

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Speaker 1: political account that you have, or from the account of

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Speaker 1: like a a group that you're a part of or

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Speaker 1: something like that. Like just try to think about and

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Speaker 1: look at your your digital footprint from the outside and think,

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Speaker 1: is it possible to connect me to people I don't

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Speaker 1: want to be publicly connected to through this And the

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Speaker 1: minute you've breached that connection once it's gone forever. Right,

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Speaker 1: this is the forever. Yes. This is the same thing

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Speaker 1: as like with phones, like someone will have like their

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Speaker 1: regular phone which, by the way, all these smartphones are

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Speaker 1: just surveillance devices in our pocket. Right. Let's let's say

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Speaker 1: you go get a burner so that you don't want

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Speaker 1: to be connected to the device that you normally use

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Speaker 1: on on a level that's one step above the regular

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Speaker 1: individual level. If you ever have those two devices emanating

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Speaker 1: at the same time, they're now connected in a way that,

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Speaker 1: like let's say, the authorities can associate them together because

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Speaker 1: of triangulation and seeing a burner phone and your phone

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Speaker 1: coming from the same house, you've breached all the privacy

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Speaker 1: you would have had from your burner phone for example. Now, Carl,

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Speaker 1: do you have much to say on the subject of

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Speaker 1: because I know one thing I have seen people do

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Speaker 1: people who are you know, having conversations that they're concerned about,

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Speaker 1: is put bags in Faraday cages. And I've heard things

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Speaker 1: about how reliable Faraday bags and stuff are for actually

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Speaker 1: stopping signals. Do you have much to say on that matter?

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Speaker 1: My experience with that is not all not all bags

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Speaker 1: that you can just buy off the internet or made equally. Um,

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Speaker 1: So what you want to do is tested, and you

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Speaker 1: can only test it to a certain degree. But the

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Speaker 1: really simple tests are you put it in the bag

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Speaker 1: and you try to darn dial the darn thing or

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Speaker 1: use any WiFi connections to it. And that's a simple test.

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Speaker 1: Now is it as good as like? Is it as

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Speaker 1: good as not having the thing on you? Of course,

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Speaker 1: not leaving or else is always the best answer, but

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Speaker 1: it properly In my opinion, a properly built Faraday box

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Speaker 1: or cage or bag that you've put some testing into

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Speaker 1: is a pretty reliable solution. And it's you know, there

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Speaker 1: are so a problem that you might encounter, is um

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Speaker 1: or that I have so one thing I have heard

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Speaker 1: people talk about it is like, well, in order to

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Speaker 1: have kind of a private conversation, we like drove to

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Speaker 1: a specific location and we left our phones off in

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Speaker 1: the car and then went on a walk. And the

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Speaker 1: problem with that is that now you have both just

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Speaker 1: driven to a location with those phones, and those phones

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Speaker 1: are associated with each at it right right, Well, so

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Speaker 1: first of all, you got to think of a world

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Speaker 1: where all of this metadata is being collected at all times.

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Speaker 1: So these phones and their associations in physical proximity to

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Speaker 1: one another is stored somewhere at all times, whether or

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Speaker 1: not it's going to be resourced or accessible to the

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Speaker 1: powers that be when they wanted to be. It's all there,

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Speaker 1: my phone next to your phone, next to that guy's phone.

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Speaker 1: Those associations all exists. They're all talking to the same

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Speaker 1: cell phone towers in the same area, giving them not

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Speaker 1: only GPS coordinates but triangulation data, which, by the way,

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Speaker 1: if you go way back to the hacker Kevin Mitnick,

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Speaker 1: that stuff was going on back then before they had

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Speaker 1: gasiness triangulation data to get him right, So that stuff

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Speaker 1: is all still happening, and those associations occur. In regards

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Speaker 1: to saying I turned my phone off, how do you

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Speaker 1: know that's off? Most of these moderate phones, what does

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Speaker 1: off mean? And yeah, okay, pull the battery maybe, But

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Speaker 1: even then, I would not trust any of these devices

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Speaker 1: in the regards to them. Quote being off, especially things

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Speaker 1: like phones that have un or not removable batteries. Off

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Speaker 1: is more like sleep it is, right, Yeah, I mean,

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Speaker 1: I think one of the worst things that's happened for

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Speaker 1: personal security is the end of the phone where you

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Speaker 1: can remove the battery, like being unable to actually cut

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Speaker 1: power to it without you know, disassembling it is a

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Speaker 1: real issue. One could argue that there was like that

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Speaker 1: that's a much much more insidious reason they did that,

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Speaker 1: or one could argue that it was just one of

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Speaker 1: design and comfort, and it's like hard to say. It

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Speaker 1: doesn't really matter if it wasn't sidious or not. Reality

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Speaker 1: kind of a poor Kano Los dose situation right totally

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Speaker 1: is so well. Now that we're talking about phones, here's

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Speaker 1: another thing that's been near and dear, and I think

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Speaker 1: you've seen some posts for me about this. Um everybody

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Speaker 1: really likes the convenience of things like biometrics, thumb authentication,

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Speaker 1: fingerprint i D, facial identification. And here's the reality of that.

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Speaker 1: We know this already and there's legal this exists in

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Speaker 1: legal space already. But the reality is that you can

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Speaker 1: be coerced to provide biometric data against your will. So

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Speaker 1: if your phone is authenticated to with a fingerprint i

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Speaker 1: D or your face i D, they can pretty much

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Speaker 1: say you must give us your thumb to unlock this phone,

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Speaker 1: or for that matter, frankly, they could hold the phone

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Speaker 1: in front of your face in certain circumstract circumstances, even

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Speaker 1: against your will, and it will unlock the device. And

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Speaker 1: that is considered not a violation of your rights. So

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Speaker 1: for example, if you had a long, strong password on

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Speaker 1: the phone, they cannot coerce you to give that up

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Speaker 1: because that would be a violation of your own rights

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Speaker 1: and Fifth Amendment, which is interesting, um so. But at

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Speaker 1: the same time, one could also argue that a certain

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Speaker 1: circumstances where there's a lot of cameras that are not

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Speaker 1: necessarily watching everything you do. But you could also consider

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Speaker 1: that pass phrases could be dangerous, like saying an airport,

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Speaker 1: because all those cameras could see you plugging in your

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Speaker 1: pass code. So it's a matter of if, when and

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Speaker 1: where right, So what's the right solution at the best time.

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Speaker 1: But I would say that if you were going to

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Speaker 1: be in a place that was contentious, um it is

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Speaker 1: almost always better to make sure you do not allow

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Speaker 1: for any biometric authentication on device. Yes, I never like

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Speaker 1: never turn on don't even like ever have had it

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Speaker 1: in the like ideally you have never turned on facial

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Speaker 1: recognition on your phone, like even if you like deactivated.

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Speaker 1: I don't know, I don't I really that was that

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Speaker 1: was one of the first I used to be in

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Speaker 1: tech journalism, right, obviously I'm not an expert on any

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Speaker 1: of this. But like the worst thing in terms of

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Speaker 1: like my personal comfort with devices was when they were

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Speaker 1: like everything's gonna read faces and fingerprints. Now I don't.

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Speaker 1: I don't love that, um, but you know it's it's inevitable, right,

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Speaker 1: because it is and I had in the past. I

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Speaker 1: did a fingerprint unlock earlier in my life, and I

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Speaker 1: do not have any devices that unlocked that way anymore.

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Speaker 1: But you do like that it is more convenient, right,

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Speaker 1: You miss it when you need to get to your

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Speaker 1: phone quickly and you can't do it. But like, I

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Speaker 1: don't even I don't even let my phone have just

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Speaker 1: like a four phrase like password anymore. Like it's eight

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Speaker 1: characters for me. It's a little bit of a pain

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Speaker 1: in the ass, but it comes with fewer risks. And

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Speaker 1: one of the things that's challenging to every individuals they

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Speaker 1: have to look at what their threat profile is, right,

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Speaker 1: So like, for example, um, soccer mom driving her kids

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Speaker 1: to school and stuff, she might be really good, well

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Speaker 1: off with a biometric authentication on her phone, frankly, because

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Speaker 1: if she didn't use that, maybe she wouldn't even use

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Speaker 1: a proper four character pass phrase. And if she's not

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Speaker 1: concerned about being at a protest, for example, and having

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Speaker 1: some authoritarian take her phone away from her and authenticate

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Speaker 1: to it. Maybe she doesn't need to worry about that.

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Speaker 1: But for a lot of us in the world's we

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Speaker 1: live in, that's a different risk profile. Right, We've got

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Speaker 1: to think about what our risks are as individuals and

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Speaker 1: what makes sense. So if your passphrase is going to

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Speaker 1: be one, two, three, four or use a thumb print

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Speaker 1: I D. For most people, they'd be better with the

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Speaker 1: thumb print I D. But for someone like myself, no,

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Speaker 1: it's not a good idea. Yeah, and that's UM. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: I think that kind of brings us to uh, probably

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Speaker 1: the last part of this, which is um, do you

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Speaker 1: have specific advice on like VPNs UM. Obviously I recommend

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Speaker 1: everybody you signal I I justform messages in general, but

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Speaker 1: like a specially stuff that is secure. Don't if you

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Speaker 1: if you like Number one first rule of any kind

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Speaker 1: of this sort of security. Don't ever put anything on

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Speaker 1: your phone ever that's legally questionable if you can avoid it,

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Speaker 1: like conversationally, like right, do not don't send it over

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Speaker 1: a phone if it's something you would not be able

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Speaker 1: to survive. Having read D you in a courtroom. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: so for the audience, a lot of the audience may

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Speaker 1: not know what signal even is, right, So signal ism

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Speaker 1: is a is a text messaging alternative. So like for example,

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Speaker 1: on your phone, you've got regular text or if you've

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Speaker 1: got an iPhone, you've got I message. Signal is an

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Speaker 1: end end encrypted solution that you install as an app.

