Speaker 1: Welcome to tex Stuff, a production from I Heart Radio.
Speaker 1: Hey there, and welcome to tech Stuff. I'm your host,
Speaker 1: Jonathan Strickland. I'm an executive producer with iHeart Radio. And
Speaker 1: how the tech are you? It is time for a
Speaker 1: tech Stuff plastic episode. This episode is called a sting
Speaker 1: ray operation and it has guest co hosts Ben Bolan
Speaker 1: and Matt Frederick of stuff they don't want you to
Speaker 1: know on the show. And that's because stingrays are a
Speaker 1: type of surveillance tech used by law enforcement agencies that
Speaker 1: trick your cell phone into thinking they're talking to an
Speaker 1: actual cell phone tower. Let's listen in. We were super
Speaker 1: excited to hear about today's topic because it's been something
Speaker 1: that Matt and I have been talking about off air.
Speaker 1: Is that correct? Absolutely? This kind of technology that we're
Speaker 1: going to get into a little later. Uh piques our interest.
Speaker 1: You could say, yeah, mine as well. Uh. You know,
Speaker 1: the stuff they don't want you to know shows great show.
Speaker 1: If you guys haven't checked it out, you need to
Speaker 1: go and and check it out. Check check out how
Speaker 1: you guys are looking into various types of conspiracies, things
Speaker 1: that are happening below the surface level that people may
Speaker 1: not be aware of and kind of sifting through the
Speaker 1: information to show which parts of it are you know,
Speaker 1: are really solid. You know, these are the things that
Speaker 1: we know for sure. And here's the conjecture that's been
Speaker 1: said about it. You guys do a great job with it.
Speaker 1: And as it turns out, there's a lot of stuff
Speaker 1: out there that can really fuel that kind of kind
Speaker 1: of talk for good reason. And I typically am one
Speaker 1: of those more you know, I am a little more
Speaker 1: conservative and skeptical with my approach to these things. But
Speaker 1: this is a technology we're gonna talk about today that
Speaker 1: I don't know how you could go to it being
Speaker 1: skeptical and say, oh, everything is fine. We are talking
Speaker 1: about sting ray or I M. S I catchers, And
Speaker 1: so sting ray is the one that I think most
Speaker 1: people have heard about. That's the one that was brought
Speaker 1: up in a lawsuit in Arizona, UM. So I think
Speaker 1: that that is what most people think about when they
Speaker 1: hear I M. S I catchers, if they are aware
Speaker 1: of that term at all. But of course sting stingray
Speaker 1: is just one version of that, and we'll talk about
Speaker 1: some of the other ones as well. So I am
Speaker 1: s I catchers stands for International Mobile subscriber identity catchers
Speaker 1: or locators, and that is a fancy way of saying.
Speaker 1: This is a technology that is able to intercept signals
Speaker 1: from cell phones, ostensibly so that a law enforcement official
Speaker 1: could locate a person based upon that person's cell phone signaling.
Speaker 1: And it does this, and we'll talk about specifics in
Speaker 1: a bit, by mimicking a cell phone tower. So in
Speaker 1: other words, your cell phone is communicating with this device
Speaker 1: thinking that this is the actual part of the infrastructure
Speaker 1: that it would normally operate inside. Yeah. Yeah, it's sort
Speaker 1: of the same way that are similar at least to
Speaker 1: the ways in which some animals have evolved to have
Speaker 1: camouflage that makes them appear to be a different type
Speaker 1: of creature. Right. Yeah. And one thing that I just
Speaker 1: want to get this out so I don't uh moan
Speaker 1: and complain about it for the whole episode. If you
Speaker 1: ever lost a cell phone or had one stolen and
Speaker 1: had the sneaking suspicion that there might be a way
Speaker 1: for law enforcement to catch it, well, theoretically there is.
Speaker 1: It's just it's just they can't do that for everybody
Speaker 1: because so many people lose their cell phones or have
Speaker 1: them stolen, you know, as long as it's turned on right, right, Yeah,
Speaker 1: and as long as well, And it also depends on
Speaker 1: a couple of other things too, Right, they have to
Speaker 1: have the if they're looking for your cell phones specifically,
Speaker 1: they kind of need to know a little bit more information,
Speaker 1: like they need to know something specific about that phone
Speaker 1: or to identify it versus all the other phones that
Speaker 1: will connect to it, right, because otherwise they just be like, well,
Speaker 1: it maybe one of the phones here, and there are
Speaker 1: different ways of looking into that. Right. It all depends
Speaker 1: on what the investigation is and we'll we'll talk more
Speaker 1: about how it's used in investigations. So basically, this is
Speaker 1: a technology meant to help Again, ostensibly law enforcement tracked
Speaker 1: down the bad guys or counter terrorism officials to identify
Speaker 1: potential terrorist threats before they become a reality. That's what
Speaker 1: it's supposed to be used for. There are a lot
Speaker 1: of people who have objected to it because it is
Speaker 1: it is take making a very wide approach to targeting
Speaker 1: something very specific, and that can be dangerous for the
Speaker 1: sting ray its self. A cost between sixty eight thousand
Speaker 1: dollars and a hundred thirty five thousand dollars last I checked.
Speaker 1: Because there are two different models of the sting ray.
Speaker 1: There's the sting ray and sting Ray. To sting Ray
Speaker 1: two came out a few years ago. The sting ray
Speaker 1: obviously came out before that. Because we move in a
Speaker 1: chronological order, they haven't gotten to that quantum effect where
Speaker 1: the sequel comes out before the original. Um. Now it's
Speaker 1: made by a company called Harris Corporation out of Melbourne, Florida,
Speaker 1: and uh and this company makes a lot of technology
Speaker 1: that falls into this general category. Some of the products
Speaker 1: that they make are similar to sting ray and do
Speaker 1: similar things to that device. Others are more specific and
Speaker 1: are meant to be used in conjunction with gadget like stingray. Yeah. Yeah,
Speaker 1: you know, it's like a console. Are like you've got
Speaker 1: your connect, you've got your you know, your your dance pad,
Speaker 1: You've got all these other things sort of the similar
Speaker 1: thing here, except the devices that Harris Corporation makes. Some
Speaker 1: of them boost the signal catching ability of the basic
Speaker 1: technology like the stingray. Some of them allow for better
Speaker 1: tracking technology. It all depends on the thing. But but
Speaker 1: you know, you may have heard some of the other names.
Speaker 1: Some of the other names that include trigger fish, kingfish,
Speaker 1: amber jack, gossamer, harpoon, and hail storm. Uh. And not
Speaker 1: only these are not types of stingray. These are all
Speaker 1: individual devices that work in a similar way to sting ray.
Speaker 1: Some of them copy the functionality of sting ray, some
Speaker 1: of them go beyond that. In fact, trigger fish is
Speaker 1: particularly troubling. Um. But sting ray it self can be
Speaker 1: really troubled too if you just do a simple upgrade
Speaker 1: to it. And then you're right. All of these have
Speaker 1: things in common and that they all are meant to
Speaker 1: detect cell phone usage in some way and either identify
Speaker 1: it or locate it and or track it. Um. And
Speaker 1: it's how you use these in combination with one another
Speaker 1: that determines your ability to do that. Now, clearly we're
Speaker 1: talking about something that's mimicking a cell phone tower. You
Speaker 1: have to have it be mobile because otherwise you just
Speaker 1: have to hope that the bad guys happened to go
Speaker 1: across your part of town. You can't take it to
Speaker 1: them if it's not mobile, right. So, Uh. One of
Speaker 1: the things that this is really helpful for as far
Speaker 1: as law enforcement are concerned, is that they can go
Speaker 1: to a part of town where they suspect someone is.
