WEBVTT - Fareed Zakaria Explains Why Today Is Just Like the 1920s

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<v Speaker 1>Bloomberg Audio Studios, Podcasts, Radio News. Welcome to the City

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<v Speaker 1>of London, the City of the City of London, Please

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<v Speaker 1>mind the gap.

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<v Speaker 2>Between the and the financial heart of the country, the city,

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<v Speaker 2>the city.

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<v Speaker 3>Welcome to in the city, the clear of the doors.

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<v Speaker 1>I'm Allegra Stratton. It's that time of year. Streets around

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<v Speaker 1>the Square mile are quieter as people are off on

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<v Speaker 1>holiday breaks. Of course, essential packing for any holiday is

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<v Speaker 1>a good book. So we're bringing you a summer reading

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<v Speaker 1>list prepared by the Votonomics team. That's me alongside Bloomberg

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<v Speaker 1>Opinions Adrian Wooldridge and the head of Government and Economics,

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<v Speaker 1>Stephanie Flanders. We've each interviewed an author whose nonfiction work

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<v Speaker 1>we felt was relevant and informative on the state of

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<v Speaker 1>politics and economics right now. And this week it's a

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<v Speaker 1>conversation between Asia and Wildridge and Foraried Zakaria on his

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<v Speaker 1>new book Age of Revolutions, Progress and Backlash from sixteen

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<v Speaker 1>hundred to the present.

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<v Speaker 3>Welcome to Voterenomics, where politics and markets Collide. I'm Adrian Wooldridge.

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<v Speaker 3>For my summer reading selection, I've chosen the latest release

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<v Speaker 3>from Fared Zacharia, Age of Revolutions. Freed, of course, hosts

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<v Speaker 3>CNN's flagship international affairs show for Reed Zakaria GPS. He

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<v Speaker 3>writes a weekly column for The Washington Post, and he

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<v Speaker 3>is the author of the Future of Freedom, The Post

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<v Speaker 3>American World, and Ten Lessons for a Post Pandemic World.

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<v Speaker 3>But as I said, this conversation focuses on Age of Revolutions,

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<v Speaker 3>Progress and Backlash from sixteen hundred to the present. This

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<v Speaker 3>is really a fascinating book about the rise of the

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<v Speaker 3>liberal order and the possible collapse of that liberal order.

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<v Speaker 3>For Reid, you have a record of taking on really

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<v Speaker 3>big themes, the future of Freedom, the post American World,

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<v Speaker 3>but this is your biggest theme yet, the Age of Revolutions,

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<v Speaker 3>Progress and Backlash from sixteen hundred to the present. Tell

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<v Speaker 3>us a bit about your argument. What was it that

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<v Speaker 3>inspired this book and what is the main thesis.

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<v Speaker 2>That's a wonderful question, Adrian. What inspired the book, or

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<v Speaker 2>at least triggered the book was that about ten years

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<v Speaker 2>ago I started to notice something that I thought was

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<v Speaker 2>very unusual, which was the rise of the Tea Party.

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<v Speaker 2>And the reason I thought it was unusual was it

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<v Speaker 2>was a kind of grassroots insurgency that was taking over

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<v Speaker 2>or upending the most hierarchical of the political parties in

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<v Speaker 2>America and one of the most hierarchical in the Western world.

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<v Speaker 2>If you think of the Republican Party, the old saying

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<v Speaker 2>about presidential nominations used to be that the Democrats have

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<v Speaker 2>to fall in love, but Republicans fall in line. And

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<v Speaker 2>if you think about, you know, the Democrats nominating John

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<v Speaker 2>Kennedy and Clinton and Obama, you understand that, whereas the

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<v Speaker 2>Republicans would nominate you know, Nixon and then Nixon and

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<v Speaker 2>then Nixon and then Bush and another Bush. You know,

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<v Speaker 2>it was very hierarchical. Stud your turn. And here the

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<v Speaker 2>Tea Party was upending that bottom up and was animated

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<v Speaker 2>by issues that were not the traditional Republican issues, not

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<v Speaker 2>about economics, cutting budgets, all that stuff. It was all

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<v Speaker 2>cultural immigration, Obama as a black president. And it made

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<v Speaker 2>me just begin to think about how politics was changing.

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<v Speaker 2>And I read a speech by Tony Blair in which

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<v Speaker 2>he talked about how the old division of left versus

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<v Speaker 2>right on the basis of economics, you know, kind of

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<v Speaker 2>the size of the state, was giving way to a

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<v Speaker 2>politics based on your attitude towards a world that was

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<v Speaker 2>open versus closed, you know, globalization, immigration, technology, even and

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<v Speaker 2>that's where it all began. And then in order to

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<v Speaker 2>you know, I found myself asking, if we're going through

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<v Speaker 2>this kind of period of enormous change which is producing

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<v Speaker 2>a backlash, when did this begin? When have we seen

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<v Speaker 2>this before? And I thought about the Industrial Revolution, but

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<v Speaker 2>then that took me back further and I ended up,

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<v Speaker 2>as you know, starting with the Dutch in the seventeenth century.

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<v Speaker 2>The basic argument of the book is that whenever you

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<v Speaker 2>have periods of enormous technological and economic change, it tends

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<v Speaker 2>to transform societies, and you also end up getting a

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<v Speaker 2>third revolution, which is a kind of identity revolution. People

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<v Speaker 2>change the way they think of themselves. So when the Dutch,

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<v Speaker 2>for the first became rich, they began to think of

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<v Speaker 2>themselves differently, not as part of the Habsburg Empire, not

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<v Speaker 2>as simply Christians, but as Protestants and essentially broke away

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<v Speaker 2>from the Habsburg Empire and created the Dutch Republic. And

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<v Speaker 2>then that identity revolution trans mophs into a political revolution.

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<v Speaker 2>And whenever you have this process that I just described,

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<v Speaker 2>there is almost always a backlash. And how you navigate

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<v Speaker 2>through this forward movement and backlash determines how successfully you

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<v Speaker 2>kind of make your way in the world. The Dutch

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<v Speaker 2>and the British, i argue, in the sixteenth seventeen eighteenth

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<v Speaker 2>centuries handled this largely well. The French in the French

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<v Speaker 2>Revolution handled it very badly. And those are in some

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<v Speaker 2>ways the two archetypal examples, one being evolutionary change of

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<v Speaker 2>bottom up, these trends of technology, economics to reshaping society

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<v Speaker 2>and politics adapting to it, versus the French, who decide

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<v Speaker 2>top down political elites are going to decree a revolution,

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<v Speaker 2>a transformation of society, and the whole thing explodes.

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<v Speaker 3>So the Dutch, followed by the British, presumably by the Americans,

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<v Speaker 3>of the good guys exactly, and the French not quite

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<v Speaker 3>so good. Is that because they go over the top,

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<v Speaker 3>and then you know, the revolution with all its blood,

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<v Speaker 3>leads to Napoleon. Is that the sequence of events.

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<v Speaker 2>Basically, the French get it all wrong in the sense

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<v Speaker 2>that France was not a society that was being transformed

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<v Speaker 2>bottom up by economics and technology at the time of

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<v Speaker 2>the French Revolution. France was a large, agrarian, centralized society.

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<v Speaker 2>It was not particularly urban, the merchants were not particularly dominant.