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Speaker 1: And because it's end end encryption, it means that it

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Speaker 1: passes the wire in theory not decryptable by the parties

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00:16:41,760 --> 00:16:44,440
Speaker 1: that are passing the data packets in the middle, So

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Speaker 1: that's a man in the middle the decryption. Right, So

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Speaker 1: for example, I message is encrypted theoretically end to end,

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Speaker 1: but Apple ultimately has the cryptographic keys, so there is well,

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Speaker 1: they might say one thing, there is nothing really preventing

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Speaker 1: them from being man in the middle and being able

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Speaker 1: to read the message in transit from a to be.

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Speaker 1: But if the keys are stored on your device, which

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00:17:04,280 --> 00:17:07,399
Speaker 1: are then protected with your passphrase or whatever your authentication

356
00:17:07,400 --> 00:17:10,480
Speaker 1: mechanism is, and those keys are not archived or kept

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Speaker 1: by some hierarchical man in the middle authority, if it's

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Speaker 1: done right, which signal is done pretty well, it means

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Speaker 1: that your data in transit is probably not decryptible, and

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Speaker 1: that's why Signal is a good solution, and it's a

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Speaker 1: good one for the average person. Install the app. It

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00:17:26,280 --> 00:17:29,000
Speaker 1: works just like test text messaging, but you can have

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Speaker 1: a pretty good level of knowledge that the data you're

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00:17:32,480 --> 00:17:36,359
Speaker 1: passing is not being decrypted or caught in transmission or

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00:17:36,400 --> 00:17:50,840
Speaker 1: in the path. So I would say get get signal. Um,

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Speaker 1: it's it's your best bet, right Like, and again we said,

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Speaker 1: I said, you know, you don't want to ever say

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Speaker 1: anything over a phone. That is something that can get

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Speaker 1: you in trouble. But also like, life is life, and

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00:18:02,760 --> 00:18:06,840
Speaker 1: that's not always realistic for people in certain situations. So again,

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00:18:07,040 --> 00:18:10,840
Speaker 1: signal is your best bet. Nothing is perfect. And again

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Speaker 1: if you're putting it on your phone, there's a number

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Speaker 1: of things that could go wrong every single time you

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Speaker 1: do that. But um, that that's one of your better

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00:18:18,600 --> 00:18:20,040
Speaker 1: things that you could do. And then of course we

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Speaker 1: talk about VPNs. Yeah, so so VPN to those like,

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Speaker 1: I'm just gonna go with the basic levels because I

378
00:18:26,080 --> 00:18:29,240
Speaker 1: don't necessarily know the level of knowledge that people are listening.

379
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Speaker 1: VPN is a virtual private network. So with that is

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00:18:32,440 --> 00:18:35,680
Speaker 1: you connect to this virtual private network and it passes

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Speaker 1: your data through an encrypted tunnel to an exit point

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Speaker 1: somewhere else on the Internet in theory masking the source

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Speaker 1: and origin of your requests. So like, for example, let's

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Speaker 1: say you were looking up something on the Internet that

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Speaker 1: you didn't necessarily want people to know you're looking up. Yeah, Like,

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Speaker 1: let's say you're researching the truth about the assassination of

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00:18:55,840 --> 00:18:59,679
Speaker 1: President John F. Kennedy by Bernard Montgomery Sanders Um. And

388
00:18:59,760 --> 00:19:01,879
Speaker 1: you know that the n s A is looking for

389
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Speaker 1: truth seekers who are who are finding out the reality

390
00:19:05,160 --> 00:19:07,560
Speaker 1: of that situation. You know, you don't necessarily want them

391
00:19:07,600 --> 00:19:11,560
Speaker 1: to know that you have have become pilled. Right, So

392
00:19:11,600 --> 00:19:13,840
Speaker 1: if you were to do this from your computer at home,

393
00:19:14,240 --> 00:19:16,040
Speaker 1: but what happen is to people that don't know how

394
00:19:16,040 --> 00:19:17,680
Speaker 1: this all works, you would be coming from an I

395
00:19:17,760 --> 00:19:21,159
Speaker 1: P address that's associated with your account that you're connecting to,

396
00:19:21,240 --> 00:19:25,000
Speaker 1: whether it's Verizon or Comcast or whatever. And you go

397
00:19:25,040 --> 00:19:27,159
Speaker 1: and search up that truth, and the n s A

398
00:19:27,359 --> 00:19:30,520
Speaker 1: finds you with a keyword search for jfk and the truth.

399
00:19:30,880 --> 00:19:33,600
Speaker 1: And therefore, because of that keyword search, they go to

400
00:19:33,680 --> 00:19:37,760
Speaker 1: Comcast or to Verizon and say, hey, we are requesting

401
00:19:37,760 --> 00:19:40,400
Speaker 1: you tell us who did this search, They will get

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00:19:40,440 --> 00:19:43,600
Speaker 1: them essentially a request that's a legal request for information,

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00:19:43,640 --> 00:19:46,320
Speaker 1: and then Comcast or Verizon will provide the n s

404
00:19:46,400 --> 00:19:48,480
Speaker 1: A this is the I P address and account of

405
00:19:48,480 --> 00:19:52,000
Speaker 1: the person that did that. What VPN does is you

406
00:19:52,040 --> 00:19:54,960
Speaker 1: connect to the vp and service. First, the connection from

407
00:19:54,960 --> 00:19:58,240
Speaker 1: your machine to the VPN services that encrypted. Now does

408
00:19:58,280 --> 00:20:02,320
Speaker 1: the VPN service no, your IP address, yes, But when

409
00:20:02,320 --> 00:20:04,359
Speaker 1: you actually type in that information or go to the

410
00:20:04,440 --> 00:20:07,000
Speaker 1: Internet to request that data, it actually goes through the

411
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Speaker 1: VPNs private tunneling network and egresses from somewhere else on

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Speaker 1: the Internet, thus masking your actual I P address and

413
00:20:15,920 --> 00:20:20,800
Speaker 1: in theory your origin of source. Now that's not true,

414
00:20:21,080 --> 00:20:23,240
Speaker 1: but what that does is mean that if someone if

415
00:20:23,280 --> 00:20:25,240
Speaker 1: say the n s A I wanted to know who's

416
00:20:25,280 --> 00:20:27,880
Speaker 1: doing this truth search, they would then find an eat

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Speaker 1: IP address that actually came out of let's say Joe's

418
00:20:32,760 --> 00:20:35,119
Speaker 1: VPN service, and they would have to go to Joe's

419
00:20:35,200 --> 00:20:39,080
Speaker 1: VPN service and go, we noticed this emanated from your network?

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00:20:39,400 --> 00:20:42,200
Speaker 1: Who did this? At that point you have to trust

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00:20:43,040 --> 00:20:47,000
Speaker 1: Joe's VPN service to not disclose their account information about you.

422
00:20:47,920 --> 00:20:50,119
Speaker 1: So what you've done is you've changed it. We know

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Speaker 1: the telecoms will communicate with the government or whoever if

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00:20:53,840 --> 00:20:57,080
Speaker 1: they need to, they always will have. You don't necessarily

425
00:20:57,080 --> 00:21:00,480
Speaker 1: know if Joe's VPN service will You've changed your trust

426
00:21:00,520 --> 00:21:04,399
Speaker 1: model from your telecom to your VPN service. So if

427
00:21:04,400 --> 00:21:06,280
Speaker 1: you're gonna pick a VPN, you have to do a

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00:21:06,320 --> 00:21:08,080
Speaker 1: little bit of research to know that it's a trustworthy

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00:21:08,080 --> 00:21:11,440
Speaker 1: resource that won't just give you up at the lightest

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Speaker 1: form of interrogation. Yeah, and none of them again, there's

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Speaker 1: nothing perfect and often like we did find out what

432
00:21:18,720 --> 00:21:21,159
Speaker 1: was it last year that one of popular VPN was

433
00:21:21,240 --> 00:21:24,480
Speaker 1: like run by the FEDS, Like it's yeah, that's not

434
00:21:24,560 --> 00:21:27,399
Speaker 1: an impossible thing. Um. I know a lot of folks,

435
00:21:27,640 --> 00:21:31,240
Speaker 1: particularly journalists, use proton Um, which is i think based

436
00:21:31,240 --> 00:21:34,480
Speaker 1: in Switzerland, and you will get given up if you

437
00:21:34,760 --> 00:21:38,199
Speaker 1: if the Swiss government is angry at you. Right, you

438
00:21:38,359 --> 00:21:42,320
Speaker 1: brought up a very good point. Uh, Services that exist

439
00:21:42,440 --> 00:21:45,760
Speaker 1: outside of the KNUS the continental US mean that they

440
00:21:45,800 --> 00:21:49,000
Speaker 1: are under different legal jurisdiction than ones that exist wholly

441
00:21:49,000 --> 00:21:52,560
Speaker 1: within the CONUS. So as a result, if something from

442
00:21:52,600 --> 00:21:55,280
Speaker 1: the United States government comes as a request to the

443
00:21:55,320 --> 00:21:58,920
Speaker 1: Swiss company, there's a much like like higher chance of

444
00:21:58,960 --> 00:22:01,320
Speaker 1: a Swiss company would be like, we don't really care

445
00:22:01,359 --> 00:22:05,000
Speaker 1: about your reports. That's worth considering. Also, think about this,

446
00:22:05,000 --> 00:22:06,639
Speaker 1: This actually works in reverse. And I don't want to

447
00:22:06,640 --> 00:22:08,600
Speaker 1: get too deep into this, but when you're working at

448
00:22:08,600 --> 00:22:10,719
Speaker 1: a tier one Internet back one provider, you should know

449
00:22:11,440 --> 00:22:15,840
Speaker 1: that sometimes traffic strangely gets pushed offshore and then back

450
00:22:15,880 --> 00:22:18,159
Speaker 1: to the United States for analysis that would normally be

451
00:22:18,760 --> 00:22:22,760
Speaker 1: let's say, not necessarily constitutionally legal in the United States.

