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Speaker 1: I'm Manny, I'm Noah, and this is no such thing.

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Speaker 1: The show where we said all our dumb arguments and

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Speaker 1: yours by actually doing the research on today's episode, he's

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Speaker 1: my phone listening to me right now. There's no no

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Speaker 1: such thing, such thing, such thing.

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Speaker 2: First question, do you guys use voice assistants like devices

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Speaker 2: very infrequently?

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Speaker 1: I'll I'll tell Siri to put something on my calendar. Okay,

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Speaker 1: I've for most of my life have not used the

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Speaker 1: calendar until very recently at all. Now I'm needing to

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Speaker 1: use a calendar busy.

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Speaker 3: Yeah, yeah, man.

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Speaker 1: You've never known the calendar. It's not that I wasn't

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Speaker 1: busy enough to use a calendar. It's that I just

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Speaker 1: would remember everything. But now I'm starting to like, I

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Speaker 1: can't remember everything.

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Speaker 3: On the calendar. It doesn't exist to me.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, it's it's very important to have it on the calendar.

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Speaker 3: So that's the only way you use hear, Yeah, put

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Speaker 3: somebody account.

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Speaker 1: Only it's only to put pay Siri put it ad.

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Speaker 1: You know, add this to my calendar.

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Speaker 2: And that's like on your phone on my phone. Yeah,

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Speaker 2: not like you don't have like a echo or something.

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Speaker 4: I'm an Alexa head, so a lot of ship in

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Speaker 4: my apartment is set up to go through Alexa, and

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Speaker 4: I really notice it when I go on vacation. You forget,

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Speaker 4: like how ingrained this stuff is into your life until

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Speaker 4: you go somewhere where you can't do the thing, because.

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Speaker 3: I'll be like, Alexa, what was the weather? And I'm

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Speaker 3: in a hotel room talking like a crazy person.

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Speaker 4: It's like or they're like, I'm having actually some issues

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Speaker 4: this week with my Alexa. It's like I got to

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Speaker 4: restart it whatever, it's not working, and I just have

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Speaker 4: been putting it off. And then I'm like, oh, like,

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Speaker 4: how am I going to turn off the lights? Because

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Speaker 4: the lights are tied to the Alexa music, Like every

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Speaker 4: everything in my house is it is Alexa. So when

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Speaker 4: Alexa doesn't work, I'm like, oh, I'm very reliant on this.

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Speaker 1: Yeah.

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Speaker 2: I don't really do voice The only voice activation stuff

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Speaker 2: I do is like on my Rocoop remote where you

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Speaker 2: press the mic and say a movie or whatever.

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Speaker 1: Oh yeah, because it.

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Speaker 2: Especially certain apps. It's the way they set up keyboards.

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Speaker 2: It's it's insane, like why would you put the alphabet

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Speaker 2: in one straight line? It makes no sense you. I

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Speaker 2: would rather randomize it. In a cube and it would

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Speaker 2: be type in stuff then do it that way. Yeah,

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Speaker 2: so that's the only voice thing I can think of

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Speaker 2: that I use. I never used Surry or I've never

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Speaker 2: had like one of those like an echo or anything

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Speaker 2: like that. But anyway, this is generally a topic that

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Speaker 2: we've actually discussed for almost a decade now. Yeah, taking

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Speaker 2: us back to our day's co working in the office, yep,

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Speaker 2: we would, you know, have our discussions that you know

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Speaker 2: would eventually become podcast episodes. Yeah, and if we caught someone,

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Speaker 2: you know, changing their story or backtracking, one of us

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Speaker 2: would yell out something like.

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Speaker 1: Hey, Alexa, play that back. Yeah, you know, as if

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Speaker 1: Amazon's Alexa had a feature that was recording and ready

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Speaker 1: to replay whatever we're referencing whenever in an argument. Now,

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Speaker 1: to be clear that this feature doesn't exist, yeah, didn't,

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Speaker 1: then doesn't now never really has.

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Speaker 3: Do you guys remember any of these?

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Speaker 5: Oh?

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Speaker 4: I remember one specifically we got in a very heated

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Speaker 4: argument about Katy Perry was hosting.

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Speaker 3: You remember this?

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Speaker 1: Not really? I mean I might I need to hear more.

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Speaker 4: It might be a most heated argument we've ever had

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Speaker 4: as friends. We might not be ready to do this,

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Speaker 4: but she was hosting a VMA's and I was saying,

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Speaker 4: this is a really bad look for Katy Perry. She's

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Speaker 4: too famous to be doing this and this is going

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Speaker 4: to be not great for her career, Like this is

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Speaker 4: a sign that she's on the downslope of her career. Okay,

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Speaker 4: obviously this week Katy Perry going to Space and a

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Speaker 4: lot of backlash for it, people not liking the music

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Speaker 4: over the last ten years.

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Speaker 3: I'm not saying because she.

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Speaker 2: Did that was the beginning of the end.

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Speaker 3: It was the beginning and the end.

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Speaker 1: Your argument has been valid is yes.

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Speaker 4: But there was a lot of back and forth when

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Speaker 4: we were there was a lot of because Mila Sarus

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Speaker 4: had done it recently, I think right before yes, so

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Speaker 4: we had asked and you know when you get into

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Speaker 4: those sort of conversations, every line you start to nitpick.

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Speaker 1: Yeah.

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Speaker 4: So during that conversation popular yes, wow, exactly, Yeah, And

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Speaker 4: there was a back and forth about Miley and whether

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Speaker 4: or not that was good for her career. And my

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Speaker 4: argument was myle Sarus was not on the level of

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Speaker 4: Katy Perry. And that's when we had to bring in

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Speaker 4: Alexa to playback the specifics of that conversation. So that

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Speaker 4: was one argument where we yes Alexa to play it.

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Speaker 1: Back, I remember, I don't remember that. That's hilarious. I'm

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Speaker 1: sure I was chiming in, And that just proves like

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Speaker 1: back then I was didn't even fucking care what I

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Speaker 1: was arguing about.

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Speaker 3: No No, that was the thing that was with the

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Speaker 3: fun aspect of it.

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Speaker 2: It's like, who really cares about?

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Speaker 4: Yeah, yeah, I think this may have been too early,

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Speaker 4: But the first time Manny and Noah Matt.

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Speaker 3: Oh, this would be a great one.

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Speaker 1: Yeah, it's not that.

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Speaker 3: It's no one else, Okay, who cares?

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Speaker 4: But uh, Manny introduced himself to Noah, and I would

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Speaker 4: put money on it that Manny said, tie, this is Manny, Yeah,

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Speaker 4: to introduce himself to Noah, and we're like, why would

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Speaker 4: you introduce yourself by saying this is your name?

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Speaker 3: Which is funny because now I do that.

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Speaker 2: Honestly, It's like, I don't even know now what I

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Speaker 2: even think happened, Like.

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Speaker 1: You know, you two thought I said this is many.

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Speaker 1: I mean, that's that's kind of the stance I've held.

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Speaker 1: I don't even know if I even believe it would

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Speaker 1: have it would have had to be, it would have

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Speaker 1: been a complete like accident. But I feel strongly that

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Speaker 1: I didn't say, this is man So what did you say?

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Speaker 1: I would have said, Hi, I'm Manny, my name is Manny.

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Speaker 1: Kind of sounds like this is many to find out

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Speaker 1: this is many, Hey, this is Manny's shaking your name.

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Speaker 3: All right.

