Speaker 1: Pushkin. Hey Leon here, Before we get to this episode,
Speaker 1: I want to let you know that you can binge
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Speaker 2: Ronald Reagan makes his debut.
Speaker 3: Today is America's leading map.
Speaker 1: On the morning of January twentieth, nineteen eighty one, the
Speaker 1: White House was preparing for the arrival of a new president,
Speaker 1: but some unfinished business was threatening to overshadow the festivities.
Speaker 4: I Reagan may be the first president the day's top
Speaker 4: news story on his inauguration day.
Speaker 3: There's Angxiat that hangs over everything.
Speaker 5: This whole business of the hostages.
Speaker 1: This whole business of the hostages referred to more than
Speaker 1: fifty American citizens who were being held prisoner in Iran.
Speaker 1: They had been there for more than a year, locked
Speaker 1: inside the US Embassy in Tehran by a group of
Speaker 1: young radicals.
Speaker 6: The US Embassy in Tehran has been invaded and occupied
Speaker 6: by Iranian students.
Speaker 7: The American hostages were blindfolded, handcuffed, and marched out on
Speaker 7: the US Embassy's front steps by the revolutionary students. The
Speaker 7: Iranians had fought US Marine guards for three hours for
Speaker 7: control of the embassy.
Speaker 1: The hostage crisis started in November of nineteen seventy nine.
Speaker 1: Iran had just undergone a revolution a few months earlier.
Speaker 1: The Shah, Iran's long serving US backed leader had been
Speaker 1: overthrown and exiled. Islamic fundamentalists who called America the Great
Speaker 1: Satan had taken power. American news networks reported that Iran's
Speaker 1: new Supreme Leader, the Ayatola Rujuola Komeni, had given the
Speaker 1: hostage takers his blessing.
Speaker 6: The move has the Iola's personal support, which adds to
Speaker 6: Washington's difficulty in trying to resolve this dangerous situation.
Speaker 1: President Jimmy Carter tried to pressure Iran into releasing the hostages.
Speaker 1: His administration cut diplomatic ties with the Komeni government, and
Speaker 1: they froze Iranian state assets in US banks. Carter even
Speaker 1: authorized the secret rescue mission, but it ended in disaster.
Speaker 2: Thousands of jubile and Iranians gathered outside to celebrate the
Speaker 2: defeat and disgrace of America.
Speaker 8: The United States tried to free the hostages and failed.
Speaker 1: None of the hostages were released, and eight American servicemen
Speaker 1: were killed in a helicopter crash. The failed mission made
Speaker 1: Carter look hapless and ineffective, and the crisis continued. Americans
Speaker 1: turned on their televisions for nightly updates. Walter Cronkite began
Speaker 1: signing off at the end of every broadcast by noting
Speaker 1: the number of days the Americans had been held captive.
Speaker 3: That's the word it is. Tuesday, February nineteenth, nineteen eighty
Speaker 3: undred and eighth day of captivity, two hundred and twenty
Speaker 3: second day of captivity, three hundred and seventy seventh day
Speaker 3: of captivity for American hostages.
Speaker 1: Inter rat Carter's efforts to win the hostages release stretched
Speaker 1: into his re election campaign.
Speaker 9: The Republicans are itching to turn the hostage crisis against
Speaker 9: the administration.
Speaker 2: The administration has boxed it so bad that we're left
Speaker 2: with very few options.
Speaker 10: The hostage issue hovered over the whole campaign, and it
Speaker 10: was something that just so damaged Carter.
Speaker 1: That's journalist Jane Mayer, who covered the Reagan administration for
Speaker 1: The Wall Street Journal and co authored the book Landslide.
Speaker 10: And the idea of Carter being weak was really the
Speaker 10: thing that was hammered over and over again and played
Speaker 10: a big part in why he lost.
Speaker 1: Reagan's inauguration in nineteen eighty one marked the four hundred
Speaker 1: and forty fourth day of the hostage crisis. The outgoing
Speaker 1: Carter administration had hoped it would be the last.
Speaker 5: This has been quite a suspense evening.
Speaker 10: Jimmy Carter, his last night in the White House, spent
Speaker 10: it in the Oval Office working with his aids.
Speaker 1: The day before, they had notified the press that a
Speaker 1: deal had been reached to finally free the Americans, but
Speaker 1: the hostages were still not home.
Speaker 10: In the United States to be Carter.
Speaker 1: At the inauguration ceremony, Carter walked to the dais where
Speaker 1: Reagan was about to be sworn in. Even then, reporters
Speaker 1: were yelling out to him for confirmation that the hostages
Speaker 1: were being released.
Speaker 11: Whether you could hear or not.
Speaker 12: The President at Carter, which just passed if the hostagers
Speaker 12: are out, and he responded saying not yet, not yet.
Speaker 1: The Iranians were not going to release the hostages on
Speaker 1: Carter's watch. They waited until after Reagan was sworn in.
Speaker 1: Before allowing them to leave Tehran. As Carter traveled home
Speaker 1: to Georgia, Reagan got to announce the good news.
Speaker 13: Some thirty minutes ago.
Speaker 12: The planes bearing our prison left Iranian airspace and are
Speaker 12: now breathed.
Speaker 2: But it had been a wrenching day for mister Carter,
Speaker 2: and aide said he had been terribly hurt and disappointed
Speaker 2: when he was not able to announce the release of
Speaker 2: the hostages before leaving alf Us this morning.
Speaker 10: The simultaneous inauguration of Reagan and the hostages getting out
Speaker 10: enabled him to take full credit for it and sort
Speaker 10: of appear to be the savior.
Speaker 1: A week later, Reagan welcomed the hostages home in a
Speaker 1: ceremony in the Rose.
Speaker 5: Gardens at the White House, a welcome fit for a king,
Speaker 5: a kind of South Lawn ceremony usually reserved for visiting.
Speaker 13: Heads of states.
Speaker 12: Welcome home, you are home, and believe me, you are welcome.
Speaker 1: But the triumphant moment also created a liability for the
Speaker 1: Reagan administration.
