1 00:00:04,400 --> 00:00:07,760 Speaker 1: Welcome to tex Stuff, a production from I Heart Radio. 2 00:00:11,840 --> 00:00:14,440 Speaker 1: Hey there, and welcome to tech Stuff. I'm your host, 3 00:00:14,560 --> 00:00:17,520 Speaker 1: Jonathan Strickland. I'm an executive producer with iHeart Radio. And 4 00:00:17,640 --> 00:00:21,759 Speaker 1: how the tech are you? It is time for a 5 00:00:21,880 --> 00:00:26,000 Speaker 1: tech Stuff plastic episode. This episode is called a sting 6 00:00:26,120 --> 00:00:30,400 Speaker 1: ray operation and it has guest co hosts Ben Bolan 7 00:00:30,520 --> 00:00:32,760 Speaker 1: and Matt Frederick of stuff they don't want you to 8 00:00:32,880 --> 00:00:37,239 Speaker 1: know on the show. And that's because stingrays are a 9 00:00:37,560 --> 00:00:42,360 Speaker 1: type of surveillance tech used by law enforcement agencies that 10 00:00:42,400 --> 00:00:45,040 Speaker 1: trick your cell phone into thinking they're talking to an 11 00:00:45,040 --> 00:00:50,640 Speaker 1: actual cell phone tower. Let's listen in. We were super 12 00:00:50,720 --> 00:00:54,520 Speaker 1: excited to hear about today's topic because it's been something 13 00:00:54,560 --> 00:00:56,240 Speaker 1: that Matt and I have been talking about off air. 14 00:00:56,320 --> 00:00:59,720 Speaker 1: Is that correct? Absolutely? This kind of technology that we're 15 00:00:59,720 --> 00:01:02,960 Speaker 1: going to get into a little later. Uh piques our interest. 16 00:01:03,040 --> 00:01:06,280 Speaker 1: You could say, yeah, mine as well. Uh. You know, 17 00:01:07,120 --> 00:01:09,560 Speaker 1: the stuff they don't want you to know shows great show. 18 00:01:10,000 --> 00:01:11,800 Speaker 1: If you guys haven't checked it out, you need to 19 00:01:11,840 --> 00:01:14,800 Speaker 1: go and and check it out. Check check out how 20 00:01:14,840 --> 00:01:21,880 Speaker 1: you guys are looking into various types of conspiracies, things 21 00:01:21,920 --> 00:01:25,680 Speaker 1: that are happening below the surface level that people may 22 00:01:25,680 --> 00:01:29,360 Speaker 1: not be aware of and kind of sifting through the 23 00:01:29,400 --> 00:01:33,320 Speaker 1: information to show which parts of it are you know, 24 00:01:34,040 --> 00:01:36,560 Speaker 1: are really solid. You know, these are the things that 25 00:01:36,600 --> 00:01:39,800 Speaker 1: we know for sure. And here's the conjecture that's been 26 00:01:39,800 --> 00:01:42,280 Speaker 1: said about it. You guys do a great job with it. 27 00:01:42,640 --> 00:01:44,280 Speaker 1: And as it turns out, there's a lot of stuff 28 00:01:44,319 --> 00:01:48,120 Speaker 1: out there that can really fuel that kind of kind 29 00:01:48,120 --> 00:01:52,080 Speaker 1: of talk for good reason. And I typically am one 30 00:01:52,120 --> 00:01:54,200 Speaker 1: of those more you know, I am a little more 31 00:01:54,240 --> 00:01:58,000 Speaker 1: conservative and skeptical with my approach to these things. But 32 00:01:58,200 --> 00:02:01,040 Speaker 1: this is a technology we're gonna talk about today that 33 00:02:02,280 --> 00:02:06,080 Speaker 1: I don't know how you could go to it being 34 00:02:06,160 --> 00:02:09,440 Speaker 1: skeptical and say, oh, everything is fine. We are talking 35 00:02:10,120 --> 00:02:14,840 Speaker 1: about sting ray or I M. S I catchers, And 36 00:02:14,919 --> 00:02:17,600 Speaker 1: so sting ray is the one that I think most 37 00:02:17,600 --> 00:02:19,720 Speaker 1: people have heard about. That's the one that was brought 38 00:02:19,760 --> 00:02:22,919 Speaker 1: up in a lawsuit in Arizona, UM. So I think 39 00:02:22,960 --> 00:02:26,120 Speaker 1: that that is what most people think about when they 40 00:02:26,120 --> 00:02:28,799 Speaker 1: hear I M. S I catchers, if they are aware 41 00:02:28,800 --> 00:02:31,639 Speaker 1: of that term at all. But of course sting stingray 42 00:02:31,680 --> 00:02:35,200 Speaker 1: is just one version of that, and we'll talk about 43 00:02:35,240 --> 00:02:38,440 Speaker 1: some of the other ones as well. So I am 44 00:02:38,840 --> 00:02:45,480 Speaker 1: s I catchers stands for International Mobile subscriber identity catchers 45 00:02:45,680 --> 00:02:50,120 Speaker 1: or locators, and that is a fancy way of saying. 46 00:02:50,360 --> 00:02:54,560 Speaker 1: This is a technology that is able to intercept signals 47 00:02:54,680 --> 00:03:01,400 Speaker 1: from cell phones, ostensibly so that a law enforcement official 48 00:03:01,639 --> 00:03:06,680 Speaker 1: could locate a person based upon that person's cell phone signaling. 49 00:03:07,360 --> 00:03:10,160 Speaker 1: And it does this, and we'll talk about specifics in 50 00:03:10,160 --> 00:03:13,960 Speaker 1: a bit, by mimicking a cell phone tower. So in 51 00:03:13,960 --> 00:03:17,919 Speaker 1: other words, your cell phone is communicating with this device 52 00:03:18,480 --> 00:03:22,080 Speaker 1: thinking that this is the actual part of the infrastructure 53 00:03:22,600 --> 00:03:25,480 Speaker 1: that it would normally operate inside. Yeah. Yeah, it's sort 54 00:03:25,480 --> 00:03:27,880 Speaker 1: of the same way that are similar at least to 55 00:03:28,480 --> 00:03:31,520 Speaker 1: the ways in which some animals have evolved to have 56 00:03:31,639 --> 00:03:34,119 Speaker 1: camouflage that makes them appear to be a different type 57 00:03:34,160 --> 00:03:37,680 Speaker 1: of creature. Right. Yeah. And one thing that I just 58 00:03:37,720 --> 00:03:40,920 Speaker 1: want to get this out so I don't uh moan 59 00:03:41,240 --> 00:03:44,000 Speaker 1: and complain about it for the whole episode. If you 60 00:03:44,120 --> 00:03:47,480 Speaker 1: ever lost a cell phone or had one stolen and 61 00:03:47,520 --> 00:03:51,280 Speaker 1: had the sneaking suspicion that there might be a way 62 00:03:51,280 --> 00:03:55,560 Speaker 1: for law enforcement to catch it, well, theoretically there is. 63 00:03:55,720 --> 00:03:58,600 Speaker 1: It's just it's just they can't do that for everybody 64 00:03:58,640 --> 00:04:01,360 Speaker 1: because so many people lose their cell phones or have 65 00:04:01,480 --> 00:04:05,240 Speaker 1: them stolen, you know, as long as it's turned on right, right, Yeah, 66 00:04:05,280 --> 00:04:07,000 Speaker 1: and as long as well, And it also depends on 67 00:04:07,040 --> 00:04:09,160 Speaker 1: a couple of other things too, Right, they have to 68 00:04:09,240 --> 00:04:13,240 Speaker 1: have the if they're looking for your cell phones specifically, 69 00:04:13,280 --> 00:04:15,840 Speaker 1: they kind of need to know a little bit more information, 70 00:04:15,960 --> 00:04:19,160 Speaker 1: like they need to know something specific about that phone 71 00:04:19,400 --> 00:04:23,800 Speaker 1: or to identify it versus all the other phones that 72 00:04:23,800 --> 00:04:27,120 Speaker 1: will connect to it, right, because otherwise they just be like, well, 73 00:04:27,160 --> 00:04:30,040 Speaker 1: it maybe one of the phones here, and there are 74 00:04:30,040 --> 00:04:32,520 Speaker 1: different ways of looking into that. Right. It all depends 75 00:04:32,520 --> 00:04:34,520 Speaker 1: on what the investigation is and we'll we'll talk more 76 00:04:34,560 --> 00:04:39,080 Speaker 1: about how it's used in investigations. So basically, this is 77 00:04:39,080 --> 00:04:45,400 Speaker 1: a technology meant to help Again, ostensibly law enforcement tracked 78 00:04:45,400 --> 00:04:49,720 Speaker 1: down the bad guys or counter terrorism officials to identify 79 00:04:49,880 --> 00:04:53,919 Speaker 1: potential terrorist threats before they become a reality. That's what 80 00:04:54,000 --> 00:04:56,000 Speaker 1: it's supposed to be used for. There are a lot 81 00:04:56,040 --> 00:04:59,080 Speaker 1: of people who have objected to it because it is 82 00:04:59,440 --> 00:05:03,280 Speaker 1: it is take making a very wide approach to targeting 83 00:05:03,320 --> 00:05:06,880 Speaker 1: something very specific, and that can be dangerous for the 84 00:05:06,920 --> 00:05:09,599 Speaker 1: sting ray its self. A cost between sixty eight thousand 85 00:05:09,680 --> 00:05:13,200 Speaker 1: dollars and a hundred thirty five thousand dollars last I checked. 86 00:05:13,440 --> 00:05:15,880 Speaker 1: Because there are two different models of the sting ray. 87 00:05:16,279 --> 00:05:18,480 Speaker 1: There's the sting ray and sting Ray. To sting Ray 88 00:05:18,480 --> 00:05:20,720 Speaker 1: two came out a few years ago. The sting ray 89 00:05:20,760 --> 00:05:24,120 Speaker 1: obviously came out before that. Because we move in a 90 00:05:24,200 --> 00:05:28,560 Speaker 1: chronological order, they haven't gotten to that quantum effect where 91 00:05:28,600 --> 00:05:32,600 Speaker 1: the sequel comes out before the original. Um. Now it's 92 00:05:32,640 --> 00:05:36,560 Speaker 1: made by a company called Harris Corporation out of Melbourne, Florida, 93 00:05:36,880 --> 00:05:40,919 Speaker 1: and uh and this company makes a lot of technology 94 00:05:40,960 --> 00:05:45,400 Speaker 1: that falls into this general category. Some of the products 95 00:05:45,400 --> 00:05:48,200 Speaker 1: that they make are similar to sting ray and do 96 00:05:48,360 --> 00:05:52,320 Speaker 1: similar things to that device. Others are more specific and 97 00:05:52,320 --> 00:05:58,560 Speaker 1: are meant to be used in conjunction with gadget like stingray. Yeah. Yeah, 98 00:05:58,640 --> 00:06:00,800 Speaker 1: you know, it's like a console. Are like you've got 99 00:06:00,800 --> 00:06:03,400 Speaker 1: your connect, you've got your you know, your your dance pad, 100 00:06:03,560 --> 00:06:06,320 Speaker 1: You've got all these other things sort of the similar 101 00:06:07,000 --> 00:06:11,359 Speaker 1: thing here, except the devices that Harris Corporation makes. Some 102 00:06:11,520 --> 00:06:16,440 Speaker 1: of them boost the signal catching ability of the basic 103 00:06:17,240 --> 00:06:21,040 Speaker 1: technology like the stingray. Some of them allow for better 104 00:06:21,080 --> 00:06:25,080 Speaker 1: tracking technology. It all depends on the thing. But but 105 00:06:25,200 --> 00:06:26,839 Speaker 1: you know, you may have heard some of the other names. 106 00:06:26,839 --> 00:06:31,520 Speaker 1: Some of the other names that include trigger fish, kingfish, 107 00:06:31,640 --> 00:06:38,680 Speaker 1: amber jack, gossamer, harpoon, and hail storm. Uh. And not 108 00:06:38,720 --> 00:06:41,640 Speaker 1: only these are not types of stingray. These are all 109 00:06:41,680 --> 00:06:44,880 Speaker 1: individual devices that work in a similar way to sting ray. 110 00:06:44,920 --> 00:06:47,680 Speaker 1: Some of them copy the functionality of sting ray, some 111 00:06:47,720 --> 00:06:50,760 Speaker 1: of them go beyond that. In fact, trigger fish is 112 00:06:50,839 --> 00:06:57,240 Speaker 1: particularly troubling. Um. But sting ray it self can be 113 00:06:57,240 --> 00:06:59,799 Speaker 1: really troubled too if you just do a simple upgrade 114 00:06:59,800 --> 00:07:03,279 Speaker 1: to it. And then you're right. All of these have 115 00:07:04,120 --> 00:07:06,400 Speaker 1: things in common and that they all are meant to 116 00:07:06,600 --> 00:07:10,960 Speaker 1: detect cell phone usage in some way and either identify 117 00:07:11,040 --> 00:07:14,600 Speaker 1: it or locate it and or track it. Um. And 118 00:07:14,800 --> 00:07:18,080 Speaker 1: it's how you use these in combination with one another 119 00:07:18,160 --> 00:07:21,920 Speaker 1: that determines your ability to do that. Now, clearly we're 120 00:07:21,920 --> 00:07:25,520 Speaker 1: talking about something that's mimicking a cell phone tower. You 121 00:07:25,560 --> 00:07:30,440 Speaker 1: have to have it be mobile because otherwise you just 122 00:07:30,480 --> 00:07:32,720 Speaker 1: have to hope that the bad guys happened to go 123 00:07:32,800 --> 00:07:34,760 Speaker 1: across your part of town. You can't take it to 124 00:07:34,800 --> 00:07:38,720 Speaker 1: them if it's not mobile, right. So, Uh. One of 125 00:07:38,760 --> 00:07:42,400 Speaker 1: the things that this is really helpful for as far 126 00:07:42,440 --> 00:07:44,840 Speaker 1: as law enforcement are concerned, is that they can go 127 00:07:44,960 --> 00:07:48,520 Speaker 1: to a part of town where they suspect someone is. 128 00:07:48,800 --> 00:07:51,280 Speaker 1: They can put out their ears, listen for it, look 129 00:07:51,520 --> 00:07:53,760 Speaker 1: to see if they have any hits that relate back 130 00:07:53,800 --> 00:07:56,800 Speaker 1: to the target they're specifically looking for, and if not, 131 00:07:57,120 --> 00:08:00,400 Speaker 1: they can move on to a different part of town. Um. 132 00:08:00,440 --> 00:08:03,000 Speaker 1: That's also one of the drawbacks, as it turns out, 133 00:08:03,040 --> 00:08:06,400 Speaker 1: at least from from the perspective of some people. Now, 134 00:08:08,160 --> 00:08:10,200 Speaker 1: let's see one other thing. Oh, I forgot to mention. 