WEBVTT - TechStuff Classic: A Stingray Operation

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<v Speaker 1>Welcome to tex Stuff, a production from I Heart Radio.

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<v Speaker 1>Hey there, and welcome to tech Stuff. I'm your host,

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<v Speaker 1>Jonathan Strickland. I'm an executive producer with iHeart Radio. And

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<v Speaker 1>how the tech are you? It is time for a

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<v Speaker 1>tech Stuff plastic episode. This episode is called a sting

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<v Speaker 1>ray operation and it has guest co hosts Ben Bolan

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<v Speaker 1>and Matt Frederick of stuff they don't want you to

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<v Speaker 1>know on the show. And that's because stingrays are a

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<v Speaker 1>type of surveillance tech used by law enforcement agencies that

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<v Speaker 1>trick your cell phone into thinking they're talking to an

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<v Speaker 1>actual cell phone tower. Let's listen in. We were super

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<v Speaker 1>excited to hear about today's topic because it's been something

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<v Speaker 1>that Matt and I have been talking about off air.

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<v Speaker 1>Is that correct? Absolutely? This kind of technology that we're

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<v Speaker 1>going to get into a little later. Uh piques our interest.

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<v Speaker 1>You could say, yeah, mine as well. Uh. You know,

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<v Speaker 1>the stuff they don't want you to know shows great show.

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<v Speaker 1>If you guys haven't checked it out, you need to

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<v Speaker 1>go and and check it out. Check check out how

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<v Speaker 1>you guys are looking into various types of conspiracies, things

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<v Speaker 1>that are happening below the surface level that people may

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<v Speaker 1>not be aware of and kind of sifting through the

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<v Speaker 1>information to show which parts of it are you know,

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<v Speaker 1>are really solid. You know, these are the things that

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<v Speaker 1>we know for sure. And here's the conjecture that's been

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<v Speaker 1>said about it. You guys do a great job with it.

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<v Speaker 1>And as it turns out, there's a lot of stuff

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<v Speaker 1>out there that can really fuel that kind of kind

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<v Speaker 1>of talk for good reason. And I typically am one

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<v Speaker 1>of those more you know, I am a little more

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<v Speaker 1>conservative and skeptical with my approach to these things. But

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<v Speaker 1>this is a technology we're gonna talk about today that

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<v Speaker 1>I don't know how you could go to it being

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<v Speaker 1>skeptical and say, oh, everything is fine. We are talking

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<v Speaker 1>about sting ray or I M. S I catchers, And

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<v Speaker 1>so sting ray is the one that I think most

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<v Speaker 1>people have heard about. That's the one that was brought

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<v Speaker 1>up in a lawsuit in Arizona, UM. So I think

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<v Speaker 1>that that is what most people think about when they

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<v Speaker 1>hear I M. S I catchers, if they are aware

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<v Speaker 1>of that term at all. But of course sting stingray

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<v Speaker 1>is just one version of that, and we'll talk about

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<v Speaker 1>some of the other ones as well. So I am

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<v Speaker 1>s I catchers stands for International Mobile subscriber identity catchers

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<v Speaker 1>or locators, and that is a fancy way of saying.

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<v Speaker 1>This is a technology that is able to intercept signals

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<v Speaker 1>from cell phones, ostensibly so that a law enforcement official

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<v Speaker 1>could locate a person based upon that person's cell phone signaling.

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<v Speaker 1>And it does this, and we'll talk about specifics in

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<v Speaker 1>a bit, by mimicking a cell phone tower. So in

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<v Speaker 1>other words, your cell phone is communicating with this device

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<v Speaker 1>thinking that this is the actual part of the infrastructure

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<v Speaker 1>that it would normally operate inside. Yeah. Yeah, it's sort

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<v Speaker 1>of the same way that are similar at least to

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<v Speaker 1>the ways in which some animals have evolved to have

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<v Speaker 1>camouflage that makes them appear to be a different type

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<v Speaker 1>of creature. Right. Yeah. And one thing that I just

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<v Speaker 1>want to get this out so I don't uh moan

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<v Speaker 1>and complain about it for the whole episode. If you

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<v Speaker 1>ever lost a cell phone or had one stolen and

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<v Speaker 1>had the sneaking suspicion that there might be a way

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<v Speaker 1>for law enforcement to catch it, well, theoretically there is.

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<v Speaker 1>It's just it's just they can't do that for everybody

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<v Speaker 1>because so many people lose their cell phones or have

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<v Speaker 1>them stolen, you know, as long as it's turned on right, right, Yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>and as long as well, And it also depends on

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<v Speaker 1>a couple of other things too, Right, they have to

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<v Speaker 1>have the if they're looking for your cell phones specifically,

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<v Speaker 1>they kind of need to know a little bit more information,

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<v Speaker 1>like they need to know something specific about that phone

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<v Speaker 1>or to identify it versus all the other phones that

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<v Speaker 1>will connect to it, right, because otherwise they just be like, well,

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<v Speaker 1>it maybe one of the phones here, and there are

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<v Speaker 1>different ways of looking into that. Right. It all depends

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<v Speaker 1>on what the investigation is and we'll we'll talk more

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<v Speaker 1>about how it's used in investigations. So basically, this is

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<v Speaker 1>a technology meant to help Again, ostensibly law enforcement tracked

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<v Speaker 1>down the bad guys or counter terrorism officials to identify

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<v Speaker 1>potential terrorist threats before they become a reality. That's what

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<v Speaker 1>it's supposed to be used for. There are a lot

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<v Speaker 1>of people who have objected to it because it is

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<v Speaker 1>it is take making a very wide approach to targeting

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<v Speaker 1>something very specific, and that can be dangerous for the

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<v Speaker 1>sting ray its self. A cost between sixty eight thousand

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<v Speaker 1>dollars and a hundred thirty five thousand dollars last I checked.

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<v Speaker 1>Because there are two different models of the sting ray.

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<v Speaker 1>There's the sting ray and sting Ray. To sting Ray

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<v Speaker 1>two came out a few years ago. The sting ray

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<v Speaker 1>obviously came out before that. Because we move in a

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<v Speaker 1>chronological order, they haven't gotten to that quantum effect where

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<v Speaker 1>the sequel comes out before the original. Um. Now it's

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<v Speaker 1>made by a company called Harris Corporation out of Melbourne, Florida,

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<v Speaker 1>and uh and this company makes a lot of technology

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<v Speaker 1>that falls into this general category. Some of the products

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<v Speaker 1>that they make are similar to sting ray and do

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<v Speaker 1>similar things to that device. Others are more specific and

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<v Speaker 1>are meant to be used in conjunction with gadget like stingray. Yeah. Yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>you know, it's like a console. Are like you've got

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<v Speaker 1>your connect, you've got your you know, your your dance pad,

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<v Speaker 1>You've got all these other things sort of the similar

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<v Speaker 1>thing here, except the devices that Harris Corporation makes. Some

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<v Speaker 1>of them boost the signal catching ability of the basic

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<v Speaker 1>technology like the stingray. Some of them allow for better

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<v Speaker 1>tracking technology. It all depends on the thing. But but

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<v Speaker 1>you know, you may have heard some of the other names.

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<v Speaker 1>Some of the other names that include trigger fish, kingfish,

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<v Speaker 1>amber jack, gossamer, harpoon, and hail storm. Uh. And not

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<v Speaker 1>only these are not types of stingray. These are all

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<v Speaker 1>individual devices that work in a similar way to sting ray.

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<v Speaker 1>Some of them copy the functionality of sting ray, some

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<v Speaker 1>of them go beyond that. In fact, trigger fish is

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<v Speaker 1>particularly troubling. Um. But sting ray it self can be

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<v Speaker 1>really troubled too if you just do a simple upgrade

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<v Speaker 1>to it. And then you're right. All of these have

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<v Speaker 1>things in common and that they all are meant to

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<v Speaker 1>detect cell phone usage in some way and either identify

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<v Speaker 1>it or locate it and or track it. Um. And

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<v Speaker 1>it's how you use these in combination with one another

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<v Speaker 1>that determines your ability to do that. Now, clearly we're

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<v Speaker 1>talking about something that's mimicking a cell phone tower. You

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<v Speaker 1>have to have it be mobile because otherwise you just

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<v Speaker 1>have to hope that the bad guys happened to go

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<v Speaker 1>across your part of town. You can't take it to

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<v Speaker 1>them if it's not mobile, right. So, Uh. One of

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<v Speaker 1>the things that this is really helpful for as far

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<v Speaker 1>as law enforcement are concerned, is that they can go

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<v Speaker 1>to a part of town where they suspect someone is.

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<v Speaker 1>They can put out their ears, listen for it, look

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<v Speaker 1>to see if they have any hits that relate back

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<v Speaker 1>to the target they're specifically looking for, and if not,

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<v Speaker 1>they can move on to a different part of town. Um.

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<v Speaker 1>That's also one of the drawbacks, as it turns out,

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<v Speaker 1>at least from from the perspective of some people. Now,

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<v Speaker 1>let's see one other thing. Oh, I forgot to mention.

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<v Speaker 1>Gossamer is one of the exceptions to this. Gossamer is

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<v Speaker 1>not about tracking or locating cell phone, but this is

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<v Speaker 1>the one that freaks me out the most. Yeah, this

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<v Speaker 1>is not passive. Now, Gossamer is about denial of service

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<v Speaker 1>attacks on a mobile phone, so it's about it's essentially

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<v Speaker 1>a jammer. No, this is great for all the paranoid

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<v Speaker 1>people in the audience. Are you getting bad reception or

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<v Speaker 1>are you being gossamer? I actually and another thing to

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<v Speaker 1>to mention. I didn't put it in our notes, but

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<v Speaker 1>one of the things these devices typically can do. The

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<v Speaker 1>stingray in particular can do this is it can boost

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<v Speaker 1>your the signal coming from your phone to connect to

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<v Speaker 1>the tower. It can essentially say I need a stronger

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<v Speaker 1>signal your phone. Then, even though you're not using it,

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<v Speaker 1>like it's just in your pocket, there's no vibrating, there's

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<v Speaker 1>no ringing, there's nothing going on, your phone starts sending

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<v Speaker 1>stronger signals. This drains your battery. So if you're the

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<v Speaker 1>paranoid persuasion, you may also think my phone's battery just

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<v Speaker 1>won't even last like a full day anymore. And it

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<v Speaker 1>might not be because your phone is old. It might

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<v Speaker 1>be because you're getting you're getting sting rayed. You guys,

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<v Speaker 1>I'm not kidding. This happening to me right now. Well,

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<v Speaker 1>I'm sorry that you should take more care when you

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<v Speaker 1>are browsing on your phone. Also, Matt, Matt, I mean

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<v Speaker 1>not to make you worried or anything, but you're definitely

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<v Speaker 1>on some lists. So I mean, you're on our list

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<v Speaker 1>of favorite people. But yeah, there's one right there. So okay,

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<v Speaker 1>So I love this idea about it being mobile. So

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<v Speaker 1>if we take that paranoid example, in the vast majority,

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<v Speaker 1>virtually every time somebody has poor reception or poor battery life,

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<v Speaker 1>it is never going to be something like this. But

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<v Speaker 1>there's a very small chance, yeah that if you are

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<v Speaker 1>a victim of this, you could literally have someone following

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<v Speaker 1>you around, right, Yeah, I mean, okay, to be fair,

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<v Speaker 1>this technology we're talking about is at a level of

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<v Speaker 1>expense where it's not likely to happen to you. And

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<v Speaker 1>if you are someone who is either hanging out with

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<v Speaker 1>questionable people or you yourself are engaged in some questionable activities,

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<v Speaker 1>then you'd be more likely to have this actually target you. Now,

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<v Speaker 1>because we know that law enforcement agencies across the United

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<v Speaker 1>States and in other parts of the world have used

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<v Speaker 1>this kind of technology, they're the they're the customers there

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<v Speaker 1>once they're purchasing the stuff from Harris Corporation, it's very

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<v Speaker 1>possible you would come into contact with this and it's

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<v Speaker 1>not that you are being targeted, but you're still being

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<v Speaker 1>affected because it's just so broad. Yeah, it's like it's

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<v Speaker 1>mimicking a cell phone tower. It's not mimicking a cell

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<v Speaker 1>phone tower for a single phone. It's mimicking a cellphone

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<v Speaker 1>tower for the broadcast range of that device. And so okay,

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<v Speaker 1>so their mobile but what what would they look like

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<v Speaker 1>if you just saw one? So they look kind of like, uh,

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<v Speaker 1>I mean, if you've ever seen one of those servers,

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<v Speaker 1>like it looks like just a basic computer with lots

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<v Speaker 1>of ports on it. It's kind of like that. It's

