WEBVTT - Pentagon’s Emil Michael on Anthropic Talks, Military’s AI Use

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<v Speaker 1>Bloomberg Audio Studios, podcasts, radio news.

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<v Speaker 2>AI in full focus this morning. The standoff between Anthropic

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<v Speaker 2>and the Pentagon over military safeguards is ramping up. The

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<v Speaker 2>tech giant facing a deadline today to accept conditions or

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<v Speaker 2>be blacklisted. The Anthropic CEO Dario Emodi saying in a statement,

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<v Speaker 2>quote these threats do not change our position. We cannot

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<v Speaker 2>in good conscience to see to their request. The US

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<v Speaker 2>Undersecretary of Defense and Mil Michael, responding to the statement,

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<v Speaker 2>calling Emodi a liar with a God complex. The under

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<v Speaker 2>Secretary joins US now for more. Under Secretary Michael, Welcome

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<v Speaker 2>to the program, Sir. Calling someone a liar is pretty

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<v Speaker 2>strong language. What's he like about?

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<v Speaker 1>Well, what happened is we've been negotiating in good faith

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<v Speaker 1>on the Department of Warside for about three months, and

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<v Speaker 1>we're working pretty diligently, and we sent over a proposal

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<v Speaker 1>that we thought made a lot of concessions to the

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<v Speaker 1>language that Anthropic wanted, and then, you know, without any notice,

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<v Speaker 1>they published an article where we thought we were getting close,

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<v Speaker 1>saying that they were breaking off talks well before the deadline,

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<v Speaker 1>which is generally not good partner oriented practice. If you

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<v Speaker 1>will so mail.

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<v Speaker 2>This is what they're asking for as far as we understand,

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<v Speaker 2>and let me share this with the audience. It doesn't

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<v Speaker 2>want its technology use for surveillments of US citizens or

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<v Speaker 2>for autonomous lethal strikes without a human in the loop.

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<v Speaker 2>That's the ask. What were the concessions.

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<v Speaker 1>Yeah, the concessions are pretty simple. We agreed in writing

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<v Speaker 1>to ensure that the Department of was following all laws

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<v Speaker 1>and regulations, including the National Security Act of nineteen forty seven,

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<v Speaker 1>the PIZ Act, and all other applicable laws and regulations,

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<v Speaker 1>because mass surveillance of Americans is already illegal, so we

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<v Speaker 1>were offering to put all of that language and affirm

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<v Speaker 1>that we were following all laws in the contract. When

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<v Speaker 1>it comes to autonomous weapons, similarly, we said we'll follow

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<v Speaker 1>all laws, including a DoD Directive that's been in place

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<v Speaker 1>for years that governs how we would use any such weapons.

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<v Speaker 1>And then we affirmed that there would be human oversight

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<v Speaker 1>over all kinds of every kind of part of the

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<v Speaker 1>development process or engagement process or use about Thomas weapons.

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<v Speaker 1>And he didn't like the word I guess as appropriate

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<v Speaker 1>at the end of that sentence, But we believe we've

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<v Speaker 1>we conceded to all their substantive demands. So it was

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<v Speaker 1>surprising that out of nowhere they'd cut off negotiations.

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<v Speaker 3>So it appears that your differences are actually minor. Would

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<v Speaker 3>that be accurate?

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<v Speaker 1>Yeah, That's what was surprising is usually if your differences

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<v Speaker 1>are minor, you get in a room, you try to

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<v Speaker 1>hash them out, and instead, without any notice, you know,

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<v Speaker 1>publishes something about his conscience and then doesn't engage. And

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<v Speaker 1>it was difficult to understand why because we were working

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<v Speaker 1>pretty diligently on this, and we were at the final

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<v Speaker 1>stages of few words here or there where we agreed

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<v Speaker 1>to what they wanted so in substance. So it was

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<v Speaker 1>very surprising given that we negotiate with hundreds of technology

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<v Speaker 1>companies and this is the only one we've ever had

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<v Speaker 1>that behavior from.

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<v Speaker 3>Are you still weighing using the Defense Production Act to

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<v Speaker 3>compel Anthropic to basically have to use its product or potential?

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<v Speaker 3>You're weighing still making it a supply chain risk, which

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<v Speaker 3>we heard from anthropics say that this is almost contradictory proposals.

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<v Speaker 1>They're two different things, and I think depending on how

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<v Speaker 1>today goes. At five o'clock, the Secretary of warpete Hexeth

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<v Speaker 1>gets to make the decision on how to reply. I've

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<v Speaker 1>maintained my openness to continue dialogue through that deadline. But

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<v Speaker 1>they've seem to have launched sort of a pr campaign

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<v Speaker 1>that was planned well before these negotiations sort of restarted

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<v Speaker 1>on Tuesday. So I don't know. Their behavior is frankly unpredictable.

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<v Speaker 1>I'm not sure what to expect.

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<v Speaker 3>So do you plan them having more talks today or

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<v Speaker 3>is a decision just need to be made by today.

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<v Speaker 1>I offered more talks if so long as they're in

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<v Speaker 1>good faith. We're always open to talks. And we set

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<v Speaker 1>a deadline, and we meant the deadline, and up until

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<v Speaker 1>that deadline, I'm open to more talks and I told

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<v Speaker 1>them so.