135 00:08:10,200 --> 00:08:14,800 Speaker 1: Gossamer is one of the exceptions to this. Gossamer is 136 00:08:14,920 --> 00:08:18,680 Speaker 1: not about tracking or locating cell phone, but this is 137 00:08:18,680 --> 00:08:20,440 Speaker 1: the one that freaks me out the most. Yeah, this 138 00:08:20,480 --> 00:08:23,480 Speaker 1: is not passive. Now, Gossamer is about denial of service 139 00:08:23,520 --> 00:08:27,640 Speaker 1: attacks on a mobile phone, so it's about it's essentially 140 00:08:27,680 --> 00:08:31,040 Speaker 1: a jammer. No, this is great for all the paranoid 141 00:08:31,120 --> 00:08:34,400 Speaker 1: people in the audience. Are you getting bad reception or 142 00:08:34,440 --> 00:08:39,959 Speaker 1: are you being gossamer? I actually and another thing to 143 00:08:39,960 --> 00:08:41,840 Speaker 1: to mention. I didn't put it in our notes, but 144 00:08:41,960 --> 00:08:44,320 Speaker 1: one of the things these devices typically can do. The 145 00:08:44,360 --> 00:08:47,640 Speaker 1: stingray in particular can do this is it can boost 146 00:08:47,960 --> 00:08:52,200 Speaker 1: your the signal coming from your phone to connect to 147 00:08:52,320 --> 00:08:55,040 Speaker 1: the tower. It can essentially say I need a stronger 148 00:08:55,080 --> 00:08:58,240 Speaker 1: signal your phone. Then, even though you're not using it, 149 00:08:58,280 --> 00:09:00,920 Speaker 1: like it's just in your pocket, there's no vibrating, there's 150 00:09:00,920 --> 00:09:04,160 Speaker 1: no ringing, there's nothing going on, your phone starts sending 151 00:09:04,200 --> 00:09:07,960 Speaker 1: stronger signals. This drains your battery. So if you're the 152 00:09:08,000 --> 00:09:11,600 Speaker 1: paranoid persuasion, you may also think my phone's battery just 153 00:09:11,640 --> 00:09:14,880 Speaker 1: won't even last like a full day anymore. And it 154 00:09:14,960 --> 00:09:17,240 Speaker 1: might not be because your phone is old. It might 155 00:09:17,280 --> 00:09:20,880 Speaker 1: be because you're getting you're getting sting rayed. You guys, 156 00:09:20,880 --> 00:09:24,400 Speaker 1: I'm not kidding. This happening to me right now. Well, 157 00:09:24,520 --> 00:09:28,200 Speaker 1: I'm sorry that you should take more care when you 158 00:09:28,480 --> 00:09:31,640 Speaker 1: are browsing on your phone. Also, Matt, Matt, I mean 159 00:09:31,640 --> 00:09:33,800 Speaker 1: not to make you worried or anything, but you're definitely 160 00:09:33,800 --> 00:09:38,360 Speaker 1: on some lists. So I mean, you're on our list 161 00:09:38,360 --> 00:09:42,760 Speaker 1: of favorite people. But yeah, there's one right there. So okay, 162 00:09:42,800 --> 00:09:45,800 Speaker 1: So I love this idea about it being mobile. So 163 00:09:45,920 --> 00:09:51,959 Speaker 1: if we take that paranoid example, in the vast majority, 164 00:09:52,040 --> 00:09:56,040 Speaker 1: virtually every time somebody has poor reception or poor battery life, 165 00:09:56,280 --> 00:09:58,200 Speaker 1: it is never going to be something like this. But 166 00:09:58,280 --> 00:10:01,240 Speaker 1: there's a very small chance, yeah that if you are 167 00:10:01,240 --> 00:10:04,360 Speaker 1: a victim of this, you could literally have someone following 168 00:10:04,360 --> 00:10:09,200 Speaker 1: you around, right, Yeah, I mean, okay, to be fair, 169 00:10:09,400 --> 00:10:12,840 Speaker 1: this technology we're talking about is at a level of 170 00:10:12,880 --> 00:10:15,199 Speaker 1: expense where it's not likely to happen to you. And 171 00:10:15,679 --> 00:10:19,520 Speaker 1: if you are someone who is either hanging out with 172 00:10:19,600 --> 00:10:24,680 Speaker 1: questionable people or you yourself are engaged in some questionable activities, 173 00:10:25,200 --> 00:10:30,280 Speaker 1: then you'd be more likely to have this actually target you. Now, 174 00:10:31,240 --> 00:10:35,040 Speaker 1: because we know that law enforcement agencies across the United 175 00:10:35,040 --> 00:10:38,800 Speaker 1: States and in other parts of the world have used 176 00:10:39,000 --> 00:10:41,760 Speaker 1: this kind of technology, they're the they're the customers there 177 00:10:41,800 --> 00:10:45,440 Speaker 1: once they're purchasing the stuff from Harris Corporation, it's very 178 00:10:45,480 --> 00:10:47,960 Speaker 1: possible you would come into contact with this and it's 179 00:10:47,960 --> 00:10:50,600 Speaker 1: not that you are being targeted, but you're still being 180 00:10:50,640 --> 00:10:54,160 Speaker 1: affected because it's just so broad. Yeah, it's like it's 181 00:10:54,200 --> 00:10:56,880 Speaker 1: mimicking a cell phone tower. It's not mimicking a cell 182 00:10:56,920 --> 00:11:00,480 Speaker 1: phone tower for a single phone. It's mimicking a cellphone 183 00:11:00,520 --> 00:11:06,440 Speaker 1: tower for the broadcast range of that device. And so okay, 184 00:11:06,480 --> 00:11:09,959 Speaker 1: so their mobile but what what would they look like 185 00:11:10,000 --> 00:11:12,160 Speaker 1: if you just saw one? So they look kind of like, uh, 186 00:11:12,360 --> 00:11:15,679 Speaker 1: I mean, if you've ever seen one of those servers, 187 00:11:15,720 --> 00:11:18,640 Speaker 1: like it looks like just a basic computer with lots 188 00:11:18,679 --> 00:11:21,160 Speaker 1: of ports on it. It's kind of like that. It's 189 00:11:21,360 --> 00:11:24,480 Speaker 1: usually a little bit uh stumpy looking like it's not 190 00:11:24,520 --> 00:11:27,000 Speaker 1: as wide as your typical server is a little more 191 00:11:27,080 --> 00:11:29,920 Speaker 1: narrow a little tall, but it's meant to fit into 192 00:11:30,000 --> 00:11:33,000 Speaker 1: racks because you can, you know, end up pairing these 193 00:11:33,000 --> 00:11:36,760 Speaker 1: with other technologies. But it's essentially a computer and you 194 00:11:36,800 --> 00:11:39,480 Speaker 1: hook it up to a laptop, so you've got really 195 00:11:39,559 --> 00:11:41,960 Speaker 1: the basic parts you have are the antenna, which is 196 00:11:41,960 --> 00:11:44,880 Speaker 1: important because obviously it has to receive signals sent from 197 00:11:44,880 --> 00:11:47,559 Speaker 1: cell phones um and a transmitter so that you can 198 00:11:47,600 --> 00:11:50,560 Speaker 1: send stuff back through if you need to. You've got 199 00:11:51,080 --> 00:11:56,040 Speaker 1: the computer itself, which is processing the signals and identifying 200 00:11:56,320 --> 00:11:59,440 Speaker 1: where those signals are coming from, both what type of 201 00:11:59,440 --> 00:12:01,800 Speaker 1: phone it is by you know, giving you the identification 202 00:12:01,920 --> 00:12:05,720 Speaker 1: numbers of that phone, the phone number that's associated with 203 00:12:05,760 --> 00:12:09,000 Speaker 1: that phone, and the location of that phone based upon 204 00:12:09,080 --> 00:12:12,839 Speaker 1: some triangulation. You might actually have to physically move the 205 00:12:13,720 --> 00:12:19,240 Speaker 1: technology around to get the triangulation. You could theoretically communicate 206 00:12:19,280 --> 00:12:22,800 Speaker 1: with another cell phone tower and by getting comparing numbers, 207 00:12:23,440 --> 00:12:25,679 Speaker 1: you know, you know you can generally tell the direction 208 00:12:25,760 --> 00:12:29,960 Speaker 1: from which the signal comes and its strength that gives 209 00:12:30,000 --> 00:12:33,400 Speaker 1: you an idea of it's it's general location in that 210 00:12:33,559 --> 00:12:36,840 Speaker 1: like you know roughly what distance it is from your 211 00:12:37,000 --> 00:12:39,760 Speaker 1: your space station. So it's one of those things where 212 00:12:39,800 --> 00:12:43,920 Speaker 1: if the signal gets stronger, it's closer to you, right, 213 00:12:43,960 --> 00:12:46,000 Speaker 1: and if it's if it's if the signal, if the 214 00:12:46,040 --> 00:12:48,199 Speaker 1: cell phone signal is getting weaker, than you know that 215 00:12:48,240 --> 00:12:51,000 Speaker 1: the target cell phone is moving away. If you were 216 00:12:51,040 --> 00:12:53,600 Speaker 1: to move the van to a second location and do 217 00:12:53,640 --> 00:12:57,400 Speaker 1: those measurements, then because you have the two points on 218 00:12:57,440 --> 00:12:59,559 Speaker 1: a on one part of a triangle, the cell phones 219 00:12:59,640 --> 00:13:03,160 Speaker 1: the third point, then you know where the person is. 220 00:13:03,480 --> 00:13:06,240 Speaker 1: It's the same way that cell phone towers are able 221 00:13:06,280 --> 00:13:09,080 Speaker 1: to give an approximation of where you are, even if 222 00:13:09,120 --> 00:13:12,640 Speaker 1: your phone doesn't have GPS. Right, it's sending the signals 223 00:13:12,880 --> 00:13:15,120 Speaker 1: and based upon the strength of the signal, how long 224 00:13:15,160 --> 00:13:17,440 Speaker 1: it takes to get there, all of these sort of things, 225 00:13:17,960 --> 00:13:21,880 Speaker 1: it can approximate where you are now. By by approximate, 226 00:13:21,920 --> 00:13:25,000 Speaker 1: I mean within a few you know, meters, So it's 227 00:13:25,000 --> 00:13:28,120 Speaker 1: not like as as a specific as GPS can be, 228 00:13:29,000 --> 00:13:32,280 Speaker 1: but it's still good enough for law enforcement to hone 229 00:13:32,360 --> 00:13:35,360 Speaker 1: in on a on a particular location and people can 230 00:13:35,400 --> 00:13:39,160 Speaker 1: sent to the use of GPS. But yeah, so there's 231 00:13:39,160 --> 00:13:41,160 Speaker 1: a question that I'm sure a lot of people are wondering, 232 00:13:41,240 --> 00:13:44,440 Speaker 1: which is this stuff sounds kind of space a g 233 00:13:44,720 --> 00:13:49,400 Speaker 1: but how how new? Is it not that new? Uh? 234 00:13:49,559 --> 00:13:53,840 Speaker 1: The the information I found said that at least the 235 00:13:53,880 --> 00:13:56,960 Speaker 1: trigger fish version of this technology has been in use 236 00:13:57,000 --> 00:14:01,520 Speaker 1: since the late nineteen nineties. What uh. Yeah, And to 237 00:14:01,600 --> 00:14:04,040 Speaker 1: keep keep in mind, like this technology has been in 238 00:14:04,120 --> 00:14:07,319 Speaker 1: some form of development or another and been available to 239 00:14:07,520 --> 00:14:11,760 Speaker 1: different types of agencies, specifically the FBI would be a 240 00:14:11,760 --> 00:14:15,080 Speaker 1: big one. Um. And it's just that over the past 241 00:14:15,120 --> 00:14:19,840 Speaker 1: few years it has become more common for local law 242 00:14:19,920 --> 00:14:23,160 Speaker 1: enforcement to get their hands on this. Before it was 243 00:14:23,240 --> 00:14:27,560 Speaker 1: something that only you know, the federal law enforcement officials 244 00:14:27,600 --> 00:14:32,240 Speaker 1: were able to access. But now we're seeing local law enforcement. 