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Speaker 2: So lex has been on our minds for a long time,

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Speaker 2: and you know, most people have had some sort of

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Speaker 2: suspicions about their phones and other devices listening all the time.

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Speaker 2: You know, you're talking about something that you haven't searched for,

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Speaker 2: not something you've bought before anything, and then you're on

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Speaker 2: your computer or whatever later and you're getting served ads

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Speaker 2: for something related to that.

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Speaker 1: We've been talking about whether this is happening for a

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Speaker 1: long time. I'm now fully convinced that it's happening. For

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Speaker 1: a while, I've been like, okay, it makes sense when

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Speaker 1: you type something that you your browsers saving the cookies

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Speaker 1: or whatever, it knows what you want to search for.

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Speaker 1: But recently Mia has been getting into gaming, and so

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Speaker 1: she's been playing the Harry Potter video game. Pretty good game.

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Speaker 1: I'll say nothing about the controversy surrounding it. I don't

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Speaker 1: know what you're talking about. But I've been joking to

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Speaker 1: friends that she's been keyword hooked on this game because

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Speaker 1: she played it a lot. And so I've been telling people, Aha,

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Speaker 1: me has been hooked on this.

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Speaker 3: And it's hooked specific hooked.

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Speaker 1: Hooked is coming up now because immediately after I've been

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Speaker 1: saying that, I've been getting Instagram ads for gaming addiction.

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Speaker 1: So I'm getting ads that are like, hey, is your

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Speaker 1: kid addicted to gaming?

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Speaker 3: Child?

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Speaker 1: Big brother doesn't know that. It's my partner, not my child.

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Speaker 1: But I want to show you, guys some of the

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Speaker 1: ads I've been getting. So here's one addiction lawsuit. These

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Speaker 1: are for lawsuits. Join the lawsuit about these gaming companies

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Speaker 1: making your child addicted? How many hours a day?

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Speaker 3: Three plus hours a day? Like normal?

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Speaker 1: That's crazy, I'm doing that easily. Here's another one. Oh wow, multiple,

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Speaker 1: Oh I got, I still get. These are different lawsuits.

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Speaker 1: The previous page is from Right Choice Legal. Yeah, these

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Speaker 1: are different. This one's from gaming addiction.

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Speaker 4: Claims, okay, and this one says gaming addiction. Yeah, gaming

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Speaker 4: giants profit six point six nine million dollars an hour.

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Speaker 1: While your child struggles to quit. And so to me,

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Speaker 1: what other information could my phone be going off of

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Speaker 1: other than me telling people.

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Speaker 3: That you've never gotten gaming additions.

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Speaker 1: I didn't even knows a thing until now.

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Speaker 3: What have you?

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Speaker 4: Have you yourself started playing different video games or anything.

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Speaker 3: Has your gaming habits changed?

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Speaker 1: Yes, less, I'm a huge gamer, but if anything, in

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Speaker 1: the past couple of years, my gaming rate has been slowing.

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Speaker 1: And so this one comes up all right, very soon

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Speaker 1: after I start joking to people that meta is hooked

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Speaker 1: on video games.

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Speaker 2: I have read articles that do debunk this. It's just

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Speaker 2: one of those things where it's like impossible to kind

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Speaker 2: of convince yourself, yeah, because you read it and it says, okay, like, well,

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Speaker 2: they just get demographic info on you. But at the

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Speaker 2: same time, it's always when it happens to you, you're

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Speaker 2: just like, oh, like in this moment, they can't know

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Speaker 2: me that well right now for the timing to happen.

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Speaker 4: Yeah, But my theory would be the advertisers know that

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Speaker 4: you and me are a couple and she's looking at

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Speaker 4: something on her phone and now they are serving it

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Speaker 4: to you.

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Speaker 5: Yeah.

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Speaker 1: Do you think that's a lot of it too? Is

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Speaker 1: how close you are to other people who might be

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Speaker 1: looking at stuff. Yeah, I remember you saying this about

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Speaker 1: how it's not necessarily that they're listening, they're doing something worse,

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Speaker 1: which is like seeing who's around you, what getting a

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Speaker 1: gaming addiction AD. I would be like, what the hell,

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Speaker 1: that's weird. This one trips me up because it's about

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Speaker 1: my kid.

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Speaker 3: Yes, yeah, that's tright.

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Speaker 1: And when I'm saying like, hey, this person's addicted and.

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Speaker 4: It is very yeah, it is very that's a serious one.

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Speaker 1: So moving forward, today's episode came from some news from

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Speaker 1: our friends at Amazon. This is from an article in

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Speaker 1: Arts Technica. In March, Amazon would no longer let users

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Speaker 1: opt out of sending their Alexa voice recordings to Amazon's cloud.

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Speaker 1: This is meant to support their new AI feature, which

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Speaker 1: is called Alexa Plus. The article points out that people

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Speaker 1: might have privacy concerns after prior mismanagement of Alexa voice

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Speaker 1: recordings in the past.

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Speaker 6: And Amazon accused of violating the Children's Privacy law.

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Speaker 2: Amazon has agreed to pay twenty five million dollars to

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Speaker 2: resolve this case.

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Speaker 6: Amazon confirms thousands of employees around the world listen to

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Speaker 6: voice recordings capture by that speaker and homes and offices

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Speaker 6: every day. Questions, family discussions, financial matters, even intimate.

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Speaker 2: Moments, and then they've also been used in criminal trials

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Speaker 2: and things like that. Right, I think a lot of

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Speaker 2: people shrug get a lot of this stuff, and they go, well,

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Speaker 2: I don't have nothing to hide, so who cares? Like

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Speaker 2: if this thing makes my life easier in whatever way,

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Speaker 2: then I don't really care if some Amazon person is

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Speaker 2: listening to me. Yeah, beyond the tech thing. I remember,

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Speaker 2: like politically, a lot of people would say that too,

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Speaker 2: when like Edward Snowden was leaking all his stuff and

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Speaker 2: you know, we know the NSAS can just you know,

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Speaker 2: kind of wiretap anyone and listen to whatever, and people

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Speaker 2: would say the same thing. Well, like I'm not a terrorist,

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Speaker 2: So like if Obama wants to listen to me, like.

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Speaker 1: Yeah, go for it, you know, yeah, And you know,

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Speaker 1: whether it's like, well, i'd rather the country be safe

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Speaker 1: if this is the cost, or you know, I don't

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Speaker 1: personally value my own privacy or whatever.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, so I kind of want to explore the erosion

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Speaker 2: of privacy, not just in big tech, but also beyond.

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Speaker 2: Of course, in more recent months, we've seen the Trump

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Speaker 2: administrations kind of using this stuff as more of a

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Speaker 2: scare tactic. Where even you know, you can write some

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Speaker 2: op ed or whatever and then they're deporting you these

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Speaker 2: sorts of things. Yeah, I guess what are your thoughts

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Speaker 2: on that generally? Like, how concerned do you guys consider

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Speaker 2: yourselves with your personal tech and privacy?

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Speaker 5: Yeah?