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<v Speaker 1>usually a little bit uh stumpy looking like it's not

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<v Speaker 1>as wide as your typical server is a little more

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<v Speaker 1>narrow a little tall, but it's meant to fit into

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<v Speaker 1>racks because you can, you know, end up pairing these

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<v Speaker 1>with other technologies. But it's essentially a computer and you

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<v Speaker 1>hook it up to a laptop, so you've got really

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<v Speaker 1>the basic parts you have are the antenna, which is

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<v Speaker 1>important because obviously it has to receive signals sent from

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<v Speaker 1>cell phones um and a transmitter so that you can

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<v Speaker 1>send stuff back through if you need to. You've got

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<v Speaker 1>the computer itself, which is processing the signals and identifying

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<v Speaker 1>where those signals are coming from, both what type of

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<v Speaker 1>phone it is by you know, giving you the identification

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<v Speaker 1>numbers of that phone, the phone number that's associated with

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<v Speaker 1>that phone, and the location of that phone based upon

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<v Speaker 1>some triangulation. You might actually have to physically move the

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<v Speaker 1>technology around to get the triangulation. You could theoretically communicate

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<v Speaker 1>with another cell phone tower and by getting comparing numbers,

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<v Speaker 1>you know, you know you can generally tell the direction

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<v Speaker 1>from which the signal comes and its strength that gives

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<v Speaker 1>you an idea of it's it's general location in that

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<v Speaker 1>like you know roughly what distance it is from your

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<v Speaker 1>your space station. So it's one of those things where

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<v Speaker 1>if the signal gets stronger, it's closer to you, right,

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<v Speaker 1>and if it's if it's if the signal, if the

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<v Speaker 1>cell phone signal is getting weaker, than you know that

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<v Speaker 1>the target cell phone is moving away. If you were

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<v Speaker 1>to move the van to a second location and do

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<v Speaker 1>those measurements, then because you have the two points on

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<v Speaker 1>a on one part of a triangle, the cell phones

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<v Speaker 1>the third point, then you know where the person is.

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<v Speaker 1>It's the same way that cell phone towers are able

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<v Speaker 1>to give an approximation of where you are, even if

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<v Speaker 1>your phone doesn't have GPS. Right, it's sending the signals

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<v Speaker 1>and based upon the strength of the signal, how long

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<v Speaker 1>it takes to get there, all of these sort of things,

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<v Speaker 1>it can approximate where you are now. By by approximate,

0:13:21.920 --> 0:13:25.000
<v Speaker 1>I mean within a few you know, meters, So it's

0:13:25.000 --> 0:13:28.120
<v Speaker 1>not like as as a specific as GPS can be,

0:13:29.000 --> 0:13:32.280
<v Speaker 1>but it's still good enough for law enforcement to hone

0:13:32.360 --> 0:13:35.360
<v Speaker 1>in on a on a particular location and people can

0:13:35.400 --> 0:13:39.160
<v Speaker 1>sent to the use of GPS. But yeah, so there's

0:13:39.160 --> 0:13:41.160
<v Speaker 1>a question that I'm sure a lot of people are wondering,

0:13:41.240 --> 0:13:44.440
<v Speaker 1>which is this stuff sounds kind of space a g

0:13:44.720 --> 0:13:49.400
<v Speaker 1>but how how new? Is it not that new? Uh?

0:13:49.559 --> 0:13:53.840
<v Speaker 1>The the information I found said that at least the

0:13:53.880 --> 0:13:56.960
<v Speaker 1>trigger fish version of this technology has been in use

0:13:57.000 --> 0:14:01.520
<v Speaker 1>since the late nineteen nineties. What uh. Yeah, And to

0:14:01.600 --> 0:14:04.040
<v Speaker 1>keep keep in mind, like this technology has been in

0:14:04.120 --> 0:14:07.319
<v Speaker 1>some form of development or another and been available to

0:14:07.520 --> 0:14:11.760
<v Speaker 1>different types of agencies, specifically the FBI would be a

0:14:11.760 --> 0:14:15.080
<v Speaker 1>big one. Um. And it's just that over the past

0:14:15.120 --> 0:14:19.840
<v Speaker 1>few years it has become more common for local law

0:14:19.920 --> 0:14:23.160
<v Speaker 1>enforcement to get their hands on this. Before it was

0:14:23.240 --> 0:14:27.560
<v Speaker 1>something that only you know, the federal law enforcement officials

0:14:27.600 --> 0:14:32.240
<v Speaker 1>were able to access. But now we're seeing local law enforcement.

0:14:32.760 --> 0:14:35.120
<v Speaker 1>Uh not everybody's owning up to it, but we're seeing

0:14:35.120 --> 0:14:39.160
<v Speaker 1>a lot of local law enforcement offices adopt this technology,

0:14:39.600 --> 0:14:41.400
<v Speaker 1>and they're doing it in kind of a kind of

0:14:41.440 --> 0:14:47.600
<v Speaker 1>a backdoor Shenanigan's way, I would say, yeah, we'll be

0:14:47.640 --> 0:14:50.240
<v Speaker 1>back with more of this classic episode of tech stuff

0:14:50.280 --> 0:15:01.280
<v Speaker 1>after this quick break. So, uh, you know, these things

0:15:01.320 --> 0:15:04.520
<v Speaker 1>can be pretty expensive, and obviously law enforcement has a

0:15:04.520 --> 0:15:07.360
<v Speaker 1>budget that they have to answer to. So some of

0:15:07.400 --> 0:15:11.080
<v Speaker 1>them are funding the purchase of this material by filing

0:15:11.080 --> 0:15:16.880
<v Speaker 1>it under counter terrorism uh um strategies. Yeah. Essentially they

0:15:16.960 --> 0:15:20.560
<v Speaker 1>say we want to participate in this, you know, we

0:15:20.600 --> 0:15:23.560
<v Speaker 1>want to make sure we help protect national security doing

0:15:23.560 --> 0:15:25.840
<v Speaker 1>it on a local level. Uh And then they get

0:15:25.880 --> 0:15:29.680
<v Speaker 1>the federal grant to purchase the stuff. But then they're

0:15:29.760 --> 0:15:33.120
<v Speaker 1>using it on a much broader scale. So it's not

0:15:33.480 --> 0:15:36.920
<v Speaker 1>like they're not using it specifically for a counter terrorism

0:15:37.000 --> 0:15:38.840
<v Speaker 1>they're using it in all sorts of cases. There was

0:15:38.880 --> 0:15:42.840
<v Speaker 1>a story about a sheriff whose own vehicle got broken

0:15:42.880 --> 0:15:47.440
<v Speaker 1>into and uh and whose phone was stolen, who decided

0:15:47.480 --> 0:15:50.320
<v Speaker 1>to use this stuff to try and ostensibly to try

0:15:50.320 --> 0:15:54.080
<v Speaker 1>and stop the the string of car break ins. Some

0:15:54.120 --> 0:15:57.880
<v Speaker 1>people would say that perhaps it was more personal than that,

0:15:58.360 --> 0:16:01.120
<v Speaker 1>but the point being that this was not a counter

0:16:01.200 --> 0:16:03.880
<v Speaker 1>terrorism issue. This was you know, someone breaking in and

0:16:04.040 --> 0:16:07.040
<v Speaker 1>entering into cars, which is you know, that's that's a crime.

0:16:07.800 --> 0:16:10.520
<v Speaker 1>But you people have been arguing, like, what at what

0:16:10.840 --> 0:16:14.440
<v Speaker 1>level of crime do you consider the use of this

0:16:14.520 --> 0:16:19.520
<v Speaker 1>particular type of technology necessary to employ? Yeah, especially given

0:16:19.560 --> 0:16:22.800
<v Speaker 1>the expense not just in financial terms but in terms

0:16:22.880 --> 0:16:27.240
<v Speaker 1>of manpower or time so that's that's one problem, but

0:16:27.400 --> 0:16:30.560
<v Speaker 1>it's my spider sense is telling me that you have

0:16:30.600 --> 0:16:32.960
<v Speaker 1>a bigger problem I've got. I've got so many problems

0:16:33.000 --> 0:16:36.120
<v Speaker 1>with this, So let's let's talk about how it works first,

0:16:36.280 --> 0:16:38.680
<v Speaker 1>because this is this is what leads into where the

0:16:38.720 --> 0:16:43.360
<v Speaker 1>biggest problems that I have where the technology come from. So, uh,

0:16:43.680 --> 0:16:45.720
<v Speaker 1>to understand how this works, you've got to know how

0:16:45.800 --> 0:16:49.360
<v Speaker 1>cell phone works, all right, And we're gonna be super

0:16:49.440 --> 0:16:51.880
<v Speaker 1>high level here because I could do a full episode

0:16:51.880 --> 0:16:55.400
<v Speaker 1>on how cell phones work and you guys would be

0:16:55.600 --> 0:16:59.000
<v Speaker 1>stabbing me because you're wondering why I pulled you in UM.

0:16:59.040 --> 0:17:02.160
<v Speaker 1>But typically the easiest way of explaining it as cell

0:17:02.200 --> 0:17:05.920
<v Speaker 1>phones broadcast over radio frequencies, and you have cell phone

0:17:05.960 --> 0:17:10.000
<v Speaker 1>towers that represent a broadcast area. The towers are able

0:17:10.080 --> 0:17:13.760
<v Speaker 1>to accept the incoming signals from a cell phone and

0:17:13.840 --> 0:17:16.159
<v Speaker 1>outgoing signals that are going to cell phones within that

0:17:16.920 --> 0:17:20.439
<v Speaker 1>UM service area. They're doing so over specific frequency to

0:17:20.520 --> 0:17:24.600
<v Speaker 1>the phones. Your phone knows which frequency quote unquote knows

0:17:24.680 --> 0:17:27.040
<v Speaker 1>which frequency to be in because there's a master control

0:17:27.080 --> 0:17:30.320
<v Speaker 1>system that's telling the phone tune into this frequency so

0:17:30.359 --> 0:17:34.000
<v Speaker 1>that you can receive and transmit information. Technically, you're using

0:17:34.000 --> 0:17:36.280
<v Speaker 1>two frequencies so you can receive and transmit at the

0:17:36.320 --> 0:17:40.640
<v Speaker 1>same time. Then as you leave one cell phone service

0:17:40.720 --> 0:17:43.960
<v Speaker 1>area and you're starting to get closer to another, then

0:17:44.119 --> 0:17:47.160
<v Speaker 1>you have to be handed off right because if if not,

0:17:47.760 --> 0:17:49.959
<v Speaker 1>once you move too far away from the base station,

0:17:50.080 --> 0:17:52.680
<v Speaker 1>you would no longer have service. So this is similar

0:17:52.720 --> 0:17:54.720
<v Speaker 1>to when you move into an area that doesn't have

0:17:55.119 --> 0:17:58.840
<v Speaker 1>the towers that support the service you use. So if

0:17:58.880 --> 0:18:00.600
<v Speaker 1>you're like an A T and T customer and you

0:18:00.640 --> 0:18:02.960
<v Speaker 1>go into an area that's not supported by A T

0:18:03.040 --> 0:18:05.679
<v Speaker 1>and T, then you're out of lock. Your phone becomes

0:18:05.720 --> 0:18:08.840
<v Speaker 1>a brick, right or whatever's on your phone, that's all

0:18:08.880 --> 0:18:12.880
<v Speaker 1>you can use. So you have to have this handoff

0:18:12.880 --> 0:18:17.840
<v Speaker 1>technology for one tower to hand off the the service

0:18:17.960 --> 0:18:21.120
<v Speaker 1>to another tower as you're moving between them. So what's

0:18:21.119 --> 0:18:24.440
<v Speaker 1>happening is your phone is constantly sending little signals even

0:18:24.440 --> 0:18:29.240
<v Speaker 1>when it's not directly in use to say here I

0:18:29.280 --> 0:18:34.760
<v Speaker 1>am It's essentially saying I'm here. Yeah, it's exactly like

0:18:34.800 --> 0:18:37.359
<v Speaker 1>paying a server. It's doing this about every seven to

0:18:37.440 --> 0:18:40.800
<v Speaker 1>fifteen seconds. So this is why even if you don't

0:18:40.880 --> 0:18:46.159
<v Speaker 1>use your phone, the battery life gradually decreases, so the

0:18:46.200 --> 0:18:49.000
<v Speaker 1>reason it does this is very important because if it

0:18:49.080 --> 0:18:51.840
<v Speaker 1>didn't tell the cell phone towers, hey here I am,

0:18:52.160 --> 0:18:54.520
<v Speaker 1>you would never get texts or cell phone or you

0:18:54.640 --> 0:18:57.520
<v Speaker 1>never get a call. You couldn't you just play solitaire

0:18:57.760 --> 0:19:00.720
<v Speaker 1>or whatever. Yeah, because because the sis stone wouldn't know

0:19:00.720 --> 0:19:02.320
<v Speaker 1>where your phone is, so it wouldn't be able to

0:19:02.320 --> 0:19:05.480
<v Speaker 1>send the signal like it doesn't when someone dials your number.

