WEBVTT - The Future of Voting

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<v Speaker 1>Brought to you by Toyota. Let's go places. Welcome to

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<v Speaker 1>Forward Thinking. Hey there, and welcome to Forward Thinking, the

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<v Speaker 1>podcast that looks at the future and says we're clearly

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<v Speaker 1>soldiers and petticoats and dauntless crusaders for women's votes. I'm

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<v Speaker 1>Jovin Strickland and I'm Joe McCormick, and today we're going

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<v Speaker 1>to be probing the future of democracy. Yeah, we're specifically

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<v Speaker 1>looking at this, I would say, from the perspective of

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<v Speaker 1>being in the United States, just which because that's where

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<v Speaker 1>we we are from. So a lot of this conversation

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<v Speaker 1>is really kind of gravitating towards that because that's that's

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<v Speaker 1>that's our lives, right, especially in an election year, you've

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<v Speaker 1>got that kind of a spotlight on that. So as

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<v Speaker 1>we record this, just remember that's where we're coming from.

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<v Speaker 1>But a lot of the stuff we're gonna talk about

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<v Speaker 1>applies to pretty much any place where there's a democratic processes.

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<v Speaker 1>The question of what is the technology around voting, how

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<v Speaker 1>does that shape voting, What are some potential changes in

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<v Speaker 1>the future, what are some of the risks or benefits

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<v Speaker 1>of that technology? How do people cheat? Yeah, that's gonna

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<v Speaker 1>be a big one. Specifically, Yeah, we are talking about voting,

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<v Speaker 1>So maybe what I said was not strictly correct, and

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<v Speaker 1>that we wouldn't have to be talking about democracy. We

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<v Speaker 1>could be talking about an oligarchy ruled over by a

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<v Speaker 1>small elite of people who vote on what happens to

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<v Speaker 1>everybody else. Again, as long as long as the voting

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<v Speaker 1>procedure is somewhere in there, right, Yeah, But but I

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<v Speaker 1>don't think you can use the movie announcer voice to say,

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<v Speaker 1>like today, we're talking about the future of oligarchy. Yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>the same ring as democracy. We're also not going to

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<v Speaker 1>dive into some of the related topics that we could

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<v Speaker 1>have explored, but it would have made this episode even longer,

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<v Speaker 1>things like what about the future of the electoral college?

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<v Speaker 1>Will that always be a thing? We're not going to

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<v Speaker 1>go into that. We're specifically focusing in on the voting

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<v Speaker 1>ASP act, Yeah, because there's there's way too much to

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<v Speaker 1>go into. Otherwise, we could do a whole podcast, like,

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<v Speaker 1>not an episode, but a series about this if we

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<v Speaker 1>wanted to. Yeah, well, I wanna take you listeners out

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<v Speaker 1>there to a place you might not usually go with

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<v Speaker 1>your brains. Okay, so you might participate in some kind

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<v Speaker 1>of no, no, no, some kind of electoral process. And

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<v Speaker 1>you take the voting process for granted, maybe you vote,

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<v Speaker 1>maybe you don't vote, but you know, you know, voting

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<v Speaker 1>goes on you. Basically, voting is something that happens. You

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<v Speaker 1>basically assumed that the elections are fair. I mean hopefully

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<v Speaker 1>they are. But think about trying to organize a massive

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<v Speaker 1>democratic election yourself. I mean especially, I mean, like, have

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<v Speaker 1>you ever tried to order a pizza for like ten people? Yeah? Yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>like picture that, but with presidents and how many millions

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<v Speaker 1>of people of the pizza I would like taff So

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<v Speaker 1>if you have never yeah, so, so imagine you no

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<v Speaker 1>infrastructure in place, you've never done this before. You've just

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<v Speaker 1>got say, well, we'll shrink the number to a very

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<v Speaker 1>manageable size. You've got ten thousand people and you're trying

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<v Speaker 1>to get them to vote on something to find out

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<v Speaker 1>what they've voted for. How would you do it? If

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<v Speaker 1>I'm going to sit there and have ten people vote

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<v Speaker 1>on things, I want to make sure I have a

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<v Speaker 1>way of distributing uh, ballots of some sort that's fair

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<v Speaker 1>so that everyone has access to it, that does not

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<v Speaker 1>appear to have a bias to it, so it doesn't

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<v Speaker 1>seem to wait one option over another or over several

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<v Speaker 1>others to share the type of vote that is easy

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<v Speaker 1>to complete, so that the barrier to actually participating in

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<v Speaker 1>the voting process is low, and that is easy to tally,

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<v Speaker 1>so that I can make certain that I can get

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<v Speaker 1>the results back at a reasonable amount of time, and

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<v Speaker 1>is difficult to game the system. It is not a

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<v Speaker 1>that's not a that's a lot of stuffs and a

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<v Speaker 1>jug several balls, and just for ten tho people. It

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<v Speaker 1>would be really really hard, Like I mean, I wouldn't

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<v Speaker 1>want to start starting from scratch. Yeah, it's a daunting prospect.

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<v Speaker 1>But imagine a country of three something million, of whom

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<v Speaker 1>you know a good percentage are of eligible voting age. Yeah, yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>that's it's really tough, really tough. And beyond that, in

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<v Speaker 1>the United States, at least, we don't have a single

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<v Speaker 1>like approach to this. It's not like there's one methodology

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<v Speaker 1>that is used throughout the entire country and everyone follows

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<v Speaker 1>it and therefore it's all exactly the same and you

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<v Speaker 1>can be certain that if it's if it's not fair,

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<v Speaker 1>it's at least consistent. That's not the case. You know,

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<v Speaker 1>fun fact, they vote in Iowa by taking a bite

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<v Speaker 1>out of a piece of cheese that represents who gets

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<v Speaker 1>their vote. Good times. What kind of cheese is? One

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<v Speaker 1>is a moonster cheese and the other is plot twist

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<v Speaker 1>head cheese. Oh oh man twist. You've got to really

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<v Speaker 1>be dedicated to voting, especially if you're lactose intolerant. I

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<v Speaker 1>don't know, it depends on how hungry you are, but

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<v Speaker 1>at any rate, yeah, no, there are there are a

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<v Speaker 1>lot of things that you have to kind of sess

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<v Speaker 1>out in creating this sort of system. But history has

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<v Speaker 1>provided us with really quite a lot of examples to

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<v Speaker 1>work from. Yes, yes, So going back democracy itself, if

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<v Speaker 1>you're looking at the representational democracy that we have here

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<v Speaker 1>in the United States, Uh, there have been some examples

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<v Speaker 1>that you could argue from from history. So how how

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<v Speaker 1>would we look at voting from a historical perspective. Let's

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<v Speaker 1>say that we're going back I don't know, Renaissance time period.

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<v Speaker 1>What would be the methodology for voting back then? The

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<v Speaker 1>method the methodology for voting in the Renaissance was actually

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<v Speaker 1>taken from the methodology for voting in ancient Greece. So

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<v Speaker 1>so so this system is is you know a few

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<v Speaker 1>thousand years old to give a take here and joined

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<v Speaker 1>you joined the thunderbirds, right, and you do musical numbers. Lauren,

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<v Speaker 1>please proceed as if he said nothing. Uh. The ancient

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<v Speaker 1>Greek system was was was tokens. You you take a

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<v Speaker 1>token representing your your choice of electorate. No, that's the

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<v Speaker 1>wrong word of of elected official or stuff, and and

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<v Speaker 1>you put it in the appropriate box. Um. And and

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<v Speaker 1>that is where eventually we got the word ballots from,

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<v Speaker 1>because it derives from the Italian bete, which is a

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<v Speaker 1>diminutive form of the word ball, so ballot, ball, ballot. Yes,

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<v Speaker 1>the word ballot was first used in Venice circa the

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<v Speaker 1>fifteen forties, where indeed small balls were used to cast votes.

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<v Speaker 1>So you would just place this like you've got your

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<v Speaker 1>boxes there, you got maybe Candida Day or candidate B.

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<v Speaker 1>And you think, well, Canada Day is a real stand

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<v Speaker 1>that person. I'm going to vote for Canada Day and

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<v Speaker 1>Canada B. I can go take a long walk off

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<v Speaker 1>a short pier. I'm gonna put this ball into Canada

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<v Speaker 1>as box. And then presumably you would just count up

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<v Speaker 1>all the balls in both boxes, and whoever had the

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<v Speaker 1>most winds. Alternately, you might have like a like a

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<v Speaker 1>like a light colored token and a dark colored token

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<v Speaker 1>given to you, and you can you can put you know,

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<v Speaker 1>whichever one you want exactly into a box. So I've

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<v Speaker 1>got a question who invented that type of voting that

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<v Speaker 1>looks like it's a bunch of bull to me? Where

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<v Speaker 1>somebody stands at the front of a room and says,

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<v Speaker 1>all who agree, say I, and some people say I

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<v Speaker 1>and then other people say nay, and it's like you

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<v Speaker 1>didn't actually count you just sound you know, that sounds

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<v Speaker 1>like more That was their screaming matic yes of the

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<v Speaker 1>of the longstanding scream a matic claim. Yes, uh no, no.

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<v Speaker 1>But but voice voting is another form of voting that

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<v Speaker 1>goes back quite a long time, especially in American history. Um,

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<v Speaker 1>it was part of our history up until the eighteen

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<v Speaker 1>sixties at the very least, which kind of is surprising

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<v Speaker 1>to me that ballots didn't catch on everywhere earlier than that.

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<v Speaker 1>But uh yeah. The voice voting is the practice of

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<v Speaker 1>going to your polling location and calling out your name

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<v Speaker 1>and your vote to the recording clerk and that's your vote.

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<v Speaker 1>That sounds cheaper than buying a bunch of balls and boxes.

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<v Speaker 1>It also seems to me that it means that everyone

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<v Speaker 1>knows who you voted for. Yeah, that is extremely true,

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<v Speaker 1>and it also led to a lot of dishonesty in

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<v Speaker 1>terms of of pressure from outside sources. Like if you

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<v Speaker 1>if you knew that your boss was going to be

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<v Speaker 1>in the polling location and your boss really wanted you

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<v Speaker 1>to vote for Canada Day, then there's not a good

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<v Speaker 1>way to get around being like, I'm voting for candidate

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<v Speaker 1>be like that, it's you know, you're it's shouting. This

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<v Speaker 1>is the democracy of shouting. It's the Internet, right, which

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<v Speaker 1>which could then mean I mean the reason why we

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<v Speaker 1>one of the reasons why we value privacy when it

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<v Speaker 1>comes to casting a vote is that it helps you

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<v Speaker 1>get around being intimid aided into voting for something you

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<v Speaker 1>don't truly believe in. Right, you aren't you aren't feeling

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<v Speaker 1>an intense sense of communal pressure to vote a specific

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<v Speaker 1>way if your vote is anonymous. But at the same time,

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<v Speaker 1>if your vote is anonymous in private, that's where you

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<v Speaker 1>start to introduce the question of is it a legitimate

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<v Speaker 1>vote or has someone been putting in fake votes? On

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<v Speaker 1>behalf sure and it was pretty pretty safe in that

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<v Speaker 1>sense because it was you know, in general, if you

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<v Speaker 1>have a if you have a person come up and

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<v Speaker 1>get sworn in by a judge say hey, this is

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<v Speaker 1>my name, I am allowed to vote and I have

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<v Speaker 1>not voted yet. Then the judge goes cool, everyone else

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<v Speaker 1>in the room goes cool, and then you shout your vote.

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<v Speaker 1>Uh that that that's a you know, communal effort at

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<v Speaker 1>keeping everybody honest and making sure that no one is

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<v Speaker 1>in their voting seventeen times right, But it does still

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<v Speaker 1>mean that if you feel like I really want Canada

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<v Speaker 1>Day to win, but if I say Canada Day, those

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<v Speaker 1>big people in the back of the room are going

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<v Speaker 1>to totally roll me as soon as I'll here. Okay,

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<v Speaker 1>we've got to address something before we proceed in this episode.