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<v Speaker 3>So what does happen at five to ZHO one today?

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<v Speaker 3>If there's no agreement between the DoD and Anthropic.

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<v Speaker 1>That's up Secretary Hegseeth. We have some courses of action

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<v Speaker 1>that he's considering. And ultimately this comes down to the

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<v Speaker 1>war fighter, right. It comes down to for any AI

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<v Speaker 1>system we might use, are we using it to protect

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<v Speaker 1>our war fighters in the right way? Are we using

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<v Speaker 1>it to sort of give them the best tools to

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<v Speaker 1>be efficient and to be lethal when they have to

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<v Speaker 1>be lethal, and that's the primary thing in Secretary hess head,

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<v Speaker 1>and we told them that Ultimately, at the end of

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<v Speaker 1>the day, we fall all the law, all laws, but

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<v Speaker 1>we can't let any one company stand between us and

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<v Speaker 1>the war fighter because they don't make the rules. Congress

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<v Speaker 1>makes the roles, the presidents signed them, We execute them,

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<v Speaker 1>and we do so safely.

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<v Speaker 3>Well, speaking of the President, has he weighed in on

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<v Speaker 3>this specifically? Has there been discussions with him? And Secretary

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<v Speaker 3>Hegseth and yourself as well?

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<v Speaker 1>This has all been internal to the Department of War

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<v Speaker 1>so far, okay?

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<v Speaker 3>And then when it comes to potentially the other AI

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<v Speaker 3>negotiations underway, What is going on right now with XAI

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<v Speaker 3>and to get grock on classified networks.

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<v Speaker 1>Well, we I think the smart approach when I came

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<v Speaker 1>in at the Department of War about nine months ago

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<v Speaker 1>and looked at what we were using AI for, and

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<v Speaker 1>it was some pretty minimal use cases. And given the

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<v Speaker 1>power of the technology, the potential power to do good

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<v Speaker 1>for the US military both from an efficiency standpoint and

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<v Speaker 1>a strength standpoint, I wanted to make sure we have

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<v Speaker 1>a lot of options. So we went around and we've

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<v Speaker 1>launched Google for unclassified networks, We've signed XAI for classified

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<v Speaker 1>and non classified networks, and we want to continue to

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<v Speaker 1>provide options to all of our components here at DOOW,

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<v Speaker 1>and that's what we'll continue to do. And it's just

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<v Speaker 1>smart to have more than one option so that we

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<v Speaker 1>can see the strengths and weaknesses of each model and

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<v Speaker 1>learn from them as the AI revolution begins here.

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<v Speaker 3>Under Secretary Michael is lethal autonomy really so critical for

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<v Speaker 3>future national security?

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<v Speaker 1>It is. I mean, if you think about it from

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<v Speaker 1>a defense standpoint, whether it's a drone swarm that's coming

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<v Speaker 1>out a military base, whether it's a hybersonic missile coming

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<v Speaker 1>out the United States, where the reaction time against the

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<v Speaker 1>sort of how many weapons are coming at you you

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<v Speaker 1>want to take them, be able to take them down

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<v Speaker 1>potentially faster than a human could alone. If that's how

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<v Speaker 1>it's done. And we're learning from the Russian Ukraine War

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<v Speaker 1>with the drone swarms and so on, and with the

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<v Speaker 1>new weapons that have been developed all over the world

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<v Speaker 1>that change the name of war, the game of warfare,

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<v Speaker 1>that we've got to respond and defend ourselves in any

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<v Speaker 1>way we can. The question is do you have a

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<v Speaker 1>human on a loop to make sure that we're monitoring

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<v Speaker 1>these systems? And that's what we proposed in writing in language,

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<v Speaker 1>that we always have human oversight over these things, but

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<v Speaker 1>they're necessary given what's happening in the world.

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<v Speaker 2>Clearly, the technology these companies are producing is tremendously powerful. Yeah,

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<v Speaker 2>you believe this individual is both a liar and has

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<v Speaker 2>a god complex. How concerned should the American public be

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<v Speaker 2>about individuals like this running companies like this if that's

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<v Speaker 2>what you believe this person is.

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<v Speaker 1>Yeah, I think there's some concern that you know, when

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<v Speaker 1>you have leaders of some of these companies talking about

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<v Speaker 1>unemploying seventy million Americans, the lawsuits they're under for scraping

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<v Speaker 1>content from content publishers and having billion dollar lawsuits against

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<v Speaker 1>them using that content to make profits. And then really

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<v Speaker 1>what's concerning is making their own policies that sort of

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<v Speaker 1>and could sit on top of democratic policies that are

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<v Speaker 1>voted on by the people, passed by Congress, signed by

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<v Speaker 1>the President. You do have to worry about are they

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<v Speaker 1>taking it too far? Are they trying to do and

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<v Speaker 1>impose their own views on the American people in an

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<v Speaker 1>undemocratic way, so, I think those things are going to

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<v Speaker 1>be things we're grappling with in society for the next

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<v Speaker 1>several years as these companies get bigger and bigger.

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<v Speaker 2>We're looking forward to having a conversation with you, sir.

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<v Speaker 2>Thanks for making time for us this morning. Meil Mark there,

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<v Speaker 2>the under Secretary of Defense,