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Speaker 1: I definitely. I've been on both sides of it. Like

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Speaker 1: I used to be when I was younger. I used

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Speaker 1: to be the person who was like, you know, I'm

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Speaker 1: not trying to kill anyone, so I don't care if

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Speaker 1: they're tapping into my thing, Like I'm not that worried

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Speaker 1: about it. Now as an adult, I'm like, oh, yeah,

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Speaker 1: wait a second, I don't want it doesn't matter if

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Speaker 1: you're not gonna you know, if you're your privacy is

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Speaker 1: your privacy. You don't want, just like any corporation or

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Speaker 1: politician to be able to tap into it. And I

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Speaker 1: and I ran into this recently because years ago for

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Speaker 1: a Business Insider video, I did one of those twenty

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Speaker 1: three and me ancestry tests and recently they just announced

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Speaker 1: that they're just like I think they're bankrupt and there

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Speaker 1: and anyone can buy them and just have that information.

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Speaker 1: And back then I didn't care, but now I care,

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Speaker 1: and I'm like, it just came back up, and I'm like,

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Speaker 1: wait a second, I'm contacting twenty three and me now

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Speaker 1: to get my stuff deleted. And there's a process you

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Speaker 1: can do it with, but like it's so long. It

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Speaker 1: hasn't been deleted yet. Is my deadline until a company

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Speaker 1: buys twenty three? Yeah, and then they can just say

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Speaker 1: no and that's now. Yeah.

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Speaker 3: Yeah, who knows.

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Speaker 1: It's a situation where it's like, all right, if I

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Speaker 1: don't know what it looks like if my ancestry gets

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Speaker 1: into the wrong and so to speak, but it's still weird.

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Speaker 1: It's your information.

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Speaker 4: Yeah, yeah, Well they've shown that they've used like the

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Speaker 4: ancestry stuff to like say you have a cousin that

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Speaker 4: commits a crime or they think committed a crime. They

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Speaker 4: could get the NA from a scene and say, oh,

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Speaker 4: you know from many that this is this guy actually yeah.

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Speaker 1: So yeah, these days, i'm a little older, I think, like,

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Speaker 1: you know, your information is so unique and it's like

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Speaker 1: one of the only things about you that's private anymore,

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Speaker 1: and I think it's important to like, you know, find

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Speaker 1: ways to keep it private.

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Speaker 4: I lie to myself about this though, because I try

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Speaker 4: to pretend like oh, I'm all about my privacy right,

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Speaker 4: Like there are certain things I won't do.

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Speaker 3: Right.

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Speaker 4: It's like Pole Foods has the like you can use

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Speaker 4: your palm to pay for things, and I'm like, absolutely

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Speaker 4: not Amazon, You're not giving my palm. But then it's

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Speaker 4: like I do all the fingerprint stuff at Apple. Apple

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Speaker 4: has my face I.

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Speaker 1: D oh, yeah.

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Speaker 2: I avoided face ID for so long, and then once

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Speaker 2: I maybe.

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Speaker 1: Had to do it, I was like, oh, yeah, this

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Speaker 1: isn't make it easy. Like yeah, it'll be things like

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Speaker 1: that where it'll be like I used to not log in,

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Speaker 1: like when you're logging into a site and there's like, okay,

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Speaker 1: you can just log in with Google.

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Speaker 3: Yeah.

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Speaker 2: I used to always just make my own password and

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Speaker 2: keep everything separate, and then now I'm.

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Speaker 1: Just like, yeah, I'll just log Now. It's like if

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Speaker 1: anyone gets in my Google account, yeah they go Thatt's over.

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Speaker 3: Yeah, yeah, they get my whole life. It's over.

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Speaker 1: We're clearly hypocrites, Like I pay for clear, which like

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Speaker 1: this is like thirty seconds after I do a speel

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Speaker 1: about keeping your information private.

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Speaker 3: It's the thought that counts it is.

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Speaker 4: I guess the thing, right is like this convenience, right,

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Speaker 4: it's like, yeah, that's really it. I care about my

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Speaker 4: privacy until it's too inconvenient to care about my privacy,

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Speaker 4: and then I don't care.

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Speaker 1: Right.

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Speaker 3: It's like the Alexa is so convenient.

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Speaker 4: It's so convenient to be able to like turn on

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Speaker 4: my music with my voice and like my lights, and

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Speaker 4: to like I have like a ring camera, which is horrible, right,

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Speaker 4: but it's like I have a dog and I need

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Speaker 4: to know when the dog walker comes and at what time.

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Speaker 4: And you know, it's like all this stuff that it's

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Speaker 4: horrible and it's surveillance, and I'm like voluntarily giving up

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Speaker 4: my privacy, but I'm justifying it by thinking, yeah, this

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Speaker 4: is making my life better an x amount of ways,

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Speaker 4: and what is the likelihood that this is going to

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Speaker 4: come back?

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Speaker 3: Yeah, it's that me.

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Speaker 4: But that is always what people think any situations. They're

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Speaker 4: never like I'm giving up my privacy. Oh no, and

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Speaker 4: then like you know, it's like they're always like it's

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Speaker 4: no big deal, and then obviously it comes back to

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Speaker 4: bite them.

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Speaker 5: Yeah.

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Speaker 1: So to spin out some of these questions, I'm going

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Speaker 1: to talk to someone who can actually explain how tech

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Speaker 1: companies like Amazon might use our recordings and why reachuch

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Speaker 1: care or not?

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Speaker 2: That's after the break.

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Speaker 3: All right, we're back. I'm Manny, I'm Noah Devin.

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Speaker 1: So we're looking at how tech and voice activated devices

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Speaker 1: are impeding on our privacy. So I reached out to

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Speaker 1: Andrew Koutz, he's senior editor of Security and Investigations at Wired,

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Speaker 1: to help de bunk some rumors and put our fears

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Speaker 1: to rest. Okay, not quite, but he was super informative.

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Speaker 2: So I wanted to start with the basic scenario we

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Speaker 2: talked about, where you're chatting about something and then you

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Speaker 2: get served ads for something related to that that you

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Speaker 2: never searched for before.

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Speaker 1: Here's what he had to say.

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Speaker 5: There have been many investigations to try to figure this out,

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Speaker 5: and as far as I know, none of them have

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Speaker 5: found evidence that the phone is actually listening to you.

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Speaker 5: Though now even as I'm saying it, I'm doubting that

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Speaker 5: there's probably some instance at some point where somebody's found something.

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Speaker 5: But in most cases, to the best of my knowledge,

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Speaker 5: there's not widespread surveillance of your conversations from your smartphone

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Speaker 5: happening all the time. I think typically what ends up

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Speaker 5: happening is that you do search for something or someone

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Speaker 5: close to you searches for something, somebody you're associated with

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Speaker 5: searches for something, and then because the proximity of your

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Speaker 5: device your locations are aligned, then like you end up

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Speaker 5: getting served ads for things that other people had searched for,

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Speaker 5: or you just happen to input some information somewhere that

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Speaker 5: made that ad pop up and that and you just

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Speaker 5: didn't realize it because we're not all able to keep

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Speaker 5: in our heads every single thing we do constantly every day.

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Speaker 5: The way that these ad systems work is basically, like

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Speaker 5: whatever data your devices are generating through apps, through web browsing,

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Speaker 5: et cetera, you end up getting put into these like buckets.

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Speaker 5: They call them segments. And so it's like white guy

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Speaker 5: in his thirties who lives in Brooklyn, and that's going

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Speaker 5: to be potentially a segment. And they can get really

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Speaker 5: granular and they can be also pretty broad, and so

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Speaker 5: we're not old as unique as we think we are

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Speaker 5: in a lot of ways. Like that explains the way

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Speaker 5: a lot of the more creepy elements to online advertising.

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Speaker 2: So not a particularly exciting truth, but I think it

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Speaker 2: makes sense.