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<v Speaker 1>We can't keep saying candidate d A and candidate B.

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<v Speaker 1>So from now on we will say kang in kodos. Okay,

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<v Speaker 1>kang in kodos, don't blame. Moving on to paper ballots,

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<v Speaker 1>the amazing technology that is paper. Uh So, originally ballots

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<v Speaker 1>like this, we're just a slip of paper that you

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<v Speaker 1>would bring in yourself that you had written out your

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<v Speaker 1>your candidate choice onto all right, and so it's just

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<v Speaker 1>a little piece of paper, says Kodos yeah or Kang yeah.

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<v Speaker 1>I mean if you if you want to support a king. Eventually,

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<v Speaker 1>the interested parties, you know, the the National Convention for

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<v Speaker 1>for Kang, would would begin handing out little pre completed

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<v Speaker 1>tickets um, saying like like, hey, like like you probably

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<v Speaker 1>since you're voting for me, you probably want to vote

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<v Speaker 1>for all these other people. You definitely don't want to

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<v Speaker 1>vote for any of the Owes other people. So uh

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<v Speaker 1>and and so so here's Kang and here's all the

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<v Speaker 1>Kang approved down ballot names. Yes. And that's where we

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<v Speaker 1>came up with the word a ticket, like if you're

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<v Speaker 1>voting Democratic ticket or Republican ticket. That that was the

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<v Speaker 1>word for the single piece of paper that someone would

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<v Speaker 1>hand you and go like just drop it in the box.

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<v Speaker 1>It'll be great, we'll have some laughs. Um. And the

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<v Speaker 1>system was pretty private, but it did provide a whole

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<v Speaker 1>lot of opportunities for for ballot box stuffing so fraud cheating, um,

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<v Speaker 1>which led to changes like like the boxes being transparent um,

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<v Speaker 1>which made your vote less private again so hull, especially

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<v Speaker 1>because now the questioning look in your eye. Maybe what's

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<v Speaker 1>that dude with a camera outside of our recording studio

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<v Speaker 1>or it? Maybe why why would why would a transparent

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<v Speaker 1>box make a paper ballot less private? And the answer

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<v Speaker 1>to that is is that a lot of these ticket

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<v Speaker 1>that parties were handing out were on these very distinctive

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<v Speaker 1>bits of paper, so that a party official standing in

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<v Speaker 1>the back of a voting precinct could kind of like

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<v Speaker 1>head tally who was voting for their representatives. So so

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<v Speaker 1>so when you made the boxes transparent, it made everything

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<v Speaker 1>less anonymous and you get back into that that that

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<v Speaker 1>that that group of group of goons out there is

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<v Speaker 1>going to roll me as soon as I get out

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<v Speaker 1>of the polling box. So this this led to the

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<v Speaker 1>idea of secret ballots. Secret ballots, Why haven't been We've

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<v Speaker 1>been using these all the time. The concept of a

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<v Speaker 1>government printing a ballot with all of the running parties

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<v Speaker 1>and providing that piece of paper to every voter who

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<v Speaker 1>comes in. Uh. It was instituted for the very first

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<v Speaker 1>time in Victoria, Australia in eight That's crazy. It's hard

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<v Speaker 1>to imagine, right, yeah, yeah, but but you know it

0:12:52.880 --> 0:12:54.600
<v Speaker 1>had to do with with like funding and just no

0:12:54.640 --> 0:12:57.760
<v Speaker 1>one had thought of it before, I guess, or or

0:12:57.920 --> 0:12:59.720
<v Speaker 1>the very least thought of it hard enough to make

0:12:59.760 --> 0:13:03.040
<v Speaker 1>it so. Yeah, Hey, guys, I'm really tired of being

0:13:03.080 --> 0:13:06.480
<v Speaker 1>beaten up. What if we just made this stuff secret

0:13:06.520 --> 0:13:09.560
<v Speaker 1>so that you know, they stopped beating me up and

0:13:09.559 --> 0:13:12.240
<v Speaker 1>and and even even from eighty eight, Um, in the

0:13:12.320 --> 0:13:16.199
<v Speaker 1>United States, certainly the system was very slow to take hold. Um.

0:13:16.280 --> 0:13:19.760
<v Speaker 1>Some localities still allowed voters to bring in whatever a

0:13:19.760 --> 0:13:22.959
<v Speaker 1>little bit of paper they wanted through nineteen forty at

0:13:23.000 --> 0:13:25.920
<v Speaker 1>the very least, and I'm looking at you, delaware, you're

0:13:25.920 --> 0:13:29.800
<v Speaker 1>messing stuff up for all of us. Uh so so

0:13:29.800 --> 0:13:34.280
<v Speaker 1>so this this system, of course is very private. That's great. Um.

0:13:34.360 --> 0:13:36.400
<v Speaker 1>And it kind of it kind of shifted the way

0:13:36.400 --> 0:13:40.240
<v Speaker 1>that people cheat at voting. It shifted it from influencing

0:13:40.679 --> 0:13:45.599
<v Speaker 1>the voter or or having uh having voter fraud, to

0:13:45.800 --> 0:13:49.720
<v Speaker 1>having counting fraud. Now, if you want to influence an election,

0:13:49.800 --> 0:13:51.959
<v Speaker 1>you have to figure out how to influence the counting,

0:13:52.400 --> 0:13:56.280
<v Speaker 1>which people proceeded to do. Although well we will get

0:13:56.320 --> 0:13:57.920
<v Speaker 1>into that a little bit later. But um, but but

0:13:58.000 --> 0:14:00.440
<v Speaker 1>one more, one more technology that I want to talk

0:14:00.480 --> 0:14:04.040
<v Speaker 1>about in order to set up how voting works today

0:14:04.280 --> 0:14:07.720
<v Speaker 1>is the very first concept of a voting machine. UM,

0:14:07.720 --> 0:14:10.400
<v Speaker 1>which were which were lever devices? Um? And and some

0:14:10.480 --> 0:14:12.560
<v Speaker 1>of you guys out there may have actually used these

0:14:12.800 --> 0:14:17.240
<v Speaker 1>pretty recently. UM. Lever Lever voting machines are these geared

0:14:17.280 --> 0:14:20.600
<v Speaker 1>devices that first gained popularity in the eighteen nineties. And

0:14:20.840 --> 0:14:22.480
<v Speaker 1>the way that they work is is there will be

0:14:22.520 --> 0:14:24.840
<v Speaker 1>a bank of switches with all of the candidates names

0:14:24.840 --> 0:14:27.840
<v Speaker 1>in there, and you pull switches over your chosen candidate's name,

0:14:28.560 --> 0:14:32.320
<v Speaker 1>and uh then pull a main lever to cast those votes,

0:14:32.400 --> 0:14:36.160
<v Speaker 1>which turns all of the chosen gears and then resets

0:14:36.200 --> 0:14:39.720
<v Speaker 1>all of the switches. UM. The maker of one famous

0:14:39.760 --> 0:14:43.840
<v Speaker 1>brand of this one Jacob H. Myers of the Myers

0:14:43.840 --> 0:14:47.040
<v Speaker 1>Automatic Booth. So that said that the machines were designed

0:14:47.080 --> 0:14:51.600
<v Speaker 1>to end I quote protect mechanically the voter from rascaldom

0:14:53.000 --> 0:14:55.840
<v Speaker 1>and make the process of casting the ballot perfectly plain,

0:14:56.080 --> 0:15:03.800
<v Speaker 1>simple and secret and loud. This is my favorite. I

0:15:03.840 --> 0:15:07.000
<v Speaker 1>remember these sorts of machines. Not they haven't been in

0:15:07.160 --> 0:15:10.120
<v Speaker 1>use in Georgia for quite some time, but I remember

0:15:10.120 --> 0:15:15.720
<v Speaker 1>you were used until ten Since then, since I'm looking

0:15:15.760 --> 0:15:18.440
<v Speaker 1>at you now, you know, i'd almost I think I

0:15:18.560 --> 0:15:21.240
<v Speaker 1>maybe rather use a machine like this than an electronic

0:15:21.320 --> 0:15:23.280
<v Speaker 1>voting machine. We'll get into those in a in a

0:15:23.320 --> 0:15:25.560
<v Speaker 1>little bit. But I I see where you're going with

0:15:25.680 --> 0:15:29.280
<v Speaker 1>that too. Uh yeah, I remember going into this when um,

0:15:29.280 --> 0:15:31.560
<v Speaker 1>I was with a relative who was voting and they

0:15:31.560 --> 0:15:34.200
<v Speaker 1>were showing me how the voting process works. And uh,

0:15:34.720 --> 0:15:38.720
<v Speaker 1>sadly Cleveland didn't take it. Harrison went back into Uh

0:15:38.760 --> 0:15:43.320
<v Speaker 1>he took over the president twenty third presidency. Uh, it was.

0:15:43.480 --> 0:15:45.720
<v Speaker 1>It was a good day though. Other than that, it

0:15:45.760 --> 0:15:49.000
<v Speaker 1>was really interesting to see how how the voting process works.

0:15:49.520 --> 0:15:52.400
<v Speaker 1>Moving on into this this idea, what about what about

0:15:52.560 --> 0:15:56.640
<v Speaker 1>more current forms of voting, because, like we just said,

0:15:56.680 --> 0:16:00.720
<v Speaker 1>the lever machines, those finally were phased out of the

0:16:00.760 --> 0:16:04.800
<v Speaker 1>United States in two we should look at some of

0:16:04.840 --> 0:16:08.000
<v Speaker 1>the things that we're using now. Sure, because okay, so

0:16:08.000 --> 0:16:11.480
<v Speaker 1>so as as we have been saying here, uh, there's

0:16:11.480 --> 0:16:14.600
<v Speaker 1>no one system there. There are many systems that are

0:16:14.600 --> 0:16:17.840
<v Speaker 1>in use throughout the United States. It it it depends deeply

0:16:17.960 --> 0:16:20.880
<v Speaker 1>on what jurisdiction you're in. Fun fact, did you know

0:16:21.000 --> 0:16:25.120
<v Speaker 1>that under the United States Constitution you do not have

0:16:25.200 --> 0:16:30.760
<v Speaker 1>an explicit right to vote? Kind of weird you'd think

0:16:30.760 --> 0:16:32.720
<v Speaker 1>that that would be up there. Yeah, So it's not

0:16:32.840 --> 0:16:35.960
<v Speaker 1>in the Constitution. There's nowhere it says explicitly that you

0:16:35.960 --> 0:16:38.840
<v Speaker 1>have a right to vote. Now, it's pretty clear throughout

0:16:38.920 --> 0:16:42.320
<v Speaker 1>the Constitution that voting is just sort of an assumed behavior.

0:16:42.440 --> 0:16:47.640
<v Speaker 1>It's the subtext right. It assumes elected officials. It prohibits

0:16:47.680 --> 0:16:50.200
<v Speaker 1>certain restrictions on the right to vote in the amendments.

0:16:50.640 --> 0:16:53.920
<v Speaker 1>The amendments say the right to vote based on race

0:16:54.080 --> 0:16:57.520
<v Speaker 1>or or sex will not be infringed, or something like that,

0:16:57.720 --> 0:17:00.080
<v Speaker 1>But there's nowhere in there it just says by the a,

0:17:00.960 --> 0:17:04.480
<v Speaker 1>you know, adult people in this country can vote. So

0:17:04.720 --> 0:17:08.160
<v Speaker 1>that's kind of strange. Some legislators have actually proposed constitutional

0:17:08.200 --> 0:17:10.840
<v Speaker 1>amendments to fix this, but it hasn't happened yet. So

0:17:10.880 --> 0:17:14.600
<v Speaker 1>still the US Constitution does not say anywhere that you

0:17:14.640 --> 0:17:17.320
<v Speaker 1>can vote. I have another fun fact that's a little

0:17:17.320 --> 0:17:21.760
<v Speaker 1>bit more actually fun. Ye okay, Yeah, Texas passed a

0:17:21.840 --> 0:17:26.080
<v Speaker 1>law that says that astronauts can and should vote electronically

0:17:26.160 --> 0:17:28.840
<v Speaker 1>from space if they are in space during an election.