Speaker 1: They can put out their ears, listen for it, look
Speaker 1: to see if they have any hits that relate back
Speaker 1: to the target they're specifically looking for, and if not,
Speaker 1: they can move on to a different part of town. Um.
Speaker 1: That's also one of the drawbacks, as it turns out,
Speaker 1: at least from from the perspective of some people. Now,
Speaker 1: let's see one other thing. Oh, I forgot to mention.
Speaker 1: Gossamer is one of the exceptions to this. Gossamer is
Speaker 1: not about tracking or locating cell phone, but this is
Speaker 1: the one that freaks me out the most. Yeah, this
Speaker 1: is not passive. Now, Gossamer is about denial of service
Speaker 1: attacks on a mobile phone, so it's about it's essentially
Speaker 1: a jammer. No, this is great for all the paranoid
Speaker 1: people in the audience. Are you getting bad reception or
Speaker 1: are you being gossamer? I actually and another thing to
Speaker 1: to mention. I didn't put it in our notes, but
Speaker 1: one of the things these devices typically can do. The
Speaker 1: stingray in particular can do this is it can boost
Speaker 1: your the signal coming from your phone to connect to
Speaker 1: the tower. It can essentially say I need a stronger
Speaker 1: signal your phone. Then, even though you're not using it,
Speaker 1: like it's just in your pocket, there's no vibrating, there's
Speaker 1: no ringing, there's nothing going on, your phone starts sending
Speaker 1: stronger signals. This drains your battery. So if you're the
Speaker 1: paranoid persuasion, you may also think my phone's battery just
Speaker 1: won't even last like a full day anymore. And it
Speaker 1: might not be because your phone is old. It might
Speaker 1: be because you're getting you're getting sting rayed. You guys,
Speaker 1: I'm not kidding. This happening to me right now. Well,
Speaker 1: I'm sorry that you should take more care when you
Speaker 1: are browsing on your phone. Also, Matt, Matt, I mean
Speaker 1: not to make you worried or anything, but you're definitely
Speaker 1: on some lists. So I mean, you're on our list
Speaker 1: of favorite people. But yeah, there's one right there. So okay,
Speaker 1: So I love this idea about it being mobile. So
Speaker 1: if we take that paranoid example, in the vast majority,
Speaker 1: virtually every time somebody has poor reception or poor battery life,
Speaker 1: it is never going to be something like this. But
Speaker 1: there's a very small chance, yeah that if you are
Speaker 1: a victim of this, you could literally have someone following
Speaker 1: you around, right, Yeah, I mean, okay, to be fair,
Speaker 1: this technology we're talking about is at a level of
Speaker 1: expense where it's not likely to happen to you. And
Speaker 1: if you are someone who is either hanging out with
Speaker 1: questionable people or you yourself are engaged in some questionable activities,
Speaker 1: then you'd be more likely to have this actually target you. Now,
Speaker 1: because we know that law enforcement agencies across the United
Speaker 1: States and in other parts of the world have used
Speaker 1: this kind of technology, they're the they're the customers there
Speaker 1: once they're purchasing the stuff from Harris Corporation, it's very
Speaker 1: possible you would come into contact with this and it's
Speaker 1: not that you are being targeted, but you're still being
Speaker 1: affected because it's just so broad. Yeah, it's like it's
Speaker 1: mimicking a cell phone tower. It's not mimicking a cell
Speaker 1: phone tower for a single phone. It's mimicking a cellphone
Speaker 1: tower for the broadcast range of that device. And so okay,
Speaker 1: so their mobile but what what would they look like
Speaker 1: if you just saw one? So they look kind of like, uh,
Speaker 1: I mean, if you've ever seen one of those servers,
Speaker 1: like it looks like just a basic computer with lots
Speaker 1: of ports on it. It's kind of like that. It's
Speaker 1: usually a little bit uh stumpy looking like it's not
Speaker 1: as wide as your typical server is a little more
Speaker 1: narrow a little tall, but it's meant to fit into
Speaker 1: racks because you can, you know, end up pairing these
Speaker 1: with other technologies. But it's essentially a computer and you
Speaker 1: hook it up to a laptop, so you've got really
Speaker 1: the basic parts you have are the antenna, which is
Speaker 1: important because obviously it has to receive signals sent from
Speaker 1: cell phones um and a transmitter so that you can
Speaker 1: send stuff back through if you need to. You've got
Speaker 1: the computer itself, which is processing the signals and identifying
Speaker 1: where those signals are coming from, both what type of
Speaker 1: phone it is by you know, giving you the identification
Speaker 1: numbers of that phone, the phone number that's associated with
Speaker 1: that phone, and the location of that phone based upon
Speaker 1: some triangulation. You might actually have to physically move the
Speaker 1: technology around to get the triangulation. You could theoretically communicate
Speaker 1: with another cell phone tower and by getting comparing numbers,
Speaker 1: you know, you know you can generally tell the direction
Speaker 1: from which the signal comes and its strength that gives
Speaker 1: you an idea of it's it's general location in that
Speaker 1: like you know roughly what distance it is from your
Speaker 1: your space station. So it's one of those things where
Speaker 1: if the signal gets stronger, it's closer to you, right,
Speaker 1: and if it's if it's if the signal, if the
Speaker 1: cell phone signal is getting weaker, than you know that
Speaker 1: the target cell phone is moving away. If you were
Speaker 1: to move the van to a second location and do
Speaker 1: those measurements, then because you have the two points on
Speaker 1: a on one part of a triangle, the cell phones
Speaker 1: the third point, then you know where the person is.
Speaker 1: It's the same way that cell phone towers are able
Speaker 1: to give an approximation of where you are, even if
Speaker 1: your phone doesn't have GPS. Right, it's sending the signals
Speaker 1: and based upon the strength of the signal, how long
Speaker 1: it takes to get there, all of these sort of things,
Speaker 1: it can approximate where you are now. By by approximate,
Speaker 1: I mean within a few you know, meters, So it's
Speaker 1: not like as as a specific as GPS can be,
Speaker 1: but it's still good enough for law enforcement to hone
Speaker 1: in on a on a particular location and people can
Speaker 1: sent to the use of GPS. But yeah, so there's
Speaker 1: a question that I'm sure a lot of people are wondering,
Speaker 1: which is this stuff sounds kind of space a g
Speaker 1: but how how new? Is it not that new? Uh?
Speaker 1: The the information I found said that at least the
Speaker 1: trigger fish version of this technology has been in use
Speaker 1: since the late nineteen nineties. What uh. Yeah, And to
Speaker 1: keep keep in mind, like this technology has been in
Speaker 1: some form of development or another and been available to
Speaker 1: different types of agencies, specifically the FBI would be a
Speaker 1: big one. Um. And it's just that over the past
Speaker 1: few years it has become more common for local law
Speaker 1: enforcement to get their hands on this. Before it was
Speaker 1: something that only you know, the federal law enforcement officials
Speaker 1: were able to access. But now we're seeing local law enforcement.