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<v Speaker 2>So all the forces of kind of modernization and change

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<v Speaker 2>that had been roiling or transforming the Netherlands in Britain

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<v Speaker 2>were absent in France. But the French politically, a certain

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<v Speaker 2>group of Frenchmen decide that they want to accelerate change

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<v Speaker 2>and to achieve not quite a merchant republic, but a

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<v Speaker 2>republic nonetheless, and they decree it from above. And what

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<v Speaker 2>it turns out is that France is still a very

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<v Speaker 2>old fashioned, traditional agrarian society and it doesn't take and

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<v Speaker 2>so the revolution goes, you know, it kind of goes

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<v Speaker 2>helter skelter in various ways. As you know, the story

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<v Speaker 2>of the French orb is so complicated. One of the

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<v Speaker 2>great challenges of the book was getting it down to

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<v Speaker 2>forty pages. But basically, the best way to think about

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<v Speaker 2>it is it fails on its own terms. This is

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<v Speaker 2>a revolution that begins with the execution of a monarch

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<v Speaker 2>and it ends with Napoleon crowning himself as monarch. So

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<v Speaker 2>on its own terms, it is unable to achieve the

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<v Speaker 2>political modernization it looks for.

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<v Speaker 3>But you have a great lineage of liberal societies starting

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<v Speaker 3>with the Netherlands, going to Britain and then going to

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<v Speaker 3>the United States with this sort of failed detour with France.

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<v Speaker 3>Can you tell us something about what that means for

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<v Speaker 3>the for the modern world. This is essentially North European

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<v Speaker 3>Anglo Saxon lineage of ideas.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, it's actually fascinating when you think about how unusual

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<v Speaker 2>or narrow or serendipitous this path is. You know, you

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<v Speaker 2>have this extraordinary breakout in the Netherlands. This is the

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<v Speaker 2>first country to really redefine national power by using not

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<v Speaker 2>agriculture and extraction. That was the old way. The only

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<v Speaker 2>way people countries knew how to get rich was you know,

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<v Speaker 2>your agriculture, which basically produced about the same level of

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<v Speaker 2>wealth per capita for thousands of years, or you could

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<v Speaker 2>go into another country stealer's goal. Those are the two way,

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<v Speaker 2>and the Dutch basically find that they use innovation, They

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<v Speaker 2>use technological innovation, they use financial innovation. Crucially important to

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<v Speaker 2>Holland's rise is the invention of the joint stock company,

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<v Speaker 2>the invention of the Amsterdam stock market, first grade multinational

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<v Speaker 2>company in the world, the Dutch East Indies Company, and

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<v Speaker 2>all these things propel the Netherlands to become the richest

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<v Speaker 2>country in Europe, which means the richest country in the world.

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<v Speaker 2>And that part of the practices are, you know, an

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<v Speaker 2>emphasis on an egalitarian political and social structure, a republic

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<v Speaker 2>rather than a monarchy, a merchants having an enormous say,

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<v Speaker 2>political parties for the first time rather than a court

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<v Speaker 2>being the locus of political influence. Tolerance because you discover

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<v Speaker 2>that tapping human talent wherever it is becomes important. So

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<v Speaker 2>the Dutch, you know, are a much more tolerant word, Jews,

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<v Speaker 2>much more tolerant towards Protestants and Catholics than any other

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<v Speaker 2>place in Europe. That model moves to England, which had

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<v Speaker 2>many similar characteristics, also a very decentralized part of Europe.

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<v Speaker 2>Both of these places were the farthest provinces of the

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<v Speaker 2>Roman Empire and were therefore the least centrally governed from Rome,

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<v Speaker 2>and so they had developed a kind of autonomy as

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<v Speaker 2>a result. And it is in this cocoon the Netherlands,

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<v Speaker 2>in Britain and England really that ideas about individual liberty,

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<v Speaker 2>individual rights, private property, the idea of the dignity of

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<v Speaker 2>the individual and his or her and really his ability

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<v Speaker 2>to pursue a life that he wants freed from monarchical tyranny,

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<v Speaker 2>church dogma. All these ideas sort of take root in

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<v Speaker 2>this area. And then I would argue, because of the

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<v Speaker 2>inherent virtue of these ideas, or certainly the technical superiority

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<v Speaker 2>of these ideas, Britain becomes the most powerful country since Rome,

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<v Speaker 2>and it colonizes large parts of the world and globalizes

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<v Speaker 2>these ideas. So a crucial part of that is that

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<v Speaker 2>Britain ended up colonizing North America, which became the next superpower.

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<v Speaker 2>But also important is the fact that Britain spread these

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<v Speaker 2>ideas to all over the world, from India to South

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<v Speaker 2>Africa to Australia. They developed a kind of a broad

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<v Speaker 2>universe of liberal ideas. But I think crucial to the

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<v Speaker 2>spreading of them was the fact that then Britain passes

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<v Speaker 2>the mantle to the United States. So if you think

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<v Speaker 2>about it, for two and a half centuries now we

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<v Speaker 2>have lived in a world in which the dominant power

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<v Speaker 2>has been one that adopted these very peculiar ideas that

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<v Speaker 2>grew out of a tiny part of northwestern Europe.

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<v Speaker 3>This is a very weak liberal interpretation of human history

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<v Speaker 3>and let me say that I completely agree with it,

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<v Speaker 3>but let me put on my woke cat for a

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<v Speaker 3>moment and saying that what you're doing is celebrating the

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<v Speaker 3>triumph of capitalist imperialism, That these are countries that grew

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<v Speaker 3>rich partly by colonialism, partly by slavery, partly by exploiting

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<v Speaker 3>what they would have regarded as lesser breeds. You're an Indian,

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<v Speaker 3>but you're celebrating that the power of this liberal imperialism.

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<v Speaker 3>How do you respond to the to the woe critique

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<v Speaker 3>which is very dominant in America American higher education.

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<v Speaker 2>Now it's a very fair critique and it's a fair argument.

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<v Speaker 2>It's worth noting that the original opposition to Whig history

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<v Speaker 2>came actually from the right, not from the left. There

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<v Speaker 2>was a much more traditional kind of deep historical school

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<v Speaker 2>of thought in Britain in other places, which this whole

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<v Speaker 2>idea that there is any progress in history is the fallacy.

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<v Speaker 2>The Whigs think that things have gotten better, and this

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<v Speaker 2>is nonsense. Well, history is cyclical, you know, morally, we

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<v Speaker 2>have degenerated. This used to be the argument against Whig history.

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<v Speaker 2>And when Herbert Butterfield writes his essay on wik history,

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<v Speaker 2>that's what he's defending himself against today. You're absolutely right,

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<v Speaker 2>the critique comes from the left. And look, what I

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<v Speaker 2>would say is, there's no question I'm celebrating capitalism and

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<v Speaker 2>democracy and individual liberty and individual rights because I do

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<v Speaker 2>believe they are fundamentally superior to everything that came before

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<v Speaker 2>them in terms of political organization, from the point of

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<v Speaker 2>view of the rights of individuals, which I hold very dear,

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<v Speaker 2>and everything that has come after in terms of challengers,

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<v Speaker 2>whether it's been fascism, communism, Islamic fundamentalism, whatever else you

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<v Speaker 2>may look at. I regard, you know, social democracy as

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<v Speaker 2>a variant of of of liberalism. On the imperialism part,

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<v Speaker 2>it's a it's a harder one, it's it's entire It's

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<v Speaker 2>absolutely true that part and parcel of this process was

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<v Speaker 2>the exploitation of people who were considered second class citizens,

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<v Speaker 2>so lesser breeds and such. I would argue that was

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<v Speaker 2>not inherent in the project. I don't think you can

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<v Speaker 2>make the case that Britain only gained its strength from

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<v Speaker 2>colonies so that they did help you can look at

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<v Speaker 2>I mean, I go through this as you know in

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<v Speaker 2>the book Japan had You know is a is a

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<v Speaker 2>good contrast because they both had textile industries. Japan had

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<v Speaker 2>no colonies, Britain had colonies. You know, it's it's not

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<v Speaker 2>it's not easy to make the case in my view

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<v Speaker 2>that Britain only advanced because of the because of the colonies.