245 00:14:32,760 --> 00:14:35,120 Speaker 1: Uh not everybody's owning up to it, but we're seeing 246 00:14:35,120 --> 00:14:39,160 Speaker 1: a lot of local law enforcement offices adopt this technology, 247 00:14:39,600 --> 00:14:41,400 Speaker 1: and they're doing it in kind of a kind of 248 00:14:41,440 --> 00:14:47,600 Speaker 1: a backdoor Shenanigan's way, I would say, yeah, we'll be 249 00:14:47,640 --> 00:14:50,240 Speaker 1: back with more of this classic episode of tech stuff 250 00:14:50,280 --> 00:15:01,280 Speaker 1: after this quick break. So, uh, you know, these things 251 00:15:01,320 --> 00:15:04,520 Speaker 1: can be pretty expensive, and obviously law enforcement has a 252 00:15:04,520 --> 00:15:07,360 Speaker 1: budget that they have to answer to. So some of 253 00:15:07,400 --> 00:15:11,080 Speaker 1: them are funding the purchase of this material by filing 254 00:15:11,080 --> 00:15:16,880 Speaker 1: it under counter terrorism uh um strategies. Yeah. Essentially they 255 00:15:16,960 --> 00:15:20,560 Speaker 1: say we want to participate in this, you know, we 256 00:15:20,600 --> 00:15:23,560 Speaker 1: want to make sure we help protect national security doing 257 00:15:23,560 --> 00:15:25,840 Speaker 1: it on a local level. Uh And then they get 258 00:15:25,880 --> 00:15:29,680 Speaker 1: the federal grant to purchase the stuff. But then they're 259 00:15:29,760 --> 00:15:33,120 Speaker 1: using it on a much broader scale. So it's not 260 00:15:33,480 --> 00:15:36,920 Speaker 1: like they're not using it specifically for a counter terrorism 261 00:15:37,000 --> 00:15:38,840 Speaker 1: they're using it in all sorts of cases. There was 262 00:15:38,880 --> 00:15:42,840 Speaker 1: a story about a sheriff whose own vehicle got broken 263 00:15:42,880 --> 00:15:47,440 Speaker 1: into and uh and whose phone was stolen, who decided 264 00:15:47,480 --> 00:15:50,320 Speaker 1: to use this stuff to try and ostensibly to try 265 00:15:50,320 --> 00:15:54,080 Speaker 1: and stop the the string of car break ins. Some 266 00:15:54,120 --> 00:15:57,880 Speaker 1: people would say that perhaps it was more personal than that, 267 00:15:58,360 --> 00:16:01,120 Speaker 1: but the point being that this was not a counter 268 00:16:01,200 --> 00:16:03,880 Speaker 1: terrorism issue. This was you know, someone breaking in and 269 00:16:04,040 --> 00:16:07,040 Speaker 1: entering into cars, which is you know, that's that's a crime. 270 00:16:07,800 --> 00:16:10,520 Speaker 1: But you people have been arguing, like, what at what 271 00:16:10,840 --> 00:16:14,440 Speaker 1: level of crime do you consider the use of this 272 00:16:14,520 --> 00:16:19,520 Speaker 1: particular type of technology necessary to employ? Yeah, especially given 273 00:16:19,560 --> 00:16:22,800 Speaker 1: the expense not just in financial terms but in terms 274 00:16:22,880 --> 00:16:27,240 Speaker 1: of manpower or time so that's that's one problem, but 275 00:16:27,400 --> 00:16:30,560 Speaker 1: it's my spider sense is telling me that you have 276 00:16:30,600 --> 00:16:32,960 Speaker 1: a bigger problem I've got. I've got so many problems 277 00:16:33,000 --> 00:16:36,120 Speaker 1: with this, So let's let's talk about how it works first, 278 00:16:36,280 --> 00:16:38,680 Speaker 1: because this is this is what leads into where the 279 00:16:38,720 --> 00:16:43,360 Speaker 1: biggest problems that I have where the technology come from. So, uh, 280 00:16:43,680 --> 00:16:45,720 Speaker 1: to understand how this works, you've got to know how 281 00:16:45,800 --> 00:16:49,360 Speaker 1: cell phone works, all right, And we're gonna be super 282 00:16:49,440 --> 00:16:51,880 Speaker 1: high level here because I could do a full episode 283 00:16:51,880 --> 00:16:55,400 Speaker 1: on how cell phones work and you guys would be 284 00:16:55,600 --> 00:16:59,000 Speaker 1: stabbing me because you're wondering why I pulled you in UM. 285 00:16:59,040 --> 00:17:02,160 Speaker 1: But typically the easiest way of explaining it as cell 286 00:17:02,200 --> 00:17:05,920 Speaker 1: phones broadcast over radio frequencies, and you have cell phone 287 00:17:05,960 --> 00:17:10,000 Speaker 1: towers that represent a broadcast area. The towers are able 288 00:17:10,080 --> 00:17:13,760 Speaker 1: to accept the incoming signals from a cell phone and 289 00:17:13,840 --> 00:17:16,159 Speaker 1: outgoing signals that are going to cell phones within that 290 00:17:16,920 --> 00:17:20,439 Speaker 1: UM service area. They're doing so over specific frequency to 291 00:17:20,520 --> 00:17:24,600 Speaker 1: the phones. Your phone knows which frequency quote unquote knows 292 00:17:24,680 --> 00:17:27,040 Speaker 1: which frequency to be in because there's a master control 293 00:17:27,080 --> 00:17:30,320 Speaker 1: system that's telling the phone tune into this frequency so 294 00:17:30,359 --> 00:17:34,000 Speaker 1: that you can receive and transmit information. Technically, you're using 295 00:17:34,000 --> 00:17:36,280 Speaker 1: two frequencies so you can receive and transmit at the 296 00:17:36,320 --> 00:17:40,640 Speaker 1: same time. Then as you leave one cell phone service 297 00:17:40,720 --> 00:17:43,960 Speaker 1: area and you're starting to get closer to another, then 298 00:17:44,119 --> 00:17:47,160 Speaker 1: you have to be handed off right because if if not, 299 00:17:47,760 --> 00:17:49,959 Speaker 1: once you move too far away from the base station, 300 00:17:50,080 --> 00:17:52,680 Speaker 1: you would no longer have service. So this is similar 301 00:17:52,720 --> 00:17:54,720 Speaker 1: to when you move into an area that doesn't have 302 00:17:55,119 --> 00:17:58,840 Speaker 1: the towers that support the service you use. So if 303 00:17:58,880 --> 00:18:00,600 Speaker 1: you're like an A T and T customer and you 304 00:18:00,640 --> 00:18:02,960 Speaker 1: go into an area that's not supported by A T 305 00:18:03,040 --> 00:18:05,679 Speaker 1: and T, then you're out of lock. Your phone becomes 306 00:18:05,720 --> 00:18:08,840 Speaker 1: a brick, right or whatever's on your phone, that's all 307 00:18:08,880 --> 00:18:12,880 Speaker 1: you can use. So you have to have this handoff 308 00:18:12,880 --> 00:18:17,840 Speaker 1: technology for one tower to hand off the the service 309 00:18:17,960 --> 00:18:21,120 Speaker 1: to another tower as you're moving between them. So what's 310 00:18:21,119 --> 00:18:24,440 Speaker 1: happening is your phone is constantly sending little signals even 311 00:18:24,440 --> 00:18:29,240 Speaker 1: when it's not directly in use to say here I 312 00:18:29,280 --> 00:18:34,760 Speaker 1: am It's essentially saying I'm here. Yeah, it's exactly like 313 00:18:34,800 --> 00:18:37,359 Speaker 1: paying a server. It's doing this about every seven to 314 00:18:37,440 --> 00:18:40,800 Speaker 1: fifteen seconds. So this is why even if you don't 315 00:18:40,880 --> 00:18:46,159 Speaker 1: use your phone, the battery life gradually decreases, so the 316 00:18:46,200 --> 00:18:49,000 Speaker 1: reason it does this is very important because if it 317 00:18:49,080 --> 00:18:51,840 Speaker 1: didn't tell the cell phone towers, hey here I am, 318 00:18:52,160 --> 00:18:54,520 Speaker 1: you would never get texts or cell phone or you 319 00:18:54,640 --> 00:18:57,520 Speaker 1: never get a call. You couldn't you just play solitaire 320 00:18:57,760 --> 00:19:00,720 Speaker 1: or whatever. Yeah, because because the sis stone wouldn't know 321 00:19:00,720 --> 00:19:02,320 Speaker 1: where your phone is, so it wouldn't be able to 322 00:19:02,320 --> 00:19:05,480 Speaker 1: send the signal like it doesn't when someone dials your number. 323 00:19:05,560 --> 00:19:09,159 Speaker 1: It doesn't magically right connect to your phone. The system 324 00:19:09,200 --> 00:19:11,360 Speaker 1: has to be aware of where you are and as 325 00:19:11,440 --> 00:19:14,440 Speaker 1: this constant game of Marco polo to ensure that there's 326 00:19:14,480 --> 00:19:18,360 Speaker 1: this seamless transition, right because you as a person, you 327 00:19:18,400 --> 00:19:21,480 Speaker 1: are mobile, so you can move from location to location. 328 00:19:21,520 --> 00:19:24,119 Speaker 1: You are not always going to be next to the 329 00:19:24,240 --> 00:19:27,960 Speaker 1: same cell phone tower all the time. So your phone 330 00:19:27,960 --> 00:19:31,400 Speaker 1: has to constantly, like every seven to fifteen seconds, say 331 00:19:31,480 --> 00:19:34,200 Speaker 1: I'm here. Because if you're in the car and you're 332 00:19:34,240 --> 00:19:37,040 Speaker 1: traveling down the road, you're moving in and out of 333 00:19:37,119 --> 00:19:41,080 Speaker 1: different you know, cell tower ranges. So the different cell 334 00:19:41,080 --> 00:19:43,399 Speaker 1: towers have to be aware of where your phone is 335 00:19:43,440 --> 00:19:46,200 Speaker 1: so that you can continue to receive messages, phone calls, 336 00:19:46,200 --> 00:19:49,000 Speaker 1: that kind of stuff, or make them. Yeah. But the 337 00:19:49,000 --> 00:19:51,280 Speaker 1: problem is that because of this technology, you know that 338 00:19:51,440 --> 00:19:55,399 Speaker 1: this is what makes cell phones useful, but because of 339 00:19:55,400 --> 00:19:58,040 Speaker 1: that same technology, it's also what makes this sting ray 340 00:19:58,200 --> 00:20:02,720 Speaker 1: technology possible. So, because your phone is sending out these 341 00:20:02,720 --> 00:20:05,240 Speaker 1: messages and your phone doesn't know where the next cell 342 00:20:05,280 --> 00:20:08,359 Speaker 1: phone tower is, it's broadcasting these little messages and the 343 00:20:08,400 --> 00:20:11,159 Speaker 1: cell phone towers pick it up. Based upon the signal strength, 344 00:20:11,160 --> 00:20:13,480 Speaker 1: the cell phone tower knows if you are moving toward 345 00:20:13,520 --> 00:20:17,200 Speaker 1: it or moving away from it. The sting ray ends 346 00:20:17,280 --> 00:20:20,080 Speaker 1: up mimicking the cell phone tower. So your little cell 347 00:20:20,119 --> 00:20:22,320 Speaker 1: phone sends out a message and the stingray picks it up. 348 00:20:22,720 --> 00:20:24,480 Speaker 1: Sting ray now knows where your phone is, or at 349 00:20:24,560 --> 00:20:28,200 Speaker 1: least knows that your phone is in that area. As 350 00:20:28,240 --> 00:20:30,280 Speaker 1: the signal gets stronger, the sting ray knows that your 351 00:20:30,320 --> 00:20:33,680 Speaker 1: phone is getting closer to it. If you have triangulated this, 352 00:20:33,960 --> 00:20:36,480 Speaker 1: then it knows where you are. Or if you have 353 00:20:36,600 --> 00:20:39,640 Speaker 1: one of the other devices that pair with the sting 354 00:20:39,760 --> 00:20:42,800 Speaker 1: ray that can help track and locate, the sting ray 355 00:20:42,840 --> 00:20:44,800 Speaker 1: knows where you are. There's a laptop that you would 356 00:20:44,800 --> 00:20:47,760 Speaker 1: connect to this device that would give you the redoubt 357 00:20:47,840 --> 00:20:49,919 Speaker 1: that would be useful for a human being, because right 358 00:20:49,960 --> 00:20:53,080 Speaker 1: now we're talking all about technology that and data that 359 00:20:53,160 --> 00:20:55,760 Speaker 1: machines could use, but it is not useful to us 360 00:20:55,800 --> 00:20:57,920 Speaker 1: because we wouldn't be able to see it. But the 361 00:20:58,040 --> 00:21:02,680 Speaker 1: laptop expresses that in ways that make it possible for 362 00:21:02,720 --> 00:21:08,120 Speaker 1: you to see. Maybe with mapping software. It's plotting the 363 00:21:08,200 --> 00:21:11,840 Speaker 1: location against a map, as well as identification of the 364 00:21:12,520 --> 00:21:17,760 Speaker 1: phone numbers UM and the I D number that's unique 365 00:21:17,800 --> 00:21:23,280 Speaker 1: to that particular mobile phone. So the issue here is 366 00:21:23,320 --> 00:21:29,760 Speaker 1: that this this sting ray, we'll accept all of those 367 00:21:29,800 --> 00:21:33,399 Speaker 1: incoming messages, all those things. Yeah, anything that's within the 368 00:21:33,560 --> 00:21:37,480 Speaker 1: area that that the sensitivity of that antenna, it will 369 00:21:37,520 --> 00:21:40,560 Speaker 1: pick that up. So is it like, is it just metadata? 