Speaker 1: Uh not everybody's owning up to it, but we're seeing
Speaker 1: a lot of local law enforcement offices adopt this technology,
Speaker 1: and they're doing it in kind of a kind of
Speaker 1: a backdoor Shenanigan's way, I would say, yeah, we'll be
Speaker 1: back with more of this classic episode of tech stuff
Speaker 1: after this quick break. So, uh, you know, these things
Speaker 1: can be pretty expensive, and obviously law enforcement has a
Speaker 1: budget that they have to answer to. So some of
Speaker 1: them are funding the purchase of this material by filing
Speaker 1: it under counter terrorism uh um strategies. Yeah. Essentially they
Speaker 1: say we want to participate in this, you know, we
Speaker 1: want to make sure we help protect national security doing
Speaker 1: it on a local level. Uh And then they get
Speaker 1: the federal grant to purchase the stuff. But then they're
Speaker 1: using it on a much broader scale. So it's not
Speaker 1: like they're not using it specifically for a counter terrorism
Speaker 1: they're using it in all sorts of cases. There was
Speaker 1: a story about a sheriff whose own vehicle got broken
Speaker 1: into and uh and whose phone was stolen, who decided
Speaker 1: to use this stuff to try and ostensibly to try
Speaker 1: and stop the the string of car break ins. Some
Speaker 1: people would say that perhaps it was more personal than that,
Speaker 1: but the point being that this was not a counter
Speaker 1: terrorism issue. This was you know, someone breaking in and
Speaker 1: entering into cars, which is you know, that's that's a crime.
Speaker 1: But you people have been arguing, like, what at what
Speaker 1: level of crime do you consider the use of this
Speaker 1: particular type of technology necessary to employ? Yeah, especially given
Speaker 1: the expense not just in financial terms but in terms
Speaker 1: of manpower or time so that's that's one problem, but
Speaker 1: it's my spider sense is telling me that you have
Speaker 1: a bigger problem I've got. I've got so many problems
Speaker 1: with this, So let's let's talk about how it works first,
Speaker 1: because this is this is what leads into where the
Speaker 1: biggest problems that I have where the technology come from. So, uh,
Speaker 1: to understand how this works, you've got to know how
Speaker 1: cell phone works, all right, And we're gonna be super
Speaker 1: high level here because I could do a full episode
Speaker 1: on how cell phones work and you guys would be
Speaker 1: stabbing me because you're wondering why I pulled you in UM.
Speaker 1: But typically the easiest way of explaining it as cell
Speaker 1: phones broadcast over radio frequencies, and you have cell phone
Speaker 1: towers that represent a broadcast area. The towers are able
Speaker 1: to accept the incoming signals from a cell phone and
Speaker 1: outgoing signals that are going to cell phones within that
Speaker 1: UM service area. They're doing so over specific frequency to
Speaker 1: the phones. Your phone knows which frequency quote unquote knows
Speaker 1: which frequency to be in because there's a master control
Speaker 1: system that's telling the phone tune into this frequency so
Speaker 1: that you can receive and transmit information. Technically, you're using
Speaker 1: two frequencies so you can receive and transmit at the
Speaker 1: same time. Then as you leave one cell phone service
Speaker 1: area and you're starting to get closer to another, then
Speaker 1: you have to be handed off right because if if not,
Speaker 1: once you move too far away from the base station,
Speaker 1: you would no longer have service. So this is similar
Speaker 1: to when you move into an area that doesn't have
Speaker 1: the towers that support the service you use. So if
Speaker 1: you're like an A T and T customer and you
Speaker 1: go into an area that's not supported by A T
Speaker 1: and T, then you're out of lock. Your phone becomes
Speaker 1: a brick, right or whatever's on your phone, that's all
Speaker 1: you can use. So you have to have this handoff
Speaker 1: technology for one tower to hand off the the service
Speaker 1: to another tower as you're moving between them. So what's
Speaker 1: happening is your phone is constantly sending little signals even
Speaker 1: when it's not directly in use to say here I
Speaker 1: am It's essentially saying I'm here. Yeah, it's exactly like
Speaker 1: paying a server. It's doing this about every seven to
Speaker 1: fifteen seconds. So this is why even if you don't
Speaker 1: use your phone, the battery life gradually decreases, so the
Speaker 1: reason it does this is very important because if it
Speaker 1: didn't tell the cell phone towers, hey here I am,
Speaker 1: you would never get texts or cell phone or you
Speaker 1: never get a call. You couldn't you just play solitaire
Speaker 1: or whatever. Yeah, because because the sis stone wouldn't know
Speaker 1: where your phone is, so it wouldn't be able to
Speaker 1: send the signal like it doesn't when someone dials your number.
Speaker 1: It doesn't magically right connect to your phone. The system
Speaker 1: has to be aware of where you are and as
Speaker 1: this constant game of Marco polo to ensure that there's
Speaker 1: this seamless transition, right because you as a person, you
Speaker 1: are mobile, so you can move from location to location.
Speaker 1: You are not always going to be next to the
Speaker 1: same cell phone tower all the time. So your phone
Speaker 1: has to constantly, like every seven to fifteen seconds, say
Speaker 1: I'm here. Because if you're in the car and you're
Speaker 1: traveling down the road, you're moving in and out of
Speaker 1: different you know, cell tower ranges. So the different cell
Speaker 1: towers have to be aware of where your phone is
Speaker 1: so that you can continue to receive messages, phone calls,
Speaker 1: that kind of stuff, or make them. Yeah. But the
Speaker 1: problem is that because of this technology, you know that
Speaker 1: this is what makes cell phones useful, but because of
Speaker 1: that same technology, it's also what makes this sting ray
Speaker 1: technology possible. So, because your phone is sending out these
Speaker 1: messages and your phone doesn't know where the next cell
Speaker 1: phone tower is, it's broadcasting these little messages and the
Speaker 1: cell phone towers pick it up. Based upon the signal strength,
Speaker 1: the cell phone tower knows if you are moving toward
Speaker 1: it or moving away from it. The sting ray ends
Speaker 1: up mimicking the cell phone tower. So your little cell
Speaker 1: phone sends out a message and the stingray picks it up.
Speaker 1: Sting ray now knows where your phone is, or at
Speaker 1: least knows that your phone is in that area. As
Speaker 1: the signal gets stronger, the sting ray knows that your
Speaker 1: phone is getting closer to it. If you have triangulated this,
Speaker 1: then it knows where you are. Or if you have
Speaker 1: one of the other devices that pair with the sting
Speaker 1: ray that can help track and locate, the sting ray
Speaker 1: knows where you are. There's a laptop that you would
Speaker 1: connect to this device that would give you the redoubt
Speaker 1: that would be useful for a human being, because right
Speaker 1: now we're talking all about technology that and data that
Speaker 1: machines could use, but it is not useful to us
Speaker 1: because we wouldn't be able to see it. But the
Speaker 1: laptop expresses that in ways that make it possible for
Speaker 1: you to see. Maybe with mapping software. It's plotting the
Speaker 1: location against a map, as well as identification of the
Speaker 1: phone numbers UM and the I D number that's unique
Speaker 1: to that particular mobile phone. So the issue here is
Speaker 1: that this this sting ray, we'll accept all of those
Speaker 1: incoming messages, all those things. Yeah, anything that's within the
Speaker 1: area that that the sensitivity of that antenna, it will
Speaker 1: pick that up. So is it like, is it just metadata?
Speaker 1: Well yes, originally, first it's just, first of all, just metadata,
Speaker 1: just metadata, because metadata you don't need very much of
Speaker 1: it to start making some very scary conclusions. You can
Speaker 1: start to really narrow down who person is based upon
Speaker 1: some metaday, their routines, what they do in the real world,
Speaker 1: and when they do it, the phone numbers they might
Speaker 1: be in contact with at that time. The phone number
Speaker 1: of the device itself obviously would be very important. So
Speaker 1: let's say that you two YouTube and Ben you are
Speaker 1: you are? You are the cops? Okay, you're in your
Speaker 1: van the power. Yeah, I know, not go crazy. Do
Speaker 1: we have a tank? You do not have a tank.