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Speaker 3: Thoughts.

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Speaker 1: Wow, So it's possible that Mia was googling is my

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Speaker 1: boyfriend addicted to gaming? That's not where I went. But yeah,

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Speaker 1: and then it's because of her proximity to my phone

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Speaker 1: for it.

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Speaker 4: God, I'm just gonna ask who signed in when she's playing.

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Speaker 3: Harry Potter account.

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Speaker 1: It's my PlayStation, but she has her own account.

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Speaker 3: See, I think this is it.

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Speaker 2: That actually kind of makes it.

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Speaker 4: I think this is it. It's a new person who

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Speaker 4: was not playing video games before.

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Speaker 2: Audibly and like she's playing kid games no offense, but

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Speaker 2: like you know.

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Speaker 1: Harry Potter, Harry Potter could be It's like it's probably teens. Yeah, yeah,

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Speaker 1: teen a new teen, get her playing some get her,

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Speaker 1: get her on what happens, Like.

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Speaker 4: We do so many things that we didn't even think

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Speaker 4: about day to day, like he's saying, and yeah, we

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Speaker 4: might not google those exact words, but we may be

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Speaker 4: with someone who is looking that thing up. Or we

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Speaker 4: may go to a certain place that you know is acid.

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Speaker 2: And you're you're less unique than you think. Just like

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Speaker 2: the general thing of like no one thinks advertising works

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Speaker 2: on them. It's the same thing of like, well there

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Speaker 2: are things that like based on who you are, like

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Speaker 2: generally they can be like okay, you're you might like

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Speaker 2: this stuff.

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Speaker 4: I feel like I come across this like once a

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Speaker 4: week where someone will make a TikTok and people will

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Speaker 4: be like, oh my god, I thought like I was

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Speaker 4: so I was the only one who had this experience,

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Speaker 4: and it's like there's a hundred thousand people who like

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Speaker 4: this particular TikTok. So like, just because we don't talk

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Speaker 4: about things doesn't mean like we don't have shared interests

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Speaker 4: or shared experiences, And I think people often forget that, like, yeah,

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Speaker 4: we're all growing up and relatively the same.

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Speaker 2: Yeah yeah, it's a good lesson for podcasting topics.

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Speaker 3: Yeah yeah.

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Speaker 2: So then next me and Andrew got into the Alexa

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Speaker 2: news we mentioned earlier. Amazon changed terms of service so

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Speaker 2: you can't prevent your requests to Alexa from going to

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Speaker 2: Amazon's cloud servers, removing a privacy feature that used to offer.

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Speaker 2: Andrew made a great social video on this and the

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Speaker 2: concerns that you just may have that I wanted to

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Speaker 2: expand on. He said that the response of well, who cares,

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Speaker 2: I'm nothing to hide when it comes to personal privacy

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Speaker 2: is actually a logical fallacy.

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Speaker 5: You don't actually know what you have to hide, and

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Speaker 5: you don't actually know what you have to fear, and

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Speaker 5: I think we are living through a moment in time

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Speaker 5: that's making that abundantly clear, where people are being essentially

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Speaker 5: kidnapped off the streets for and off ed that they

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Speaker 5: wrote for their college newspaper or any other types of

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Speaker 5: speech that is well, certainly isn't criminal, but is not

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Speaker 5: even that provocative. And so if you are a person

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Speaker 5: who has a vulnerability at all, which we all do,

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Speaker 5: you have to understand that that can be potentially exploited

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Speaker 5: at some point. And so right now we're seeing what

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Speaker 5: it means to be a target of a government scrutiny

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Speaker 5: is changing by the day. It seems, you know, I

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Speaker 5: would argue that you can think you don't have anything

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Speaker 5: to hide, and you can think you don't have anything

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Speaker 5: to fear, but you aren't necessarily going to know that.

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Speaker 5: When we're seeing things retroactively being used against people that

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Speaker 5: were previously fine and seemingly a not and are now

441
00:21:01,400 --> 00:21:06,040
Speaker 5: deemed problematic or even criminal, that's when we're into really

442
00:21:06,040 --> 00:21:09,000
Speaker 5: scary territory where you can't actually make that assessment.

443
00:21:10,160 --> 00:21:12,399
Speaker 4: What that brought some mind to me is that when

444
00:21:12,440 --> 00:21:14,920
Speaker 4: we're all been thinking about privacy.

445
00:21:14,440 --> 00:21:17,000
Speaker 3: In the moment in which we're doing the thing, right, we're.

446
00:21:16,920 --> 00:21:22,000
Speaker 4: Like, yeah, oh I currently am looking at x X

447
00:21:22,119 --> 00:21:25,600
Speaker 4: is not that bad currently if someone sees this who

448
00:21:25,680 --> 00:21:28,800
Speaker 4: cares not thinking that, you know, like the woman wrote

449
00:21:28,800 --> 00:21:30,760
Speaker 4: an op ed for her school newspaper. I don't think

450
00:21:30,800 --> 00:21:33,200
Speaker 4: she thought in that moment, oh my god, I'm gonna

451
00:21:33,200 --> 00:21:35,200
Speaker 4: get like deported because it.

452
00:21:35,160 --> 00:21:36,600
Speaker 2: Is like maybe I'll get some mean emails.

453
00:21:36,680 --> 00:21:39,840
Speaker 4: Yes, but like you know, if she would have today,

454
00:21:40,080 --> 00:21:42,040
Speaker 4: she probably would not have written that op ed. So

455
00:21:42,119 --> 00:21:44,639
Speaker 4: we don't think about like these things that we are

456
00:21:44,720 --> 00:21:47,200
Speaker 4: searching or looking up, Like our privacy doesn't just exist

457
00:21:47,280 --> 00:21:49,879
Speaker 4: in a vacuum. There's you know, there's going to be

458
00:21:50,119 --> 00:21:53,320
Speaker 4: time that comes after whatever we're doing that those things

459
00:21:53,359 --> 00:21:54,600
Speaker 4: may no longer be klosher.

460
00:21:56,680 --> 00:21:59,080
Speaker 2: So that's that's his main thesis, and then he kind

461
00:21:59,080 --> 00:22:01,359
Speaker 2: of breaks it into three major points for why people

462
00:22:01,560 --> 00:22:04,000
Speaker 2: should think about their privacy. So, number one, he says,

463
00:22:04,000 --> 00:22:06,520
Speaker 2: you don't know what's being recorded. So when you have

464
00:22:06,560 --> 00:22:08,359
Speaker 2: one of these devices in your home, you may not

465
00:22:08,440 --> 00:22:11,200
Speaker 2: be aware of when you're accidentally activating it or exactly

466
00:22:11,280 --> 00:22:14,439
Speaker 2: when it's recording. Andrew says it's not only recording when

467
00:22:14,480 --> 00:22:16,760
Speaker 2: you want it to, and there's no ability to edit

468
00:22:16,800 --> 00:22:19,080
Speaker 2: that in real time. So losing that control is part

469
00:22:19,119 --> 00:22:21,640
Speaker 2: of the price of having these devices around, no matter

470
00:22:21,640 --> 00:22:22,720
Speaker 2: how convenient they might be.