370 00:21:41,240 --> 00:21:49,240 Speaker 1: Well yes, originally, first it's just, first of all, just metadata, 371 00:21:49,800 --> 00:21:54,040 Speaker 1: just metadata, because metadata you don't need very much of 372 00:21:54,080 --> 00:21:58,240 Speaker 1: it to start making some very scary conclusions. You can 373 00:21:58,280 --> 00:22:01,560 Speaker 1: start to really narrow down who person is based upon 374 00:22:01,640 --> 00:22:05,040 Speaker 1: some metaday, their routines, what they do in the real world, 375 00:22:05,080 --> 00:22:07,600 Speaker 1: and when they do it, the phone numbers they might 376 00:22:07,680 --> 00:22:10,600 Speaker 1: be in contact with at that time. The phone number 377 00:22:10,600 --> 00:22:13,160 Speaker 1: of the device itself obviously would be very important. So 378 00:22:14,200 --> 00:22:18,640 Speaker 1: let's say that you two YouTube and Ben you are 379 00:22:18,680 --> 00:22:22,359 Speaker 1: you are? You are the cops? Okay, you're in your 380 00:22:22,440 --> 00:22:26,080 Speaker 1: van the power. Yeah, I know, not go crazy. Do 381 00:22:26,119 --> 00:22:28,320 Speaker 1: we have a tank? You do not have a tank. 382 00:22:29,240 --> 00:22:34,280 Speaker 1: We're not We're not Swanny. Was Swanny? Wasn't it? I 383 00:22:34,320 --> 00:22:37,560 Speaker 1: was thinking I Swanny. By the way, listeners, is is 384 00:22:37,760 --> 00:22:40,720 Speaker 1: just to the northeast of Atlanta. It's a little part 385 00:22:40,760 --> 00:22:44,840 Speaker 1: of Metro Atlanta area. Um and they have a tank. 386 00:22:45,320 --> 00:22:48,960 Speaker 1: So anyway, you are in a van, you have heard 387 00:22:48,960 --> 00:22:51,960 Speaker 1: about tanks, but you do not currently own one. You've 388 00:22:52,000 --> 00:22:54,160 Speaker 1: got plenty of donuts to get you through the day. 389 00:22:55,119 --> 00:22:56,800 Speaker 1: By the way, if you were in law enforcement, and 390 00:22:56,800 --> 00:23:00,440 Speaker 1: I am offending you, dear listeners, I'm merely poking fun. 391 00:23:00,920 --> 00:23:03,000 Speaker 1: I love you guys at any rate. So you guys 392 00:23:03,040 --> 00:23:07,479 Speaker 1: are looking at the incoming messages that are being hittop. 393 00:23:07,640 --> 00:23:12,359 Speaker 1: You're looking specifically for a phone number associated with a suspect, 394 00:23:13,119 --> 00:23:15,399 Speaker 1: a person of interest. You want to be able to 395 00:23:15,440 --> 00:23:19,160 Speaker 1: track this person down, but so far have been unable 396 00:23:19,200 --> 00:23:21,560 Speaker 1: to do so. You have heard that this person may 397 00:23:21,600 --> 00:23:23,520 Speaker 1: in fact be in this particular part of town, which 398 00:23:23,520 --> 00:23:25,919 Speaker 1: is why you have parked your van, And all you 399 00:23:25,960 --> 00:23:28,600 Speaker 1: are doing is looking for a hit of that particular 400 00:23:28,680 --> 00:23:31,600 Speaker 1: number as it moves through. And once you do, you 401 00:23:31,680 --> 00:23:35,440 Speaker 1: then try to triangulate, you locate, and then your your 402 00:23:35,480 --> 00:23:39,720 Speaker 1: send people out there to talk to this suspect or 403 00:23:39,800 --> 00:23:42,960 Speaker 1: person of interest. Now that that alone, that sounds like 404 00:23:43,000 --> 00:23:46,320 Speaker 1: that's okay. I mean, there might be some problems we 405 00:23:46,359 --> 00:23:50,000 Speaker 1: have here, but you're specifically looking for the hit. You're 406 00:23:50,040 --> 00:23:53,200 Speaker 1: not looking at the massive amount of information that's coming in. 407 00:23:53,680 --> 00:23:59,800 Speaker 1: You're looking for something specific. Yeah, and now, Matt, I know, 408 00:24:00,720 --> 00:24:03,560 Speaker 1: I know that, dude, I know, I know. It's the 409 00:24:03,560 --> 00:24:07,160 Speaker 1: pencil pushers who really are to blame. Don't don't, don't 410 00:24:07,200 --> 00:24:11,800 Speaker 1: bust my chops um so at any rate, Yeah, in 411 00:24:11,800 --> 00:24:15,280 Speaker 1: this case, you are specifically looking for a particular phone number. 412 00:24:15,280 --> 00:24:17,879 Speaker 1: It's a little more tricky if you don't know the 413 00:24:17,960 --> 00:24:22,240 Speaker 1: number though, right Like now you're looking for patterns. Now 414 00:24:22,280 --> 00:24:27,919 Speaker 1: you're looking specifically for activities that match what you suspect 415 00:24:28,119 --> 00:24:32,240 Speaker 1: your target is already doing. You're also possibly looking to 416 00:24:32,960 --> 00:24:35,560 Speaker 1: find out what phone numbers are being used in an area. Now, 417 00:24:35,560 --> 00:24:38,639 Speaker 1: this is where it really gets tricky because some of 418 00:24:38,680 --> 00:24:40,960 Speaker 1: these devices, not all of them, but the sting ray 419 00:24:41,000 --> 00:24:45,240 Speaker 1: and the trigger fish included both can tell you if 420 00:24:45,280 --> 00:24:48,760 Speaker 1: someone makes a call from within that area that the 421 00:24:48,800 --> 00:24:54,080 Speaker 1: sting ray covers. You can see what number they called. Now, now, 422 00:24:54,640 --> 00:24:57,600 Speaker 1: at least with the basic sting ray, you can't listen 423 00:24:57,640 --> 00:25:04,080 Speaker 1: in on the call. You just know the time, the number, 424 00:25:04,200 --> 00:25:06,920 Speaker 1: and the duration of the call. Hold on. It sounds 425 00:25:06,960 --> 00:25:08,760 Speaker 1: like we're getting to a point where we can listen 426 00:25:08,840 --> 00:25:13,200 Speaker 1: to these calls basic sting ray. Yeah. Okay, So remember 427 00:25:13,200 --> 00:25:16,480 Speaker 1: when I said you can upgrade. So sting ray is 428 00:25:16,600 --> 00:25:19,359 Speaker 1: it's a computer, is what it boils down to. I mean, 429 00:25:19,400 --> 00:25:22,000 Speaker 1: it's more than a computer, but it has elements of 430 00:25:22,000 --> 00:25:26,159 Speaker 1: a computer. It runs software. There is software that you 431 00:25:26,240 --> 00:25:30,200 Speaker 1: can install on the sting ray that does allow you 432 00:25:30,520 --> 00:25:34,400 Speaker 1: to listen in. There is fish Hawk, which is software 433 00:25:34,400 --> 00:25:37,919 Speaker 1: that allows you to eavesdrop upon conversations. And there's also Porpoise. 434 00:25:38,560 --> 00:25:42,160 Speaker 1: You might have noticed a theme I was gonna ask about. 435 00:25:43,000 --> 00:25:48,000 Speaker 1: They're in Florida, that makes sense. But anyway, so the 436 00:25:48,080 --> 00:25:52,640 Speaker 1: porpoise allows you to uh see texts that are sent 437 00:25:53,840 --> 00:25:58,200 Speaker 1: through here. So it's again it's messages or phone calls 438 00:25:58,240 --> 00:26:02,639 Speaker 1: that are sent from the phone out through the the 439 00:26:03,119 --> 00:26:07,320 Speaker 1: sting ray that go on. Now, this obviously raises a 440 00:26:07,359 --> 00:26:11,560 Speaker 1: lot of very tricky questions, particularly when it comes to 441 00:26:11,920 --> 00:26:17,640 Speaker 1: basic rights, because if you are just taking in everything 442 00:26:17,880 --> 00:26:21,159 Speaker 1: and you can potentially read all the text messages or 443 00:26:21,240 --> 00:26:23,640 Speaker 1: listening on any of the conversations that are going through. 444 00:26:24,160 --> 00:26:27,119 Speaker 1: Then remember this is just based on geography. You know, 445 00:26:27,160 --> 00:26:31,840 Speaker 1: you're not targeting, you're getting everything. There's no probable cause, 446 00:26:31,960 --> 00:26:34,960 Speaker 1: there's no probable cause, there's no warrant. So back in 447 00:26:34,960 --> 00:26:37,880 Speaker 1: our scenario, Ben and I in our readout, well, okay, 448 00:26:37,880 --> 00:26:41,120 Speaker 1: I'm driving, so Ben, you're alright, so you're the wheelman, 449 00:26:41,200 --> 00:26:44,359 Speaker 1: get it so you can see. Then we'll be able 450 00:26:44,400 --> 00:26:47,359 Speaker 1: to see all of this on a readout. A Matt, look, 451 00:26:47,680 --> 00:26:50,440 Speaker 1: look at his number. It's been going back and forth 452 00:26:50,440 --> 00:26:53,960 Speaker 1: from these two cell phone towers every freaking Thursday. Yeah. 453 00:26:54,240 --> 00:26:57,440 Speaker 1: Or it could be Ben saying, hey, Matt, look this 454 00:26:57,640 --> 00:27:01,439 Speaker 1: duphus over here thinks his girlfriend's gonna may can dinner tonight, 455 00:27:01,480 --> 00:27:04,119 Speaker 1: and we already know she ain't gonna do that, right buddy, 456 00:27:04,480 --> 00:27:07,680 Speaker 1: You guys are so good at after this comes out, 457 00:27:08,000 --> 00:27:14,760 Speaker 1: it's so I'll just be stopped on the street. We've 458 00:27:14,800 --> 00:27:17,399 Speaker 1: got more to say in this classic episode of tech stuff. 459 00:27:17,440 --> 00:27:31,800 Speaker 1: After these quick messages, that's funny until it happened, alright, 460 00:27:31,840 --> 00:27:36,560 Speaker 1: So at any rate, uh yeah, yeah, I mean technically, 461 00:27:36,600 --> 00:27:39,520 Speaker 1: if you have the right technology right, being the the 462 00:27:39,560 --> 00:27:43,080 Speaker 1: appropriate one for this, uh, and you have the correct 463 00:27:43,080 --> 00:27:46,480 Speaker 1: software on it, then you could be you could start 464 00:27:46,640 --> 00:27:50,720 Speaker 1: filtering through you could potentially read anything that's coming through 465 00:27:50,720 --> 00:27:53,600 Speaker 1: that that stingray device. So again, it would be any 466 00:27:53,600 --> 00:27:57,640 Speaker 1: phone that was within that range of the antenna. Um 467 00:27:57,720 --> 00:28:01,399 Speaker 1: you wouldn't necessarily I mean you probably wouldn't be storing 468 00:28:01,400 --> 00:28:03,639 Speaker 1: at all. I mean you could if you had a 469 00:28:03,680 --> 00:28:05,200 Speaker 1: large enough hard drive. That would be another thing you 470 00:28:05,200 --> 00:28:11,800 Speaker 1: would need to have in your array of technology piling 471 00:28:11,880 --> 00:28:14,800 Speaker 1: up very quickly. Yeah, and so this is starting to 472 00:28:14,840 --> 00:28:17,840 Speaker 1: sound probably very similar to the discussions we've had about 473 00:28:17,840 --> 00:28:19,720 Speaker 1: the n s A. You know, the fact that they 474 00:28:19,960 --> 00:28:24,600 Speaker 1: have been collecting cell phone data at the they're doing 475 00:28:24,640 --> 00:28:28,440 Speaker 1: it at the provider level, right like they're there, they've 476 00:28:28,480 --> 00:28:33,800 Speaker 1: got their ears on this national or even global level, 477 00:28:33,840 --> 00:28:39,080 Speaker 1: whereas we're really talking about very regional effects here. Yes, 478 00:28:39,240 --> 00:28:42,440 Speaker 1: still very concerning. So how much how much information can 479 00:28:42,520 --> 00:28:46,640 Speaker 1: it actually capture? Um, well, you know it's here all right. 480 00:28:47,160 --> 00:28:51,680 Speaker 1: Here's the thing. We don't know the full extent of 481 00:28:51,680 --> 00:28:55,320 Speaker 1: what I can capture because secrets have to be kept 482 00:28:55,480 --> 00:29:00,640 Speaker 1: for your safety from the creators of sting ray or 483 00:29:00,760 --> 00:29:03,600 Speaker 1: from the police departments. In the law enforcement. I'm just 484 00:29:03,640 --> 00:29:09,280 Speaker 1: gonna say yes from both. So there was a story recently. 