0:17:29.040 --> 0:17:33.639
<v Speaker 1>That's it really hard to drop a ball from lower

0:17:33.720 --> 0:17:37.080
<v Speaker 1>thorbit into a box that's in Texas. They originally tried

0:17:37.119 --> 0:17:40.400
<v Speaker 1>to do voice voting. That wasn't very good either. There

0:17:40.440 --> 0:17:46.400
<v Speaker 1>were like mistakes were made, so as as astronauts from

0:17:46.440 --> 0:17:50.880
<v Speaker 1>Texas can definitely participate in Texas elections from space, good

0:17:50.920 --> 0:17:54.000
<v Speaker 1>job text. I wonder what that's got to be like, right,

0:17:54.200 --> 0:17:57.680
<v Speaker 1>Like can you just imagine, like, hey Bill, stop looking

0:17:57.720 --> 0:18:03.320
<v Speaker 1>over here, my my right to making a private vote here?

0:18:03.720 --> 0:18:08.160
<v Speaker 1>Like it's crazy. I mean, it obviously makes sense, but

0:18:08.320 --> 0:18:10.280
<v Speaker 1>it's one of those things where I just didn't occur

0:18:10.359 --> 0:18:13.560
<v Speaker 1>to me until until we started doing this episode. So

0:18:13.680 --> 0:18:15.399
<v Speaker 1>talking about some of the other ways that here in

0:18:15.400 --> 0:18:18.160
<v Speaker 1>the United States people vote, uh, A lot of states

0:18:18.160 --> 0:18:21.119
<v Speaker 1>still use paper ballots in some way, shape or form,

0:18:21.880 --> 0:18:26.320
<v Speaker 1>particularly the upper Midwestern states and New England. Um. They

0:18:26.840 --> 0:18:30.399
<v Speaker 1>paper ballots can take different forms themselves. It's not like

0:18:30.440 --> 0:18:34.320
<v Speaker 1>they're all uh, you know, produced by one company and

0:18:34.320 --> 0:18:37.760
<v Speaker 1>then shipped off to each state. You've got the optical

0:18:37.800 --> 0:18:40.440
<v Speaker 1>scan approach, which is kind of similar to standardized tests

0:18:40.440 --> 0:18:41.800
<v Speaker 1>like the S A T. Where you know, you fill

0:18:41.800 --> 0:18:45.520
<v Speaker 1>in the circle completely so that a scantron type machine

0:18:45.560 --> 0:18:47.320
<v Speaker 1>can tell you the votes later, so that a human

0:18:47.320 --> 0:18:48.840
<v Speaker 1>person doesn't have to sit there and go through all

0:18:48.880 --> 0:18:52.480
<v Speaker 1>of them, right, although sometimes a human person does, but

0:18:52.840 --> 0:18:56.760
<v Speaker 1>that's not the intent. It is to make that automation possibility,

0:18:57.240 --> 0:19:01.240
<v Speaker 1>and then their punch cards, which if you were paying

0:19:01.280 --> 0:19:04.119
<v Speaker 1>attention to the elections back in two thousand, you heard

0:19:04.160 --> 0:19:08.280
<v Speaker 1>a lot about hanging Chad's, especially in Florida. Yep, yep,

0:19:08.400 --> 0:19:10.960
<v Speaker 1>you this is where you would you use Usually you

0:19:11.000 --> 0:19:14.320
<v Speaker 1>typically use a little punch hole kind of device thing

0:19:14.359 --> 0:19:17.840
<v Speaker 1>to push. It depends on it depends on whether you're

0:19:17.880 --> 0:19:21.520
<v Speaker 1>in a precinct with a machine where sometimes there will

0:19:21.560 --> 0:19:23.320
<v Speaker 1>be like a like a button thing that you use,

0:19:23.520 --> 0:19:25.320
<v Speaker 1>or um, if you're doing a mail in thing, which

0:19:25.359 --> 0:19:27.680
<v Speaker 1>is what I did in Florida for that election, where

0:19:28.040 --> 0:19:30.400
<v Speaker 1>they like send you a paper clip with your mail

0:19:30.440 --> 0:19:35.000
<v Speaker 1>in ballot, and they and the instructions are like unfold

0:19:35.080 --> 0:19:38.120
<v Speaker 1>this paper clip and punch with it. Yeah, the idea

0:19:38.160 --> 0:19:41.000
<v Speaker 1>being that you So wait a minute, Lauren, you voted

0:19:41.040 --> 0:19:43.800
<v Speaker 1>in two thousand in Florida. Do you know if your

0:19:43.840 --> 0:19:48.800
<v Speaker 1>vote for Kang was counted? You know, to this day,

0:19:48.840 --> 0:19:52.960
<v Speaker 1>I'm not sure. It was very confusing the little punch card, Like,

0:19:53.000 --> 0:19:57.520
<v Speaker 1>I mean, I consider myself like a relatively uh observant

0:19:57.680 --> 0:20:00.840
<v Speaker 1>human person, and I and I definitely was not positive

0:20:00.840 --> 0:20:03.359
<v Speaker 1>whether I was voting for Kang or Cronus to be

0:20:03.960 --> 0:20:07.600
<v Speaker 1>to be fair. I I consider myself a fairly capable

0:20:07.680 --> 0:20:10.480
<v Speaker 1>at at at simulating a human being, and I have

0:20:10.640 --> 0:20:16.880
<v Speaker 1>also I have also found numerous voting devices to be

0:20:17.359 --> 0:20:21.679
<v Speaker 1>unnecessarily obtuse, like to the point where I'm thinking, like

0:20:21.800 --> 0:20:23.920
<v Speaker 1>I understand what first of all, when you read a

0:20:23.960 --> 0:20:26.280
<v Speaker 1>sentence and you think, I understand what each individual word

0:20:26.280 --> 0:20:28.119
<v Speaker 1>in the sentence means, but when you put them together

0:20:28.160 --> 0:20:31.560
<v Speaker 1>and together quite like that? Yeah, oh yeah, Like sometimes

0:20:31.560 --> 0:20:35.080
<v Speaker 1>in Georgia will have we'll have state referendums on an

0:20:35.119 --> 0:20:39.600
<v Speaker 1>issue and standing there trying to read this and it

0:20:39.680 --> 0:20:44.280
<v Speaker 1>has like fourteen negatives in it, the right to not

0:20:44.520 --> 0:20:49.040
<v Speaker 1>do X when unprivileged with X, you know, will not

0:20:49.240 --> 0:20:53.680
<v Speaker 1>be infringe And you're like, I'm not I just did

0:20:53.680 --> 0:20:57.119
<v Speaker 1>a visual gag out of there was a lot of

0:20:57.160 --> 0:20:59.600
<v Speaker 1>there were a lot of faces being pulled at that moment.

0:21:00.119 --> 0:21:03.480
<v Speaker 1>But so the punch cards, you know, obviously, the way

0:21:03.480 --> 0:21:05.840
<v Speaker 1>you vote is that you punch a hole next to

0:21:05.880 --> 0:21:08.959
<v Speaker 1>whatever your choice is, right either it's usually a pre

0:21:09.119 --> 0:21:12.919
<v Speaker 1>perforated type of of ballots, so that you're actually just

0:21:12.920 --> 0:21:15.240
<v Speaker 1>punching out something that's meant to be punched, as opposed

0:21:15.280 --> 0:21:19.560
<v Speaker 1>to having to make a hole in that piece of paper. Um.

0:21:20.320 --> 0:21:22.159
<v Speaker 1>And of course the idea of that is that again

0:21:22.240 --> 0:21:24.760
<v Speaker 1>you could have an automatic tally machine. You could feed

0:21:24.800 --> 0:21:28.080
<v Speaker 1>it through and uh the machine would very quickly be

0:21:28.119 --> 0:21:31.600
<v Speaker 1>able to determine who you voted for based upon where

0:21:31.600 --> 0:21:34.280
<v Speaker 1>the holes are. Yeah. And an interesting story about these.

0:21:34.320 --> 0:21:36.600
<v Speaker 1>They came about in the nineteen sixties when a couple

0:21:36.680 --> 0:21:41.399
<v Speaker 1>of Berkeley professors adapted IBM s like pre cut punch

0:21:41.480 --> 0:21:46.120
<v Speaker 1>cards for computers, and they're they're portable punching machine for

0:21:46.160 --> 0:21:49.520
<v Speaker 1>those cards, um, in order to to make and and

0:21:49.680 --> 0:21:54.439
<v Speaker 1>cast ballots. And IBM briefly owned the company um uh

0:21:54.600 --> 0:21:59.359
<v Speaker 1>the votomatic or the or. Yeah, that's that's the great

0:22:00.160 --> 0:22:02.800
<v Speaker 1>terminology of the day, right, that's the sixties ist term

0:22:02.920 --> 0:22:05.600
<v Speaker 1>that I've heard all day and I love it. Um

0:22:05.680 --> 0:22:07.280
<v Speaker 1>and And actually one of the first tests of this

0:22:07.320 --> 0:22:10.679
<v Speaker 1>technology was conducted right here in Fulton and Decab counties

0:22:10.680 --> 0:22:13.919
<v Speaker 1>in Georgia. Those are interesting to the three of us

0:22:13.920 --> 0:22:16.120
<v Speaker 1>and maybe not to anybody else counties in the metro

0:22:16.240 --> 0:22:20.439
<v Speaker 1>Atlanta area if you were not aware, if you're not

0:22:20.480 --> 0:22:23.600
<v Speaker 1>from Georgia, there's no reason you would be. But but yeah,

0:22:23.640 --> 0:22:26.800
<v Speaker 1>these these uh, the photo of the photomatic and other

0:22:26.840 --> 0:22:30.760
<v Speaker 1>similar punch card devices have generally fallen out of fashion,

0:22:31.280 --> 0:22:34.600
<v Speaker 1>um in a widespread kind of way because of these

0:22:34.680 --> 0:22:37.560
<v Speaker 1>these issues with with jamming and with less than clean punches,

0:22:37.600 --> 0:22:41.679
<v Speaker 1>and with the dangling chads chads, Yeah, the chad by

0:22:41.680 --> 0:22:43.400
<v Speaker 1>the way, that refers to the little piece of paper

0:22:43.440 --> 0:22:48.320
<v Speaker 1>that you've punched out, Yeah, perforated. Yeah, they they And

0:22:48.359 --> 0:22:53.760
<v Speaker 1>you could imagine that these problems with UH processing these

0:22:53.800 --> 0:22:58.000
<v Speaker 1>punched out pieces of paper, they increase as the age

0:22:58.160 --> 0:23:01.119
<v Speaker 1>of the machines that tally increase, things just start to

0:23:01.119 --> 0:23:03.520
<v Speaker 1>break down. Also, you can imagine that if there are

0:23:03.520 --> 0:23:06.639
<v Speaker 1>more people voting, if you have a greater volume of

0:23:06.720 --> 0:23:09.680
<v Speaker 1>votes that you have to process, then you have the

0:23:09.680 --> 0:23:14.240
<v Speaker 1>the potential for more problems happening over time. And that's

0:23:14.280 --> 0:23:18.480
<v Speaker 1>not that's not great. That's not a great way of

0:23:18.480 --> 0:23:22.680
<v Speaker 1>of making sure you have a fair fairly and consistently

0:23:22.760 --> 0:23:27.960
<v Speaker 1>and and speedily run election process. Then you've got ballot

0:23:28.000 --> 0:23:30.679
<v Speaker 1>marking devices, and these are usually reserved for people who

0:23:30.720 --> 0:23:34.280
<v Speaker 1>would have difficulty making marks on paper ballots. UM. It