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<v Speaker 2>And much more importantly what you you can see the

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<v Speaker 2>power of these ideas by the fact that it is

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<v Speaker 2>these ideas that caused Europe to decolonize. And it is

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<v Speaker 2>only in Europe that you begin you got the anti

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<v Speaker 2>slavery movement. There's slavery all over the world, but what

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<v Speaker 2>caused Europe to become the locust classic of anti slavery.

0:15:14.520 --> 0:15:18.000
<v Speaker 2>It was these liberal ideas. So I think there's something

0:15:18.080 --> 0:15:23.160
<v Speaker 2>to it, and it's probably worth always remembering that the

0:15:23.280 --> 0:15:28.320
<v Speaker 2>rise of these liberalism and industrialization did come along with

0:15:29.240 --> 0:15:33.280
<v Speaker 2>an enormous exploitation of other countries. You know, as as

0:15:33.280 --> 0:15:35.440
<v Speaker 2>somebody who grew up in India, I'm well aware of it,

0:15:35.960 --> 0:15:38.480
<v Speaker 2>and you know, we lived it. I mean I saw

0:15:38.520 --> 0:15:41.680
<v Speaker 2>it more from my father's generation. But my father was

0:15:41.880 --> 0:15:45.160
<v Speaker 2>very attracted to British ideas of liberalism and in his

0:15:45.280 --> 0:15:49.440
<v Speaker 2>case kind of Fabian socialism as well. But always also

0:15:49.520 --> 0:15:53.480
<v Speaker 2>aware that for Britain. They came coupled with a certain

0:15:53.640 --> 0:15:58.080
<v Speaker 2>kind of pretty unvarnished racism. There was the reality that

0:15:58.120 --> 0:16:02.640
<v Speaker 2>Britain was, in a sense the tutor for so much

0:16:02.680 --> 0:16:05.920
<v Speaker 2>of the Indian kind of political elite, and yet the

0:16:06.040 --> 0:16:09.120
<v Speaker 2>same political elite were jailed by the British and in

0:16:09.400 --> 0:16:12.760
<v Speaker 2>trials that were not free and fair. They walked past

0:16:12.840 --> 0:16:15.960
<v Speaker 2>clubs and buildings which said which had signs which said

0:16:16.440 --> 0:16:19.840
<v Speaker 2>dogs and Indians not allowed. You know. My father once

0:16:20.160 --> 0:16:22.360
<v Speaker 2>pointed out a couple of places where there used to

0:16:22.360 --> 0:16:26.760
<v Speaker 2>be that sign. So that is the mixed legacy of

0:16:26.840 --> 0:16:29.400
<v Speaker 2>the Enlightenment, and you can't get away from it. But

0:16:29.480 --> 0:16:33.040
<v Speaker 2>I think it was a historical fact, not a logical fact.

0:16:33.480 --> 0:16:36.560
<v Speaker 3>But when Kipling says take up the white man's burden,

0:16:37.000 --> 0:16:40.480
<v Speaker 3>he's talking to the United States. And this mixed legacy

0:16:40.600 --> 0:16:43.360
<v Speaker 3>is even stronger in the United States, I think than Britain,

0:16:43.360 --> 0:16:45.880
<v Speaker 3>because it has the institution of slavery, and it has

0:16:45.920 --> 0:16:50.080
<v Speaker 3>the institutions of Jim Crow right, you know, and voting

0:16:50.120 --> 0:16:52.920
<v Speaker 3>discrimination and things like that right up to the nineteen sixties.

0:16:53.080 --> 0:16:55.480
<v Speaker 3>It does seem to be extraordinary that you can have

0:16:56.440 --> 0:17:02.240
<v Speaker 3>liberal values and those very very anti liberal values coexisting

0:17:02.360 --> 0:17:05.920
<v Speaker 3>within this global hegemon, which is the United States. How

0:17:05.920 --> 0:17:06.880
<v Speaker 3>can we explain that?

0:17:08.040 --> 0:17:10.280
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, it's a very good point, and I think it's

0:17:10.280 --> 0:17:13.680
<v Speaker 2>a point that tells us something about the present as well,

0:17:13.720 --> 0:17:18.679
<v Speaker 2>which is tribalism and tribal affiliation is one of the

0:17:18.840 --> 0:17:24.119
<v Speaker 2>deepest social organizing factors of life. The ability to think

0:17:24.480 --> 0:17:28.600
<v Speaker 2>about your tribe as separate, distinct better than the other

0:17:28.720 --> 0:17:33.680
<v Speaker 2>tribe is the oldest form of politics, really, and what

0:17:33.800 --> 0:17:37.040
<v Speaker 2>you see with liberalism is that it is not able

0:17:37.040 --> 0:17:42.800
<v Speaker 2>to completely overcome that, and that it rests uneasily alongside

0:17:42.880 --> 0:17:48.000
<v Speaker 2>that reality. And in the American case, think of Jefferson

0:17:49.040 --> 0:17:52.240
<v Speaker 2>as such an interesting example, right, because of course he's

0:17:52.280 --> 0:17:55.879
<v Speaker 2>a slaver owner, but as so many of the biography's

0:17:55.880 --> 0:17:59.560
<v Speaker 2>point out, he was tortured by this. Yeah quite not

0:17:59.600 --> 0:18:02.879
<v Speaker 2>so to that he freed his own slaves, but you know,

0:18:02.920 --> 0:18:06.080
<v Speaker 2>he it was tortured by it. And ultimately what gets

0:18:06.160 --> 0:18:09.760
<v Speaker 2>rid of slavery is the you know, those same liberal

0:18:09.800 --> 0:18:14.159
<v Speaker 2>ideals as as Lincoln points out, that were in the Declaration,

0:18:14.960 --> 0:18:17.639
<v Speaker 2>you know that were that were in there and in

0:18:17.680 --> 0:18:20.879
<v Speaker 2>a sense have to be have to triumph over the

0:18:20.880 --> 0:18:24.680
<v Speaker 2>tribalism that says white soar superior to blacks. And then

0:18:24.720 --> 0:18:29.080
<v Speaker 2>what makes Jim Crow disappear is again those same ideals.

0:18:29.119 --> 0:18:32.200
<v Speaker 2>You know, Martin Luther King talks about how the Declaration

0:18:32.240 --> 0:18:37.040
<v Speaker 2>of Independence was a promisory note to blacks, in other words, saying,

0:18:37.320 --> 0:18:40.040
<v Speaker 2>you know, we we, we are using those same ideas

0:18:40.160 --> 0:18:45.480
<v Speaker 2>to break through the irrational tribalism that has kept us down.