485 00:29:09,360 --> 00:29:11,040 Speaker 1: I think it was I want to say it was 486 00:29:11,120 --> 00:29:13,680 Speaker 1: Santa Clara, California, but I could be wrong. It was 487 00:29:13,720 --> 00:29:17,040 Speaker 1: a It was a town in California, however, that recently 488 00:29:17,440 --> 00:29:22,480 Speaker 1: declined to purchase from Harris Corporation because they said there 489 00:29:22,520 --> 00:29:25,720 Speaker 1: were agreements that they would have been forced to enter 490 00:29:25,840 --> 00:29:31,840 Speaker 1: into that would prevent them from releasing any information about 491 00:29:31,920 --> 00:29:34,840 Speaker 1: the product, even in the face of a Freedom of 492 00:29:34,880 --> 00:29:39,560 Speaker 1: Information Act request. So an iron clad in yes, like 493 00:29:39,600 --> 00:29:43,520 Speaker 1: a nondisclosure agreement to trump all nondisclosure. How the heck 494 00:29:43,560 --> 00:29:47,600 Speaker 1: do you get aroun A. You mostly just drag your 495 00:29:47,640 --> 00:29:49,920 Speaker 1: heels as long as possible and hope that the judge 496 00:29:49,920 --> 00:29:52,800 Speaker 1: that ends up hearing any case about it is not 497 00:29:53,000 --> 00:29:56,480 Speaker 1: savvy enough to understand the implications of this technology. You 498 00:29:56,520 --> 00:30:00,680 Speaker 1: can appeal for national security, I think right. That's essentially 499 00:30:00,680 --> 00:30:02,640 Speaker 1: what they say is that if we were to tell 500 00:30:02,720 --> 00:30:07,080 Speaker 1: you what the capabilities of this technology were, then the 501 00:30:07,160 --> 00:30:09,680 Speaker 1: bad guys would be able to work around it, thus 502 00:30:09,760 --> 00:30:12,560 Speaker 1: making the technology useless and we'd only be getting your 503 00:30:12,640 --> 00:30:15,840 Speaker 1: boring text messages instead of the bad guys stuff. Well, 504 00:30:15,880 --> 00:30:20,400 Speaker 1: it's okay just to play the advocate here that kind 505 00:30:20,400 --> 00:30:24,920 Speaker 1: of reasoning, which is incredibly slippery and dangerous. It does 506 00:30:25,040 --> 00:30:28,880 Speaker 1: make sense if you think again about the ostensible purpose, right, 507 00:30:29,040 --> 00:30:32,400 Speaker 1: the the idea that this stuff could be rendered useless 508 00:30:32,800 --> 00:30:34,920 Speaker 1: if it wasn't a secret. But also, I'm just gonna 509 00:30:34,960 --> 00:30:37,880 Speaker 1: say the word I'm going to say is convenient. It's 510 00:30:37,880 --> 00:30:42,320 Speaker 1: a convenient reason well, and it's it's yeah, when you 511 00:30:42,360 --> 00:30:45,720 Speaker 1: have like a rubber stamp that's a secret, then how 512 00:30:45,720 --> 00:30:48,480 Speaker 1: do you have oversight? How can you make certain that 513 00:30:48,520 --> 00:30:53,680 Speaker 1: the figures that have been put into authority positions in 514 00:30:53,840 --> 00:30:57,520 Speaker 1: order to help the citizens, how can you make sure 515 00:30:57,560 --> 00:31:00,800 Speaker 1: that they are doing that that do that they've been 516 00:31:01,320 --> 00:31:04,760 Speaker 1: they've been tasked with, as opposed to abusing it or 517 00:31:04,920 --> 00:31:07,800 Speaker 1: misusing it, maybe not even abusing it on purpose, but 518 00:31:07,960 --> 00:31:14,560 Speaker 1: perhaps through you know, no no maliciousness, have been using 519 00:31:14,600 --> 00:31:18,800 Speaker 1: it incorrectly. Uh. And there have been arguments that judges 520 00:31:18,880 --> 00:31:23,320 Speaker 1: have allowed this kind of technology to be used because 521 00:31:24,080 --> 00:31:27,640 Speaker 1: the explanations they were given about what the technology did 522 00:31:28,000 --> 00:31:32,880 Speaker 1: were purposefully vague and limited, so that they would not 523 00:31:33,200 --> 00:31:36,880 Speaker 1: know the full extent of what this technology does. So, 524 00:31:36,920 --> 00:31:39,040 Speaker 1: in other words, here's where we're going to kind of 525 00:31:39,080 --> 00:31:41,920 Speaker 1: transition into more of the policy stuff, because you know, 526 00:31:42,480 --> 00:31:44,560 Speaker 1: that's really why I got you guys to come on here. 527 00:31:44,840 --> 00:31:47,320 Speaker 1: The technology we've kind of covered, you know, the very 528 00:31:47,360 --> 00:31:50,400 Speaker 1: basic ideas that he's a man in the middle kind 529 00:31:50,400 --> 00:31:54,000 Speaker 1: of attack. The reason why I brought you on here 530 00:31:54,080 --> 00:31:58,280 Speaker 1: is because this is my own personal perspective, my own opinion. 531 00:31:58,760 --> 00:32:03,959 Speaker 1: But my opinion is at this technology is dangerously close, 532 00:32:04,120 --> 00:32:08,720 Speaker 1: if not identical, to the concept of issuing a general warrant, 533 00:32:09,280 --> 00:32:12,360 Speaker 1: which is precisely what the Fourth Amendment was supposed to 534 00:32:12,560 --> 00:32:15,680 Speaker 1: protect us from. So the idea being that here in 535 00:32:15,720 --> 00:32:18,560 Speaker 1: the United States, by the way, this technology is being 536 00:32:18,640 --> 00:32:20,440 Speaker 1: used in other places. In fact, one of the reasons 537 00:32:20,440 --> 00:32:22,760 Speaker 1: that I brought up is because recently Sky News was 538 00:32:22,800 --> 00:32:25,800 Speaker 1: reporting about how it's being used in the UK. Uh. 539 00:32:25,880 --> 00:32:29,160 Speaker 1: It had been thought to have been used in the 540 00:32:29,240 --> 00:32:31,520 Speaker 1: UK for a while, but now there's kind of essentially 541 00:32:31,520 --> 00:32:35,200 Speaker 1: ironclad evidence that yes, it's being used as the UK. Yeah. 542 00:32:35,240 --> 00:32:39,120 Speaker 1: So the reason why, uh, you know, I brought you 543 00:32:39,120 --> 00:32:42,840 Speaker 1: guys in is this this idea of one of the 544 00:32:42,880 --> 00:32:45,760 Speaker 1: founding principles of the United States of America was that 545 00:32:47,200 --> 00:32:50,520 Speaker 1: the colonists didn't they weren't so crazy about the British 546 00:32:50,560 --> 00:32:54,760 Speaker 1: coming up and going into every single house looking for 547 00:32:54,800 --> 00:32:59,360 Speaker 1: a specific person, with no reason to suspect that the 548 00:32:59,400 --> 00:33:01,880 Speaker 1: person of ed was actually in the houses they were stopping. 549 00:33:01,920 --> 00:33:06,480 Speaker 1: It's just a general blanket search, right, So search and seizure. 550 00:33:06,480 --> 00:33:09,320 Speaker 1: The idea of being that we're looking for this person. 551 00:33:09,640 --> 00:33:13,040 Speaker 1: This person is is bad and so you have no 552 00:33:13,240 --> 00:33:16,000 Speaker 1: rights until we find this person. So we're gonna go 553 00:33:16,080 --> 00:33:18,680 Speaker 1: into your house and turn it upside down looking for 554 00:33:18,720 --> 00:33:20,920 Speaker 1: this person. If they're not there, too, well, okay, well 555 00:33:21,080 --> 00:33:22,800 Speaker 1: good for you, too bad for us. We're gonna go 556 00:33:22,840 --> 00:33:28,240 Speaker 1: do it to the next family. Ah. So, this approach 557 00:33:28,960 --> 00:33:32,680 Speaker 1: of using a device to pull in all incoming data, 558 00:33:33,520 --> 00:33:36,240 Speaker 1: even if you're looking for a really bad person, you're 559 00:33:36,240 --> 00:33:39,920 Speaker 1: getting everything, and it doesn't seem that different to me 560 00:33:41,240 --> 00:33:44,040 Speaker 1: than the approach of there's this bad person out there, 561 00:33:44,120 --> 00:33:46,720 Speaker 1: we're going to go through everybody's house until we find 562 00:33:46,720 --> 00:33:48,960 Speaker 1: that person. So for me, there are a couple of 563 00:33:48,960 --> 00:33:51,160 Speaker 1: things you have to establish. One of them is does 564 00:33:51,200 --> 00:33:54,560 Speaker 1: that data that you're sending out belong to you? Is 565 00:33:54,600 --> 00:33:58,320 Speaker 1: it really yours or you know, is it the companies 566 00:33:58,440 --> 00:34:01,680 Speaker 1: that you're using just to ostensibly send the information to 567 00:34:01,720 --> 00:34:05,800 Speaker 1: a cell tower to another person. Um, and then for me, 568 00:34:06,200 --> 00:34:08,600 Speaker 1: if you look at things like when the Boston bombing occurred, 569 00:34:08,760 --> 00:34:11,440 Speaker 1: and then the search for the Sarnative brothers afterwards, and 570 00:34:11,560 --> 00:34:14,520 Speaker 1: when the police were going through and essentially doing what 571 00:34:14,560 --> 00:34:18,960 Speaker 1: you're saying, searching through houses. Yeah, with just it's not 572 00:34:19,080 --> 00:34:21,960 Speaker 1: really a general warrant, but something kind of similar to that, 573 00:34:22,080 --> 00:34:24,959 Speaker 1: where yeah, I mean they didn't have all they didn't 574 00:34:24,960 --> 00:34:27,440 Speaker 1: have a warrant for each specific house they went through, 575 00:34:27,800 --> 00:34:31,880 Speaker 1: which they're supposed to if if I mean, your rights 576 00:34:31,960 --> 00:34:33,880 Speaker 1: as a citizen are supposed to say, listen, if you 577 00:34:33,920 --> 00:34:36,200 Speaker 1: don't have a warrant, you cannot come into my house. 578 00:34:36,320 --> 00:34:39,600 Speaker 1: That is a constitutional right guaranteed to me. Yeah, it's 579 00:34:39,640 --> 00:34:43,400 Speaker 1: the old, the old ticking time bomb reasoning, which I 580 00:34:43,440 --> 00:34:49,120 Speaker 1: find fairly disingenuous. Uh. When the idea we heard it before, 581 00:34:49,200 --> 00:34:53,200 Speaker 1: with the idea of using torture to obtain some sort 582 00:34:53,200 --> 00:34:56,600 Speaker 1: of confession or insider information, where people would say, well, 583 00:34:56,880 --> 00:35:00,040 Speaker 1: torture is not ordinarily allowed, but if there is a 584 00:35:00,080 --> 00:35:01,919 Speaker 1: bomb that is going to go off in a set 585 00:35:01,920 --> 00:35:04,279 Speaker 1: amount of time, and we have one person who knows 586 00:35:04,320 --> 00:35:09,799 Speaker 1: the information in custody, then shouldn't we torture somebody to 587 00:35:09,840 --> 00:35:12,200 Speaker 1: save a hundred people or whatever the number is. And 588 00:35:12,320 --> 00:35:15,359 Speaker 1: this with what's similar to me about this is that 589 00:35:15,400 --> 00:35:20,319 Speaker 1: this encounters um so many ways to bend rules that 590 00:35:20,360 --> 00:35:23,040 Speaker 1: are that exists for a reason, as you said, and 591 00:35:24,000 --> 00:35:28,920 Speaker 1: it doesn't really provide a way to bend those rules 592 00:35:28,960 --> 00:35:31,960 Speaker 1: back to their original shape. I mean, Jonathan, I can 593 00:35:32,000 --> 00:35:36,239 Speaker 1: think of already, uh several scenarios wherein this gig gets 594 00:35:36,280 --> 00:35:39,200 Speaker 1: sticky very quickly. Matt. I love that you mentioned, Uh. 595 00:35:39,280 --> 00:35:43,200 Speaker 1: It might not be the person actually using the phone, right, 596 00:35:43,239 --> 00:35:46,080 Speaker 1: It might be someone else, uh took a phone right 597 00:35:46,360 --> 00:35:49,400 Speaker 1: and used it as a burner. But the person, the 598 00:35:49,440 --> 00:35:53,520 Speaker 1: innocent person whose name is uh tied to that number 599 00:35:53,680 --> 00:35:57,919 Speaker 1: that I d they're going to be automatically suspect number 600 00:35:57,960 --> 00:36:01,120 Speaker 1: one or maybe even public enemy number one. Another question 601 00:36:01,200 --> 00:36:04,600 Speaker 1: is what if? What if? This search? Right? So let's 602 00:36:04,600 --> 00:36:08,120 Speaker 1: go back in, Um, Matt, you and I are still cops, Jonathan, 603 00:36:08,160 --> 00:36:12,120 Speaker 1: your FBI, your special investigator. All right, you came in, 604 00:36:12,239 --> 00:36:14,400 Speaker 1: you said, I'm taking over this investigation. I got a 605 00:36:14,400 --> 00:36:16,600 Speaker 1: little flip phone because I'm from the later seasons of 606 00:36:16,800 --> 00:36:20,239 Speaker 1: X Files, right exactly right, black two, black tie, whole thing. 607 00:36:20,640 --> 00:36:25,040 Speaker 1: And you say that we are looking for you know, 608 00:36:25,200 --> 00:36:31,040 Speaker 1: insert bad guy's name here. Uh. And while we're looking though, however, uh, 609 00:36:31,080 --> 00:36:35,440 Speaker 1: there are our search our vacuum cleaner approach brings in 610 00:36:35,520 --> 00:36:40,839 Speaker 1: another number that pings on your radar because you were 611 00:36:41,880 --> 00:36:45,440 Speaker 1: already suspicious of one person doing, you know, a federal 612 00:36:45,560 --> 00:36:49,400 Speaker 1: level crime. So this person who we were not looking for, 613 00:36:49,960 --> 00:36:53,319 Speaker 1: just showed up. What happens then, Uh? Well, I mean, 614 00:36:53,320 --> 00:36:56,239 Speaker 1: obviously I gotta take over the investigation. I've seen a 615 00:36:56,320 --> 00:37:00,120 Speaker 1: lot of episodes of various crime dramas, and that's what 616 00:37:00,160 --> 00:37:02,000 Speaker 1: the That's the only thing the FBI is around to 617 00:37:02,040 --> 00:37:06,239 Speaker 1: do is to push the local police force out of 618 00:37:06,800 --> 00:37:09,360 Speaker 1: this was my case. That's the way you have to 619 00:37:09,400 --> 00:37:12,120 Speaker 1: keep putting your sunglasses on and taking the Occasionally you 620 00:37:12,160 --> 00:37:15,960 Speaker 1: just hear the who yeah, yeah, Well I've got a 621 00:37:16,000 --> 00:37:19,040 Speaker 1: scenario kind of like that. Unlessing, Jonathan, do you want 622 00:37:19,040 --> 00:37:22,000 Speaker 1: to do? Answer no, No, I did. The only answer 623 00:37:22,000 --> 00:37:24,759 Speaker 1: to that that I have is that I would imagine 624 00:37:25,120 --> 00:37:30,760 Speaker 1: that at least until there are some strong precedents set 625 00:37:30,840 --> 00:37:35,320 Speaker 1: in in court about the actual use of this technology, 626 00:37:35,400 --> 00:37:38,360 Speaker 1: what it really can do, and whether or not it 627 00:37:38,520 --> 00:37:41,360 Speaker 1: truly is constitutional to use it in the way that 628 00:37:41,360 --> 00:37:45,480 Speaker 1: it's being used. I would