471
00:22:23,880 --> 00:22:26,960
Speaker 4: This happens to me all the time, where like sometimes

472
00:22:27,000 --> 00:22:29,400
Speaker 4: I'll be playing music and then the music lowers, which

473
00:22:29,440 --> 00:22:32,400
Speaker 4: means ALEXA is being activated, but like I haven't said anything,

474
00:22:32,480 --> 00:22:34,960
Speaker 4: so like who knows if music isn't playing? How many

475
00:22:34,960 --> 00:22:37,280
Speaker 4: times throughout the day, think so I'm saying something and

476
00:22:37,400 --> 00:22:40,720
Speaker 4: is recording me not just ask what the weather is

477
00:22:40,800 --> 00:22:43,359
Speaker 4: and other things, and it's like, yeah, there was a

478
00:22:43,440 --> 00:22:45,080
Speaker 4: lot of I do a lot of talking in my

479
00:22:45,400 --> 00:22:47,520
Speaker 4: you know, even just like work meetings and stuff. Right now,

480
00:22:47,560 --> 00:22:49,680
Speaker 4: every time you talk, you're talking to your smart speaker

481
00:22:50,160 --> 00:22:54,600
Speaker 4: or smart device to Yeah, keeping in mind that you

482
00:22:54,640 --> 00:22:56,320
Speaker 4: don't know what it's actually recording.

483
00:22:56,520 --> 00:22:58,040
Speaker 2: Point number two is that you don't know how the

484
00:22:58,080 --> 00:23:00,000
Speaker 2: company will use your data. Once they have it.

485
00:23:00,359 --> 00:23:02,159
Speaker 5: They can take that data and kind of use it

486
00:23:02,200 --> 00:23:05,200
Speaker 5: for business purposes that I'm sure laid out in terms

487
00:23:05,200 --> 00:23:07,280
Speaker 5: of service that nobody read, or a privacy polic saying

488
00:23:07,280 --> 00:23:10,119
Speaker 5: that nobody read that are probably more expansive than you think.

489
00:23:10,359 --> 00:23:13,720
Speaker 5: We do know that they use it for training AI.

490
00:23:13,880 --> 00:23:17,520
Speaker 5: We know that they are, you know, collecting this data

491
00:23:17,640 --> 00:23:22,120
Speaker 5: and having certain employees listen to the recordings. So there

492
00:23:22,119 --> 00:23:24,800
Speaker 5: is a human element, or at least historically there has been.

493
00:23:24,920 --> 00:23:27,800
Speaker 5: And then the other category is what other people are

494
00:23:27,840 --> 00:23:30,919
Speaker 5: going to do with that. That can include Amazon employees

495
00:23:30,960 --> 00:23:34,679
Speaker 5: who get fired and then are mad and take all

496
00:23:34,720 --> 00:23:36,320
Speaker 5: the data and post me on the internet, or it

497
00:23:36,359 --> 00:23:40,080
Speaker 5: can include hackers. Amazon is in a security but it

498
00:23:40,119 --> 00:23:42,200
Speaker 5: can get hacked to like anything that can be designed

499
00:23:42,200 --> 00:23:44,920
Speaker 5: can be hacked, and so you have to just assume

500
00:23:45,040 --> 00:23:46,760
Speaker 5: that it's going to get out there at some point

501
00:23:46,800 --> 00:23:48,480
Speaker 5: and kind of what that would mean for your life.

502
00:23:48,480 --> 00:23:49,520
Speaker 3: That did so.

503
00:23:49,560 --> 00:23:51,480
Speaker 2: That one reminded me of the recent story about twenty

504
00:23:51,480 --> 00:23:53,320
Speaker 2: three and me that you brought up earlier. I asked

505
00:23:53,320 --> 00:23:56,160
Speaker 2: if there is risks if something similar happening to say Amazon.

506
00:23:56,200 --> 00:23:58,520
Speaker 2: Andrew said that, Amazon is of course like an extremely

507
00:23:58,600 --> 00:24:00,960
Speaker 2: huge and wealthy company, so it's unl they go bankrupt

508
00:24:01,040 --> 00:24:02,680
Speaker 2: the same way, but we're still at the whims of

509
00:24:02,720 --> 00:24:06,400
Speaker 2: their future business dealings. And companies also just don't last forever,

510
00:24:06,440 --> 00:24:08,520
Speaker 2: so they could always kind of spin off their AI

511
00:24:08,960 --> 00:24:12,399
Speaker 2: segment and sell that somewhere whenever. Fifty years ago, Sears

512
00:24:12,480 --> 00:24:14,200
Speaker 2: or something going out of business would have been crazy,

513
00:24:14,200 --> 00:24:16,920
Speaker 2: and then they did. So it's like, you know, these

514
00:24:16,920 --> 00:24:19,040
Speaker 2: things only last so long. Once that data is out

515
00:24:19,040 --> 00:24:21,359
Speaker 2: of our hands. It's it's out of our hands, you know.

516
00:24:21,640 --> 00:24:23,840
Speaker 1: Yeah, you never know, like we might launch like no

517
00:24:23,960 --> 00:24:26,920
Speaker 1: such thing warehouses that take Amazon out of business.

518
00:24:27,080 --> 00:24:31,680
Speaker 2: We're planning on it. Yeah soon stay cue yeah twenty

519
00:24:31,720 --> 00:24:32,280
Speaker 2: twenty six.

520
00:24:32,560 --> 00:24:33,359
Speaker 3: Well I think about it too.

521
00:24:33,400 --> 00:24:36,720
Speaker 4: When Amazon acquires a lot of companies, right when people become.

522
00:24:36,520 --> 00:24:37,840
Speaker 3: Like medical companies and stuff.

523
00:24:37,880 --> 00:24:40,359
Speaker 4: Yeah, it's like, okay, I got you know, when I

524
00:24:40,440 --> 00:24:42,520
Speaker 4: signed up for this thing, I didn't realize that Jeff

525
00:24:42,560 --> 00:24:45,600
Speaker 4: Bezos would one day be like controlling this data.

526
00:24:45,640 --> 00:24:47,840
Speaker 3: So yeah, you never even if you trust the.

527
00:24:47,840 --> 00:24:50,360
Speaker 4: Company currently that has your data, you don't know where

528
00:24:50,359 --> 00:24:51,680
Speaker 4: it's going to end up down the line.

529
00:24:51,880 --> 00:24:55,080
Speaker 2: His last point, number three is that privacy just as

530
00:24:55,080 --> 00:24:57,320
Speaker 2: a concept is important.

531
00:25:00,080 --> 00:25:04,280
Speaker 5: Uncovering privacy for probably about the past fifteen years or so.

532
00:25:04,560 --> 00:25:07,679
Speaker 5: And you know, one things that's striking to me is

533
00:25:07,840 --> 00:25:13,560
Speaker 5: just how many of the doomsday scenarios that people in

534
00:25:13,680 --> 00:25:17,000
Speaker 5: the early oughts laid out of what could happen actually

535
00:25:17,200 --> 00:25:20,520
Speaker 5: has come to fruition, not not just in this in

536
00:25:20,600 --> 00:25:24,240
Speaker 5: secretive ways, but like entire business models being built around

537
00:25:24,400 --> 00:25:28,640
Speaker 5: privacy violations. So we have very very little privacy now.

538
00:25:28,640 --> 00:25:31,040
Speaker 5: I mean just you have your own thoughts and then

539
00:25:31,080 --> 00:25:33,960
Speaker 5: there's like two apps or something that actually have good

540
00:25:33,960 --> 00:25:37,440
Speaker 5: privacy protections. The point that you have to care about

541
00:25:37,440 --> 00:25:41,359
Speaker 5: privacy as a concept is that you can't you can't

542
00:25:41,440 --> 00:25:44,160
Speaker 5: take it back right like once the once the data

543
00:25:44,200 --> 00:25:46,560
Speaker 5: is out there, it's out there and there's no putting

544
00:25:46,600 --> 00:25:46,880
Speaker 5: it back.

