WEBVTT - United Technologies-Rockwell Collins Deal Defends Against Boeing, Rothacker Says

0:00:05.800 --> 0:00:08.720
<v Speaker 1>Welcome to the Bloomberg P and L Podcast. I'm pim Fox.

0:00:08.760 --> 0:00:11.520
<v Speaker 1>Along with my co host Lisa Bramowitz. Each day we

0:00:11.640 --> 0:00:15.120
<v Speaker 1>bring you the most important, noteworthy, and useful interviews for

0:00:15.200 --> 0:00:17.840
<v Speaker 1>you and your money, whether you're at the grocery store

0:00:17.960 --> 0:00:20.720
<v Speaker 1>or the trading floor. Find the Bloomberg P and L

0:00:20.840 --> 0:00:32.200
<v Speaker 1>Podcast on Apple Podcasts, SoundCloud, and Bloomberg dot com. Well

0:00:32.240 --> 0:00:35.440
<v Speaker 1>the shares of Rockwell Collins. They are up about four percent.

0:00:35.640 --> 0:00:39.200
<v Speaker 1>This follows a report from Bloomberg on Friday that United

0:00:39.240 --> 0:00:43.000
<v Speaker 1>Technologies may be considering an acquisition of Rockwell Collins. And

0:00:43.000 --> 0:00:45.880
<v Speaker 1>here to tell us more about this potential deal is

0:00:45.880 --> 0:00:49.000
<v Speaker 1>Bloomberg Intelligence. Is Joel Levington. He is an expert in

0:00:49.040 --> 0:00:51.879
<v Speaker 1>the world of corporate debt. And Douglas Rothacker, he is

0:00:51.880 --> 0:00:57.080
<v Speaker 1>our aerospace and autos analyst for Bloomberg Intelligence. Gentlemen, thank

0:00:57.080 --> 0:00:58.680
<v Speaker 1>you very much for being here in the studio in

0:00:58.720 --> 0:01:01.240
<v Speaker 1>our eleven three oh headquarters. You know, Doug, I want

0:01:01.280 --> 0:01:05.080
<v Speaker 1>to begin with you because can you tell people why

0:01:05.720 --> 0:01:08.679
<v Speaker 1>forget let's put the price aside. That's gonna be Joel's problem.

0:01:08.720 --> 0:01:10.959
<v Speaker 1>He's gonna figure out how to pay for it. Uh,

0:01:11.360 --> 0:01:15.319
<v Speaker 1>why would um U t X why would United Technologies

0:01:15.520 --> 0:01:19.680
<v Speaker 1>want to buy Rockwell Collins. Sure, yeah, morning, thanks for

0:01:19.720 --> 0:01:24.520
<v Speaker 1>having us. The strategic rational behind creating a forty billion

0:01:24.560 --> 0:01:29.479
<v Speaker 1>dollar revenue airspace portfolio is largely to defend against the

0:01:29.520 --> 0:01:33.119
<v Speaker 1>concerted efforts of Boeing, I would say for aftermarket services

0:01:33.600 --> 0:01:37.440
<v Speaker 1>and revenue that they're trying to get into pretty aggressively

0:01:38.000 --> 0:01:42.000
<v Speaker 1>and twofold to largely gain pricing power and scale. Right,

0:01:42.040 --> 0:01:46.240
<v Speaker 1>So as Boeing and Airbus work through years of development

0:01:46.240 --> 0:01:49.840
<v Speaker 1>and aircraft wore largely focused on profitability, right now, you know,

0:01:49.920 --> 0:01:52.720
<v Speaker 1>focus on improving margins and a lot of that is

0:01:52.720 --> 0:01:56.400
<v Speaker 1>going to trickle down to supply train pricing pressure. So

0:01:56.520 --> 0:01:59.880
<v Speaker 1>as you see United Technologies, you know in this part

0:02:00.080 --> 0:02:03.400
<v Speaker 1>ential deal deal, clearly it's an effort to you know,

0:02:03.480 --> 0:02:06.560
<v Speaker 1>fight against that troll comment on this because it's one

0:02:06.560 --> 0:02:08.960
<v Speaker 1>thing to have a great theory about, you know, uh,

0:02:09.200 --> 0:02:14.320
<v Speaker 1>air aircraft control systems, you've got pilot systems, avionics, all

0:02:14.440 --> 0:02:18.800
<v Speaker 1>this thing that's Rockwell Collins. Uh. Is there a price

0:02:18.840 --> 0:02:22.240
<v Speaker 1>at which this deal just looks bad? Because I mean

0:02:22.280 --> 0:02:24.519
<v Speaker 1>we've been down this road before, right, I mean we

0:02:24.680 --> 0:02:27.440
<v Speaker 1>we've seen in that you know, Rockwell Collins has been

0:02:27.520 --> 0:02:31.760
<v Speaker 1>kind of talked about as an acquisition target previously. That's true,

0:02:31.800 --> 0:02:35.080
<v Speaker 1>and given where the market is with high evaluations, uh,

0:02:35.760 --> 0:02:37.440
<v Speaker 1>what I can tell you is that the math works

0:02:37.480 --> 0:02:41.760
<v Speaker 1>with about a premium, which is pretty traditional for an

0:02:41.800 --> 0:02:45.600
<v Speaker 1>industrial asset. So you can make the math work relative

0:02:45.680 --> 0:02:49.040
<v Speaker 1>to uh EPs growth, which I think Doug get pittened

0:02:49.040 --> 0:02:51.760
<v Speaker 1>out at about seven percent. And then from a balance

0:02:51.760 --> 0:02:54.480
<v Speaker 1>sheet perspective, you could lever the company up to a

0:02:54.480 --> 0:02:57.680
<v Speaker 1>little over three times on a net debt basis, which

0:02:57.720 --> 0:03:00.880
<v Speaker 1>is actually better than when knew we'll try to buy

0:03:00.919 --> 0:03:02.840
<v Speaker 1>you U t X a little over a year ago

0:03:03.560 --> 0:03:06.600
<v Speaker 1>UM and perhaps retained the single A rating that the

0:03:06.639 --> 0:03:09.560
<v Speaker 1>company wants to maintain. Well, having said that, I mean,

0:03:09.600 --> 0:03:11.720
<v Speaker 1>would it be any problem for them to raise the money?

0:03:11.919 --> 0:03:14.960
<v Speaker 1>I don't think. So we got a thing today, one

0:03:15.000 --> 0:03:17.560
<v Speaker 1>and a half billion dollar bond offering from Tesla, So

0:03:17.639 --> 0:03:19.640
<v Speaker 1>I guess you know everybody can borrow money, right, and

0:03:19.680 --> 0:03:22.200
<v Speaker 1>that's coming with like a five percent coupon handle on it.

0:03:22.280 --> 0:03:25.239
<v Speaker 1>So it's so maybe you and I should and Duck

0:03:25.240 --> 0:03:27.920
<v Speaker 1>can open up a business together and and and finance

0:03:27.960 --> 0:03:29.960
<v Speaker 1>it with some debt. But I do think kind of

0:03:29.960 --> 0:03:32.480
<v Speaker 1>the interesting or maybe the more interesting way of doing

0:03:32.520 --> 0:03:36.080
<v Speaker 1>things would be if this would lead to a separate

0:03:36.240 --> 0:03:40.360
<v Speaker 1>split of United Technologies, which has also been discussed, where

0:03:40.360 --> 0:03:42.960
<v Speaker 1>you would have an aerospace business and an industrial business.