imagine at least until that happens, 629 00:37:46,239 --> 00:37:49,280 Speaker 1: the FBI acts on that act on that information, because 630 00:37:49,320 --> 00:37:51,280 Speaker 1: if there if no one has come out and said 631 00:37:52,400 --> 00:37:56,480 Speaker 1: you can't do that, they're going to do that. And 632 00:37:57,560 --> 00:38:00,480 Speaker 1: I don't mean to cast aspersions on lawn enforcement of 633 00:38:00,520 --> 00:38:05,680 Speaker 1: the FBI. I realized that they have incredibly difficult and 634 00:38:05,960 --> 00:38:10,600 Speaker 1: very high stakes jobs, right and in order for them 635 00:38:10,640 --> 00:38:13,439 Speaker 1: to be able to do those jobs in an increasingly 636 00:38:13,640 --> 00:38:18,360 Speaker 1: complex technological world, there are some very tough questions we 637 00:38:18,400 --> 00:38:21,200 Speaker 1: have to answer. But the problem I have is that 638 00:38:21,239 --> 00:38:23,880 Speaker 1: these are questions that that seem to already have been 639 00:38:23,880 --> 00:38:26,719 Speaker 1: answered in the past. We just haven't applied the answer yet, 640 00:38:27,440 --> 00:38:31,440 Speaker 1: or people judges in particular, haven't understood the implications of 641 00:38:31,440 --> 00:38:37,280 Speaker 1: this technology, and that we're seeing some civil liberties fade 642 00:38:37,280 --> 00:38:41,000 Speaker 1: away as a result or get less, you know, like 643 00:38:41,000 --> 00:38:43,920 Speaker 1: like it's like you are protected against this except in 644 00:38:44,000 --> 00:38:48,120 Speaker 1: all of these other newer situations, many of which we 645 00:38:48,239 --> 00:38:52,000 Speaker 1: cannot legally tell you about because national security, right, because 646 00:38:52,000 --> 00:38:54,960 Speaker 1: if we told you about how we're violating your civil liberties, 647 00:38:55,000 --> 00:38:58,239 Speaker 1: then the bad guys would win. Like, well, technically, if 648 00:38:58,280 --> 00:39:00,560 Speaker 1: you're telling me that my civil liberties are being violated, 649 00:39:00,600 --> 00:39:03,319 Speaker 1: but you can't tell me how the bad guys have one. Yeah, 650 00:39:03,440 --> 00:39:06,000 Speaker 1: it's it's an interesting deliminate is one that we keep 651 00:39:06,080 --> 00:39:08,960 Speaker 1: running into. And this is not the first time. I 652 00:39:09,000 --> 00:39:12,360 Speaker 1: love that you mentioned there's precedent through about this throughout history. 653 00:39:12,400 --> 00:39:15,480 Speaker 1: I mean back when it was just the post office, right. Uh, 654 00:39:15,560 --> 00:39:18,160 Speaker 1: there were there were still these ongoing debates about what 655 00:39:18,320 --> 00:39:21,520 Speaker 1: kind of right to privacy should someone expect when they're 656 00:39:21,600 --> 00:39:27,640 Speaker 1: using the postal system. But you also mentioned advocacy groups, 657 00:39:28,320 --> 00:39:31,600 Speaker 1: So is there some organized opposition to there's quite quite 658 00:39:31,600 --> 00:39:34,239 Speaker 1: a lot. There's a lot of disorganized opposition too. But 659 00:39:34,320 --> 00:39:37,840 Speaker 1: the organized opposition includes like the Electronic Frontier Foundation, the 660 00:39:37,880 --> 00:39:42,480 Speaker 1: e F E f UH, there's the American Civil Liberties Union, 661 00:39:42,560 --> 00:39:45,920 Speaker 1: the a c l u UH, there's EPIC. There are 662 00:39:45,920 --> 00:39:48,960 Speaker 1: all these different groups that are all about privacy and 663 00:39:49,200 --> 00:39:54,480 Speaker 1: civil rights that have identified problem areas with US technologies, 664 00:39:54,600 --> 00:39:56,759 Speaker 1: some of which have been they've kind of some of 665 00:39:56,760 --> 00:40:00,319 Speaker 1: them have couched their arguments, largely because they ay, we 666 00:40:00,440 --> 00:40:04,719 Speaker 1: can't come out and say how strongly strongly we feel 667 00:40:04,719 --> 00:40:09,719 Speaker 1: about this because of the secrecy involved. Without knowing everything, 668 00:40:10,600 --> 00:40:13,359 Speaker 1: we we don't want to suspect the worst. But we 669 00:40:13,440 --> 00:40:17,000 Speaker 1: can't discount it either because you won't tell us what 670 00:40:17,080 --> 00:40:20,920 Speaker 1: it does or how it's being used. Um, you know, 671 00:40:21,000 --> 00:40:23,080 Speaker 1: but there are a lot who are saying you need 672 00:40:23,120 --> 00:40:27,040 Speaker 1: to have rules set in place on how this technology 673 00:40:27,040 --> 00:40:29,279 Speaker 1: can be used, if in fact it is legal to 674 00:40:29,360 --> 00:40:33,680 Speaker 1: use it at all. So, for example, perhaps before you 675 00:40:33,800 --> 00:40:37,440 Speaker 1: use this you have to secure a warrant that specifies 676 00:40:38,160 --> 00:40:41,960 Speaker 1: who you are looking for and and narrows that down 677 00:40:42,480 --> 00:40:44,480 Speaker 1: to a point where you can't just throw out a 678 00:40:44,640 --> 00:40:48,520 Speaker 1: net and everybody who's caught in the net, their lives 679 00:40:48,520 --> 00:40:51,320 Speaker 1: are turned upside down for the duration of you sorting 680 00:40:51,320 --> 00:40:54,600 Speaker 1: out which person is the one you actually are interested in. 681 00:40:54,719 --> 00:40:58,840 Speaker 1: But they'll never know the collateral damage isn't really collateral 682 00:40:58,880 --> 00:41:02,520 Speaker 1: if they have no idea, Well, they might not ever know. 683 00:41:03,080 --> 00:41:05,479 Speaker 1: And you know, you could argue that in a world 684 00:41:05,560 --> 00:41:08,200 Speaker 1: where you never know that this is happening and it's 685 00:41:08,200 --> 00:41:13,560 Speaker 1: never affecting you, stick with me. You're in a world 686 00:41:13,600 --> 00:41:16,239 Speaker 1: where you you don't know that's happening to you and 687 00:41:16,320 --> 00:41:19,880 Speaker 1: it's not having any noticeable effect on your life. Ultimately, 688 00:41:20,239 --> 00:41:22,080 Speaker 1: you might be able to go to sleep at night 689 00:41:22,120 --> 00:41:24,400 Speaker 1: and think, well, it doesn't really matter, because if it 690 00:41:24,520 --> 00:41:27,640 Speaker 1: is not affecting my life. Then I mean, I don't 691 00:41:27,640 --> 00:41:29,680 Speaker 1: want it to happen, and I'm still going to protest 692 00:41:29,680 --> 00:41:32,040 Speaker 1: it happening because I don't think it's right. But if 693 00:41:32,080 --> 00:41:34,560 Speaker 1: it doesn't have a noticeable effect on my life at 694 00:41:34,600 --> 00:41:36,960 Speaker 1: the end of the day, when I draw my last breath, 695 00:41:37,320 --> 00:41:41,799 Speaker 1: it hasn't really made a difference, who cares. But we 696 00:41:41,880 --> 00:41:44,399 Speaker 1: might also live in a world where sometimes it does 697 00:41:44,480 --> 00:41:47,440 Speaker 1: affect us, even if we are perfectly innocent in all 698 00:41:47,560 --> 00:41:50,200 Speaker 1: in the eyes of the law. Let's just throw out 699 00:41:50,200 --> 00:41:52,880 Speaker 1: some examples of the n S saver, for instance, like 700 00:41:53,040 --> 00:41:55,760 Speaker 1: a person who decides to use the n S as 701 00:41:55,960 --> 00:41:59,560 Speaker 1: wide array of of surveillance techniques to look in on 702 00:41:59,600 --> 00:42:02,400 Speaker 1: an ex girlfriend. That's exactly the scenario I was going 703 00:42:02,440 --> 00:42:05,240 Speaker 1: to bring up. If you and I back in our scenario, 704 00:42:05,840 --> 00:42:07,600 Speaker 1: I decided to go back and use the machine for 705 00:42:07,600 --> 00:42:09,440 Speaker 1: a little bit because we parked to get some coffee 706 00:42:09,520 --> 00:42:13,359 Speaker 1: or something, and I see a number that I recognize 707 00:42:13,480 --> 00:42:16,920 Speaker 1: pop up, and I'm just like, oh, what is my 708 00:42:17,000 --> 00:42:19,439 Speaker 1: ex wife's new husband talking about? Oh, and then blah 709 00:42:19,480 --> 00:42:22,280 Speaker 1: blah blah blah blah. There you go down the rabbit 710 00:42:22,320 --> 00:42:26,319 Speaker 1: hole into weird personal things. Then, and this is the thing. 711 00:42:26,360 --> 00:42:31,240 Speaker 1: It's it's you know, the technology allows that to happen, 712 00:42:32,200 --> 00:42:35,680 Speaker 1: and humans being human are going to do it right. 713 00:42:36,000 --> 00:42:38,440 Speaker 1: Like it's it's not a question of whether the technology 714 00:42:38,440 --> 00:42:41,960 Speaker 1: itself is good or bad because it's a tool. Uh, 715 00:42:42,160 --> 00:42:44,719 Speaker 1: you might say, is it a tool that is appropriate? 716 00:42:45,160 --> 00:42:48,040 Speaker 1: Is there any is there are there appropriate use cases 717 00:42:48,120 --> 00:42:51,080 Speaker 1: for this tool? And if so, how are they defined? 718 00:42:51,160 --> 00:42:54,200 Speaker 1: I think that's the important step. We have to come 719 00:42:54,239 --> 00:42:58,480 Speaker 1: to the conclusion of does this tool make sense? If so, 720 00:42:58,640 --> 00:43:02,399 Speaker 1: in which context does it make sense? And how can 721 00:43:02,440 --> 00:43:05,719 Speaker 1: we be certain that in any given use case it 722 00:43:05,880 --> 00:43:09,080 Speaker 1: fits those contexts? And if if we can answer all 723 00:43:09,120 --> 00:43:13,600 Speaker 1: those to our satisfaction, fine, I question whether that's possible 724 00:43:14,080 --> 00:43:18,000 Speaker 1: particular technology. But but the problem is that people they'll 725 00:43:18,000 --> 00:43:20,880 Speaker 1: behave outside of that, right. I mean, if there is 726 00:43:20,920 --> 00:43:24,359 Speaker 1: the capability of someone to do this, you know, use 727 00:43:24,440 --> 00:43:30,560 Speaker 1: this technology in a selfish, possibly harmful way, for then 728 00:43:30,640 --> 00:43:32,759 Speaker 1: someone will do it. It's not a question of if. 729 00:43:32,800 --> 00:43:36,600 Speaker 1: It's a question of when and how frequently and uh, 730 00:43:36,680 --> 00:43:39,480 Speaker 1: because we've seen it with the n s A. It's again, 731 00:43:39,560 --> 00:43:41,480 Speaker 1: you know, you have to remember that at the end 732 00:43:41,480 --> 00:43:45,279 Speaker 1: of the day, they're real human beings in charge of 733 00:43:45,400 --> 00:43:50,520 Speaker 1: using this technology, and real human beings have real motivations 734 00:43:50,560 --> 00:43:53,719 Speaker 1: that happen every single day of their lives. Just like 735 00:43:53,760 --> 00:43:56,680 Speaker 1: you and me. We we go through our lives and 736 00:43:56,719 --> 00:43:59,360 Speaker 1: we realize, oh, man, if only I knew what was 737 00:43:59,400 --> 00:44:02,680 Speaker 1: going on in that person's head. Oh wait, I could 738 00:44:02,760 --> 00:44:05,480 Speaker 1: figure it out because I've got access to this technology. 739 00:44:06,400 --> 00:44:10,160 Speaker 1: It happens, right, it does. One thing immediately that we 740 00:44:10,200 --> 00:44:14,480 Speaker 1: could say that might be a glimmer of hope with 741 00:44:14,560 --> 00:44:20,480 Speaker 1: this is that many of the surveillance technologies or proprietary 742 00:44:20,520 --> 00:44:25,759 Speaker 1: systems rather do have strict usage logs where wherein you know, 743 00:44:25,800 --> 00:44:29,120 Speaker 1: any user with an I D dis tract. So, uh, 744 00:44:29,239 --> 00:44:34,200 Speaker 1: Lieutenant Frederick would be pinned up for they would say, hey, lieutenant, 745 00:44:34,239 --> 00:44:39,239 Speaker 1: why were you running by the way? Uh? Private in 746 00:44:39,320 --> 00:44:43,680 Speaker 1: the police force, have you militarized the entire police force? Yes, 747 00:44:44,200 --> 00:44:46,359 Speaker 1: several years in the future. He's not a rookie, he's 748 00:44:46,360 --> 00:44:51,200 Speaker 1: a private all right. Well, anyhow, whatever your position would be, 749 00:44:51,400 --> 00:44:53,520 Speaker 1: you know, there would be somebody over you, ideally who 750 00:44:53,520 --> 00:44:56,799 Speaker 1: would say, hey, we noticed that you were searching this 751 00:44:56,880 --> 00:44:59,359 Speaker 1: number which is not part of it, and you went 752 00:44:59,400 --> 00:45:02,320 Speaker 1: pretty into So so that's one thing, But then again 753 00:45:02,360 --> 00:45:05,160 Speaker 1: it relies as you said, on the policy on the system. 