545
00:25:46,920 --> 00:25:53,320
Speaker 1: In part of me thinks about the like the future,

546
00:25:53,400 --> 00:25:55,960
Speaker 1: and like there's almost a zero percent chance that one

547
00:25:56,040 --> 00:25:59,159
Speaker 1: hundred years from now will have like the same or

548
00:25:59,560 --> 00:26:02,400
Speaker 1: like more or privacy than we do today. And so

549
00:26:02,480 --> 00:26:05,160
Speaker 1: that kind of makes me feel like, all right, we're

550
00:26:05,240 --> 00:26:08,520
Speaker 1: kind of privileged right now. We should hold onto a

551
00:26:08,880 --> 00:26:12,160
Speaker 1: privacy I have, Yeah, while we have it, because our

552
00:26:12,280 --> 00:26:14,480
Speaker 1: kids certainly won't have it. I mean, that's a very

553
00:26:14,520 --> 00:26:16,280
Speaker 1: bleak worldview.

554
00:26:16,440 --> 00:26:20,040
Speaker 2: So beyond just concerns of you know, big corporations profiting

555
00:26:20,080 --> 00:26:23,199
Speaker 2: off of our private data, what if a government wants it?

556
00:26:23,520 --> 00:26:27,080
Speaker 2: Can they just access anything with a subpoena? Andrew said, yeah,

557
00:26:27,280 --> 00:26:30,440
Speaker 2: it basically happens all the time. The FBI used geofence

558
00:26:30,480 --> 00:26:33,000
Speaker 2: warrants from Google to get location data for devices on

559
00:26:33,080 --> 00:26:35,320
Speaker 2: January sixth, for one example.

560
00:26:35,720 --> 00:26:37,119
Speaker 1: From some patriots.

561
00:26:39,800 --> 00:26:43,800
Speaker 3: But I think orange, so it's a crime to be

562
00:26:43,840 --> 00:26:44,640
Speaker 3: near the capital now.

563
00:26:45,440 --> 00:26:47,320
Speaker 2: But more interestingly, he said that most of the time

564
00:26:47,320 --> 00:26:49,280
Speaker 2: they don't even have to try that hard and do

565
00:26:49,359 --> 00:26:51,760
Speaker 2: the whole subpoena thing. You can just buy that from

566
00:26:51,800 --> 00:26:54,320
Speaker 2: a data broker and it's not even very expensive.

567
00:26:56,280 --> 00:26:58,720
Speaker 5: We did a story that we've partnered with some German

568
00:26:58,760 --> 00:27:02,040
Speaker 5: publications on where our German partners had reached out to

569
00:27:02,040 --> 00:27:04,040
Speaker 5: this data broker and just asked if they could have

570
00:27:04,240 --> 00:27:07,879
Speaker 5: some of the data, and they gave them like a

571
00:27:08,000 --> 00:27:11,880
Speaker 5: month's worth of data on every device in Germany for free,

572
00:27:11,920 --> 00:27:14,840
Speaker 5: just as a sample of what they have, because what

573
00:27:14,880 --> 00:27:17,639
Speaker 5: they actually sell is the real time and access to

574
00:27:17,680 --> 00:27:20,119
Speaker 5: that data. And in that instance, we were able to

575
00:27:20,160 --> 00:27:23,040
Speaker 5: track members of the US military because there's a bunch

576
00:27:23,040 --> 00:27:26,520
Speaker 5: of military bases in Germany and see like everywhere they

577
00:27:26,600 --> 00:27:29,280
Speaker 5: went over the course of a month, like when they

578
00:27:29,320 --> 00:27:31,360
Speaker 5: went to brothels, when they went to the bars, when

579
00:27:31,359 --> 00:27:34,080
Speaker 5: they went home and back to work, what their route

580
00:27:34,160 --> 00:27:36,200
Speaker 5: was to and from work, and you know, these we're

581
00:27:36,200 --> 00:27:39,320
Speaker 5: talking about people on facilities where our nuclear weapons are

582
00:27:39,320 --> 00:27:41,959
Speaker 5: scored and so like, that's just from advertising data that

583
00:27:42,000 --> 00:27:43,600
Speaker 5: they literally gave away for free.

584
00:27:43,680 --> 00:27:46,359
Speaker 1: And Andrew says that law enforcement agencies like the FBI

585
00:27:46,400 --> 00:27:48,400
Speaker 1: and ICE have in the past and can't today buy

586
00:27:48,400 --> 00:27:50,639
Speaker 1: the data and use it for whatever purposes they'd like.

587
00:27:53,200 --> 00:27:56,080
Speaker 4: It's crazy too, because I think of like kind of

588
00:27:56,119 --> 00:27:59,560
Speaker 4: for those Cereal heads Cereal season one, there's so much

589
00:27:59,640 --> 00:28:03,520
Speaker 4: about out tracking and trying to figure out where people are.

590
00:28:03,560 --> 00:28:06,639
Speaker 4: And it was before our phones obviously with tracking us

591
00:28:06,680 --> 00:28:10,679
Speaker 4: to the degree that they are now. Yeah, the unreliable

592
00:28:10,720 --> 00:28:12,640
Speaker 4: cell phone towers, And I'm like, oh, if you were,

593
00:28:12,920 --> 00:28:14,639
Speaker 4: like you know, if you think a non did it,

594
00:28:14,680 --> 00:28:16,240
Speaker 4: if you were to commit that crime today, it would

595
00:28:16,240 --> 00:28:17,760
Speaker 4: be very easy to be like, you're.

596
00:28:17,600 --> 00:28:19,760
Speaker 3: Here, here, here, here, We're here and here right.

597
00:28:19,720 --> 00:28:22,880
Speaker 4: Like this is what happened with the the Iowa suspect

598
00:28:24,280 --> 00:28:27,160
Speaker 4: his phone and saw that you know, he was.

599
00:28:27,119 --> 00:28:29,840
Speaker 3: At the house where the people were killed.

600
00:28:30,160 --> 00:28:33,359
Speaker 4: So it is crazy to think just like yeah, and

601
00:28:33,400 --> 00:28:35,560
Speaker 4: that's not even something we think about in regards to privacy.

602
00:28:35,560 --> 00:28:37,679
Speaker 4: It's like you carry your phone everywhere and you're not

603
00:28:37,720 --> 00:28:39,480
Speaker 4: like saying yes, tell them like.

604
00:28:41,120 --> 00:28:45,280
Speaker 1: Something yeah and say, you know, if if a detective

605
00:28:45,400 --> 00:28:48,760
Speaker 1: wants to see that data. It seems to be just

606
00:28:48,840 --> 00:28:51,680
Speaker 1: like a request to the company, do you have do

607
00:28:51,720 --> 00:28:54,400
Speaker 1: you need like a subpoena or anything to be able

608
00:28:54,440 --> 00:28:57,200
Speaker 1: to access that information or that's the company's information.