0:03:43.600 --> 0:03:45.920
<v Speaker 1>To me, that kind of makes the most logic and

0:03:46.040 --> 0:03:49.280
<v Speaker 1>sense given what their peers have done, whether you look

0:03:49.320 --> 0:03:52.720
<v Speaker 1>at a GE or dana Her and Emerson, where it

0:03:52.720 --> 0:03:54.640
<v Speaker 1>seems to be all the rage these days to be

0:03:55.120 --> 0:03:57.800
<v Speaker 1>a company that's single focused as opposed to a diversified

0:03:57.840 --> 0:04:01.120
<v Speaker 1>industrial with some pluses and binuses. Just come in a

0:04:01.120 --> 0:04:04.960
<v Speaker 1>little bit more about margins and pricing and if you

0:04:05.040 --> 0:04:07.800
<v Speaker 1>can maybe use an example for Rockwall cons because this

0:04:07.840 --> 0:04:10.840
<v Speaker 1>idea of an aftermarket uh, we all know that. You know,

0:04:10.880 --> 0:04:13.920
<v Speaker 1>when you buy an automobile, for example, the true cost

0:04:14.040 --> 0:04:16.320
<v Speaker 1>is not what you pay. The true cost is what

0:04:16.400 --> 0:04:19.280
<v Speaker 1>you pay for the life of the automobile, right right,

0:04:19.520 --> 0:04:21.560
<v Speaker 1>So if you look at Rockwell Collins and their recent

0:04:21.600 --> 0:04:24.479
<v Speaker 1>acquis just in b airspace there, you know, typical operating

0:04:24.480 --> 0:04:27.560
<v Speaker 1>margins are north of which is well above what the

0:04:27.640 --> 0:04:31.560
<v Speaker 1>United Technologies generates on their airspace portfolio. And a lot

0:04:31.600 --> 0:04:35.640
<v Speaker 1>of that comes from a very large business of aftermarket

0:04:36.240 --> 0:04:38.360
<v Speaker 1>products and services. Right. So when you go and buy

0:04:38.480 --> 0:04:41.599
<v Speaker 1>used aircraft, you completely tear out the insides, the guts

0:04:41.600 --> 0:04:45.960
<v Speaker 1>of it, refit it with UH new seats, new interiors,

0:04:46.000 --> 0:04:48.400
<v Speaker 1>and boom, your customers think they're sitting in a brand

0:04:48.400 --> 0:04:51.200
<v Speaker 1>new airplane. Right. So again, oh that's high margin and

0:04:51.279 --> 0:04:54.360
<v Speaker 1>would uh you know, I ran the numbers UH over

0:04:54.400 --> 0:04:58.679
<v Speaker 1>the weekend. If you combine on a proformer basis Rockwell

0:04:58.720 --> 0:05:02.520
<v Speaker 1>Collins UH to United Technologies aerospace portfolio, they look at,

0:05:02.680 --> 0:05:05.400
<v Speaker 1>you know, a marchin boost of hundred two hundred basis

0:05:05.440 --> 0:05:08.520
<v Speaker 1>points and that's just on the you know, excluding any

0:05:08.520 --> 0:05:10.920
<v Speaker 1>synergies or anything like that that that are potentially there.

0:05:11.120 --> 0:05:13.480
<v Speaker 1>But I want to bring in starboard value for just

0:05:13.560 --> 0:05:16.240
<v Speaker 1>a second here, because they were a focus last year

0:05:16.279 --> 0:05:19.560
<v Speaker 1>I believe when it had when you just mentioned that

0:05:19.760 --> 0:05:23.400
<v Speaker 1>be a UH aerospace right the the act with the

0:05:23.440 --> 0:05:27.480
<v Speaker 1>Biero Space acquisition that closed in April, Joel, I mean

0:05:27.880 --> 0:05:30.320
<v Speaker 1>they were pushing, they were saying, no, don't buy anything.

0:05:30.440 --> 0:05:32.400
<v Speaker 1>We we we want you to split, as you were

0:05:32.440 --> 0:05:35.560
<v Speaker 1>just saying in a new strategy, right and selling out

0:05:35.920 --> 0:05:37.880
<v Speaker 1>at a premium might be the elegant way out for

0:05:38.160 --> 0:05:41.680
<v Speaker 1>Rockwell Collins and their management team. So clearly you could

0:05:41.680 --> 0:05:43.880
<v Speaker 1>see that, and I think if you look at what's

0:05:43.920 --> 0:05:48.160
<v Speaker 1>happened with activists in the multi industrial space. Again, there

0:05:48.160 --> 0:05:50.120
<v Speaker 1>has been a huge push you could look at that

0:05:50.160 --> 0:05:52.520
<v Speaker 1>they wanted to get simpler. They wanted to get simpler.

0:05:52.520 --> 0:05:55.520
<v Speaker 1>They want to get multiples that are focused on the

0:05:55.560 --> 0:05:59.279
<v Speaker 1>different sectors and they want different balance sheets to reflect that.

0:05:59.400 --> 0:06:02.440
<v Speaker 1>So in the piece of United Technologies, what you have

0:06:02.839 --> 0:06:06.880
<v Speaker 1>putting the aerospace business aside, is this industrial business with carrier,

0:06:07.000 --> 0:06:11.160
<v Speaker 1>their security operations, UM and all the h VAC equipment

0:06:11.240 --> 0:06:13.240
<v Speaker 1>that could be levered let's say it about three and

0:06:13.279 --> 0:06:17.040
<v Speaker 1>a half times UH to mimic other peers, and with

0:06:17.080 --> 0:06:18.960
<v Speaker 1>that you can take a twenty billion dollar diven end

0:06:19.240 --> 0:06:21.920
<v Speaker 1>that goes a long way to paying for Rockwell Collins. Yeah. Well,

0:06:21.920 --> 0:06:23.279
<v Speaker 1>I mean it sounds good on the fine on the

0:06:23.279 --> 0:06:26.799
<v Speaker 1>balance sheet, right, I mean, it looks good financially. I'm wondering, Doug,

0:06:26.880 --> 0:06:30.799
<v Speaker 1>is there a technical or even uh sort of product

0:06:31.000 --> 0:06:34.200
<v Speaker 1>reason to keep it all together? Because one part of

0:06:34.200 --> 0:06:36.960
<v Speaker 1>the business helps to inform the other part and it

0:06:37.240 --> 0:06:40.400
<v Speaker 1>goes back and forth. UM. I think for the equity

0:06:40.600 --> 0:06:44.040
<v Speaker 1>shareholders to really get comfortable with this, we'd have to

0:06:44.080 --> 0:06:47.400
<v Speaker 1>get back to what Joel was mentioning about separating UM

0:06:47.560 --> 0:06:50.960
<v Speaker 1>the businesses. The the EPs secretion of seven percent is

0:06:51.160 --> 0:06:53.920
<v Speaker 1>is okay, it's uh, it's it's going to be a

0:06:54.000 --> 0:06:59.080
<v Speaker 1>very expensive acquisition, you know, Rockwell Collins up from October

0:06:59.120 --> 0:07:02.520
<v Speaker 1>when they announced quiring be Aerospace, and again Joel mentioned

0:07:02.520 --> 0:07:06.880
<v Speaker 1>probably looking at so premium on top of that. Um so,

0:07:07.520 --> 0:07:10.080
<v Speaker 1>I mean we'll see how the the the plans, uh

0:07:10.120 --> 0:07:11.840
<v Speaker 1>you know, play out. But isn't this it's a sickly

0:07:12.000 --> 0:07:14.280
<v Speaker 1>is it a cyclical business to a certain extent? I mean,

0:07:14.320 --> 0:07:17.600
<v Speaker 1>I know, you know, aftermarket's always got to replace the seeds,

0:07:17.840 --> 0:07:20.560
<v Speaker 1>you know, Avionyx and somebody. Well, then the nice thing

0:07:20.600 --> 0:07:24.520
<v Speaker 1>about aftermarket parts and services is that it's generally countercyclical

0:07:24.680 --> 0:07:27.440
<v Speaker 1>to what you have with new production. Right, so when

0:07:27.480 --> 0:07:30.880
<v Speaker 1>you're first here O E M supplier uh to Boeing

0:07:30.880 --> 0:07:33.640
<v Speaker 1>and Airbus, you're you know, you're at their mercing in

0:07:33.800 --> 0:07:37.880
<v Speaker 1>terms of raising and lowering production and the cycles of that. Uh.

0:07:38.040 --> 0:07:41.000
<v Speaker 1>Important offset to that is the aftermarket services business, which

0:07:41.000 --> 0:07:42.880
<v Speaker 1>again is very high margin where a lot of these

0:07:42.960 --> 0:07:46.640
<v Speaker 1>parts suppliers you know, uh, butter their bread as they say.

0:07:46.720 --> 0:07:49.000
<v Speaker 1>All right, well, you know, Joel, last point to you.

0:07:49.000 --> 0:07:52.480
<v Speaker 1>You know, if if Rockwell Collins, if this deal happens.