Speaker 10: It so publicly associated them with this act that it
Speaker 10: upped the anti for Reagan. He was more vulnerable than
Speaker 10: maybe other presidents would have been to being manipulated on
Speaker 10: the issue because he'd made this sort of his selling point.
Speaker 1: Later, one of Reagan's counter terrorism analysts expressed regret over
Speaker 1: the spectacle. Where did we first go wrong? Nineteen eighty one?
Speaker 1: He said, once we had the Rose Garden ceremony, we
Speaker 1: had attached huge political benefits to the return of US hostages.
Speaker 1: In other words, Reagan had set himself up for a
Speaker 1: potential hostage crisis of his own. I'm Leon Nevak from
Speaker 1: Prolog Projects and Pushkin Industries. This is fiasco iran contrast.
Speaker 14: Seven Americans kidnapped over the past fifteen months, seven Americans
Speaker 14: who have disappeared.
Speaker 15: The Reagan administration's response to the series of kidnappings has
Speaker 15: been one of almost total silence.
Speaker 16: They did not want to have a hostage problem like
Speaker 16: Jimmy Carter has.
Speaker 10: Maybe they can get the hostages out.
Speaker 1: I can't assure you that no deal was made.
Speaker 6: The impression left by all of this is that things
Speaker 6: are afoot.
Speaker 17: The only person that could have stopped me, and I
Speaker 17: didn't do it.
Speaker 1: Episode two, Trade Secrets how Ronald Reagan tried to avoid
Speaker 1: Jimmy Carter's fate by extending a hand to one of
Speaker 1: America's sworn enemies. We'll be right back. Among the advisors
Speaker 1: and aides who joined Ronald Reagan in the White House
Speaker 1: was a soft spoken and cerebral retired Marine named Robert
Speaker 1: Bud McFarlane. McFarlane's domain was foreign policy. As a student
Speaker 1: at the US Naval Academy, he had longed to have
Speaker 1: a hand in shaping America's relationship to the rest of
Speaker 1: the world.
Speaker 17: And I had to think with all the rigor I
Speaker 17: could muster about the elements of power and their nature
Speaker 17: and their limits.
Speaker 1: This is Bud McFarlane speaking to me in December of
Speaker 1: twe nineteen in Washington, DC.
Speaker 13: All that is not unique to me.
Speaker 17: I mean, hundreds thousands of people go through as good
Speaker 17: or better schools than I did and get this foundation
Speaker 17: knowledge and self confidence that, yes, you can contribute constructively
Speaker 17: because you know the rules and you occasionally have a
Speaker 17: lucid interval and even imagination that could make the world
Speaker 17: a better place.
Speaker 1: Bud McFarland died in twenty twenty two at the age
Speaker 1: of eighty four. Perhaps more than anyone else in the
Speaker 1: Reagan White House, McFarlane felt personally responsible for the events
Speaker 1: that led to Iran Contra. When I first approached him
Speaker 1: about an interview. He made it clear that rehashing the
Speaker 1: story of the scandal would be painful.
Speaker 17: Remorse doesn't quite capture it. I I'd failed my country.
Speaker 1: McFarlane's career in government began during that Nickson administration, when
Speaker 1: he worked for Henry Kissinger.
Speaker 4: Henry Kissinger has been on the road conferring, negotiating, and
Speaker 4: meeting with heads of state in eight countries in nine days.
Speaker 1: McFarlane saw Kissinger as a professional role model, an ambitious
Speaker 1: geopolitical thinker who could see the vulnerabilities of America's adversaries
Speaker 1: and knew how to exploit them.
Speaker 4: Kissinger carried out his Middle East peace mission today in
Speaker 4: three Arab countries.
Speaker 2: He's the most gifted man to work in American foreign
Speaker 2: policy in any generation since World War Two.
Speaker 17: Henry was someone who I had admired, notwithstanding his cynicism
Speaker 17: and occasionally ruthless methods, and being there even as a
Speaker 17: note taker was a.
Speaker 13: Gift.
Speaker 1: In nineteen eighty three, just days before the invasion of Grenada,
Speaker 1: Reagan made McFarlane his National Security Advisor, the same job
Speaker 1: Henry Kissinger had held a decade earlier.
Speaker 12: Robert McFarlane, we'll be confirmed as National Security Advisor, but
Speaker 12: I want to thank you for accepting this new challenge.
Speaker 12: All of us look forward to working with you in
Speaker 12: the coming months.
Speaker 1: From the beginning of his tenure as National Security Advisor,
Speaker 1: McFarlan had a special interest in Iran. He believed that
Speaker 1: even though Iran was led by the intensely anti American
Speaker 1: Iatola Komani, the US might have a chance to intervene
Speaker 1: in the country's politics.
Speaker 9: Conscious of iran strategic and economic importance, the administration wants
Speaker 9: to keep the door open to possible reconciliation. But while
Speaker 9: Comte lives, that seems a distant hope.
Speaker 17: I really didn't imagine that we had a plausible prospect
Speaker 17: of being able to engage with this government. I did think, however,
Speaker 17: that there were reasons why the circumstances facing Iran might
Speaker 17: give us an opportunity to influence the regime change.
Speaker 1: McFarlane had this theory that there might be people inside
Speaker 1: the Iranian military who would be amenable to the idea
Speaker 1: of a coup against Komani. Theoretically, the Americans could help
Speaker 1: these dissident elements and in the process turn Iran from
Speaker 1: an enemy into an ally. The way they had been
Speaker 1: before the revolution.
Speaker 17: I mean, you'd have to have the very senior leadership
Speaker 17: of the military who had become demoralized. And that's theory,
Speaker 17: but it was a very plausible possibility that the military
Speaker 17: would be the instrument of changing the regime in a
Speaker 17: relatively bloodless coup.
Speaker 1: MacFarlane had a specific reason for thinking that Iran was
Speaker 1: vulnerable to an internal coup. As he saw it, the
Speaker 1: country was stuck between two foreign powers, Iraq to the
Speaker 1: west and the Soviet Union to the northeast. In Iraq,
Speaker 1: the problem was Saddam Hussein, who had invaded Iran in
Speaker 1: nineteen eighty right after the Iranian Revolution. The war that
Speaker 1: followed was unimaginably violent. Hundreds of thousands of people were
Speaker 1: being killed.