754 00:45:05,280 --> 00:45:08,520 Speaker 1: I'd like to take the danger even further because one 755 00:45:08,600 --> 00:45:11,560 Speaker 1: of the most dangerous potential things about the n s 756 00:45:11,640 --> 00:45:15,879 Speaker 1: A program and possibly Stingray and it's other accoutrement, is 757 00:45:15,960 --> 00:45:20,400 Speaker 1: the idea that this could be used by corrupt people 758 00:45:20,480 --> 00:45:24,879 Speaker 1: with access to the technology to do things like smear campaigns, 759 00:45:25,320 --> 00:45:30,440 Speaker 1: to do blackmail, or even extortion. And the most frightening 760 00:45:30,480 --> 00:45:34,319 Speaker 1: thing to me, although it is it is offensive, the 761 00:45:34,360 --> 00:45:38,840 Speaker 1: idea that an innocent person's uh terrible late night you 762 00:45:39,120 --> 00:45:42,520 Speaker 1: up text messages might be collected and saved for posterity, 763 00:45:42,880 --> 00:45:48,680 Speaker 1: it's more frightening that this could be used to curtail 764 00:45:48,800 --> 00:45:53,880 Speaker 1: people who were fighting against it. Yeah, I mean there's 765 00:45:54,000 --> 00:45:57,400 Speaker 1: there's that possibilities. Well, I mean, grant this would a 766 00:45:57,440 --> 00:46:00,400 Speaker 1: lot of that responsibility falls on the Harris Car operation 767 00:46:00,480 --> 00:46:04,640 Speaker 1: and how they deal with the orders. I imagine that 768 00:46:04,719 --> 00:46:10,160 Speaker 1: they mostly I mean before they were really working with 769 00:46:10,600 --> 00:46:15,360 Speaker 1: the FBI and some military companies or military organizations I 770 00:46:15,360 --> 00:46:19,680 Speaker 1: should say, um, And it was only relatively recently, in 771 00:46:19,719 --> 00:46:22,960 Speaker 1: the last maybe five to ten years, that they started 772 00:46:23,000 --> 00:46:30,040 Speaker 1: really working with the local law enforcement agencies. UM. I 773 00:46:30,120 --> 00:46:34,360 Speaker 1: don't know what there are other customers are like or 774 00:46:34,400 --> 00:46:38,839 Speaker 1: who they are, but you could presumably, I mean, even 775 00:46:38,880 --> 00:46:42,240 Speaker 1: if even if it's not made by Harris Corporation, because 776 00:46:42,280 --> 00:46:44,359 Speaker 1: it's out there and because people know about it, then 777 00:46:44,440 --> 00:46:47,239 Speaker 1: that's enough for someone to say, hey, let's pour some 778 00:46:47,280 --> 00:46:49,960 Speaker 1: money into making one of these of our own so 779 00:46:50,000 --> 00:46:54,920 Speaker 1: we can spy on people in the CIA, or the 780 00:46:55,000 --> 00:46:56,959 Speaker 1: CIA might say let's use this so we can spy 781 00:46:57,040 --> 00:47:04,120 Speaker 1: on people in other countries. I mean, it's definitely a difficult, 782 00:47:05,080 --> 00:47:10,960 Speaker 1: difficult subject. It's tricky, uh, I mean, obviously, spying throughout 783 00:47:11,040 --> 00:47:13,759 Speaker 1: history has all been about let's find out what they 784 00:47:13,800 --> 00:47:16,799 Speaker 1: know without letting them know we know. So at some 785 00:47:16,840 --> 00:47:19,920 Speaker 1: point you're like, well, if we if we assume that 786 00:47:20,000 --> 00:47:23,839 Speaker 1: the premise that spies are necessary is true, then these 787 00:47:23,880 --> 00:47:26,040 Speaker 1: other technologies need to exist for us to be able 788 00:47:26,040 --> 00:47:28,040 Speaker 1: to do that. Yeah, but maybe you will, maybe you 789 00:47:28,040 --> 00:47:30,879 Speaker 1: would argue that spying is not something that should happen 790 00:47:30,920 --> 00:47:33,080 Speaker 1: in the first place. Okay, this this is something that 791 00:47:33,160 --> 00:47:36,279 Speaker 1: I know we really wanted your opinion. Okay for a while, 792 00:47:36,400 --> 00:47:40,560 Speaker 1: so have we? And we asked Alex Winter the same question. 793 00:47:40,600 --> 00:47:45,440 Speaker 1: He's a filmmaker made the deep webs. Have we reached 794 00:47:45,440 --> 00:47:49,160 Speaker 1: the point of new return with technology? Has technology rendered 795 00:47:49,360 --> 00:47:54,240 Speaker 1: the concept of individual privacy obsolete or will it do so? Okay, 796 00:47:54,280 --> 00:47:59,800 Speaker 1: well this is super complicated, right, Sorry, it's a great question. 797 00:48:01,040 --> 00:48:04,120 Speaker 1: Stay tuned for the exciting conclusion of this text stuff 798 00:48:04,120 --> 00:48:14,960 Speaker 1: classic episode right after we take this break. On the 799 00:48:15,000 --> 00:48:18,640 Speaker 1: one hand, you have stuff like this, the technology specifically 800 00:48:18,680 --> 00:48:22,759 Speaker 1: meant to intercept and perhaps even uh not just not 801 00:48:22,880 --> 00:48:25,279 Speaker 1: just intercept in the sense of finding out who is 802 00:48:25,280 --> 00:48:28,319 Speaker 1: talking to whom, but what they are saying. Right, You've 803 00:48:28,320 --> 00:48:32,520 Speaker 1: got that technology, that's one thing, And you could argue 804 00:48:32,560 --> 00:48:35,359 Speaker 1: that as long as that technology exists, then privacy might 805 00:48:35,440 --> 00:48:37,760 Speaker 1: only be an illusion. It might be something you believe 806 00:48:37,840 --> 00:48:43,280 Speaker 1: you have, but in reality, your information is being collected somewhere. 807 00:48:43,560 --> 00:48:46,120 Speaker 1: And of course we know that anything we post or 808 00:48:46,360 --> 00:48:50,400 Speaker 1: call or text through or whatever, it's going through an infrastructure. 809 00:48:50,920 --> 00:48:53,080 Speaker 1: So there is at least one entity out there that 810 00:48:53,200 --> 00:48:55,320 Speaker 1: has the access to it. The question is whether anyone 811 00:48:55,760 --> 00:48:58,520 Speaker 1: is looking at it or if it's just if it's 812 00:48:58,560 --> 00:49:02,640 Speaker 1: just a conduit. Right, So you could argue that privacy 813 00:49:02,719 --> 00:49:04,840 Speaker 1: is just an illusion in that case. There's another argument 814 00:49:04,880 --> 00:49:09,960 Speaker 1: to make that has nothing to do with surveillance. Facebook. Twitter, 815 00:49:10,239 --> 00:49:14,920 Speaker 1: we are we are voluntarily sharing more and more of 816 00:49:14,920 --> 00:49:19,520 Speaker 1: our lives. Instagram, Pinterest, really anything you can think of 817 00:49:19,560 --> 00:49:22,960 Speaker 1: where you are allowed a platform people are taking advantage 818 00:49:23,000 --> 00:49:28,960 Speaker 1: of it. YouTube another great example, periscope. So you're you're 819 00:49:31,080 --> 00:49:35,600 Speaker 1: volunteering to share a lot more information and you don't 820 00:49:35,640 --> 00:49:40,479 Speaker 1: necessarily think while you're doing it. This could potentially put 821 00:49:40,680 --> 00:49:44,840 Speaker 1: other things in my life at risk of becoming public knowledge, 822 00:49:45,040 --> 00:49:47,600 Speaker 1: whether it's because you're not paying enough attention or you 823 00:49:47,640 --> 00:49:50,480 Speaker 1: just don't realize how much information you are revealing every 824 00:49:50,520 --> 00:49:55,640 Speaker 1: time you post something. Um So, you could argue in 825 00:49:55,680 --> 00:49:59,640 Speaker 1: that case, privacy might also be an illusion, not because 826 00:50:00,120 --> 00:50:02,439 Speaker 1: there are all these ways of staring at what's really 827 00:50:02,440 --> 00:50:08,200 Speaker 1: going on, but because we're actually giving everything away and 828 00:50:08,239 --> 00:50:10,759 Speaker 1: we're just not aware of it. We're not aware of 829 00:50:10,760 --> 00:50:13,840 Speaker 1: the consequences of what we our own actions happened to 830 00:50:13,880 --> 00:50:18,560 Speaker 1: be um I would argue we haven't gone too far 831 00:50:18,680 --> 00:50:23,400 Speaker 1: in the sense that we could, if motivated to do 832 00:50:23,640 --> 00:50:28,160 Speaker 1: so and given the authority to do so, reverse a 833 00:50:28,239 --> 00:50:31,640 Speaker 1: lot of the things that have been happening. The question 834 00:50:31,680 --> 00:50:34,759 Speaker 1: of whether that's a reality or not, I mean, that's 835 00:50:34,800 --> 00:50:37,600 Speaker 1: kind of like the pie in the sky optimistic idealism, 836 00:50:37,600 --> 00:50:41,840 Speaker 1: the idea that people could actually be motivated to take action, 837 00:50:42,280 --> 00:50:45,799 Speaker 1: specifically through voting and through campaigning, and through bringing things 838 00:50:45,840 --> 00:50:48,800 Speaker 1: to attention and getting the word out there and getting 839 00:50:48,800 --> 00:50:53,440 Speaker 1: people behind the argument, Hey, we need to address this, 840 00:50:53,880 --> 00:50:56,040 Speaker 1: and we need to have it addressed to our satisfaction, 841 00:50:56,160 --> 00:51:01,360 Speaker 1: not just it's secret. You can't know. I think it's possible, 842 00:51:02,320 --> 00:51:05,440 Speaker 1: I think it would be really hard, and I don't 843 00:51:05,840 --> 00:51:07,560 Speaker 1: even though I think it's possible, I don't think it's 844 00:51:07,560 --> 00:51:12,239 Speaker 1: the plausible outcome. If I'm being perfectly honest, Um, it 845 00:51:12,280 --> 00:51:19,360 Speaker 1: would require enormous changes in momentum among vast, huge entities 846 00:51:19,400 --> 00:51:21,960 Speaker 1: out there that are bigger than any one person is. 847 00:51:22,520 --> 00:51:24,359 Speaker 1: So even if you let's say that you have an 848 00:51:24,400 --> 00:51:27,120 Speaker 1: ideal candidate for president of the United States in mind, 849 00:51:27,200 --> 00:51:30,840 Speaker 1: someone that you truly believe has the best interests of 850 00:51:30,880 --> 00:51:35,040 Speaker 1: the citizens at heart and wants to protect constitutional rights, 851 00:51:35,080 --> 00:51:38,640 Speaker 1: so they want to do right by the citizens and 852 00:51:38,680 --> 00:51:41,080 Speaker 1: make sure that the things they do truly do protect 853 00:51:41,120 --> 00:51:43,720 Speaker 1: them and do so in a way that follows the rules. 854 00:51:44,280 --> 00:51:47,759 Speaker 1: Even if that person exists and has put into the 855 00:51:47,800 --> 00:51:52,799 Speaker 1: position of president, you still have everything outs that it, 856 00:51:52,880 --> 00:51:57,080 Speaker 1: like from the local level to n essay too. You know, 857 00:51:57,160 --> 00:52:00,239 Speaker 1: organizations that do not directly answer to the president. It's 858 00:52:00,280 --> 00:52:05,640 Speaker 1: not like the president is capable of changing everything by 859 00:52:05,719 --> 00:52:07,880 Speaker 1: flicking a wand in fact, they're not supposed to be 860 00:52:07,920 --> 00:52:13,239 Speaker 1: able to do that. Doesn't have the position to president us. Yeah. So, uh, 861 00:52:13,360 --> 00:52:16,880 Speaker 1: this is why until I become benevolent dictator, we're going 862 00:52:16,920 --> 00:52:20,960 Speaker 1: to have these problems. Yeah, you know, you've you've been 863 00:52:21,040 --> 00:52:23,680 Speaker 1: saying that more and more often. I I appreciate the 864 00:52:23,719 --> 00:52:27,759 Speaker 1: posters that you've put up around the office. Uh they're 865 00:52:28,120 --> 00:52:31,520 Speaker 1: they're a little bit stark. I don't know, I you know, 866 00:52:32,080 --> 00:52:35,960 Speaker 1: I think they might be a bit too Soviet. Yeah, 867 00:52:36,040 --> 00:52:37,920 Speaker 1: I mean, it would help if they were in English. 868 00:52:38,080 --> 00:52:41,680 Speaker 1: But there's a lot of like crush this thing beneath 869 00:52:41,719 --> 00:52:46,440 Speaker 1: the boot. I just like the fist looked really like empowering. 