0:18:46.320 --> 0:18:50.560
<v Speaker 2>And even now, you know, we see that the return

0:18:50.640 --> 0:18:54.439
<v Speaker 2>to tribalism is very easy. And whether you look in

0:18:54.480 --> 0:18:57.200
<v Speaker 2>the United States, whether you look in Europe, you see

0:18:57.200 --> 0:19:00.400
<v Speaker 2>that it doesn't take a lot to get us back

0:19:00.400 --> 0:19:02.040
<v Speaker 2>to a kind of tribal way of thinking.

0:19:02.920 --> 0:19:06.080
<v Speaker 3>Now, I'm quite convinced by your wig interpretation of history.

0:19:06.119 --> 0:19:09.239
<v Speaker 3>I share it quite strongly. I'm less convinced by this

0:19:09.400 --> 0:19:14.159
<v Speaker 3>notion of the open versus the closed, which is something

0:19:14.200 --> 0:19:18.399
<v Speaker 3>that Tony Blair embraced and you embraces in this book,

0:19:19.200 --> 0:19:23.119
<v Speaker 3>that liberals are essentially open to the world, open to change,

0:19:23.200 --> 0:19:29.240
<v Speaker 3>open to immigration, open to globalization, and nonliberals, conservatives' reactionaries,

0:19:29.320 --> 0:19:31.560
<v Speaker 3>whatever you want to call them, are much more closed.

0:19:32.080 --> 0:19:35.200
<v Speaker 3>And let me say why, I'm a bit skeptical about this.

0:19:36.000 --> 0:19:39.360
<v Speaker 3>It strikes me that it's rather the Victor's propaganda, and

0:19:39.359 --> 0:19:43.320
<v Speaker 3>that many liberals, though they claim to be open, are

0:19:43.359 --> 0:19:46.880
<v Speaker 3>actually very good at protecting themselves. They protect themselves through

0:19:47.000 --> 0:19:52.480
<v Speaker 3>educational credentials, through various sorts of certificates, licenses to operate.

0:19:52.680 --> 0:19:55.600
<v Speaker 3>For example, barristers in this country don't let solicitors go

0:19:55.680 --> 0:19:58.480
<v Speaker 3>into courts. If you go to university towns, they seem

0:19:58.520 --> 0:20:03.000
<v Speaker 3>to be well defended against che And if you look

0:20:03.000 --> 0:20:06.240
<v Speaker 3>at the service sector, it's much much less globalized than

0:20:06.280 --> 0:20:10.040
<v Speaker 3>the manufacturing sector. If you look at immigration, openness to immigration,

0:20:10.240 --> 0:20:14.399
<v Speaker 3>the so called disupposedly troglodyte people who are opposed to

0:20:14.400 --> 0:20:18.080
<v Speaker 3>immigration actually a people who are badly affected by immigration.

0:20:18.200 --> 0:20:21.840
<v Speaker 3>They lose jobs, they see their wages declined, whereas most

0:20:21.960 --> 0:20:25.800
<v Speaker 3>liberals benefit from immigration. They get cheap servants, they get cheap,

0:20:25.840 --> 0:20:29.160
<v Speaker 3>cheap services and things like that. Isn't this a bit

0:20:29.200 --> 0:20:31.240
<v Speaker 3>of a liberal illusion that they're open.

0:20:31.760 --> 0:20:36.320
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, So let me first explain in the broader sense

0:20:36.400 --> 0:20:38.480
<v Speaker 2>what I meant I mean by that, and in a

0:20:38.480 --> 0:20:40.600
<v Speaker 2>way you can see it in the transformation of the

0:20:40.640 --> 0:20:45.520
<v Speaker 2>Republican Party. The old model the Republican Party was basically

0:20:45.640 --> 0:20:49.840
<v Speaker 2>a free market party believed in low taxes, low regulation,

0:20:50.080 --> 0:20:56.000
<v Speaker 2>low tariffs, welcomed immigration. Ronald Reagan famously signed the eighty

0:20:56.040 --> 0:20:59.040
<v Speaker 2>six amnesty bill, So it was you know, it was

0:20:59.280 --> 0:21:02.720
<v Speaker 2>a raid largely along the kind of free market orientation.

0:21:03.280 --> 0:21:06.280
<v Speaker 2>And what has happened to the Republican Party now it's

0:21:06.520 --> 0:21:11.560
<v Speaker 2>essentially almost entirely transformed itself. It is now largely skeptical

0:21:11.640 --> 0:21:14.760
<v Speaker 2>of trade. In fact, it is the most protectionist major party,

0:21:14.760 --> 0:21:18.240
<v Speaker 2>I would argue in the Western world these days. It

0:21:18.320 --> 0:21:23.760
<v Speaker 2>has become much more uneasy about even things like fiscal conservatism.

0:21:23.800 --> 0:21:29.679
<v Speaker 2>You know, Trump was a big spender. The degree to

0:21:29.720 --> 0:21:35.440
<v Speaker 2>which it has completely try reversed itself on immigration is striking.

0:21:35.680 --> 0:21:39.639
<v Speaker 2>So it's become a party more comfortable with the idea

0:21:40.200 --> 0:21:44.520
<v Speaker 2>of a society that's more closed, more protected, more culturally chauvinistic,

0:21:44.600 --> 0:21:48.240
<v Speaker 2>more nationalistic. Now when you get to liberals, you're right,

0:21:48.320 --> 0:21:51.280
<v Speaker 2>they have a slightly more uneasy relationship. In general, I

0:21:51.280 --> 0:21:53.560
<v Speaker 2>would say they are more comfortable with the world that's

0:21:53.640 --> 0:21:58.359
<v Speaker 2>open and things like that. In theory, they are in

0:21:58.440 --> 0:22:02.680
<v Speaker 2>favor of meritocracy. You are right that they preach more

0:22:02.720 --> 0:22:07.199
<v Speaker 2>meritocracy than they practice, and that they quietly managed to

0:22:07.320 --> 0:22:11.000
<v Speaker 2>find some ways to protect themselves. But I recall a

0:22:11.040 --> 0:22:17.080
<v Speaker 2>wonderful book on meritocracy by Adrian Wolridge that basically concludes,

0:22:17.560 --> 0:22:21.600
<v Speaker 2>look for all its problems, there is no other solution,

0:22:22.400 --> 0:22:25.440
<v Speaker 2>and the answer to the problems of meritocracy is surely

0:22:25.680 --> 0:22:29.320
<v Speaker 2>more meritocracy. In other words, you're absolutely right that there

0:22:29.320 --> 0:22:32.320
<v Speaker 2>are places where they do this. But just as you

0:22:32.320 --> 0:22:36.439
<v Speaker 2>know Martin Luther King used liberalism to push out the

0:22:36.440 --> 0:22:41.200
<v Speaker 2>illiberal features of life, I think one could effectively use liberalism.

0:22:41.200 --> 0:22:43.400
<v Speaker 2>And it is as you know, there is now pressure

0:22:43.520 --> 0:22:48.000
<v Speaker 2>on universities, for example, not to have legacy admissions in

0:22:48.040 --> 0:22:50.840
<v Speaker 2>that sense. Most people don't realize this, but Oxford and

0:22:50.880 --> 0:22:54.560
<v Speaker 2>Cambridge are much more meritocratic than Harvard and Yale. Oxford

0:22:54.600 --> 0:22:58.159
<v Speaker 2>and Cambridge just have a you know, essentially an entrance exam.