0:19:05.560 --> 0:19:09.159
<v Speaker 1>It doesn't magically right connect to your phone. The system

0:19:09.200 --> 0:19:11.360
<v Speaker 1>has to be aware of where you are and as

0:19:11.440 --> 0:19:14.440
<v Speaker 1>this constant game of Marco polo to ensure that there's

0:19:14.480 --> 0:19:18.360
<v Speaker 1>this seamless transition, right because you as a person, you

0:19:18.400 --> 0:19:21.480
<v Speaker 1>are mobile, so you can move from location to location.

0:19:21.520 --> 0:19:24.119
<v Speaker 1>You are not always going to be next to the

0:19:24.240 --> 0:19:27.960
<v Speaker 1>same cell phone tower all the time. So your phone

0:19:27.960 --> 0:19:31.400
<v Speaker 1>has to constantly, like every seven to fifteen seconds, say

0:19:31.480 --> 0:19:34.200
<v Speaker 1>I'm here. Because if you're in the car and you're

0:19:34.240 --> 0:19:37.040
<v Speaker 1>traveling down the road, you're moving in and out of

0:19:37.119 --> 0:19:41.080
<v Speaker 1>different you know, cell tower ranges. So the different cell

0:19:41.080 --> 0:19:43.399
<v Speaker 1>towers have to be aware of where your phone is

0:19:43.440 --> 0:19:46.200
<v Speaker 1>so that you can continue to receive messages, phone calls,

0:19:46.200 --> 0:19:49.000
<v Speaker 1>that kind of stuff, or make them. Yeah. But the

0:19:49.000 --> 0:19:51.280
<v Speaker 1>problem is that because of this technology, you know that

0:19:51.440 --> 0:19:55.399
<v Speaker 1>this is what makes cell phones useful, but because of

0:19:55.400 --> 0:19:58.040
<v Speaker 1>that same technology, it's also what makes this sting ray

0:19:58.200 --> 0:20:02.720
<v Speaker 1>technology possible. So, because your phone is sending out these

0:20:02.720 --> 0:20:05.240
<v Speaker 1>messages and your phone doesn't know where the next cell

0:20:05.280 --> 0:20:08.359
<v Speaker 1>phone tower is, it's broadcasting these little messages and the

0:20:08.400 --> 0:20:11.159
<v Speaker 1>cell phone towers pick it up. Based upon the signal strength,

0:20:11.160 --> 0:20:13.480
<v Speaker 1>the cell phone tower knows if you are moving toward

0:20:13.520 --> 0:20:17.200
<v Speaker 1>it or moving away from it. The sting ray ends

0:20:17.280 --> 0:20:20.080
<v Speaker 1>up mimicking the cell phone tower. So your little cell

0:20:20.119 --> 0:20:22.320
<v Speaker 1>phone sends out a message and the stingray picks it up.

0:20:22.720 --> 0:20:24.480
<v Speaker 1>Sting ray now knows where your phone is, or at

0:20:24.560 --> 0:20:28.200
<v Speaker 1>least knows that your phone is in that area. As

0:20:28.240 --> 0:20:30.280
<v Speaker 1>the signal gets stronger, the sting ray knows that your

0:20:30.320 --> 0:20:33.680
<v Speaker 1>phone is getting closer to it. If you have triangulated this,

0:20:33.960 --> 0:20:36.480
<v Speaker 1>then it knows where you are. Or if you have

0:20:36.600 --> 0:20:39.640
<v Speaker 1>one of the other devices that pair with the sting

0:20:39.760 --> 0:20:42.800
<v Speaker 1>ray that can help track and locate, the sting ray

0:20:42.840 --> 0:20:44.800
<v Speaker 1>knows where you are. There's a laptop that you would

0:20:44.800 --> 0:20:47.760
<v Speaker 1>connect to this device that would give you the redoubt

0:20:47.840 --> 0:20:49.919
<v Speaker 1>that would be useful for a human being, because right

0:20:49.960 --> 0:20:53.080
<v Speaker 1>now we're talking all about technology that and data that

0:20:53.160 --> 0:20:55.760
<v Speaker 1>machines could use, but it is not useful to us

0:20:55.800 --> 0:20:57.920
<v Speaker 1>because we wouldn't be able to see it. But the

0:20:58.040 --> 0:21:02.680
<v Speaker 1>laptop expresses that in ways that make it possible for

0:21:02.720 --> 0:21:08.120
<v Speaker 1>you to see. Maybe with mapping software. It's plotting the

0:21:08.200 --> 0:21:11.840
<v Speaker 1>location against a map, as well as identification of the

0:21:12.520 --> 0:21:17.760
<v Speaker 1>phone numbers UM and the I D number that's unique

0:21:17.800 --> 0:21:23.280
<v Speaker 1>to that particular mobile phone. So the issue here is

0:21:23.320 --> 0:21:29.760
<v Speaker 1>that this this sting ray, we'll accept all of those

0:21:29.800 --> 0:21:33.399
<v Speaker 1>incoming messages, all those things. Yeah, anything that's within the

0:21:33.560 --> 0:21:37.480
<v Speaker 1>area that that the sensitivity of that antenna, it will

0:21:37.520 --> 0:21:40.560
<v Speaker 1>pick that up. So is it like, is it just metadata?

0:21:41.240 --> 0:21:49.240
<v Speaker 1>Well yes, originally, first it's just, first of all, just metadata,

0:21:49.800 --> 0:21:54.040
<v Speaker 1>just metadata, because metadata you don't need very much of

0:21:54.080 --> 0:21:58.240
<v Speaker 1>it to start making some very scary conclusions. You can

0:21:58.280 --> 0:22:01.560
<v Speaker 1>start to really narrow down who person is based upon

0:22:01.640 --> 0:22:05.040
<v Speaker 1>some metaday, their routines, what they do in the real world,

0:22:05.080 --> 0:22:07.600
<v Speaker 1>and when they do it, the phone numbers they might

0:22:07.680 --> 0:22:10.600
<v Speaker 1>be in contact with at that time. The phone number

0:22:10.600 --> 0:22:13.160
<v Speaker 1>of the device itself obviously would be very important. So

0:22:14.200 --> 0:22:18.640
<v Speaker 1>let's say that you two YouTube and Ben you are

0:22:18.680 --> 0:22:22.359
<v Speaker 1>you are? You are the cops? Okay, you're in your

0:22:22.440 --> 0:22:26.080
<v Speaker 1>van the power. Yeah, I know, not go crazy. Do

0:22:26.119 --> 0:22:28.320
<v Speaker 1>we have a tank? You do not have a tank.

0:22:29.240 --> 0:22:34.280
<v Speaker 1>We're not We're not Swanny. Was Swanny? Wasn't it? I

0:22:34.320 --> 0:22:37.560
<v Speaker 1>was thinking I Swanny. By the way, listeners, is is

0:22:37.760 --> 0:22:40.720
<v Speaker 1>just to the northeast of Atlanta. It's a little part

0:22:40.760 --> 0:22:44.840
<v Speaker 1>of Metro Atlanta area. Um and they have a tank.

0:22:45.320 --> 0:22:48.960
<v Speaker 1>So anyway, you are in a van, you have heard

0:22:48.960 --> 0:22:51.960
<v Speaker 1>about tanks, but you do not currently own one. You've

0:22:52.000 --> 0:22:54.160
<v Speaker 1>got plenty of donuts to get you through the day.

0:22:55.119 --> 0:22:56.800
<v Speaker 1>By the way, if you were in law enforcement, and

0:22:56.800 --> 0:23:00.440
<v Speaker 1>I am offending you, dear listeners, I'm merely poking fun.

0:23:00.920 --> 0:23:03.000
<v Speaker 1>I love you guys at any rate. So you guys

0:23:03.040 --> 0:23:07.479
<v Speaker 1>are looking at the incoming messages that are being hittop.

0:23:07.640 --> 0:23:12.359
<v Speaker 1>You're looking specifically for a phone number associated with a suspect,

0:23:13.119 --> 0:23:15.399
<v Speaker 1>a person of interest. You want to be able to

0:23:15.440 --> 0:23:19.160
<v Speaker 1>track this person down, but so far have been unable

0:23:19.200 --> 0:23:21.560
<v Speaker 1>to do so. You have heard that this person may

0:23:21.600 --> 0:23:23.520
<v Speaker 1>in fact be in this particular part of town, which

0:23:23.520 --> 0:23:25.919
<v Speaker 1>is why you have parked your van, And all you

0:23:25.960 --> 0:23:28.600
<v Speaker 1>are doing is looking for a hit of that particular

0:23:28.680 --> 0:23:31.600
<v Speaker 1>number as it moves through. And once you do, you

0:23:31.680 --> 0:23:35.440
<v Speaker 1>then try to triangulate, you locate, and then your your

0:23:35.480 --> 0:23:39.720
<v Speaker 1>send people out there to talk to this suspect or

0:23:39.800 --> 0:23:42.960
<v Speaker 1>person of interest. Now that that alone, that sounds like

0:23:43.000 --> 0:23:46.320
<v Speaker 1>that's okay. I mean, there might be some problems we

0:23:46.359 --> 0:23:50.000
<v Speaker 1>have here, but you're specifically looking for the hit. You're

0:23:50.040 --> 0:23:53.200
<v Speaker 1>not looking at the massive amount of information that's coming in.

0:23:53.680 --> 0:23:59.800
<v Speaker 1>You're looking for something specific. Yeah, and now, Matt, I know,

0:24:00.720 --> 0:24:03.560
<v Speaker 1>I know that, dude, I know, I know. It's the

0:24:03.560 --> 0:24:07.160
<v Speaker 1>pencil pushers who really are to blame. Don't don't, don't

0:24:07.200 --> 0:24:11.800
<v Speaker 1>bust my chops um so at any rate, Yeah, in

0:24:11.800 --> 0:24:15.280
<v Speaker 1>this case, you are specifically looking for a particular phone number.

0:24:15.280 --> 0:24:17.879
<v Speaker 1>It's a little more tricky if you don't know the

0:24:17.960 --> 0:24:22.240
<v Speaker 1>number though, right Like now you're looking for patterns. Now

0:24:22.280 --> 0:24:27.919
<v Speaker 1>you're looking specifically for activities that match what you suspect

0:24:28.119 --> 0:24:32.240
<v Speaker 1>your target is already doing. You're also possibly looking to

0:24:32.960 --> 0:24:35.560
<v Speaker 1>find out what phone numbers are being used in an area. Now,

0:24:35.560 --> 0:24:38.639
<v Speaker 1>this is where it really gets tricky because some of

0:24:38.680 --> 0:24:40.960
<v Speaker 1>these devices, not all of them, but the sting ray

0:24:41.000 --> 0:24:45.240
<v Speaker 1>and the trigger fish included both can tell you if

0:24:45.280 --> 0:24:48.760
<v Speaker 1>someone makes a call from within that area that the

0:24:48.800 --> 0:24:54.080
<v Speaker 1>sting ray covers. You can see what number they called. Now, now,

0:24:54.640 --> 0:24:57.600
<v Speaker 1>at least with the basic sting ray, you can't listen

0:24:57.640 --> 0:25:04.080
<v Speaker 1>in on the call. You just know the time, the number,

0:25:04.200 --> 0:25:06.920
<v Speaker 1>and the duration of the call. Hold on. It sounds

0:25:06.960 --> 0:25:08.760
<v Speaker 1>like we're getting to a point where we can listen

0:25:08.840 --> 0:25:13.200
<v Speaker 1>to these calls basic sting ray. Yeah. Okay, So remember

0:25:13.200 --> 0:25:16.480
<v Speaker 1>when I said you can upgrade. So sting ray is

0:25:16.600 --> 0:25:19.359
<v Speaker 1>it's a computer, is what it boils down to. I mean,

0:25:19.400 --> 0:25:22.000
<v Speaker 1>it's more than a computer, but it has elements of

0:25:22.000 --> 0:25:26.159
<v Speaker 1>a computer. It runs software. There is software that you

0:25:26.240 --> 0:25:30.200
<v Speaker 1>can install on the sting ray that does allow you

0:25:30.520 --> 0:25:34.400
<v Speaker 1>to listen in. There is fish Hawk, which is software

0:25:34.400 --> 0:25:37.919
<v Speaker 1>that allows you to eavesdrop upon conversations. And there's also Porpoise.