0:23:34.440 --> 0:23:37.880
<v Speaker 1>usually involves something like a touchscreen interface and an audio

0:23:38.000 --> 0:23:41.080
<v Speaker 1>output to help voters navigate the ballot. So if you

0:23:41.119 --> 0:23:44.679
<v Speaker 1>have like UH problems with your vision. This might be

0:23:44.760 --> 0:23:47.359
<v Speaker 1>something that you use so that you can still participate

0:23:47.400 --> 0:23:51.760
<v Speaker 1>in the voting process and still have a private, you know,

0:23:52.000 --> 0:23:54.520
<v Speaker 1>a secret ballot, as opposed to having to rely on

0:23:54.560 --> 0:23:57.520
<v Speaker 1>someone else to put the that in for you, which

0:23:57.520 --> 0:24:00.080
<v Speaker 1>would necessarily mean that you have to share your it

0:24:00.119 --> 0:24:03.399
<v Speaker 1>with someone else. Kind of goes against the spirit of

0:24:03.440 --> 0:24:06.160
<v Speaker 1>the thing. UM and there's votes by mail. A couple

0:24:06.200 --> 0:24:09.520
<v Speaker 1>of states UH conduct their their votes by mail UM

0:24:09.760 --> 0:24:14.680
<v Speaker 1>Washington State, Oregon, and Colorado. Do you you could imagine

0:24:14.680 --> 0:24:19.280
<v Speaker 1>that any state where you have a pretty UH sparse

0:24:19.280 --> 0:24:22.280
<v Speaker 1>population or people just tend to live very far apart,

0:24:22.320 --> 0:24:26.160
<v Speaker 1>it's very difficult to create polling places that are centrally

0:24:26.200 --> 0:24:28.439
<v Speaker 1>located for enough of the population so that they can

0:24:28.440 --> 0:24:32.159
<v Speaker 1>actually participate in the process. So that's a that's a

0:24:32.200 --> 0:24:35.880
<v Speaker 1>possible solution is doing the votes by mail UH and

0:24:36.160 --> 0:24:38.560
<v Speaker 1>paper ballots, like we said, could be tallied manually or

0:24:38.680 --> 0:24:41.080
<v Speaker 1>by machines. So in some cases you actually had people

0:24:41.920 --> 0:24:43.679
<v Speaker 1>whose job it was was to go through each of

0:24:43.680 --> 0:24:47.359
<v Speaker 1>those paper ballots and mark down what the various UH

0:24:47.480 --> 0:24:50.399
<v Speaker 1>votes were for. But various types of scanners have have

0:24:50.560 --> 0:24:53.640
<v Speaker 1>come out are recently and and lots of different ones

0:24:53.680 --> 0:24:58.040
<v Speaker 1>like different states use different companies. It's not again, it's

0:24:58.080 --> 0:25:03.199
<v Speaker 1>not like there's an impartial producer of voting machines and

0:25:03.280 --> 0:25:07.399
<v Speaker 1>tallying devices and that's where all of it comes from. No,

0:25:07.520 --> 0:25:11.480
<v Speaker 1>they're they're companies from across the United States that make

0:25:11.920 --> 0:25:14.840
<v Speaker 1>either the voting machine or the telling machine or both,

0:25:15.520 --> 0:25:18.000
<v Speaker 1>and different states by different ones, So you don't have

0:25:18.160 --> 0:25:22.359
<v Speaker 1>a consistent kind of experience from one state, sometimes not

0:25:22.440 --> 0:25:26.240
<v Speaker 1>even between one county and another. You can come across

0:25:26.280 --> 0:25:29.920
<v Speaker 1>some very different systems and that can be a little. Uh.

0:25:30.040 --> 0:25:31.720
<v Speaker 1>I don't know if daunting is the right word, because

0:25:31.720 --> 0:25:34.280
<v Speaker 1>you're not typically going, as an individual, going to encounter

0:25:34.320 --> 0:25:36.399
<v Speaker 1>more than one system, because you're going to be in

0:25:36.440 --> 0:25:40.000
<v Speaker 1>whatever county you you reside in. But it seems perhaps

0:25:40.040 --> 0:25:42.840
<v Speaker 1>counterintuitive if you're trying to have what if you need

0:25:42.920 --> 0:25:46.200
<v Speaker 1>to go to the next county to vote again, so

0:25:46.240 --> 0:25:50.080
<v Speaker 1>you live in So you live in Illinois, So you've

0:25:50.080 --> 0:25:52.520
<v Speaker 1>been dead for fifty years, and you want to vote

0:25:52.520 --> 0:25:55.280
<v Speaker 1>as many times in the Chicago elections, you've only got

0:25:55.359 --> 0:26:00.760
<v Speaker 1>until dawn because they turned to dust. And then we

0:26:00.920 --> 0:26:05.120
<v Speaker 1>have fun with Chicago, but we love you. Uh. This

0:26:05.200 --> 0:26:10.760
<v Speaker 1>moves us over into pretty controversial but also extremely common

0:26:10.920 --> 0:26:14.159
<v Speaker 1>method of voting. They the last few times I've voted,

0:26:14.160 --> 0:26:17.680
<v Speaker 1>I've voted on one of these, the direct recording Electronic

0:26:17.760 --> 0:26:20.040
<v Speaker 1>Voting system. Yeah, the d r E s, these are

0:26:20.080 --> 0:26:24.800
<v Speaker 1>the the Essentially they're like touch screen computer typically it's

0:26:24.800 --> 0:26:28.440
<v Speaker 1>like a touch screen computer interface. Uh. In Georgia, that's

0:26:28.480 --> 0:26:31.320
<v Speaker 1>been the case for a while, and in fact, Georgia

0:26:31.359 --> 0:26:33.159
<v Speaker 1>is one of the states that happens to have some

0:26:33.240 --> 0:26:36.480
<v Speaker 1>of the oldest d r E s currently in use.

0:26:36.520 --> 0:26:38.320
<v Speaker 1>I think the ones that were purchased in Georgia were

0:26:38.320 --> 0:26:41.680
<v Speaker 1>purchased before two thousand six. D r E s typically

0:26:41.720 --> 0:26:44.400
<v Speaker 1>have a ten to fifteen year long lifespan and they

0:26:44.400 --> 0:26:49.399
<v Speaker 1>have not been replaced purchased. More more on that in

0:26:49.440 --> 0:26:54.520
<v Speaker 1>a minute. A quick historical note though, Uh, patents for

0:26:54.640 --> 0:26:58.399
<v Speaker 1>electric ballot machines not electronic quite yet, but but but

0:26:58.560 --> 0:27:03.200
<v Speaker 1>electric like like tell Graham or telegram telegraph based machines

0:27:03.640 --> 0:27:09.160
<v Speaker 1>started appearing in eighteen fifty, but nobody ever used them

0:27:09.240 --> 0:27:15.240
<v Speaker 1>until nineteen. Uh, just just everyone was like electricity, it's

0:27:15.280 --> 0:27:18.800
<v Speaker 1>a passing phase. Yeah, it's not as reliable as good

0:27:18.800 --> 0:27:23.879
<v Speaker 1>old mechanical work. I can just imagine someone over and

0:27:24.000 --> 0:27:26.399
<v Speaker 1>an office just kind of you know, a clerk with

0:27:26.440 --> 0:27:28.920
<v Speaker 1>like the little the little visor on his head and

0:27:29.000 --> 0:27:31.160
<v Speaker 1>he's he's guys chin in his hand. He's just sitting

0:27:31.200 --> 0:27:33.040
<v Speaker 1>there looking at a little light bulb and then suddenly

0:27:33.080 --> 0:27:38.239
<v Speaker 1>blinks twice. Another one for for Kang Mark, another one

0:27:38.280 --> 0:27:41.479
<v Speaker 1>down for Kan. But but but when we when we

0:27:41.520 --> 0:27:45.960
<v Speaker 1>did eventually get electric devices, they were like push button

0:27:46.040 --> 0:27:47.720
<v Speaker 1>kind of things, sort of like sort of like a

0:27:47.800 --> 0:27:50.800
<v Speaker 1>keyboard or an old phone pad, if anyone ever pushed

0:27:51.200 --> 0:27:54.840
<v Speaker 1>a phone button in their life. Yeah, and these these

0:27:54.840 --> 0:27:59.560
<v Speaker 1>are meant to record votes electronically, right, Like, that's the

0:27:59.800 --> 0:28:02.440
<v Speaker 1>idea is that if you can record your vote electronically,

0:28:03.080 --> 0:28:05.800
<v Speaker 1>it's speed of light. I mean, it's really easy to

0:28:05.800 --> 0:28:07.600
<v Speaker 1>tell you because you put it through a computer program

0:28:07.600 --> 0:28:10.280
<v Speaker 1>that just sorts the votes on its own, and the

0:28:10.359 --> 0:28:15.119
<v Speaker 1>user interface is easy, right, And in theory it protects

0:28:15.160 --> 0:28:18.760
<v Speaker 1>the person's privacy and like that. There are a lot

0:28:18.800 --> 0:28:22.679
<v Speaker 1>of things that on the surface are very easy to

0:28:22.720 --> 0:28:25.720
<v Speaker 1>point out as pros uh to be fair, though they're

0:28:25.760 --> 0:28:28.480
<v Speaker 1>not all equal. Right. There's some d r E s

0:28:28.560 --> 0:28:31.760
<v Speaker 1>that generate a hard copy of every single vote that

0:28:31.880 --> 0:28:33.840
<v Speaker 1>is cast, and this is meant so that you can

0:28:33.880 --> 0:28:37.879
<v Speaker 1>compare the hard copy against the electronic copy, makes certain

0:28:37.960 --> 0:28:41.120
<v Speaker 1>that the machines are accurately recording the votes as they

0:28:41.160 --> 0:28:45.520
<v Speaker 1>were cast. Uh. In some cases, we would allow even

0:28:45.800 --> 0:28:49.240
<v Speaker 1>the voter him or herself to see immediately after casting

0:28:49.240 --> 0:28:53.840
<v Speaker 1>the vote if the paper ballot that is generated reflects

0:28:53.840 --> 0:28:56.360
<v Speaker 1>what they actually chose, so they can be certain that

0:28:56.680 --> 0:28:58.960
<v Speaker 1>their vote was recorded the way they wanted it to

0:28:58.960 --> 0:29:03.840
<v Speaker 1>be recorded. There are other places that have absolutely no

0:29:04.480 --> 0:29:08.160
<v Speaker 1>hard copy produced, so the only copy is electronic. I

0:29:08.240 --> 0:29:10.719
<v Speaker 1>just get a little card, stick it in the machine.

0:29:11.040 --> 0:29:13.320
<v Speaker 1>Vote how I want, take the card out, give the

0:29:13.360 --> 0:29:16.240
<v Speaker 1>card to somebody. Yep, And I don't see any It's

0:29:16.240 --> 0:29:20.720
<v Speaker 1>not a paper card, it's a little it's plastic. Yeah,

0:29:20.720 --> 0:29:22.800
<v Speaker 1>that's how it works. In Georgia, we do not have

0:29:22.880 --> 0:29:25.800
<v Speaker 1>a paper copy that gets generated. There's no way to

0:29:25.920 --> 0:29:28.920
<v Speaker 1>compare a hard copy against the electronic copy and make

0:29:29.000 --> 0:29:32.720
<v Speaker 1>certain that in fact the votes match up. Uh. And

0:29:32.800 --> 0:29:35.160
<v Speaker 1>we'll talk more about that in greater detail. But you

0:29:35.200 --> 0:29:39.880
<v Speaker 1>could see that that creates some that could create some

0:29:39.880 --> 0:29:44.680
<v Speaker 1>some controversy at the very least. Yeah. Uh. And but

0:29:44.720 --> 0:29:46.240
<v Speaker 1>like I said, most of the time, the interfaces for

0:29:46.280 --> 0:29:48.800
<v Speaker 1>these machines, they typically are touch screens, but you can

0:29:48.840 --> 0:29:51.400
<v Speaker 1>also find some that are mechanical buttons like you know,

0:29:51.520 --> 0:29:56.640
<v Speaker 1>the screen tells you which button corresponds with which choice

0:29:57.480 --> 0:30:03.400
<v Speaker 1>and exactly twigs and k ing Man, I remember that campaign. Uh.