0:22:58.800 --> 0:23:02.160
<v Speaker 2>These professions, though they would argue they're trying to maintain

0:23:02.200 --> 0:23:05.320
<v Speaker 2>a certain kind of standards, but those standards again should

0:23:05.320 --> 0:23:08.639
<v Speaker 2>be more meritocratic. But I think that to me, the

0:23:08.920 --> 0:23:13.719
<v Speaker 2>question is is politics becoming more about these two poles?

0:23:13.840 --> 0:23:19.320
<v Speaker 2>Not so much our liberals always consistently open or consistently closed.

0:23:20.280 --> 0:23:23.959
<v Speaker 2>I think in all politics there's a certain amount of hypocrisy,

0:23:24.320 --> 0:23:27.560
<v Speaker 2>and all that what I would ask you is isn't

0:23:27.560 --> 0:23:30.840
<v Speaker 2>it fair to say that the old left right divide

0:23:31.080 --> 0:23:34.320
<v Speaker 2>has gone away largely because the two parties are relatively

0:23:34.400 --> 0:23:37.240
<v Speaker 2>close to one another. You can see this in Britain

0:23:37.280 --> 0:23:40.120
<v Speaker 2>where the Labor Party has come into Barn this seemingly

0:23:40.520 --> 0:23:43.280
<v Speaker 2>revolutionary election and said, oh, by the way, we're not

0:23:43.320 --> 0:23:45.760
<v Speaker 2>going to change anything that the Conservatives have done on

0:23:45.840 --> 0:23:50.760
<v Speaker 2>economic policy. The battleground is now immigration and so called

0:23:50.840 --> 0:23:54.280
<v Speaker 2>wo woke ideology and assimilation and culture.

0:23:55.040 --> 0:23:57.919
<v Speaker 3>I'm skeptical about it. I'm willing to be skeptical about it.

0:23:58.000 --> 0:24:00.160
<v Speaker 3>Is when you talk about the rise of the rest

0:24:00.400 --> 0:24:04.199
<v Speaker 3>and the relative decline of America, which you do this

0:24:04.320 --> 0:24:06.919
<v Speaker 3>in this book towards the end. Is it true that

0:24:06.920 --> 0:24:08.840
<v Speaker 3>we're seeing the rise of the rest and the relative

0:24:08.880 --> 0:24:12.959
<v Speaker 3>decline of America? Or is America pretty constant? You know,

0:24:13.280 --> 0:24:17.120
<v Speaker 3>twenty five percent of GDP in nineteen ninety, twenty five

0:24:17.119 --> 0:24:20.440
<v Speaker 3>percent of GDP now a big chunk of the most

0:24:20.520 --> 0:24:24.080
<v Speaker 3>highly valued companies in the world, Now American, Isn't it

0:24:24.160 --> 0:24:28.040
<v Speaker 3>really what we're seeing the decline of Europe, America maintaining

0:24:28.080 --> 0:24:31.639
<v Speaker 3>its position. The rest certainly rising, particularly India and obviously China.

0:24:32.080 --> 0:24:34.399
<v Speaker 3>But really, isn't it a story of the decline of

0:24:34.440 --> 0:24:37.040
<v Speaker 3>this chunk of the West that is Europe that we're

0:24:37.080 --> 0:24:37.800
<v Speaker 3>seeing at the moment.

0:24:39.200 --> 0:24:41.879
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, it's a very good question because it's the answer

0:24:41.960 --> 0:24:44.840
<v Speaker 2>is I think complicated, and I tried to explain it better.

0:24:45.080 --> 0:24:47.480
<v Speaker 2>I think in my book The Post American World, which

0:24:47.520 --> 0:24:50.760
<v Speaker 2>is the reason I talk about the decline of America

0:24:50.800 --> 0:24:54.320
<v Speaker 2>in a post American world, is that the most important

0:24:54.400 --> 0:24:57.920
<v Speaker 2>shift that's taken place is the decline in American influence,

0:24:58.320 --> 0:25:02.359
<v Speaker 2>not American power. Absolutely right. American heart power has stayed constant.

0:25:02.480 --> 0:25:05.399
<v Speaker 2>In fact, you could argue on some levels Adrian as

0:25:05.440 --> 0:25:09.160
<v Speaker 2>I'm sure you would agree, American power has grown. American

0:25:09.200 --> 0:25:12.760
<v Speaker 2>technological dominance of the world is probably greater today than

0:25:12.800 --> 0:25:15.399
<v Speaker 2>it's ever been. I looked it up to see what

0:25:15.560 --> 0:25:18.840
<v Speaker 2>were the top top ten technology companies in nineteen eighty nine.

0:25:19.240 --> 0:25:23.560
<v Speaker 2>Only four were American, four were Japanese, and two were European. Today,

0:25:23.640 --> 0:25:26.280
<v Speaker 2>ten out of ten out of ten are American. So

0:25:27.240 --> 0:25:30.720
<v Speaker 2>American power has stayed at least constant, if not increased,

0:25:30.920 --> 0:25:34.040
<v Speaker 2>but American influence has declined. And what I mean by

0:25:34.080 --> 0:25:36.240
<v Speaker 2>that is, and this is why the rise of the

0:25:36.280 --> 0:25:41.000
<v Speaker 2>rest becomes important. Take a country like Turkey. Forty years ago,

0:25:41.119 --> 0:25:45.840
<v Speaker 2>Turkey was a basket case economy with a military hunter

0:25:46.000 --> 0:25:50.880
<v Speaker 2>that ruled it and was absolutely reliably pro American and

0:25:51.960 --> 0:25:55.919
<v Speaker 2>did whatever Washington told it to do. Today, the Turkish

0:25:56.000 --> 0:25:59.320
<v Speaker 2>economy is about four times bigger, or maybe five times bigger,

0:25:59.359 --> 0:26:01.720
<v Speaker 2>than it was four forty years ago. It has a

0:26:01.760 --> 0:26:06.040
<v Speaker 2>stable political system with a very powerful, charismatic leader who

0:26:06.160 --> 0:26:09.720
<v Speaker 2>routinely tells the United States to go to hell when

0:26:09.720 --> 0:26:13.560
<v Speaker 2>America asks said what to do. And that pattern recurs

0:26:13.600 --> 0:26:17.000
<v Speaker 2>with India, because of course with China and with Russia,

0:26:17.040 --> 0:26:22.199
<v Speaker 2>but with Indonesia, with Vietnam, with Brazil. And that's what

0:26:22.240 --> 0:26:24.199
<v Speaker 2>I was trying to get across, which was that the

0:26:24.280 --> 0:26:29.040
<v Speaker 2>United States had a certain kind of extraordinary political influence

0:26:29.119 --> 0:26:32.040
<v Speaker 2>after the end of the Cold War. It literally set

0:26:32.119 --> 0:26:36.160
<v Speaker 2>the terms for the rest of the world. And that

0:26:36.520 --> 0:26:39.960
<v Speaker 2>influences waning because you have a lot of uppity middle

0:26:40.040 --> 0:26:43.280
<v Speaker 2>powers who are willing to say, we're just going to

0:26:43.280 --> 0:26:45.159
<v Speaker 2>do our own thing. And look at India and the

0:26:45.200 --> 0:26:49.000
<v Speaker 2>way it's handling the Ukraine War. You know, it is

0:26:49.760 --> 0:26:52.919
<v Speaker 2>happy to be courted by Washington and sometimes agrees with