Speaker 1: We're not We're not Swanny. Was Swanny? Wasn't it? I
Speaker 1: was thinking I Swanny. By the way, listeners, is is
Speaker 1: just to the northeast of Atlanta. It's a little part
Speaker 1: of Metro Atlanta area. Um and they have a tank.
Speaker 1: So anyway, you are in a van, you have heard
Speaker 1: about tanks, but you do not currently own one. You've
Speaker 1: got plenty of donuts to get you through the day.
Speaker 1: By the way, if you were in law enforcement, and
Speaker 1: I am offending you, dear listeners, I'm merely poking fun.
Speaker 1: I love you guys at any rate. So you guys
Speaker 1: are looking at the incoming messages that are being hittop.
Speaker 1: You're looking specifically for a phone number associated with a suspect,
Speaker 1: a person of interest. You want to be able to
Speaker 1: track this person down, but so far have been unable
Speaker 1: to do so. You have heard that this person may
Speaker 1: in fact be in this particular part of town, which
Speaker 1: is why you have parked your van, And all you
Speaker 1: are doing is looking for a hit of that particular
Speaker 1: number as it moves through. And once you do, you
Speaker 1: then try to triangulate, you locate, and then your your
Speaker 1: send people out there to talk to this suspect or
Speaker 1: person of interest. Now that that alone, that sounds like
Speaker 1: that's okay. I mean, there might be some problems we
Speaker 1: have here, but you're specifically looking for the hit. You're
Speaker 1: not looking at the massive amount of information that's coming in.
Speaker 1: You're looking for something specific. Yeah, and now, Matt, I know,
Speaker 1: I know that, dude, I know, I know. It's the
Speaker 1: pencil pushers who really are to blame. Don't don't, don't
Speaker 1: bust my chops um so at any rate, Yeah, in
Speaker 1: this case, you are specifically looking for a particular phone number.
Speaker 1: It's a little more tricky if you don't know the
Speaker 1: number though, right Like now you're looking for patterns. Now
Speaker 1: you're looking specifically for activities that match what you suspect
Speaker 1: your target is already doing. You're also possibly looking to
Speaker 1: find out what phone numbers are being used in an area. Now,
Speaker 1: this is where it really gets tricky because some of
Speaker 1: these devices, not all of them, but the sting ray
Speaker 1: and the trigger fish included both can tell you if
Speaker 1: someone makes a call from within that area that the
Speaker 1: sting ray covers. You can see what number they called. Now, now,
Speaker 1: at least with the basic sting ray, you can't listen
Speaker 1: in on the call. You just know the time, the number,
Speaker 1: and the duration of the call. Hold on. It sounds
Speaker 1: like we're getting to a point where we can listen
Speaker 1: to these calls basic sting ray. Yeah. Okay, So remember
Speaker 1: when I said you can upgrade. So sting ray is
Speaker 1: it's a computer, is what it boils down to. I mean,
Speaker 1: it's more than a computer, but it has elements of
Speaker 1: a computer. It runs software. There is software that you
Speaker 1: can install on the sting ray that does allow you
Speaker 1: to listen in. There is fish Hawk, which is software
Speaker 1: that allows you to eavesdrop upon conversations. And there's also Porpoise.
Speaker 1: You might have noticed a theme I was gonna ask about.
Speaker 1: They're in Florida, that makes sense. But anyway, so the
Speaker 1: porpoise allows you to uh see texts that are sent
Speaker 1: through here. So it's again it's messages or phone calls
Speaker 1: that are sent from the phone out through the the
Speaker 1: sting ray that go on. Now, this obviously raises a
Speaker 1: lot of very tricky questions, particularly when it comes to
Speaker 1: basic rights, because if you are just taking in everything
Speaker 1: and you can potentially read all the text messages or
Speaker 1: listening on any of the conversations that are going through.
Speaker 1: Then remember this is just based on geography. You know,
Speaker 1: you're not targeting, you're getting everything. There's no probable cause,
Speaker 1: there's no probable cause, there's no warrant. So back in
Speaker 1: our scenario, Ben and I in our readout, well, okay,
Speaker 1: I'm driving, so Ben, you're alright, so you're the wheelman,
Speaker 1: get it so you can see. Then we'll be able
Speaker 1: to see all of this on a readout. A Matt, look,
Speaker 1: look at his number. It's been going back and forth
Speaker 1: from these two cell phone towers every freaking Thursday. Yeah.
Speaker 1: Or it could be Ben saying, hey, Matt, look this
Speaker 1: duphus over here thinks his girlfriend's gonna may can dinner tonight,
Speaker 1: and we already know she ain't gonna do that, right buddy,
Speaker 1: You guys are so good at after this comes out,
Speaker 1: it's so I'll just be stopped on the street. We've
Speaker 1: got more to say in this classic episode of tech stuff.
Speaker 1: After these quick messages, that's funny until it happened, alright,
Speaker 1: So at any rate, uh yeah, yeah, I mean technically,
Speaker 1: if you have the right technology right, being the the
Speaker 1: appropriate one for this, uh, and you have the correct
Speaker 1: software on it, then you could be you could start
Speaker 1: filtering through you could potentially read anything that's coming through
Speaker 1: that that stingray device. So again, it would be any
Speaker 1: phone that was within that range of the antenna. Um
Speaker 1: you wouldn't necessarily I mean you probably wouldn't be storing
Speaker 1: at all. I mean you could if you had a
Speaker 1: large enough hard drive. That would be another thing you
Speaker 1: would need to have in your array of technology piling
Speaker 1: up very quickly. Yeah, and so this is starting to
Speaker 1: sound probably very similar to the discussions we've had about
Speaker 1: the n s A. You know, the fact that they
Speaker 1: have been collecting cell phone data at the they're doing
Speaker 1: it at the provider level, right like they're there, they've
Speaker 1: got their ears on this national or even global level,
Speaker 1: whereas we're really talking about very regional effects here. Yes,
Speaker 1: still very concerning. So how much how much information can
Speaker 1: it actually capture? Um, well, you know it's here all right.
Speaker 1: Here's the thing. We don't know the full extent of
Speaker 1: what I can capture because secrets have to be kept
Speaker 1: for your safety from the creators of sting ray or
Speaker 1: from the police departments. In the law enforcement. I'm just
Speaker 1: gonna say yes from both. So there was a story recently.