0:07:52.800 --> 0:07:55.760
<v Speaker 1>You think you're gonna see other deals. You're always gonna

0:07:55.760 --> 0:07:57.320
<v Speaker 1>see other deal I mean, well, because you know this

0:07:57.400 --> 0:07:59.960
<v Speaker 1>is like the consolidation. This is the special of the month, right,

0:08:00.160 --> 0:08:02.400
<v Speaker 1>Everyone kind of gets in this fever of oh we

0:08:02.520 --> 0:08:06.760
<v Speaker 1>gotta consolidate and then split right certainly in the arrows

0:08:06.760 --> 0:08:09.720
<v Speaker 1>of the aerospace supply chain. I think you're you have

0:08:09.840 --> 0:08:12.520
<v Speaker 1>to see consolidation happen because, as Doug was pointing out,

0:08:12.880 --> 0:08:16.680
<v Speaker 1>as Boeing tries to become more vertically integrated, you have

0:08:16.800 --> 0:08:19.280
<v Speaker 1>to be able to differentiate and push back on your

0:08:19.440 --> 0:08:22.040
<v Speaker 1>on your client. Yeah. Well, thanks very much for being here,

0:08:22.040 --> 0:08:24.280
<v Speaker 1>both of you. I really appreciated that. Joe Levington is

0:08:24.280 --> 0:08:28.080
<v Speaker 1>our senior credit analyst for Bloomberg Intelligence. And Douglas Rothacker

0:08:28.160 --> 0:08:32.680
<v Speaker 1>he is an aerospace defense analyst for Bloomberg Intelligence. And

0:08:32.760 --> 0:08:34.920
<v Speaker 1>just by way of a kind of shout out to Boeing,

0:08:35.280 --> 0:08:38.480
<v Speaker 1>they did a fly by that actually flew around the

0:08:38.559 --> 0:08:53.840
<v Speaker 1>United States in the shape of a Boeing airliner. Paul Sweeney,

0:08:53.960 --> 0:08:56.880
<v Speaker 1>he knows everything about the media and the Internet. He

0:08:57.000 --> 0:09:00.360
<v Speaker 1>is our US Director of Research for Media and Internet

0:09:00.360 --> 0:09:03.720
<v Speaker 1>Analysts for Bloomberg Intelligence and Paul thanks very much for

0:09:03.760 --> 0:09:07.160
<v Speaker 1>coming in. I want to begin by just asking you

0:09:07.200 --> 0:09:10.199
<v Speaker 1>about CBS and something with a T and T because

0:09:10.880 --> 0:09:13.200
<v Speaker 1>remember when A T and T launched that direct tv

0:09:13.320 --> 0:09:17.599
<v Speaker 1>now service, Well, they just reached an agreement with CBS

0:09:17.640 --> 0:09:21.040
<v Speaker 1>because that will give them a lot more programming. Can

0:09:21.080 --> 0:09:23.000
<v Speaker 1>we look forward to more of these kinds of deals

0:09:23.000 --> 0:09:25.199
<v Speaker 1>and what's in it for for both of them? Yeah,

0:09:25.240 --> 0:09:27.160
<v Speaker 1>I think we're gonna see more of these types of deals.

0:09:27.400 --> 0:09:30.079
<v Speaker 1>And Direct TV Now is a streaming direct to consumer

0:09:31.320 --> 0:09:34.640
<v Speaker 1>app similar to a Netflix and UM and it's kind

0:09:34.640 --> 0:09:36.440
<v Speaker 1>of a little bit of a skinny bundle, if you will.

0:09:36.480 --> 0:09:38.960
<v Speaker 1>But CBS just announced that they're gonna be part of it.

0:09:38.960 --> 0:09:41.120
<v Speaker 1>They're gonna be on air. It's very good for direct

0:09:41.120 --> 0:09:44.280
<v Speaker 1>TV now because CBS is the number one ranked broadcasting

0:09:44.280 --> 0:09:46.640
<v Speaker 1>network in terms of total audience. So plus they have

0:09:46.800 --> 0:09:50.120
<v Speaker 1>NFL football, So it's certainly a programmer and a source

0:09:50.160 --> 0:09:52.240
<v Speaker 1>of programming that you want to have on your service. Uh.

0:09:52.280 --> 0:09:54.520
<v Speaker 1>If you're CBS, UM, you're like a lot of these

0:09:54.559 --> 0:09:57.520
<v Speaker 1>traditional media companies and you're trying to figure out, um,

0:09:57.559 --> 0:10:00.880
<v Speaker 1>the business is changing, my viewer is are viewing my

0:10:00.960 --> 0:10:04.280
<v Speaker 1>content on lots of different uh types of platforms. It's

0:10:04.280 --> 0:10:06.160
<v Speaker 1>not just with the rabbit ears over the air like

0:10:06.200 --> 0:10:08.080
<v Speaker 1>it was fifty years ago. It's not even just on

0:10:08.160 --> 0:10:11.520
<v Speaker 1>cable television. It's now on satellite and now more and

0:10:11.559 --> 0:10:15.640
<v Speaker 1>more it's now direct to consumer on some of these apps.

0:10:15.640 --> 0:10:18.080
<v Speaker 1>And so I think, if you're CBS, you'r ABC, your Disney,

0:10:18.120 --> 0:10:20.240
<v Speaker 1>you're all any of these players. You're trying to figure

0:10:20.280 --> 0:10:22.439
<v Speaker 1>out do I need to be on all these platforms?

0:10:22.480 --> 0:10:24.160
<v Speaker 1>If so, what do I need to get paid to

0:10:24.160 --> 0:10:27.199
<v Speaker 1>make it worth my while? What happens to CBS, Because

0:10:27.880 --> 0:10:30.040
<v Speaker 1>I know that you've mentioned in the past that CBS

0:10:30.080 --> 0:10:34.160
<v Speaker 1>almost is like a standalone when it comes to programming content. Yes,

0:10:34.200 --> 0:10:36.559
<v Speaker 1>CBS is a you know, it's it's the really the

0:10:36.600 --> 0:10:41.120
<v Speaker 1>only standalone broadcast network, UM that investors can can play.

0:10:41.400 --> 0:10:43.760
<v Speaker 1>The other broadcast networks are embedded in big media companies

0:10:43.800 --> 0:10:46.640
<v Speaker 1>like Disney and Fox UM and CBS does own the

0:10:46.640 --> 0:10:49.920
<v Speaker 1>Showtime premium net network as well. But if you're buying CBS,

0:10:49.920 --> 0:10:54.120
<v Speaker 1>you're really buying a play on US broadcast television. UM.

0:10:54.160 --> 0:10:57.200
<v Speaker 1>It's been a great business for them. Television advertising has

0:10:57.240 --> 0:10:59.520
<v Speaker 1>generally been pretty decent over the last you know, coming

0:10:59.559 --> 0:11:02.080
<v Speaker 1>out of the last ten years after the financial crisis.

0:11:02.280 --> 0:11:04.480
<v Speaker 1>And what's really changed for the better for CBS has

0:11:04.520 --> 0:11:07.120
<v Speaker 1>been a new revenue stream for them and for the

0:11:07.120 --> 0:11:11.400
<v Speaker 1>broadcast industry, and that's retransmission fees. Uh. The broadcast networks

0:11:11.440 --> 0:11:14.720
<v Speaker 1>are finally getting paid by the distributors the Comcast of

0:11:14.720 --> 0:11:17.520
<v Speaker 1>the world to carry their programming. They never got paid

0:11:17.520 --> 0:11:20.600
<v Speaker 1>for it before. Es Pianos got paid for their programming

0:11:20.640 --> 0:11:23.240
<v Speaker 1>by the distributors, but the broadcast networks never did up

0:11:23.320 --> 0:11:25.840
<v Speaker 1>until about seven or eight years ago. And CBS has

0:11:26.000 --> 0:11:28.760
<v Speaker 1>really been a big beneficiary that that's been a driver

0:11:28.840 --> 0:11:31.120
<v Speaker 1>of their revenue and profits. That looks to be a

0:11:31.120 --> 0:11:33.800
<v Speaker 1>pretty good story going forward for CBS. So so why

0:11:33.840 --> 0:11:36.320
<v Speaker 1>do you believe maybe the stock has not really performed

0:11:36.360 --> 0:11:38.160
<v Speaker 1>that well this year. I mean the stock of CBS

0:11:38.280 --> 0:11:40.559
<v Speaker 1>is basically unchanged. I mean that's not to say that

0:11:40.600 --> 0:11:42.920
<v Speaker 1>hasn't had big moves. I mean this was, you know,

0:11:42.960 --> 0:11:47.880
<v Speaker 1>a stock trading at fifty uh, let's say back in September. Yes,

0:11:48.080 --> 0:11:50.240
<v Speaker 1>the media stocks, you know, they've had a great run

0:11:50.280 --> 0:11:52.760
<v Speaker 1>over the last eight nine years after the financial crisis,

0:11:52.840 --> 0:11:54.600
<v Speaker 1>but really in the last year or so, it's been

0:11:54.679 --> 0:11:56.880
<v Speaker 1>kind of flattish and and year to date, you know,

0:11:56.920 --> 0:11:59.559
<v Speaker 1>the media stocks are pretty flat up a little bit.

