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Speaker 1: From UFOs to psychic powers and government conspiracies. History is

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Speaker 1: riddled with unexplained events. You can turn back now or

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Speaker 1: learn this stuff they don't want you to know. A

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Speaker 1: production of iHeartRadio.

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Speaker 2: Hello, welcome back to the show. My name is Matt

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Speaker 2: our pal Nol is on an adventure.

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Speaker 3: They called me Ben. We're joined as always with our

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Speaker 3: super producer Paul Mission Control decad Most importantly, you are you.

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Speaker 3: You are here. That makes this the stuff they don't

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Speaker 3: want you to know. And I was thinking a good

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Speaker 3: way to open the conversation this evening. Not everybody likes

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Speaker 3: to hear this, but folks, fellow conspiracy realist, if you

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Speaker 3: are listening tonight, you can thank drugs. We're not saying

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Speaker 3: everybody's tuning in because they're under the influence of something

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Speaker 3: at this moment. Matt, I was just I was thinking

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Speaker 3: through this. At some point in every human's personal history,

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Speaker 3: a drug of some sort has saved your life or

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Speaker 3: the lives of your ancestors, the people who came before

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Speaker 3: you know, penicillin, chemotherapy, even insulin treatments. Right in the

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Speaker 3: modern day, drugs have saved countless lives, oh.

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Speaker 2: For sure, even potentially something as innocuous as aspirin, or

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Speaker 2: maybe you feel as though a drug has saved your

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Speaker 2: life when you've taken a pain pill because you've been

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Speaker 2: in excruciating pain and couldn't mentally handle it. You felt

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Speaker 2: but this magic little medicine, this drug got you through something.

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Speaker 2: And one of the weird things with these drugs is

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Speaker 2: that you are prescribed very specific doses of them when

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Speaker 2: you've taken them, and potentially when they've saved your lives,

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Speaker 2: even something like you know, an antibiotic. But if you

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Speaker 2: overtake any one of these drugs, there are potential very,

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Speaker 2: very very bad effects.

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Speaker 3: Here are the facts. I don't know if it's this

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Speaker 3: way in every language, but in English the word drug

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Speaker 3: has a pretty rough connotation. Nowadays, we associate it with

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Speaker 3: the heartbreak of abuse and addiction. And when we hear

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Speaker 3: the word drug, a lot of us, I think it's

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Speaker 3: fair to say, immediately think of illegal narcotics, O bioids,

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Speaker 3: crack cocaine, things like that. But the real definition of

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Speaker 3: a drug is much simpler, so much so that it's

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Speaker 3: kind of unhelpful. A drug is technically, quote, any chemical

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Speaker 3: substance that affects the functioning of living things and organisms.

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Speaker 2: Okay, that sounds like a lot of stuff.

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Speaker 3: So yeah, at that point we have to ask ourselves,

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Speaker 3: if this is true, then what is not a drug

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Speaker 3: by that definition? Right?

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Speaker 2: Is right? Yeah? I mean any sugar potentially falls into that. Gosh,

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Speaker 2: I guess even guess even sodium.

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Speaker 3: Yeah, I mean sodium is a chemical substance. I mean

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Speaker 3: drug use is also one of the oldest of all

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Speaker 3: human technologies. I remember years ago we both got super

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Speaker 3: into the theory that early humans ingesting hallucinogens may have

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Speaker 3: led to the creation of religion or the breaking of

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Speaker 3: the bicameral mind.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, the evolution of the thought process that we associate

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Speaker 2: with humans may have had something to do with weird

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Speaker 2: neurological connections that were made or you know, remade or

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Speaker 2: broken apart and reconnected because of psychotropic drug use.

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Speaker 3: So cool, so cool. Can't really prove it, can't prove

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Speaker 3: it yet, but what a cool uber conspiracy. We know

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Speaker 3: we can prove that well. Before the invention of the

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Speaker 3: written word, humans around the world knew some substances had

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Speaker 3: beneficial effects and some harmful effects, which leads us to

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Speaker 3: the question people still ask today, what then, is the

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Speaker 3: difference between a good drug and a bad one. It's

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Speaker 3: a confusing question you pointed out earlier, so astuteley man,

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Speaker 3: that these even the most innocuous substances can be dangerous

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Speaker 3: or deadly and high enough doses or depending upon how

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Speaker 3: they interact with other substances, which is why you get

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Speaker 3: weird warnings about when you should or should not consume

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Speaker 3: things like grapefruits.

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Speaker 2: The thing my parents are dealing with right now. Really, yeah, grapefruits, man,

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Speaker 2: Who would.

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Speaker 3: Have thought it's the least favorite fruit for me?

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Speaker 2: Oh, I can understand why. I think there are specific

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Speaker 2: species of the grapefruit that are pretty wonderful, or you know,

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Speaker 2: versions of the grapefruit that are a little sweeter, less

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Speaker 2: obnoxious to the old taste buds.

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Speaker 3: Yeah, I'll come clean with you the reason, and lest

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Speaker 3: I seem to cast on an all grapefruit enthusiasts, do

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Speaker 3: as you will. The reason for me is probably due

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Speaker 3: to a situation where I was stuck out in this

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Speaker 3: camping compound for several weeks and we were slowly running

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Speaker 3: out of food and beverages, and the last thing left

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Speaker 3: that was not water was grapefruit juice that had clearly

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Speaker 3: gone bad in my opinion, and it was my first

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Speaker 3: time drinking grapefruit juice absolutely ruined it for me. I thought,

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Speaker 3: this is what this thing is supposed to taste like, And.

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Speaker 2: Now I mean, it tastes like that, bro, that's what

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Speaker 2: it tastes like.

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Speaker 3: That's what it tastes like. Oh boy, I was.

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Speaker 2: In a situation where my grandparents would set of my

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Speaker 2: grandparents would constantly cut open a grapefruit and then each

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Speaker 2: of them have a half in a bowl in the morning. Yeah,

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Speaker 2: it wasn't the fun kind of grapefruit. It was just

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Speaker 2: a grapefruit in dang, it's just.

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Speaker 3: Oh it wasn't one of the red ones or the Yeah,

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Speaker 3: the bruby ones. Pretty good, that's it. Yeah. Well, this idea, right,

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Speaker 3: as complicated as we can already tell it is it

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Speaker 3: arrives because drugs, again, like any other technology, they have

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Speaker 3: the same pitfalls. Right. A fire can burn a house

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Speaker 3: as easily as it can warm a house. But in

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Speaker 3: this case, with drugs, the house is you folks.

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Speaker 2: Yeah. Yeah, it's very, very, very true. And I think

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Speaker 2: maybe this specific point is let's say, a learning, a

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Speaker 2: lesson that was learned by military's governments, people who want

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Speaker 2: to be in control. Also learned by hunters early, early,

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Speaker 2: early on, that you can use a substance that might

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Speaker 2: be good for you in certain respects, or at certain

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Speaker 2: times or in certain dosages, but it can also be

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Speaker 2: deadly to an enemy or some thing you're trying to

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Speaker 2: eventually eat.

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Speaker 3: And the weirdest part is all across human civilization. In

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Speaker 3: most cases we still don't know which use. Humans figure

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Speaker 3: it out first. They say, oh, this poison is actually

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Speaker 3: a medicine, or oh, whoops, this medicine can be also

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Speaker 3: be a poison.

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Speaker 2: I want to, I want to, I want to believe.

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Speaker 2: Let's say that it was medicinal first, like right, some

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Speaker 2: kind of herbs that were discovered to or just through

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Speaker 2: testing and experimentation and word of mouth. Try this specific

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Speaker 2: herb concoction and it will actually help your stomach if

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Speaker 2: it's hurting really badly. But if you take too much

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Speaker 2: of it and apply it to an arrowhead, you're going

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Speaker 2: to make whatever you know deer or you know bison

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Speaker 2: that you're hunting, it will go down way faster.

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Speaker 3: And you'll add importantly, you'll still be able to eat it,

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Speaker 3: so it will be contaminated, right, which you can't say

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Speaker 3: for all all substances. I also, I'm with you, Ben,

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Speaker 3: I kind of like to think there is some relationship

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Speaker 3: between the belief and sympathetic magic there because someone, perhaps

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Speaker 3: someone got sick or they got cut by something and

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Speaker 3: substance entered their bloodstream, and someone said let's go back

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Speaker 3: to the you know, the scene of the crime or

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Speaker 3: the accident, and said, well, let's try a different version

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Speaker 3: of the thing that cut you, you know, because you're

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Speaker 3: going to die anyway. There's a lot of trial and error,

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Speaker 3: is what we're saying. And there's still a lot of

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Speaker 3: errors today. Recently, a collaboration that you and I did

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Speaker 3: with the folks over at Lava for Good, a panel

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Speaker 3: about the war on drugs in the US and abroad,

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Speaker 3: which is now up for a Webby. Everybody please go vote.

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Speaker 3: It'll be the first time we've gotten a Webby for

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Speaker 3: something we were on air for. Is that correct?

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Speaker 2: Maybe? Well, I don't know. Thirteen Days of Halloween I

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Speaker 2: believe won a Webby, oh, which means and I think

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Speaker 2: it was one of the season. It was definitely a

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Speaker 2: season that you wrote on. It was definitely a season

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Speaker 2: that I executive produced on. So no, we had well,

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Speaker 2: but I was not.

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Speaker 4: On Mike wells to Mike either well semi congratulations to

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Speaker 4: both of us, and also with you to check out

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Speaker 4: do check out thirteen Days as a cantel.

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Speaker 3: Matt and I really really love the work that goes

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Speaker 3: into that and it makes our day whatever people get

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Speaker 3: to experience it for the first time. But with the

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Speaker 3: social effects of drug use, right, I love that you

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Speaker 3: laid out any kind of controlling, authoritative structure has struggled

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Speaker 3: with this. Religions, governments, you name it, your favorite cult leader,

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Speaker 3: they have these policies around drug use, meaning there are

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Speaker 3: social effects. So if you live in the US, whether

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Speaker 3: or not you indulge in cannabis, you know, millions of

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Speaker 3: people get locked away for non violent drug crimes. It

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Speaker 3: ruins their lives, It sets them on a cycle of

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Speaker 3: recidivism that gets increasingly difficult to escape and increasingly expensive

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Speaker 3: to survive within. And then you know that's still better,

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Speaker 3: sadly than places in the Middle East and Southeast Asia

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Speaker 3: in particular, where a comparatively minor amount of certain narcotics

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Speaker 3: can lead to a death sentence and your home government

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Speaker 3: cannot save you. Hear us, well, Americans, your home government

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Speaker 3: cannot save you. If a country has a death penalty

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Speaker 3: for drug possession.

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Speaker 2: And you get caught with it, Yeah.

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Speaker 3: Don't do it. If you feel like you have to

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Speaker 3: have your drugs. In that case, stay home, go somewhere else.

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Speaker 2: Also, don't carry around large sums of cash with you,

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Speaker 2: especially if you're going to an airport, especially when in Atlanta.

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Speaker 3: Yes, oh nice, Yeah, shout out to Clayton English and

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Speaker 3: Eric Andre. Check out that panel, folks. There's also just

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Speaker 3: a side note here. There's also something a lot of

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Speaker 3: people don't understand. If a foreign government that has really

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Speaker 3: draconian drug policies wants to get you for possession, they

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Speaker 3: can drug test you, and having a substance in your hair,

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Speaker 3: or your bloodstream or your body will for them count

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Speaker 3: as possession.

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Speaker 2: Oh yeah, if it is in you, I suppose you

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Speaker 2: do possess it. Yeah, I don't know.

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Speaker 3: It depends on really, it depends on what they want

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Speaker 3: to do with you.

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Speaker 2: Well, it's more like it's possessing you, right, Nah.

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Speaker 3: Yeah, it depends on the substance. And this gets us

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Speaker 3: to these are all true chilling conspiracies, but it leads

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Speaker 3: us to another side of the story. A disturbing aspect

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Speaker 3: to drugs and humans that we briefly discussed but haven't

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Speaker 3: really explored fully. It's this what happens when people purposely

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Speaker 3: decide to use drugs as weapons. We're going to pause

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Speaker 3: for a word from our sponsors. We'll be right back.