609
00:28:57,560 --> 00:29:00,680
Speaker 2: Yeah, because then there's like the case like the San

610
00:29:00,720 --> 00:29:04,280
Speaker 2: Bernardino shooting a few years ago. Yeah, Apple refused to

611
00:29:04,320 --> 00:29:07,680
Speaker 2: open it for the FBI. Yeah, Andrew said that Apple

612
00:29:07,680 --> 00:29:09,600
Speaker 2: didn't do it because they didn't you know, it looks

613
00:29:09,640 --> 00:29:13,040
Speaker 2: good to them to say like we care about people's privacy,

614
00:29:13,160 --> 00:29:15,760
Speaker 2: even though obviously right, you know, but then like the

615
00:29:15,800 --> 00:29:17,400
Speaker 2: FBI was able to.

616
00:29:17,320 --> 00:29:17,719
Speaker 3: Just get it.

617
00:29:17,760 --> 00:29:19,840
Speaker 2: You know, they had have their own hackers and they're

618
00:29:19,880 --> 00:29:21,880
Speaker 2: able to get in the back end anyway. But that's

619
00:29:21,920 --> 00:29:24,320
Speaker 2: another thing where like depending on kind of the circumstances,

620
00:29:24,360 --> 00:29:27,640
Speaker 2: and you can imagine a world where you know, tech

621
00:29:27,680 --> 00:29:30,320
Speaker 2: companies are CosIng up to different administrations in different ways,

622
00:29:30,360 --> 00:29:33,200
Speaker 2: they might be more lenient or not just based on

623
00:29:33,240 --> 00:29:36,960
Speaker 2: the circumstance and their personal stances maybe, and again you

624
00:29:37,000 --> 00:29:39,000
Speaker 2: don't really know that's their own assessment of like what's

625
00:29:39,040 --> 00:29:42,080
Speaker 2: more important to like protect our customer in this sense,

626
00:29:42,200 --> 00:29:46,040
Speaker 2: or catch some terrorists or you know, perceived terrorists or whatever.

627
00:29:46,480 --> 00:29:50,040
Speaker 1: The dynamic of a tech company cozying up with an

628
00:29:50,080 --> 00:29:53,480
Speaker 1: administration is happening right now with that company Palanteer, where

629
00:29:53,520 --> 00:29:57,320
Speaker 1: like Ice is now paying they just it's a thirty

630
00:29:57,400 --> 00:30:02,440
Speaker 1: million dollar contracts to build like US the immigration surveillance program.

631
00:30:02,760 --> 00:30:05,000
Speaker 1: I mean, those things just change on a whim depending

632
00:30:05,000 --> 00:30:06,160
Speaker 1: on who's in the administration.

633
00:30:06,400 --> 00:30:08,600
Speaker 2: So then, anyway, I asked Andrew if there's any way

634
00:30:08,760 --> 00:30:10,560
Speaker 2: that things can get better or is it just all

635
00:30:10,600 --> 00:30:12,360
Speaker 2: too far gone.

636
00:30:13,040 --> 00:30:16,200
Speaker 5: You can't do much about what's already out there beyond

637
00:30:16,640 --> 00:30:21,400
Speaker 5: the basically impossible instance where just companies just start deleting

638
00:30:21,480 --> 00:30:24,240
Speaker 5: data or there's like some law that gets past that

639
00:30:24,280 --> 00:30:26,320
Speaker 5: they say like, oh yeah, all that data collection that's

640
00:30:26,320 --> 00:30:29,280
Speaker 5: happened for the past twenty years, that's illegal now and

641
00:30:29,320 --> 00:30:31,480
Speaker 5: you have to go back and delete all of it.

642
00:30:31,840 --> 00:30:32,640
Speaker 5: That's not going to.

643
00:30:32,600 --> 00:30:34,680
Speaker 1: Happen, But he says we could see a digital privacy

644
00:30:34,720 --> 00:30:37,320
Speaker 1: law passed on state or federal levels, which could make

645
00:30:37,360 --> 00:30:40,440
Speaker 1: for more transparency on what's actually collected and maybe put

646
00:30:40,480 --> 00:30:43,320
Speaker 1: some terms on it being deleted. Andrew says some countries

647
00:30:43,360 --> 00:30:45,320
Speaker 1: in Europe right now and even in China have better

648
00:30:45,400 --> 00:30:47,920
Speaker 1: data protections than we do, So there are ways to

649
00:30:47,920 --> 00:30:50,080
Speaker 1: improve on where we are, even if we can't quite

650
00:30:50,120 --> 00:30:52,960
Speaker 1: ever reverse the destruction to our collective privacy so far,

651
00:30:55,480 --> 00:30:58,440
Speaker 1: it's good to have a little bit of optimism. Yeah,

652
00:30:58,480 --> 00:30:59,440
Speaker 1: care you can move to China.

653
00:30:59,640 --> 00:31:01,800
Speaker 3: Yeah, I will say too.

654
00:31:02,000 --> 00:31:03,960
Speaker 4: There is a lot more of a focus now, at

655
00:31:04,040 --> 00:31:08,040
Speaker 4: least with kids on their privacy and data companies.

656
00:31:08,520 --> 00:31:12,280
Speaker 3: I could see that at some point, once we do.

657
00:31:12,200 --> 00:31:15,160
Speaker 4: A little bit better job of that, of that, you know,

658
00:31:15,280 --> 00:31:19,040
Speaker 4: that being a framework for expanding to us adults in

659
00:31:19,160 --> 00:31:22,880
Speaker 4: our privacy as well, because I think the assumption is that, oh,

660
00:31:22,880 --> 00:31:25,280
Speaker 4: when you're an adult, you're unaware of what you're giving up.

661
00:31:25,400 --> 00:31:25,640
Speaker 1: Yeah.

662
00:31:25,720 --> 00:31:27,480
Speaker 3: Yeah, but I don't think that's the case.

663
00:31:27,680 --> 00:31:30,880
Speaker 4: I think people would be shocked by the things that

664
00:31:30,920 --> 00:31:32,520
Speaker 4: they are agreeing to on a daily basis.

665
00:31:32,600 --> 00:31:32,959
Speaker 1: Yeah.

666
00:31:33,040 --> 00:31:35,240
Speaker 2: So I was curious if Andrew himself used any voice

667
00:31:35,280 --> 00:31:39,000
Speaker 2: activated devices. He doesn't really, but he did make a

668
00:31:39,000 --> 00:31:41,840
Speaker 2: good point about why people might and how we can

669
00:31:41,880 --> 00:31:43,880
Speaker 2: live rationally with these privacy intrusions.

670
00:31:44,320 --> 00:31:46,280
Speaker 5: I will say, like, a lot of the things that

671
00:31:46,320 --> 00:31:49,719
Speaker 5: are really bad for privacy are great for accessibility. So

672
00:31:50,000 --> 00:31:52,360
Speaker 5: if people have disabilities, there's just a lot of things

673
00:31:52,440 --> 00:31:55,960
Speaker 5: that make it people's lives a lot easier. And that's

674
00:31:56,000 --> 00:31:58,960
Speaker 5: why I'm I'm hesn't called any of these things like

675
00:31:59,040 --> 00:32:01,520
Speaker 5: bad on their face because they are useful for a

676
00:32:01,520 --> 00:32:04,280
Speaker 5: lot of people. Even you know, my eighty five year

677
00:32:04,280 --> 00:32:06,560
Speaker 5: old mother in law who doesn't get around as quickly

678
00:32:06,560 --> 00:32:09,240
Speaker 5: as she used to. She uses an Alexa device, I believe,

679
00:32:09,320 --> 00:32:12,720
Speaker 5: and I would never take that away from her, Like

680
00:32:12,760 --> 00:32:14,840
Speaker 5: it makes her life a lot easier. It reduces the

681
00:32:14,960 --> 00:32:17,280
Speaker 5: risk of falling and you know, having a serious injury

682
00:32:17,320 --> 00:32:19,480
Speaker 5: or going to the hospital, and that's really good. And

683
00:32:19,560 --> 00:32:21,600
Speaker 5: I think the way you have to think about these

684
00:32:21,640 --> 00:32:25,000
Speaker 5: things is to have kind of a personal threat model

685
00:32:25,120 --> 00:32:28,240
Speaker 5: and understand what your risk thresholds are. For my mother

686
00:32:28,240 --> 00:32:30,240
Speaker 5: in law, it's tripping and falling is a much higher

687
00:32:30,280 --> 00:32:34,440
Speaker 5: risk than hacker stealing her whatever she says to her Alexa.