0:11:59.600 --> 0:12:02.199
<v Speaker 1>But the real concerns are chord cutting. That is d

0:12:02.280 --> 0:12:04.880
<v Speaker 1>number one issue out there for the media sector. If

0:12:04.880 --> 0:12:09.240
<v Speaker 1>consumers really are cutting the chord in mass, everybody's economic

0:12:09.320 --> 0:12:11.920
<v Speaker 1>model as is at risk. The affiliate fees that the

0:12:11.960 --> 0:12:15.600
<v Speaker 1>content companies get paid, that's at risk. The advertising revenue

0:12:16.040 --> 0:12:18.880
<v Speaker 1>that's built upon a large audience that can be delivered,

0:12:19.000 --> 0:12:21.160
<v Speaker 1>that's at risk. And so what I think you're seeing

0:12:21.160 --> 0:12:23.480
<v Speaker 1>media investors do today is try to pick some winners

0:12:23.480 --> 0:12:27.120
<v Speaker 1>and losers within the group in general. Um, but right now,

0:12:27.120 --> 0:12:29.240
<v Speaker 1>I think we've had a rough third quarter results coming

0:12:29.240 --> 0:12:31.559
<v Speaker 1>out of the media sector. Maybe they can turn it

0:12:31.559 --> 0:12:33.880
<v Speaker 1>around tonight with CBS, who tends to be very bullish

0:12:33.880 --> 0:12:36.959
<v Speaker 1>about the prospects for the sector. Will see Disney tomorrow

0:12:37.000 --> 0:12:40.240
<v Speaker 1>night after the clothes, see what it has to say. Uh, investors,

0:12:40.280 --> 0:12:42.360
<v Speaker 1>they are particularly concerned about ESPN and the fact that

0:12:42.440 --> 0:12:45.920
<v Speaker 1>chord cutting is having on the great ESPN. Anything on

0:12:45.960 --> 0:12:48.280
<v Speaker 1>the horizon that you would point to as far as

0:12:48.360 --> 0:12:51.760
<v Speaker 1>someone may be making an acquisition or a run at CBS.

0:12:51.800 --> 0:12:54.520
<v Speaker 1>I mean, it's a twenty six billion dollar market cap

0:12:54.640 --> 0:12:56.320
<v Speaker 1>right now. Right Well, we just had a you know,

0:12:56.480 --> 0:12:58.120
<v Speaker 1>a big m and a trade in the media sector.

0:12:58.200 --> 0:13:00.600
<v Speaker 1>Last week when Discovery Communications and out they are buying

0:13:00.600 --> 0:13:04.000
<v Speaker 1>Scripts Networks Viacom, which is a sister company to CBS,

0:13:04.120 --> 0:13:06.400
<v Speaker 1>it was rumored to be a buyer for Scripts Networks,

0:13:06.400 --> 0:13:08.880
<v Speaker 1>which really caught people by surprise. Most people didn't view

0:13:09.000 --> 0:13:12.360
<v Speaker 1>Viacom as a buyer. But ultimately, when you talk about CBS,

0:13:12.400 --> 0:13:15.320
<v Speaker 1>you talk about Viacom, you're talking about Subner Redstone and

0:13:15.440 --> 0:13:18.679
<v Speaker 1>his common ownership of both companies. And the question remains,

0:13:18.720 --> 0:13:21.520
<v Speaker 1>does do these two companies should they be uh, you know,

0:13:21.600 --> 0:13:24.040
<v Speaker 1>maybe in a better position if they were to merge,

0:13:24.040 --> 0:13:25.920
<v Speaker 1>and remember they used to be together than they split

0:13:25.920 --> 0:13:28.400
<v Speaker 1>apart about ten years ago. The question is now in

0:13:28.440 --> 0:13:31.239
<v Speaker 1>a consolidating media world, in a world that's being disrupted

0:13:31.240 --> 0:13:34.679
<v Speaker 1>by the Internet like Netflix, Um, do these companies need

0:13:34.720 --> 0:13:38.520
<v Speaker 1>to be bigger, stronger, have more heft in the marketplace.

0:13:38.600 --> 0:13:41.679
<v Speaker 1>If so, then the easiest transaction for both of these

0:13:41.679 --> 0:13:44.920
<v Speaker 1>companies via common CBS to simply kind of merge back together.

0:13:45.120 --> 0:13:47.200
<v Speaker 1>All right, now, you mentioned Disney, so let's move on

0:13:47.280 --> 0:13:48.840
<v Speaker 1>to there because I want to get your thoughts on

0:13:49.240 --> 0:13:52.600
<v Speaker 1>ESPN that has been both an achilles heel and a

0:13:52.640 --> 0:13:55.800
<v Speaker 1>gold mine for Disney at different times. Right it it

0:13:55.840 --> 0:13:58.319
<v Speaker 1>continues to be by far the largest profit generator for

0:13:58.360 --> 0:14:00.880
<v Speaker 1>the Walt Disney Company, and really over the last twenty

0:14:00.960 --> 0:14:04.199
<v Speaker 1>years it has been the most consistent profit generator for

0:14:04.240 --> 0:14:06.920
<v Speaker 1>the company. Um, those days are over. UM. So what

0:14:07.000 --> 0:14:10.319
<v Speaker 1>you have at Disney now is cord cutting h impacting

0:14:10.360 --> 0:14:12.480
<v Speaker 1>the growth of their revenue, so putting pressure on their

0:14:12.480 --> 0:14:15.440
<v Speaker 1>revenue growth. That's a problem, but it's compounded by the

0:14:15.440 --> 0:14:18.160
<v Speaker 1>fact that their costs are primarily fixed. I mean, think

0:14:18.160 --> 0:14:20.240
<v Speaker 1>about the cost for ESPN. You think about these huge

0:14:20.240 --> 0:14:23.280
<v Speaker 1>sports contracts with the NFL, with Major League Baseball, with

0:14:23.280 --> 0:14:26.720
<v Speaker 1>all the college sports U leagues around the country. Those

0:14:26.760 --> 0:14:29.120
<v Speaker 1>are big, big ticket items and they are a fixed

0:14:29.120 --> 0:14:32.400
<v Speaker 1>cost over many years. And so if you're at at ESPN,

0:14:32.480 --> 0:14:34.960
<v Speaker 1>you're seeing your revenue pressured and your costs you know,

0:14:35.040 --> 0:14:37.960
<v Speaker 1>continuing to go up. So that's a real profit issue

0:14:37.960 --> 0:14:40.360
<v Speaker 1>for this company. It's been you know, really developing over

0:14:40.400 --> 0:14:43.200
<v Speaker 1>the last two years, and quite frankly, investors are are

0:14:43.400 --> 0:14:47.000
<v Speaker 1>very concerned about that. It's definitely impacted Disney, who you know,

0:14:47.080 --> 0:14:50.480
<v Speaker 1>despite you know, the concerns at ESPN, the other two

0:14:50.480 --> 0:14:53.440
<v Speaker 1>main businesses of the Walt Disney company. It's theme parks

0:14:53.880 --> 0:14:57.560
<v Speaker 1>um and um uh it's movie business are both doing great.