452
00:22:23,200 --> 00:22:28,320
Speaker 1: So there's a lot of shenanigans going on. Yeah, and again, like,

453
00:22:28,840 --> 00:22:31,320
Speaker 1: I think protons are generally a pretty good service. I've

454
00:22:31,359 --> 00:22:34,800
Speaker 1: had no problems with it. Um, But we should should

455
00:22:34,840 --> 00:22:37,040
Speaker 1: be clear hear. None of these are perfect solutions. There

456
00:22:37,119 --> 00:22:40,439
Speaker 1: is no perfect solution. The only perfect method of digital

457
00:22:40,440 --> 00:22:43,320
Speaker 1: security is not putting things on the Internet or like

458
00:22:43,400 --> 00:22:46,199
Speaker 1: through you know, the mobile networks and stuff like that. Is,

459
00:22:46,440 --> 00:22:49,879
Speaker 1: if it stays between you and someone else, Um, that

460
00:22:50,000 --> 00:22:53,040
Speaker 1: is your best bet of it not being you know,

461
00:22:53,119 --> 00:22:56,040
Speaker 1: intercepted or something. A conversation that you have in the

462
00:22:56,080 --> 00:22:59,240
Speaker 1: woods without phones anywhere near you is the most secure

463
00:22:59,320 --> 00:23:02,159
Speaker 1: kind of conversation station. Let me second on proton. I

464
00:23:02,160 --> 00:23:03,800
Speaker 1: agree it's a good service. There are others out there.

465
00:23:03,800 --> 00:23:05,520
Speaker 1: We're not trying to pick on one in particular or

466
00:23:05,520 --> 00:23:08,320
Speaker 1: pick against anyone in particularly. There's a bunch of work. Yeah,

467
00:23:08,720 --> 00:23:10,480
Speaker 1: another thing that you need to consider in this sort

468
00:23:10,520 --> 00:23:13,080
Speaker 1: of thing is also what you're dealing with. Like so,

469
00:23:13,119 --> 00:23:15,480
Speaker 1: for example, on I put up a post a while

470
00:23:15,480 --> 00:23:17,320
Speaker 1: back because there was a bunch of stuff going on

471
00:23:17,359 --> 00:23:20,960
Speaker 1: in Ukraine with with people posting photos that got their locations,

472
00:23:21,720 --> 00:23:24,199
Speaker 1: had things happen. I mean, that's and that has been

473
00:23:24,240 --> 00:23:27,080
Speaker 1: happening for a decade in that war, like well almost

474
00:23:27,080 --> 00:23:29,000
Speaker 1: a decade as long as it's been going on, And

475
00:23:29,040 --> 00:23:31,360
Speaker 1: I posted something about it. And one of the recommendations

476
00:23:31,359 --> 00:23:33,000
Speaker 1: I made on there was a contentious one, but I'm

477
00:23:33,000 --> 00:23:34,360
Speaker 1: gonna back it up in a minute. As I used,

478
00:23:34,320 --> 00:23:38,320
Speaker 1: I mentioned tour the Onion relay. So the tour is

479
00:23:38,480 --> 00:23:42,679
Speaker 1: essentially it was originally created as a as a way

480
00:23:42,720 --> 00:23:46,399
Speaker 1: to deal with the dark Web quote unquote and to

481
00:23:46,600 --> 00:23:49,760
Speaker 1: also relay traffic in a way to mask the origins,

482
00:23:49,920 --> 00:23:52,520
Speaker 1: very much like a VPN service. Now there are a

483
00:23:52,560 --> 00:23:54,040
Speaker 1: bunch of these, So what it was is there's these

484
00:23:54,080 --> 00:23:56,879
Speaker 1: Onion relay nodes all over the Internet, and when you

485
00:23:56,880 --> 00:23:59,960
Speaker 1: connect to the to the Onion network, your traffic bounces

486
00:24:00,040 --> 00:24:02,600
Speaker 1: through three, four, or five, six, seven of these nodes,

487
00:24:02,640 --> 00:24:04,960
Speaker 1: you can sort of dictate what you want depending on

488
00:24:04,960 --> 00:24:06,960
Speaker 1: the client you have. And so let's say you connect

489
00:24:06,960 --> 00:24:10,080
Speaker 1: to an Onion router network node in Arizona and then

490
00:24:10,119 --> 00:24:13,240
Speaker 1: you egress somewhere in France, and you've jumped through six

491
00:24:13,280 --> 00:24:15,760
Speaker 1: nodes in the process. Well, one of the things that's

492
00:24:15,760 --> 00:24:17,760
Speaker 1: a well known fact is that a number of these

493
00:24:17,800 --> 00:24:21,520
Speaker 1: Onion relay routing nodes are owned by nation state actors,

494
00:24:21,520 --> 00:24:25,080
Speaker 1: whether it's the United States or others. So, so one

495
00:24:25,080 --> 00:24:26,720
Speaker 1: of the things I got taken to task for, and

496
00:24:26,800 --> 00:24:28,320
Speaker 1: I want to explain this is people like, well, that's

497
00:24:28,320 --> 00:24:31,080
Speaker 1: not a compromise network. It doesn't mean that it's useful.

498
00:24:31,400 --> 00:24:34,320
Speaker 1: Actually it does, because depending on what you're trying to

499
00:24:34,400 --> 00:24:37,880
Speaker 1: do may matter. If you're trying to mask the origin

500
00:24:38,040 --> 00:24:42,400
Speaker 1: of your data source or your upload or your search

501
00:24:42,760 --> 00:24:45,760
Speaker 1: for a short duration of time, this will still help

502
00:24:45,800 --> 00:24:48,320
Speaker 1: you jump through six nodes. They've got a relay back

503
00:24:48,480 --> 00:24:51,520
Speaker 1: six nodes to figure out the origin of the person

504
00:24:51,600 --> 00:24:55,080
Speaker 1: connecting to the relay network. And that's assuming that there

505
00:24:55,160 --> 00:24:58,080
Speaker 1: was a compromise node in the process. So that means

506
00:24:58,560 --> 00:25:01,040
Speaker 1: if you're passing data through a compromise No. Does that

507
00:25:01,080 --> 00:25:04,720
Speaker 1: mean the data in transit is safe? No? But is

508
00:25:04,760 --> 00:25:08,119
Speaker 1: the is the anonymity of the origin of the poster

509
00:25:08,640 --> 00:25:12,440
Speaker 1: safer for a longer duration of time? Yes. So these

510
00:25:12,440 --> 00:25:15,439
Speaker 1: things get really complex, real fast. And this is again

511
00:25:15,880 --> 00:25:17,840
Speaker 1: one of the best things you can do, because there's

512
00:25:17,880 --> 00:25:21,240
Speaker 1: no single perfect solution, but stacking, so not just going

513
00:25:21,280 --> 00:25:23,840
Speaker 1: through tour but also tour into VPN at the same time.

514
00:25:23,920 --> 00:25:26,720
Speaker 1: And you're I think one of the better ways to

515
00:25:26,720 --> 00:25:30,639
Speaker 1: think about security is kind of the way Sebastian Younger

516
00:25:30,680 --> 00:25:34,160
Speaker 1: describes how insurgent war works, which is it's all about

517
00:25:34,160 --> 00:25:37,560
Speaker 1: creating friction for anybody trying to spy on your ship.

518
00:25:38,000 --> 00:25:40,600
Speaker 1: There's no perfect answer, but the more things you can

519
00:25:40,600 --> 00:25:42,880
Speaker 1: make be a pain in the ass, the better your

520
00:25:42,880 --> 00:25:45,359
Speaker 1: odds that you will not have an issue. Right like,

521
00:25:45,480 --> 00:25:48,880
Speaker 1: That's all you can do is make it potentially more

522
00:25:48,880 --> 00:25:53,000
Speaker 1: annoying and more difficult for for whoever might be looking

523
00:25:53,119 --> 00:25:57,040
Speaker 1: right like it. The more friction you can create, broadly speaking,

524
00:25:57,040 --> 00:26:00,000
Speaker 1: the more secure you're going to be. Absolutely Now another

525
00:26:00,040 --> 00:26:01,640
Speaker 1: thing to think about, and we're getting kind of deep

526
00:26:01,640 --> 00:26:03,199
Speaker 1: in the weeds too. This is above and on the

527
00:26:03,240 --> 00:26:06,080
Speaker 1: average person, right, the average person get a password manager

528
00:26:06,280 --> 00:26:09,439
Speaker 1: don't use your same password everywhere, and don't use biometrics

529
00:26:09,480 --> 00:26:11,800
Speaker 1: unless you're forced, like pretty much have to and move

530
00:26:11,840 --> 00:26:14,440
Speaker 1: on with your life. But once you're beyond the average person,

531
00:26:14,640 --> 00:26:16,600
Speaker 1: this is what we're talking about now. So like if

532
00:26:16,600 --> 00:26:18,200
Speaker 1: you're if you have a computer and you use it

533
00:26:18,240 --> 00:26:21,240
Speaker 1: as your normal day to day operating system, talking to

534
00:26:21,280 --> 00:26:23,680
Speaker 1: your friends, doing dot dot dot dot dot, but then

535
00:26:23,720 --> 00:26:26,600
Speaker 1: also need to do something else a little more privacy inclined,

536
00:26:27,200 --> 00:26:29,800
Speaker 1: you should not trust that device. So at that point,

537
00:26:30,080 --> 00:26:32,919
Speaker 1: your web browser may have all sorts of cookies and

538
00:26:33,040 --> 00:26:35,800
Speaker 1: metadata and storage in it that, even if you're going

539
00:26:35,840 --> 00:26:38,720
Speaker 1: through a VPN, still may be able to reveal your

540
00:26:38,760 --> 00:26:42,040
Speaker 1: identity a spell as Mac addresses and other stuff. So

541
00:26:42,080 --> 00:26:43,879
Speaker 1: if you really want to get pretty into the weeds

542
00:26:43,880 --> 00:26:46,080
Speaker 1: with this, you have to do something like use an

543
00:26:46,080 --> 00:26:50,639
Speaker 1: ephemeral operating system, install that it has no legacy data

544
00:26:50,720 --> 00:26:53,000
Speaker 1: on it. One example of that that is it's a

545
00:26:53,040 --> 00:26:55,720
Speaker 1: Linux based when it's called TAILS, you essentially use it

546
00:26:55,760 --> 00:26:58,879
Speaker 1: like a live USB drive. You boot off of that only,

547
00:26:59,000 --> 00:27:01,000
Speaker 1: or you use a machine dead cared for this and