0:25:38.560 --> 0:25:42.160
<v Speaker 1>You might have noticed a theme I was gonna ask about.

0:25:43.000 --> 0:25:48.000
<v Speaker 1>They're in Florida, that makes sense. But anyway, so the

0:25:48.080 --> 0:25:52.640
<v Speaker 1>porpoise allows you to uh see texts that are sent

0:25:53.840 --> 0:25:58.200
<v Speaker 1>through here. So it's again it's messages or phone calls

0:25:58.240 --> 0:26:02.639
<v Speaker 1>that are sent from the phone out through the the

0:26:03.119 --> 0:26:07.320
<v Speaker 1>sting ray that go on. Now, this obviously raises a

0:26:07.359 --> 0:26:11.560
<v Speaker 1>lot of very tricky questions, particularly when it comes to

0:26:11.920 --> 0:26:17.640
<v Speaker 1>basic rights, because if you are just taking in everything

0:26:17.880 --> 0:26:21.159
<v Speaker 1>and you can potentially read all the text messages or

0:26:21.240 --> 0:26:23.640
<v Speaker 1>listening on any of the conversations that are going through.

0:26:24.160 --> 0:26:27.119
<v Speaker 1>Then remember this is just based on geography. You know,

0:26:27.160 --> 0:26:31.840
<v Speaker 1>you're not targeting, you're getting everything. There's no probable cause,

0:26:31.960 --> 0:26:34.960
<v Speaker 1>there's no probable cause, there's no warrant. So back in

0:26:34.960 --> 0:26:37.880
<v Speaker 1>our scenario, Ben and I in our readout, well, okay,

0:26:37.880 --> 0:26:41.120
<v Speaker 1>I'm driving, so Ben, you're alright, so you're the wheelman,

0:26:41.200 --> 0:26:44.359
<v Speaker 1>get it so you can see. Then we'll be able

0:26:44.400 --> 0:26:47.359
<v Speaker 1>to see all of this on a readout. A Matt, look,

0:26:47.680 --> 0:26:50.440
<v Speaker 1>look at his number. It's been going back and forth

0:26:50.440 --> 0:26:53.960
<v Speaker 1>from these two cell phone towers every freaking Thursday. Yeah.

0:26:54.240 --> 0:26:57.440
<v Speaker 1>Or it could be Ben saying, hey, Matt, look this

0:26:57.640 --> 0:27:01.439
<v Speaker 1>duphus over here thinks his girlfriend's gonna may can dinner tonight,

0:27:01.480 --> 0:27:04.119
<v Speaker 1>and we already know she ain't gonna do that, right buddy,

0:27:04.480 --> 0:27:07.680
<v Speaker 1>You guys are so good at after this comes out,

0:27:08.000 --> 0:27:14.760
<v Speaker 1>it's so I'll just be stopped on the street. We've

0:27:14.800 --> 0:27:17.399
<v Speaker 1>got more to say in this classic episode of tech stuff.

0:27:17.440 --> 0:27:31.800
<v Speaker 1>After these quick messages, that's funny until it happened, alright,

0:27:31.840 --> 0:27:36.560
<v Speaker 1>So at any rate, uh yeah, yeah, I mean technically,

0:27:36.600 --> 0:27:39.520
<v Speaker 1>if you have the right technology right, being the the

0:27:39.560 --> 0:27:43.080
<v Speaker 1>appropriate one for this, uh, and you have the correct

0:27:43.080 --> 0:27:46.480
<v Speaker 1>software on it, then you could be you could start

0:27:46.640 --> 0:27:50.720
<v Speaker 1>filtering through you could potentially read anything that's coming through

0:27:50.720 --> 0:27:53.600
<v Speaker 1>that that stingray device. So again, it would be any

0:27:53.600 --> 0:27:57.640
<v Speaker 1>phone that was within that range of the antenna. Um

0:27:57.720 --> 0:28:01.399
<v Speaker 1>you wouldn't necessarily I mean you probably wouldn't be storing

0:28:01.400 --> 0:28:03.639
<v Speaker 1>at all. I mean you could if you had a

0:28:03.680 --> 0:28:05.200
<v Speaker 1>large enough hard drive. That would be another thing you

0:28:05.200 --> 0:28:11.800
<v Speaker 1>would need to have in your array of technology piling

0:28:11.880 --> 0:28:14.800
<v Speaker 1>up very quickly. Yeah, and so this is starting to

0:28:14.840 --> 0:28:17.840
<v Speaker 1>sound probably very similar to the discussions we've had about

0:28:17.840 --> 0:28:19.720
<v Speaker 1>the n s A. You know, the fact that they

0:28:19.960 --> 0:28:24.600
<v Speaker 1>have been collecting cell phone data at the they're doing

0:28:24.640 --> 0:28:28.440
<v Speaker 1>it at the provider level, right like they're there, they've

0:28:28.480 --> 0:28:33.800
<v Speaker 1>got their ears on this national or even global level,

0:28:33.840 --> 0:28:39.080
<v Speaker 1>whereas we're really talking about very regional effects here. Yes,

0:28:39.240 --> 0:28:42.440
<v Speaker 1>still very concerning. So how much how much information can

0:28:42.520 --> 0:28:46.640
<v Speaker 1>it actually capture? Um, well, you know it's here all right.

0:28:47.160 --> 0:28:51.680
<v Speaker 1>Here's the thing. We don't know the full extent of

0:28:51.680 --> 0:28:55.320
<v Speaker 1>what I can capture because secrets have to be kept

0:28:55.480 --> 0:29:00.640
<v Speaker 1>for your safety from the creators of sting ray or

0:29:00.760 --> 0:29:03.600
<v Speaker 1>from the police departments. In the law enforcement. I'm just

0:29:03.640 --> 0:29:09.280
<v Speaker 1>gonna say yes from both. So there was a story recently.

0:29:09.360 --> 0:29:11.040
<v Speaker 1>I think it was I want to say it was

0:29:11.120 --> 0:29:13.680
<v Speaker 1>Santa Clara, California, but I could be wrong. It was

0:29:13.720 --> 0:29:17.040
<v Speaker 1>a It was a town in California, however, that recently

0:29:17.440 --> 0:29:22.480
<v Speaker 1>declined to purchase from Harris Corporation because they said there

0:29:22.520 --> 0:29:25.720
<v Speaker 1>were agreements that they would have been forced to enter

0:29:25.840 --> 0:29:31.840
<v Speaker 1>into that would prevent them from releasing any information about

0:29:31.920 --> 0:29:34.840
<v Speaker 1>the product, even in the face of a Freedom of

0:29:34.880 --> 0:29:39.560
<v Speaker 1>Information Act request. So an iron clad in yes, like

0:29:39.600 --> 0:29:43.520
<v Speaker 1>a nondisclosure agreement to trump all nondisclosure. How the heck

0:29:43.560 --> 0:29:47.600
<v Speaker 1>do you get aroun A. You mostly just drag your

0:29:47.640 --> 0:29:49.920
<v Speaker 1>heels as long as possible and hope that the judge

0:29:49.920 --> 0:29:52.800
<v Speaker 1>that ends up hearing any case about it is not

0:29:53.000 --> 0:29:56.480
<v Speaker 1>savvy enough to understand the implications of this technology. You

0:29:56.520 --> 0:30:00.680
<v Speaker 1>can appeal for national security, I think right. That's essentially

0:30:00.680 --> 0:30:02.640
<v Speaker 1>what they say is that if we were to tell

0:30:02.720 --> 0:30:07.080
<v Speaker 1>you what the capabilities of this technology were, then the

0:30:07.160 --> 0:30:09.680
<v Speaker 1>bad guys would be able to work around it, thus

0:30:09.760 --> 0:30:12.560
<v Speaker 1>making the technology useless and we'd only be getting your

0:30:12.640 --> 0:30:15.840
<v Speaker 1>boring text messages instead of the bad guys stuff. Well,

0:30:15.880 --> 0:30:20.400
<v Speaker 1>it's okay just to play the advocate here that kind

0:30:20.400 --> 0:30:24.920
<v Speaker 1>of reasoning, which is incredibly slippery and dangerous. It does

0:30:25.040 --> 0:30:28.880
<v Speaker 1>make sense if you think again about the ostensible purpose, right,

0:30:29.040 --> 0:30:32.400
<v Speaker 1>the the idea that this stuff could be rendered useless

0:30:32.800 --> 0:30:34.920
<v Speaker 1>if it wasn't a secret. But also, I'm just gonna

0:30:34.960 --> 0:30:37.880
<v Speaker 1>say the word I'm going to say is convenient. It's

0:30:37.880 --> 0:30:42.320
<v Speaker 1>a convenient reason well, and it's it's yeah, when you

0:30:42.360 --> 0:30:45.720
<v Speaker 1>have like a rubber stamp that's a secret, then how

0:30:45.720 --> 0:30:48.480
<v Speaker 1>do you have oversight? How can you make certain that

0:30:48.520 --> 0:30:53.680
<v Speaker 1>the figures that have been put into authority positions in

0:30:53.840 --> 0:30:57.520
<v Speaker 1>order to help the citizens, how can you make sure

0:30:57.560 --> 0:31:00.800
<v Speaker 1>that they are doing that that do that they've been

0:31:01.320 --> 0:31:04.760
<v Speaker 1>they've been tasked with, as opposed to abusing it or

0:31:04.920 --> 0:31:07.800
<v Speaker 1>misusing it, maybe not even abusing it on purpose, but

0:31:07.960 --> 0:31:14.560
<v Speaker 1>perhaps through you know, no no maliciousness, have been using

0:31:14.600 --> 0:31:18.800
<v Speaker 1>it incorrectly. Uh. And there have been arguments that judges

0:31:18.880 --> 0:31:23.320
<v Speaker 1>have allowed this kind of technology to be used because

0:31:24.080 --> 0:31:27.640
<v Speaker 1>the explanations they were given about what the technology did

0:31:28.000 --> 0:31:32.880
<v Speaker 1>were purposefully vague and limited, so that they would not

0:31:33.200 --> 0:31:36.880
<v Speaker 1>know the full extent of what this technology does. So,

0:31:36.920 --> 0:31:39.040
<v Speaker 1>in other words, here's where we're going to kind of

0:31:39.080 --> 0:31:41.920
<v Speaker 1>transition into more of the policy stuff, because you know,

0:31:42.480 --> 0:31:44.560
<v Speaker 1>that's really why I got you guys to come on here.

0:31:44.840 --> 0:31:47.320
<v Speaker 1>The technology we've kind of covered, you know, the very

0:31:47.360 --> 0:31:50.400
<v Speaker 1>basic ideas that he's a man in the middle kind

0:31:50.400 --> 0:31:54.000
<v Speaker 1>of attack. The reason why I brought you on here

0:31:54.080 --> 0:31:58.280
<v Speaker 1>is because this is my own personal perspective, my own opinion.

0:31:58.760 --> 0:32:03.959
<v Speaker 1>But my opinion is at this technology is dangerously close,

0:32:04.120 --> 0:32:08.720
<v Speaker 1>if not identical, to the concept of issuing a general warrant,

0:32:09.280 --> 0:32:12.360
<v Speaker 1>which is precisely what the Fourth Amendment was supposed to

0:32:12.560 --> 0:32:15.680
<v Speaker 1>protect us from. So the idea being that here in

0:32:15.720 --> 0:32:18.560
<v Speaker 1>the United States, by the way, this technology is being

0:32:18.640 --> 0:32:20.440
<v Speaker 1>used in other places. In fact, one of the reasons

0:32:20.440 --> 0:32:22.760
<v Speaker 1>that I brought up is because recently Sky News was

0:32:22.800 --> 0:32:25.800
<v Speaker 1>reporting about how it's being used in the UK. Uh.

0:32:25.880 --> 0:32:29.160
<v Speaker 1>It had been thought to have been used in the

0:32:29.240 --> 0:32:31.520
<v Speaker 1>UK for a while, but now there's kind of essentially

0:32:31.520 --> 0:32:35.200
<v Speaker 1>ironclad evidence that yes, it's being used as the UK. Yeah.

0:32:35.240 --> 0:32:39.120
<v Speaker 1>So the reason why, uh, you know, I brought you

0:32:39.120 --> 0:32:42.840
<v Speaker 1>guys in is this this idea of one of the

0:32:42.880 --> 0:32:45.760
<v Speaker 1>founding principles of the United States of America was that

0:32:47.200 --> 0:32:50.520
<v Speaker 1>the colonists didn't they weren't so crazy about the British

0:32:50.560 --> 0:32:54.760
<v Speaker 1>coming up and going into every single house looking for

0:32:54.800 --> 0:32:59.360
<v Speaker 1>a specific person, with no reason to suspect that the

0:32:59.400 --> 0:33:01.880
<v Speaker 1>person of ed was actually in the houses they were stopping.