0:14:58.040 --> 0:15:01.120
<v Speaker 1>But again investors are really focusing on on ESPN. All right,

0:15:01.160 --> 0:15:04.480
<v Speaker 1>you want to do Fox, uh, twenty one century Fox

0:15:04.520 --> 0:15:06.800
<v Speaker 1>because they're waiting on a deal in the UK for

0:15:06.840 --> 0:15:10.520
<v Speaker 1>a Sky Yeah. The next big trade for the twenty

0:15:10.520 --> 0:15:12.520
<v Speaker 1>one century Fox and Rupert Murdoch. You know, one of

0:15:12.520 --> 0:15:15.000
<v Speaker 1>the great media moguls is to get even bigger, and

0:15:15.200 --> 0:15:17.520
<v Speaker 1>that is to own complete control of be Sky b

0:15:18.320 --> 0:15:20.920
<v Speaker 1>which is this big satellite provider in the UK and

0:15:20.920 --> 0:15:24.440
<v Speaker 1>in Italy and Germany. UM and that is being that

0:15:24.520 --> 0:15:27.320
<v Speaker 1>is under review. It was he was kind of thwarted

0:15:27.360 --> 0:15:30.320
<v Speaker 1>in this transaction about seven years ago. He's now come

0:15:30.360 --> 0:15:33.600
<v Speaker 1>back and the expectation is that transaction will be approved.

0:15:34.040 --> 0:15:36.720
<v Speaker 1>That would be a net positive for twenty one century

0:15:36.720 --> 0:15:38.960
<v Speaker 1>Fox because a lot of those markets in Europe there's

0:15:39.000 --> 0:15:40.880
<v Speaker 1>still more growth to go there in terms of pay

0:15:40.920 --> 0:15:43.840
<v Speaker 1>TV subscribers. It is not saturated like the US market,

0:15:44.120 --> 0:15:45.720
<v Speaker 1>and so a lot of investors believe that is a

0:15:46.000 --> 0:15:48.960
<v Speaker 1>better organic growth market than the US. Right now. Hey, Paul,

0:15:49.000 --> 0:15:51.360
<v Speaker 1>you know, as as something that's been doing this more

0:15:51.400 --> 0:15:53.520
<v Speaker 1>really more years than I know, you care to care

0:15:53.560 --> 0:15:55.640
<v Speaker 1>to admit, is can you give some advice to people

0:15:55.640 --> 0:15:57.720
<v Speaker 1>that are trying to sort of value these businesses When

0:15:57.720 --> 0:16:00.680
<v Speaker 1>you've got companies like Amazon getting into con tent and

0:16:00.840 --> 0:16:03.520
<v Speaker 1>you know, music from from Apple and so on, it's

0:16:03.520 --> 0:16:05.600
<v Speaker 1>hard to kind of get your fingers around this, it

0:16:05.680 --> 0:16:07.360
<v Speaker 1>really is. I mean, we have, you know, the traditional

0:16:07.400 --> 0:16:10.520
<v Speaker 1>metrics for media companies, whether that's price, price to earnings,

0:16:10.600 --> 0:16:13.440
<v Speaker 1>or enterprise value. But those are well established and we

0:16:13.480 --> 0:16:15.800
<v Speaker 1>know how to value you know, the Disneys of the world,

0:16:15.800 --> 0:16:17.720
<v Speaker 1>in the Foxes the world, in the Comcast of the world,

0:16:17.760 --> 0:16:20.640
<v Speaker 1>and we have historical benchmarks for when these stocks are

0:16:20.640 --> 0:16:23.680
<v Speaker 1>expensive or when they're cheap given their growth outlook. But

0:16:23.760 --> 0:16:26.120
<v Speaker 1>when you bring in some of these new disruptive stories

0:16:26.160 --> 0:16:29.440
<v Speaker 1>like Netflix, like Amazon that are coming into the movie business,

0:16:29.720 --> 0:16:31.560
<v Speaker 1>and you take a look at even at the internet companies,

0:16:31.600 --> 0:16:34.200
<v Speaker 1>the Internet companies are more media companies than they are

0:16:34.280 --> 0:16:37.080
<v Speaker 1>technology companies. They are driven by advertising revenue, and they

0:16:37.080 --> 0:16:40.360
<v Speaker 1>trade at different valuation multiples multiples revenue, and it's really

0:16:40.360 --> 0:16:43.120
<v Speaker 1>hard to compare. Thank you very much, Paul Sweeney. Here's

0:16:43.160 --> 0:16:46.400
<v Speaker 1>our expert US Director Research, senior Media Internet analyst for

0:16:46.480 --> 0:17:02.640
<v Speaker 1>Bloomberg Intelligence, Berkshire Hathaway. The shares are up nearly nine

0:17:02.720 --> 0:17:05.879
<v Speaker 1>percent so far this year, but what will move them higher?

0:17:06.040 --> 0:17:08.480
<v Speaker 1>Here to tell us more is Tara La Chapelle. Our

0:17:08.520 --> 0:17:12.320
<v Speaker 1>Deal's column is for Bloomberg Gadfly and you can follow

0:17:12.320 --> 0:17:16.320
<v Speaker 1>her on Twitter at Tara l. A c. H. Great

0:17:16.359 --> 0:17:18.920
<v Speaker 1>to have you with us, Thanks for coming into the studio. UM.

0:17:18.960 --> 0:17:22.400
<v Speaker 1>The report from Berkshire Hathaway last Friday not greeted by

0:17:22.400 --> 0:17:25.560
<v Speaker 1>the market with much enthusiasm. But this is a company

0:17:25.560 --> 0:17:28.600
<v Speaker 1>that has what a hundred billion dollars in cash right

0:17:28.600 --> 0:17:32.359
<v Speaker 1>which is almost exactly why it's not being greeted with enthusiasm, ironically,

0:17:32.440 --> 0:17:36.200
<v Speaker 1>because the results were a little lackluster. We saw another

0:17:36.280 --> 0:17:40.400
<v Speaker 1>underwriting loss in the insurance division, dragged down overall results.

0:17:40.560 --> 0:17:42.800
<v Speaker 1>So you know, the whole point of Berkshire's conglomerate is

0:17:42.800 --> 0:17:45.720
<v Speaker 1>that all these other businesses offset the ones that are having,

0:17:45.960 --> 0:17:48.639
<v Speaker 1>you know, going through difficult times, and this time it

0:17:48.680 --> 0:17:51.080
<v Speaker 1>did drag down earnings a little bit um nothing to

0:17:51.119 --> 0:17:53.119
<v Speaker 1>be concerned about, of course, but I think what it

0:17:53.160 --> 0:17:55.440
<v Speaker 1>comes down to is they have almost a hundred billion

0:17:55.480 --> 0:17:58.159
<v Speaker 1>in cash now and they're not really spending it, and

0:17:58.200 --> 0:18:00.520
<v Speaker 1>so what are the high return opportunities out there, what's

0:18:00.560 --> 0:18:03.359
<v Speaker 1>the reason to own the stock and what's Buffett thinking next?

0:18:03.840 --> 0:18:07.720
<v Speaker 1>So what do you believe is necessary for Berkshire Hathway,

0:18:07.760 --> 0:18:13.320
<v Speaker 1>Because you know they Burlington Northern Santa fe uh acquisition.

0:18:13.720 --> 0:18:16.720
<v Speaker 1>They just got eight hundred million in cash in the

0:18:17.520 --> 0:18:21.240
<v Speaker 1>from the railroad. Um. Also I understand you know that

0:18:21.400 --> 0:18:24.080
<v Speaker 1>they want to be even bigger in the energy business.

0:18:24.080 --> 0:18:27.879
<v Speaker 1>They're trying to acquire the Texas utility Encore, right, So

0:18:27.960 --> 0:18:31.240
<v Speaker 1>that deal makes a lot of sense for Burlington Northern

0:18:31.320 --> 0:18:33.719
<v Speaker 1>and that business has been great for them to total

0:18:33.760 --> 0:18:37.640
<v Speaker 1>home run of an acquisition for Berkshire. But with all

0:18:37.680 --> 0:18:39.960
<v Speaker 1>this cash, a deal like Encore, which I believe is

0:18:39.960 --> 0:18:42.600
<v Speaker 1>around nine billion dollars, really isn't enough to move the

0:18:42.600 --> 0:18:45.160
<v Speaker 1>needle that much anymore. It's it's great for that division,

0:18:45.240 --> 0:18:47.720
<v Speaker 1>but overall, when you have a hundred billion dollars of

0:18:47.760 --> 0:18:50.600
<v Speaker 1>cash and it's just sitting there with these low returns,

0:18:50.640 --> 0:18:53.960
<v Speaker 1>it makes sense for Berkshire to start thinking about bigger acquisitions.