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Speaker 3: We've returned. Here's where it gets crazy, man. Man, we

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Speaker 3: were just compared notes before we went on air, Matt

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Speaker 3: and I think we both yet again, we both got

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Speaker 3: super into the same two big topics and they're I

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Speaker 3: don't know, man, I'm bothered.

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Speaker 2: I don't think it's bothersome. I think this is exactly

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Speaker 2: the kind of thing this topic needs us to discuss.

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Speaker 2: Like some specific examples of when drugs were used as weapons, right,

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Speaker 2: but that are not the let's say, traditional chemical weapons

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Speaker 2: we might think of, right, Like especially chemical weapons that

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Speaker 2: are associated with World War One, mustard gas, some of

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Speaker 2: the stuff that was developed by the Nazis, some by

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Speaker 2: you know, British and American forces, but chemical weapons that

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Speaker 2: were meant to be dropped often from above and meant

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Speaker 2: to incompare state or kill enemy combatants down below. We're

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Speaker 2: talking more. When is a more medicinal drug that we

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Speaker 2: would think about when is that used or has it

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Speaker 2: been used as a weapon.

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Speaker 3: Yeah, and that's an important distinction. We know, we know

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Speaker 3: chemical warfare or drugs as weapons. We do associate it

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Speaker 3: with World War One these days with nerve gas and

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Speaker 3: uh later with VX and stuff like that. But but

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Speaker 3: again it goes back to the ancient past. In eight

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Speaker 3: one eight four BCE, Hannibal's army used Belladonna to disorient

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Speaker 3: enemy forces.

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Speaker 2: And I do what is Belladonna?

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Speaker 3: Belladonna is one of the Okay, so there's like a

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Speaker 3: Wu Tang clan of these plants that have these drugs.

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Speaker 2: Now you're gonna say, there's a member of Wu Tang

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Speaker 2: called Belladonna that I've never heard of, And I was like.

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Speaker 3: I would totally I would totally tune in it out.

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Speaker 3: It's uh, it's from the night shade family. Okay, okay,

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Speaker 3: and a lot of these things that we're going to

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Speaker 3: explore originate from the night shade family. It's if you

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Speaker 3: look at it, it's like an herb. It's a it's

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Speaker 3: a bush basically, and you can find it throughout Central

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Speaker 3: and South Eurasia. It gets pretty tall. It is toxic.

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Speaker 3: Its other name is Deadly Nightshade, Oh, to differentiate it

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Speaker 3: from the rest of the good folks at the night

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Speaker 3: Shade family.

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Speaker 2: And you said, Hannibal way back then used it as

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Speaker 2: not as a maybe lethal technique, dosing technique, but as

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Speaker 2: a disorienting thing.

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Speaker 3: Yes, And to be clear, Hannibal would have been fine

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Speaker 3: if that disorientation led to death.

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Speaker 2: Sure, sure, But in this case, it's more like make

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Speaker 2: my troops advancement more effective by disabling.

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Speaker 3: Your troops, a little like a flashbank, right in some ways.

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Speaker 3: And then I didn't know this, But there's this author,

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Speaker 3: David A. Price, who has a book called Love and

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Speaker 3: Hate and Jamestown. And in this book, which I haven't finished,

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Speaker 3: in this book, he makes a pretty fascinating case. He

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Speaker 3: says that Chief Palwaton had deployed a toxic hallucinogen against

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Speaker 3: the Jamestown colony in sixteen eleven, which I had not

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Speaker 3: heard before.

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Speaker 2: Was it bread? Was it was it that?

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Speaker 3: Er? I don't know, man, I don't know this, but

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Speaker 3: this is just These are two examples from across centuries

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Speaker 3: and continents. We also, I think you and I were

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Speaker 3: both very taken with an article about this conundrum by

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Speaker 3: a scholar named Vladimir Pitchman and his co author's name.

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Speaker 2: Yes, the co authors, Well, the co author is zd

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Speaker 2: n e. K Zeni Hahn. And there's also an academic

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Speaker 2: editor that worked on this paper, Mirta Milic.

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Speaker 3: And this paper is fascinating. It's called Drugs as Chemical Weapons,

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Speaker 3: Past and Perspectives. You can read it in full online

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Speaker 3: for free today. They make this case where they say, look,

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Speaker 3: the sources of pretty much any poison that's been deployed

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Speaker 3: by the big criminals or state powers, they've also always

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Speaker 3: been natural agents that serve as medicines. And then he says,

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Speaker 3: you know, originally the most militarily significant toxins, they were

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Speaker 3: discovered as a byproduct of pharmaceutical research most for most

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Speaker 3: of history. It wasn't until pretty recently that governments started saying,

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Speaker 3: let's make bad stuff on purpose.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, let's have an R and D department that specifically

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Speaker 2: tries to figure out the most toxic, dangerous chemicals or

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Speaker 2: just natural substances that we can then synthesize with a

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Speaker 2: new thing that's exactly the same chemical combination, or we

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Speaker 2: can concentrate and combine to make something that just makes

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Speaker 2: you dead.

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Speaker 3: Yeah, drugs are a dual use technology now that we

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Speaker 3: think about it, aren't they. And then, of course there's

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Speaker 3: that lovely, lovely phase that so many governments went through

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Speaker 3: several decades back, where they would find nifty unfamiliar substances

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Speaker 3: and then say, hey, what does this do? Let's just

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Speaker 3: you know, let's fa fo Yeah, but what it do?

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Speaker 2: Though? You know what I mean?

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Speaker 3: What shout out to mk ultra, shout out to the

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Speaker 3: CIA's weird phase with LSD when they were literally just

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Speaker 3: dosing the snot out of each other.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, yeah, hey, let's just we can't recommend this article

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Speaker 2: enough because there was a huge list that Ben and

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Speaker 2: I were discussing off air that it shows what we

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Speaker 2: were talking about early on here arrowhead toxins that were

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Speaker 2: also used as for medicinal purposes by indigenous groups across

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Speaker 2: the world. It is really great, Like, it's really great

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Speaker 2: and worth your time. We decided that we cannot pronounce

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Speaker 2: effectively most of the words that I decided I decided

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Speaker 2: that I can't pronounce.

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Speaker 3: We can make an attempt, but we're not going to

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Speaker 3: nail a lot of these because we are not chemists.

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Speaker 2: But yes, but do look it up because it's very fascinating.

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Speaker 2: It goes across I think it's every continent that it hits.

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Speaker 2: Where here is a series of medicinal herbs that were

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Speaker 2: also used as offensive weapons.

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Speaker 3: Yeah, and here's the good thing that people learned to

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Speaker 3: do with this stuff, like treat skin problems or fungal infections,

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Speaker 3: and then they found out they could also poison animals

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Speaker 3: and yeah, I don't know. I mean also, you know,

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Speaker 3: if you fast forward to the modern day, there's one

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Speaker 3: story that we have to share that captivated both of

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Speaker 3: us because we were saying, you know, to that earlier

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Speaker 3: distinction you made. We were saying, let's find a case

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Speaker 3: where someone took not like a not mustard gas, not

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Speaker 3: a nerve agent, but what you would consider a quote

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Speaker 3: unquote regular drug, and let's see when they used it

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Speaker 3: offensively on purpose in the modern day. That takes us

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Speaker 3: to Russia in October of two thousand and two at

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Speaker 3: the Moscow Ball Bearing Plants Palace of Culture.

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Speaker 2: It's also known as the Dubrovka Theater in Moscow, and

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Speaker 2: this is well, there was something that was showing that

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Speaker 2: night according to the BBC. I'm just going to cite

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Speaker 2: this article, Ben so people can find it if they

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Speaker 2: want to. There's a BBC article from October twenty fourth,

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Speaker 2: twenty twelve titled Moscow Theater siege Questions Remain Unanswered, which

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Speaker 2: is written ten years after this thing we're talking about

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Speaker 2: that happened in two thousand and two, and it gives

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Speaker 2: us a little bit of context. But what we need

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Speaker 2: to know is that there is a show going on them,

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Speaker 2: a musical going on at this huge theater in Moscow,

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Speaker 2: when it is stormed by a bunch of people.

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Speaker 3: Yeah, so later results will find that nine hundred and

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Speaker 3: twelve people or so we're in the audience and they're

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Speaker 3: watching that musical you're describing, nord Ost and I think

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Speaker 3: they're just moving. They're relatively early into the show. I

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Speaker 3: think they're in the second act maybe. And these terrorists

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Speaker 3: male and female, identified members of the Chechen army. Some

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Speaker 3: of them have explosives strapped to their body, and they

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Speaker 3: have one demand, and it is the typical demand of

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Speaker 3: Chechen separatist groups, or as Russia will call them, Chechen

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Speaker 3: separatist groups. They say, Russia, withdraw all of your military

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Speaker 3: forces immediately, all of your state forces, free Chechnya. And

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Speaker 3: this was a common demand. This withdrawal because Russian forces

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Speaker 3: had been occupying Chechnya had left, had come back, and

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Speaker 3: for fifty seven hours it was a brutal standoff. We

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Speaker 3: know that two of the hostages died sometime in that

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Speaker 3: fifty seven hours, but the Russian authorities were at a loss.

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Speaker 3: They had the place surrounded. These terrorists were not going

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Speaker 3: to make it out one way or the other.

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Speaker 2: Well, and there, let's say there were there were at

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Speaker 2: least forty militant yes, or you know, people who were

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Speaker 2: in there as the hostage takers who were controlling the

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Speaker 2: nine hundred and twelve people who were hostages. So if

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Speaker 2: you just imagine a huge theater that number of people

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Speaker 2: and then think about strategies of going in and stopping

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Speaker 2: the situation, if you're going to do it by four yeah, yeah,

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Speaker 2: I imagine those Russian forces strategizing and you know, a

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Speaker 2: room of people trying to come up with the best way,

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Speaker 2: and what do they come up with?

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Speaker 3: They came up with what you might call a very

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Speaker 3: Russian solution to the problem. Right, if they attempt to

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Speaker 3: breach this facility occupied by a small basically a militia,

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Speaker 3: they would lose most people before before they could rescue hostages.

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Speaker 3: So their solution is novel, it's innovative, it is incredibly ruthless.

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Speaker 3: They pump what is first described as an unknown gas

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Speaker 3: into the building, and they pump a lot of it

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Speaker 3: in nearly all of the terrorists and hostages fall unconscious

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Speaker 3: immediately or die.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, and well, at least according to BBC News and

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Speaker 2: people reporting on it at the time, there was no

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Speaker 2: warning given to anybody that this gas, this subs since

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Speaker 2: whatever it was was going to be deployed, and they

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Speaker 2: didn't even warn like some of the first responders that

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Speaker 2: were immediately outside of the facility. So and it was

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Speaker 2: leaking outside of the facility and affecting people that were nearby.

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Speaker 3: Yeah, you're just some guy at you know, the sandwich

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Speaker 3: shop next door.

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Speaker 2: Well, yeah, we're a fireman or you know, just first

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Speaker 2: respond exactly who's outside and there's some kind of weird

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Speaker 2: smoke looking stuff coming out of like some of the

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Speaker 2: ventilation or the side of the building, and it's affecting you.

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Speaker 2: And how did they describe it at the time after

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Speaker 2: they they because they acknowledged it like hours and hours

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Speaker 2: later that they released some kind of gas.

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Speaker 3: Yeah, yeah, you're just saying how did the international news

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Speaker 3: or how.

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Speaker 2: Did the expression authorities acknowledge that they even gassed people?

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Speaker 1: Oh?

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Speaker 3: Oh, do you have the quote? I think BBC as

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Speaker 3: this one.

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Speaker 2: Well, according to this BBC News article by Artem Kretschetnikov,

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Speaker 2: he is saying that public health services were not warned

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Speaker 2: in advance that this type of I don't know measure

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Speaker 2: would be used releasing a gas into this huge building.

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Speaker 2: Police did not clear the nearby streets of any parked vehicles.

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Speaker 2: Ambulances arrived on the scene an hour and a half

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Speaker 2: after the operation began, and again this gas was still

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Speaker 2: it wasn't being dispersed actively, but it was still dispersing

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Speaker 2: out of the building.