Speaker 14: A war that started months ago with fretful skirm issues,
Speaker 14: a war that no one now seems able to stop.
Speaker 1: Meanwhile, the Soviet Union was just sort of looming over Iran.
Speaker 13: On its northern border.
Speaker 9: Iran worries about twenty four Soviet divisions.
Speaker 1: The two countries shared a border, and MacFarland had no
Speaker 1: doubt that the Soviets, who had recently invaded Afghanistan, wanted
Speaker 1: to gain influence in the Middle East. He thought maybe
Speaker 1: there were people within the Iranian leadership who were concerned
Speaker 1: about the same thing.
Speaker 17: Out of self interest. That ought to have nurtured a
Speaker 17: dissonant element.
Speaker 1: There was just one problem. McFarlane didn't actually know for
Speaker 1: sure that these dissidents existed. He was thinking strategically, just
Speaker 1: like Kissinger had taught him, and he was hoping to
Speaker 1: be fair. There wasn't much else he could do. Concrete
Speaker 1: intelligence about what was happening in the Iranian government was
Speaker 1: very hard to come by. The relationship between Iran and
Speaker 1: the US was openly hostile.
Speaker 8: Leading officials of the Reagan administration repeatedly have accused Iran
Speaker 8: of sponsoring terrorist attacks against the United States.
Speaker 1: In nineteen eighty four, the Reagan administration officially designated the
Speaker 1: Komani regime a state sponsor of terrorism. They enforced an
Speaker 1: arms embargo that prevented the US government from selling weapons
Speaker 1: to Iran, and launched a diplomatic campaign to pressure other
Speaker 1: countries to do the same.
Speaker 9: The burning of the American flag, the shouts of Death
Speaker 9: to America.
Speaker 1: Friday prayers, Iranian imams led chance of death to America.
Speaker 1: So it was Chile between the Reagan White House and
Speaker 1: the Komani regime. But then in July of nineteen eighty five,
Speaker 1: Bud McFarlane received a visit from a trusted associate bearing
Speaker 1: good news. It turned out that the people mc farland
Speaker 1: had been imagining the dissidents within the Iranian regime were
Speaker 1: in fact real and they wanted to talk. Around the
Speaker 1: same time, a related crisis was unfolding in the Middle East.
Speaker 5: The American University of Beirut today is under heavier guard
Speaker 5: than usual. The US Embassy there, citing intelligence reports, has
Speaker 5: warned that pro Iranian extremists are planning mass kidnappings of
Speaker 5: Americans on the campus.
Speaker 1: John Weir was in his twenties when his father was
Speaker 1: taken hostage in Lebanon.
Speaker 16: I remember talking to my sisters and my sisters being upset,
Speaker 16: my mom being very upset.
Speaker 1: It was six months into Bud McFarland's tenure as National
Speaker 1: Security Advisor, and about three years since the American hostages
Speaker 1: taken in Tehran were returned home. John Weir's father, the
Speaker 1: Reverend Benjamin Weir, was a Presbyterian minister who had been
Speaker 1: assigned to Beirut, the capital city of Lebanon. Weir was
Speaker 1: kidnapped as he and his wife Carol were leaving them apartment.
Speaker 16: And not too far from the anxious department building, a
Speaker 16: car pulled up, some guys got out and grabbed my dad.
Speaker 16: My mom tried to fight them off, She's not much
Speaker 16: of a fighter, and they basically just muzzled him into
Speaker 16: the car and drove off.
Speaker 1: In the nineteen eighties, Lebanon was embroiled in a brutal
Speaker 1: sectarian civil war, and Islamic militia groups began kidnapping European
Speaker 1: and American citizens. The group that captured Benjamin Weir was
Speaker 1: associated with Hesbela, which enjoyed the support of the Komani
Speaker 1: regime in Iran. By nineteen eighty five, Weir was one
Speaker 1: of seven Americans being held hostage in Lebanon.
Speaker 14: Seven Americans kidnapped in Beirut over the past fifteen months,
Speaker 14: seven Americans who have disappeared.
Speaker 1: In addition to Weir, the group of hostages included a
Speaker 1: Catholic priest, a correspondent for the Associated Press, and three
Speaker 1: employees of the American University in Beirut. In the federal government,
Speaker 1: administration officials were most co earned, with one hostage in particular,
Speaker 1: a CIA operative named William Buckley.
Speaker 5: William Buckley, a political officer at the US Embassy in Beirut,
Speaker 5: was kidnapped.
Speaker 4: He was kidnapped on March the sixteenth, nineteen eighty four.
Speaker 1: Buckley had been with the CIA for decades, working in Zayir, Cambodia, Egypt,
Speaker 1: and Pakistan. When he was kidnapped, Buckley was the head
Speaker 1: of the CIA's be Route Division, though that was not
Speaker 1: public information at the time. News outlets identified him only
Speaker 1: as a political officer at the US Embassy. In January
Speaker 1: of nineteen eighty five, Buckley's captors released a videotape of
Speaker 1: him to prove that he was still alive.
Speaker 15: January nineteen, page five Hi as well.
Speaker 1: In the video, Buckley appeared weak and his voice sounded thin.
Speaker 1: Intelligence officials feared that the kidnappers were torturing him in
Speaker 1: order to get CIA's secrets. As Buckley's captivity stretched into
Speaker 1: its second year, it weighed on the minds of administration
Speaker 1: officials like McFarlane, CIA Director William Casey and President Reagan himself,
Speaker 1: But the administration seemed to be avoiding drawing attention to
Speaker 1: the hostage situation as much as possible.
Speaker 15: The Reagan administration's response to the series of kidnappings has
Speaker 15: been one of almost total silence. What a complete contrast
Speaker 15: to the actions of the Carter administration when Iranian extremists
Speaker 15: seized the American embassy in Tehran more than five years ago.