548
00:27:01,080 --> 00:27:03,920
Speaker 1: you burn the OS down every time you're done. Because

549
00:27:03,960 --> 00:27:08,040
Speaker 1: there's no legacy information or data that can be pulled

550
00:27:08,040 --> 00:27:10,800
Speaker 1: out of your web browser or your cookies or your

551
00:27:10,880 --> 00:27:14,520
Speaker 1: Mac dress information that can associate it with you, regardless

552
00:27:14,520 --> 00:27:17,120
Speaker 1: of if you've done everything right to mask your IP

553
00:27:17,200 --> 00:27:20,800
Speaker 1: address of origin. God, that's the hot girl shit. Um,

554
00:27:20,920 --> 00:27:22,919
Speaker 1: when you're when you're when you're doing when you when

555
00:27:22,960 --> 00:27:25,560
Speaker 1: you're doing that kind of stuff. Um. And again I

556
00:27:25,600 --> 00:27:27,600
Speaker 1: think at this point, I think, up through most of this,

557
00:27:27,680 --> 00:27:30,400
Speaker 1: it's been kind of like people being like, that's too much,

558
00:27:30,440 --> 00:27:32,520
Speaker 1: and people being like, Okay, yep, this is exactly what

559
00:27:32,560 --> 00:27:35,320
Speaker 1: I already am or need to be doing. Um, this

560
00:27:35,400 --> 00:27:38,520
Speaker 1: is probably very few people need to be concerned about

561
00:27:38,560 --> 00:27:41,119
Speaker 1: that sort of thing, but um, you know it it

562
00:27:41,600 --> 00:27:43,680
Speaker 1: is I I've know, I know. Like again, I worked

563
00:27:43,680 --> 00:27:46,120
Speaker 1: at Belling cat Um. I had a number of colleagues

564
00:27:46,119 --> 00:27:49,120
Speaker 1: who were like personal enemies of the Russian state who

565
00:27:50,280 --> 00:27:54,600
Speaker 1: had to do stuff like this. Um and it's you know, paranoia,

566
00:27:54,800 --> 00:27:57,400
Speaker 1: I mean, And here's the thing going above. So again

567
00:27:57,440 --> 00:27:59,560
Speaker 1: like if you're a normal person, you probably don't need

568
00:27:59,600 --> 00:28:03,000
Speaker 1: to be you know, doing stacking a VPN, you know,

569
00:28:03,400 --> 00:28:07,320
Speaker 1: getting signal and all this stuff. But also why not, right, like,

570
00:28:07,400 --> 00:28:10,040
Speaker 1: there's no harm in in the additional security. It is

571
00:28:10,080 --> 00:28:12,920
Speaker 1: a little bit frustrating. But here's one of the things

572
00:28:12,920 --> 00:28:15,520
Speaker 1: I think people don't often think about enough. You're not

573
00:28:16,200 --> 00:28:20,280
Speaker 1: engaging in that kind of security stuff purely because there's

574
00:28:20,280 --> 00:28:23,040
Speaker 1: a threat now, but in part because you don't know

575
00:28:23,080 --> 00:28:25,000
Speaker 1: what the future is going to bring. And one of

576
00:28:25,040 --> 00:28:27,439
Speaker 1: the things that I would point out for that is

577
00:28:27,840 --> 00:28:30,360
Speaker 1: a lot of people right now have been having for

578
00:28:30,480 --> 00:28:34,359
Speaker 1: years conversations about a thing that may soon legally be

579
00:28:34,480 --> 00:28:38,640
Speaker 1: murder on a federal level, you know, um abortion right,

580
00:28:39,080 --> 00:28:42,800
Speaker 1: And so it is possible that overnight an awful lot

581
00:28:42,840 --> 00:28:46,680
Speaker 1: of conversations a bunch of people have had legally will

582
00:28:46,680 --> 00:28:49,520
Speaker 1: suddenly be very illegal conversations. And then you may be

583
00:28:49,640 --> 00:28:52,840
Speaker 1: glad that you took greater care with your your personal

584
00:28:52,880 --> 00:28:55,240
Speaker 1: security prior to that point. Yeah, I mean, like so

585
00:28:55,360 --> 00:28:57,920
Speaker 1: think of the I mean, I'm not a person that menstrates,

586
00:28:57,920 --> 00:29:00,120
Speaker 1: but on menstruation tracking app it's very useful to a

587
00:29:00,120 --> 00:29:02,680
Speaker 1: lot of people who do. And those tracking apps now

588
00:29:03,240 --> 00:29:06,680
Speaker 1: that metadata in there, at some point could be extremely

589
00:29:06,760 --> 00:29:11,840
Speaker 1: dangerous or incriminalized or incrimin criminalizing, incriminating excuse me, to

590
00:29:12,080 --> 00:29:15,240
Speaker 1: someone who otherwise was doing nothing more than trying to

591
00:29:15,320 --> 00:29:18,120
Speaker 1: maintain their natural health. And so that is a really

592
00:29:18,200 --> 00:29:20,640
Speaker 1: dangerous concept. So at this point, I mean, within the

593
00:29:20,720 --> 00:29:23,239
Speaker 1: United States, I hate to say this, those apps are

594
00:29:23,280 --> 00:29:26,760
Speaker 1: probably dangerous to the individual because that data could be

595
00:29:26,800 --> 00:29:30,000
Speaker 1: easily used by a government resource to UH to do

596
00:29:30,080 --> 00:29:33,240
Speaker 1: something bad to someone who's done nothing wrong. So I

597
00:29:33,280 --> 00:29:34,920
Speaker 1: think we should move. I mean, at this point, I

598
00:29:34,920 --> 00:29:37,000
Speaker 1: think we've covered the basis that you could kind of

599
00:29:37,000 --> 00:29:40,240
Speaker 1: responsibly the advice you can responsibly give someone in a podcast,

600
00:29:40,280 --> 00:29:43,080
Speaker 1: and and folks should be able to let let me

601
00:29:43,120 --> 00:29:45,560
Speaker 1: throw one thing out real quickly. So you mentioned, like,

602
00:29:45,600 --> 00:29:47,720
Speaker 1: for example, we don't you don't necessarily have the risk

603
00:29:47,880 --> 00:29:50,520
Speaker 1: vector that requires using VPN or signal. But let me

604
00:29:50,520 --> 00:29:52,760
Speaker 1: say this, way back when, gosh, when I was doing

605
00:29:52,760 --> 00:29:57,120
Speaker 1: crypto work decades ago, I was what you mean, cryptography

606
00:29:57,160 --> 00:30:02,520
Speaker 1: and not we should specify these days, excuse me, cryptograencryption. Yeah, yeah,

607
00:30:02,600 --> 00:30:05,760
Speaker 1: I had the opportunity. We're with Phil Zimmerman of p

608
00:30:05,920 --> 00:30:08,960
Speaker 1: GP and actually PGP pretty Good Privacy, which was one

609
00:30:09,000 --> 00:30:13,040
Speaker 1: of the fundamental UH security project or projects way back when,

610
00:30:13,160 --> 00:30:15,560
Speaker 1: was actually written for human rights violations. He wrote it

611
00:30:15,600 --> 00:30:19,600
Speaker 1: because people were doing research of like warlords were getting

612
00:30:19,640 --> 00:30:21,760
Speaker 1: their laptops taken away and then finding out who spoke

613
00:30:21,800 --> 00:30:24,040
Speaker 1: to them and getting people killed. So PGP was like

614
00:30:24,080 --> 00:30:27,240
Speaker 1: this human rights thing right from the beginning. And cryptography

615
00:30:27,280 --> 00:30:29,800
Speaker 1: back when I was young and naive, I always thought

616
00:30:29,840 --> 00:30:31,720
Speaker 1: to myself, this is what we need. This is the

617
00:30:31,720 --> 00:30:35,240
Speaker 1: future when everyone gets proper crypto will blind the government

618
00:30:35,240 --> 00:30:38,640
Speaker 1: will blind the corporations. We're gonna have this crypto anarchist

619
00:30:38,720 --> 00:30:41,840
Speaker 1: future where the government and corporations can't get us. And

620
00:30:41,880 --> 00:30:44,920
Speaker 1: the reality is most of that God who served. And

621
00:30:45,000 --> 00:30:47,320
Speaker 1: the truth is cryptography is too hard for most people

622
00:30:47,360 --> 00:30:49,760
Speaker 1: to use, and as a result, we don't. But here's

623
00:30:49,760 --> 00:30:51,920
Speaker 1: what I will say. The more people that do something

624
00:30:51,960 --> 00:30:55,320
Speaker 1: simple like you signal or use a VPN just to

625
00:30:55,320 --> 00:30:58,000
Speaker 1: browse the Internet, not because they're doing anything to various

626
00:30:58,040 --> 00:31:02,080
Speaker 1: just because their privacy like conscious, Yeah, because it makes

627
00:31:02,080 --> 00:31:05,000
Speaker 1: it normalize. And that means that the person that's using

628
00:31:05,000 --> 00:31:07,600
Speaker 1: it because they need to for like, let's say, to

629
00:31:07,720 --> 00:31:10,920
Speaker 1: protect human rights doesn't stick out like a needle in

630
00:31:10,960 --> 00:31:14,080
Speaker 1: the haystack because everybody's already doing something sane in the

631
00:31:14,080 --> 00:31:19,880
Speaker 1: first place. Normalizing proper privacy and cryptography is better for everyone. Yes, yes,

632
00:31:20,080 --> 00:31:33,280
Speaker 1: absolutely agreed. This is a nice segue because you were

633
00:31:33,320 --> 00:31:36,760
Speaker 1: just talking about the past and how beautiful and bright

634
00:31:36,800 --> 00:31:39,600
Speaker 1: it seemed. Um, let's talk about what you see as

635
00:31:39,680 --> 00:31:44,880
Speaker 1: kind of the future of info security threats. Well, I mean,

636
00:31:44,920 --> 00:31:47,000
Speaker 1: so there's so many levels to that. First of all,

637
00:31:47,160 --> 00:31:50,000
Speaker 1: if we're talking nation state level, I personally strongly believe

638
00:31:50,040 --> 00:31:53,240
Speaker 1: that all of the big players have already compromised everyone's network.