0:18:53.960 --> 0:18:56.120
<v Speaker 1>I mean, we could see the fifty billion to even

0:18:56.119 --> 0:18:59.280
<v Speaker 1>a hundred billion dollar range. Realistically, it's not crazy to

0:18:59.320 --> 0:19:01.200
<v Speaker 1>think that they could do something like that. The problem

0:19:01.240 --> 0:19:04.359
<v Speaker 1>is finding a target that's worth that price and would

0:19:04.359 --> 0:19:08.000
<v Speaker 1>fit in with the conglomerate. Well, you mentioned in your

0:19:08.040 --> 0:19:10.640
<v Speaker 1>story that you know, the equity investments that warm Buffett

0:19:10.680 --> 0:19:13.639
<v Speaker 1>has made, whether it's craft Hinds, whether it's airlines, Apple

0:19:13.680 --> 0:19:16.360
<v Speaker 1>and so on, that's all been they've done pretty well.

0:19:16.440 --> 0:19:18.399
<v Speaker 1>Oh those have been great. I mean Apple, It's so funny,

0:19:18.440 --> 0:19:21.040
<v Speaker 1>right because Buffett for so long was opposed to investing

0:19:21.080 --> 0:19:25.080
<v Speaker 1>in things that really didn't um weren't his expertise industrial

0:19:25.119 --> 0:19:29.159
<v Speaker 1>companies or insurance businesses, right, So to to have Apple

0:19:29.280 --> 0:19:32.480
<v Speaker 1>be sort of this incredible investment for them, and in

0:19:32.560 --> 0:19:35.760
<v Speaker 1>kudos to their UM investing lieutenants there. But it's just

0:19:35.840 --> 0:19:38.439
<v Speaker 1>been really fun to watch. But even though those are

0:19:38.480 --> 0:19:40.400
<v Speaker 1>doing really well again, it's like they need to think

0:19:40.440 --> 0:19:43.000
<v Speaker 1>about a big acquisition to take in house, not just

0:19:43.119 --> 0:19:46.160
<v Speaker 1>these equity investments that are doing well. But in doing

0:19:46.160 --> 0:19:49.480
<v Speaker 1>your research, you find that investors in Berkshire Hathaway have

0:19:49.560 --> 0:19:52.240
<v Speaker 1>a different criteria when it comes to what they do

0:19:52.320 --> 0:19:54.440
<v Speaker 1>with their money. They want to be there because warm

0:19:54.480 --> 0:19:57.679
<v Speaker 1>buffets there, right, And I think that's where the issue

0:19:58.280 --> 0:20:00.840
<v Speaker 1>is now because if the and you own the stock

0:20:00.880 --> 0:20:03.199
<v Speaker 1>is because Buffett can take that money that all these

0:20:03.240 --> 0:20:06.560
<v Speaker 1>businesses are throwing off and invest it far better than

0:20:06.840 --> 0:20:08.600
<v Speaker 1>your return would be if he had paid, you know,

0:20:08.680 --> 0:20:11.600
<v Speaker 1>a dividend or was buying backstock at these levels. Then

0:20:11.640 --> 0:20:13.920
<v Speaker 1>I mean, we're looking at this and we're waiting for

0:20:14.000 --> 0:20:16.199
<v Speaker 1>him to do that, and there really hasn't been a

0:20:16.240 --> 0:20:18.840
<v Speaker 1>whole lot of deal activity in the past year. So

0:20:18.920 --> 0:20:20.880
<v Speaker 1>I mean, he did do the Precision Cast Parts deal.

0:20:20.960 --> 0:20:22.800
<v Speaker 1>Now that's clothes. That's been doing very well for the

0:20:22.840 --> 0:20:25.720
<v Speaker 1>manufacturing division. But it's like, Okay, well, what's next now?

0:20:25.760 --> 0:20:28.680
<v Speaker 1>Because the reason the shareholder's own the stock is because

0:20:28.720 --> 0:20:30.239
<v Speaker 1>they want to see him invest the money. And if

0:20:30.280 --> 0:20:32.920
<v Speaker 1>he's not going to find a great target that's really

0:20:32.920 --> 0:20:35.440
<v Speaker 1>going to move the needle, then it begs the question,

0:20:35.440 --> 0:20:38.399
<v Speaker 1>you know, do does Berkshire start to pay a dividend? Right?

0:20:38.400 --> 0:20:41.000
<v Speaker 1>But but I guess my point is do investor's care.

0:20:41.720 --> 0:20:44.400
<v Speaker 1>I mean, I understand from a theoretical point of view,

0:20:44.400 --> 0:20:47.760
<v Speaker 1>but when you go to the annual meeting in Omaha,

0:20:48.040 --> 0:20:51.720
<v Speaker 1>you don't find people saying, oh, I wish they do this,

0:20:51.800 --> 0:20:54.000
<v Speaker 1>I wish they did that. No one's pounting the table saying,

0:20:54.040 --> 0:20:55.840
<v Speaker 1>you know they I mean, everyone trust buffet. I think

0:20:55.880 --> 0:20:57.760
<v Speaker 1>the problem is Buffett is going to be eighty seven

0:20:57.800 --> 0:21:00.159
<v Speaker 1>this month, and people are starting to think about what

0:21:00.240 --> 0:21:02.399
<v Speaker 1>does Berkshire look like after Buffett? And I think he

0:21:02.400 --> 0:21:04.440
<v Speaker 1>needs to sort of open the door for his successor

0:21:04.720 --> 0:21:07.680
<v Speaker 1>to have that wiggle room, you know, have a good deal, opportunities,

0:21:07.760 --> 0:21:09.640
<v Speaker 1>have the ability to pay a diven if if that's

0:21:09.640 --> 0:21:11.720
<v Speaker 1>going to be the reality and this sort of slow

0:21:11.760 --> 0:21:14.720
<v Speaker 1>growth world, um, I think Buffett sort of needs to

0:21:14.760 --> 0:21:16.760
<v Speaker 1>start giving commentary on that. And I think that's what

0:21:16.760 --> 0:21:19.359
<v Speaker 1>people are looking for. It's not that they're thinking he's

0:21:19.440 --> 0:21:21.600
<v Speaker 1>you know, not living up to what he's promised them

0:21:21.680 --> 0:21:24.240
<v Speaker 1>or anything, but it's just that they're waiting to see, well,

0:21:24.280 --> 0:21:26.800
<v Speaker 1>what's Berkshire look like now for the next ten, fifteen,

0:21:26.840 --> 0:21:29.719
<v Speaker 1>twenty years. Maybe he's just waiting for the right pitch, right,

0:21:29.760 --> 0:21:32.679
<v Speaker 1>I mean, because I note that just I guess it

0:21:32.720 --> 0:21:35.320
<v Speaker 1>was over the last month when a Bank of America

0:21:35.840 --> 0:21:39.680
<v Speaker 1>Merrill Lynch announced, you know that they were paying Buffett

0:21:39.720 --> 0:21:43.600
<v Speaker 1>because of his participation. And you know, he strikes these

0:21:43.640 --> 0:21:46.919
<v Speaker 1>sort of idiosyncratic deals with preferred stock that you know,

0:21:46.960 --> 0:21:49.640
<v Speaker 1>they really pay off, right, I mean, the Craft Hyans deal,

0:21:49.760 --> 0:21:52.080
<v Speaker 1>the same thing. I mean, that's been great for Berkshire.

0:21:52.359 --> 0:21:54.960
<v Speaker 1>I think we're waiting to see kraft Hians do something

0:21:54.960 --> 0:21:57.120
<v Speaker 1>else and that Buffett will sort of bankroll the deal

0:21:57.160 --> 0:22:01.919
<v Speaker 1>and get another sort of high return preferred doc situation. Again. Um,

0:22:01.960 --> 0:22:03.920
<v Speaker 1>but I think it's you need is a really big

0:22:03.960 --> 0:22:06.680
<v Speaker 1>sell off, or you know, you need somebody get into

0:22:06.720 --> 0:22:09.119
<v Speaker 1>a lot of trouble. But also I think it's it's

0:22:09.119 --> 0:22:11.119
<v Speaker 1>a little more nuance on that now too, because you

0:22:11.200 --> 0:22:15.520
<v Speaker 1>have all these big companies that are thinking about acquisitions themselves.