Speaker 1: I think it was I want to say it was
Speaker 1: Santa Clara, California, but I could be wrong. It was
Speaker 1: a It was a town in California, however, that recently
Speaker 1: declined to purchase from Harris Corporation because they said there
Speaker 1: were agreements that they would have been forced to enter
Speaker 1: into that would prevent them from releasing any information about
Speaker 1: the product, even in the face of a Freedom of
Speaker 1: Information Act request. So an iron clad in yes, like
Speaker 1: a nondisclosure agreement to trump all nondisclosure. How the heck
Speaker 1: do you get aroun A. You mostly just drag your
Speaker 1: heels as long as possible and hope that the judge
Speaker 1: that ends up hearing any case about it is not
Speaker 1: savvy enough to understand the implications of this technology. You
Speaker 1: can appeal for national security, I think right. That's essentially
Speaker 1: what they say is that if we were to tell
Speaker 1: you what the capabilities of this technology were, then the
Speaker 1: bad guys would be able to work around it, thus
Speaker 1: making the technology useless and we'd only be getting your
Speaker 1: boring text messages instead of the bad guys stuff. Well,
Speaker 1: it's okay just to play the advocate here that kind
Speaker 1: of reasoning, which is incredibly slippery and dangerous. It does
Speaker 1: make sense if you think again about the ostensible purpose, right,
Speaker 1: the the idea that this stuff could be rendered useless
Speaker 1: if it wasn't a secret. But also, I'm just gonna
Speaker 1: say the word I'm going to say is convenient. It's
Speaker 1: a convenient reason well, and it's it's yeah, when you
Speaker 1: have like a rubber stamp that's a secret, then how
Speaker 1: do you have oversight? How can you make certain that
Speaker 1: the figures that have been put into authority positions in
Speaker 1: order to help the citizens, how can you make sure
Speaker 1: that they are doing that that do that they've been
Speaker 1: they've been tasked with, as opposed to abusing it or
Speaker 1: misusing it, maybe not even abusing it on purpose, but
Speaker 1: perhaps through you know, no no maliciousness, have been using
Speaker 1: it incorrectly. Uh. And there have been arguments that judges
Speaker 1: have allowed this kind of technology to be used because
Speaker 1: the explanations they were given about what the technology did
Speaker 1: were purposefully vague and limited, so that they would not
Speaker 1: know the full extent of what this technology does. So,
Speaker 1: in other words, here's where we're going to kind of
Speaker 1: transition into more of the policy stuff, because you know,
Speaker 1: that's really why I got you guys to come on here.
Speaker 1: The technology we've kind of covered, you know, the very
Speaker 1: basic ideas that he's a man in the middle kind
Speaker 1: of attack. The reason why I brought you on here
Speaker 1: is because this is my own personal perspective, my own opinion.
Speaker 1: But my opinion is at this technology is dangerously close,
Speaker 1: if not identical, to the concept of issuing a general warrant,
Speaker 1: which is precisely what the Fourth Amendment was supposed to
Speaker 1: protect us from. So the idea being that here in
Speaker 1: the United States, by the way, this technology is being
Speaker 1: used in other places. In fact, one of the reasons
Speaker 1: that I brought up is because recently Sky News was
Speaker 1: reporting about how it's being used in the UK. Uh.
Speaker 1: It had been thought to have been used in the
Speaker 1: UK for a while, but now there's kind of essentially
Speaker 1: ironclad evidence that yes, it's being used as the UK. Yeah.
Speaker 1: So the reason why, uh, you know, I brought you
Speaker 1: guys in is this this idea of one of the
Speaker 1: founding principles of the United States of America was that
Speaker 1: the colonists didn't they weren't so crazy about the British
Speaker 1: coming up and going into every single house looking for
Speaker 1: a specific person, with no reason to suspect that the
Speaker 1: person of ed was actually in the houses they were stopping.
Speaker 1: It's just a general blanket search, right, So search and seizure.
Speaker 1: The idea of being that we're looking for this person.
Speaker 1: This person is is bad and so you have no
Speaker 1: rights until we find this person. So we're gonna go
Speaker 1: into your house and turn it upside down looking for
Speaker 1: this person. If they're not there, too, well, okay, well
Speaker 1: good for you, too bad for us. We're gonna go
Speaker 1: do it to the next family. Ah. So, this approach
Speaker 1: of using a device to pull in all incoming data,
Speaker 1: even if you're looking for a really bad person, you're
Speaker 1: getting everything, and it doesn't seem that different to me
Speaker 1: than the approach of there's this bad person out there,
Speaker 1: we're going to go through everybody's house until we find
Speaker 1: that person. So for me, there are a couple of
Speaker 1: things you have to establish. One of them is does
Speaker 1: that data that you're sending out belong to you? Is
Speaker 1: it really yours or you know, is it the companies
Speaker 1: that you're using just to ostensibly send the information to
Speaker 1: a cell tower to another person. Um, and then for me,
Speaker 1: if you look at things like when the Boston bombing occurred,
Speaker 1: and then the search for the Sarnative brothers afterwards, and
Speaker 1: when the police were going through and essentially doing what
Speaker 1: you're saying, searching through houses. Yeah, with just it's not
Speaker 1: really a general warrant, but something kind of similar to that,
Speaker 1: where yeah, I mean they didn't have all they didn't
Speaker 1: have a warrant for each specific house they went through,
Speaker 1: which they're supposed to if if I mean, your rights
Speaker 1: as a citizen are supposed to say, listen, if you
Speaker 1: don't have a warrant, you cannot come into my house.
Speaker 1: That is a constitutional right guaranteed to me. Yeah, it's
Speaker 1: the old, the old ticking time bomb reasoning, which I
Speaker 1: find fairly disingenuous. Uh. When the idea we heard it before,
Speaker 1: with the idea of using torture to obtain some sort
Speaker 1: of confession or insider information, where people would say, well,
Speaker 1: torture is not ordinarily allowed, but if there is a
Speaker 1: bomb that is going to go off in a set
Speaker 1: amount of time, and we have one person who knows
Speaker 1: the information in custody, then shouldn't we torture somebody to
Speaker 1: save a hundred people or whatever the number is. And
Speaker 1: this with what's similar to me about this is that
Speaker 1: this encounters um so many ways to bend rules that
Speaker 1: are that exists for a reason, as you said, and
Speaker 1: it doesn't really provide a way to bend those rules
Speaker 1: back to their original shape. I mean, Jonathan, I can
Speaker 1: think of already, uh several scenarios wherein this gig gets
Speaker 1: sticky very quickly. Matt. I love that you mentioned, Uh.
Speaker 1: It might not be the person actually using the phone, right,
Speaker 1: It might be someone else, uh took a phone right
Speaker 1: and used it as a burner. But the person, the
Speaker 1: innocent person whose name is uh tied to that number
Speaker 1: that I d they're going to be automatically suspect number
Speaker 1: one or maybe even public enemy number one. Another question
Speaker 1: is what if? What if? This search? Right? So let's
Speaker 1: go back in, Um, Matt, you and I are still cops, Jonathan,
Speaker 1: your FBI, your special investigator. All right, you came in,
Speaker 1: you said, I'm taking over this investigation. I got a
Speaker 1: little flip phone because I'm from the later seasons of
Speaker 1: X Files, right exactly right, black two, black tie, whole thing.