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Speaker 3: Yeah. The phrase they would use is an aerosol anesthetic

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Speaker 3: later when they explained this. But for a lot of

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Speaker 3: the surviving hostages, we see that they originally thought there

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Speaker 3: was smoke from a fire somewhere else. Yes, because it

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Speaker 3: was pumped through the AC system.

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Speaker 2: And then the authorities I found it been. The authorities

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Speaker 2: didn't acknowledge it until eight hours later that they even

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Speaker 2: did that.

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Speaker 3: And as oh, okay, we'll see why that was sort

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Speaker 3: of a dick move.

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Speaker 2: Oh, and they didn't say what gas it was, and.

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Speaker 3: They did not see what gas it was. Later, the

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Speaker 3: Russian Health Minister Yuri Shivchenko would say that this gas

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Speaker 3: is based on fentanyl. What this means is that the

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Speaker 3: gas was later found to contain car fentinyl opioi, ten

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Speaker 3: thousand times more powerful than morphine, about one hundred times

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Speaker 3: more powerful than fentanyl, which is already very scary stuff.

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Speaker 3: It's rippen through various parts of the world like a

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Speaker 3: natural disaster. But I guess we should also point out,

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Speaker 3: now we're talking about this off air, do we still

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Speaker 3: have to smack in allegedly on this one.

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Speaker 2: I guess we probably should. There have been some court

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Speaker 2: cases associated with this because one hundred and thirty hostages

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Speaker 2: died during this operation. One hundred and thirty. Of those

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Speaker 2: nine one hundred and twelve. Many of them died at

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Speaker 2: the hands of, you know, allegedly the hostage takers, at

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Speaker 2: least according to the reports. But some of them died

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Speaker 2: from the effects of the gas, some of them pretty

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Speaker 2: soon after it was released and others days after it

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Speaker 2: was released.

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Speaker 3: Oh yeah, here's a terrifying quote from an author named

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Speaker 3: David Sadder in his book The Less You Know, the

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Speaker 3: Better You sleep. He studies Russia extensively for the Hudson Institution.

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Speaker 2: Can we just say that quote is amazing. The less

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Speaker 2: you know, the better you sleep.

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Speaker 3: Yeah. Yeah, and that's not even the full title of

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Speaker 3: the book, but yeah, but we went with the bangor part.

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Speaker 3: So here's the quote. Here's a quote from Sader's book

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Speaker 3: and talks about how when after the breach, after the

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Speaker 3: authorities deployed the gas and breached the theater, they just

436
00:26:40,600 --> 00:26:43,679
Speaker 3: started dragging folks out, and they did not discriminate between

437
00:26:43,680 --> 00:26:47,000
Speaker 3: the hostages and the terrorists, or excuse me, the hostage takers,

438
00:26:47,560 --> 00:26:50,720
Speaker 3: nor the living and the dead. They just piled them

439
00:26:50,720 --> 00:26:54,000
Speaker 3: all up like firewood in buses and cars, and Sadder

440
00:26:54,080 --> 00:26:57,520
Speaker 3: says they were bodies were piled on top of another

441
00:26:57,800 --> 00:27:01,440
Speaker 3: each other outside the theater entrance, no attempt to separate

442
00:27:01,480 --> 00:27:04,680
Speaker 3: the living from the dead. A well known songwriter died

443
00:27:05,240 --> 00:27:09,679
Speaker 3: after spending seven hours alive in a bus packed with corpses.

444
00:27:10,480 --> 00:27:17,919
Speaker 3: Godly thirteen year old girl was also crushed beneath a

445
00:27:18,000 --> 00:27:21,520
Speaker 3: mass of hostages in a mini bus died on the

446
00:27:21,520 --> 00:27:22,440
Speaker 3: way to the hospital.

447
00:27:23,119 --> 00:27:29,239
Speaker 2: Geez, well, let's talk about why this is so messed up,

448
00:27:29,240 --> 00:27:31,960
Speaker 2: Why the tactic itself was messed up to just release

449
00:27:32,080 --> 00:27:37,600
Speaker 2: gas at whatever concentration it was at into a massive

450
00:27:37,800 --> 00:27:41,240
Speaker 2: area with a huge group of people, because no matter

451
00:27:41,280 --> 00:27:44,719
Speaker 2: what that substance was, whether it was carfentanyl or some

452
00:27:44,760 --> 00:27:48,600
Speaker 2: other fentanyl derivative or some other sleeping gas as they

453
00:27:48,760 --> 00:27:54,520
Speaker 2: called it, you are dosing everybody with the same amount. Right.

454
00:27:54,960 --> 00:27:57,760
Speaker 2: And as we know, when you go to the doctor

455
00:27:57,760 --> 00:28:00,080
Speaker 2: and you get prescribed a medicine of any kind, and

456
00:28:00,640 --> 00:28:04,200
Speaker 2: they look at your weight, right, your height, you're sometimes

457
00:28:04,240 --> 00:28:06,919
Speaker 2: your BMI, which is a flawed thing anyway, but you

458
00:28:06,960 --> 00:28:08,480
Speaker 2: know your body mass.

459
00:28:08,280 --> 00:28:10,840
Speaker 3: Index, other medications you might be taking.

460
00:28:10,800 --> 00:28:15,600
Speaker 2: Yes, your age, right. The everything goes into account for

461
00:28:15,680 --> 00:28:18,320
Speaker 2: how much of a certain medicine you are supposed to

462
00:28:18,320 --> 00:28:22,440
Speaker 2: be getting, what dosage. In this case, they dosed everybody

463
00:28:22,480 --> 00:28:27,560
Speaker 2: with the same amount with the hope of disabling like

464
00:28:28,040 --> 00:28:30,760
Speaker 2: grown men with Kalishnikov's.

465
00:28:30,440 --> 00:28:32,040
Speaker 3: Right and suicide bombers.

466
00:28:32,440 --> 00:28:36,679
Speaker 2: Yes, so they're going you gotta think they're going for

467
00:28:36,800 --> 00:28:37,960
Speaker 2: an od effect.

468
00:28:38,920 --> 00:28:44,040
Speaker 3: Yes, yeah, And then there is some brutal calculus that

469
00:28:44,080 --> 00:28:46,840
Speaker 3: we can unfortunately understand. Right, we don't have to agree

470
00:28:46,880 --> 00:28:49,280
Speaker 3: with what they did, but we can understand where they

471
00:28:49,280 --> 00:28:54,120
Speaker 3: were coming from because it was from their perspective, it

472
00:28:54,240 --> 00:28:58,680
Speaker 3: was a at least in the official narrative, they were saying, Look,

473
00:28:59,400 --> 00:29:03,200
Speaker 3: we can try traditional methods and lose all of them

474
00:29:03,440 --> 00:29:06,800
Speaker 3: and probably quite a few of our own officers, or

475
00:29:08,320 --> 00:29:11,120
Speaker 3: we can try to save some knowing that some of

476
00:29:11,160 --> 00:29:14,200
Speaker 3: these hostages will die, you know, because again it's almost

477
00:29:14,240 --> 00:29:15,160
Speaker 3: a thousand people.

478
00:29:15,440 --> 00:29:18,520
Speaker 2: Yeah, we're gonna save some people. That's the thought, right.

479
00:29:19,040 --> 00:29:22,320
Speaker 3: Well, if that was the thought, however, and we could

480
00:29:22,360 --> 00:29:25,680
Speaker 3: even we could make an entire episode about this theater situation,

481
00:29:25,880 --> 00:29:28,640
Speaker 3: because there's a lot going on under the surface. But

482
00:29:28,800 --> 00:29:33,800
Speaker 3: if that was indeed their thought, then why did they

483
00:29:34,320 --> 00:29:37,840
Speaker 3: refuse to reveal what they had dosed the theater with?

484
00:29:38,200 --> 00:29:41,680
Speaker 3: Because in those eight hours it took them to reveal

485
00:29:42,080 --> 00:29:47,200
Speaker 3: the actual ingredients of the drug they weaponized. Doctors were

486
00:29:47,280 --> 00:29:50,640
Speaker 3: losing patients in the hospital because you have to know

487
00:29:50,720 --> 00:29:54,440
Speaker 3: what happened to someone to treat them. So they're scrambling,

488
00:29:54,640 --> 00:29:57,520
Speaker 3: and we cannot praise these doctors highly enough. They're in

489
00:29:57,520 --> 00:30:02,160
Speaker 3: a terrible situation. It's a ticking imbomb, and they're going

490
00:30:02,200 --> 00:30:06,160
Speaker 3: through one antidote or treatment or cure after another. They

491
00:30:06,400 --> 00:30:09,800
Speaker 3: finally scramble lot. I think it was uh NOTx alone.

492
00:30:10,000 --> 00:30:12,640
Speaker 2: Oh yeah, like the stuff that you save someone who

493
00:30:12,720 --> 00:30:14,680
Speaker 2: is overdosing on an opioid.

494
00:30:14,440 --> 00:30:17,960
Speaker 3: Right, yes, yeah, that's stuff. And all of the hostage

495
00:30:17,960 --> 00:30:21,200
Speaker 3: takers did die. One hundred and thirty or so of

496
00:30:21,240 --> 00:30:24,320
Speaker 3: the hostages died, and most of the hostages who died

497
00:30:25,280 --> 00:30:30,160
Speaker 3: was a result of the terrorism. For the hostage takers,

498
00:30:30,200 --> 00:30:32,320
Speaker 3: it was a result of the gas that the Russian

499
00:30:32,360 --> 00:30:33,240
Speaker 3: government deployed.

500
00:30:33,600 --> 00:30:37,640
Speaker 2: Yeah, we don't know the exact details, which is a problem.

501
00:30:37,760 --> 00:30:40,720
Speaker 2: Right Again, this has gone to trial. There's been examinations

502
00:30:40,920 --> 00:30:45,400
Speaker 2: of this, like what happened there with some conclusions that

503
00:30:45,480 --> 00:30:50,560
Speaker 2: feel more concrete than others. But definitely the forty people. Well,

504
00:30:50,600 --> 00:30:54,200
Speaker 2: and let's say thirty nine of the people that were

505
00:30:54,440 --> 00:30:58,000
Speaker 2: hostage takers were killed either by being shot, after being

506
00:30:58,040 --> 00:31:01,040
Speaker 2: disabled or whatever. But there's one guy who ended up

507
00:31:01,040 --> 00:31:04,280
Speaker 2: having to stand trial for this, literally one human being

508
00:31:04,320 --> 00:31:06,160
Speaker 2: out of the forty Oh that's right, he made it

509
00:31:06,160 --> 00:31:10,760
Speaker 2: out alive that had to stand trial. But then the

510
00:31:10,960 --> 00:31:13,160
Speaker 2: you know, the rest of the families of the other people,

511
00:31:13,280 --> 00:31:16,120
Speaker 2: specifically the one hundred and thirty that died, were left

512
00:31:16,120 --> 00:31:17,720
Speaker 2: with so many questions trying to figure out what the

513
00:31:17,720 --> 00:31:19,959
Speaker 2: heck happened, and what do you do now? Like, what

514
00:31:20,000 --> 00:31:21,720
Speaker 2: do we do now? Yeah?

515
00:31:21,760 --> 00:31:27,000
Speaker 3: What about when leven Letvigneko said later that some of

516
00:31:27,040 --> 00:31:31,920
Speaker 3: these hostage takers or Chechen militants were working for the FSB,

517
00:31:32,440 --> 00:31:32,640
Speaker 3: you know.

518
00:31:33,280 --> 00:31:36,680
Speaker 2: See, Yeah, well, we don't want to focus too much

519
00:31:36,680 --> 00:31:40,400
Speaker 2: on this, but how did the Chechen rebels get into Moscow?

520
00:31:40,640 --> 00:31:45,360
Speaker 2: One hundred kilograms of explosives, one hundred hand grenades, three

521
00:31:45,480 --> 00:31:49,920
Speaker 2: what they call heavy bombs, and eighteen ak assault rifles

522
00:31:50,680 --> 00:31:52,640
Speaker 2: and twenty pistols by the way, but how did they

523
00:31:52,800 --> 00:31:55,080
Speaker 2: get into the country and threw all the checkpoints and

524
00:31:55,160 --> 00:31:58,200
Speaker 2: into the heart of Moscow to take like to make

525
00:31:58,240 --> 00:31:59,080
Speaker 2: this attack happen?