0:30:03.480 --> 0:30:06.360
<v Speaker 1>And again since twenty ten, we haven't had any mechanical

0:30:06.440 --> 0:30:09.000
<v Speaker 1>lever voting machines, but those were still in use up

0:30:09.040 --> 0:30:14.400
<v Speaker 1>to that point. Um. So in the United States, Congress

0:30:14.400 --> 0:30:16.920
<v Speaker 1>passed the Help America Vote Act in two thousand two

0:30:17.000 --> 0:30:19.880
<v Speaker 1>to make reforms to the voting process. So it wasn't

0:30:19.920 --> 0:30:22.480
<v Speaker 1>that long ago. And that act required states to invest

0:30:22.520 --> 0:30:26.200
<v Speaker 1>money in updating and upgrading voting equipment for because as

0:30:26.280 --> 0:30:30.080
<v Speaker 1>as this equipment ages, than it has more potential for

0:30:30.160 --> 0:30:35.240
<v Speaker 1>inserting errors. And when you're talking about voting, obviously the

0:30:35.240 --> 0:30:38.760
<v Speaker 1>the stakes are very high, right, you don't want there

0:30:38.760 --> 0:30:41.360
<v Speaker 1>to be errors in that sort of thing. Uh. The

0:30:41.400 --> 0:30:43.880
<v Speaker 1>Act was actually drafted in a response to problems people

0:30:43.960 --> 0:30:47.400
<v Speaker 1>encountered in the two thousand election, and that brings us

0:30:47.400 --> 0:30:52.000
<v Speaker 1>to a section about problems with voting and voting technology. Uh.

0:30:52.320 --> 0:30:56.800
<v Speaker 1>One of the big ones is accessibility. Making sure that

0:30:56.880 --> 0:31:02.040
<v Speaker 1>the system you have designed is accessible by the population

0:31:02.240 --> 0:31:05.880
<v Speaker 1>at large, and that you're not excluding anyone through the

0:31:05.920 --> 0:31:10.440
<v Speaker 1>design of your voting system. Yeah, because imagine everyone has

0:31:10.480 --> 0:31:14.400
<v Speaker 1>a legal right to vote. But say there's only one

0:31:14.520 --> 0:31:17.400
<v Speaker 1>building in the entire United States of America where you

0:31:17.440 --> 0:31:20.800
<v Speaker 1>can vote, and it closes at six pm on voting day,

0:31:20.880 --> 0:31:24.360
<v Speaker 1>and it's up five flights of stairs. Yeah, the voting

0:31:24.480 --> 0:31:27.480
<v Speaker 1>places up five ft no elevator. Yeah, So anyone with

0:31:27.520 --> 0:31:30.720
<v Speaker 1>mobility issues, anyone who can't get to that building. You know,

0:31:30.760 --> 0:31:34.360
<v Speaker 1>there are a lot of different dolleks. You can you

0:31:34.400 --> 0:31:39.120
<v Speaker 1>can have somebody granted explicitly the right to vote. Yeah,

0:31:39.200 --> 0:31:43.080
<v Speaker 1>the conditions make it such that they really can't. Yeah. Yeah.

0:31:43.160 --> 0:31:45.120
<v Speaker 1>And and this is sadly a thing that is that

0:31:45.240 --> 0:31:50.760
<v Speaker 1>is contested in several places in the country. Absolutely. One

0:31:50.760 --> 0:31:53.000
<v Speaker 1>of one of the one of the other elements of

0:31:53.040 --> 0:31:55.960
<v Speaker 1>that act I was talking about, had a section in

0:31:56.040 --> 0:31:59.440
<v Speaker 1>it about how states had to come up with a

0:31:59.520 --> 0:32:03.000
<v Speaker 1>voter i A D system so that they could prevent

0:32:03.280 --> 0:32:05.240
<v Speaker 1>fraud from happening. In other words, you can't just have

0:32:05.320 --> 0:32:08.000
<v Speaker 1>someone show up and claim that they are eligible to

0:32:08.080 --> 0:32:10.200
<v Speaker 1>vote in that jurisdiction and then cast a vote and

0:32:10.200 --> 0:32:14.040
<v Speaker 1>then leave. There has to be some way of of saying, yes,

0:32:14.080 --> 0:32:17.320
<v Speaker 1>this person does have the right to vote in this jurisdiction.

0:32:17.440 --> 0:32:21.480
<v Speaker 1>According to that act. But what if they are eligible

0:32:21.520 --> 0:32:24.640
<v Speaker 1>to vote and they don't have the appropriate I D. Yeah,

0:32:24.840 --> 0:32:28.560
<v Speaker 1>that's a and that that is a continuing issue here

0:32:28.560 --> 0:32:33.000
<v Speaker 1>in the United States and multiple jurisdictions, A very a

0:32:33.120 --> 0:32:38.480
<v Speaker 1>very challenging problem because there are two very important aspects

0:32:38.480 --> 0:32:41.120
<v Speaker 1>at play here. The idea of let's make certain that

0:32:41.200 --> 0:32:45.719
<v Speaker 1>we don't create a system that allows folks to gain

0:32:45.920 --> 0:32:48.360
<v Speaker 1>that system, and also, let's make sure we create a

0:32:48.360 --> 0:32:50.720
<v Speaker 1>system that allows the people who are eligible to participate

0:32:50.760 --> 0:32:53.600
<v Speaker 1>in it to actually participate in it, that the people

0:32:53.640 --> 0:33:00.880
<v Speaker 1>who are eligible to actually vote. Yeah, and not than that, right,

0:33:01.120 --> 0:33:05.200
<v Speaker 1>it's and no one who is intelligible, right, this is right,

0:33:05.320 --> 0:33:08.360
<v Speaker 1>no one who's dead or yeah, exactly. Uh. And we

0:33:08.400 --> 0:33:11.000
<v Speaker 1>could get into voter eligibility stuff too, but that would

0:33:11.000 --> 0:33:13.280
<v Speaker 1>just be an enormous can of worms, because there are

0:33:13.320 --> 0:33:16.120
<v Speaker 1>different states that have different definitions of that. Like if

0:33:16.160 --> 0:33:19.560
<v Speaker 1>you have committed a felony or been convicted of a felony,

0:33:19.960 --> 0:33:21.880
<v Speaker 1>don't even have to have committed a felony, you just

0:33:21.920 --> 0:33:25.680
<v Speaker 1>have to be convicted of one. That that could be uh,

0:33:25.840 --> 0:33:27.800
<v Speaker 1>that could strike you from ever being able to vote

0:33:27.800 --> 0:33:30.240
<v Speaker 1>again in certain states, not in all of them, but

0:33:30.280 --> 0:33:34.520
<v Speaker 1>in some of them, So that's another issue entirely. Then

0:33:34.520 --> 0:33:36.920
<v Speaker 1>there's problems with tallying votes. This gets back to that

0:33:37.000 --> 0:33:40.160
<v Speaker 1>hanging chat issue. So that was when in Florida these

0:33:40.200 --> 0:33:42.920
<v Speaker 1>ballots that had the punchhole variety. That wasn't the only kind.

0:33:42.960 --> 0:33:45.880
<v Speaker 1>They're also the butterfly ballots that also that had issues.

0:33:45.920 --> 0:33:48.880
<v Speaker 1>They were related to the punch hoole ones where it

0:33:48.960 --> 0:33:54.600
<v Speaker 1>wasn't clear which indicator areas were related to which names. Yeah,

0:33:54.680 --> 0:33:57.160
<v Speaker 1>that was a real issue with the punch hole ones.

0:33:57.480 --> 0:34:00.280
<v Speaker 1>Sometimes the paper wouldn't completely tear from the ballot when

0:34:00.280 --> 0:34:02.720
<v Speaker 1>you get that hanging chat, it's still something, it's still

0:34:02.760 --> 0:34:06.479
<v Speaker 1>partially attached to the ballot itself, and that could end

0:34:06.560 --> 0:34:10.120
<v Speaker 1>up creating errors when the when the votes were being

0:34:10.120 --> 0:34:15.600
<v Speaker 1>tallied by machine. So there was a very close race

0:34:15.600 --> 0:34:17.560
<v Speaker 1>in the United States in two thousand, I mean it

0:34:17.600 --> 0:34:20.279
<v Speaker 1>was it was really coming down to Florida, and so

0:34:20.440 --> 0:34:25.239
<v Speaker 1>everyone was really paying close attention. And while many were

0:34:25.320 --> 0:34:28.600
<v Speaker 1>calling for a careful recount of the votes to make

0:34:28.680 --> 0:34:32.800
<v Speaker 1>certain that the votes that were cast accurately reflected the

0:34:32.840 --> 0:34:35.640
<v Speaker 1>results that were being posted, the Supreme Court ruled that

0:34:35.760 --> 0:34:38.680
<v Speaker 1>George W. Bush had won the election over al gore,

0:34:39.040 --> 0:34:43.000
<v Speaker 1>and that caused its own controversy that lasted for quite

0:34:43.040 --> 0:34:46.879
<v Speaker 1>some time. Uh So in the wake of that, that's

0:34:46.920 --> 0:34:49.080
<v Speaker 1>when that act was drafted, saying we want to make

0:34:49.080 --> 0:34:51.760
<v Speaker 1>sure that you know, we're not saying that something wrong

0:34:51.840 --> 0:34:53.759
<v Speaker 1>definitely happened in two thousand, but we want to make

0:34:53.800 --> 0:34:56.960
<v Speaker 1>sure that that possibility doesn't arise again. Yeah. Well, I mean,

0:34:57.239 --> 0:34:59.600
<v Speaker 1>even if you're the person who won, it's not fun

0:34:59.680 --> 0:35:05.000
<v Speaker 1>to be uh entering public office with suspicion hanging over

0:35:05.040 --> 0:35:08.279
<v Speaker 1>you that you're not actually the people's choice, right, and

0:35:08.320 --> 0:35:10.960
<v Speaker 1>to say nothing of the person who didn't win and

0:35:11.239 --> 0:35:14.400
<v Speaker 1>are wondering if maybe they should have. Right. Yeah, it's

0:35:14.440 --> 0:35:16.840
<v Speaker 1>it is not healthy for the country as a whole.

0:35:17.760 --> 0:35:20.080
<v Speaker 1>So then we get to d r s without a

0:35:20.080 --> 0:35:23.000
<v Speaker 1>paper trail like here in Georgia, the type that we

0:35:23.040 --> 0:35:24.879
<v Speaker 1>have here in Georgia. The concern here is that there's

0:35:24.920 --> 0:35:27.160
<v Speaker 1>since there's no physical piece of evidence of a vote

0:35:27.600 --> 0:35:30.319
<v Speaker 1>and it's all just a file, this could easily be

0:35:30.480 --> 0:35:35.000
<v Speaker 1>misrepresenting the actual votes of the populace, which we can't

0:35:35.040 --> 0:35:37.840
<v Speaker 1>check because we don't have anything to check it against.