Speaker 1: Here again is John Weir.
Speaker 16: The Reagan White House had made a lot of political
Speaker 16: hay out of Jimmy Carter's issues with the hostages in Iran,
Speaker 16: and it was pretty clear to us that they were
Speaker 16: kind of suppressing as much as they could discussion of
Speaker 16: hostages or use of the word hostages, and they did
Speaker 16: not want to have a hostage problem like Jimmy Carter had.
Speaker 1: The administration had also publicly committed itself to an ironclad
Speaker 1: principle America does not negotiate with terrorists.
Speaker 12: Terrorists and those who support them must and will be
Speaker 12: held to account.
Speaker 10: The principle was that, you know, we should never deal
Speaker 10: with terrorists.
Speaker 1: Here's Jane Mayer again, that you.
Speaker 10: Do not honor them by dealing with them, and they
Speaker 10: took a very hard line on it.
Speaker 1: The Reagan administration communicated a consistent message to the Weir family,
Speaker 1: just laylo, the government is doing everything it can. They
Speaker 1: even had a phrase for it, quiet diplomacy.
Speaker 16: Quiet diplomacy was their explanation of why we had no
Speaker 16: idea what they were doing. We would say, so, what
Speaker 16: are you doing, Oh, well, we're using quiet diplomacy.
Speaker 1: Eventually, Benjamin Weir's wife, Carol took matters into her own hands.
Speaker 1: She had lived in Lebanon for more than thirty years
Speaker 1: and she knew a lot of people. She began traveling
Speaker 1: around the region talking to religious leaders, following leads of
Speaker 1: her own, and comparing notes with her contacts at the
Speaker 1: US embassy.
Speaker 16: She would ask them, you know, who have you seen?
Speaker 16: And there were a couple of occasions when they mentioned
Speaker 16: some people and she said, well, I've already seen that person. So,
Speaker 16: you know, she started trying to figure out who had them,
Speaker 16: what was going on, what did they want. But after
Speaker 16: we'd heard quiet diplomacy long enough, we decided that the
Speaker 16: quiet diplomacy was just a way of trying to pacify us,
Speaker 16: and that we needed to ratchet things up.
Speaker 1: Finally, Carol Weir decided that she needed to relocate to
Speaker 1: the United States and take her message to Washington.
Speaker 4: The wife of the Reverend Benjamin Weir was in Washington
Speaker 4: today seeking more help for her husband.
Speaker 18: It's four hundred and seventeen days now for me since
Speaker 18: my husband was kidnapped. As that's a long time, and
Speaker 18: I believe they have been forgotten.
Speaker 1: The Weirs used the resources of the Presbyterian Church to
Speaker 1: launch a public pressure campaign. They spoke at churches and
Speaker 1: gave press conferences. They organized an effort to get a
Speaker 1: milli letters written to the administration. In one speech, Carol
Speaker 1: Weir invoked the Iranian hostage crisis that had consumed the
Speaker 1: nation's attention just a few years earlier. She asked if
Speaker 1: she would have to wait four hundred and forty four
Speaker 1: days to see her husband. During his first term, Reagan's
Speaker 1: closest aids had tried to prevent the president from directly
Speaker 1: engaging with the hostage families.
Speaker 10: The old aides who knew him well, tried to keep
Speaker 10: people with hard luck stories away from him. That is
Speaker 10: the truth about Reagan was that whenever there was somebody
Speaker 10: who was an individual with a problem that was near him,
Speaker 10: he had a tendency to be empathetic and he could
Speaker 10: be manipulated.
Speaker 1: Reagan's minders had feared that if he met with the
Speaker 1: hostage families, he would begin pushing to get their loved
Speaker 1: ones released at any cost, and he might be tempted
Speaker 1: to violate his policy of never negotiating with terrorists. But
Speaker 1: by the summer of nineteen eighty five, many of Reagan's
Speaker 1: first term aids were no longer around. Without them there
Speaker 1: to hold him back, the President began to fixate on
Speaker 1: the hostages, asking about them in meetings nearly every day
Speaker 1: and agonizing over their continued captivity.
Speaker 10: He basically got drawn in and hooked and became emotionally
Speaker 10: involved in the situation, and he made clear that he
Speaker 10: cared and he really wanted these hostages out and something
Speaker 10: done about it. And his motto, which he often said
Speaker 10: to his aides, was don't bring me problems, bring me solutions.
Speaker 1: In July of nineteen eighty five, National security advisor Bud
Speaker 1: McFarlane approached the President with a possible solution. In his diary,
Speaker 1: Reagan wrote, some strange soundings are coming from the Iranians.
Speaker 1: Bud em will be here tomorrow to talk about it.
Speaker 1: It could be a breakthrough on getting our seven kidnap
Speaker 1: victims back. McFarland's meeting with Reagan was prompted by a
Speaker 1: conversation he had had two weeks earlier with a senior
Speaker 1: Israeli diplomat. The diplomat's name was David kim k He
Speaker 1: had previously served as deputy director of Masad, Israel's intelligence agency,
Speaker 1: and MacFarland trusted his judgment. According to MacFarlane, kim Key
Speaker 1: told him that Israel had been in touch with Iranians
Speaker 1: who were disaffected by the turmoil in their country and
Speaker 1: who were both willing and able to change the government.
Speaker 17: It was simply stated that there are elements in the
Speaker 17: Iranian army that are prepared to open a dialogue with
Speaker 17: us that might lead to oh regime change, but that
Speaker 17: it would take probably years of nurture to do it.
Speaker 17: I was simply heartened, however, by the fact that he
Speaker 17: thought it might be nurtured and developed over time.
Speaker 1: It was exactly what MacFarlane had hoped for, Iranian moderates
Speaker 1: and positions of power who secretly opposed the revolutionary government
Speaker 1: that had taken over their country. There was a catch.
Speaker 1: The coup was not going to nurture itself before there
Speaker 1: could be any dialogue between the US and these Iranian moderates.