526
00:31:59,600 --> 00:32:02,760
Speaker 3: And how okay? And also what about the signals that

527
00:32:02,840 --> 00:32:06,880
Speaker 3: the Chechens were sending out pretty blatantly in the month's

528
00:32:06,920 --> 00:32:10,000
Speaker 3: leading Okay, you're right, you're right. We'll have to do

529
00:32:10,040 --> 00:32:14,600
Speaker 3: an episode because otherwise we're just okay, all right, maybe Matt,

530
00:32:14,600 --> 00:32:16,720
Speaker 3: what about this? Should we take an ad break and

531
00:32:16,760 --> 00:32:20,280
Speaker 3: get to another drug as a weapon? Uh?

532
00:32:20,400 --> 00:32:21,000
Speaker 2: Yeah, please?

533
00:32:27,960 --> 00:32:32,320
Speaker 3: And we have returned. I believe this is what originally

534
00:32:32,520 --> 00:32:39,120
Speaker 3: inspired this episode. This evening, Matt, on a previous strange

535
00:32:39,280 --> 00:32:44,800
Speaker 3: news you had shared an intensely disturbing story of criminals

536
00:32:45,160 --> 00:32:51,280
Speaker 3: operating in the Atlanta area and drugging partygoers with something.

537
00:32:52,480 --> 00:32:58,560
Speaker 2: Yeah, gosh it, it's unknown right now what drug was

538
00:32:58,680 --> 00:33:02,520
Speaker 2: used in these specific attacks. There were also attacks in

539
00:33:02,560 --> 00:33:06,840
Speaker 2: New York City that were very, very similar with substances.

540
00:33:06,880 --> 00:33:11,760
Speaker 2: Whatever the substance is, it was, it was used to

541
00:33:11,800 --> 00:33:16,880
Speaker 2: make someone seem extremely intoxicated and lose consciousness at some

542
00:33:17,000 --> 00:33:21,640
Speaker 2: point or to some extent, and also become extremely what

543
00:33:21,720 --> 00:33:22,280
Speaker 2: word would you.

544
00:33:22,360 --> 00:33:24,560
Speaker 3: Use, suggestible, compliant.

545
00:33:24,800 --> 00:33:27,040
Speaker 2: That's it. That's what it is, Just going along with

546
00:33:27,160 --> 00:33:30,320
Speaker 2: things like everything's okay, but not having all of your

547
00:33:30,320 --> 00:33:31,760
Speaker 2: faculties anymore.

548
00:33:32,080 --> 00:33:35,880
Speaker 3: Yeah. Yeah, And this prompted a conversation that we've had

549
00:33:35,920 --> 00:33:40,240
Speaker 3: with many of our fellow conspiracy realists via email via

550
00:33:40,360 --> 00:33:44,440
Speaker 3: the various waging contact us like our call in line,

551
00:33:45,040 --> 00:33:48,160
Speaker 3: and a lot of us were bringing up a substance

552
00:33:48,400 --> 00:33:52,000
Speaker 3: made from the Torah seeds are also derived from the

553
00:33:52,200 --> 00:33:57,400
Speaker 3: nightshade family, called scopolamine s C O P O L

554
00:33:57,440 --> 00:34:00,640
Speaker 3: A M I N E. It is way more fun

555
00:34:01,560 --> 00:34:04,520
Speaker 3: to sound out that word than it is to take

556
00:34:04,560 --> 00:34:05,280
Speaker 3: that substance.

557
00:34:05,840 --> 00:34:08,160
Speaker 2: Yeah, it's called the most dangerous drug in the world,

558
00:34:09,760 --> 00:34:12,400
Speaker 2: and it's also used it's called in other place in

559
00:34:12,440 --> 00:34:17,480
Speaker 2: the Zombie Drug and Devil's Breath. Yeah, it's got all

560
00:34:17,560 --> 00:34:21,840
Speaker 2: kinds of words, specifically because of the way it was deployed. Gosh,

561
00:34:21,840 --> 00:34:24,560
Speaker 2: where was that ben We heard about it being deployed

562
00:34:24,560 --> 00:34:26,920
Speaker 2: in several countries where it was made into a powder

563
00:34:27,120 --> 00:34:29,080
Speaker 2: that was then blown into somebody's face.

564
00:34:29,320 --> 00:34:34,400
Speaker 3: Yeah, Columbia was big for that, parts of other parts

565
00:34:34,440 --> 00:34:39,840
Speaker 3: of the region, like Ecuador. Yeah, but the substances like

566
00:34:39,880 --> 00:34:43,160
Speaker 3: this can be derived from a lot of different forms

567
00:34:43,200 --> 00:34:48,760
Speaker 3: of the night shade family, and you can find scopolamine

568
00:34:48,960 --> 00:34:55,360
Speaker 3: in things like man drake, angels, trumpet, h main plants

569
00:34:55,440 --> 00:34:57,239
Speaker 3: to be honest, that I would not be able to

570
00:34:57,280 --> 00:34:58,680
Speaker 3: readily identify in the wild.

571
00:34:58,800 --> 00:35:02,120
Speaker 2: Yeah, but this specific plant is detura, right, That's the one.

572
00:35:02,239 --> 00:35:04,120
Speaker 2: We had people writing to us after we had that

573
00:35:04,160 --> 00:35:08,520
Speaker 2: discussion on Strange News talking about Detura and the seeds

574
00:35:08,680 --> 00:35:09,480
Speaker 2: from that plant.

575
00:35:09,600 --> 00:35:12,719
Speaker 3: Old Jimson Weed. He's another name for it, which is

576
00:35:12,760 --> 00:35:17,960
Speaker 3: way more innocuous, Jimson weed. Jimson Weed sounds like a

577
00:35:18,080 --> 00:35:21,480
Speaker 3: character in a Wild West story that we would make up,

578
00:35:22,080 --> 00:35:22,279
Speaker 3: you know.

579
00:35:22,560 --> 00:35:24,760
Speaker 2: Yeah, I like him. If he's a little bit older.

580
00:35:25,000 --> 00:35:27,720
Speaker 2: He's been around for a long time. Old Jimson Weed.

581
00:35:31,040 --> 00:35:32,200
Speaker 2: He's seen it all, you know.

582
00:35:35,000 --> 00:35:38,360
Speaker 3: Okay, we needed that levity, but yeah, maybe we should

583
00:35:38,360 --> 00:35:41,400
Speaker 3: write that, maybe we should use the character Jimson Weed

584
00:35:41,680 --> 00:35:46,239
Speaker 3: into it. He always he's always vaguely surprised.

585
00:35:47,440 --> 00:35:48,120
Speaker 2: He's got a dog.

586
00:35:49,320 --> 00:35:52,879
Speaker 3: So all right, Each of these plants, as Jimson can

587
00:35:52,920 --> 00:35:55,920
Speaker 3: assure you, will have a long history in the spiritual

588
00:35:55,960 --> 00:35:59,560
Speaker 3: practices of indigenous cultures around the world. Like they're not

589
00:36:00,440 --> 00:36:04,680
Speaker 3: universally considered demonic, insidious, or bad. I was surprised to

590
00:36:04,760 --> 00:36:10,040
Speaker 3: learn the name Daturah comes from India because thed torah metal,

591
00:36:10,200 --> 00:36:14,400
Speaker 3: a related plant, is considered to be a sacred favorite

592
00:36:14,400 --> 00:36:16,200
Speaker 3: plant of the god Shiva.

593
00:36:16,400 --> 00:36:23,400
Speaker 2: Oh cool, Am I wrong? Isn't Shiva like the creator destroyer?

594
00:36:24,200 --> 00:36:25,000
Speaker 3: Yeah? No, you're right.

595
00:36:25,239 --> 00:36:29,360
Speaker 2: Okay, yeah, that's interesting. Isn't that interesting? Creator and destroyer?

596
00:36:30,280 --> 00:36:33,719
Speaker 3: Uh yeah the uh? I think Sheiva is the destroyer

597
00:36:34,040 --> 00:36:34,960
Speaker 3: of trinity?

598
00:36:35,520 --> 00:36:36,560
Speaker 2: Oh okay cool?

599
00:36:37,680 --> 00:36:44,480
Speaker 3: Who yes, yeah, yeah, exactly. No, No, you're right, because

600
00:36:44,600 --> 00:36:51,840
Speaker 3: Shiva creates the universe, but that is also the destroyer

601
00:36:52,000 --> 00:36:54,520
Speaker 3: in the trimurty, the Hindu trinity.

602
00:36:54,600 --> 00:36:56,799
Speaker 2: Look, man, I'm just going off of these weird little

603
00:36:56,800 --> 00:36:59,319
Speaker 2: impulses that are bouncing around my brain of things I

604
00:36:59,360 --> 00:37:02,760
Speaker 2: may have read once and so I have no idea.

605
00:37:02,800 --> 00:37:04,320
Speaker 2: I need to bone up on my Shiva.

606
00:37:04,440 --> 00:37:06,880
Speaker 3: Dude, we should go to We should go to BAPS.

607
00:37:08,040 --> 00:37:09,400
Speaker 2: Oh, I would love to go there. We should go

608
00:37:09,480 --> 00:37:10,800
Speaker 2: do some stuff, talk to some people.

609
00:37:11,280 --> 00:37:13,360
Speaker 3: Yeah, let's actually, let's make a day of it.

610
00:37:13,440 --> 00:37:13,920
Speaker 2: Let's see it.

611
00:37:15,120 --> 00:37:17,560
Speaker 3: We are very lucky here in the fair metropolis of

612
00:37:17,600 --> 00:37:25,000
Speaker 3: Atlanta to have some to have a collection of holy places, watts, temples,

613
00:37:25,120 --> 00:37:30,120
Speaker 3: and monasteries even and BAPS is a Hindu temple with

614
00:37:30,239 --> 00:37:34,759
Speaker 3: quite a story behind it. And lest we sound, lest

615
00:37:34,800 --> 00:37:38,480
Speaker 3: we sound like we're, you know, super fancy guys or something, Matt,

616
00:37:38,520 --> 00:37:40,360
Speaker 3: the reason I want to go to the temple is

617
00:37:40,360 --> 00:37:42,120
Speaker 3: I want to go back to the gift shop again

618
00:37:42,440 --> 00:37:45,839
Speaker 3: because they have comic books about Shiva. Oh cool, Yeah,

619
00:37:45,880 --> 00:37:46,600
Speaker 3: they're really cool.

620
00:37:47,719 --> 00:37:52,239
Speaker 2: And temples too, Yeah, exactly. What's a good way for

621
00:37:52,280 --> 00:37:53,600
Speaker 2: people to find if you want to look it up,

622
00:37:53,680 --> 00:37:57,800
Speaker 2: just b a PS Atlanta is probably the only search

623
00:37:57,880 --> 00:38:00,800
Speaker 2: terms you need to be able to find this amazing place.

624
00:38:01,000 --> 00:38:05,320
Speaker 3: Maybe BAPS Atlanta Hindu. There you go, just to be safe,

625
00:38:05,320 --> 00:38:08,239
Speaker 3: but that'll lead you to BAPS. Sri swam and Ari

626
00:38:08,400 --> 00:38:13,320
Speaker 3: on Mandir coumples are called mandas. It's in Lilburn, Georgia.

627
00:38:13,440 --> 00:38:15,680
Speaker 3: So if you happen to have some time in Atlanta

628
00:38:15,680 --> 00:38:18,480
Speaker 3: and you want to see something cool, then do check

629
00:38:18,560 --> 00:38:19,160
Speaker 3: that out.

630
00:38:19,440 --> 00:38:23,719
Speaker 2: Like astounding and unexpected, like yeah, when you behold it

631
00:38:23,760 --> 00:38:25,879
Speaker 2: and you're like, wait, where am I? How did this?

632
00:38:26,120 --> 00:38:29,440
Speaker 3: Why? What? They've got a great vegetarian restaurant on the ground.

633
00:38:29,520 --> 00:38:33,279
Speaker 3: All they ask is that you don't bring meat or

634
00:38:33,400 --> 00:38:37,400
Speaker 3: leather products into the grounds, which I think is very reasonable.