0:26:53.040 --> 0:26:57.760
<v Speaker 2>Washington when it serves its own India's purposes, for example,

0:26:57.800 --> 0:27:00.560
<v Speaker 2>the anti Chinese element to Indian policy. But at the

0:27:00.560 --> 0:27:04.520
<v Speaker 2>same time it happily buys oil from Russia, trades with Russia,

0:27:04.720 --> 0:27:08.720
<v Speaker 2>consorts with Russia, buys weapons from Russia because that helps

0:27:08.720 --> 0:27:12.080
<v Speaker 2>it on its own defense independence line. So that's the

0:27:12.119 --> 0:27:14.760
<v Speaker 2>reality of the world today. And I couldn't I couldn't

0:27:14.800 --> 0:27:18.440
<v Speaker 2>think of a better term than post American, because it's

0:27:18.480 --> 0:27:22.360
<v Speaker 2>not a Chinese word. Dominated world certainly, but it's not

0:27:22.480 --> 0:27:26.080
<v Speaker 2>quite the American dominance that you had now Europe. I

0:27:26.080 --> 0:27:28.960
<v Speaker 2>think just the coda I would say to Europe is,

0:27:29.640 --> 0:27:32.560
<v Speaker 2>in my view, you're absolutely right by the way, of

0:27:32.600 --> 0:27:36.040
<v Speaker 2>course Europe has declined and China's rise in India's rise

0:27:36.160 --> 0:27:37.840
<v Speaker 2>has all come out. You know, if you're trying to

0:27:37.880 --> 0:27:42.760
<v Speaker 2>think about, yeah, who declined so that China could rise,

0:27:42.840 --> 0:27:47.840
<v Speaker 2>it was Europe. But Europe was never politically powerful, unified,

0:27:47.880 --> 0:27:51.440
<v Speaker 2>and strategic in the first place. So the economic decline

0:27:51.440 --> 0:27:55.840
<v Speaker 2>of Europe has not actually had that much geopolitical effect

0:27:55.960 --> 0:28:00.320
<v Speaker 2>because Europe has never been united as a geopolitical player.

0:28:00.640 --> 0:28:03.119
<v Speaker 3>One wrinkle to the argument that strikes me is it

0:28:03.200 --> 0:28:06.639
<v Speaker 3>used to be the case that America was influential because

0:28:06.640 --> 0:28:10.480
<v Speaker 3>it exported its best features, like good governance, like the

0:28:10.560 --> 0:28:16.360
<v Speaker 3>charisma of Kennedy, like the commitment of the liberal democratic order.

0:28:16.600 --> 0:28:19.280
<v Speaker 3>Now it seems as America is getting better at exporting

0:28:19.320 --> 0:28:23.040
<v Speaker 3>its worst features, which you know, to some extent is wokeism,

0:28:23.359 --> 0:28:27.119
<v Speaker 3>to some extent is polarization, and to some extent is

0:28:27.160 --> 0:28:33.640
<v Speaker 3>a sort of technology that exacerbates anger and angsed America is.

0:28:34.160 --> 0:28:36.880
<v Speaker 3>People around the world are obsessed by America, but they

0:28:36.920 --> 0:28:39.320
<v Speaker 3>no longer see it as a shining city on the hill.

0:28:39.320 --> 0:28:40.840
<v Speaker 3>They quite often see it as a sort of version

0:28:40.840 --> 0:28:43.280
<v Speaker 3>of hell. Actually it doesn't stop them being obsessed, but

0:28:43.600 --> 0:28:47.440
<v Speaker 3>they're still fixated, but not fixated in an admiring way.

0:28:47.640 --> 0:28:51.280
<v Speaker 3>America is treated as an example of politics we don't

0:28:51.280 --> 0:28:55.480
<v Speaker 3>want to imitate, as an example of an administrative system

0:28:55.480 --> 0:28:57.880
<v Speaker 3>we don't want to imitate, and in an example is

0:28:57.880 --> 0:29:00.320
<v Speaker 3>a healthcare system that we don't want to imitate. It's

0:29:00.360 --> 0:29:03.680
<v Speaker 3>a very different sort of influence from the nineteen sixties influence.

0:29:04.280 --> 0:29:06.200
<v Speaker 2>Yeah, I would agree with that, and I think that

0:29:06.200 --> 0:29:09.320
<v Speaker 2>that's part of what has caused the decline in American influence.

0:29:09.600 --> 0:29:11.200
<v Speaker 2>As you know, in the book, I argue there's sort

0:29:11.200 --> 0:29:14.920
<v Speaker 2>of the three blows to American influence one, the Iraq

0:29:14.960 --> 0:29:20.480
<v Speaker 2>War damaged America's military credibility, the economic crisis of o

0:29:20.560 --> 0:29:25.320
<v Speaker 2>Waight damaged its economic credibility, and the rise of populism

0:29:25.360 --> 0:29:28.080
<v Speaker 2>and the paralysis that came out of that damaged its

0:29:28.080 --> 0:29:32.400
<v Speaker 2>political credibility. And those three things together, I think you

0:29:32.440 --> 0:29:35.080
<v Speaker 2>put it very well. I would actually even broad and

0:29:35.160 --> 0:29:37.640
<v Speaker 2>it's not just the healthcare system, I think, and you

0:29:37.720 --> 0:29:41.400
<v Speaker 2>may be more uncomfortable with this as I am as well,

0:29:41.440 --> 0:29:46.280
<v Speaker 2>but most of the world sees Europe's social market as

0:29:46.360 --> 0:29:51.200
<v Speaker 2>much more attractive than America's kind of laissez fair, you know,

0:29:51.240 --> 0:29:53.960
<v Speaker 2>And I would argue highly inefficient ly say fair system,

0:29:54.000 --> 0:29:56.920
<v Speaker 2>because as you know, we do plenty of government spending.

0:29:57.000 --> 0:29:59.920
<v Speaker 2>It's just very badly done. And you know, we have

0:30:00.080 --> 0:30:03.400
<v Speaker 2>our own weird wealth estate which mostly coddles the middle

0:30:03.440 --> 0:30:07.200
<v Speaker 2>class and it miserates the poor. I saw a poll

0:30:07.320 --> 0:30:10.600
<v Speaker 2>recently that ipsisted. As I recall, twenty four thousand people

0:30:10.680 --> 0:30:14.200
<v Speaker 2>thirty one countries. Most people were still very admiring of

0:30:14.520 --> 0:30:17.920
<v Speaker 2>or not admiring, thought that America did more good in

0:30:18.000 --> 0:30:21.160
<v Speaker 2>the world than China or Russia by far. But when

0:30:21.200 --> 0:30:25.880
<v Speaker 2>asked what model people liked, Europe was number one. America

0:30:26.000 --> 0:30:28.600
<v Speaker 2>was number two. In a way, Europe has done something

0:30:28.680 --> 0:30:31.480
<v Speaker 2>very extraordinary, even as it has declined in terms of

0:30:31.560 --> 0:30:35.600
<v Speaker 2>raw power, it has shown that pasted a certain level

0:30:35.640 --> 0:30:42.120
<v Speaker 2>of economic wealth. What matters is not just sheer economic wealth.

0:30:42.680 --> 0:30:46.320
<v Speaker 2>What matters is quality of life. What matters a certain

0:30:46.600 --> 0:30:48.640
<v Speaker 2>level of equality and things like that. You know the

0:30:48.680 --> 0:30:53.160
<v Speaker 2>Europeans have. As you know, for most of history, kind

0:30:53.160 --> 0:30:57.520
<v Speaker 2>of general quality of life was closely correlated with wealth.