Speaker 1: The Americans would have to do Their new friends a
Speaker 1: good turn, they would have to sell them some weapons. Specifically,
Speaker 1: the Iranians wanted anti tank missiles for use in their
Speaker 1: war against Iraq. It was a big request, but the
Speaker 1: Iranians were offering something valuable in return. They could use
Speaker 1: their influence over HESBLA to bring about the release of
Speaker 1: William Buckley, Benjamin Weir, and all the other American hostages
Speaker 1: being held in Lebanon. At least that's what Bud McFarlane
Speaker 1: was hearing from David Kimke, the Israeli diplomat.
Speaker 17: Kim k presented it as their being able to achieve
Speaker 17: the release of the hostages, and that wasn't just his notion,
Speaker 17: but that it had been vetted by Iranians that he
Speaker 17: believed were worthy people.
Speaker 1: How did David Kimki know they were worthy people? The
Speaker 1: answer lay with the man who was helping Israel make
Speaker 1: contact with the Iranian moderates. His name was Menu chair
Speaker 1: Goorbanifar Orbanifar was an Iranian businessman living in Europe. He
Speaker 1: was a kind of international fixer, a guy who helped
Speaker 1: broker deals between parties who would otherwise have no reason
Speaker 1: to trust each other. And according to David kimk Gorbanifar
Speaker 1: could connect the Americans to the moderates inside Iran who
Speaker 1: were open, perhaps even eager, for a better relationship with
Speaker 1: the United States. If this all sounds convoluted, that's because
Speaker 1: it was McFarlane, kimky goor Bonifar, these nameless moderates in Iran.
Speaker 1: It's a bizarre daisy chain, and the mechanics of it
Speaker 1: aren't that important. The point is a guy knew a
Speaker 1: guy who knew a guy who claimed to know some
Speaker 1: high level Iranians who didn't see eye to eye with
Speaker 1: the anti American and Comani regime. Incredibly, that was enough
Speaker 1: to get the ball rolling. Over the course of several weeks.
Speaker 1: In July, a specific proposal took shape in which one
Speaker 1: hundred American missiles would be traded for all seven American hostages.
Speaker 1: The trade would serve as a demonstration of good faith.
Speaker 1: With mutual trust established, the two sides might then be
Speaker 1: able to start talking about the bigger picture, the eventual
Speaker 1: ouster of the Iyatola. As McFarland well knew, the deal
Speaker 1: would violate American policy in at least two ways. First,
Speaker 1: it would break the Reagan administration's rule against negotiating with terrorists. Second,
Speaker 1: it would undermine the international effort to stop weapons sales
Speaker 1: to Iran that the US it self had introduced principles Aside,
Speaker 1: the arms for hostages deal would depend entirely on the
Speaker 1: credibility of the mysterious Iranian fixer, Manucher Gorbanifar, a man
Speaker 1: McFarlane didn't know at all.
Speaker 13: I thought it was fraud.
Speaker 17: After all, unless you have absolute conviction in the integrity
Speaker 17: of the people you're dealing with, a barter for hostages
Speaker 17: is just an open door to encouraging more hostages being taken.
Speaker 1: Nonetheless, McFarland decided the opportunity was worth bringing to President Reagan.
Speaker 1: The risk was obvious, but so was the potential for
Speaker 1: a historic world changing moment. Remember McFarland's role model was
Speaker 1: Henry Kissinger, whose crowning achievement under Nixon was making a
Speaker 1: surprise opening to communist China. Here again is Jane Mayer.
Speaker 10: He just so wanted to be a major global player.
Speaker 10: He wanted to be like Henry Kissinger. He wanted to
Speaker 10: be a huge state craft warrior who was going to
Speaker 10: change the world. And this looked like something where he could,
Speaker 10: you know, put his mark on the world and have
Speaker 10: a legacy here.
Speaker 1: Two weeks after McFarland's meeting with David Kimkey, Ronald Reagan
Speaker 1: was in the hospital recovering from surgery that removed a
Speaker 1: cancerous growth from his intestine. McFarland came to Reagan's bedside
Speaker 1: to brief him on the potential opening to Iran. McFarland
Speaker 1: says he mapped out the benefits, but was very clear
Speaker 1: on the downsides.
Speaker 17: They said, this is a very high risk venture for you.
Speaker 17: I briefed him on the prospect that this could go wrong.
Speaker 1: McFarland told me that Reagan was enthusiastic about the idea
Speaker 1: as soon as he understood that it might bring home
Speaker 1: the hostages.
Speaker 17: He focused upon what Kimky had said that his intermediary,
Speaker 17: Go Bonifar, believes that the army officers involved could affect
Speaker 17: the release of the hostages. Well, Reagan said, well, but
Speaker 17: we can't let an opportunity of that. Lord, it's risky
Speaker 17: go buy. Let's test it first and see to what
Speaker 17: extent there is good faith here or not.
Speaker 1: McFarland worked out a plan with Kimki and other Israeli
Speaker 1: officials in order to avoid the appearance of a direct
Speaker 1: weapons sale from the United States to Iran, the White
Speaker 1: House would use Israel as a go between. Essentially, Israel
Speaker 1: would sell some of their American made missiles to the
Speaker 1: Iranian moderates, and the US would then replenish Israel's stocks.
Speaker 1: Several top officials in the administration, notably the Secretary of
Speaker 1: State and the Secretary of Defense, thought the arms for
Speaker 1: hostages trade was a terrible idea. But as Jane Mayer
Speaker 1: writes in Landslide, Reagan often blocked out uncomfortable information and
Speaker 1: focused only on the positive, sometimes to the point of
Speaker 1: self delusion. For example, after getting his cancer removed, Reagan
Speaker 1: took the position that he had never had cancer in
Speaker 1: the first place.
Speaker 10: As he saw it, whatever cancer had been in his
Speaker 10: body had been taken out, and it was never he
Speaker 10: who had had it. It was just the tumor that
Speaker 10: had it, so he could say that, actually, he never
Speaker 10: had cancer.
Speaker 1: Reagan was so focused on the hostages that he waved
Speaker 1: away the arguments as cabinet officers tried to make against
Speaker 1: the Iran plan.