635
00:38:37,520 --> 00:38:39,960
Speaker 3: But it's such a trip to find it because directly

636
00:38:39,960 --> 00:38:42,520
Speaker 3: across the street there's a subway.

637
00:38:43,920 --> 00:38:45,759
Speaker 2: Well, thank goodness, there are least sandwiches.

638
00:38:46,560 --> 00:38:49,880
Speaker 3: I always remember that because pre internet days, I was

639
00:38:50,480 --> 00:38:55,280
Speaker 3: attempting to find this for some unrelated research and meeting

640
00:38:55,360 --> 00:38:59,400
Speaker 3: some folks, and I didn't have like GPS, So I

641
00:38:59,680 --> 00:39:02,200
Speaker 3: stopped a gas station asked for directions and the guy

642
00:39:02,280 --> 00:39:05,040
Speaker 3: told me, well, you know where the subway is right

643
00:39:06,160 --> 00:39:08,279
Speaker 3: and told me to just drive to the subway and

644
00:39:08,320 --> 00:39:11,000
Speaker 3: take a left or something. Anyway, it doesn't matter. Check out,

645
00:39:11,280 --> 00:39:13,399
Speaker 3: check this out. What you need to know from this

646
00:39:14,040 --> 00:39:18,600
Speaker 3: conversation is that these drugs do, or these substances these

647
00:39:18,600 --> 00:39:24,800
Speaker 3: plants do, again have a deep religious history, right, medicine

648
00:39:24,840 --> 00:39:27,399
Speaker 3: for the mind, you could say, But in the modern day,

649
00:39:27,680 --> 00:39:30,000
Speaker 3: you're not gonna hear a lot about that. You're gonna

650
00:39:30,080 --> 00:39:34,200
Speaker 3: much more often hear about the torah and the tore

651
00:39:34,320 --> 00:39:39,200
Speaker 3: seeds and scopolamine being used in crime. And that's where like,

652
00:39:39,480 --> 00:39:42,399
Speaker 3: that's where they have a little paper thing and they

653
00:39:42,719 --> 00:39:45,720
Speaker 3: blow the dust in your face in Columbia or also

654
00:39:46,480 --> 00:39:48,920
Speaker 3: lace it on a cigarette. Because it just takes a

655
00:39:48,960 --> 00:39:49,960
Speaker 3: little bit of this stuff.

656
00:39:50,320 --> 00:39:55,279
Speaker 2: Oh that's really scary. Yeah, any well, I guess it's

657
00:39:55,320 --> 00:39:57,920
Speaker 2: true for so many drugs. But any drug or substance

658
00:39:57,920 --> 00:40:00,640
Speaker 2: that you can just slip into something like that or dose,

659
00:40:01,200 --> 00:40:04,839
Speaker 2: you know, another thing that you're going to take in

660
00:40:04,920 --> 00:40:08,400
Speaker 2: either either by inhaling or drinking that that is just

661
00:40:08,560 --> 00:40:13,480
Speaker 2: super freaky because it is somewhat or mostly invisible, yeah.

662
00:40:13,520 --> 00:40:19,759
Speaker 3: Tasteless, odorless, it's and it's just a couple sniffs and

663
00:40:19,800 --> 00:40:25,480
Speaker 3: then the effects are severe, virtually immediate, and to the

664
00:40:25,719 --> 00:40:31,279
Speaker 3: unsuspecting bystander, the effects are invisible. Yikes, you're not you know,

665
00:40:31,719 --> 00:40:34,640
Speaker 3: you're not like Hunter S. Thompson on ether in Vegas

666
00:40:34,760 --> 00:40:39,319
Speaker 3: or something, waving around like a cartoon inflatable guy at

667
00:40:39,360 --> 00:40:42,040
Speaker 3: a car shop car shop.

668
00:40:42,640 --> 00:40:46,000
Speaker 2: Yeah. No, you may just seem intoxicated, right, And when

669
00:40:46,239 --> 00:40:49,080
Speaker 2: this drug is applied to someone who is let's say,

670
00:40:49,080 --> 00:40:51,200
Speaker 2: in a bar or coming out of a bar where

671
00:40:51,280 --> 00:40:54,120
Speaker 2: had just you know, been having drinks or smoking a

672
00:40:54,120 --> 00:40:57,920
Speaker 2: little whatever with some friends, that it may appear completely

673
00:40:57,960 --> 00:41:00,600
Speaker 2: normal and just the mild effects of what whatever other

674
00:41:00,680 --> 00:41:02,920
Speaker 2: substance they were in taking.

675
00:41:03,560 --> 00:41:09,840
Speaker 3: Yeah, but the criminals will know what's going on beneath

676
00:41:09,880 --> 00:41:12,840
Speaker 3: the surface, and they have deployed this drug as a

677
00:41:12,880 --> 00:41:17,400
Speaker 3: weapon because it makes people so incredibly suggestible to a

678
00:41:17,480 --> 00:41:21,040
Speaker 3: zombie level of compliance. They can walk around on their

679
00:41:21,080 --> 00:41:24,759
Speaker 3: own power. But if you say, hey, let's go to

680
00:41:24,840 --> 00:41:28,799
Speaker 3: the ATM, put your card in the ATM, or give

681
00:41:28,840 --> 00:41:31,600
Speaker 3: me your card and your pin number and then withdraw

682
00:41:31,600 --> 00:41:34,520
Speaker 3: as much as you can, they'll say, oh yeah, okay.

683
00:41:34,680 --> 00:41:38,040
Speaker 2: Sure, sure, let's do it. And then you found an

684
00:41:38,120 --> 00:41:42,719
Speaker 2: article here from GlobalPost dot Ca. Why don't you tell

685
00:41:42,800 --> 00:41:43,359
Speaker 2: us about that?

686
00:41:43,719 --> 00:41:47,960
Speaker 3: Yeah, So we go to a toxicologist, an expert on

687
00:41:48,000 --> 00:41:51,239
Speaker 3: this drug in particular, who points out several things. The

688
00:41:51,360 --> 00:41:54,600
Speaker 3: effect can last for more than twenty four hours, and

689
00:41:56,680 --> 00:42:00,920
Speaker 3: if someone is somehow still not fully compliant, then the

690
00:42:01,000 --> 00:42:05,000
Speaker 3: criminals may dose them again. And if you have a

691
00:42:05,280 --> 00:42:08,840
Speaker 3: large enough dose of this drug, usually delivered in like

692
00:42:08,880 --> 00:42:13,440
Speaker 3: a powder form, then you will experience respiratory failure and death.

693
00:42:13,960 --> 00:42:19,319
Speaker 3: And this guy Camilo uribe this toxicologist. He says that

694
00:42:20,360 --> 00:42:25,560
Speaker 3: scapolamine blocks neurotransmitters that carry information to the brain, the

695
00:42:25,640 --> 00:42:28,799
Speaker 3: part of the brain that stores short term memory. So

696
00:42:29,520 --> 00:42:32,880
Speaker 3: like being blackout drunk, it doesn't record what a person

697
00:42:32,920 --> 00:42:37,000
Speaker 3: has done or being really high, I guess. And that's why,

698
00:42:37,120 --> 00:42:39,640
Speaker 3: you know, like you were saying, you were saying, Ben,

699
00:42:39,760 --> 00:42:42,960
Speaker 3: these you know, I'm remembering these things because they're popping

700
00:42:43,040 --> 00:42:48,440
Speaker 3: around and the neurons of my brain. Scapolamine stops a

701
00:42:48,440 --> 00:42:52,520
Speaker 3: lot of that. And there's a chilling quote from Camilo

702
00:42:52,640 --> 00:42:56,320
Speaker 3: that we were able to confirm this expert is describing

703
00:42:56,400 --> 00:42:58,160
Speaker 3: things that actually happen.

704
00:42:58,920 --> 00:43:01,520
Speaker 2: Oh yeah, he says, quote, I can give you a

705
00:43:01,560 --> 00:43:04,239
Speaker 2: gun and tell you to go kill someone and you

706
00:43:04,280 --> 00:43:11,280
Speaker 2: will do it. Yes, hikes. Guykes. See now that speaking

707
00:43:11,320 --> 00:43:13,040
Speaker 2: of mk ult and some of these other you know,

708
00:43:13,120 --> 00:43:18,760
Speaker 2: experimentations and potential like pop let's say, rumors about mentoring

709
00:43:18,840 --> 00:43:22,719
Speaker 2: candidate stuff, someone who is so susceptible that they will

710
00:43:22,760 --> 00:43:25,520
Speaker 2: take a gun and they will you know, when they're

711
00:43:25,520 --> 00:43:28,120
Speaker 2: in that state or under the effects of a substance,

712
00:43:28,320 --> 00:43:31,760
Speaker 2: they will need to want to and be totally fine

713
00:43:31,800 --> 00:43:34,359
Speaker 2: with taking a gun and shooting someone. And then when

714
00:43:34,360 --> 00:43:37,320
Speaker 2: they're not on that drug, they don't even remember having

715
00:43:37,360 --> 00:43:40,839
Speaker 2: those thoughts. But then drug gets introduced again, and then

716
00:43:41,120 --> 00:43:43,440
Speaker 2: potentially they're a killer.

717
00:43:44,200 --> 00:43:49,880
Speaker 3: Which differentiates this from other states of suggestibility, like a

718
00:43:49,960 --> 00:43:53,200
Speaker 3: trance state or hypnosis. When people are in those sorts

719
00:43:53,239 --> 00:43:56,879
Speaker 3: of states, they are suggestible, but they will not ordinarily

720
00:43:56,960 --> 00:44:00,880
Speaker 3: do something they would otherwise not have done, you know

721
00:44:00,880 --> 00:44:03,120
Speaker 3: what I mean. If they weren't going to kill someone

722
00:44:03,160 --> 00:44:05,400
Speaker 3: while they were fully conscious, they're not going to do

723
00:44:05,440 --> 00:44:09,960
Speaker 3: it when they're quote unquote hypnotized. But with this drug,

724
00:44:10,800 --> 00:44:12,040
Speaker 3: anything is on the table.

725
00:44:12,200 --> 00:44:15,080
Speaker 2: Yeah, this drug has actual brainwashing potential.

726
00:44:15,640 --> 00:44:18,279
Speaker 3: And you might be saying, well, does that mean Manchurian

727
00:44:18,440 --> 00:44:22,840
Speaker 3: candidates are real? Not quite, because of the window of time.

728
00:44:23,600 --> 00:44:28,440
Speaker 3: You know, a Manchurian candidate would need to function as

729
00:44:28,480 --> 00:44:33,279
Speaker 3: a sleeper agent without their own knowledge for much longer

730
00:44:33,320 --> 00:44:36,560
Speaker 3: than the effects of scopolamine can create.

731
00:44:36,960 --> 00:44:39,440
Speaker 2: Well, I see, but okay, let's just let's game it

732
00:44:39,440 --> 00:44:42,880
Speaker 2: out for a second. Sure, Let's imagine that yourhn se,

733
00:44:42,920 --> 00:44:46,680
Speaker 2: your hand the man who you know killed Robert Kennedy.

734
00:44:48,000 --> 00:44:52,520
Speaker 2: Let's just say, while he's there at that event, he

735
00:44:53,040 --> 00:44:56,520
Speaker 2: this stuff is blown into his face and he has

736
00:44:56,719 --> 00:44:58,680
Speaker 2: given a gun and he is told, you need to

737
00:44:59,120 --> 00:45:01,680
Speaker 2: kill Robert candidate. You have to kill Robert Kennedy.

738
00:45:01,840 --> 00:45:04,640
Speaker 3: Yeah, And because I see where you're going, because he

739
00:45:04,719 --> 00:45:09,240
Speaker 3: doesn't have a memory of doing this, he comes to However,

740
00:45:10,120 --> 00:45:13,120
Speaker 3: that's I would say, that's like a It's like a

741
00:45:13,160 --> 00:45:17,440
Speaker 3: microwave Manchurian candidate, right, a micro Manchurian because again of

742
00:45:17,480 --> 00:45:23,640
Speaker 3: that time window, right, you could in the Manchurian candidate

743
00:45:24,200 --> 00:45:27,200
Speaker 3: story and the fiction, right, the idea is that you

744
00:45:27,200 --> 00:45:31,319
Speaker 3: could have this effect buried for years and then trigger it.