0:30:57.600 --> 0:31:00.480
<v Speaker 2>The richer you were, the better. And what's happened in

0:31:01.360 --> 0:31:04.120
<v Speaker 2>the most in the richest countries in the world is

0:31:04.160 --> 0:31:07.400
<v Speaker 2>that has now gotten decoupled. I think most people would

0:31:07.440 --> 0:31:11.160
<v Speaker 2>say that they would prefer to live as an average

0:31:11.200 --> 0:31:14.160
<v Speaker 2>person in Europe than they would in Americans. It's still

0:31:14.200 --> 0:31:17.920
<v Speaker 2>great to be rich in America, probably better than anywhere else,

0:31:17.960 --> 0:31:20.280
<v Speaker 2>But for the average person, I think Europe is the

0:31:20.320 --> 0:31:22.200
<v Speaker 2>model absolutely.

0:31:22.320 --> 0:31:24.360
<v Speaker 3>And this brings me on to the final thing I

0:31:24.360 --> 0:31:27.120
<v Speaker 3>want to talk about, which is the notion of a

0:31:27.200 --> 0:31:32.880
<v Speaker 3>liberal hegimen. That since about eighteen hundred we pretty much

0:31:32.960 --> 0:31:36.520
<v Speaker 3>always had a liberal hegimen, starting off with Britain, which,

0:31:36.560 --> 0:31:38.920
<v Speaker 3>for all its faults, is wedded to a certain set

0:31:38.960 --> 0:31:42.840
<v Speaker 3>of liberal values and a certain set of liberal norms.

0:31:42.840 --> 0:31:46.080
<v Speaker 3>About how to run into national affairs. America takes over

0:31:46.120 --> 0:31:48.920
<v Speaker 3>that position. It's a bit of a messy handover. But

0:31:49.120 --> 0:31:52.479
<v Speaker 3>even during the sort of the messiest part of the handover,

0:31:52.520 --> 0:31:55.520
<v Speaker 3>the nineteen twenties and nineteen thirties, America is essentially a

0:31:55.560 --> 0:31:59.080
<v Speaker 3>liberal power which is in a state of retrenchment. And then,

0:31:59.120 --> 0:32:02.720
<v Speaker 3>of course after forty five America takes up the burden

0:32:03.000 --> 0:32:07.520
<v Speaker 3>and becomes the great liberal hegimen. We are now, as

0:32:07.560 --> 0:32:10.000
<v Speaker 3>far as I can see, in danger of having a

0:32:10.040 --> 0:32:13.280
<v Speaker 3>Hegemen which is not a liberal power. I mean by

0:32:13.320 --> 0:32:17.280
<v Speaker 3>that that Trump and JD. Vance are not liberals. They

0:32:17.320 --> 0:32:19.800
<v Speaker 3>will be in charge of the world's most powerful country,

0:32:20.040 --> 0:32:22.000
<v Speaker 3>but wedded to a set of policies and a set

0:32:22.000 --> 0:32:26.560
<v Speaker 3>of assumptions which we haven't seen in two hundred years.

0:32:27.240 --> 0:32:29.040
<v Speaker 3>Is that true? And if so, does it worry you?

0:32:29.640 --> 0:32:33.200
<v Speaker 2>It worries me deeply. So there are two problems. One,

0:32:33.440 --> 0:32:36.440
<v Speaker 2>I think is exactly what you say, with Trump and Vance,

0:32:36.560 --> 0:32:41.440
<v Speaker 2>who will fundamentally reject that kind of open liberal internationalism

0:32:41.520 --> 0:32:46.240
<v Speaker 2>that really has been practiced by every American administration since FDR.

0:32:46.920 --> 0:32:49.800
<v Speaker 2>I think what we are watching historically, I mean it

0:32:49.800 --> 0:32:53.360
<v Speaker 2>comes straight out of my book, is that the period

0:32:53.400 --> 0:32:59.120
<v Speaker 2>of high open globalization immigration led to a backlash in

0:32:59.160 --> 0:33:01.880
<v Speaker 2>the twenties, as you note, and you know, the United

0:33:01.920 --> 0:33:05.840
<v Speaker 2>States ended up very closed, with the immigration policy much

0:33:05.840 --> 0:33:11.000
<v Speaker 2>more restrictive than anything Trump or Vans as proposing. And

0:33:11.280 --> 0:33:15.880
<v Speaker 2>maybe we're watching a similar kind of retreat or turning back.

0:33:16.800 --> 0:33:19.120
<v Speaker 2>But there's a you know, the optimist in me hopes,

0:33:19.280 --> 0:33:22.920
<v Speaker 2>just as the twenties didn't last forever, that that will

0:33:22.960 --> 0:33:24.920
<v Speaker 2>be reversed. I hope it doesn't take a world war

0:33:25.040 --> 0:33:29.040
<v Speaker 2>to do that, But I think that there's a I'm

0:33:29.160 --> 0:33:33.760
<v Speaker 2>still I still believe that the larger liberal project is

0:33:33.880 --> 0:33:37.160
<v Speaker 2>so it benefits so many countries, it benefits so many

0:33:37.200 --> 0:33:41.000
<v Speaker 2>human beings around the world, that ultimately, you know, we

0:33:41.120 --> 0:33:43.960
<v Speaker 2>will come to we will come to realize that. For example,

0:33:44.200 --> 0:33:46.719
<v Speaker 2>I don't think Europe will go in that direction if

0:33:46.760 --> 0:33:49.120
<v Speaker 2>America goes in that direction. I don't think this is

0:33:49.120 --> 0:33:51.960
<v Speaker 2>a case. You know, for one thing, other countries can't

0:33:52.040 --> 0:33:54.880
<v Speaker 2>become as protectionists as America because they don't have the option.

0:33:55.560 --> 0:33:58.080
<v Speaker 2>The US is a huge internal market. You know, there

0:33:58.080 --> 0:34:00.320
<v Speaker 2>are only two countries that can really thry in this

0:34:00.440 --> 0:34:04.080
<v Speaker 2>kind of America first world ironically, and that's America and China,

0:34:04.560 --> 0:34:07.440
<v Speaker 2>the two vast internal markets. But for a country like

0:34:07.480 --> 0:34:11.960
<v Speaker 2>Britain or Germany where trade is almost half the economy,

0:34:12.280 --> 0:34:15.080
<v Speaker 2>you can't, you know, you can't succeed. So I think

0:34:15.080 --> 0:34:18.200
<v Speaker 2>that there will be a kind of self limiting quality

0:34:18.239 --> 0:34:20.640
<v Speaker 2>to it. I think the fact that half of America

0:34:20.719 --> 0:34:24.200
<v Speaker 2>doesn't agree with what Trump and Vans agree with helps enormously.