Speaker 1: And you say that we are looking for you know,
Speaker 1: insert bad guy's name here. Uh. And while we're looking though, however, uh,
Speaker 1: there are our search our vacuum cleaner approach brings in
Speaker 1: another number that pings on your radar because you were
Speaker 1: already suspicious of one person doing, you know, a federal
Speaker 1: level crime. So this person who we were not looking for,
Speaker 1: just showed up. What happens then, Uh? Well, I mean,
Speaker 1: obviously I gotta take over the investigation. I've seen a
Speaker 1: lot of episodes of various crime dramas, and that's what
Speaker 1: the That's the only thing the FBI is around to
Speaker 1: do is to push the local police force out of
Speaker 1: this was my case. That's the way you have to
Speaker 1: keep putting your sunglasses on and taking the Occasionally you
Speaker 1: just hear the who yeah, yeah, Well I've got a
Speaker 1: scenario kind of like that. Unlessing, Jonathan, do you want
Speaker 1: to do? Answer no, No, I did. The only answer
Speaker 1: to that that I have is that I would imagine
Speaker 1: that at least until there are some strong precedents set
Speaker 1: in in court about the actual use of this technology,
Speaker 1: what it really can do, and whether or not it
Speaker 1: truly is constitutional to use it in the way that
Speaker 1: it's being used. I would imagine at least until that happens,
Speaker 1: the FBI acts on that act on that information, because
Speaker 1: if there if no one has come out and said
Speaker 1: you can't do that, they're going to do that. And
Speaker 1: I don't mean to cast aspersions on lawn enforcement of
Speaker 1: the FBI. I realized that they have incredibly difficult and
Speaker 1: very high stakes jobs, right and in order for them
Speaker 1: to be able to do those jobs in an increasingly
Speaker 1: complex technological world, there are some very tough questions we
Speaker 1: have to answer. But the problem I have is that
Speaker 1: these are questions that that seem to already have been
Speaker 1: answered in the past. We just haven't applied the answer yet,
Speaker 1: or people judges in particular, haven't understood the implications of
Speaker 1: this technology, and that we're seeing some civil liberties fade
Speaker 1: away as a result or get less, you know, like
Speaker 1: like it's like you are protected against this except in
Speaker 1: all of these other newer situations, many of which we
Speaker 1: cannot legally tell you about because national security, right, because
Speaker 1: if we told you about how we're violating your civil liberties,
Speaker 1: then the bad guys would win. Like, well, technically, if
Speaker 1: you're telling me that my civil liberties are being violated,
Speaker 1: but you can't tell me how the bad guys have one. Yeah,
Speaker 1: it's it's an interesting deliminate is one that we keep
Speaker 1: running into. And this is not the first time. I
Speaker 1: love that you mentioned there's precedent through about this throughout history.
Speaker 1: I mean back when it was just the post office, right. Uh,
Speaker 1: there were there were still these ongoing debates about what
Speaker 1: kind of right to privacy should someone expect when they're
Speaker 1: using the postal system. But you also mentioned advocacy groups,
Speaker 1: So is there some organized opposition to there's quite quite
Speaker 1: a lot. There's a lot of disorganized opposition too. But
Speaker 1: the organized opposition includes like the Electronic Frontier Foundation, the
Speaker 1: e F E f UH, there's the American Civil Liberties Union,
Speaker 1: the a c l u UH, there's EPIC. There are
Speaker 1: all these different groups that are all about privacy and
Speaker 1: civil rights that have identified problem areas with US technologies,
Speaker 1: some of which have been they've kind of some of
Speaker 1: them have couched their arguments, largely because they ay, we
Speaker 1: can't come out and say how strongly strongly we feel
Speaker 1: about this because of the secrecy involved. Without knowing everything,
Speaker 1: we we don't want to suspect the worst. But we
Speaker 1: can't discount it either because you won't tell us what
Speaker 1: it does or how it's being used. Um, you know,
Speaker 1: but there are a lot who are saying you need
Speaker 1: to have rules set in place on how this technology
Speaker 1: can be used, if in fact it is legal to
Speaker 1: use it at all. So, for example, perhaps before you
Speaker 1: use this you have to secure a warrant that specifies
Speaker 1: who you are looking for and and narrows that down
Speaker 1: to a point where you can't just throw out a
Speaker 1: net and everybody who's caught in the net, their lives
Speaker 1: are turned upside down for the duration of you sorting
Speaker 1: out which person is the one you actually are interested in.
Speaker 1: But they'll never know the collateral damage isn't really collateral
Speaker 1: if they have no idea, Well, they might not ever know.
Speaker 1: And you know, you could argue that in a world
Speaker 1: where you never know that this is happening and it's
Speaker 1: never affecting you, stick with me. You're in a world
Speaker 1: where you you don't know that's happening to you and
Speaker 1: it's not having any noticeable effect on your life. Ultimately,
Speaker 1: you might be able to go to sleep at night
Speaker 1: and think, well, it doesn't really matter, because if it
Speaker 1: is not affecting my life. Then I mean, I don't
Speaker 1: want it to happen, and I'm still going to protest
Speaker 1: it happening because I don't think it's right. But if
Speaker 1: it doesn't have a noticeable effect on my life at
Speaker 1: the end of the day, when I draw my last breath,
Speaker 1: it hasn't really made a difference, who cares. But we
Speaker 1: might also live in a world where sometimes it does
Speaker 1: affect us, even if we are perfectly innocent in all
Speaker 1: in the eyes of the law. Let's just throw out
Speaker 1: some examples of the n S saver, for instance, like
Speaker 1: a person who decides to use the n S as
Speaker 1: wide array of of surveillance techniques to look in on
Speaker 1: an ex girlfriend. That's exactly the scenario I was going
Speaker 1: to bring up. If you and I back in our scenario,
Speaker 1: I decided to go back and use the machine for
Speaker 1: a little bit because we parked to get some coffee
Speaker 1: or something, and I see a number that I recognize
Speaker 1: pop up, and I'm just like, oh, what is my
Speaker 1: ex wife's new husband talking about? Oh, and then blah
Speaker 1: blah blah blah blah. There you go down the rabbit
Speaker 1: hole into weird personal things. Then, and this is the thing.
Speaker 1: It's it's you know, the technology allows that to happen,
Speaker 1: and humans being human are going to do it right.
Speaker 1: Like it's it's not a question of whether the technology
Speaker 1: itself is good or bad because it's a tool. Uh,
Speaker 1: you might say, is it a tool that is appropriate?
Speaker 1: Is there any is there are there appropriate use cases
Speaker 1: for this tool? And if so, how are they defined?
Speaker 1: I think that's the important step. We have to come
Speaker 1: to the conclusion of does this tool make sense? If so,
Speaker 1: in which context does it make sense? And how can
Speaker 1: we be certain that in any given use case it
Speaker 1: fits those contexts? And if if we can answer all
Speaker 1: those to our satisfaction, fine, I question whether that's possible
Speaker 1: particular technology. But but the problem is that people they'll
Speaker 1: behave outside of that, right. I mean, if there is
Speaker 1: the capability of someone to do this, you know, use
Speaker 1: this technology in a selfish, possibly harmful way, for then
Speaker 1: someone will do it. It's not a question of if.
Speaker 1: It's a question of when and how frequently and uh,
Speaker 1: because we've seen it with the n s A. It's again,
Speaker 1: you know, you have to remember that at the end
Speaker 1: of the day, they're real human beings in charge of
Speaker 1: using this technology, and real human beings have real motivations
Speaker 1: that happen every single day of their lives. Just like
Speaker 1: you and me. We we go through our lives and
Speaker 1: we realize, oh, man, if only I knew what was
Speaker 1: going on in that person's head. Oh wait, I could
Speaker 1: figure it out because I've got access to this technology.
Speaker 1: It happens, right, it does. One thing immediately that we
Speaker 1: could say that might be a glimmer of hope with
Speaker 1: this is that many of the surveillance technologies or proprietary
Speaker 1: systems rather do have strict usage logs where wherein you know,
Speaker 1: any user with an I D dis tract. So, uh,
Speaker 1: Lieutenant Frederick would be pinned up for they would say, hey, lieutenant,
Speaker 1: why were you running by the way? Uh? Private in
Speaker 1: the police force, have you militarized the entire police force? Yes,
Speaker 1: several years in the future. He's not a rookie, he's
Speaker 1: a private all right. Well, anyhow, whatever your position would be,
Speaker 1: you know, there would be somebody over you, ideally who
Speaker 1: would say, hey, we noticed that you were searching this
Speaker 1: number which is not part of it, and you went
Speaker 1: pretty into So so that's one thing, But then again
Speaker 1: it relies as you said, on the policy on the system.