0:35:38.520 --> 0:35:40.400
<v Speaker 1>Right if we even if we had a paper trail,

0:35:41.560 --> 0:35:44.480
<v Speaker 1>the let's say that's Uh, that's sending out a hard

0:35:44.520 --> 0:35:48.400
<v Speaker 1>copy printed version. Unless the voter him or herself is

0:35:48.440 --> 0:35:52.200
<v Speaker 1>able to look at that paper trail and say, yes,

0:35:52.320 --> 0:35:56.680
<v Speaker 1>this does accurately reflect what I chose. Uh, then the

0:35:56.680 --> 0:35:58.719
<v Speaker 1>paper trail is kind of meaningless, right, because the paper

0:35:58.760 --> 0:36:00.960
<v Speaker 1>trail could say the exact same thing that the electronic

0:36:01.040 --> 0:36:05.600
<v Speaker 1>results say. Unless you relate it back to the individual voters,

0:36:06.080 --> 0:36:10.640
<v Speaker 1>there's no way of saying that it is verified or

0:36:10.680 --> 0:36:13.960
<v Speaker 1>fraudulent because if if I sit there and like, no, no, no,

0:36:14.040 --> 0:36:18.640
<v Speaker 1>the twenty tho pages of votes I have here exactly

0:36:18.719 --> 0:36:21.759
<v Speaker 1>match up against the electronic file, but it turns out

0:36:21.800 --> 0:36:24.840
<v Speaker 1>that if you pull those people and they all voted

0:36:24.920 --> 0:36:29.720
<v Speaker 1>something else, then you're like, well shucks. You know, there's

0:36:29.760 --> 0:36:32.799
<v Speaker 1>nothing that links it to the actual intent of the voter.

0:36:32.960 --> 0:36:38.319
<v Speaker 1>And it's really challenging to change that without bringing that

0:36:38.440 --> 0:36:42.520
<v Speaker 1>privacy concern back up and saying, well, unless we're specifically

0:36:42.600 --> 0:36:47.080
<v Speaker 1>linking very specific votes to a very specific people, how

0:36:47.120 --> 0:36:49.279
<v Speaker 1>do we verify this? And if we do that, then

0:36:49.320 --> 0:36:51.680
<v Speaker 1>we remove the privacy from the vote. It's no longer

0:36:51.719 --> 0:36:56.360
<v Speaker 1>a secret ballot, and that's very important in this process. So, uh,

0:36:56.520 --> 0:37:00.479
<v Speaker 1>that's been pretty ugly um. And also it's very easy

0:37:00.520 --> 0:37:03.840
<v Speaker 1>to lose electronic votes. It's a file. It's not hard

0:37:04.160 --> 0:37:09.680
<v Speaker 1>to completely disenfranchise an entire population from from any sort

0:37:09.680 --> 0:37:14.160
<v Speaker 1>of voting process by quote unquote losing on purpose an

0:37:14.160 --> 0:37:18.880
<v Speaker 1>electronic file. Not that that necessarily even even by accident.

0:37:19.000 --> 0:37:23.680
<v Speaker 1>I didn't mean to you don't want votes to be lost, right, Yeah,

0:37:23.719 --> 0:37:25.400
<v Speaker 1>it's just that it's one of those things that it

0:37:25.800 --> 0:37:29.080
<v Speaker 1>lends itself to conversations where you start to make cynical

0:37:29.120 --> 0:37:35.480
<v Speaker 1>assumptions that the parties that are perhaps administering a vote

0:37:35.719 --> 0:37:38.799
<v Speaker 1>have invested interest in the outcome of that vote, and

0:37:38.840 --> 0:37:43.200
<v Speaker 1>therefore they are working toward that purpose. That's not necessarily

0:37:43.200 --> 0:37:47.680
<v Speaker 1>the case, but this sort of stuff lens ammunition to

0:37:47.719 --> 0:37:50.440
<v Speaker 1>that kind of argument, right, Like you're like, well, if

0:37:50.440 --> 0:37:52.560
<v Speaker 1>they can do it, then they must be doing it,

0:37:52.920 --> 0:37:56.000
<v Speaker 1>and that's the problem. Uh. There's also the question of security.

0:37:56.000 --> 0:37:57.840
<v Speaker 1>How do you make sure that the votes are actually

0:37:57.920 --> 0:38:05.080
<v Speaker 1>coming uh from legitimate SSEs and meanwhile protecting that privacy. Um,

0:38:05.120 --> 0:38:07.759
<v Speaker 1>all of the systems that are in place according to

0:38:08.320 --> 0:38:11.600
<v Speaker 1>that act I was mentioning earlier, are supposed to be auditable.

0:38:12.000 --> 0:38:15.120
<v Speaker 1>But how do you make a system auditable that is

0:38:15.160 --> 0:38:19.120
<v Speaker 1>also protecting the identity of the voters. How can you

0:38:19.160 --> 0:38:22.840
<v Speaker 1>audit an electronic system and say yes, in fact, I

0:38:22.960 --> 0:38:26.440
<v Speaker 1>know that this is working because Miss Johnson over there

0:38:26.480 --> 0:38:28.720
<v Speaker 1>voted for Kang, and it's sure comes up as Kang

0:38:28.760 --> 0:38:32.440
<v Speaker 1>over here, and and Mr Johnson voted for Kodos, and

0:38:32.480 --> 0:38:34.640
<v Speaker 1>Nick came up as Codas, and that dinner is going

0:38:34.680 --> 0:38:37.799
<v Speaker 1>to be interesting. But I know for a fact the

0:38:37.840 --> 0:38:41.520
<v Speaker 1>system is working. That that's It's really hard to do.

0:38:41.560 --> 0:38:43.160
<v Speaker 1>But at the same time, you gotta say, well, an

0:38:43.160 --> 0:38:46.200
<v Speaker 1>auditable system is important because you don't want there to

0:38:46.200 --> 0:38:49.400
<v Speaker 1>be some sort of bias inherent in the machinery itself.

0:38:50.440 --> 0:38:53.399
<v Speaker 1>So you start to see where these challenges are coming in.

0:38:53.719 --> 0:38:57.040
<v Speaker 1>One potential solution to this, or one that people have proposed,

0:38:57.160 --> 0:39:00.680
<v Speaker 1>is called the voter Verified Paper Trail, which sounds like

0:39:00.880 --> 0:39:02.880
<v Speaker 1>Oregon Trail to me. It's like we're going on an

0:39:02.880 --> 0:39:09.520
<v Speaker 1>adventure and we're probably gonna get dysenterry, Like, yeah, Kang

0:39:09.560 --> 0:39:12.880
<v Speaker 1>broke your leg and bought three barrels of salt pork. Yeah,

0:39:13.600 --> 0:39:15.440
<v Speaker 1>I kind of want to play Oregon Trail now. But

0:39:16.160 --> 0:39:19.480
<v Speaker 1>the very the voter Verified Paper Trail talks about producing

0:39:19.480 --> 0:39:22.479
<v Speaker 1>a paper ballot that reflects the electronic choices of the voter,

0:39:22.640 --> 0:39:25.520
<v Speaker 1>and then ideally the voter would be able to compare

0:39:25.920 --> 0:39:29.080
<v Speaker 1>the paper ballot to the output of the electronic screen

0:39:29.600 --> 0:39:33.680
<v Speaker 1>and make certain that, in fact it does say exactly

0:39:33.680 --> 0:39:36.560
<v Speaker 1>what they intended it to say. But of course, if

0:39:36.600 --> 0:39:39.680
<v Speaker 1>you were particularly sneaky, you could have the printed ballot

0:39:39.800 --> 0:39:44.600
<v Speaker 1>reflect what the displayed results are on the screen, but

0:39:44.680 --> 0:39:48.799
<v Speaker 1>have the recorded but vote be something totally different. So

0:39:48.920 --> 0:39:51.719
<v Speaker 1>like vote number fifty on the screen, it says this.

0:39:51.840 --> 0:39:54.040
<v Speaker 1>On the paper ballot it says the same thing. That's

0:39:54.080 --> 0:39:57.680
<v Speaker 1>exactly what I wanted, Press submit, But when it goes

0:39:57.760 --> 0:40:02.680
<v Speaker 1>to be saved, all the lets get switched. That's entirely possible.

0:40:02.920 --> 0:40:06.720
<v Speaker 1>So it's not a perfect system either, right, And because

0:40:07.480 --> 0:40:12.759
<v Speaker 1>the electronic approach has the capacity of affecting a very

0:40:12.920 --> 0:40:16.360
<v Speaker 1>large number of votes with a relatively small amount of effort,

0:40:17.000 --> 0:40:20.120
<v Speaker 1>that has got a lot of people worried about it. Right, Like,

0:40:20.160 --> 0:40:22.920
<v Speaker 1>if you wanted to affect paper votes, that takes a

0:40:22.960 --> 0:40:26.479
<v Speaker 1>lot of effort, especially if assuming that the people running

0:40:26.520 --> 0:40:28.719
<v Speaker 1>the election are on the up and up. It's hard

0:40:28.760 --> 0:40:33.040
<v Speaker 1>to do. You need help, Yeah, if you are capable

0:40:33.280 --> 0:40:37.880
<v Speaker 1>of of executing an attack upon a vulnerability and an

0:40:37.920 --> 0:40:43.360
<v Speaker 1>electronic voting system, then you could affect thousands or maybe

0:40:43.440 --> 0:40:47.360
<v Speaker 1>millions of votes from one single source. And that, I

0:40:47.400 --> 0:40:49.240
<v Speaker 1>think is where a lot of people are saying, Okay,

0:40:49.280 --> 0:40:53.000
<v Speaker 1>we really have to read evaluate the approach we're taking.

0:40:53.360 --> 0:40:57.160
<v Speaker 1>And then there's that that question of of including a

0:40:57.239 --> 0:41:01.680
<v Speaker 1>bias in a system, which is not just uh academic

0:41:01.680 --> 0:41:05.960
<v Speaker 1>discussion in many ways, because this question was very seriously

0:41:06.040 --> 0:41:10.319
<v Speaker 1>raised in the not too distant past because of the

0:41:10.360 --> 0:41:15.680
<v Speaker 1>political um involvement of a CEO who was the head

0:41:15.680 --> 0:41:20.040
<v Speaker 1>of a company that made voting machines. UH specifically talking

0:41:20.080 --> 0:41:24.279
<v Speaker 1>about the the then CEO of Diebald Incorporated. Back in

0:41:24.400 --> 0:41:27.640
<v Speaker 1>two thousand three. Die Bald was one of the big

0:41:27.680 --> 0:41:31.560
<v Speaker 1>companies producing voting machines they had. Their business was mainly

0:41:31.800 --> 0:41:34.320
<v Speaker 1>a t M S, but they also did voting machines.

0:41:35.040 --> 0:41:40.279
<v Speaker 1>And the same ceo wrote fundraising letters on behalf of

0:41:40.280 --> 0:41:43.239
<v Speaker 1>the Republican Party and included the sentence quote, I am

0:41:43.320 --> 0:41:46.920
<v Speaker 1>committed to helping Ohio deliver its electoral votes to the

0:41:46.960 --> 0:41:50.080
<v Speaker 1>president next year. End quote. Now I suppose that could

0:41:50.120 --> 0:41:53.520
<v Speaker 1>be interpreted in an innocuous way, sure, just saying like

0:41:53.920 --> 0:41:55.960
<v Speaker 1>I want to help with the system yeah, I am

0:41:56.000 --> 0:41:59.200
<v Speaker 1>going to advocate for this person and we're gonna get

0:41:59.280 --> 0:42:02.160
<v Speaker 1>them into off that. That's one way of looking at

0:42:02.200 --> 0:42:04.640
<v Speaker 1>Another way of looking at it, saying I'm the head

0:42:04.640 --> 0:42:08.040
<v Speaker 1>of a company that creates voting machines and I could

0:42:08.200 --> 0:42:13.200
<v Speaker 1>totally make this happen, So at least for people reading

0:42:13.239 --> 0:42:17.040
<v Speaker 1>that on the outside, introduced suspicion, right. It raised ethical questions.