639
00:31:54,080 --> 00:31:58,960
Speaker 1: Everybody got everybody's got us, China's got us, we got China,

640
00:31:59,240 --> 00:32:01,440
Speaker 1: anybody right now it could go in and pretty much

641
00:32:01,440 --> 00:32:04,560
Speaker 1: funk up the grid on someone else like that, And

642
00:32:04,560 --> 00:32:08,120
Speaker 1: there's yeah, and that's not actually the least that's that's

643
00:32:08,160 --> 00:32:11,400
Speaker 1: safer than other possibilities, like because there is the level

644
00:32:11,400 --> 00:32:14,200
Speaker 1: of of mutually a shared destruction there where it's like, yeah, man,

645
00:32:14,280 --> 00:32:16,680
Speaker 1: Russia could take down the grid, but like that wouldn't

646
00:32:16,680 --> 00:32:19,760
Speaker 1: be good for them, and vice versa. You know, Yeah, no, true.

647
00:32:19,840 --> 00:32:22,400
Speaker 1: So the reality is, though everybody's and everybody's network, those

648
00:32:22,440 --> 00:32:25,560
Speaker 1: days are over. Um, when it comes to the individual

649
00:32:25,640 --> 00:32:28,960
Speaker 1: and I'm gonna have a the audience, there might be

650
00:32:28,960 --> 00:32:30,800
Speaker 1: people in the audience to feel differently, and it still

651
00:32:30,800 --> 00:32:32,440
Speaker 1: doesn't mean that we don't try. So one of the

652
00:32:32,440 --> 00:32:34,440
Speaker 1: things I want to say is you're gonna hear some

653
00:32:34,560 --> 00:32:36,520
Speaker 1: skepticism here because I've been doing this career for a

654
00:32:36,560 --> 00:32:39,640
Speaker 1: long time and I've seen things go wrong more than right,

655
00:32:39,960 --> 00:32:42,560
Speaker 1: and so in that regard, this is gonna sound kind

656
00:32:42,560 --> 00:32:44,480
Speaker 1: of cynical. But when it comes to the idea of

657
00:32:45,400 --> 00:32:49,040
Speaker 1: individual privacy, in my opinion, with the exception of when

658
00:32:49,080 --> 00:32:52,600
Speaker 1: you're taking a very active effort in something very specific

659
00:32:52,640 --> 00:32:55,000
Speaker 1: that you want to keep private because that's something you're

660
00:32:55,040 --> 00:32:59,080
Speaker 1: working on personally, the reality is individual privacy is dead

661
00:32:59,120 --> 00:33:03,880
Speaker 1: and gone, and we're just starting to smell that corpse um.

662
00:33:04,120 --> 00:33:08,600
Speaker 1: Whether it is credit card data transactions, your cell phone history,

663
00:33:08,680 --> 00:33:11,200
Speaker 1: your phone numbers, what you've done on the internet, what

664
00:33:11,320 --> 00:33:13,840
Speaker 1: you've done on social media or not done on social media,

665
00:33:14,040 --> 00:33:16,000
Speaker 1: whether you have an account on Facebook or not, doesn't

666
00:33:16,000 --> 00:33:19,120
Speaker 1: even matter. The metadata and the trailer you're leaving behind

667
00:33:19,160 --> 00:33:23,240
Speaker 1: you is all aggregated, all of it behind big data corporations,

668
00:33:23,480 --> 00:33:26,840
Speaker 1: all of it compromised, all of it searchable. Even stuff

669
00:33:26,840 --> 00:33:30,160
Speaker 1: the government has on you has been sold to large corporations.

670
00:33:30,160 --> 00:33:32,280
Speaker 1: Because I can tell you that some of the data

671
00:33:32,320 --> 00:33:34,480
Speaker 1: that they kept for like let's say D m V

672
00:33:34,680 --> 00:33:37,200
Speaker 1: or m v D, they decided to sell it off

673
00:33:37,240 --> 00:33:40,080
Speaker 1: to a corporation and they themselves access it through a

674
00:33:40,160 --> 00:33:43,360
Speaker 1: third party when doing research on you. So all of

675
00:33:43,360 --> 00:33:45,560
Speaker 1: that big data, there's a law of physics. The more

676
00:33:45,640 --> 00:33:52,320
Speaker 1: you aggregate, the mortal get compromised. Um, geez, I'm sorry,

677
00:33:52,360 --> 00:33:54,520
Speaker 1: that's the truth. No, no, no, I mean yeah, you're

678
00:33:54,560 --> 00:34:01,840
Speaker 1: you're you're like it's this Uh, there's this frustration because

679
00:34:01,840 --> 00:34:07,400
Speaker 1: I can remember the days when the privacy hounds. And

680
00:34:07,400 --> 00:34:09,360
Speaker 1: I don't say that in a negative term. We're like

681
00:34:09,440 --> 00:34:12,719
Speaker 1: warning everybody about, Hey, you don't want to be aggregating

682
00:34:12,719 --> 00:34:14,719
Speaker 1: all of these different social media things together. Hey you

683
00:34:14,719 --> 00:34:16,400
Speaker 1: don't want to be using all of these services. Hey

684
00:34:16,440 --> 00:34:19,480
Speaker 1: there's actually some like real downsides like all of what's happening.

685
00:34:19,560 --> 00:34:22,000
Speaker 1: Like part of why things are so cheap on Amazon

686
00:34:22,160 --> 00:34:24,160
Speaker 1: is you know that that your data there is is

687
00:34:24,239 --> 00:34:27,799
Speaker 1: one of the assets that they have. And um, those

688
00:34:27,800 --> 00:34:31,920
Speaker 1: people were absolutely right, and they lost harder than anyone

689
00:34:31,920 --> 00:34:35,400
Speaker 1: has ever lost at anything. Like So, Like when I

690
00:34:35,480 --> 00:34:38,040
Speaker 1: was back there at that company doing all that cryptography work,

691
00:34:38,440 --> 00:34:40,719
Speaker 1: we were trying to give crypto like to the average

692
00:34:40,840 --> 00:34:43,680
Speaker 1: general population of the Internet. I had this, like I said,

693
00:34:43,719 --> 00:34:46,160
Speaker 1: this naive view of like the future that was gonna

694
00:34:46,200 --> 00:34:47,879
Speaker 1: be this place where we're gonna have the Internet where

695
00:34:47,880 --> 00:34:50,120
Speaker 1: everyone was connected, and it was gonna be not only

696
00:34:50,120 --> 00:34:52,680
Speaker 1: would we have personal privacy through cryptography, but we would

697
00:34:52,719 --> 00:34:55,120
Speaker 1: be able to transfer information to one another in a

698
00:34:55,160 --> 00:34:58,279
Speaker 1: way that would make the Shenanigans impossible. Well, to some

699
00:34:58,360 --> 00:35:00,719
Speaker 1: degree that's been true, we've seen some of that, but

700
00:35:00,880 --> 00:35:04,760
Speaker 1: to another degree, we also have Snowdon dropping the bomb

701
00:35:04,800 --> 00:35:07,319
Speaker 1: on revelations about what the government has done to the

702
00:35:07,360 --> 00:35:10,279
Speaker 1: individual and how they've broken the law with all of

703
00:35:10,320 --> 00:35:13,640
Speaker 1: our privacy and data and what came of that a

704
00:35:13,680 --> 00:35:18,840
Speaker 1: man in exile in Russia and pretty much fucking nothing, Yeah, right, nothing?

705
00:35:19,239 --> 00:35:22,959
Speaker 1: And um I was sitting at a Defcon presentation where

706
00:35:23,040 --> 00:35:26,160
Speaker 1: General Alexander was on the screen talking about what they

707
00:35:26,160 --> 00:35:30,360
Speaker 1: weren't doing while Snowden was dropping revelations proving him to

708
00:35:30,400 --> 00:35:34,000
Speaker 1: be lying. And nothing comes of it, right, nothing really

709
00:35:34,040 --> 00:35:37,200
Speaker 1: comes of it. And one of the things that's so real.

710
00:35:37,520 --> 00:35:41,320
Speaker 1: And so whether it's the tribal level, your neighbors across

711
00:35:41,360 --> 00:35:45,120
Speaker 1: the street or the internet tribe, we as a people

712
00:35:45,200 --> 00:35:48,879
Speaker 1: in the aggregate are always willing to give up our

713
00:35:49,000 --> 00:35:52,160
Speaker 1: rights to something bigger for convenience. And we've done that

714
00:35:52,200 --> 00:35:56,120
Speaker 1: and it's called Facebook and Twitter and social media and

715
00:35:56,200 --> 00:35:58,680
Speaker 1: in the process, what was going to be an amazing

716
00:35:58,760 --> 00:36:05,359
Speaker 1: resource has become the trap. Uh, it's such a it's

717
00:36:05,360 --> 00:36:08,279
Speaker 1: because you know, you know Garrison, I I my my

718
00:36:08,440 --> 00:36:11,720
Speaker 1: friend who is much younger than me, UM has grown

719
00:36:11,800 --> 00:36:15,919
Speaker 1: up with the Internet being being what it is now

720
00:36:16,120 --> 00:36:18,840
Speaker 1: right like this this kind of like nightmare trap. You

721
00:36:18,880 --> 00:36:21,240
Speaker 1: know that that's sucking us all in this like giant

722
00:36:21,360 --> 00:36:24,800
Speaker 1: squid that has us in its tentacles. Um. And it's

723
00:36:24,840 --> 00:36:27,560
Speaker 1: I get I sometimes like dissociate talking with them about

724
00:36:27,600 --> 00:36:30,920
Speaker 1: certain Internet things because in my heart it's still the

725
00:36:30,920 --> 00:36:34,759
Speaker 1: promised land. Yeah, I wish I I guess my I

726
00:36:35,000 --> 00:36:36,560
Speaker 1: wish I felt that way. It doesn't feel like that

727
00:36:36,600 --> 00:36:38,319
Speaker 1: way to me anymore, to be honest, I mean it's

728
00:36:38,400 --> 00:36:40,920
Speaker 1: it's not right like and what I mean that in

729
00:36:41,000 --> 00:36:44,080
Speaker 1: like sort of I have this I don't know. I've