Speaker 1: I'd like to take the danger even further because one
Speaker 1: of the most dangerous potential things about the n s
Speaker 1: A program and possibly Stingray and it's other accoutrement, is
Speaker 1: the idea that this could be used by corrupt people
Speaker 1: with access to the technology to do things like smear campaigns,
Speaker 1: to do blackmail, or even extortion. And the most frightening
Speaker 1: thing to me, although it is it is offensive, the
Speaker 1: idea that an innocent person's uh terrible late night you
Speaker 1: up text messages might be collected and saved for posterity,
Speaker 1: it's more frightening that this could be used to curtail
Speaker 1: people who were fighting against it. Yeah, I mean there's
Speaker 1: there's that possibilities. Well, I mean, grant this would a
Speaker 1: lot of that responsibility falls on the Harris Car operation
Speaker 1: and how they deal with the orders. I imagine that
Speaker 1: they mostly I mean before they were really working with
Speaker 1: the FBI and some military companies or military organizations I
Speaker 1: should say, um, And it was only relatively recently, in
Speaker 1: the last maybe five to ten years, that they started
Speaker 1: really working with the local law enforcement agencies. UM. I
Speaker 1: don't know what there are other customers are like or
Speaker 1: who they are, but you could presumably, I mean, even
Speaker 1: if even if it's not made by Harris Corporation, because
Speaker 1: it's out there and because people know about it, then
Speaker 1: that's enough for someone to say, hey, let's pour some
Speaker 1: money into making one of these of our own so
Speaker 1: we can spy on people in the CIA, or the
Speaker 1: CIA might say let's use this so we can spy
Speaker 1: on people in other countries. I mean, it's definitely a difficult,
Speaker 1: difficult subject. It's tricky, uh, I mean, obviously, spying throughout
Speaker 1: history has all been about let's find out what they
Speaker 1: know without letting them know we know. So at some
Speaker 1: point you're like, well, if we if we assume that
Speaker 1: the premise that spies are necessary is true, then these
Speaker 1: other technologies need to exist for us to be able
Speaker 1: to do that. Yeah, but maybe you will, maybe you
Speaker 1: would argue that spying is not something that should happen
Speaker 1: in the first place. Okay, this this is something that
Speaker 1: I know we really wanted your opinion. Okay for a while,
Speaker 1: so have we? And we asked Alex Winter the same question.
Speaker 1: He's a filmmaker made the deep webs. Have we reached
Speaker 1: the point of new return with technology? Has technology rendered
Speaker 1: the concept of individual privacy obsolete or will it do so? Okay,
Speaker 1: well this is super complicated, right, Sorry, it's a great question.
Speaker 1: Stay tuned for the exciting conclusion of this text stuff
Speaker 1: classic episode right after we take this break. On the
Speaker 1: one hand, you have stuff like this, the technology specifically
Speaker 1: meant to intercept and perhaps even uh not just not
Speaker 1: just intercept in the sense of finding out who is
Speaker 1: talking to whom, but what they are saying. Right, You've
Speaker 1: got that technology, that's one thing, And you could argue
Speaker 1: that as long as that technology exists, then privacy might
Speaker 1: only be an illusion. It might be something you believe
Speaker 1: you have, but in reality, your information is being collected somewhere.
Speaker 1: And of course we know that anything we post or
Speaker 1: call or text through or whatever, it's going through an infrastructure.
Speaker 1: So there is at least one entity out there that
Speaker 1: has the access to it. The question is whether anyone
Speaker 1: is looking at it or if it's just if it's
Speaker 1: just a conduit. Right, So you could argue that privacy
Speaker 1: is just an illusion in that case. There's another argument
Speaker 1: to make that has nothing to do with surveillance. Facebook. Twitter,
Speaker 1: we are we are voluntarily sharing more and more of
Speaker 1: our lives. Instagram, Pinterest, really anything you can think of
Speaker 1: where you are allowed a platform people are taking advantage
Speaker 1: of it. YouTube another great example, periscope. So you're you're
Speaker 1: volunteering to share a lot more information and you don't
Speaker 1: necessarily think while you're doing it. This could potentially put
Speaker 1: other things in my life at risk of becoming public knowledge,
Speaker 1: whether it's because you're not paying enough attention or you
Speaker 1: just don't realize how much information you are revealing every
Speaker 1: time you post something. Um So, you could argue in
Speaker 1: that case, privacy might also be an illusion, not because
Speaker 1: there are all these ways of staring at what's really
Speaker 1: going on, but because we're actually giving everything away and
Speaker 1: we're just not aware of it. We're not aware of
Speaker 1: the consequences of what we our own actions happened to
Speaker 1: be um I would argue we haven't gone too far
Speaker 1: in the sense that we could, if motivated to do
Speaker 1: so and given the authority to do so, reverse a
Speaker 1: lot of the things that have been happening. The question
Speaker 1: of whether that's a reality or not, I mean, that's
Speaker 1: kind of like the pie in the sky optimistic idealism,
Speaker 1: the idea that people could actually be motivated to take action,
Speaker 1: specifically through voting and through campaigning, and through bringing things
Speaker 1: to attention and getting the word out there and getting
Speaker 1: people behind the argument, Hey, we need to address this,
Speaker 1: and we need to have it addressed to our satisfaction,
Speaker 1: not just it's secret. You can't know. I think it's possible,
Speaker 1: I think it would be really hard, and I don't
Speaker 1: even though I think it's possible, I don't think it's
Speaker 1: the plausible outcome. If I'm being perfectly honest, Um, it
Speaker 1: would require enormous changes in momentum among vast, huge entities
Speaker 1: out there that are bigger than any one person is.
Speaker 1: So even if you let's say that you have an
Speaker 1: ideal candidate for president of the United States in mind,
Speaker 1: someone that you truly believe has the best interests of
Speaker 1: the citizens at heart and wants to protect constitutional rights,
Speaker 1: so they want to do right by the citizens and
Speaker 1: make sure that the things they do truly do protect
Speaker 1: them and do so in a way that follows the rules.
Speaker 1: Even if that person exists and has put into the
Speaker 1: position of president, you still have everything outs that it,
Speaker 1: like from the local level to n essay too. You know,
Speaker 1: organizations that do not directly answer to the president. It's
Speaker 1: not like the president is capable of changing everything by
Speaker 1: flicking a wand in fact, they're not supposed to be
Speaker 1: able to do that. Doesn't have the position to president us. Yeah. So, uh,
Speaker 1: this is why until I become benevolent dictator, we're going
Speaker 1: to have these problems. Yeah, you know, you've you've been
Speaker 1: saying that more and more often. I I appreciate the
Speaker 1: posters that you've put up around the office. Uh they're
Speaker 1: they're a little bit stark. I don't know, I you know,
Speaker 1: I think they might be a bit too Soviet. Yeah,
Speaker 1: I mean, it would help if they were in English.
Speaker 1: But there's a lot of like crush this thing beneath
Speaker 1: the boot. I just like the fist looked really like empowering.
Speaker 1: And now I oh it does man, it do? Yeah,
Speaker 1: it does. You're both on the list now, alright, so
Speaker 1: any rate, No, but this is this was the reason
Speaker 1: why why did you guys on here is because as
Speaker 1: I know you guys, I assume you feel similarly to
Speaker 1: to what I've stated. But I mean, if there's if
Speaker 1: I have in any way misconstrued, I would I definitely
Speaker 1: want you to have the opportunity to address it, well,
Speaker 1: I will let Ben finish this idea that I'm going
Speaker 1: to start. But when we spoke with Mr. Winter, he
Speaker 1: had a surprisingly positive outlook privacy. That's wonderful he did
Speaker 1: the people that he's been speaking with and communicating with
Speaker 1: in his research on the subject of the deep web.