0:34:24.680 --> 0:34:28.160
<v Speaker 2>The second problem, though, is harder, which is this decline

0:34:28.200 --> 0:34:33.080
<v Speaker 2>of American influence. We've never had a world, a liberal

0:34:33.160 --> 0:34:38.400
<v Speaker 2>world without a liberal hegemon. And if the liberal hegemon

0:34:38.480 --> 0:34:41.680
<v Speaker 2>is getting weaker in influence of not in raw power,

0:34:42.320 --> 0:34:45.080
<v Speaker 2>how do you sustain that. My hope is that you

0:34:45.120 --> 0:34:49.000
<v Speaker 2>can have a kind of coalition of liberal powers Europe,

0:34:49.040 --> 0:34:54.560
<v Speaker 2>the United States, Japan, Australia, countries like Singapore, even countries

0:34:54.600 --> 0:34:56.960
<v Speaker 2>like Saudi Arabia. At the end of the they want

0:34:57.000 --> 0:35:01.680
<v Speaker 2>an open international system. Would that work? You know, We've

0:35:01.680 --> 0:35:07.160
<v Speaker 2>never had power that way shared that way. We've never

0:35:07.680 --> 0:35:11.719
<v Speaker 2>had the world run by committee, and that is a

0:35:11.760 --> 0:35:14.440
<v Speaker 2>real puzzle. But we are going to run this experiment,

0:35:14.480 --> 0:35:18.960
<v Speaker 2>both experiments. You know, probably if you assume Trump wins,

0:35:19.480 --> 0:35:22.480
<v Speaker 2>we have to try the experiment of a coalition of

0:35:22.520 --> 0:35:25.960
<v Speaker 2>liberal powers. And in a way that's a more stable

0:35:26.239 --> 0:35:28.560
<v Speaker 2>you know, in the long term, you can't just hope

0:35:28.560 --> 0:35:31.600
<v Speaker 2>that you're always going to have one enormous liberal hegemon.

0:35:31.719 --> 0:35:34.440
<v Speaker 2>Maybe you have to hope that enough of the world

0:35:34.560 --> 0:35:37.960
<v Speaker 2>is converted to this idea because it really does help everyone.

0:35:38.120 --> 0:35:40.440
<v Speaker 2>You know. That's why at the end of the day,

0:35:40.800 --> 0:35:43.239
<v Speaker 2>I'm an optimist, because I do believe that these are

0:35:44.120 --> 0:35:45.000
<v Speaker 2>better values.

0:35:45.719 --> 0:35:47.880
<v Speaker 3>But that means Europe stepping up a bit more in

0:35:47.960 --> 0:35:51.239
<v Speaker 3>terms of defense spending, in terms of acting on the

0:35:51.280 --> 0:35:55.680
<v Speaker 3>global stage, of course, but it's very hard for Europe

0:35:55.719 --> 0:35:59.200
<v Speaker 3>to do that at a time when America is treating

0:35:59.360 --> 0:36:02.160
<v Speaker 3>an in seeing a set of values which sometimes look

0:36:02.400 --> 0:36:04.799
<v Speaker 3>like more like the values of autocracies than they do

0:36:04.920 --> 0:36:06.960
<v Speaker 3>like liberal paths. I mean, even if you go back

0:36:06.960 --> 0:36:09.960
<v Speaker 3>to the nineteen twenties and thirties, you know, the Harding

0:36:10.080 --> 0:36:13.239
<v Speaker 3>and Coolidge sort of seemed half liberal and half not.

0:36:13.920 --> 0:36:17.280
<v Speaker 3>I mean, both Trump and Vance do seem to be

0:36:18.640 --> 0:36:21.640
<v Speaker 3>very hostile to the liberal project.

0:36:22.120 --> 0:36:26.239
<v Speaker 2>There's a possibility that that actually spurs the Europeans to

0:36:26.320 --> 0:36:30.200
<v Speaker 2>do more absolutely for example, on you know, on defense,

0:36:30.600 --> 0:36:34.319
<v Speaker 2>they realize they have no option and they do it. Look,

0:36:34.320 --> 0:36:38.920
<v Speaker 2>it's back to that agal struggle between tribalism and liberalism,

0:36:38.960 --> 0:36:41.799
<v Speaker 2>because in a way, the Europeans talk a good game

0:36:42.440 --> 0:36:44.520
<v Speaker 2>at but at the end of the day, you know,

0:36:44.719 --> 0:36:48.440
<v Speaker 2>the Paris wants to make French foreign policy and Berlin

0:36:48.520 --> 0:36:51.240
<v Speaker 2>wants to make German foreign policy, and they talk about

0:36:51.280 --> 0:36:55.480
<v Speaker 2>delegating and having a unified strategic European foreign policy. But

0:36:56.200 --> 0:36:59.839
<v Speaker 2>you know, they don't want to give up the national chauvinism,

0:37:00.160 --> 0:37:03.279
<v Speaker 2>you know, So so maybe this is a bit more

0:37:03.320 --> 0:37:07.840
<v Speaker 2>of a spur for it happening. I also do think

0:37:08.640 --> 0:37:13.360
<v Speaker 2>that maybe I'm wrong about this, but the Trump backlash is,

0:37:13.960 --> 0:37:16.560
<v Speaker 2>you know, it's not the wave of the future. I mean,

0:37:16.560 --> 0:37:18.880
<v Speaker 2>look at the people who vote for Trump. They're older,

0:37:18.960 --> 0:37:22.279
<v Speaker 2>they're wider, they're they're you know, this is the part

0:37:22.280 --> 0:37:25.120
<v Speaker 2>of America that is fading, and it might take a

0:37:25.160 --> 0:37:29.719
<v Speaker 2>while to fade, but there is a demographic reality to

0:37:29.840 --> 0:37:33.359
<v Speaker 2>the change that's taking place, so you know, it can't

0:37:33.360 --> 0:37:34.080
<v Speaker 2>go on forever.

0:37:34.320 --> 0:37:36.080
<v Speaker 3>I think there's truth in that, But I also think

0:37:36.120 --> 0:37:41.560
<v Speaker 3>that liberalism needs to examine itself and reform itself and

0:37:41.760 --> 0:37:45.520
<v Speaker 3>defend both the liberal cause but also the interests of

0:37:45.640 --> 0:37:48.360
<v Speaker 3>ordinary working, working people a bit better than it has.

0:37:48.719 --> 0:37:49.160
<v Speaker 2>But Frei.

0:37:49.320 --> 0:37:51.399
<v Speaker 3>Thank you, thank you very much for everything you've said

0:37:51.440 --> 0:37:52.120
<v Speaker 3>and for being here.

0:37:52.400 --> 0:37:55.120
<v Speaker 2>Arian's a huge pleasure to have this conversation. Thank you.

0:37:58.920 --> 0:38:02.160
<v Speaker 3>Thanks for listening to this week's Photonomics from Bloomberg. This

0:38:02.280 --> 0:38:06.120
<v Speaker 3>episode was hosted by me Adrian Wooldridge. It was produced

0:38:06.120 --> 0:38:11.120
<v Speaker 3>by Samasadi, with booking support from Chris Martlau, production support

0:38:11.200 --> 0:38:15.320
<v Speaker 3>and sound design from Moshus and dam Random. Francis Newnham

0:38:15.480 --> 0:38:19.359
<v Speaker 3>is our executive producer. Sage Bowman is Head of Podcasts

0:38:19.600 --> 0:38:23.840
<v Speaker 3>Special thanks to Fareed Zakaria. Please subscribe, rate, and review

0:38:24.000 --> 0:38:26.480
<v Speaker 3>highly wherever you listen to our podcasts.

0:38:41.080 --> 0:38:43.600
<v Speaker 1>Thanks for listening to this week's in the City, featuring

0:38:43.600 --> 0:38:46.080
<v Speaker 1>an interview from our sister show, Votomics.