870 00:52:46,480 --> 00:52:50,239 Speaker 1: And now I oh it does man, it do? Yeah, 871 00:52:50,280 --> 00:52:55,400 Speaker 1: it does. You're both on the list now, alright, so 872 00:52:56,320 --> 00:52:58,600 Speaker 1: any rate, No, but this is this was the reason 873 00:52:58,600 --> 00:53:00,160 Speaker 1: why why did you guys on here is because as 874 00:53:00,160 --> 00:53:04,279 Speaker 1: I know you guys, I assume you feel similarly to 875 00:53:04,280 --> 00:53:06,480 Speaker 1: to what I've stated. But I mean, if there's if 876 00:53:06,560 --> 00:53:11,280 Speaker 1: I have in any way misconstrued, I would I definitely 877 00:53:11,280 --> 00:53:13,880 Speaker 1: want you to have the opportunity to address it, well, 878 00:53:13,719 --> 00:53:16,920 Speaker 1: I will let Ben finish this idea that I'm going 879 00:53:16,960 --> 00:53:18,960 Speaker 1: to start. But when we spoke with Mr. Winter, he 880 00:53:19,080 --> 00:53:24,160 Speaker 1: had a surprisingly positive outlook privacy. That's wonderful he did 881 00:53:24,440 --> 00:53:27,399 Speaker 1: the people that he's been speaking with and communicating with 882 00:53:27,640 --> 00:53:30,520 Speaker 1: in his research on the subject of the deep web. 883 00:53:30,920 --> 00:53:33,239 Speaker 1: He's finding that there are a lot of people who 884 00:53:33,280 --> 00:53:39,440 Speaker 1: are freely focused on encrypting data and finding ways to 885 00:53:39,560 --> 00:53:43,160 Speaker 1: encrypt almost all communication that is done from a private 886 00:53:43,200 --> 00:53:46,480 Speaker 1: person's level, so that a company that is even handling 887 00:53:46,480 --> 00:53:48,840 Speaker 1: your data won't be able to decrypt it. Right. So, 888 00:53:48,880 --> 00:53:52,479 Speaker 1: in other words, the the the company that handles it, 889 00:53:52,480 --> 00:53:56,080 Speaker 1: it literally is just the conduit. It cannot it cannot 890 00:53:56,080 --> 00:53:58,799 Speaker 1: see the content and most it will see where it's 891 00:53:58,840 --> 00:54:01,399 Speaker 1: coming from and where it's going, but beyond that not 892 00:54:01,480 --> 00:54:05,399 Speaker 1: what the actual information is. He used the phrase. One 893 00:54:05,400 --> 00:54:09,560 Speaker 1: phrase I remember that he used was a renaissance of privacy, 894 00:54:09,640 --> 00:54:14,960 Speaker 1: which which I found inspiring because the the old argument 895 00:54:15,200 --> 00:54:17,800 Speaker 1: of well, if you have nothing to worry about, what 896 00:54:17,920 --> 00:54:21,239 Speaker 1: you're worried about hiding, right, it's kind of silly when 897 00:54:21,280 --> 00:54:24,960 Speaker 1: you consider that we do live in a world now 898 00:54:25,080 --> 00:54:28,319 Speaker 1: where let's say, Jonathan, let's say that you as an 899 00:54:28,360 --> 00:54:31,000 Speaker 1: FBI agent, love the part of towner and so much. 900 00:54:31,000 --> 00:54:33,120 Speaker 1: You said, you know what, guys, I'm gonna pull up 901 00:54:33,120 --> 00:54:36,399 Speaker 1: my tent stakes from Langley and I'm gonna come down here, 902 00:54:36,719 --> 00:54:39,520 Speaker 1: and I am gonna I'm gonna live here, and a 903 00:54:39,520 --> 00:54:43,040 Speaker 1: matter of fact, I'm gonna run for city commissioner because 904 00:54:43,160 --> 00:54:46,160 Speaker 1: I think, uh, this kind of stuff needs to be 905 00:54:46,200 --> 00:54:48,400 Speaker 1: dealt with in a public eye. And then all of 906 00:54:48,440 --> 00:54:51,600 Speaker 1: a sudden, all of this stuff, every time you had 907 00:54:51,719 --> 00:54:54,799 Speaker 1: used your phone in that region got leaked by somebody. 908 00:54:55,120 --> 00:54:57,640 Speaker 1: Or maybe you're running for sheriff, right, because we do 909 00:54:57,680 --> 00:55:00,200 Speaker 1: know that the sheriff's uh, at least in the Cab 910 00:55:00,280 --> 00:55:04,279 Speaker 1: County once played to corrupt the game here. Yeah, well, 911 00:55:04,520 --> 00:55:09,239 Speaker 1: or or even just something that, like, you know, a 912 00:55:09,360 --> 00:55:12,919 Speaker 1: mistake that you make at some point, and it may 913 00:55:12,920 --> 00:55:15,080 Speaker 1: be it may be one that you you know, it 914 00:55:15,120 --> 00:55:18,000 Speaker 1: could be that something you consciously did, or not even 915 00:55:18,040 --> 00:55:21,399 Speaker 1: a conscious mistake, something that due to your actions has 916 00:55:21,440 --> 00:55:24,600 Speaker 1: accidentally happened, and that you have already taken care of it, 917 00:55:24,760 --> 00:55:27,560 Speaker 1: You have fixed whatever problems there are, whatever the nature 918 00:55:27,600 --> 00:55:30,160 Speaker 1: of that thing is, you have you know, you've done 919 00:55:30,200 --> 00:55:33,880 Speaker 1: your time. However that I'm that might be for something 920 00:55:33,920 --> 00:55:35,879 Speaker 1: like that to like, let's say that you do want 921 00:55:35,920 --> 00:55:39,959 Speaker 1: to run for a local, local position and it has 922 00:55:40,000 --> 00:55:43,480 Speaker 1: no bearing whatsoever on your ability to carry out your duties. 923 00:55:44,840 --> 00:55:46,680 Speaker 1: We live in a world now where that stuff comes back, 924 00:55:47,000 --> 00:55:50,840 Speaker 1: I mean, like big time comes back. And none of 925 00:55:50,880 --> 00:55:53,799 Speaker 1: us are saints. You know, no one, No one has 926 00:55:53,840 --> 00:55:57,319 Speaker 1: gone through life completely unsullied. Even if you, you know, 927 00:55:57,360 --> 00:56:01,319 Speaker 1: are have the best of intentions. Something has happened at 928 00:56:01,440 --> 00:56:03,200 Speaker 1: some point in your life. Maybe you were just in 929 00:56:03,200 --> 00:56:05,359 Speaker 1: the wrong place at the wrong time, but that can 930 00:56:05,440 --> 00:56:08,600 Speaker 1: be bad enough. Yeah, that's true. I I do want 931 00:56:08,600 --> 00:56:12,480 Speaker 1: to say, Um, I really enjoyed I always enjoy being 932 00:56:12,880 --> 00:56:15,200 Speaker 1: on the show, And um, I don't want to speak 933 00:56:15,200 --> 00:56:17,759 Speaker 1: for you, mat but I'm I'm grateful that hates it. Yeah, 934 00:56:17,920 --> 00:56:22,719 Speaker 1: I'm grateful that we got it horrible for me. You guys, 935 00:56:22,880 --> 00:56:25,440 Speaker 1: you would be so impressed by vast ability to silently weep. 936 00:56:25,640 --> 00:56:29,239 Speaker 1: We sit in this room, salty salty beard. But the 937 00:56:29,280 --> 00:56:31,240 Speaker 1: only thing I would add to what we were saying 938 00:56:31,480 --> 00:56:34,120 Speaker 1: is that I love that we were talking about how 939 00:56:34,160 --> 00:56:38,719 Speaker 1: we are not casting aspersion on the individuals working in 940 00:56:38,800 --> 00:56:43,560 Speaker 1: law enforcement, which is so often an incredibly thankless job, 941 00:56:43,680 --> 00:56:47,239 Speaker 1: a fatally at times thankless job. And when you're when 942 00:56:47,280 --> 00:56:52,560 Speaker 1: you are representing the good guys, right, the force of 943 00:56:52,920 --> 00:56:56,520 Speaker 1: the force of crime prevention in our society, then the 944 00:56:56,520 --> 00:56:59,760 Speaker 1: thing is that the game you are playing is stacked 945 00:56:59,840 --> 00:57:02,880 Speaker 1: against you because the bad guys, whomever they may be, 946 00:57:03,360 --> 00:57:07,319 Speaker 1: do not have to follow the same rules. So I 947 00:57:07,840 --> 00:57:12,840 Speaker 1: while I think that, while I think that it's often easy, 948 00:57:12,880 --> 00:57:15,879 Speaker 1: at least in our fuel, for people to demonize law 949 00:57:15,960 --> 00:57:18,520 Speaker 1: enforcement as a faithless entity rather than a group of 950 00:57:18,560 --> 00:57:27,720 Speaker 1: human beings, I do completely believe that this is horrible technology. 951 00:57:27,160 --> 00:57:32,080 Speaker 1: I don't see a lot of cases of it being successful. 952 00:57:32,160 --> 00:57:33,880 Speaker 1: The a c l U has tried their best to 953 00:57:33,920 --> 00:57:37,080 Speaker 1: make a map of all the police areas they're using this, 954 00:57:37,840 --> 00:57:40,480 Speaker 1: but they still they had to say that this map 955 00:57:40,680 --> 00:57:45,880 Speaker 1: is incomplete. This is, I believe, very very close to 956 00:57:46,040 --> 00:57:48,160 Speaker 1: a kind of Pandora's box. Because as we know, the 957 00:57:48,200 --> 00:57:52,680 Speaker 1: price of technology continually decreases. Right, So what happens when 958 00:57:52,720 --> 00:57:55,600 Speaker 1: it's a steam gray as the price of a PS four, Well, 959 00:57:55,880 --> 00:57:57,800 Speaker 1: I mean you know it's it's being made in such 960 00:57:58,400 --> 00:58:01,320 Speaker 1: limited amounts. I mean you have to have the demand there, 961 00:58:01,360 --> 00:58:03,320 Speaker 1: and you have to have I would imagine there will 962 00:58:03,320 --> 00:58:05,480 Speaker 1: also be laws that will limit the use of this 963 00:58:05,640 --> 00:58:09,680 Speaker 1: because you have the giant phone companies that will lobby 964 00:58:09,840 --> 00:58:12,800 Speaker 1: very hard. They don't want the ability for someone to 965 00:58:12,800 --> 00:58:14,920 Speaker 1: spoof a cell phone tower to fall into the hands 966 00:58:14,920 --> 00:58:18,760 Speaker 1: of an average citizen. Their their business depends upon that 967 00:58:18,920 --> 00:58:23,480 Speaker 1: not happening. You're not the average citizen. No, No, I'm 968 00:58:23,520 --> 00:58:26,600 Speaker 1: the future benevolent dictator of the new World Order. I 969 00:58:26,640 --> 00:58:29,919 Speaker 1: think you need a tank the I think you don't 970 00:58:29,960 --> 00:58:36,280 Speaker 1: need a tank on speed pial. Yeah, yeah, but they yeah, 971 00:58:36,360 --> 00:58:39,080 Speaker 1: this is this is fantastic and I really appreciate the 972 00:58:39,080 --> 00:58:43,040 Speaker 1: opportunity to let more people know about this. Yeah, And 973 00:58:43,320 --> 00:58:45,080 Speaker 1: like I said, this technology has been around for a while. 974 00:58:45,080 --> 00:58:48,160 Speaker 1: In fact that the stingray stuff really started hitting headlines 975 00:58:48,200 --> 00:58:50,520 Speaker 1: a couple of years ago, back in that's when I 976 00:58:50,560 --> 00:58:53,000 Speaker 1: was really starting to get noticed and keep in mind, 977 00:58:53,040 --> 00:58:56,560 Speaker 1: and then use more than a decade before that. So 978 00:58:57,120 --> 00:58:58,920 Speaker 1: it's it's good to be aware of it. It's good 979 00:58:58,960 --> 00:59:01,880 Speaker 1: to ask these questions. And like I said, we may 980 00:59:02,040 --> 00:59:04,120 Speaker 1: at some point come to a point where we are 981 00:59:04,240 --> 00:59:07,240 Speaker 1: able to answer the questions I've been asking, to a 982 00:59:07,280 --> 00:59:10,400 Speaker 1: point where maybe I would be like, Okay, I understand 983 00:59:10,400 --> 00:59:12,600 Speaker 1: that in the world we live in the reality of 984 00:59:12,600 --> 00:59:16,520 Speaker 1: the world we live in that under these situations, this 985 00:59:16,680 --> 00:59:20,560 Speaker 1: might be an acceptable use of the technology. Uh, it's 986 00:59:20,600 --> 00:59:23,080 Speaker 1: just right now we haven't. We don't have those answers 987 00:59:23,120 --> 00:59:27,840 Speaker 1: because of secrecy. So yeah, it's it's it's definitely something 988 00:59:27,840 --> 00:59:30,480 Speaker 1: to be aware of. H I. I don't want to 989 00:59:30,520 --> 00:59:33,960 Speaker 1: be a fearmonger or anything like that, but um, it 990 00:59:34,080 --> 00:59:37,800 Speaker 1: is important that you know about it because I mean, 991 00:59:38,240 --> 00:59:40,200 Speaker 1: it's it's out there. Whether you know or not, it 992 00:59:40,320 --> 00:59:43,840 Speaker 1: is there, so it's better to know. All right, Well, guys, 993 00:59:43,880 --> 00:59:47,600 Speaker 1: thank you so much for joining the show. Obviously you 994 00:59:47,640 --> 00:59:50,880 Speaker 1: can find Matt and Ben's work at Stuff. They don't 995 00:59:51,000 --> 00:59:55,439 Speaker 1: want you to know. Well, I hope you feels weird 996 00:59:55,480 --> 00:59:59,960 Speaker 1: to say this. Enjoyed that classic episode about law enforcement 997 01:00:00,120 --> 01:00:05,240 Speaker 1: surveillance always a tricky thing to talk about. And if 998 01:00:05,280 --> 01:00:07,760 Speaker 1: you have suggestions for topics I should cover in future 999 01:00:07,840 --> 01:00:10,280 Speaker 1: episodes of tech Stuff, please reach out to me. The 1000 01:00:10,280 --> 01:00:13,040 Speaker 1: best way to do so is on Twitter. The handle 1001 01:00:13,120 --> 01:00:16,200 Speaker 1: for the show is text Stuff H s W and 1002 01:00:16,200 --> 01:00:25,400 Speaker 1: I'll talk to you again really soon. Text Stuff is 1003 01:00:25,440 --> 01:00:28,560 Speaker 1: an I Heart Radio production. For more podcasts from my 1004 01:00:28,720 --> 01:00:32,320 Speaker 1: Heart Radio, visit the I Heart Radio app, Apple Podcasts, 1005 01:00:32,440 --> 01:00:34,400 Speaker 1: or wherever you listen to your favorite shows,