745
00:45:31,800 --> 00:45:34,960
Speaker 3: But what you're describing now you pointed out, dude, that

746
00:45:35,040 --> 00:45:38,920
Speaker 3: does sound possible, right, episode, Let's do it.

747
00:45:39,520 --> 00:45:42,520
Speaker 2: I don't know. I mean, I'm just throwing things out here,

748
00:45:42,520 --> 00:45:45,839
Speaker 2: trying to make connections, but it is. It is weird

749
00:45:45,840 --> 00:45:49,360
Speaker 2: thinking about that drug as the potential for that drug

750
00:45:49,400 --> 00:45:53,440
Speaker 2: to be used in heinous ways by let's say, a

751
00:45:53,480 --> 00:45:56,880
Speaker 2: military or an intelligence agency that wants to use it

752
00:45:56,920 --> 00:45:59,000
Speaker 2: for offensive reasons.

753
00:45:59,080 --> 00:46:02,920
Speaker 3: Right, Yeah, And again, when the effect wears off, it

754
00:46:03,000 --> 00:46:05,880
Speaker 3: will be as though the victim is trying to recall

755
00:46:06,040 --> 00:46:10,440
Speaker 3: a fading dream. A lot of people experience that pretty commonly.

756
00:46:10,520 --> 00:46:14,160
Speaker 3: Throughout the week. You will wake up with a vivid

757
00:46:14,239 --> 00:46:16,400
Speaker 3: dream and you'll try to remember it, and then you know,

758
00:46:16,560 --> 00:46:20,440
Speaker 3: by the time twenty or thirty minutes have passed, you

759
00:46:20,600 --> 00:46:23,200
Speaker 3: only remember these little tableaus, right, bro.

760
00:46:23,400 --> 00:46:25,359
Speaker 2: I'm pro I had one last night where I woke up.

761
00:46:25,520 --> 00:46:28,680
Speaker 2: I thought, I woke up in my bed, took some actions,

762
00:46:29,320 --> 00:46:34,279
Speaker 2: and then something horrible happened, and then I woke up

763
00:46:34,320 --> 00:46:36,759
Speaker 2: in my bed again. And I swear to you I

764
00:46:36,800 --> 00:46:39,680
Speaker 2: was in my house awake for that dream part. It

765
00:46:39,719 --> 00:46:42,759
Speaker 2: was just it was intense. And it's that kind of

766
00:46:42,800 --> 00:46:49,719
Speaker 2: thing where I don't know. This drug specifically blurs the

767
00:46:49,760 --> 00:46:52,880
Speaker 2: line between reality and, like you said, kind of a

768
00:46:52,920 --> 00:46:55,160
Speaker 2: dream state so much that I feel like it's one

769
00:46:55,160 --> 00:46:56,520
Speaker 2: of the most dangerous. It is one of the most

770
00:46:56,560 --> 00:46:58,720
Speaker 2: dangerous things that exists on the planet.

771
00:46:59,160 --> 00:47:02,440
Speaker 3: Yeah, because if reality is perception, it is altering your

772
00:47:02,440 --> 00:47:06,640
Speaker 3: reality in a non consensual way, right, and and the

773
00:47:07,600 --> 00:47:11,080
Speaker 3: it's even worse than you know, some of those dreams

774
00:47:11,560 --> 00:47:14,160
Speaker 3: that we're talking about. Like Matt, it sounds like you

775
00:47:14,200 --> 00:47:16,680
Speaker 3: two have experienced the thing where you have a dream

776
00:47:17,680 --> 00:47:20,799
Speaker 3: where that's so vivid and disturbing that you don't want

777
00:47:20,800 --> 00:47:24,640
Speaker 3: to go back to sleep for a little bit. Oh yeah, yeah,

778
00:47:26,080 --> 00:47:28,879
Speaker 3: that's why I'll send it an email at three thirty

779
00:47:28,880 --> 00:47:31,040
Speaker 3: in the morning sometimes because I'm like, ah, they're not

780
00:47:31,080 --> 00:47:32,640
Speaker 3: going to get me this time. Back to work.

781
00:47:33,640 --> 00:47:35,920
Speaker 2: What was that book? Again? The less you know, the

782
00:47:35,960 --> 00:47:36,640
Speaker 2: better you sleep.

783
00:47:36,920 --> 00:47:40,880
Speaker 3: Unless there it is, There it is. And this is

784
00:47:42,280 --> 00:47:45,480
Speaker 3: exposure to this substance is even worse because you will

785
00:47:45,480 --> 00:47:49,000
Speaker 3: come to in a situation that is probably very unfamiliar

786
00:47:49,040 --> 00:47:52,200
Speaker 3: to you, and if you think really hard, you might

787
00:47:52,239 --> 00:47:56,040
Speaker 3: be able to retrieve from your memory banks flashes like

788
00:47:56,120 --> 00:47:58,840
Speaker 3: you may you may remember emptying your bank account, or

789
00:47:58,880 --> 00:48:01,959
Speaker 3: throwing a bunch of valuable things from your house into

790
00:48:01,960 --> 00:48:05,120
Speaker 3: a bag, or we even found one story. Guy wakes

791
00:48:05,239 --> 00:48:11,320
Speaker 3: up but his apartment's empty, and he vaguely remembers helping

792
00:48:11,600 --> 00:48:14,759
Speaker 3: move all his crap out of his apartment into a van.

793
00:48:15,360 --> 00:48:17,480
Speaker 3: What vaguely?

794
00:48:18,040 --> 00:48:22,960
Speaker 2: Okay, pizza and beer will do that sometimes to you,

795
00:48:22,960 --> 00:48:28,160
Speaker 2: you know, like too much cheese and carbs and alcohol. Man,

796
00:48:28,239 --> 00:48:29,320
Speaker 2: I really don't remember.

797
00:48:31,640 --> 00:48:34,040
Speaker 3: That's why you always take a picture of your moving

798
00:48:34,160 --> 00:48:41,040
Speaker 3: crew before you start. So there's this Vice documentary that

799
00:48:41,160 --> 00:48:45,480
Speaker 3: we talked about briefly as well, from twenty twelve. It's excellent.

800
00:48:45,560 --> 00:48:48,680
Speaker 3: This is the one that calls this drug the most

801
00:48:48,800 --> 00:48:52,319
Speaker 3: dangerous drug in the world and in Colombia. I think

802
00:48:52,320 --> 00:48:56,960
Speaker 3: it's commonly derived from the boracho tree, which is roughly

803
00:48:56,960 --> 00:49:01,640
Speaker 3: translates to like, I think the drunken tree or something

804
00:49:01,680 --> 00:49:07,759
Speaker 3: like that. Yeah, and the people who are making this documentary,

805
00:49:07,960 --> 00:49:10,640
Speaker 3: they're down there, they're in Colombia and they're speaking with

806
00:49:10,800 --> 00:49:15,560
Speaker 3: drug dealers and also just regular Colombian civilians who all

807
00:49:15,600 --> 00:49:19,160
Speaker 3: confirm this stuff makes people childlike you can guide them

808
00:49:19,239 --> 00:49:24,640
Speaker 3: wherever you want. The US authorities think it also wrote

809
00:49:24,640 --> 00:49:27,480
Speaker 3: about this because it was seen as a big, big problem.

810
00:49:28,239 --> 00:49:32,600
Speaker 3: It's just like what happens in other countries. You're at

811
00:49:32,640 --> 00:49:37,440
Speaker 3: a bar, you're at a club, you're having fun. Maybe

812
00:49:37,600 --> 00:49:42,800
Speaker 3: an unfamiliar, attractive stranger finds you very interesting, you know

813
00:49:42,840 --> 00:49:45,680
Speaker 3: what I mean? Who doesn't love a little affirmation of

814
00:49:45,800 --> 00:49:48,799
Speaker 3: that regard, even if you're even if you're already in

815
00:49:48,840 --> 00:49:51,640
Speaker 3: a relationship. A lot of people will just say like, oh, well,

816
00:49:52,400 --> 00:49:56,040
Speaker 3: thank you. I also find myself pretty interesting.

817
00:49:56,480 --> 00:49:59,840
Speaker 2: There's also this scenario where there's an attractive person like

818
00:49:59,880 --> 00:50:03,680
Speaker 2: that that unbeknownst to you, is making themselves known to

819
00:50:03,800 --> 00:50:08,120
Speaker 2: you without approaching you, so that you approach them, which

820
00:50:08,160 --> 00:50:11,799
Speaker 2: is in the exact same scenario. Just that one is

821
00:50:11,880 --> 00:50:14,319
Speaker 2: even a little more insidious because it makes you think

822
00:50:14,360 --> 00:50:14,920
Speaker 2: it's your.

823
00:50:14,840 --> 00:50:19,840
Speaker 3: Idea that I would say yes, And I'm glad you

824
00:50:19,880 --> 00:50:23,320
Speaker 3: point that out. But that also brings up some bigger

825
00:50:23,440 --> 00:50:29,759
Speaker 3: issues because people who are doing that and sort of

826
00:50:30,440 --> 00:50:34,720
Speaker 3: implanting that idea or those actions in your head, they're

827
00:50:34,760 --> 00:50:37,920
Speaker 3: often professionals at guing that kind of thing.

828
00:50:38,000 --> 00:50:41,760
Speaker 2: Hey, quick plug, listen to to Die For. It's another

829
00:50:41,800 --> 00:50:45,879
Speaker 2: show from Tenderfoot TV, and it is with the host

830
00:50:45,960 --> 00:50:47,880
Speaker 2: Neil STRAUSSI made to Live and Die in La and

831
00:50:47,920 --> 00:50:53,560
Speaker 2: it talks it. The whole thing is about this Russian,

832
00:50:54,040 --> 00:50:58,720
Speaker 2: alleged Russian sexpionage agent and using these types of tactics.

833
00:50:58,760 --> 00:51:00,520
Speaker 2: That's what got me get about that.

834
00:51:00,600 --> 00:51:03,760
Speaker 3: To shout out the sparrows, Yeah, the concept that black

835
00:51:03,800 --> 00:51:08,640
Speaker 3: Widow did not come from thin air. Yeah, but the yeah,

836
00:51:08,719 --> 00:51:10,960
Speaker 3: and look it goes back to you know, what we

837
00:51:11,000 --> 00:51:16,040
Speaker 3: have described sometimes as the two ten rule. Honeypot operations

838
00:51:16,160 --> 00:51:19,319
Speaker 3: are real. You don't have to be a diplomat, you know,

839
00:51:19,920 --> 00:51:22,000
Speaker 3: you don't have to be a professor doing some like

840
00:51:22,200 --> 00:51:24,480
Speaker 3: edgy research or a business tycoon.

841
00:51:25,120 --> 00:51:27,160
Speaker 2: You might just be hanging out at a bar in Atlanta.

842
00:51:27,920 --> 00:51:30,759
Speaker 3: Yeah you can. You can also just be You don't

843
00:51:30,760 --> 00:51:33,080
Speaker 3: have to be a stranger in a strange land. This

844
00:51:33,160 --> 00:51:36,799
Speaker 3: can happen in much many more places than you think.

845
00:51:36,840 --> 00:51:41,239
Speaker 3: And folks, we are not saying this to disrespect anybody's

846
00:51:41,239 --> 00:51:44,800
Speaker 3: self esteem or your appearance or your RIZ or whatever.

847
00:51:45,120 --> 00:51:49,440
Speaker 3: You just always need to be skeptical when an attractive

848
00:51:49,480 --> 00:51:54,280
Speaker 3: person approaches you in an unfamiliar place, not even attractive,

849
00:51:54,280 --> 00:51:59,000
Speaker 3: not even physical terms like someone with that you want.

850
00:51:59,120 --> 00:52:04,719
Speaker 2: Yes, you, specifically you, And well, this is what I

851
00:52:04,760 --> 00:52:07,600
Speaker 2: would recommend to everybody. Just make sure you have zero

852
00:52:07,800 --> 00:52:10,480
Speaker 2: RIZ when you're out and about as I do, and

853
00:52:10,520 --> 00:52:11,239
Speaker 2: you're good to go.