730
00:36:44,080 --> 00:36:46,120
Speaker 1: never entirely been able to like let go of the

731
00:36:46,200 --> 00:36:47,960
Speaker 1: vision of like, oh it could have been There's so

732
00:36:48,000 --> 00:36:50,239
Speaker 1: many things that could have been. Well, it's like, you know,

733
00:36:50,280 --> 00:36:53,560
Speaker 1: it's like all technology, anything can be remonized, right right,

734
00:36:53,640 --> 00:36:55,879
Speaker 1: Like an a R fifteen can be used for good

735
00:36:56,200 --> 00:36:58,319
Speaker 1: or for evil. A knife can be used to make

736
00:36:58,360 --> 00:37:00,719
Speaker 1: a beautiful meal or to commit a murder. And the

737
00:37:00,760 --> 00:37:03,359
Speaker 1: Internet is technology and it has been weaponized. It's been

738
00:37:03,360 --> 00:37:06,000
Speaker 1: weaponized against us. But at the same time, if we

739
00:37:06,080 --> 00:37:08,239
Speaker 1: just turn a blind eye to it and then not

740
00:37:08,360 --> 00:37:10,960
Speaker 1: learn how to use this technology to our advantage, we're

741
00:37:11,000 --> 00:37:13,480
Speaker 1: allowing them to do that unabated. And that's where like

742
00:37:13,480 --> 00:37:15,400
Speaker 1: the kind of hacker mindset comes from, which is like,

743
00:37:15,520 --> 00:37:17,600
Speaker 1: how do I make this thing do what I wanted

744
00:37:17,640 --> 00:37:20,120
Speaker 1: to do for me while not letting someone else do

745
00:37:20,160 --> 00:37:23,000
Speaker 1: it for them. And unless we take control of the

746
00:37:23,040 --> 00:37:26,960
Speaker 1: technology for ourselves, like I said earlier, normalizing using signal

747
00:37:27,280 --> 00:37:31,000
Speaker 1: and even basic VPN and cryptography, then we're just giving

748
00:37:31,000 --> 00:37:33,239
Speaker 1: it up. We're not even making it a challenge. We're

749
00:37:33,280 --> 00:37:36,000
Speaker 1: just like, here, you go have it. And uh, that's

750
00:37:36,000 --> 00:37:38,120
Speaker 1: something that I think that's more important as a community.

751
00:37:38,160 --> 00:37:41,120
Speaker 1: Maybe as people grow up on the Internet versus seeing

752
00:37:41,120 --> 00:37:45,160
Speaker 1: it becoming something that I saw become something maybe either

753
00:37:45,239 --> 00:37:48,040
Speaker 1: a they'll just accept which I hope isn't the case

754
00:37:48,080 --> 00:37:50,600
Speaker 1: that the reality is privacy is dead, or maybe they'll

755
00:37:50,640 --> 00:37:54,040
Speaker 1: approach the Internet differently than say someone at my age did.

756
00:37:54,520 --> 00:37:56,680
Speaker 1: We're frankly, we kind of messed up and we didn't

757
00:37:56,719 --> 00:38:01,440
Speaker 1: realize that Primrose Path was actually trap and that's a

758
00:38:01,640 --> 00:38:04,239
Speaker 1: like that was a mistake and maybe we can kind

759
00:38:04,239 --> 00:38:07,359
Speaker 1: of like evolve beyond that. But like you're asking, where

760
00:38:07,400 --> 00:38:10,120
Speaker 1: is info set going now? I I don't have good

761
00:38:10,160 --> 00:38:12,040
Speaker 1: notes for that. Like when I first started working in

762
00:38:12,040 --> 00:38:14,319
Speaker 1: the career, it really felt like a great thing. We

763
00:38:14,320 --> 00:38:17,080
Speaker 1: were doing important stuff. We were doing the DOOS mitigation.

764
00:38:17,160 --> 00:38:19,680
Speaker 1: We were going into hospitals and making sure that insulin

765
00:38:19,760 --> 00:38:23,600
Speaker 1: pumps weren't compromised as a DIDOS host. Believe it or not,

766
00:38:23,960 --> 00:38:27,640
Speaker 1: hospitals are INFOSECT nightmares. And we were doing stuff that

767
00:38:27,680 --> 00:38:30,560
Speaker 1: felt good. And then later in the career I realized,

768
00:38:30,920 --> 00:38:33,280
Speaker 1: wait a minute, I'm not doing anything to secure anybody's

769
00:38:33,320 --> 00:38:36,440
Speaker 1: personal information or make the Internet safer. I was just

770
00:38:36,520 --> 00:38:40,239
Speaker 1: protecting some corporate coffer And the reality was that the

771
00:38:40,280 --> 00:38:43,680
Speaker 1: private information that we were supposedly protecting the debate would

772
00:38:43,719 --> 00:38:47,360
Speaker 1: turn into calls, which was what's more expensive losing the

773
00:38:47,440 --> 00:38:51,040
Speaker 1: data or the lawsuit for losing the data. Literally, those

774
00:38:51,080 --> 00:38:54,000
Speaker 1: were the conversations and corporations, and those are the conversations

775
00:38:54,040 --> 00:38:56,880
Speaker 1: that corporations have now about each and every one of

776
00:38:56,880 --> 00:39:02,080
Speaker 1: ours personal information. Now when you when you think about

777
00:39:02,800 --> 00:39:06,360
Speaker 1: because so I obviously I'm in a different it was

778
00:39:06,400 --> 00:39:08,279
Speaker 1: in a different field. But when I was doing a

779
00:39:08,280 --> 00:39:10,480
Speaker 1: lot of the research on terrorism that I was doing,

780
00:39:10,920 --> 00:39:12,920
Speaker 1: I had these things that were like sort of the

781
00:39:13,680 --> 00:39:15,719
Speaker 1: this kind of attack is going to happen at something

782
00:39:15,719 --> 00:39:18,319
Speaker 1: I feel that very much about, Like drones. There's going

783
00:39:18,360 --> 00:39:21,440
Speaker 1: to be like a mass killing of civilians not in

784
00:39:21,480 --> 00:39:24,640
Speaker 1: a war zone by a civilian weaponized drone at some

785
00:39:24,719 --> 00:39:26,799
Speaker 1: point in the not too distant features going to happen.

786
00:39:26,800 --> 00:39:31,120
Speaker 1: It's going to be done. It's absolutely in an inevitability. Um,

787
00:39:31,160 --> 00:39:32,920
Speaker 1: that kind of stuff. Do you what are you when

788
00:39:33,000 --> 00:39:35,920
Speaker 1: you think about kind of the the digital equivalence of that,

789
00:39:35,960 --> 00:39:40,600
Speaker 1: Like what are you looking towards? Well, I agree with

790
00:39:40,640 --> 00:39:42,720
Speaker 1: you about the drone, Like you can see God, Yes,

791
00:39:42,960 --> 00:39:44,680
Speaker 1: you plot the you plot the dots and you know

792
00:39:44,719 --> 00:39:46,600
Speaker 1: what's going to occur, right, It's it's not it's not

793
00:39:46,680 --> 00:39:49,920
Speaker 1: possible to avoid. We unleashed that out of the cage

794
00:39:49,920 --> 00:39:53,040
Speaker 1: and it's going to happen. Um. Quite honestly, I think

795
00:39:53,080 --> 00:39:57,040
Speaker 1: we're seeing it already. We're seeing we're seeing the level

796
00:39:57,080 --> 00:40:00,600
Speaker 1: of privacy invasion that I don't think people already know

797
00:40:00,800 --> 00:40:03,160
Speaker 1: has happened. Like I know some of us realize that

798
00:40:03,239 --> 00:40:05,319
Speaker 1: we talked about it, we rant about it, but like,

799
00:40:05,880 --> 00:40:09,080
Speaker 1: I don't think people realize the level of the incursion

800
00:40:09,120 --> 00:40:12,719
Speaker 1: that has occurred to the point where all of this

801
00:40:12,840 --> 00:40:15,560
Speaker 1: data aggregated to the point they know what toilet paper

802
00:40:15,640 --> 00:40:18,480
Speaker 1: you prefer to buy. Like I'm talking like people like

803
00:40:18,520 --> 00:40:22,640
Speaker 1: Facebook knowing that um or the size of the corporate

804
00:40:22,680 --> 00:40:25,600
Speaker 1: oligarchy that controls the Internet, whether it's the small like

805
00:40:25,880 --> 00:40:30,480
Speaker 1: Alphabet Court, Facebook, Apple, Microsoft's becoming a smaller player weirdly,

806
00:40:30,600 --> 00:40:34,080
Speaker 1: but when you think about those big names, they kind

807
00:40:34,120 --> 00:40:38,360
Speaker 1: of like control everything in every piece of data about

808
00:40:38,400 --> 00:40:41,960
Speaker 1: you and everything you move, and say that, I think,

809
00:40:42,000 --> 00:40:43,640
Speaker 1: I think what's the end of that? I don't think

810
00:40:43,680 --> 00:40:45,799
Speaker 1: we got to the end game of that, but I

811
00:40:45,880 --> 00:40:48,480
Speaker 1: don't know how we roll it back. And that's the thing.