0:33:01.920 --> 0:33:06.480
<v Speaker 1>It's just a general blanket search, right, So search and seizure.

0:33:06.480 --> 0:33:09.320
<v Speaker 1>The idea of being that we're looking for this person.

0:33:09.640 --> 0:33:13.040
<v Speaker 1>This person is is bad and so you have no

0:33:13.240 --> 0:33:16.000
<v Speaker 1>rights until we find this person. So we're gonna go

0:33:16.080 --> 0:33:18.680
<v Speaker 1>into your house and turn it upside down looking for

0:33:18.720 --> 0:33:20.920
<v Speaker 1>this person. If they're not there, too, well, okay, well

0:33:21.080 --> 0:33:22.800
<v Speaker 1>good for you, too bad for us. We're gonna go

0:33:22.840 --> 0:33:28.240
<v Speaker 1>do it to the next family. Ah. So, this approach

0:33:28.960 --> 0:33:32.680
<v Speaker 1>of using a device to pull in all incoming data,

0:33:33.520 --> 0:33:36.240
<v Speaker 1>even if you're looking for a really bad person, you're

0:33:36.240 --> 0:33:39.920
<v Speaker 1>getting everything, and it doesn't seem that different to me

0:33:41.240 --> 0:33:44.040
<v Speaker 1>than the approach of there's this bad person out there,

0:33:44.120 --> 0:33:46.720
<v Speaker 1>we're going to go through everybody's house until we find

0:33:46.720 --> 0:33:48.960
<v Speaker 1>that person. So for me, there are a couple of

0:33:48.960 --> 0:33:51.160
<v Speaker 1>things you have to establish. One of them is does

0:33:51.200 --> 0:33:54.560
<v Speaker 1>that data that you're sending out belong to you? Is

0:33:54.600 --> 0:33:58.320
<v Speaker 1>it really yours or you know, is it the companies

0:33:58.440 --> 0:34:01.680
<v Speaker 1>that you're using just to ostensibly send the information to

0:34:01.720 --> 0:34:05.800
<v Speaker 1>a cell tower to another person. Um, and then for me,

0:34:06.200 --> 0:34:08.600
<v Speaker 1>if you look at things like when the Boston bombing occurred,

0:34:08.760 --> 0:34:11.440
<v Speaker 1>and then the search for the Sarnative brothers afterwards, and

0:34:11.560 --> 0:34:14.520
<v Speaker 1>when the police were going through and essentially doing what

0:34:14.560 --> 0:34:18.960
<v Speaker 1>you're saying, searching through houses. Yeah, with just it's not

0:34:19.080 --> 0:34:21.960
<v Speaker 1>really a general warrant, but something kind of similar to that,

0:34:22.080 --> 0:34:24.959
<v Speaker 1>where yeah, I mean they didn't have all they didn't

0:34:24.960 --> 0:34:27.440
<v Speaker 1>have a warrant for each specific house they went through,

0:34:27.800 --> 0:34:31.880
<v Speaker 1>which they're supposed to if if I mean, your rights

0:34:31.960 --> 0:34:33.880
<v Speaker 1>as a citizen are supposed to say, listen, if you

0:34:33.920 --> 0:34:36.200
<v Speaker 1>don't have a warrant, you cannot come into my house.

0:34:36.320 --> 0:34:39.600
<v Speaker 1>That is a constitutional right guaranteed to me. Yeah, it's

0:34:39.640 --> 0:34:43.400
<v Speaker 1>the old, the old ticking time bomb reasoning, which I

0:34:43.440 --> 0:34:49.120
<v Speaker 1>find fairly disingenuous. Uh. When the idea we heard it before,

0:34:49.200 --> 0:34:53.200
<v Speaker 1>with the idea of using torture to obtain some sort

0:34:53.200 --> 0:34:56.600
<v Speaker 1>of confession or insider information, where people would say, well,

0:34:56.880 --> 0:35:00.040
<v Speaker 1>torture is not ordinarily allowed, but if there is a

0:35:00.080 --> 0:35:01.919
<v Speaker 1>bomb that is going to go off in a set

0:35:01.920 --> 0:35:04.279
<v Speaker 1>amount of time, and we have one person who knows

0:35:04.320 --> 0:35:09.799
<v Speaker 1>the information in custody, then shouldn't we torture somebody to

0:35:09.840 --> 0:35:12.200
<v Speaker 1>save a hundred people or whatever the number is. And

0:35:12.320 --> 0:35:15.359
<v Speaker 1>this with what's similar to me about this is that

0:35:15.400 --> 0:35:20.319
<v Speaker 1>this encounters um so many ways to bend rules that

0:35:20.360 --> 0:35:23.040
<v Speaker 1>are that exists for a reason, as you said, and

0:35:24.000 --> 0:35:28.920
<v Speaker 1>it doesn't really provide a way to bend those rules

0:35:28.960 --> 0:35:31.960
<v Speaker 1>back to their original shape. I mean, Jonathan, I can

0:35:32.000 --> 0:35:36.239
<v Speaker 1>think of already, uh several scenarios wherein this gig gets

0:35:36.280 --> 0:35:39.200
<v Speaker 1>sticky very quickly. Matt. I love that you mentioned, Uh.

0:35:39.280 --> 0:35:43.200
<v Speaker 1>It might not be the person actually using the phone, right,

0:35:43.239 --> 0:35:46.080
<v Speaker 1>It might be someone else, uh took a phone right

0:35:46.360 --> 0:35:49.400
<v Speaker 1>and used it as a burner. But the person, the

0:35:49.440 --> 0:35:53.520
<v Speaker 1>innocent person whose name is uh tied to that number

0:35:53.680 --> 0:35:57.919
<v Speaker 1>that I d they're going to be automatically suspect number

0:35:57.960 --> 0:36:01.120
<v Speaker 1>one or maybe even public enemy number one. Another question

0:36:01.200 --> 0:36:04.600
<v Speaker 1>is what if? What if? This search? Right? So let's

0:36:04.600 --> 0:36:08.120
<v Speaker 1>go back in, Um, Matt, you and I are still cops, Jonathan,

0:36:08.160 --> 0:36:12.120
<v Speaker 1>your FBI, your special investigator. All right, you came in,

0:36:12.239 --> 0:36:14.400
<v Speaker 1>you said, I'm taking over this investigation. I got a

0:36:14.400 --> 0:36:16.600
<v Speaker 1>little flip phone because I'm from the later seasons of

0:36:16.800 --> 0:36:20.239
<v Speaker 1>X Files, right exactly right, black two, black tie, whole thing.

0:36:20.640 --> 0:36:25.040
<v Speaker 1>And you say that we are looking for you know,

0:36:25.200 --> 0:36:31.040
<v Speaker 1>insert bad guy's name here. Uh. And while we're looking though, however, uh,

0:36:31.080 --> 0:36:35.440
<v Speaker 1>there are our search our vacuum cleaner approach brings in

0:36:35.520 --> 0:36:40.839
<v Speaker 1>another number that pings on your radar because you were

0:36:41.880 --> 0:36:45.440
<v Speaker 1>already suspicious of one person doing, you know, a federal

0:36:45.560 --> 0:36:49.400
<v Speaker 1>level crime. So this person who we were not looking for,

0:36:49.960 --> 0:36:53.319
<v Speaker 1>just showed up. What happens then, Uh? Well, I mean,

0:36:53.320 --> 0:36:56.239
<v Speaker 1>obviously I gotta take over the investigation. I've seen a

0:36:56.320 --> 0:37:00.120
<v Speaker 1>lot of episodes of various crime dramas, and that's what

0:37:00.160 --> 0:37:02.000
<v Speaker 1>the That's the only thing the FBI is around to

0:37:02.040 --> 0:37:06.239
<v Speaker 1>do is to push the local police force out of

0:37:06.800 --> 0:37:09.360
<v Speaker 1>this was my case. That's the way you have to

0:37:09.400 --> 0:37:12.120
<v Speaker 1>keep putting your sunglasses on and taking the Occasionally you

0:37:12.160 --> 0:37:15.960
<v Speaker 1>just hear the who yeah, yeah, Well I've got a

0:37:16.000 --> 0:37:19.040
<v Speaker 1>scenario kind of like that. Unlessing, Jonathan, do you want

0:37:19.040 --> 0:37:22.000
<v Speaker 1>to do? Answer no, No, I did. The only answer

0:37:22.000 --> 0:37:24.759
<v Speaker 1>to that that I have is that I would imagine

0:37:25.120 --> 0:37:30.760
<v Speaker 1>that at least until there are some strong precedents set

0:37:30.840 --> 0:37:35.320
<v Speaker 1>in in court about the actual use of this technology,

0:37:35.400 --> 0:37:38.360
<v Speaker 1>what it really can do, and whether or not it

0:37:38.520 --> 0:37:41.360
<v Speaker 1>truly is constitutional to use it in the way that

0:37:41.360 --> 0:37:45.480
<v Speaker 1>it's being used. I would imagine at least until that happens,

0:37:46.239 --> 0:37:49.280
<v Speaker 1>the FBI acts on that act on that information, because

0:37:49.320 --> 0:37:51.280
<v Speaker 1>if there if no one has come out and said

0:37:52.400 --> 0:37:56.480
<v Speaker 1>you can't do that, they're going to do that. And

0:37:57.560 --> 0:38:00.480
<v Speaker 1>I don't mean to cast aspersions on lawn enforcement of

0:38:00.520 --> 0:38:05.680
<v Speaker 1>the FBI. I realized that they have incredibly difficult and

0:38:05.960 --> 0:38:10.600
<v Speaker 1>very high stakes jobs, right and in order for them

0:38:10.640 --> 0:38:13.439
<v Speaker 1>to be able to do those jobs in an increasingly

0:38:13.640 --> 0:38:18.360
<v Speaker 1>complex technological world, there are some very tough questions we

0:38:18.400 --> 0:38:21.200
<v Speaker 1>have to answer. But the problem I have is that

0:38:21.239 --> 0:38:23.880
<v Speaker 1>these are questions that that seem to already have been

0:38:23.880 --> 0:38:26.719
<v Speaker 1>answered in the past. We just haven't applied the answer yet,

0:38:27.440 --> 0:38:31.440
<v Speaker 1>or people judges in particular, haven't understood the implications of

0:38:31.440 --> 0:38:37.280
<v Speaker 1>this technology, and that we're seeing some civil liberties fade

0:38:37.280 --> 0:38:41.000
<v Speaker 1>away as a result or get less, you know, like

0:38:41.000 --> 0:38:43.920
<v Speaker 1>like it's like you are protected against this except in

0:38:44.000 --> 0:38:48.120
<v Speaker 1>all of these other newer situations, many of which we

0:38:48.239 --> 0:38:52.000
<v Speaker 1>cannot legally tell you about because national security, right, because

0:38:52.000 --> 0:38:54.960
<v Speaker 1>if we told you about how we're violating your civil liberties,

0:38:55.000 --> 0:38:58.239
<v Speaker 1>then the bad guys would win. Like, well, technically, if

0:38:58.280 --> 0:39:00.560
<v Speaker 1>you're telling me that my civil liberties are being violated,

0:39:00.600 --> 0:39:03.319
<v Speaker 1>but you can't tell me how the bad guys have one. Yeah,

0:39:03.440 --> 0:39:06.000
<v Speaker 1>it's it's an interesting deliminate is one that we keep

0:39:06.080 --> 0:39:08.960
<v Speaker 1>running into. And this is not the first time. I

0:39:09.000 --> 0:39:12.360
<v Speaker 1>love that you mentioned there's precedent through about this throughout history.