Speaker 1: He's finding that there are a lot of people who
Speaker 1: are freely focused on encrypting data and finding ways to
Speaker 1: encrypt almost all communication that is done from a private
Speaker 1: person's level, so that a company that is even handling
Speaker 1: your data won't be able to decrypt it. Right. So,
Speaker 1: in other words, the the the company that handles it,
Speaker 1: it literally is just the conduit. It cannot it cannot
Speaker 1: see the content and most it will see where it's
Speaker 1: coming from and where it's going, but beyond that not
Speaker 1: what the actual information is. He used the phrase. One
Speaker 1: phrase I remember that he used was a renaissance of privacy,
Speaker 1: which which I found inspiring because the the old argument
Speaker 1: of well, if you have nothing to worry about, what
Speaker 1: you're worried about hiding, right, it's kind of silly when
Speaker 1: you consider that we do live in a world now
Speaker 1: where let's say, Jonathan, let's say that you as an
Speaker 1: FBI agent, love the part of towner and so much.
Speaker 1: You said, you know what, guys, I'm gonna pull up
Speaker 1: my tent stakes from Langley and I'm gonna come down here,
Speaker 1: and I am gonna I'm gonna live here, and a
Speaker 1: matter of fact, I'm gonna run for city commissioner because
Speaker 1: I think, uh, this kind of stuff needs to be
Speaker 1: dealt with in a public eye. And then all of
Speaker 1: a sudden, all of this stuff, every time you had
Speaker 1: used your phone in that region got leaked by somebody.
Speaker 1: Or maybe you're running for sheriff, right, because we do
Speaker 1: know that the sheriff's uh, at least in the Cab
Speaker 1: County once played to corrupt the game here. Yeah, well,
Speaker 1: or or even just something that, like, you know, a
Speaker 1: mistake that you make at some point, and it may
Speaker 1: be it may be one that you you know, it
Speaker 1: could be that something you consciously did, or not even
Speaker 1: a conscious mistake, something that due to your actions has
Speaker 1: accidentally happened, and that you have already taken care of it,
Speaker 1: You have fixed whatever problems there are, whatever the nature
Speaker 1: of that thing is, you have you know, you've done
Speaker 1: your time. However that I'm that might be for something
Speaker 1: like that to like, let's say that you do want
Speaker 1: to run for a local, local position and it has
Speaker 1: no bearing whatsoever on your ability to carry out your duties.
Speaker 1: We live in a world now where that stuff comes back,
Speaker 1: I mean, like big time comes back. And none of
Speaker 1: us are saints. You know, no one, No one has
Speaker 1: gone through life completely unsullied. Even if you, you know,
Speaker 1: are have the best of intentions. Something has happened at
Speaker 1: some point in your life. Maybe you were just in
Speaker 1: the wrong place at the wrong time, but that can
Speaker 1: be bad enough. Yeah, that's true. I I do want
Speaker 1: to say, Um, I really enjoyed I always enjoy being
Speaker 1: on the show, And um, I don't want to speak
Speaker 1: for you, mat but I'm I'm grateful that hates it. Yeah,
Speaker 1: I'm grateful that we got it horrible for me. You guys,
Speaker 1: you would be so impressed by vast ability to silently weep.
Speaker 1: We sit in this room, salty salty beard. But the
Speaker 1: only thing I would add to what we were saying
Speaker 1: is that I love that we were talking about how
Speaker 1: we are not casting aspersion on the individuals working in
Speaker 1: law enforcement, which is so often an incredibly thankless job,
Speaker 1: a fatally at times thankless job. And when you're when
Speaker 1: you are representing the good guys, right, the force of
Speaker 1: the force of crime prevention in our society, then the
Speaker 1: thing is that the game you are playing is stacked
Speaker 1: against you because the bad guys, whomever they may be,
Speaker 1: do not have to follow the same rules. So I
Speaker 1: while I think that, while I think that it's often easy,
Speaker 1: at least in our fuel, for people to demonize law
Speaker 1: enforcement as a faithless entity rather than a group of
Speaker 1: human beings, I do completely believe that this is horrible technology.
Speaker 1: I don't see a lot of cases of it being successful.
Speaker 1: The a c l U has tried their best to
Speaker 1: make a map of all the police areas they're using this,
Speaker 1: but they still they had to say that this map
Speaker 1: is incomplete. This is, I believe, very very close to
Speaker 1: a kind of Pandora's box. Because as we know, the
Speaker 1: price of technology continually decreases. Right, So what happens when
Speaker 1: it's a steam gray as the price of a PS four, Well,
Speaker 1: I mean you know it's it's being made in such
Speaker 1: limited amounts. I mean you have to have the demand there,
Speaker 1: and you have to have I would imagine there will
Speaker 1: also be laws that will limit the use of this
Speaker 1: because you have the giant phone companies that will lobby
Speaker 1: very hard. They don't want the ability for someone to
Speaker 1: spoof a cell phone tower to fall into the hands
Speaker 1: of an average citizen. Their their business depends upon that
Speaker 1: not happening. You're not the average citizen. No, No, I'm
Speaker 1: the future benevolent dictator of the new World Order. I
Speaker 1: think you need a tank the I think you don't
Speaker 1: need a tank on speed pial. Yeah, yeah, but they yeah,
Speaker 1: this is this is fantastic and I really appreciate the
Speaker 1: opportunity to let more people know about this. Yeah, And
Speaker 1: like I said, this technology has been around for a while.
Speaker 1: In fact that the stingray stuff really started hitting headlines
Speaker 1: a couple of years ago, back in that's when I
Speaker 1: was really starting to get noticed and keep in mind,
Speaker 1: and then use more than a decade before that. So
Speaker 1: it's it's good to be aware of it. It's good
Speaker 1: to ask these questions. And like I said, we may
Speaker 1: at some point come to a point where we are
Speaker 1: able to answer the questions I've been asking, to a
Speaker 1: point where maybe I would be like, Okay, I understand
Speaker 1: that in the world we live in the reality of
Speaker 1: the world we live in that under these situations, this
Speaker 1: might be an acceptable use of the technology. Uh, it's
Speaker 1: just right now we haven't. We don't have those answers
Speaker 1: because of secrecy. So yeah, it's it's it's definitely something
Speaker 1: to be aware of. H I. I don't want to
Speaker 1: be a fearmonger or anything like that, but um, it
Speaker 1: is important that you know about it because I mean,
Speaker 1: it's it's out there. Whether you know or not, it
Speaker 1: is there, so it's better to know. All right, Well, guys,
Speaker 1: thank you so much for joining the show. Obviously you
Speaker 1: can find Matt and Ben's work at Stuff. They don't
Speaker 1: want you to know. Well, I hope you feels weird
Speaker 1: to say this. Enjoyed that classic episode about law enforcement
Speaker 1: surveillance always a tricky thing to talk about. And if
Speaker 1: you have suggestions for topics I should cover in future
Speaker 1: episodes of tech Stuff, please reach out to me. The
Speaker 1: best way to do so is on Twitter. The handle
Speaker 1: for the show is text Stuff H s W and
Speaker 1: I'll talk to you again really soon. Text Stuff is
Speaker 1: an I Heart Radio production. For more podcasts from my
Speaker 1: Heart Radio, visit the I Heart Radio app, Apple Podcasts,
Speaker 1: or wherever you listen to your favorite shows,