812
00:40:48,920 --> 00:40:52,439
Speaker 1: So what's the prediction. My prediction is it's gonna get

813
00:40:52,440 --> 00:40:54,960
Speaker 1: worse and we're gonna get to the point where there

814
00:40:55,080 --> 00:40:59,480
Speaker 1: isn't room to move without that surveillance tracking you and

815
00:40:59,560 --> 00:41:01,880
Speaker 1: like so for example, you think of things like Sci

816
00:41:01,920 --> 00:41:04,560
Speaker 1: Fi Minority Report, you walk to the mall and there's

817
00:41:04,640 --> 00:41:08,560
Speaker 1: facial idea happening everywhere you go with targeted advertising at

818
00:41:08,600 --> 00:41:12,640
Speaker 1: the mall. Oh that's coming I guarantee that's coming, and

819
00:41:13,200 --> 00:41:16,680
Speaker 1: all of that's happening already, and that facial recognition stuff

820
00:41:16,680 --> 00:41:20,040
Speaker 1: that's going on is happening currently now we're just not

821
00:41:20,160 --> 00:41:23,640
Speaker 1: that aware of it happening. The cop cars driving down

822
00:41:23,640 --> 00:41:27,319
Speaker 1: the road and every license plate is being measured with

823
00:41:27,360 --> 00:41:31,160
Speaker 1: the cameras being O CRD optical character recognition, and that's

824
00:41:31,160 --> 00:41:34,120
Speaker 1: coming back, and they're tracking every car they're driving by

825
00:41:34,120 --> 00:41:36,760
Speaker 1: on the highway even though there's not a GPS unit

826
00:41:36,840 --> 00:41:43,000
Speaker 1: on your car. The ability to not be tracked will

827
00:41:43,080 --> 00:41:48,920
Speaker 1: soon be impossible. How's that yeah? I mean allegedly, when

828
00:41:48,960 --> 00:41:53,400
Speaker 1: I was younger, they were like certain stupid petty crimes

829
00:41:53,440 --> 00:41:55,920
Speaker 1: I would commit just because like, people will not be

830
00:41:56,000 --> 00:41:58,000
Speaker 1: able to do this in the future, and I have

831
00:41:58,040 --> 00:42:00,919
Speaker 1: a moral responsibility to steal the bulbs from in front

832
00:42:00,920 --> 00:42:02,680
Speaker 1: of this bar and throw them in my threads, Like

833
00:42:02,760 --> 00:42:04,839
Speaker 1: what one day that will be a thing that people

834
00:42:04,960 --> 00:42:07,160
Speaker 1: can't do without getting caught, And so like I just

835
00:42:07,239 --> 00:42:10,800
Speaker 1: I had to. You know, there are like some bright spots,

836
00:42:10,840 --> 00:42:13,200
Speaker 1: because I think you're absolutely right, there's no on like

837
00:42:13,320 --> 00:42:16,520
Speaker 1: a broader scale, there's no turning back the clock for

838
00:42:16,560 --> 00:42:19,000
Speaker 1: stuff like facial recognition and how funked up. It's going

839
00:42:19,040 --> 00:42:21,080
Speaker 1: to get There are states like where I live in Oregon,

840
00:42:21,080 --> 00:42:23,160
Speaker 1: where like they have passed laws that are just like you,

841
00:42:23,400 --> 00:42:26,240
Speaker 1: public facial recognition is not a thing that is legal

842
00:42:26,280 --> 00:42:30,880
Speaker 1: in this state. Um. And I definitely support more attempts

843
00:42:30,960 --> 00:42:33,799
Speaker 1: like that, because again, anything you can do to sty

844
00:42:33,920 --> 00:42:36,080
Speaker 1: me them, to reduce the spread of the grid, to

845
00:42:36,520 --> 00:42:39,280
Speaker 1: reduce the profitability of these things, even though it's again

846
00:42:39,719 --> 00:42:43,680
Speaker 1: overall a doomed cause. Right, Um yeah, I don't know.

847
00:42:43,920 --> 00:42:46,319
Speaker 1: I mean I obviously I think that that's a good law,

848
00:42:46,360 --> 00:42:48,719
Speaker 1: but I don't know that laws stop corporations when the

849
00:42:48,800 --> 00:42:53,719
Speaker 1: corporations have more power than law. Yes, of course. Um.

850
00:42:53,719 --> 00:42:56,239
Speaker 1: And it's like I mean, obviously you can you can

851
00:42:56,400 --> 00:42:58,959
Speaker 1: ban it for police to use and stuff, which does

852
00:42:59,000 --> 00:43:02,040
Speaker 1: something to the extent that you know they follow the law,

853
00:43:02,160 --> 00:43:04,440
Speaker 1: but um, none of this is I don't know, Like

854
00:43:04,719 --> 00:43:07,680
Speaker 1: I That's one of the things that makes me most

855
00:43:08,560 --> 00:43:13,200
Speaker 1: depressed about the future is the thought that like the

856
00:43:13,680 --> 00:43:16,560
Speaker 1: space for this is not like a major issue, I guess,

857
00:43:16,560 --> 00:43:18,560
Speaker 1: but like the space for kids just like funk around

858
00:43:19,640 --> 00:43:21,920
Speaker 1: and do dumb ship when they're nineteen is going to

859
00:43:21,960 --> 00:43:23,839
Speaker 1: get so much smaller. I mean, I would say. I mean,

860
00:43:23,840 --> 00:43:26,560
Speaker 1: I think the thing is like, as a natural human being,

861
00:43:26,560 --> 00:43:29,359
Speaker 1: whether you're doing anything wrong, even if you're not doing

862
00:43:29,400 --> 00:43:32,319
Speaker 1: anything wrong, the nature to feel like you have a

863
00:43:32,360 --> 00:43:36,080
Speaker 1: private space that's to your private community space. I'm not

864
00:43:36,120 --> 00:43:37,839
Speaker 1: even talking about wrong or right here. We're just talking

865
00:43:37,880 --> 00:43:41,080
Speaker 1: about just that feeling that at this moment, this is

866
00:43:41,120 --> 00:43:44,880
Speaker 1: my space where I'm not being watched. Is a natural,

867
00:43:45,040 --> 00:43:51,960
Speaker 1: healthy need of the human orgasm or organism. Um and interesting,

868
00:43:52,080 --> 00:43:55,319
Speaker 1: Uh yeah, but no, it's it's a it's a human need.

869
00:43:55,680 --> 00:43:59,160
Speaker 1: And I think we're gonna find those spaces become smaller

870
00:43:59,200 --> 00:44:02,000
Speaker 1: and small. And I think when you said, what's your prediction,

871
00:44:02,040 --> 00:44:03,520
Speaker 1: I hate to say it, but I think the prediction

872
00:44:03,600 --> 00:44:06,840
Speaker 1: is it will become impossible to not be tracked. Now,

873
00:44:07,400 --> 00:44:09,279
Speaker 1: the bright spide of that, the bright side of that,

874
00:44:09,360 --> 00:44:12,600
Speaker 1: maybe maybe there's a bright side. Maybe at some point

875
00:44:13,360 --> 00:44:16,279
Speaker 1: when that's the reality, it could somehow also affect the

876
00:44:16,320 --> 00:44:20,240
Speaker 1: people that are powerful and the people that are small.

877
00:44:20,640 --> 00:44:23,720
Speaker 1: And we all realize that humans are humans and therefore

878
00:44:24,280 --> 00:44:27,360
Speaker 1: the failings that sometimes we have as all human beings

879
00:44:27,560 --> 00:44:29,839
Speaker 1: we just kind of acknowledge and be like, oh, yeah,

880
00:44:29,840 --> 00:44:32,759
Speaker 1: of course that's just what people do. Like maybe we

881
00:44:32,880 --> 00:44:35,359
Speaker 1: just realize people are people. But the idea that there's

882
00:44:35,400 --> 00:44:37,600
Speaker 1: never going to be a space to not get tracked,

883
00:44:37,960 --> 00:44:41,200
Speaker 1: I don't know. To me, I find darkly disturbing. It

884
00:44:41,360 --> 00:44:43,920
Speaker 1: is disturbing. I do think it kind of to pivot

885
00:44:43,920 --> 00:44:45,600
Speaker 1: off of what you were saying. The other aspect of

886
00:44:45,600 --> 00:44:49,440
Speaker 1: that that is more positive is that all of this stuff,

887
00:44:49,960 --> 00:44:53,799
Speaker 1: all of this surveillance ship um or at least not all,

888
00:44:53,800 --> 00:44:57,279
Speaker 1: but quite a bit of it is you know, in

889
00:44:57,320 --> 00:44:59,439
Speaker 1: a way, it's like a knife fight. There's no way

890
00:44:59,480 --> 00:45:01,719
Speaker 1: that both parties don't get cut, and you know, the

891
00:45:01,760 --> 00:45:04,520
Speaker 1: ones wielding the knife might get cut less, but they're

892
00:45:04,520 --> 00:45:06,560
Speaker 1: still going to get cut. And part of what that

893
00:45:06,640 --> 00:45:10,560
Speaker 1: means in this situation is that the prevalence of all

894
00:45:10,560 --> 00:45:13,840
Speaker 1: of these different ways to surveil and track also allows

895
00:45:14,680 --> 00:45:18,080
Speaker 1: us to track in the same way that like police

896
00:45:18,360 --> 00:45:21,319
Speaker 1: law enforcement watches people through their phones, but also a

897
00:45:21,320 --> 00:45:23,120
Speaker 1: hell of a lot of cops are getting filmed doing

898
00:45:23,160 --> 00:45:29,120
Speaker 1: fucked up ship now right now. Again, the balance of

899
00:45:29,160 --> 00:45:30,960
Speaker 1: the cuts I don't think is going to be work

900
00:45:31,000 --> 00:45:32,640
Speaker 1: out in our favor, but it's not going to be

901
00:45:32,760 --> 00:45:35,080
Speaker 1: nothing on them either. And and and you're right, I

902
00:45:35,080 --> 00:45:37,600
Speaker 1: think there are there are some things that we will

903
00:45:37,840 --> 00:45:40,360
Speaker 1: learn in the future about the people in power in

904
00:45:40,400 --> 00:45:42,600
Speaker 1: the world that would it wouldn't have been possible for

905
00:45:42,680 --> 00:45:44,319
Speaker 1: us to learn in the past, or may not be

906
00:45:44,360 --> 00:45:48,160
Speaker 1: possibly even right now, And that could be And if

907
00:45:48,160 --> 00:45:50,040
Speaker 1: we learned that about people in power, then they can't

908
00:45:50,040 --> 00:45:53,200
Speaker 1: weaponize it as much against the people that aren't in power. Right. Yeah, yeah,

909
00:45:53,280 --> 00:45:55,600
Speaker 1: you know one thing that I'm because I'm thinking a

910
00:45:55,640 --> 00:45:57,839
Speaker 1: lot about the fact that a bunch of folks in

911
00:45:57,880 --> 00:46:03,000
Speaker 1: the reproductive healthcare industry have pointed out that right wingers

912
00:46:03,000 --> 00:46:07,640
Speaker 1: have started using drones uh to follow people home from

913
00:46:07,640 --> 00:46:09,560
Speaker 1: like planted parrot hoods and followed them to their cards

914
00:46:09,560 --> 00:46:11,680
Speaker 1: to build databases of the people who are going to

915
00:46:11,920 --> 00:46:16,080
Speaker 1: places to potentially like do that kind of reproductive healthcare

916
00:46:16,160 --> 00:46:19,560
Speaker 1: that these folks don't think should exist. Um. The other

917
00:46:19,600 --> 00:46:22,839
Speaker 1: side of it, though, is that, um, it is also

918
00:46:23,440 --> 00:46:27,440
Speaker 1: possible to surveil them, um, and it will be possible

919
00:46:27,480 --> 00:46:30,719
Speaker 1: to track the people doing that sort of thing, and

920
00:46:30,719 --> 00:46:32,520
Speaker 1: it will be possible to do that in terms of

921
00:46:32,520 --> 00:46:34,560
Speaker 1: like legal accountability, and it will be possible to do

922
00:46:34,600 --> 00:46:39,520
Speaker 1: that for the people who embrace uh questionably legal tactics

923
00:46:39,719 --> 00:46:44,200
Speaker 1: for for frustrating those efforts um or illegal tactics for

924
00:46:44,200 --> 00:46:47,680
Speaker 1: frustrating those efforts. They have access to the same technology.