0:39:12.400 --> 0:39:15.480
<v Speaker 1>I mean back when it was just the post office, right. Uh,

0:39:15.560 --> 0:39:18.160
<v Speaker 1>there were there were still these ongoing debates about what

0:39:18.320 --> 0:39:21.520
<v Speaker 1>kind of right to privacy should someone expect when they're

0:39:21.600 --> 0:39:27.640
<v Speaker 1>using the postal system. But you also mentioned advocacy groups,

0:39:28.320 --> 0:39:31.600
<v Speaker 1>So is there some organized opposition to there's quite quite

0:39:31.600 --> 0:39:34.239
<v Speaker 1>a lot. There's a lot of disorganized opposition too. But

0:39:34.320 --> 0:39:37.840
<v Speaker 1>the organized opposition includes like the Electronic Frontier Foundation, the

0:39:37.880 --> 0:39:42.480
<v Speaker 1>e F E f UH, there's the American Civil Liberties Union,

0:39:42.560 --> 0:39:45.920
<v Speaker 1>the a c l u UH, there's EPIC. There are

0:39:45.920 --> 0:39:48.960
<v Speaker 1>all these different groups that are all about privacy and

0:39:49.200 --> 0:39:54.480
<v Speaker 1>civil rights that have identified problem areas with US technologies,

0:39:54.600 --> 0:39:56.759
<v Speaker 1>some of which have been they've kind of some of

0:39:56.760 --> 0:40:00.319
<v Speaker 1>them have couched their arguments, largely because they ay, we

0:40:00.440 --> 0:40:04.719
<v Speaker 1>can't come out and say how strongly strongly we feel

0:40:04.719 --> 0:40:09.719
<v Speaker 1>about this because of the secrecy involved. Without knowing everything,

0:40:10.600 --> 0:40:13.359
<v Speaker 1>we we don't want to suspect the worst. But we

0:40:13.440 --> 0:40:17.000
<v Speaker 1>can't discount it either because you won't tell us what

0:40:17.080 --> 0:40:20.920
<v Speaker 1>it does or how it's being used. Um, you know,

0:40:21.000 --> 0:40:23.080
<v Speaker 1>but there are a lot who are saying you need

0:40:23.120 --> 0:40:27.040
<v Speaker 1>to have rules set in place on how this technology

0:40:27.040 --> 0:40:29.279
<v Speaker 1>can be used, if in fact it is legal to

0:40:29.360 --> 0:40:33.680
<v Speaker 1>use it at all. So, for example, perhaps before you

0:40:33.800 --> 0:40:37.440
<v Speaker 1>use this you have to secure a warrant that specifies

0:40:38.160 --> 0:40:41.960
<v Speaker 1>who you are looking for and and narrows that down

0:40:42.480 --> 0:40:44.480
<v Speaker 1>to a point where you can't just throw out a

0:40:44.640 --> 0:40:48.520
<v Speaker 1>net and everybody who's caught in the net, their lives

0:40:48.520 --> 0:40:51.320
<v Speaker 1>are turned upside down for the duration of you sorting

0:40:51.320 --> 0:40:54.600
<v Speaker 1>out which person is the one you actually are interested in.

0:40:54.719 --> 0:40:58.840
<v Speaker 1>But they'll never know the collateral damage isn't really collateral

0:40:58.880 --> 0:41:02.520
<v Speaker 1>if they have no idea, Well, they might not ever know.

0:41:03.080 --> 0:41:05.479
<v Speaker 1>And you know, you could argue that in a world

0:41:05.560 --> 0:41:08.200
<v Speaker 1>where you never know that this is happening and it's

0:41:08.200 --> 0:41:13.560
<v Speaker 1>never affecting you, stick with me. You're in a world

0:41:13.600 --> 0:41:16.239
<v Speaker 1>where you you don't know that's happening to you and

0:41:16.320 --> 0:41:19.880
<v Speaker 1>it's not having any noticeable effect on your life. Ultimately,

0:41:20.239 --> 0:41:22.080
<v Speaker 1>you might be able to go to sleep at night

0:41:22.120 --> 0:41:24.400
<v Speaker 1>and think, well, it doesn't really matter, because if it

0:41:24.520 --> 0:41:27.640
<v Speaker 1>is not affecting my life. Then I mean, I don't

0:41:27.640 --> 0:41:29.680
<v Speaker 1>want it to happen, and I'm still going to protest

0:41:29.680 --> 0:41:32.040
<v Speaker 1>it happening because I don't think it's right. But if

0:41:32.080 --> 0:41:34.560
<v Speaker 1>it doesn't have a noticeable effect on my life at

0:41:34.600 --> 0:41:36.960
<v Speaker 1>the end of the day, when I draw my last breath,

0:41:37.320 --> 0:41:41.799
<v Speaker 1>it hasn't really made a difference, who cares. But we

0:41:41.880 --> 0:41:44.399
<v Speaker 1>might also live in a world where sometimes it does

0:41:44.480 --> 0:41:47.440
<v Speaker 1>affect us, even if we are perfectly innocent in all

0:41:47.560 --> 0:41:50.200
<v Speaker 1>in the eyes of the law. Let's just throw out

0:41:50.200 --> 0:41:52.880
<v Speaker 1>some examples of the n S saver, for instance, like

0:41:53.040 --> 0:41:55.760
<v Speaker 1>a person who decides to use the n S as

0:41:55.960 --> 0:41:59.560
<v Speaker 1>wide array of of surveillance techniques to look in on

0:41:59.600 --> 0:42:02.400
<v Speaker 1>an ex girlfriend. That's exactly the scenario I was going

0:42:02.440 --> 0:42:05.240
<v Speaker 1>to bring up. If you and I back in our scenario,

0:42:05.840 --> 0:42:07.600
<v Speaker 1>I decided to go back and use the machine for

0:42:07.600 --> 0:42:09.440
<v Speaker 1>a little bit because we parked to get some coffee

0:42:09.520 --> 0:42:13.359
<v Speaker 1>or something, and I see a number that I recognize

0:42:13.480 --> 0:42:16.920
<v Speaker 1>pop up, and I'm just like, oh, what is my

0:42:17.000 --> 0:42:19.439
<v Speaker 1>ex wife's new husband talking about? Oh, and then blah

0:42:19.480 --> 0:42:22.280
<v Speaker 1>blah blah blah blah. There you go down the rabbit

0:42:22.320 --> 0:42:26.319
<v Speaker 1>hole into weird personal things. Then, and this is the thing.

0:42:26.360 --> 0:42:31.240
<v Speaker 1>It's it's you know, the technology allows that to happen,

0:42:32.200 --> 0:42:35.680
<v Speaker 1>and humans being human are going to do it right.

0:42:36.000 --> 0:42:38.440
<v Speaker 1>Like it's it's not a question of whether the technology

0:42:38.440 --> 0:42:41.960
<v Speaker 1>itself is good or bad because it's a tool. Uh,

0:42:42.160 --> 0:42:44.719
<v Speaker 1>you might say, is it a tool that is appropriate?

0:42:45.160 --> 0:42:48.040
<v Speaker 1>Is there any is there are there appropriate use cases

0:42:48.120 --> 0:42:51.080
<v Speaker 1>for this tool? And if so, how are they defined?

0:42:51.160 --> 0:42:54.200
<v Speaker 1>I think that's the important step. We have to come

0:42:54.239 --> 0:42:58.480
<v Speaker 1>to the conclusion of does this tool make sense? If so,

0:42:58.640 --> 0:43:02.399
<v Speaker 1>in which context does it make sense? And how can

0:43:02.440 --> 0:43:05.719
<v Speaker 1>we be certain that in any given use case it

0:43:05.880 --> 0:43:09.080
<v Speaker 1>fits those contexts? And if if we can answer all

0:43:09.120 --> 0:43:13.600
<v Speaker 1>those to our satisfaction, fine, I question whether that's possible

0:43:14.080 --> 0:43:18.000
<v Speaker 1>particular technology. But but the problem is that people they'll

0:43:18.000 --> 0:43:20.880
<v Speaker 1>behave outside of that, right. I mean, if there is

0:43:20.920 --> 0:43:24.359
<v Speaker 1>the capability of someone to do this, you know, use

0:43:24.440 --> 0:43:30.560
<v Speaker 1>this technology in a selfish, possibly harmful way, for then

0:43:30.640 --> 0:43:32.759
<v Speaker 1>someone will do it. It's not a question of if.

0:43:32.800 --> 0:43:36.600
<v Speaker 1>It's a question of when and how frequently and uh,

0:43:36.680 --> 0:43:39.480
<v Speaker 1>because we've seen it with the n s A. It's again,

0:43:39.560 --> 0:43:41.480
<v Speaker 1>you know, you have to remember that at the end

0:43:41.480 --> 0:43:45.279
<v Speaker 1>of the day, they're real human beings in charge of

0:43:45.400 --> 0:43:50.520
<v Speaker 1>using this technology, and real human beings have real motivations

0:43:50.560 --> 0:43:53.719
<v Speaker 1>that happen every single day of their lives. Just like

0:43:53.760 --> 0:43:56.680
<v Speaker 1>you and me. We we go through our lives and

0:43:56.719 --> 0:43:59.360
<v Speaker 1>we realize, oh, man, if only I knew what was

0:43:59.400 --> 0:44:02.680
<v Speaker 1>going on in that person's head. Oh wait, I could

0:44:02.760 --> 0:44:05.480
<v Speaker 1>figure it out because I've got access to this technology.

0:44:06.400 --> 0:44:10.160
<v Speaker 1>It happens, right, it does. One thing immediately that we

0:44:10.200 --> 0:44:14.480
<v Speaker 1>could say that might be a glimmer of hope with

0:44:14.560 --> 0:44:20.480
<v Speaker 1>this is that many of the surveillance technologies or proprietary

0:44:20.520 --> 0:44:25.759
<v Speaker 1>systems rather do have strict usage logs where wherein you know,

0:44:25.800 --> 0:44:29.120
<v Speaker 1>any user with an I D dis tract. So, uh,

0:44:29.239 --> 0:44:34.200
<v Speaker 1>Lieutenant Frederick would be pinned up for they would say, hey, lieutenant,

0:44:34.239 --> 0:44:39.239
<v Speaker 1>why were you running by the way? Uh? Private in

0:44:39.320 --> 0:44:43.680
<v Speaker 1>the police force, have you militarized the entire police force? Yes,

0:44:44.200 --> 0:44:46.359
<v Speaker 1>several years in the future. He's not a rookie, he's

0:44:46.360 --> 0:44:51.200
<v Speaker 1>a private all right. Well, anyhow, whatever your position would be,

0:44:51.400 --> 0:44:53.520
<v Speaker 1>you know, there would be somebody over you, ideally who

0:44:53.520 --> 0:44:56.799
<v Speaker 1>would say, hey, we noticed that you were searching this

0:44:56.880 --> 0:44:59.359
<v Speaker 1>number which is not part of it, and you went

0:44:59.400 --> 0:45:02.320
<v Speaker 1>pretty into So so that's one thing, But then again

0:45:02.360 --> 0:45:05.160
<v Speaker 1>it relies as you said, on the policy on the system.

0:45:05.280 --> 0:45:08.520
<v Speaker 1>I'd like to take the danger even further because one

0:45:08.600 --> 0:45:11.560
<v Speaker 1>of the most dangerous potential things about the n s

0:45:11.640 --> 0:45:15.879
<v Speaker 1>A program and possibly Stingray and it's other accoutrement, is

0:45:15.960 --> 0:45:20.400
<v Speaker 1>the idea that this could be used by corrupt people

0:45:20.480 --> 0:45:24.879
<v Speaker 1>with access to the technology to do things like smear campaigns,

0:45:25.320 --> 0:45:30.440
<v Speaker 1>to do blackmail, or even extortion. And the most frightening

0:45:30.480 --> 0:45:34.319
<v Speaker 1>thing to me, although it is it is offensive, the

0:45:34.360 --> 0:45:38.840
<v Speaker 1>idea that an innocent person's uh terrible late night you

0:45:39.120 --> 0:45:42.520
<v Speaker 1>up text messages might be collected and saved for posterity,

0:45:42.880 --> 0:45:48.680
<v Speaker 1>it's more frightening that this could be used to curtail

0:45:48.800 --> 0:45:53.880
<v Speaker 1>people who were fighting against it. Yeah, I mean there's

0:45:54.000 --> 0:45:57.400
<v Speaker 1>there's that possibilities. Well, I mean, grant this would a

0:45:57.440 --> 0:46:00.400
<v Speaker 1>lot of that responsibility falls on the Harris Car operation

0:46:00.480 --> 0:46:04.640
<v Speaker 1>and how they deal with the orders. I imagine that

0:46:04.719 --> 0:46:10.160
<v Speaker 1>they mostly I mean before they were really working with

0:46:10.600 --> 0:46:15.360
<v Speaker 1>the FBI and some military companies or military organizations I

0:46:15.360 --> 0:46:19.680
<v Speaker 1>should say, um, And it was only relatively recently, in

0:46:19.719 --> 0:46:22.960
<v Speaker 1>the last maybe five to ten years, that they started

0:46:23.000 --> 0:46:30.040
<v Speaker 1>really working with the local law enforcement agencies. UM. I

0:46:30.120 --> 0:46:34.360
<v Speaker 1>don't know what there are other customers are like or

0:46:34.400 --> 0:46:38.839
<v Speaker 1>who they are, but you could presumably, I mean, even

0:46:38.880 --> 0:46:42.240
<v Speaker 1>if even if it's not made by Harris Corporation, because

0:46:42.280 --> 0:46:44.359
<v Speaker 1>it's out there and because people know about it, then

0:46:44.440 --> 0:46:47.239
<v Speaker 1>that's enough for someone to say, hey, let's pour some

0:46:47.280 --> 0:46:49.960
<v Speaker 1>money into making one of these of our own so

0:46:50.000 --> 0:46:54.920
<v Speaker 1>we can spy on people in the CIA, or the

0:46:55.000 --> 0:46:56.959
<v Speaker 1>CIA might say let's use this so we can spy

0:46:57.040 --> 0:47:04.120
<v Speaker 1>on people in other countries. I mean, it's definitely a difficult,

0:47:05.080 --> 0:47:10.960
<v Speaker 1>difficult subject. It's tricky, uh, I mean, obviously, spying throughout

0:47:11.040 --> 0:47:13.759
<v Speaker 1>history has all been about let's find out what they

0:47:13.800 --> 0:47:16.799
<v Speaker 1>know without letting them know we know. So at some

0:47:16.840 --> 0:47:19.920
<v Speaker 1>point you're like, well, if we if we assume that

0:47:20.000 --> 0:47:23.839
<v Speaker 1>the premise that spies are necessary is true, then these

0:47:23.880 --> 0:47:26.040
<v Speaker 1>other technologies need to exist for us to be able

0:47:26.040 --> 0:47:28.040
<v Speaker 1>to do that. Yeah, but maybe you will, maybe you

0:47:28.040 --> 0:47:30.879
<v Speaker 1>would argue that spying is not something that should happen

0:47:30.920 --> 0:47:33.080
<v Speaker 1>in the first place. Okay, this this is something that

0:47:33.160 --> 0:47:36.279
<v Speaker 1>I know we really wanted your opinion. Okay for a while,

0:47:36.400 --> 0:47:40.560
<v Speaker 1>so have we? And we asked Alex Winter the same question.