Speaker 17: He just didn't want to deal with it. He was
Speaker 17: an optimist. Oh, he was a near sighted humanitarian.
Speaker 13: If you will, but.
Speaker 17: Without thinking seriously about the downside risks here.
Speaker 1: According to McFarlane, Reagan called him in early August to
Speaker 1: personally authorize the shipment of anti tank missiles to Iran.
Speaker 17: I reminded him again that look, this may not work,
Speaker 17: and he said, well, Bud, we don't know until we try.
Speaker 1: By the summer of nineteen eighty five, the Weird family
Speaker 1: felt like they were finallying traction with the Reagan administration.
Speaker 1: According to John Weir, the breakthrough came after the family
Speaker 1: scored a meeting with a prominent politician who had some
Speaker 1: experience dealing with a hostage crisis, Jimmy Carter.
Speaker 16: We flew to the airport in Atlanta, and Jimmy Carter
Speaker 16: met us in a lounge at the airport. There was
Speaker 16: no one else present other than his security detail.
Speaker 1: The Weirs asked Carter for advice.
Speaker 16: And said, you know, we've been very frustrated with the
Speaker 16: current administration. We don't feel like we're making any progress.
Speaker 16: You know, what do you think? What can you tell us?
Speaker 1: Weir says that Carter initially hesitated, saying the family couldn't
Speaker 1: possibly want his advice, but the Weirs kept pushing and
Speaker 1: finally Carter gave them a name.
Speaker 16: Jimmy Carter said, you know, Bud McFarlane works in the
Speaker 16: current administration and the National Security Council, and I will
Speaker 16: contact Bud and ask him if he will meet with you.
Speaker 16: And Jimmy Carter stepped out of the room and he
Speaker 16: came back a few minutes later and he said, Bud
Speaker 16: McFarlane has agreed to meet with you. Basically, that was
Speaker 16: the end of the meeting.
Speaker 1: John Weir says that his family felt a sense of
Speaker 1: momentum once they were introduced to Bud McFarlane. McFarland seemed engaged, sympathetic,
Speaker 1: and solutions oriented. He also gave the family another contact
Speaker 1: in the White House.
Speaker 16: This guy over here, Attenant, Colonel Oliver North, and he
Speaker 16: will be your contact person. And if you have any
Speaker 16: questions or any issues, Colonel North will make himself available
Speaker 16: to you and you contact him and you talk to
Speaker 16: him and he'll bring you up to speed on anything
Speaker 16: that's going on.
Speaker 1: McFarlane had taken Oliver North under his wing at the
Speaker 1: National Security Council. They were both graduates of the Naval
Speaker 1: Academy who had served in Vietnam, and though they had
Speaker 1: very different personalities, they were fond of each other. Accounts
Speaker 1: differ on when exactly North was brought into the Iran initiative,
Speaker 1: but starting in the sun of nineteen eighty five, he
Speaker 1: began interfacing with hostage families like the Weirs.
Speaker 16: Colonel North would provide information from time to time about
Speaker 16: trips he was taking. He wouldn't give any details, but
Speaker 16: he would say, well, you know, I flew and inn
Speaker 16: F fourteen to go to Europe for a quick meeting
Speaker 16: that was really important. Would kind of talk about how
Speaker 16: tough his life was, which is kind of funny. You know,
Speaker 16: how hard he worked and all the hours he put in,
Speaker 16: and how he had to take off on short notice
Speaker 16: for things. And he would answer the phone when we
Speaker 16: called and he would talk to us, which was a
Speaker 16: big step forward.
Speaker 1: McFarlane and North met with several hostage families throughout the
Speaker 1: summer and offered similar assurances.
Speaker 11: The families of the American hostages said that in an
Speaker 11: hour with National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane they had learned
Speaker 11: a lot more about what the Reagan administration has been
Speaker 11: doing and they had.
Speaker 13: Known in the past.
Speaker 1: John Weir said that despite the overtures, his mother, Carol
Speaker 1: was skeptical. After spending decades living in Lebanon, she had
Speaker 1: deep reservations about US foreign policy in the Middle East.
Speaker 1: Earlier that year, she had met with Secretary of State
Speaker 1: George Schultz, but the Schultz's surprise and frustration, she used
Speaker 1: the time to lay out the grievances of her husband's captors,
Speaker 1: telling Schultz that US policy in the Middle East was
Speaker 1: partially to blame for her husband's kidnapping. As Carol Weir
Speaker 1: saw it, McFarlane and North were part of the same
Speaker 1: American made machine.
Speaker 16: My mother did not trust Bud MacFarlane or Colonel North
Speaker 16: or George Schultz at all. She didn't believe anything they
Speaker 16: told her, and she didn't really trust the information that
Speaker 16: they gave her.
Speaker 13: You know.
Speaker 16: She didn't want to be uncooperative or ungrateful, but she
Speaker 16: didn't really believe that they were being productive or being honest.
Speaker 1: On August twentieth, nineteen eighty five, the first arms for
Speaker 1: hostages trade between the US and Iran began. That evening,
Speaker 1: ninety six anti tank missiles were loaded onto a plane
Speaker 1: at Bengurian Airport in Tel Aviv. The operation was carried
Speaker 1: out in complete secrecy. Only a handful of people knew
Speaker 1: it was happening. According to Plan, the missiles were Israeli
Speaker 1: owned and made in California. The cargo also included the
Speaker 1: man responsible for putting the deal together, Manu Chair Gorbanifhar,
Speaker 1: but after the shipment went through, no hostages were released. Instead,
Speaker 1: Gorbanifar conveyed a new demand. He said the ninety six
Speaker 1: missiles had been intercepted by hardliners in the Iranian Revolutionary
Speaker 1: Guard Corps. His moderate contact in the Iranian government now
Speaker 1: wanted four hundred more. Gorbanifar also said that the exchange
Speaker 1: would only get one hostage released, not all seven, as
Speaker 1: the Americans had been hoping. Bud McFarlane did not like
Speaker 1: what he was hearing.