0:22:15.600 --> 0:22:17.840
<v Speaker 1>So it's a much more competitive m and A environment

0:22:17.920 --> 0:22:20.520
<v Speaker 1>right now. Buffett is used to someone calling him up

0:22:20.520 --> 0:22:21.879
<v Speaker 1>and saying, you know, we want to sell to you,

0:22:21.960 --> 0:22:25.359
<v Speaker 1>here's our price. I don't think that that's as realistic nowadays.

0:22:25.400 --> 0:22:27.240
<v Speaker 1>I think there's so much em and a happening, and

0:22:27.240 --> 0:22:30.560
<v Speaker 1>people are paying incredible prices for some of these deals,

0:22:30.640 --> 0:22:33.479
<v Speaker 1>and I don't know that Buffett is willing to you know,

0:22:33.680 --> 0:22:36.480
<v Speaker 1>overpay of course, so it becomes a little more tricky.

0:22:36.520 --> 0:22:38.840
<v Speaker 1>And then also he's looking for companies with really solid

0:22:38.880 --> 0:22:40.800
<v Speaker 1>management teams that want to be around for a really

0:22:40.840 --> 0:22:43.880
<v Speaker 1>long time, and with all this activist investors out there

0:22:44.280 --> 0:22:46.719
<v Speaker 1>and a lot of shake ups up top, and you know,

0:22:47.119 --> 0:22:49.440
<v Speaker 1>I think it's just it's becoming a lot harder to

0:22:49.480 --> 0:22:52.200
<v Speaker 1>find companies that fit his criteria. Thank you very much

0:22:52.240 --> 0:22:54.280
<v Speaker 1>for coming in and spending time with us. Tara la

0:22:54.400 --> 0:22:58.359
<v Speaker 1>Chapelle is our deals columnist for Bloomberg Gadfly, speaking about

0:22:58.520 --> 0:23:12.919
<v Speaker 1>a Berkshire Hathaway and that a hundred billion dollars of cash. Alright,

0:23:12.960 --> 0:23:15.800
<v Speaker 1>no vacation when it comes to negotiations of what is

0:23:15.840 --> 0:23:18.320
<v Speaker 1>the future of Sprint. And here to tell us more

0:23:18.400 --> 0:23:22.199
<v Speaker 1>is Alex Sherman, our deal's reporter for Bloomberg News. Alex,

0:23:22.240 --> 0:23:24.520
<v Speaker 1>always a pleasure. Maybe you could just give us the

0:23:24.600 --> 0:23:26.520
<v Speaker 1>lay of the land, because there are a lot of

0:23:26.560 --> 0:23:30.919
<v Speaker 1>moving parts here. You've got Sprint, T Mobile, Comcast, Charter

0:23:31.200 --> 0:23:33.240
<v Speaker 1>and go ahead. I'm sure there must be something else

0:23:33.240 --> 0:23:37.480
<v Speaker 1>I'm forgetting. I'm sure there is him. You basically got

0:23:37.480 --> 0:23:39.399
<v Speaker 1>the gist of it there, but already that's quite a

0:23:39.440 --> 0:23:43.200
<v Speaker 1>bit so. Last week we did a bunch of reporting

0:23:43.440 --> 0:23:48.560
<v Speaker 1>suggesting that Soft Bank and it's billionaire owners, Mathayoshi's son

0:23:49.600 --> 0:23:54.359
<v Speaker 1>was considering buying Charter, which would be a huge deal,

0:23:54.440 --> 0:23:57.520
<v Speaker 1>one of the largest deals ever probably let's say about

0:23:57.520 --> 0:23:59.679
<v Speaker 1>a hundred and fifty billion dollars. After the attack on

0:23:59.760 --> 0:24:04.000
<v Speaker 1>a reasonable premium. Uh they Haffik has not made a

0:24:04.040 --> 0:24:07.919
<v Speaker 1>formal bid for Charter, but what we reported was that

0:24:07.960 --> 0:24:11.440
<v Speaker 1>it was at least considering it, and this would unite Sprint,

0:24:11.440 --> 0:24:14.200
<v Speaker 1>the fourth largest US wireless player, with Charter, the second

0:24:14.280 --> 0:24:18.240
<v Speaker 1>largest US cable provider, and give the United States its

0:24:18.320 --> 0:24:23.240
<v Speaker 1>first true wireless flash cable combined company if it were

0:24:23.320 --> 0:24:26.440
<v Speaker 1>to happen. What my colleagues Scott Maritz and I reported

0:24:26.560 --> 0:24:30.639
<v Speaker 1>last night was that in addition to this, Sprint has

0:24:30.720 --> 0:24:34.680
<v Speaker 1>also resumed talks about a potential merger with T Mobile,

0:24:35.119 --> 0:24:39.560
<v Speaker 1>something that has been sort of batted around by both

0:24:39.560 --> 0:24:43.000
<v Speaker 1>sides for years. You should think of this as Sprint

0:24:43.520 --> 0:24:46.119
<v Speaker 1>covering its basis before it spends a hundred and fifty

0:24:46.119 --> 0:24:49.560
<v Speaker 1>billion dollars on Charter. It probably wants to see if

0:24:49.560 --> 0:24:52.080
<v Speaker 1>a deal with T Mobile can be done, because there

0:24:52.119 --> 0:24:56.640
<v Speaker 1>are so many synergies in this deal that they would

0:24:56.680 --> 0:25:00.280
<v Speaker 1>be doing themselves a disservice if they didn't look very

0:25:00.320 --> 0:25:02.040
<v Speaker 1>hard at it. So I think that's where we are

0:25:02.119 --> 0:25:05.560
<v Speaker 1>right now, where Sprint is looking at both options. Well,

0:25:05.720 --> 0:25:08.240
<v Speaker 1>what about just let's talk about Sprint for just a second,

0:25:08.280 --> 0:25:10.480
<v Speaker 1>because I understand in the last quarter they lost thirty

0:25:10.520 --> 0:25:16.040
<v Speaker 1>nine customers. Is there something inherently broken at Sprint? There

0:25:16.119 --> 0:25:18.920
<v Speaker 1>is something inherently broken at Sprint as Sprint stands today.

0:25:19.160 --> 0:25:22.280
<v Speaker 1>I mean, this has been a long time money losing operation.

0:25:22.560 --> 0:25:26.359
<v Speaker 1>The the bet on Sprint is that they are well

0:25:26.400 --> 0:25:31.639
<v Speaker 1>positioned for tomorrow's wireless world. So today we all have

0:25:32.080 --> 0:25:35.600
<v Speaker 1>what's known as an LTE standard or other people call

0:25:35.680 --> 0:25:39.160
<v Speaker 1>it four G. In a five G world, this would

0:25:39.200 --> 0:25:42.840
<v Speaker 1>be you know, five G standing for generation. Uh. Many

0:25:42.880 --> 0:25:47.359
<v Speaker 1>people feel like Sprint has the correct wireless spectrum or

0:25:47.400 --> 0:25:51.879
<v Speaker 1>wireless air waves that if combined with so called small

0:25:51.920 --> 0:25:55.160
<v Speaker 1>cell technology, which is owned in large part by cable

0:25:55.160 --> 0:25:58.080
<v Speaker 1>companies but also Sprint on some uh, that Sprint can

0:25:58.119 --> 0:26:03.639
<v Speaker 1>actually be a much strong, younger competitor. However, the finances

0:26:03.680 --> 0:26:06.720
<v Speaker 1>are what they are today, and that's why Masayoshi's son,

0:26:07.119 --> 0:26:10.200
<v Speaker 1>the founder of soft Bank, who owns plus of Sprint,

0:26:10.520 --> 0:26:13.160
<v Speaker 1>has been so aggressive in trying to do a deal

0:26:13.320 --> 0:26:17.000
<v Speaker 1>because Sprint as it stands today is not well positioned

0:26:17.040 --> 0:26:19.480
<v Speaker 1>at all. So it needs to be a much more

0:26:19.600 --> 0:26:22.480
<v Speaker 1>robust company. You combine that with T Mobile, you combine

0:26:22.480 --> 0:26:24.640
<v Speaker 1>it with Charter, you combine it with some other company,

0:26:24.920 --> 0:26:27.240
<v Speaker 1>then Sprint can sort of get from where it is

0:26:27.280 --> 0:26:31.879
<v Speaker 1>today to the ties when five G technology will kick in,

0:26:31.960 --> 0:26:36.120
<v Speaker 1>and theoretically Sprint would be a much stronger company then

0:26:36.880 --> 0:26:39.560
<v Speaker 1>because of the airwaves it owns I like this idea

0:26:39.600 --> 0:26:41.760
<v Speaker 1>that you know, it's all in the future, right, it's

0:26:41.760 --> 0:26:45.840
<v Speaker 1>all in the creation of this rhetorical Uh sort of

0:26:45.880 --> 0:26:49.520
<v Speaker 1>makes sense a program, but you know, it just makes

0:26:49.520 --> 0:26:51.879
<v Speaker 1>me think of John Ledger and T Mobile because when

0:26:51.960 --> 0:26:54.600
<v Speaker 1>he came in, people were leaving T Mobile for dead,

0:26:54.640 --> 0:26:58.120
<v Speaker 1>but they actually took some initiatives that have not only

0:26:58.200 --> 0:27:01.560
<v Speaker 1>changed the industry but have forced the competition to follow them.