925
00:46:47,800 --> 00:46:50,520
Speaker 1: Um And again it's it's it is a knife that

926
00:46:50,800 --> 00:46:54,759
Speaker 1: will cut everybody. Um And I guess that's better than

927
00:46:54,800 --> 00:46:58,000
Speaker 1: just one person getting cut in this situation. That's that's

928
00:46:58,040 --> 00:46:59,759
Speaker 1: the concern I have, right, I agree with that like

929
00:46:59,800 --> 00:47:02,280
Speaker 1: I that technology goes it's a weapon and its weaponized

930
00:47:02,280 --> 00:47:03,920
Speaker 1: in all directions, depending on how to use it for

931
00:47:03,920 --> 00:47:06,160
Speaker 1: good over bad. And so this is the same place

932
00:47:06,200 --> 00:47:08,320
Speaker 1: I come to when it comes to the gun control argument.

933
00:47:08,360 --> 00:47:14,640
Speaker 1: I mean, we can do no, no, no, the same problem, right,

934
00:47:14,880 --> 00:47:19,279
Speaker 1: because if we allow only one side to have all

935
00:47:19,320 --> 00:47:21,880
Speaker 1: of the control and power and understanding of the technology,

936
00:47:22,080 --> 00:47:24,480
Speaker 1: then we at ourselves are at a huge deficit. We

937
00:47:24,560 --> 00:47:27,960
Speaker 1: cannot defend ourselves or fight back. So when it comes

938
00:47:28,040 --> 00:47:30,640
Speaker 1: to this kind of data and technology, knowing the basic

939
00:47:30,640 --> 00:47:33,360
Speaker 1: fundamentals of what you can do to protect yourself, understand

940
00:47:33,400 --> 00:47:36,879
Speaker 1: the reality of what the surveillance state or corporation is,

941
00:47:37,160 --> 00:47:39,160
Speaker 1: and then doing your best to not make it easy

942
00:47:39,239 --> 00:47:41,640
Speaker 1: for them is at least one step forward. But if

943
00:47:41,680 --> 00:47:44,719
Speaker 1: we don't own this technology, if we don't own the tech,

944
00:47:45,239 --> 00:47:48,000
Speaker 1: someone else will and they will use it against us.

945
00:47:48,000 --> 00:47:50,680
Speaker 1: It's as simple as that, and like they're super simple

946
00:47:50,719 --> 00:47:52,120
Speaker 1: stuff like I was gonna bring us up with like

947
00:47:52,680 --> 00:47:54,440
Speaker 1: you can't see video because it's a podcast, but like

948
00:47:54,480 --> 00:47:57,960
Speaker 1: there's these cool glasses from doctor are called reflectacles that

949
00:47:58,040 --> 00:48:01,319
Speaker 1: I'm showing you Robert, and look like regular sunglasses, but

950
00:48:01,320 --> 00:48:04,880
Speaker 1: when you put them on, they do they reflect I

951
00:48:05,160 --> 00:48:08,879
Speaker 1: R light and actually mess with cameras in a way

952
00:48:08,920 --> 00:48:11,279
Speaker 1: that your turns are diet facing a ball of light.

953
00:48:11,520 --> 00:48:14,160
Speaker 1: So you can wear these, You can wear their cold reflectacles.

954
00:48:14,200 --> 00:48:15,960
Speaker 1: You can wear them and just walk around the mall

955
00:48:16,360 --> 00:48:18,480
Speaker 1: and all the cameras get blown out by your by

956
00:48:18,480 --> 00:48:21,960
Speaker 1: your glasses. Like doing that just because you can. It's

957
00:48:22,040 --> 00:48:24,919
Speaker 1: kind of fun. That's the hot ship. That's the ship.

958
00:48:25,040 --> 00:48:28,200
Speaker 1: I was promised that that at least does exist. It's

959
00:48:28,239 --> 00:48:31,160
Speaker 1: not everything I had hoped it would be in terms

960
00:48:31,160 --> 00:48:33,080
Speaker 1: of its ability, but it is like that kind of

961
00:48:33,080 --> 00:48:35,200
Speaker 1: stuff rules and I will be picking up a pair

962
00:48:35,239 --> 00:48:37,800
Speaker 1: of those. Um, well, we should probably close out. I

963
00:48:37,840 --> 00:48:40,080
Speaker 1: didn't want to note because I mentioned this. UM I

964
00:48:40,120 --> 00:48:41,720
Speaker 1: got something a little wrong when I was talking about

965
00:48:41,719 --> 00:48:45,160
Speaker 1: the facial recognition ban. UM. It is in an ordinance

966
00:48:45,160 --> 00:48:48,680
Speaker 1: in the City of Portland itself, Um, it's the first

967
00:48:48,760 --> 00:48:51,120
Speaker 1: city that has done this, and it prohibits the use

968
00:48:51,239 --> 00:48:55,400
Speaker 1: of public facial recognition technology by all private businesses in

969
00:48:55,440 --> 00:48:58,680
Speaker 1: the city. UM. So that is the scope of the

970
00:48:58,719 --> 00:49:00,920
Speaker 1: band that a band that exists in Portland. I recommend

971
00:49:00,920 --> 00:49:02,560
Speaker 1: looking it up. It is the kind of thing that

972
00:49:02,600 --> 00:49:06,480
Speaker 1: I would support everyone pushing forward in their city. UM.

973
00:49:06,560 --> 00:49:09,600
Speaker 1: Because again, the more holes you can make in this thing,

974
00:49:09,760 --> 00:49:11,799
Speaker 1: the better. Yeah. I don't want to put that down.

975
00:49:11,800 --> 00:49:13,520
Speaker 1: That's a good thing. But the challenge of this is

976
00:49:13,560 --> 00:49:15,680
Speaker 1: just like I mentioned earlier, moving the data out of

977
00:49:15,719 --> 00:49:18,759
Speaker 1: the konas and back the minute photos from like I

978
00:49:18,800 --> 00:49:20,920
Speaker 1: take my iPhone and scan the crowd and then put

979
00:49:20,960 --> 00:49:24,320
Speaker 1: that picture up on the internet, not under their jurisdiction,

980
00:49:24,360 --> 00:49:27,640
Speaker 1: and all that facial recondition happens on every face in

981
00:49:27,719 --> 00:49:31,440
Speaker 1: that yep. And that is again, well, we'll do another

982
00:49:31,480 --> 00:49:33,480
Speaker 1: episode at some point about things that you can do

983
00:49:33,560 --> 00:49:36,399
Speaker 1: to just get like there. That's a whole different bag

984
00:49:36,440 --> 00:49:38,880
Speaker 1: of tricks. Um. But this has been really useful and

985
00:49:38,920 --> 00:49:41,160
Speaker 1: really valuable. Carl, do you want to plug anything before

986
00:49:41,160 --> 00:49:43,839
Speaker 1: we roll out here? Not much, just my normal thing

987
00:49:43,880 --> 00:49:45,520
Speaker 1: if you're interested in this kind of content, but with

988
00:49:45,560 --> 00:49:47,680
Speaker 1: a more firearms oriented thing. You can find me an

989
00:49:47,680 --> 00:49:50,800
Speaker 1: in range dot tv. But you'll also find some information

990
00:49:50,840 --> 00:49:53,680
Speaker 1: security stuff there as well. I cover that intermittently when

991
00:49:53,719 --> 00:49:56,880
Speaker 1: it applies to both topics. So if you, if you

992
00:49:57,480 --> 00:49:59,799
Speaker 1: even if you disagree, but appreciate my approach to this,

993
00:50:00,320 --> 00:50:03,920
Speaker 1: come check me out. I appreciate it awesome. Check out Carl,

994
00:50:04,040 --> 00:50:07,520
Speaker 1: check out in range tv, and continue to listen to

995
00:50:07,640 --> 00:50:13,320
Speaker 1: podcasts because the only thing that will save us is podcasts.

996
00:50:13,760 --> 00:50:16,440
Speaker 1: When I think the same, right, but good for business.

997
00:50:21,239 --> 00:50:23,600
Speaker 1: It could happen here is a production of cool Zone Media.

998
00:50:23,840 --> 00:50:26,520
Speaker 1: For more podcasts from cool Zone Media, visit our website

999
00:50:26,520 --> 00:50:28,640
Speaker 1: cool zone media dot com, or check us out on

1000
00:50:28,680 --> 00:50:31,239
Speaker 1: the I Heart Radio app, Apple Podcasts, or wherever you

1001
00:50:31,280 --> 00:50:34,080
Speaker 1: listen to podcasts. You can find sources for It could

1002
00:50:34,080 --> 00:50:37,080
Speaker 1: Happen here, updated monthly at cool zone media dot com

1003
00:50:37,120 --> 00:50:39,040
Speaker 1: slash sources. Thanks for listening.