Speaker 17: The kind of things that are obviouscations that tell you
Speaker 17: either they're not competent to do this or that there's
Speaker 17: malfeasance and you're being screwed here. And I said, look,
Speaker 17: this is really unimpressive on their part and foolish on ours.
Speaker 17: If we can't get this straightened.
Speaker 1: Out, Reagan agreed to the terms of the new proposal.
Speaker 1: A second Israeli shipment, this time carrying more than four
Speaker 1: hundred missiles was sent to Iran. Meanwhile, MacFarland had received
Speaker 1: a call from one of the many intermediaries he had
Speaker 1: been dealing with and was told that he would have
Speaker 1: to pick which hostage to release. As McFarland later described it,
Speaker 1: he was being asked to play god. Despite the pressure,
Speaker 1: MacFarland felt the choice was obvious. Administration officials have been
Speaker 1: profoundly worried about William Buckley, a CIA officer. They were
Speaker 1: worried about his health, of course, but they were also
Speaker 1: really worried about the kidnappers getting classified information out of him.
Speaker 1: So McFarland chose Buckley.
Speaker 17: And clearly that's the one I favored, just out of
Speaker 17: professional anguish.
Speaker 1: But the kidnappers did not release The CIA station chief
Speaker 1: Gorbanifar relayed that Buckley was too sick to be transferred.
Speaker 1: This was a disturbing news. Either Buckley's condition was worsening
Speaker 1: or the kidnappers thought they could get more weapons for
Speaker 1: him later. Instead, the Americans were getting someone else. We'll
Speaker 1: be right back. On September fifteenth, nearly five hundred days
Speaker 1: after the Reverend Benjamin Weir was kidnapped, his family got
Speaker 1: a call from the Reage administration.
Speaker 16: Somewhat unexpectedly, we were told that my dad had been released.
Speaker 16: At that particular moment, we weren't really expecting that news.
Speaker 16: We'd had no premonition that that was going to happen
Speaker 16: in any way. But we're also told, you know, you
Speaker 16: really need to keep this quiet. We don't want anybody
Speaker 16: to know. We think other people may be released, and
Speaker 16: any type of public disclosure of this information right now
Speaker 16: could put the release of the other people at risk.
Speaker 1: The family traveled to a hotel in Virginia to gather
Speaker 1: with officials from the federal government.
Speaker 16: And then all of a sudden, there was a knock
Speaker 16: on the door and there was my dad. Quite a shock.
Speaker 1: Five days later, President Reagan announced that Weir had come home.
Speaker 12: I'm pleased to inform you if at Reverend Benjamin Weir
Speaker 12: has now been released.
Speaker 1: Neither Weir, nor his family, nor anyone else outside of
Speaker 1: Reagan's inner circle knew that Weir had been set free
Speaker 1: as part of an arms for hostages deal, and so
Speaker 1: the administration had to walk a very fine line between
Speaker 1: celebrating Weir's release and keeping its distance. In the briefing room,
Speaker 1: the official explanation was that foreign humanitarians had helped secure
Speaker 1: Weir's freedom.
Speaker 5: I can assure you that no deal was made and
Speaker 5: that our position on no concessions two terrorists has not changed.
Speaker 6: The President and other officials hinted strongly that US efforts
Speaker 6: had obtained Reverend Ware's release, but they wrapped that claim
Speaker 6: in a mystery of no comments. The impression left by
Speaker 6: all of this is that things are afoot, that Reverend
Speaker 6: Ware's release was no fluke, but the product of an
Speaker 6: intense administration effort that could still result in the freeing
Speaker 6: of the other six.
Speaker 1: As far as William Buckley was concerned, he would never
Speaker 1: be released. He had died before the first weapons shipment
Speaker 1: ever touched down in Tehran. In the weeks after a
Speaker 1: Weir's release, the big question for the Reagan administration was
Speaker 1: what to do next. Six hostages remained in Beirut and
Speaker 1: Manuchaer Gorbanifharr was saying that the Iranians wanted more weapons.
Speaker 1: All of that meant that an opening to Iran and
Speaker 1: potentially a path to regime change were still on the table.
Speaker 1: But McFarland was starting to have serious doubts about Gorbanifhar.
Speaker 1: Did this guy actually know any moderates in Iran or
Speaker 1: was he just saying whatever he needed to say in
Speaker 1: order to earn his commission on the weapons sales.
Speaker 17: Well, the more I heard about Gorboni Fahar, the lower
Speaker 17: my confidence that this had any plausibility.
Speaker 1: McFarland was right to be skeptical. As it turned out,
Speaker 1: the August arms deal wasn't the first time Gorbanifar had
Speaker 1: approached the US government to offer help in releasing the hostages.
Speaker 1: Here's Jane Mayer again.
Speaker 10: He had already twice taken polygraphs at the CIA and
Speaker 10: flunked them both in earlier episodes when he went to
Speaker 10: the CIA and claimed that he knew who had kidnapped Buckley,
Speaker 10: at which point the CIA labeled him a fabricator and
Speaker 10: put out a burn notice, meaning don't deal with this guy.
Speaker 1: By the fall of nineteen eighty five, McFarland was exhausted
Speaker 1: and he was ready to retire from government. In late November,
Speaker 1: he told Reagan that he wanted to leave the administration.
Speaker 1: He tried to resign once before, a year earlier, but
Speaker 1: Reagan had convinced him to stay, telling him he considered
Speaker 1: him indispensable. This time, Reagan accepted McFarland's decision. According to McFarlane,
Speaker 1: he then told the President that the Iran initiative that
Speaker 1: McFarland himself had introduced four and a half months earlier
Speaker 1: was doomed to failure.
Speaker 17: I didn't think it was working. I think, at best,
Speaker 17: if there are any pragmatists in Iran, we're not in
Speaker 17: touch with them. And the stakes here in terms of
Speaker 17: the failure of the mission, but more importantly, the embarrassment,
Speaker 17: even if it had succeeded and were disclosed, was just
Speaker 17: too great. And wanted to leave government and did not
Speaker 17: want to leave a ticking bomb Bill.