0:27:01.560 --> 0:27:04.200
<v Speaker 1>Why doesn't Sprint take a leaf out of their book? Well,

0:27:04.240 --> 0:27:06.399
<v Speaker 1>that's a great question, and I suppose they merged with

0:27:06.480 --> 0:27:08.760
<v Speaker 1>T Mobile would do that because in the end, here

0:27:08.840 --> 0:27:11.639
<v Speaker 1>Mateyoshi Son, who has a three hundred year plan has

0:27:11.960 --> 0:27:14.040
<v Speaker 1>uh and that's not an exaggeration. He literally has a

0:27:14.040 --> 0:27:16.960
<v Speaker 1>three hundred year plan for his company. UM has two

0:27:16.960 --> 0:27:21.119
<v Speaker 1>options here, UH, If you buy charter Mateyoshi Son would

0:27:21.160 --> 0:27:24.880
<v Speaker 1>stay in control of this new company UH, and therefore

0:27:24.920 --> 0:27:27.440
<v Speaker 1>would be able to dictate its terms. If they merge

0:27:27.440 --> 0:27:30.000
<v Speaker 1>with T Mobile, so I think would actually have to

0:27:30.040 --> 0:27:33.360
<v Speaker 1>sell Sprint and it would be run by T Mobile

0:27:33.880 --> 0:27:36.399
<v Speaker 1>and John Ledger. So I think that the the the

0:27:36.520 --> 0:27:39.399
<v Speaker 1>idea there would be Sprint would say, look, we we

0:27:39.520 --> 0:27:42.959
<v Speaker 1>understand here that this combined company is stronger, and frankly,

0:27:43.080 --> 0:27:45.239
<v Speaker 1>T Mobile, you've done a better job than us over

0:27:45.280 --> 0:27:48.040
<v Speaker 1>the past few years of running this company. It's certainly

0:27:48.080 --> 0:27:51.520
<v Speaker 1>possible that Sprint could have done exactly what T Mobile

0:27:51.560 --> 0:27:54.000
<v Speaker 1>did under price, be very aggressive, have a much better

0:27:54.040 --> 0:27:57.440
<v Speaker 1>marketing plan, sort of failed on all of these. Uh

0:27:57.680 --> 0:28:00.159
<v Speaker 1>if if if you follow John Ledger on Twitter, he's

0:28:00.200 --> 0:28:04.080
<v Speaker 1>constantly mocking Sprint and it's sort of second rate promotions

0:28:04.160 --> 0:28:08.560
<v Speaker 1>and also it's second rate network. Uh So, the idea

0:28:08.600 --> 0:28:10.680
<v Speaker 1>here then would be this combined company would in fact

0:28:10.720 --> 0:28:14.480
<v Speaker 1>be run by Ledger and Sun would give up on Sprint.

0:28:14.480 --> 0:28:16.320
<v Speaker 1>He would still own some of the company, but he

0:28:16.359 --> 0:28:19.520
<v Speaker 1>would no longer be the controlling shareholders. So very much

0:28:19.600 --> 0:28:22.359
<v Speaker 1>two different outlooks there. Some people tell me the idea

0:28:22.400 --> 0:28:25.400
<v Speaker 1>would be after Sprint bought Charter, if that's the plan

0:28:25.520 --> 0:28:27.879
<v Speaker 1>that happens, it would then go after T Mobile, and

0:28:27.920 --> 0:28:30.520
<v Speaker 1>in that case stop think actually would be able to

0:28:30.520 --> 0:28:33.240
<v Speaker 1>maintain control of the company because it would be so

0:28:33.359 --> 0:28:36.440
<v Speaker 1>much bigger than T Mobile. Of course it is still

0:28:36.440 --> 0:28:40.240
<v Speaker 1>to be determined. If T Mobile's German owners, Deutsche Telecom,

0:28:40.240 --> 0:28:43.280
<v Speaker 1>would even be interested in selling the company, we know

0:28:43.440 --> 0:28:46.160
<v Speaker 1>for the time being they are not, which is why

0:28:46.200 --> 0:28:50.440
<v Speaker 1>the Sprint Temo deal may actually happen with the Germans

0:28:50.720 --> 0:28:54.200
<v Speaker 1>buying and consolidating the new Sprint Temo company. Of course,

0:28:54.240 --> 0:28:59.200
<v Speaker 1>that wouldn't mean anti trust regulations or review. Yeah, why

0:28:59.200 --> 0:29:04.160
<v Speaker 1>doesn't Mastios he sagn just hired John Leger. Well, that's

0:29:04.160 --> 0:29:07.000
<v Speaker 1>a good question. Um. I think part of the reason

0:29:07.160 --> 0:29:11.640
<v Speaker 1>is that he feels like Stephen John Leger at this

0:29:11.720 --> 0:29:14.480
<v Speaker 1>Maybe it's too little, too late. Look, he did hire

0:29:15.560 --> 0:29:19.560
<v Speaker 1>a person named Maurice Claure excuse me, Marcello Claure. Um,

0:29:19.880 --> 0:29:21.760
<v Speaker 1>I would say a few years ago at this point,

0:29:22.240 --> 0:29:25.120
<v Speaker 1>to try to turn around the net worth of previous

0:29:25.120 --> 0:29:28.040
<v Speaker 1>CEO's name was Dan Hessey. Uh So, the idea at

0:29:28.040 --> 0:29:31.520
<v Speaker 1>the time was to bring in someone that Massio she

0:29:31.600 --> 0:29:34.560
<v Speaker 1>soun was familiar with to to turn around the company.

0:29:34.560 --> 0:29:36.160
<v Speaker 1>And look, if you if you go on a pure

0:29:36.160 --> 0:29:40.120
<v Speaker 1>stock performance, even though Sprint continues to struggle, actually you

0:29:40.160 --> 0:29:43.160
<v Speaker 1>could make a very strong case that Sprint has turned

0:29:43.160 --> 0:29:45.000
<v Speaker 1>it around. I mean their shares were training around two

0:29:45.000 --> 0:29:47.800
<v Speaker 1>dollars a share at one point now eight dollars and

0:29:47.840 --> 0:29:49.960
<v Speaker 1>seventy three cents now a lot of a lot of

0:29:50.000 --> 0:29:52.240
<v Speaker 1>that m and a premium, but still tapped off the

0:29:52.280 --> 0:29:54.360
<v Speaker 1>Clare and the Sprint team for getting the share price up.

0:29:54.400 --> 0:29:56.920
<v Speaker 1>We gotta leave it there. Alex Sherman, our tech media

0:29:56.920 --> 0:30:02.840
<v Speaker 1>and telecom m and a reporter from Bloomberg News. Thanks

0:30:02.840 --> 0:30:05.480
<v Speaker 1>for listening to the Bloomberg P and L podcast. You

0:30:05.480 --> 0:30:09.280
<v Speaker 1>can subscribe and listen to interviews at Apple Podcasts, SoundCloud,

0:30:09.400 --> 0:30:12.880
<v Speaker 1>or whatever podcast platform you prefer. I'm pim Fox. I'm

0:30:12.920 --> 0:30:16.920
<v Speaker 1>on Twitter at pim Fox. I'm on Twitter at Lisa Abramo.

0:30:17.040 --> 0:30:19.640
<v Speaker 1>It's one before the podcast. You can always catch us

0:30:19.680 --> 0:30:21.240
<v Speaker 1>worldwide on Bloomberg Radio