0:42:17.040 --> 0:42:21.360
<v Speaker 1>It was obviously a conflict of interest for someone who

0:42:21.560 --> 0:42:23.680
<v Speaker 1>is the head of a company that is producing machines

0:42:23.680 --> 0:42:26.479
<v Speaker 1>that are supposed to be unbiased and not give any

0:42:26.520 --> 0:42:30.480
<v Speaker 1>weight toward one choice or another, so that you have

0:42:31.120 --> 0:42:34.440
<v Speaker 1>a a an approach that any voter can come into

0:42:34.520 --> 0:42:37.960
<v Speaker 1>absolutely with a clean slate and just be confident that

0:42:38.000 --> 0:42:41.000
<v Speaker 1>their vote will be reflected. And then they're also advocating

0:42:41.040 --> 0:42:43.799
<v Speaker 1>for a specific party. That is problematic, and it has

0:42:43.880 --> 0:42:47.920
<v Speaker 1>raised some pretty tough questions. Now. Of course, one solution

0:42:47.960 --> 0:42:50.319
<v Speaker 1>that people have discussed to this is that if you know,

0:42:50.520 --> 0:42:55.040
<v Speaker 1>if you have machines that have software governing the process

0:42:55.120 --> 0:42:58.640
<v Speaker 1>behind counting votes, that software should be open source. People

0:42:58.680 --> 0:43:00.640
<v Speaker 1>should be able to see what the code is doing.

0:43:01.520 --> 0:43:04.160
<v Speaker 1>But of course companies who make those machines probably don't

0:43:04.200 --> 0:43:07.120
<v Speaker 1>want that no, they take a very proprietary approach. And

0:43:07.160 --> 0:43:13.560
<v Speaker 1>again it's different systems across the United States, so you have, uh,

0:43:13.920 --> 0:43:17.600
<v Speaker 1>you don't have a consistent approach. And according to professors

0:43:17.640 --> 0:43:21.000
<v Speaker 1>with john hop Johns Hopkins University and Rice University, who

0:43:21.040 --> 0:43:24.680
<v Speaker 1>did a study on various d r E machines, they

0:43:24.680 --> 0:43:27.080
<v Speaker 1>said that out of all the d r E machines

0:43:27.080 --> 0:43:31.680
<v Speaker 1>they looked at, none of them used cryptography correctly and

0:43:31.760 --> 0:43:34.759
<v Speaker 1>many of them didn't use it at all. So that

0:43:35.480 --> 0:43:39.120
<v Speaker 1>you have these unencrypted results there that could be altered,

0:43:39.320 --> 0:43:42.200
<v Speaker 1>they could be it could be stolen, so that someone

0:43:42.320 --> 0:43:46.279
<v Speaker 1>is getting specific information about specific voters. It's it was

0:43:46.280 --> 0:43:50.279
<v Speaker 1>a big mess. Um. So we obviously see that there

0:43:50.280 --> 0:43:56.200
<v Speaker 1>are some real areas for improvement. Uh, there's some opportunities here.

0:43:56.600 --> 0:43:59.440
<v Speaker 1>If we were giving if we were giving voting, the

0:43:59.520 --> 0:44:03.719
<v Speaker 1>voting process a review a performance review. Right now, it's

0:44:03.719 --> 0:44:08.000
<v Speaker 1>saying we've we've identified some areas, some opportunity areas for us,

0:44:08.000 --> 0:44:10.120
<v Speaker 1>feel like you're not living up to your full potential

0:44:10.280 --> 0:44:14.200
<v Speaker 1>and we want to try and fix you. Man, how

0:44:14.200 --> 0:44:17.839
<v Speaker 1>many of my performance reviews have gone with that specific route.

0:44:17.880 --> 0:44:21.840
<v Speaker 1>We want to fix you, get you fixed. Yeah, So

0:44:22.600 --> 0:44:25.440
<v Speaker 1>one of the big issues facing the United States. Uh,

0:44:25.600 --> 0:44:29.360
<v Speaker 1>is this aging voting equipment story? Like I said, Georgia's

0:44:29.440 --> 0:44:32.200
<v Speaker 1>got some of the most ancient of the the d

0:44:32.360 --> 0:44:34.640
<v Speaker 1>r E systems that are out there. And by the way,

0:44:34.800 --> 0:44:39.920
<v Speaker 1>as when The Atlantic ran a piece about aging electronic

0:44:40.160 --> 0:44:43.880
<v Speaker 1>voting systems, had no contention of replacing them, or at

0:44:43.920 --> 0:44:48.200
<v Speaker 1>least no plan to do so. Uh. And according to

0:44:48.239 --> 0:44:51.280
<v Speaker 1>the piece in The Atlantic from it said, the problem

0:44:51.280 --> 0:44:54.560
<v Speaker 1>of aging voting technology reaches nearly every corner of the

0:44:54.640 --> 0:44:58.400
<v Speaker 1>United States. Unlike voting machines used in past eras, today's

0:44:58.480 --> 0:45:01.759
<v Speaker 1>systems were not designed to asked for decades. And this

0:45:01.840 --> 0:45:03.480
<v Speaker 1>is an issue we see just by going in that

0:45:03.560 --> 0:45:06.000
<v Speaker 1>high tech route. I mean, if you've bought a computer,

0:45:06.480 --> 0:45:08.839
<v Speaker 1>you know that after a few years that computer just

0:45:08.880 --> 0:45:12.680
<v Speaker 1>doesn't seem to work so well anymore. Well and for

0:45:12.760 --> 0:45:15.279
<v Speaker 1>them where you're you're gonna especially like I read that,

0:45:15.320 --> 0:45:16.640
<v Speaker 1>I read that a lot of the systems that are

0:45:16.640 --> 0:45:20.120
<v Speaker 1>in place there are from the nineteen nineties even And uh.

0:45:20.160 --> 0:45:22.520
<v Speaker 1>And when you're using equipment that old, you start getting

0:45:22.520 --> 0:45:24.279
<v Speaker 1>into the issues that you would get into with with

0:45:24.320 --> 0:45:28.160
<v Speaker 1>any kind of proprietary legacy systems. You know, the vendors

0:45:28.400 --> 0:45:32.239
<v Speaker 1>eventually stop using that operating system and aren't going to

0:45:32.280 --> 0:45:36.080
<v Speaker 1>be able to help you, uh fix or update anything

0:45:36.160 --> 0:45:39.640
<v Speaker 1>that goes wiggy. So when you do have a situation

0:45:39.640 --> 0:45:42.400
<v Speaker 1>where let's say a machine goes down in a busy

0:45:42.520 --> 0:45:47.680
<v Speaker 1>polling place, you may not have any way of addressing

0:45:47.719 --> 0:45:51.120
<v Speaker 1>that in a in a way that the matters to

0:45:51.160 --> 0:45:52.960
<v Speaker 1>any of the voters who are in line, and so

0:45:53.040 --> 0:45:56.440
<v Speaker 1>that process slows down more and more. This in turn,

0:45:56.880 --> 0:45:59.439
<v Speaker 1>can create a hardship on the people who want to vote.

0:45:59.440 --> 0:46:04.200
<v Speaker 1>It can it can It can disincentivize I guess that's

0:46:04.200 --> 0:46:06.000
<v Speaker 1>a terrible that's not even a real word, but it

0:46:06.040 --> 0:46:12.120
<v Speaker 1>can use. It disincentivize when I'm when I'm living in

0:46:12.120 --> 0:46:15.520
<v Speaker 1>suburbian areas as my other terrible flood I've done in

0:46:15.520 --> 0:46:17.640
<v Speaker 1>the past, that i will never live down, and so

0:46:17.680 --> 0:46:20.440
<v Speaker 1>I've just adopted it. It will make it will make

0:46:20.520 --> 0:46:23.000
<v Speaker 1>people less likely to go out and vote, because if

0:46:23.040 --> 0:46:24.640
<v Speaker 1>they go out there and they see that there's a

0:46:24.760 --> 0:46:29.360
<v Speaker 1>line that stretches around the block and hasn't moved significantly

0:46:29.719 --> 0:46:33.400
<v Speaker 1>for the last twenty minutes, then that creates this this

0:46:33.480 --> 0:46:36.360
<v Speaker 1>barrier to voting, And it is the opposite of that

0:46:36.400 --> 0:46:39.719
<v Speaker 1>accessibility we had been talking about. Sure, so okay, so

0:46:39.760 --> 0:46:42.719
<v Speaker 1>we want to replace these systems, but what kind of

0:46:42.760 --> 0:46:45.560
<v Speaker 1>technology would it be best to implement. Should we take

0:46:45.600 --> 0:46:48.200
<v Speaker 1>some off the shelf stuff that would be cheaper and

0:46:48.280 --> 0:46:52.880
<v Speaker 1>easier to set up and also easier to hack. Yeah,

0:46:53.320 --> 0:46:57.920
<v Speaker 1>let's just like put some MacBooks on the you know, oh,

0:46:58.000 --> 0:47:01.200
<v Speaker 1>here's my voting app. Right, And it's easy for us

0:47:01.239 --> 0:47:04.759
<v Speaker 1>also to to say, hey, you guys should replace those systems.

0:47:04.840 --> 0:47:08.800
<v Speaker 1>But that costs money. And then you get into the

0:47:08.880 --> 0:47:11.640
<v Speaker 1>argument of who pays for this? And this is I

0:47:11.680 --> 0:47:14.240
<v Speaker 1>bet you know I have a guest who pays for it?

0:47:14.560 --> 0:47:19.279
<v Speaker 1>Somebody else? Well, ultimately it's the taxpayers who pay for it, right,

0:47:19.440 --> 0:47:23.440
<v Speaker 1>ultimatelysdiction Right. The question is is it is it coming

0:47:23.520 --> 0:47:26.759
<v Speaker 1>from county budgets or state budgets those tend to in

0:47:26.760 --> 0:47:28.640
<v Speaker 1>the United States, that tends to be a pretty hotly

0:47:28.640 --> 0:47:32.799
<v Speaker 1>contested uh kind of argument about whether should it be

0:47:32.840 --> 0:47:35.800
<v Speaker 1>the local region that has to pay for those upgrades

0:47:36.080 --> 0:47:42.120
<v Speaker 1>or should it be a state budgetary concern and uh some.

0:47:42.840 --> 0:47:45.120
<v Speaker 1>In fact, the Atlantic report says that like some of

0:47:45.120 --> 0:47:47.960
<v Speaker 1>the problems here is that it seems like the various

0:47:48.000 --> 0:47:52.719
<v Speaker 1>parties are essentially waiting until something catastrophic happens in the

0:47:52.719 --> 0:47:55.719
<v Speaker 1>federal government steps in and says, all right, now we're

0:47:55.719 --> 0:47:58.799
<v Speaker 1>gonna have to pay for these upgrades. But that's not

0:47:58.880 --> 0:48:02.719
<v Speaker 1>a great stress to g right. Let's well, I'd like

0:48:02.840 --> 0:48:05.360
<v Speaker 1>to build up the levy a little more, but I

0:48:05.400 --> 0:48:06.880
<v Speaker 1>don't have the money for it. So we're just gonna

0:48:06.880 --> 0:48:09.839
<v Speaker 1>wait for a massive storm to come in wipe out

0:48:09.920 --> 0:48:13.360
<v Speaker 1>the levy. Lots of people are going to be harmed,

0:48:13.440 --> 0:48:15.759
<v Speaker 1>perhaps killed in the process, but afterward we'll have the

0:48:15.800 --> 0:48:18.080
<v Speaker 1>money to build up that levy again. Or we're going

0:48:18.120 --> 0:48:21.080
<v Speaker 1>to change public opinion with a John Bonham drum solo

0:48:22.960 --> 0:48:27.440
<v Speaker 1>also a possibility. So one of the other options we

0:48:27.520 --> 0:48:30.360
<v Speaker 1>have heard about in the past is the idea of

0:48:30.400 --> 0:48:35.279
<v Speaker 1>allowing people to vote over the internet. Genius there it is.