0:47:40.600 --> 0:47:45.440
<v Speaker 1>He's a filmmaker made the deep webs. Have we reached

0:47:45.440 --> 0:47:49.160
<v Speaker 1>the point of new return with technology? Has technology rendered

0:47:49.360 --> 0:47:54.240
<v Speaker 1>the concept of individual privacy obsolete or will it do so? Okay,

0:47:54.280 --> 0:47:59.800
<v Speaker 1>well this is super complicated, right, Sorry, it's a great question.

0:48:01.040 --> 0:48:04.120
<v Speaker 1>Stay tuned for the exciting conclusion of this text stuff

0:48:04.120 --> 0:48:14.960
<v Speaker 1>classic episode right after we take this break. On the

0:48:15.000 --> 0:48:18.640
<v Speaker 1>one hand, you have stuff like this, the technology specifically

0:48:18.680 --> 0:48:22.759
<v Speaker 1>meant to intercept and perhaps even uh not just not

0:48:22.880 --> 0:48:25.279
<v Speaker 1>just intercept in the sense of finding out who is

0:48:25.280 --> 0:48:28.319
<v Speaker 1>talking to whom, but what they are saying. Right, You've

0:48:28.320 --> 0:48:32.520
<v Speaker 1>got that technology, that's one thing, And you could argue

0:48:32.560 --> 0:48:35.359
<v Speaker 1>that as long as that technology exists, then privacy might

0:48:35.440 --> 0:48:37.760
<v Speaker 1>only be an illusion. It might be something you believe

0:48:37.840 --> 0:48:43.280
<v Speaker 1>you have, but in reality, your information is being collected somewhere.

0:48:43.560 --> 0:48:46.120
<v Speaker 1>And of course we know that anything we post or

0:48:46.360 --> 0:48:50.400
<v Speaker 1>call or text through or whatever, it's going through an infrastructure.

0:48:50.920 --> 0:48:53.080
<v Speaker 1>So there is at least one entity out there that

0:48:53.200 --> 0:48:55.320
<v Speaker 1>has the access to it. The question is whether anyone

0:48:55.760 --> 0:48:58.520
<v Speaker 1>is looking at it or if it's just if it's

0:48:58.560 --> 0:49:02.640
<v Speaker 1>just a conduit. Right, So you could argue that privacy

0:49:02.719 --> 0:49:04.840
<v Speaker 1>is just an illusion in that case. There's another argument

0:49:04.880 --> 0:49:09.960
<v Speaker 1>to make that has nothing to do with surveillance. Facebook. Twitter,

0:49:10.239 --> 0:49:14.920
<v Speaker 1>we are we are voluntarily sharing more and more of

0:49:14.920 --> 0:49:19.520
<v Speaker 1>our lives. Instagram, Pinterest, really anything you can think of

0:49:19.560 --> 0:49:22.960
<v Speaker 1>where you are allowed a platform people are taking advantage

0:49:23.000 --> 0:49:28.960
<v Speaker 1>of it. YouTube another great example, periscope. So you're you're

0:49:31.080 --> 0:49:35.600
<v Speaker 1>volunteering to share a lot more information and you don't

0:49:35.640 --> 0:49:40.479
<v Speaker 1>necessarily think while you're doing it. This could potentially put

0:49:40.680 --> 0:49:44.840
<v Speaker 1>other things in my life at risk of becoming public knowledge,

0:49:45.040 --> 0:49:47.600
<v Speaker 1>whether it's because you're not paying enough attention or you

0:49:47.640 --> 0:49:50.480
<v Speaker 1>just don't realize how much information you are revealing every

0:49:50.520 --> 0:49:55.640
<v Speaker 1>time you post something. Um So, you could argue in

0:49:55.680 --> 0:49:59.640
<v Speaker 1>that case, privacy might also be an illusion, not because

0:50:00.120 --> 0:50:02.439
<v Speaker 1>there are all these ways of staring at what's really

0:50:02.440 --> 0:50:08.200
<v Speaker 1>going on, but because we're actually giving everything away and

0:50:08.239 --> 0:50:10.759
<v Speaker 1>we're just not aware of it. We're not aware of

0:50:10.760 --> 0:50:13.840
<v Speaker 1>the consequences of what we our own actions happened to

0:50:13.880 --> 0:50:18.560
<v Speaker 1>be um I would argue we haven't gone too far

0:50:18.680 --> 0:50:23.400
<v Speaker 1>in the sense that we could, if motivated to do

0:50:23.640 --> 0:50:28.160
<v Speaker 1>so and given the authority to do so, reverse a

0:50:28.239 --> 0:50:31.640
<v Speaker 1>lot of the things that have been happening. The question

0:50:31.680 --> 0:50:34.759
<v Speaker 1>of whether that's a reality or not, I mean, that's

0:50:34.800 --> 0:50:37.600
<v Speaker 1>kind of like the pie in the sky optimistic idealism,

0:50:37.600 --> 0:50:41.840
<v Speaker 1>the idea that people could actually be motivated to take action,

0:50:42.280 --> 0:50:45.799
<v Speaker 1>specifically through voting and through campaigning, and through bringing things

0:50:45.840 --> 0:50:48.800
<v Speaker 1>to attention and getting the word out there and getting

0:50:48.800 --> 0:50:53.440
<v Speaker 1>people behind the argument, Hey, we need to address this,

0:50:53.880 --> 0:50:56.040
<v Speaker 1>and we need to have it addressed to our satisfaction,

0:50:56.160 --> 0:51:01.360
<v Speaker 1>not just it's secret. You can't know. I think it's possible,

0:51:02.320 --> 0:51:05.440
<v Speaker 1>I think it would be really hard, and I don't

0:51:05.840 --> 0:51:07.560
<v Speaker 1>even though I think it's possible, I don't think it's

0:51:07.560 --> 0:51:12.239
<v Speaker 1>the plausible outcome. If I'm being perfectly honest, Um, it

0:51:12.280 --> 0:51:19.360
<v Speaker 1>would require enormous changes in momentum among vast, huge entities

0:51:19.400 --> 0:51:21.960
<v Speaker 1>out there that are bigger than any one person is.

0:51:22.520 --> 0:51:24.359
<v Speaker 1>So even if you let's say that you have an

0:51:24.400 --> 0:51:27.120
<v Speaker 1>ideal candidate for president of the United States in mind,

0:51:27.200 --> 0:51:30.840
<v Speaker 1>someone that you truly believe has the best interests of

0:51:30.880 --> 0:51:35.040
<v Speaker 1>the citizens at heart and wants to protect constitutional rights,

0:51:35.080 --> 0:51:38.640
<v Speaker 1>so they want to do right by the citizens and

0:51:38.680 --> 0:51:41.080
<v Speaker 1>make sure that the things they do truly do protect

0:51:41.120 --> 0:51:43.720
<v Speaker 1>them and do so in a way that follows the rules.

0:51:44.280 --> 0:51:47.759
<v Speaker 1>Even if that person exists and has put into the

0:51:47.800 --> 0:51:52.799
<v Speaker 1>position of president, you still have everything outs that it,

0:51:52.880 --> 0:51:57.080
<v Speaker 1>like from the local level to n essay too. You know,

0:51:57.160 --> 0:52:00.239
<v Speaker 1>organizations that do not directly answer to the president. It's

0:52:00.280 --> 0:52:05.640
<v Speaker 1>not like the president is capable of changing everything by

0:52:05.719 --> 0:52:07.880
<v Speaker 1>flicking a wand in fact, they're not supposed to be

0:52:07.920 --> 0:52:13.239
<v Speaker 1>able to do that. Doesn't have the position to president us. Yeah. So, uh,

0:52:13.360 --> 0:52:16.880
<v Speaker 1>this is why until I become benevolent dictator, we're going

0:52:16.920 --> 0:52:20.960
<v Speaker 1>to have these problems. Yeah, you know, you've you've been

0:52:21.040 --> 0:52:23.680
<v Speaker 1>saying that more and more often. I I appreciate the

0:52:23.719 --> 0:52:27.759
<v Speaker 1>posters that you've put up around the office. Uh they're

0:52:28.120 --> 0:52:31.520
<v Speaker 1>they're a little bit stark. I don't know, I you know,

0:52:32.080 --> 0:52:35.960
<v Speaker 1>I think they might be a bit too Soviet. Yeah,

0:52:36.040 --> 0:52:37.920
<v Speaker 1>I mean, it would help if they were in English.

0:52:38.080 --> 0:52:41.680
<v Speaker 1>But there's a lot of like crush this thing beneath

0:52:41.719 --> 0:52:46.440
<v Speaker 1>the boot. I just like the fist looked really like empowering.

0:52:46.480 --> 0:52:50.239
<v Speaker 1>And now I oh it does man, it do? Yeah,

0:52:50.280 --> 0:52:55.400
<v Speaker 1>it does. You're both on the list now, alright, so

0:52:56.320 --> 0:52:58.600
<v Speaker 1>any rate, No, but this is this was the reason

0:52:58.600 --> 0:53:00.160
<v Speaker 1>why why did you guys on here is because as

0:53:00.160 --> 0:53:04.279
<v Speaker 1>I know you guys, I assume you feel similarly to

0:53:04.280 --> 0:53:06.480
<v Speaker 1>to what I've stated. But I mean, if there's if

0:53:06.560 --> 0:53:11.280
<v Speaker 1>I have in any way misconstrued, I would I definitely

0:53:11.280 --> 0:53:13.880
<v Speaker 1>want you to have the opportunity to address it, well,

0:53:13.719 --> 0:53:16.920
<v Speaker 1>I will let Ben finish this idea that I'm going

0:53:16.960 --> 0:53:18.960
<v Speaker 1>to start. But when we spoke with Mr. Winter, he

0:53:19.080 --> 0:53:24.160
<v Speaker 1>had a surprisingly positive outlook privacy. That's wonderful he did

0:53:24.440 --> 0:53:27.399
<v Speaker 1>the people that he's been speaking with and communicating with

0:53:27.640 --> 0:53:30.520
<v Speaker 1>in his research on the subject of the deep web.