854
00:52:13,239 --> 00:52:16,759
Speaker 3: Right. One of my I don't know if I ever

855
00:52:16,800 --> 00:52:19,520
Speaker 3: told you this, one of the best ways I cut

856
00:52:19,560 --> 00:52:24,520
Speaker 3: off a conversation. I was. I was at a crosswalk

857
00:52:25,360 --> 00:52:27,560
Speaker 3: in New York City and someone is really trying to

858
00:52:27,600 --> 00:52:30,839
Speaker 3: talk to me about something. So I'm just waiting, and

859
00:52:30,880 --> 00:52:34,160
Speaker 3: then eventually I turned to them, because you know, they're

860
00:52:34,200 --> 00:52:37,400
Speaker 3: clearly targeting me talking to me. Turned to them and

861
00:52:37,440 --> 00:52:41,120
Speaker 3: then I say, just like this, I'm sorry, I don't

862
00:52:41,160 --> 00:52:41,920
Speaker 3: speak English.

863
00:52:42,560 --> 00:52:43,960
Speaker 2: Effective was it?

864
00:52:45,320 --> 00:52:49,640
Speaker 3: I think it was just surreal enough because of the

865
00:52:49,640 --> 00:52:53,600
Speaker 3: the American accent. It was just surreal enough. They were like, Oh, okay,

866
00:52:53,680 --> 00:52:57,720
Speaker 3: this guy is either a jerk, mental issues either way,

867
00:52:58,239 --> 00:53:02,320
Speaker 3: too complicated moving on to the Yeah, nice, very nice,

868
00:53:02,440 --> 00:53:06,000
Speaker 3: So tell us if that works for you. But what

869
00:53:06,120 --> 00:53:12,719
Speaker 3: we're what we're seeing here is that approximately fifty thousand

870
00:53:13,200 --> 00:53:19,000
Speaker 3: known incidents of drugging occurred from twenty twelve on like

871
00:53:19,719 --> 00:53:23,880
Speaker 3: each year in Colombia, largely in the capital city, but Columbia.

872
00:53:24,200 --> 00:53:26,080
Speaker 3: I think it's a short shrift and a lot of

873
00:53:26,080 --> 00:53:29,400
Speaker 3: this reporting because when we focus on Columbia, then we

874
00:53:29,560 --> 00:53:34,360
Speaker 3: are forgetting that this substance is deployed around the world.

875
00:53:34,760 --> 00:53:37,520
Speaker 3: It is a drug that has been weaponized, not just

876
00:53:37,680 --> 00:53:41,000
Speaker 3: for street crime. We're gonna maybe we go through some

877
00:53:41,080 --> 00:53:43,879
Speaker 3: quick historical stories, Matt. I want to get to one

878
00:53:43,920 --> 00:53:47,719
Speaker 3: of my favorite ones from the eighties, but this it

879
00:53:47,719 --> 00:53:49,120
Speaker 3: feels weird to call the favorite.

880
00:53:49,160 --> 00:53:51,680
Speaker 2: Oh sure, well, let's just continue with scopel being there

881
00:53:51,719 --> 00:53:53,319
Speaker 2: for a second, because we do know that it has

882
00:53:53,360 --> 00:53:58,640
Speaker 2: been used as an interrogation additive, a little adjunctive, what

883
00:53:58,840 --> 00:54:00,240
Speaker 2: you want to call it.

884
00:54:00,320 --> 00:54:02,799
Speaker 3: Just as a truth Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yea yeah.

885
00:54:03,360 --> 00:54:06,520
Speaker 2: But you can imagine when someone is super compliant and

886
00:54:06,560 --> 00:54:09,520
Speaker 2: you are not. They are not holding back on all

887
00:54:09,560 --> 00:54:13,000
Speaker 2: of those control mechanisms that would prevent them from revealing

888
00:54:13,040 --> 00:54:16,920
Speaker 2: secret information, right or you know, confessing to a crime

889
00:54:16,920 --> 00:54:18,840
Speaker 2: and saying what they actually did. You can imagine to

890
00:54:18,880 --> 00:54:22,319
Speaker 2: be very helpful. And this was something that what did

891
00:54:22,320 --> 00:54:24,160
Speaker 2: you find here, Ben, who was using it?

892
00:54:24,640 --> 00:54:29,520
Speaker 3: Uh? Yeah? The check Secret Police back in the nineteen fifties.

893
00:54:29,520 --> 00:54:32,799
Speaker 3: In two thousand and nine, it was proven beyond the

894
00:54:32,800 --> 00:54:35,920
Speaker 3: shadow of a doubt that they used scopolamine at least

895
00:54:36,440 --> 00:54:40,520
Speaker 3: thrice to get confessions, so that means they used it

896
00:54:41,200 --> 00:54:43,200
Speaker 3: much more often. The only way we were able to

897
00:54:43,239 --> 00:54:47,319
Speaker 3: confirm the three instances is because there's an eyewitness who

898
00:54:47,360 --> 00:54:50,239
Speaker 3: is credible in court in two thousand and nine. And

899
00:54:51,719 --> 00:54:54,879
Speaker 3: they weren't the first to do this. Josef Mengele, the

900
00:54:55,120 --> 00:54:58,600
Speaker 3: Nazi Angel at Death, used it in interrogations. People thought

901
00:54:58,600 --> 00:55:01,319
Speaker 3: it was a truth serum because it made them more compliant,

902
00:55:01,600 --> 00:55:05,560
Speaker 3: but it turns out the science was sort of trash

903
00:55:05,920 --> 00:55:10,959
Speaker 3: because if people are very compliant, but they're also they've

904
00:55:11,000 --> 00:55:14,960
Speaker 3: also lost the ability to differentiate fact from fiction. Then

905
00:55:15,080 --> 00:55:19,200
Speaker 3: whatever their confessions are are just what you told them

906
00:55:19,239 --> 00:55:19,640
Speaker 3: to say.

907
00:55:20,120 --> 00:55:21,799
Speaker 2: Oh boy, you asked them.

908
00:55:21,680 --> 00:55:24,720
Speaker 3: A question in a leading way and they were like, yeah,

909
00:55:24,880 --> 00:55:28,520
Speaker 3: I guess are you Elvis Presley? Now that I think about.

910
00:55:28,280 --> 00:55:32,400
Speaker 2: It, you know what, But you know, that reminds me

911
00:55:32,480 --> 00:55:36,680
Speaker 2: of our exploration on torture, and the results often that

912
00:55:36,719 --> 00:55:40,120
Speaker 2: you get from torturing someone is what you want them to.

913
00:55:40,080 --> 00:55:45,120
Speaker 3: Say, exactly right. And that's a hard pill for a

914
00:55:45,120 --> 00:55:48,560
Speaker 3: lot of people to swallow because it leads us to

915
00:55:48,920 --> 00:55:54,600
Speaker 3: an even more uncomfortable series of conspiracies. And Okay, here

916
00:55:54,760 --> 00:55:58,520
Speaker 3: is again I hesitate to call it my favorite story,

917
00:55:58,520 --> 00:56:01,600
Speaker 3: but this is so strange. Way back in the nineteen eighties,

918
00:56:02,040 --> 00:56:06,960
Speaker 3: there is a diplomat, Colombian diplomat going to Chile. Happens

919
00:56:06,960 --> 00:56:12,800
Speaker 3: all the time, right, this guy's caught smuggling cocaine into

920
00:56:12,840 --> 00:56:17,720
Speaker 3: the country. Diplomat smuggling cocaine. Weird disaster from the jump.

921
00:56:17,960 --> 00:56:20,480
Speaker 3: It's not a good look. You know, you're supposed to

922
00:56:20,719 --> 00:56:26,759
Speaker 3: use diplomatic pouches for non illegal things. So he was

923
00:56:26,800 --> 00:56:31,000
Speaker 3: going under the jail right in many ways. But apparently

924
00:56:31,080 --> 00:56:35,640
Speaker 3: authorities and doctors investigated him and determined that he was

925
00:56:35,840 --> 00:56:41,200
Speaker 3: under the influence of scopolamine at the time. No way,

926
00:56:42,120 --> 00:56:43,120
Speaker 3: that's the story.

927
00:56:43,440 --> 00:56:45,719
Speaker 2: An unwilling diplomatic mule.

928
00:56:45,760 --> 00:56:50,040
Speaker 3: An unwilling diplomatic drug mule, and he couldn't remember who

929
00:56:50,120 --> 00:56:54,400
Speaker 3: got to him, so the charges against him were dropped.

930
00:56:54,520 --> 00:56:59,560
Speaker 3: Now this is a little bit weird because also, if

931
00:56:59,600 --> 00:57:02,239
Speaker 3: you don't want to get in trouble for smuggling cocaine

932
00:57:03,440 --> 00:57:07,000
Speaker 3: and you're aware of this drug, then maybe you could

933
00:57:07,080 --> 00:57:09,320
Speaker 3: use that as you get out of jail free card.

934
00:57:09,200 --> 00:57:12,360
Speaker 2: On yourself, like hit yourself with it. Oh the cops,

935
00:57:16,160 --> 00:57:19,000
Speaker 2: I'm like, whoa would that work? Oh my god?

936
00:57:19,520 --> 00:57:23,960
Speaker 3: What that's like a nuclear level strategy.

937
00:57:24,240 --> 00:57:26,640
Speaker 2: Well yeah, but instead of a you know, false tooth

938
00:57:26,760 --> 00:57:28,960
Speaker 2: that's got poison in it to take yourself out. If

939
00:57:28,960 --> 00:57:31,600
Speaker 2: you're an intelligence agent, you've just got a scopel, I

940
00:57:31,640 --> 00:57:34,320
Speaker 2: mean tooth, take it out, crack it, and.

941
00:57:36,040 --> 00:57:39,480
Speaker 3: This guy great, we have to hold him for another

942
00:57:39,520 --> 00:57:40,560
Speaker 3: twenty four hours.

943
00:57:40,720 --> 00:57:42,439
Speaker 2: Well yeah, but they didn't see it. So now you're

944
00:57:42,480 --> 00:57:43,880
Speaker 2: like somebody scopeling to me.

945
00:57:46,920 --> 00:57:51,800
Speaker 3: Can you imagine you see that in just any awkward situation, right,

946
00:57:52,440 --> 00:57:56,280
Speaker 3: like your your significant other is mad at you or something. Oh,

947
00:57:56,320 --> 00:58:02,360
Speaker 3: you didn't defrost the chicken. Oh, no, sorry, babe, I

948
00:58:02,360 --> 00:58:07,280
Speaker 3: got again. At least I still have my kidneys.

949
00:58:07,400 --> 00:58:09,400
Speaker 2: Oh, I'm sorry. I know we're joking about this, but

950
00:58:09,720 --> 00:58:13,960
Speaker 2: people have died from this stuff, people robbed and assaulted

951
00:58:13,960 --> 00:58:16,920
Speaker 2: with this kidnapps, and we're so sorry. I'm sorry for

952
00:58:17,120 --> 00:58:20,640
Speaker 2: joking about it, but it is like, it is.

953
00:58:20,680 --> 00:58:24,600
Speaker 3: Ridiculous whatever, it is ridiculous though it is so surreal

954
00:58:24,680 --> 00:58:28,920
Speaker 3: and ridiculous. I think we do need some levity. I

955
00:58:28,960 --> 00:58:31,600
Speaker 3: appreciate what you're pointing out their matt because kidnappers have

956
00:58:31,640 --> 00:58:34,960
Speaker 3: made use of this drug like drugging parents and abducting

957
00:58:35,000 --> 00:58:42,040
Speaker 3: their children. Sexual predators use this extensively. It's just incredibly

958
00:58:42,080 --> 00:58:45,880
Speaker 3: difficult to similar to ghb or Rufi's right, it's difficult

959
00:58:45,920 --> 00:58:48,440
Speaker 3: to track down a criminal when the victim may have

960
00:58:48,560 --> 00:58:51,600
Speaker 3: almost no memory of the crime. And as you listen

961
00:58:51,880 --> 00:58:55,479
Speaker 3: right now, wherever you are in this wide world, these

962
00:58:55,560 --> 00:58:58,439
Speaker 3: crimes are continuing, and I think we could say each

963
00:58:58,440 --> 00:59:02,240
Speaker 3: of these is a conspiracy all their own. Yes, a

964
00:59:02,280 --> 00:59:06,760
Speaker 3: lot of these substances again do have legit medical uses,

965
00:59:07,240 --> 00:59:14,600
Speaker 3: like scopolamine can treat motion sickness, but it's usually used

966
00:59:14,880 --> 00:59:16,320
Speaker 3: these days as a weapon.