688
00:32:34,680 --> 00:32:36,360
Speaker 2: You have to think about how this can work in

689
00:32:36,400 --> 00:32:39,200
Speaker 2: your life and like, obviously these things really help you,

690
00:32:39,240 --> 00:32:42,800
Speaker 2: then that's great. Just be mindful of those sorts of things.

691
00:32:42,800 --> 00:32:45,480
Speaker 2: He also is just just like especially for certain things,

692
00:32:45,520 --> 00:32:48,440
Speaker 2: like read the terms and conditions and check like, okay,

693
00:32:48,440 --> 00:32:50,840
Speaker 2: what can they actually do with this? See if there

694
00:32:50,880 --> 00:32:52,840
Speaker 2: is kind of what you would see as an overreach,

695
00:32:52,920 --> 00:32:53,680
Speaker 2: that sort of thing.

696
00:32:53,720 --> 00:32:56,480
Speaker 1: Yeah, it's a good advice. I don't think I even

697
00:32:56,760 --> 00:32:59,400
Speaker 1: once ever have looked at terms and conditions.

698
00:32:59,400 --> 00:33:01,440
Speaker 2: Oh yeah, I'm going when when like sometimes on a

699
00:33:01,480 --> 00:33:03,960
Speaker 2: video game something it makes you.

700
00:33:03,360 --> 00:33:05,880
Speaker 1: Like really go down, It's like, actually, I don't care

701
00:33:05,920 --> 00:33:08,560
Speaker 1: about myself, just just automatic.

702
00:33:08,920 --> 00:33:13,840
Speaker 2: I mean, does hearing all this change how you think

703
00:33:13,880 --> 00:33:16,320
Speaker 2: you guys will go about your lives? Or is it

704
00:33:16,400 --> 00:33:17,880
Speaker 2: just kind of more maybe a thought.

705
00:33:18,200 --> 00:33:21,840
Speaker 1: So I certainly learned more about like the extent of

706
00:33:22,520 --> 00:33:27,760
Speaker 1: what quote unquote they have us, Like the story about

707
00:33:27,760 --> 00:33:30,800
Speaker 1: the German like in Germany Blue kind of blew my mind.

708
00:33:31,120 --> 00:33:35,680
Speaker 1: I already knew that all this stuff is compromised, so

709
00:33:35,760 --> 00:33:38,680
Speaker 1: to speak. My concern is like, what's the potential of

710
00:33:38,720 --> 00:33:41,280
Speaker 1: it being used in a harmful way?

711
00:33:41,400 --> 00:33:41,680
Speaker 3: To me?

712
00:33:42,200 --> 00:33:44,000
Speaker 1: Sure, your interview with him gave me a lot to

713
00:33:44,000 --> 00:33:44,440
Speaker 1: think about.

714
00:33:45,160 --> 00:33:46,000
Speaker 2: You're welcome.

715
00:33:47,240 --> 00:33:47,960
Speaker 3: Doing God's work.

716
00:33:48,120 --> 00:33:50,400
Speaker 4: No, I think the thing that I didn't quite think

717
00:33:50,440 --> 00:33:54,959
Speaker 4: about was, yeah, how can this stuff be weaponized in

718
00:33:55,600 --> 00:33:57,040
Speaker 4: the not so just in future?

719
00:33:57,160 --> 00:33:57,280
Speaker 1: Right?

720
00:33:57,320 --> 00:33:58,840
Speaker 3: And I'm always thinking about things.

721
00:33:58,640 --> 00:34:02,200
Speaker 4: Within a context of now and not like, oh, ten

722
00:34:02,320 --> 00:34:06,160
Speaker 4: fifteen years down the line. If yeah, I don't know,

723
00:34:06,520 --> 00:34:08,920
Speaker 4: someone knows that I listened to Kanye. It cannot be

724
00:34:09,040 --> 00:34:11,920
Speaker 4: used against me in some cord of law or something,

725
00:34:12,000 --> 00:34:14,440
Speaker 4: you know, if it's no longer cool to do that.

726
00:34:15,560 --> 00:34:18,680
Speaker 4: And I always thought of privacy as in what am

727
00:34:18,719 --> 00:34:21,040
Speaker 4: I doing in this moment? If I were caught now

728
00:34:21,120 --> 00:34:24,120
Speaker 4: doing this thing by someone? Yeah, yeah, how bad would

729
00:34:24,160 --> 00:34:27,320
Speaker 4: that look? And I'm like, I amout doing anything that bad. Yeah,

730
00:34:27,360 --> 00:34:29,239
Speaker 4: but it's like, oh yeah, norms changed, and.

731
00:34:29,320 --> 00:34:31,480
Speaker 2: You never know if someone has some case they're trying

732
00:34:31,480 --> 00:34:34,120
Speaker 2: to build against you, yep, how they can spend anything.

733
00:34:34,520 --> 00:34:43,360
Speaker 1: Yeah, look at all right, thank you for listening. We

734
00:34:43,400 --> 00:34:50,600
Speaker 1: could cut that out to thank you. No Such Thing

735
00:34:50,600 --> 00:34:53,320
Speaker 1: as produced by Noah Friedman, Manny Fidela, and Devin Joseph.

736
00:34:53,560 --> 00:34:56,799
Speaker 1: Theme music is by Manny, with additional music by Xeno Piccarelli.

737
00:34:57,200 --> 00:34:59,600
Speaker 1: Big thanks to our guest today Andrew Kouts from Wired.

738
00:35:00,040 --> 00:35:02,600
Speaker 1: For related links in research, please subscribe to our newsletter

739
00:35:02,600 --> 00:35:04,920
Speaker 1: at No Such Thing dot show, and if you have

740
00:35:04,920 --> 00:35:07,280
Speaker 1: a question you'd like us to tackle or want to

741
00:35:07,320 --> 00:35:10,000
Speaker 1: say anything, shoot us an email at many Nooadevin at

742
00:35:10,080 --> 00:35:13,200
Speaker 1: gmail dot com. Lastly, if you like the show, please

743
00:35:13,200 --> 00:35:15,279
Speaker 1: follow us wherever you listen and give us a five

744
00:35:15,360 --> 00:35:17,799
Speaker 1: star rating and write a nice review while you're at it.

745
00:35:17,800 --> 00:35:20,320
Speaker 1: It really really helps a lot. Thank you to the

746
00:35:20,360 --> 00:35:22,520
Speaker 1: loyal NST heads out there, and we'll talk to you

747
00:35:22,560 --> 00:35:23,040
Speaker 1: again soon