0:53:30.920 --> 0:53:33.239
<v Speaker 1>He's finding that there are a lot of people who

0:53:33.280 --> 0:53:39.440
<v Speaker 1>are freely focused on encrypting data and finding ways to

0:53:39.560 --> 0:53:43.160
<v Speaker 1>encrypt almost all communication that is done from a private

0:53:43.200 --> 0:53:46.480
<v Speaker 1>person's level, so that a company that is even handling

0:53:46.480 --> 0:53:48.840
<v Speaker 1>your data won't be able to decrypt it. Right. So,

0:53:48.880 --> 0:53:52.479
<v Speaker 1>in other words, the the the company that handles it,

0:53:52.480 --> 0:53:56.080
<v Speaker 1>it literally is just the conduit. It cannot it cannot

0:53:56.080 --> 0:53:58.799
<v Speaker 1>see the content and most it will see where it's

0:53:58.840 --> 0:54:01.399
<v Speaker 1>coming from and where it's going, but beyond that not

0:54:01.480 --> 0:54:05.399
<v Speaker 1>what the actual information is. He used the phrase. One

0:54:05.400 --> 0:54:09.560
<v Speaker 1>phrase I remember that he used was a renaissance of privacy,

0:54:09.640 --> 0:54:14.960
<v Speaker 1>which which I found inspiring because the the old argument

0:54:15.200 --> 0:54:17.800
<v Speaker 1>of well, if you have nothing to worry about, what

0:54:17.920 --> 0:54:21.239
<v Speaker 1>you're worried about hiding, right, it's kind of silly when

0:54:21.280 --> 0:54:24.960
<v Speaker 1>you consider that we do live in a world now

0:54:25.080 --> 0:54:28.319
<v Speaker 1>where let's say, Jonathan, let's say that you as an

0:54:28.360 --> 0:54:31.000
<v Speaker 1>FBI agent, love the part of towner and so much.

0:54:31.000 --> 0:54:33.120
<v Speaker 1>You said, you know what, guys, I'm gonna pull up

0:54:33.120 --> 0:54:36.399
<v Speaker 1>my tent stakes from Langley and I'm gonna come down here,

0:54:36.719 --> 0:54:39.520
<v Speaker 1>and I am gonna I'm gonna live here, and a

0:54:39.520 --> 0:54:43.040
<v Speaker 1>matter of fact, I'm gonna run for city commissioner because

0:54:43.160 --> 0:54:46.160
<v Speaker 1>I think, uh, this kind of stuff needs to be

0:54:46.200 --> 0:54:48.400
<v Speaker 1>dealt with in a public eye. And then all of

0:54:48.440 --> 0:54:51.600
<v Speaker 1>a sudden, all of this stuff, every time you had

0:54:51.719 --> 0:54:54.799
<v Speaker 1>used your phone in that region got leaked by somebody.

0:54:55.120 --> 0:54:57.640
<v Speaker 1>Or maybe you're running for sheriff, right, because we do

0:54:57.680 --> 0:55:00.200
<v Speaker 1>know that the sheriff's uh, at least in the Cab

0:55:00.280 --> 0:55:04.279
<v Speaker 1>County once played to corrupt the game here. Yeah, well,

0:55:04.520 --> 0:55:09.239
<v Speaker 1>or or even just something that, like, you know, a

0:55:09.360 --> 0:55:12.919
<v Speaker 1>mistake that you make at some point, and it may

0:55:12.920 --> 0:55:15.080
<v Speaker 1>be it may be one that you you know, it

0:55:15.120 --> 0:55:18.000
<v Speaker 1>could be that something you consciously did, or not even

0:55:18.040 --> 0:55:21.399
<v Speaker 1>a conscious mistake, something that due to your actions has

0:55:21.440 --> 0:55:24.600
<v Speaker 1>accidentally happened, and that you have already taken care of it,

0:55:24.760 --> 0:55:27.560
<v Speaker 1>You have fixed whatever problems there are, whatever the nature

0:55:27.600 --> 0:55:30.160
<v Speaker 1>of that thing is, you have you know, you've done

0:55:30.200 --> 0:55:33.880
<v Speaker 1>your time. However that I'm that might be for something

0:55:33.920 --> 0:55:35.879
<v Speaker 1>like that to like, let's say that you do want

0:55:35.920 --> 0:55:39.959
<v Speaker 1>to run for a local, local position and it has

0:55:40.000 --> 0:55:43.480
<v Speaker 1>no bearing whatsoever on your ability to carry out your duties.

0:55:44.840 --> 0:55:46.680
<v Speaker 1>We live in a world now where that stuff comes back,

0:55:47.000 --> 0:55:50.840
<v Speaker 1>I mean, like big time comes back. And none of

0:55:50.880 --> 0:55:53.799
<v Speaker 1>us are saints. You know, no one, No one has

0:55:53.840 --> 0:55:57.319
<v Speaker 1>gone through life completely unsullied. Even if you, you know,

0:55:57.360 --> 0:56:01.319
<v Speaker 1>are have the best of intentions. Something has happened at

0:56:01.440 --> 0:56:03.200
<v Speaker 1>some point in your life. Maybe you were just in

0:56:03.200 --> 0:56:05.359
<v Speaker 1>the wrong place at the wrong time, but that can

0:56:05.440 --> 0:56:08.600
<v Speaker 1>be bad enough. Yeah, that's true. I I do want

0:56:08.600 --> 0:56:12.480
<v Speaker 1>to say, Um, I really enjoyed I always enjoy being

0:56:12.880 --> 0:56:15.200
<v Speaker 1>on the show, And um, I don't want to speak

0:56:15.200 --> 0:56:17.759
<v Speaker 1>for you, mat but I'm I'm grateful that hates it. Yeah,

0:56:17.920 --> 0:56:22.719
<v Speaker 1>I'm grateful that we got it horrible for me. You guys,

0:56:22.880 --> 0:56:25.440
<v Speaker 1>you would be so impressed by vast ability to silently weep.

0:56:25.640 --> 0:56:29.239
<v Speaker 1>We sit in this room, salty salty beard. But the

0:56:29.280 --> 0:56:31.240
<v Speaker 1>only thing I would add to what we were saying

0:56:31.480 --> 0:56:34.120
<v Speaker 1>is that I love that we were talking about how

0:56:34.160 --> 0:56:38.719
<v Speaker 1>we are not casting aspersion on the individuals working in

0:56:38.800 --> 0:56:43.560
<v Speaker 1>law enforcement, which is so often an incredibly thankless job,

0:56:43.680 --> 0:56:47.239
<v Speaker 1>a fatally at times thankless job. And when you're when

0:56:47.280 --> 0:56:52.560
<v Speaker 1>you are representing the good guys, right, the force of

0:56:52.920 --> 0:56:56.520
<v Speaker 1>the force of crime prevention in our society, then the

0:56:56.520 --> 0:56:59.760
<v Speaker 1>thing is that the game you are playing is stacked

0:56:59.840 --> 0:57:02.880
<v Speaker 1>against you because the bad guys, whomever they may be,

0:57:03.360 --> 0:57:07.319
<v Speaker 1>do not have to follow the same rules. So I

0:57:07.840 --> 0:57:12.840
<v Speaker 1>while I think that, while I think that it's often easy,

0:57:12.880 --> 0:57:15.879
<v Speaker 1>at least in our fuel, for people to demonize law

0:57:15.960 --> 0:57:18.520
<v Speaker 1>enforcement as a faithless entity rather than a group of

0:57:18.560 --> 0:57:27.720
<v Speaker 1>human beings, I do completely believe that this is horrible technology.

0:57:27.160 --> 0:57:32.080
<v Speaker 1>I don't see a lot of cases of it being successful.

0:57:32.160 --> 0:57:33.880
<v Speaker 1>The a c l U has tried their best to

0:57:33.920 --> 0:57:37.080
<v Speaker 1>make a map of all the police areas they're using this,

0:57:37.840 --> 0:57:40.480
<v Speaker 1>but they still they had to say that this map

0:57:40.680 --> 0:57:45.880
<v Speaker 1>is incomplete. This is, I believe, very very close to

0:57:46.040 --> 0:57:48.160
<v Speaker 1>a kind of Pandora's box. Because as we know, the

0:57:48.200 --> 0:57:52.680
<v Speaker 1>price of technology continually decreases. Right, So what happens when

0:57:52.720 --> 0:57:55.600
<v Speaker 1>it's a steam gray as the price of a PS four, Well,

0:57:55.880 --> 0:57:57.800
<v Speaker 1>I mean you know it's it's being made in such

0:57:58.400 --> 0:58:01.320
<v Speaker 1>limited amounts. I mean you have to have the demand there,

0:58:01.360 --> 0:58:03.320
<v Speaker 1>and you have to have I would imagine there will

0:58:03.320 --> 0:58:05.480
<v Speaker 1>also be laws that will limit the use of this

0:58:05.640 --> 0:58:09.680
<v Speaker 1>because you have the giant phone companies that will lobby

0:58:09.840 --> 0:58:12.800
<v Speaker 1>very hard. They don't want the ability for someone to

0:58:12.800 --> 0:58:14.920
<v Speaker 1>spoof a cell phone tower to fall into the hands

0:58:14.920 --> 0:58:18.760
<v Speaker 1>of an average citizen. Their their business depends upon that

0:58:18.920 --> 0:58:23.480
<v Speaker 1>not happening. You're not the average citizen. No, No, I'm

0:58:23.520 --> 0:58:26.600
<v Speaker 1>the future benevolent dictator of the new World Order. I

0:58:26.640 --> 0:58:29.919
<v Speaker 1>think you need a tank the I think you don't

0:58:29.960 --> 0:58:36.280
<v Speaker 1>need a tank on speed pial. Yeah, yeah, but they yeah,

0:58:36.360 --> 0:58:39.080
<v Speaker 1>this is this is fantastic and I really appreciate the

0:58:39.080 --> 0:58:43.040
<v Speaker 1>opportunity to let more people know about this. Yeah, And

0:58:43.320 --> 0:58:45.080
<v Speaker 1>like I said, this technology has been around for a while.

0:58:45.080 --> 0:58:48.160
<v Speaker 1>In fact that the stingray stuff really started hitting headlines

0:58:48.200 --> 0:58:50.520
<v Speaker 1>a couple of years ago, back in that's when I

0:58:50.560 --> 0:58:53.000
<v Speaker 1>was really starting to get noticed and keep in mind,

0:58:53.040 --> 0:58:56.560
<v Speaker 1>and then use more than a decade before that. So

0:58:57.120 --> 0:58:58.920
<v Speaker 1>it's it's good to be aware of it. It's good

0:58:58.960 --> 0:59:01.880
<v Speaker 1>to ask these questions. And like I said, we may

0:59:02.040 --> 0:59:04.120
<v Speaker 1>at some point come to a point where we are

0:59:04.240 --> 0:59:07.240
<v Speaker 1>able to answer the questions I've been asking, to a

0:59:07.280 --> 0:59:10.400
<v Speaker 1>point where maybe I would be like, Okay, I understand

0:59:10.400 --> 0:59:12.600
<v Speaker 1>that in the world we live in the reality of

0:59:12.600 --> 0:59:16.520
<v Speaker 1>the world we live in that under these situations, this

0:59:16.680 --> 0:59:20.560
<v Speaker 1>might be an acceptable use of the technology. Uh, it's

0:59:20.600 --> 0:59:23.080
<v Speaker 1>just right now we haven't. We don't have those answers

0:59:23.120 --> 0:59:27.840
<v Speaker 1>because of secrecy. So yeah, it's it's it's definitely something

0:59:27.840 --> 0:59:30.480
<v Speaker 1>to be aware of. H I. I don't want to

0:59:30.520 --> 0:59:33.960
<v Speaker 1>be a fearmonger or anything like that, but um, it

0:59:34.080 --> 0:59:37.800
<v Speaker 1>is important that you know about it because I mean,

0:59:38.240 --> 0:59:40.200
<v Speaker 1>it's it's out there. Whether you know or not, it

0:59:40.320 --> 0:59:43.840
<v Speaker 1>is there, so it's better to know. All right, Well, guys,

0:59:43.880 --> 0:59:47.600
<v Speaker 1>thank you so much for joining the show. Obviously you

0:59:47.640 --> 0:59:50.880
<v Speaker 1>can find Matt and Ben's work at Stuff. They don't

0:59:51.000 --> 0:59:55.439
<v Speaker 1>want you to know. Well, I hope you feels weird

0:59:55.480 --> 0:59:59.960
<v Speaker 1>to say this. Enjoyed that classic episode about law enforcement

1:00:00.120 --> 1:00:05.240
<v Speaker 1>surveillance always a tricky thing to talk about. And if

1:00:05.280 --> 1:00:07.760
<v Speaker 1>you have suggestions for topics I should cover in future

1:00:07.840 --> 1:00:10.280
<v Speaker 1>episodes of tech Stuff, please reach out to me. The

1:00:10.280 --> 1:00:13.040
<v Speaker 1>best way to do so is on Twitter. The handle

1:00:13.120 --> 1:00:16.200
<v Speaker 1>for the show is text Stuff H s W and

1:00:16.200 --> 1:00:25.400
<v Speaker 1>I'll talk to you again really soon. Text Stuff is

1:00:25.440 --> 1:00:28.560
<v Speaker 1>an I Heart Radio production. For more podcasts from my

1:00:28.720 --> 1:00:32.320
<v Speaker 1>Heart Radio, visit the I Heart Radio app, Apple Podcasts,

1:00:32.440 --> 1:00:34.400
<v Speaker 1>or wherever you listen to your favorite shows,