Speaker 1: McFarlane was getting ready to leave the White House, Reagan
Speaker 1: asked him to fly to London and discussed the arrangement
Speaker 1: with Gorbonifhar in person. McFarlane was on a flight to
Speaker 1: London that very night. Oliver North was already there, and
Speaker 1: on Sunday, December eighth, the two of them met Gorbanifar
Speaker 1: in a West End apartment belonging to an Israeli armsdeer.
Speaker 1: The meeting did not go well.
Speaker 17: It started off mildly enough, but I explained that the
Speaker 17: President had heard my recommendation that it be discontinued because
Speaker 17: there was simply was amounting evidence of bad faith on
Speaker 17: the Iranian side. I said, this is a pointless, open ended,
Speaker 17: bad idea, and my country, my president is unwilling to
Speaker 17: accept the risks, and I'm here to convey his decision
Speaker 17: that this simply will not go on. It's terminated. Immediately.
Speaker 17: Gorbani far flared stormed around, said, you're foolish, you're crazy,
Speaker 17: you're misguided, You're wrong. This will mature, it will develop.
Speaker 17: I'm telling you, I've dealt with these people for a
Speaker 17: long time.
Speaker 13: And I said, I don't believe you, and we left.
Speaker 1: When McFarlane returned to Washington, he reported that Gorbanifharr was
Speaker 1: a borderline moron and called him the most despicable character
Speaker 1: he had ever met. But as he prepared to clear
Speaker 1: out his office, McFarlane says he feared that, despite his
Speaker 1: best efforts, the Arms for Hostages program was not truly dead.
Speaker 1: The President was simply too invested in bringing the hostages home.
Speaker 17: I knew that his preoccupation was the safety of the
Speaker 17: hostages would lead him to start this process up again,
Speaker 17: and it was with doubt, in fact high prospect of
Speaker 17: it being renewed that. I nonetheless tabled my resignation and left.
Speaker 17: And I shouldn't have done it. I consider that I
Speaker 17: had failed our country and retiring at that point. The
Speaker 17: only person that could have stopped it was me, and
Speaker 17: I didn't do it.
Speaker 1: Look, Farland knew that Reagan trusted him. If he had
Speaker 1: stayed by the President's side, maybe he would have succeeded
Speaker 1: at extinguishing the Iran initiative for good.
Speaker 17: The President came to office, I think to be a
Speaker 17: domestic president, and he never made any pretense at being
Speaker 17: a man of great depth on foreign affairs. And for
Speaker 17: him to say at the end in tears, but I
Speaker 17: never had anybody I could count on as indispensable.
Speaker 13: But you are that guy. Well I was, But.
Speaker 17: From my first time at the Naval Academy. I mean,
Speaker 17: it's in your bones. You know what your job is,
Speaker 17: serve the country, and don't blame somebody else. Don't make
Speaker 17: up pretense, don't figure out some excuse circumstances. It's kind
Speaker 17: of blarny. I mean, step up. Now, you can solve
Speaker 17: your soul by saying, well, the President asked me to
Speaker 17: do it. But if you know, as I knew that
Speaker 17: this was not going to work. I don't think there's
Speaker 17: any way of salvaging that's that's something that gets sorted
Speaker 17: out when you die and it's all over. But you
Speaker 17: can at least stand up, tell the truth, take responsibility
Speaker 17: and move on, and judgments will be rendered by people
Speaker 17: that aren't really qualifyed. Whatever good you did while you
Speaker 17: were in government, nobody will remember that. The ending of
Speaker 17: the Cold War, bringing down Marxism, Soviet Union, reducing nuclear
Speaker 17: weapons for the first time industry, all these things happened,
Speaker 17: and nobody knows that and they never will.
Speaker 13: And so.
Speaker 17: Sure, if I had to do again, I would not
Speaker 17: have let it go on. But I did, and there's
Speaker 17: no changing the facts.
Speaker 8: The changing of the guard today and a top White
Speaker 8: House foreign policy job, national Security Advisor, Robert McFarland, resigned
Speaker 8: and he was replaced by his deputy.
Speaker 6: Farland was a Kissinger proteget.
Speaker 11: He was appointed National Security Advisor as a quiet team player.
Speaker 1: After McFarland's departure from the White House, talks between Oliver
Speaker 1: North and Minuchair Gribonifar did indeed resume, and two months
Speaker 1: later more American missiles were on their way to Iran.
Speaker 1: On the next episode of Fiasco, the Reagan Administration's War
Speaker 1: on Communism arrives secretly in Nicaragua.
Speaker 19: I was confronted with questions which began more or less
Speaker 19: as follows, mister ambassador, the CIA has blown up the
Speaker 19: bridges connecting Nicaragua and Honduras. What do you think about this?
Speaker 19: Start to your investorship.
Speaker 1: For a list of books, articles, and documentary we used
Speaker 1: in our research, follow the link in the show notes.
Speaker 1: Fiasco is a production of Prologue Projects and it's distributed
Speaker 1: by Pushkin Industries. The show is produced by Andrew Parsons,
Speaker 1: Madeline kaplan Ula Kulpa and me Leon Mayfock. Our editor
Speaker 1: was Camilla Hammer. Our researcher was Francis Carr. Additional archival
Speaker 1: research from Caitlin Nicholas. Our music is by Nick Silvester.
Speaker 1: Our theme song is by Spatial Relations. Our artwork is
Speaker 1: by Teddy Blanks at Chips and y Audio, mixed by
Speaker 1: Rob Buyers, Michael Rayphiel and Johnny Vince Evans. Copyright council
Speaker 1: provided by Peter Yassi at Yass Butler Plc. Thanks to
Speaker 1: Chris weir aviad Ryan Bonnell, Malcolm Burne, Shane Harris, Michael Ledeen,
Speaker 1: Howard Titcher, TC Winter, as well as Sam Graham, Felsen,
Speaker 1: Saya Shockley, and Katchak and Kova. Special thanks to Luminary
Speaker 1: and thank you for listening.