967
00:59:16,840 --> 00:59:21,960
Speaker 2: Yikes. And you know what scope of me is terrifying.

968
00:59:22,600 --> 00:59:26,160
Speaker 2: Uh just I love that we focused on that there

969
00:59:26,160 --> 00:59:28,960
Speaker 2: are other things been in here that we haven't even

970
00:59:29,000 --> 00:59:31,320
Speaker 2: gotten to yet, and I feel like that's always the case.

971
00:59:31,720 --> 00:59:33,520
Speaker 2: We just need to have a twenty four hour feed

972
00:59:33,560 --> 00:59:35,720
Speaker 2: where we just have a conversation and it doesn't stop

973
00:59:36,920 --> 00:59:38,800
Speaker 2: and just keep talking through things.

974
00:59:38,840 --> 00:59:41,120
Speaker 3: So great for our friendship, oh yeah.

975
00:59:40,920 --> 00:59:43,640
Speaker 2: Oh yeah, well and our families and our families.

976
00:59:43,840 --> 00:59:44,480
Speaker 3: Yeah.

977
00:59:44,640 --> 00:59:48,720
Speaker 2: But these things that are often called riot control agents

978
00:59:48,760 --> 00:59:52,919
Speaker 2: nowadays also known as non lethal chemical weapons. Yeah, these

979
00:59:53,320 --> 00:59:58,600
Speaker 2: substances that are often found through you know what do

980
00:59:58,640 --> 01:00:02,440
Speaker 2: they call it, pharmacological research or a drug research that

981
01:00:02,560 --> 01:00:05,320
Speaker 2: is not weaponized, is not meant to be weaponized. But

982
01:00:05,360 --> 01:00:08,880
Speaker 2: you find out about these substances, then you imagine from

983
01:00:08,920 --> 01:00:12,640
Speaker 2: a military perspective, increasing the dosage on these things and

984
01:00:12,680 --> 01:00:15,840
Speaker 2: then deploying them in either as the name states, in

985
01:00:15,880 --> 01:00:20,560
Speaker 2: a riot situation, right to either calm down a populace

986
01:00:20,640 --> 01:00:22,800
Speaker 2: or a bunch of people that are angry, probably for

987
01:00:22,880 --> 01:00:28,200
Speaker 2: good reason, or to use against an attacking military or

988
01:00:28,480 --> 01:00:31,120
Speaker 2: to you know, the way a chemical agent like a

989
01:00:31,160 --> 01:00:32,960
Speaker 2: nerve gas would have been used back in the day,

990
01:00:33,480 --> 01:00:36,240
Speaker 2: but in this case it would be quote non lethal.

991
01:00:36,800 --> 01:00:40,200
Speaker 2: So maybe it would skirt underneath some of those chemical

992
01:00:40,720 --> 01:00:46,200
Speaker 2: weapons control treaties and convention that we have so like,

993
01:00:46,520 --> 01:00:48,960
Speaker 2: and there is research on that. But just to go

994
01:00:49,040 --> 01:00:51,520
Speaker 2: back to that article we cited before drugs as chemical

995
01:00:51,560 --> 01:00:55,760
Speaker 2: weapons passed in perspectives, Uh, this, this sentence, I think

996
01:00:55,880 --> 01:00:59,800
Speaker 2: is the most important thing for our show. Research and

997
01:00:59,840 --> 01:01:05,040
Speaker 2: production on new chemical warfare agents or cwa's has virtually stopped,

998
01:01:06,160 --> 01:01:11,240
Speaker 2: or it's being conducted secretly, which I think because no

999
01:01:11,440 --> 01:01:13,400
Speaker 2: country is going to come out and say, ah, we

1000
01:01:13,440 --> 01:01:18,360
Speaker 2: are making great advances in our chemical weapons department of whatever.

1001
01:01:19,080 --> 01:01:25,040
Speaker 3: And furthermore, no country is going to accept without extensive

1002
01:01:25,080 --> 01:01:28,520
Speaker 3: proof that other countries are somehow keeping their word right,

1003
01:01:28,560 --> 01:01:29,720
Speaker 3: Oh yeah, why would you?

1004
01:01:30,360 --> 01:01:35,440
Speaker 2: But again and they probably aren't. It's very similar to

1005
01:01:36,040 --> 01:01:39,240
Speaker 2: some of the pathogen research that we've talked about since

1006
01:01:39,560 --> 01:01:44,040
Speaker 2: twenty nineteen extensively, where there's gain of function research happening

1007
01:01:44,080 --> 01:01:48,400
Speaker 2: across the world to make sure that each individual country,

1008
01:01:48,720 --> 01:01:53,040
Speaker 2: sometimes science at large, but mostly individual countries can defend

1009
01:01:53,280 --> 01:01:58,800
Speaker 2: against any possible release of a pathogen within their populace, right.

1010
01:01:58,920 --> 01:02:03,480
Speaker 3: And how much defensive research can you do before you

1011
01:02:03,720 --> 01:02:08,120
Speaker 3: are making the offensive materials?

1012
01:02:08,320 --> 01:02:12,160
Speaker 2: Yes, but in this case just with drugs, but medicines.

1013
01:02:12,400 --> 01:02:15,440
Speaker 3: Right, Yeah, it's a it's a hell of a loophole

1014
01:02:15,480 --> 01:02:19,680
Speaker 3: because it's nigh impossible to close it right until every

1015
01:02:19,880 --> 01:02:24,800
Speaker 3: substance has been discovered in all of its various forms.

1016
01:02:24,560 --> 01:02:27,400
Speaker 3: It's just it's not going to happen. And a lot

1017
01:02:27,440 --> 01:02:29,720
Speaker 3: of that look, a lot of that research, of the

1018
01:02:29,800 --> 01:02:34,720
Speaker 3: defensive research is legitimate. We're just saying that the line

1019
01:02:34,760 --> 01:02:40,160
Speaker 3: between defensive and offensive is much less bright. There's there's

1020
01:02:40,200 --> 01:02:43,400
Speaker 3: a lot of liminal gray overlap the closer you look,

1021
01:02:43,720 --> 01:02:49,520
Speaker 3: and it's it's dangerous. Basically, what we're saying is the

1022
01:02:49,560 --> 01:02:52,360
Speaker 3: same stuff we say every time here when we talk

1023
01:02:52,440 --> 01:02:56,880
Speaker 3: about these kind of grifts micro and macro level. Be

1024
01:02:57,000 --> 01:03:01,200
Speaker 3: careful when you're out having fun. We simply cannot assume

1025
01:03:01,920 --> 01:03:07,560
Speaker 3: that every single stranger we meet, or every country we encounter,

1026
01:03:08,160 --> 01:03:11,160
Speaker 3: is going to be acting in good faith. That was depressing.

1027
01:03:11,760 --> 01:03:16,040
Speaker 2: Yeah, yeah, I think most of this is. But you know,

1028
01:03:16,720 --> 01:03:19,840
Speaker 2: that's just kind of it's kind of our trade. Ben

1029
01:03:19,880 --> 01:03:25,000
Speaker 2: that's what we do. We find Jimson Weed finds that

1030
01:03:25,120 --> 01:03:25,800
Speaker 2: silver lining.

1031
01:03:26,320 --> 01:03:28,640
Speaker 3: Oh you boys looking for some toro.

1032
01:03:29,760 --> 01:03:32,960
Speaker 2: That's the name is dog silver silver Lining.

1033
01:03:33,400 --> 01:03:37,000
Speaker 3: There we go Jameson Weed and silver Lighting. That's the

1034
01:03:37,040 --> 01:03:40,120
Speaker 3: news show. Please tune in tell us if we should

1035
01:03:40,120 --> 01:03:42,400
Speaker 3: make that show. Give us some background on Jimson Wheed

1036
01:03:42,440 --> 01:03:46,200
Speaker 3: and silver Lining. In the meantime, perhaps even more importantly,

1037
01:03:46,600 --> 01:03:50,520
Speaker 3: we hope that this finds everyone safe amid grand adventure.

1038
01:03:51,120 --> 01:03:54,920
Speaker 3: We will be back later with a se Seer Hadden episode.

1039
01:03:54,960 --> 01:03:58,200
Speaker 3: We've got more on supplements coming out. We've got a

1040
01:03:58,200 --> 01:04:00,240
Speaker 3: lot of work to do, and we'd love for you

1041
01:04:00,320 --> 01:04:03,440
Speaker 3: to be part of our continuing mission. Let us know

1042
01:04:03,480 --> 01:04:06,200
Speaker 3: what you think. Give us your first hand personal experiences.

1043
01:04:06,440 --> 01:04:09,880
Speaker 3: Always give us suggestions for episodes we should cover in

1044
01:04:09,880 --> 01:04:12,760
Speaker 3: the future. We try to be easy to find online.

1045
01:04:13,080 --> 01:04:18,240
Speaker 3: You've heard it all before, we you know, folks, we

1046
01:04:18,280 --> 01:04:21,080
Speaker 3: hope you're not tired of the George Washington stuff. Matt

1047
01:04:21,120 --> 01:04:25,360
Speaker 3: redid the song. We've got a continuing saga, Saga Saga.

1048
01:04:25,440 --> 01:04:28,400
Speaker 3: You can find that on Instagram. If you want to

1049
01:04:28,560 --> 01:04:30,760
Speaker 3: talk with us directly, why not give us a phone call.

1050
01:04:31,200 --> 01:04:36,120
Speaker 2: Our number is one eight three three st DWYTK. When

1051
01:04:36,160 --> 01:04:38,760
Speaker 2: you call in, give yourself three minutes, because that's how

1052
01:04:38,760 --> 01:04:41,040
Speaker 2: long you've got to make the message. Give yourself a

1053
01:04:41,040 --> 01:04:44,360
Speaker 2: cool nickname, whatever you want, anything literally anything, just make

1054
01:04:44,360 --> 01:04:47,000
Speaker 2: it fun, and then let us know at some point

1055
01:04:47,000 --> 01:04:48,600
Speaker 2: in that three minutes if we can use your name

1056
01:04:48,600 --> 01:04:51,320
Speaker 2: and message on the air, and then include your voice

1057
01:04:51,360 --> 01:04:53,440
Speaker 2: by the way, So like, if you want us to

1058
01:04:53,440 --> 01:04:55,280
Speaker 2: do something with your voice, let us know, or if

1059
01:04:55,320 --> 01:04:57,680
Speaker 2: you don't want us to use your voice, let us know.

1060
01:04:58,000 --> 01:05:00,080
Speaker 3: Or if you yeah, if you want us just to

1061
01:05:01,200 --> 01:05:04,960
Speaker 3: summarize what you said, we're totally fine. Misses anonymity, Yeah,

1062
01:05:04,960 --> 01:05:06,720
Speaker 3: we've got your back absolutely.

1063
01:05:07,280 --> 01:05:09,200
Speaker 2: If you don't want to do that, If you've got

1064
01:05:09,280 --> 01:05:11,880
Speaker 2: maybe an attachment a picture of your cat, as many

1065
01:05:11,880 --> 01:05:16,680
Speaker 2: people have been sending us recently, we love those, or

1066
01:05:16,760 --> 01:05:19,480
Speaker 2: you know a bunch of links, why not instead send

1067
01:05:19,560 --> 01:05:21,040
Speaker 2: us a good old fashioned email.

1068
01:05:21,240 --> 01:05:43,080
Speaker 3: We are conspiracy at iHeartRadio dot com.

1069
01:05:43,240 --> 01:05:45,280
Speaker 2: Stuff they don't want you to know is a production

1070
01:05:45,400 --> 01:05:49,919
Speaker 2: of iHeartRadio. For more podcasts from iHeartRadio, visit the iHeartRadio app,

1071
01:05:50,000 --> 01:05:52,880
Speaker 2: Apple Podcasts, or wherever you listen to your favorite shows.