0:48:35.480 --> 0:48:37.279
<v Speaker 1>That's the I mean, I would love to be able

0:48:37.320 --> 0:48:40.080
<v Speaker 1>to vote online. I don't know if I'd feel very

0:48:40.080 --> 0:48:43.080
<v Speaker 1>good about it, but that would be great because the

0:48:43.160 --> 0:48:45.560
<v Speaker 1>last time I went to the polls, I went there

0:48:45.680 --> 0:48:48.040
<v Speaker 1>and I you know, I got there and they were like, oh,

0:48:48.120 --> 0:48:50.000
<v Speaker 1>you're not supposed to be here. You're supposed to be

0:48:50.040 --> 0:48:52.719
<v Speaker 1>at this other place back where your old address was.

0:48:52.840 --> 0:48:56.200
<v Speaker 1>And I was like, why aren't stirred here. I just

0:48:56.360 --> 0:48:59.439
<v Speaker 1>want I just want an approach like American Idol, were

0:48:59.480 --> 0:49:01.560
<v Speaker 1>two different phone numbers pop up and I just have

0:49:01.640 --> 0:49:04.279
<v Speaker 1>to call one of them. M M, That's what I want.

0:49:05.320 --> 0:49:08.080
<v Speaker 1>So the Internet, like you're you know, the idea of

0:49:08.120 --> 0:49:12.520
<v Speaker 1>having something really convenient and instantaneous and having this ability

0:49:12.600 --> 0:49:16.439
<v Speaker 1>to to see in real time what election results are going,

0:49:16.480 --> 0:49:19.000
<v Speaker 1>like who's in the lead and who's behind. That has

0:49:19.040 --> 0:49:21.480
<v Speaker 1>a certain uh, you know, charm to it, as certain

0:49:21.520 --> 0:49:25.080
<v Speaker 1>attractiveness to it. You could argue that this would open

0:49:25.160 --> 0:49:28.640
<v Speaker 1>up access to even more voters. It lowers that barrier

0:49:28.719 --> 0:49:32.120
<v Speaker 1>of participation even further for people who have access to

0:49:32.200 --> 0:49:35.040
<v Speaker 1>a computer. Anyway, that's still not that's non trivial, by

0:49:35.040 --> 0:49:37.799
<v Speaker 1>the way, like you know, that's that's still that's still

0:49:37.800 --> 0:49:40.719
<v Speaker 1>a huge assumption. But I mean, there are a lot

0:49:40.719 --> 0:49:44.560
<v Speaker 1>of people who probably are you know, they worry about

0:49:44.560 --> 0:49:46.400
<v Speaker 1>how can I get away from work? Right? You know,

0:49:46.480 --> 0:49:49.120
<v Speaker 1>they've got stuff to do there for I mean, technically

0:49:49.160 --> 0:49:51.319
<v Speaker 1>your boss is supposed to let you go vote, but

0:49:51.360 --> 0:49:54.160
<v Speaker 1>a lot but in practice that's not necessarily going to

0:49:54.239 --> 0:49:56.640
<v Speaker 1>be how it turns out like And it's not like

0:49:56.800 --> 0:50:00.560
<v Speaker 1>most of us are equipped to say, oh, well, I

0:50:00.560 --> 0:50:02.200
<v Speaker 1>was going to vote and then my boss said that

0:50:02.280 --> 0:50:04.319
<v Speaker 1>I had to come in and so now I'm going

0:50:04.360 --> 0:50:06.759
<v Speaker 1>to have a civil lawsuit that most of us can't do.

0:50:06.840 --> 0:50:10.440
<v Speaker 1>That it's not something that we it's not it's not

0:50:10.480 --> 0:50:15.319
<v Speaker 1>a realistic approach. So yeah, so that could make it

0:50:15.360 --> 0:50:17.560
<v Speaker 1>easier in those cases. You can just go to work

0:50:17.719 --> 0:50:20.000
<v Speaker 1>still and then if you get you get a ten

0:50:20.040 --> 0:50:24.040
<v Speaker 1>minute break, go vote on your break. Yeah. In fact,

0:50:24.080 --> 0:50:28.319
<v Speaker 1>that this might end up increasing voter participation, which is

0:50:28.719 --> 0:50:31.719
<v Speaker 1>something of a weird topic here in the United States too.

0:50:31.719 --> 0:50:33.680
<v Speaker 1>You may have heard that in the US that voter

0:50:33.760 --> 0:50:37.560
<v Speaker 1>participation is particularly low. The Pew Research Center found that

0:50:37.640 --> 0:50:42.920
<v Speaker 1>voting participation in the US was that um only seventy

0:50:42.920 --> 0:50:45.240
<v Speaker 1>one percent of the United States citizens who are eligible

0:50:45.280 --> 0:50:48.880
<v Speaker 1>to vote were even registered. It's been decreasing for fifty

0:50:48.960 --> 0:50:52.160
<v Speaker 1>years running. I actually saw some figures earlier today that

0:50:52.239 --> 0:50:54.960
<v Speaker 1>if true. They say that more than half of eligible

0:50:55.000 --> 0:50:59.520
<v Speaker 1>eighteen to twenty four year olds are unregistered. Yeah, so

0:51:00.160 --> 0:51:03.319
<v Speaker 1>that's so young people especially don't even get registered. That's

0:51:03.360 --> 0:51:08.759
<v Speaker 1>even that's just registering, not that's so that you can vote. Right. Uh. Yeah,

0:51:08.800 --> 0:51:11.240
<v Speaker 1>so we're we're seeing that the participation on that side

0:51:11.320 --> 0:51:14.760
<v Speaker 1>is pretty low. But to be fair, to be perfectly fair,

0:51:15.160 --> 0:51:19.279
<v Speaker 1>some countries that have incredibly high percentages, it's compulsory, like

0:51:19.360 --> 0:51:22.520
<v Speaker 1>you have no choice in it um and and some

0:51:22.520 --> 0:51:25.120
<v Speaker 1>some of them you have no choice but to vote

0:51:25.200 --> 0:51:28.240
<v Speaker 1>as well, like you are you are compelled to vote.

0:51:28.560 --> 0:51:31.120
<v Speaker 1>So it all depends upon the systems you look at.

0:51:31.160 --> 0:51:33.439
<v Speaker 1>It's not we can't just assume that all of them

0:51:33.480 --> 0:51:36.839
<v Speaker 1>are equivalent to the approach the United States takes. Um.

0:51:36.880 --> 0:51:38.759
<v Speaker 1>It would be a very different story if in the

0:51:38.880 --> 0:51:41.719
<v Speaker 1>US you not only had to register to vote, but

0:51:41.760 --> 0:51:44.239
<v Speaker 1>you had to vote in every election, and then you

0:51:44.400 --> 0:51:47.359
<v Speaker 1>see the numbers go up if you had like real

0:51:47.480 --> 0:51:51.000
<v Speaker 1>consequences that could happen to you if you did not participate.

0:51:51.440 --> 0:51:55.200
<v Speaker 1>So yeah, that's important to keep in mind too. Uh

0:51:55.640 --> 0:51:58.080
<v Speaker 1>So there's some people say, yes, we should have internet voting.

0:51:58.080 --> 0:51:59.919
<v Speaker 1>It would it would mean that more people would partic

0:52:00.000 --> 0:52:03.799
<v Speaker 1>sipate in the system, that the whomever is voted or

0:52:03.840 --> 0:52:08.600
<v Speaker 1>whatever measures are past would accurately reflect the majority the

0:52:09.000 --> 0:52:12.920
<v Speaker 1>desire of the largest number of people within the population

0:52:13.040 --> 0:52:15.560
<v Speaker 1>who are eligible to vote, and that that would be

0:52:15.600 --> 0:52:19.279
<v Speaker 1>more fair. So it would be super fast, to be

0:52:19.320 --> 0:52:21.799
<v Speaker 1>super easy to tell you those votes why not go

0:52:21.920 --> 0:52:25.839
<v Speaker 1>that way? Well, one would be you remember those old

0:52:26.239 --> 0:52:29.600
<v Speaker 1>rock the Vote things the future that could be replaced

0:52:29.640 --> 0:52:32.279
<v Speaker 1>with hack the Vote. You're killing me that you're calling

0:52:32.280 --> 0:52:35.400
<v Speaker 1>it the old rock the Vote things that was a

0:52:35.480 --> 0:52:38.320
<v Speaker 1>voting age when those were up. Come on hack the

0:52:38.400 --> 0:52:41.239
<v Speaker 1>Vote that that is what you you'd have people like

0:52:41.360 --> 0:52:45.640
<v Speaker 1>organizing conferences for fun just to try to do things. Absolutely. Yeah,

0:52:45.880 --> 0:52:50.640
<v Speaker 1>communication over the internet is is pretty much insecure. That's

0:52:50.640 --> 0:52:54.080
<v Speaker 1>like excluding the people who would have organized nefarious campaigns

0:52:54.080 --> 0:52:56.879
<v Speaker 1>trying to sway the election. Right there's there's already been

0:52:57.239 --> 0:53:00.560
<v Speaker 1>a published paper that contains a no own hack for

0:53:00.600 --> 0:53:03.920
<v Speaker 1>attacking home WiFi routers in order to tamper with PDF

0:53:03.920 --> 0:53:07.320
<v Speaker 1>ballots on the way from a voter back to the precinct. Yeah,

0:53:07.440 --> 0:53:09.520
<v Speaker 1>so that is a thing that exists on the Internet

0:53:09.640 --> 0:53:12.319
<v Speaker 1>right now, and that's that's that's before you actually see

0:53:12.360 --> 0:53:15.520
<v Speaker 1>a rollout to a larger population. Like even if you're

0:53:15.560 --> 0:53:19.200
<v Speaker 1>just doing a little pilot program where you're testing it out, uh,

0:53:19.239 --> 0:53:23.640
<v Speaker 1>you you would have hackers target that. A general rule

0:53:23.680 --> 0:53:28.040
<v Speaker 1>of thumb is the the shinier the target, the more

0:53:28.080 --> 0:53:30.040
<v Speaker 1>hackers are going to want to attack it. And nothing

0:53:30.120 --> 0:53:34.520
<v Speaker 1>really gets shinier than the elections of a nation um,

0:53:34.560 --> 0:53:37.960
<v Speaker 1>and you could see all sorts of ways to disrupt

0:53:38.040 --> 0:53:40.800
<v Speaker 1>an election, from something as simple as a di DOS attack,

0:53:40.880 --> 0:53:44.640
<v Speaker 1>that the distributed denial of service attacks, so that that

0:53:44.719 --> 0:53:47.960
<v Speaker 1>the actual servers that are accepting votes and allowing you

0:53:48.000 --> 0:53:52.720
<v Speaker 1>to vote are down, thus you cannot even participate. There's

0:53:52.760 --> 0:53:56.720
<v Speaker 1>that approach to perhaps infecting computers and having them vote

0:53:57.280 --> 0:54:02.000
<v Speaker 1>via a bot net to sway results or to deny

0:54:02.120 --> 0:54:04.880
<v Speaker 1>people their actual chance to vote. There are a lot

0:54:04.920 --> 0:54:06.680
<v Speaker 1>of ways that they could block a vote so that

0:54:06.719 --> 0:54:09.359
<v Speaker 1>it looks like you've cast your vote but nothing has

0:54:09.360 --> 0:54:13.880
<v Speaker 1>actually happened, or they could make changes to results. I mean,

0:54:13.880 --> 0:54:19.040
<v Speaker 1>there's so many different avenues to attack that making sure

0:54:19.080 --> 0:54:22.920
<v Speaker 1>all of them are secure would be a massive undertaking,

0:54:23.520 --> 0:54:27.919
<v Speaker 1>one that some security experts say is, for for all

0:54:28.000 --> 0:54:31.480
<v Speaker 1>reality's sake, impossible, Like it's just not it's not within

0:54:31.520 --> 0:54:36.440
<v Speaker 1>our capability of producing that. Uh. Obviously, if you were

0:54:36.440 --> 0:54:40.480
<v Speaker 1>to create that system, it would have a huge target

0:54:40.600 --> 0:54:43.200
<v Speaker 1>where hackers would have this enormous incentive to try and

0:54:43.239 --> 0:54:47.320
<v Speaker 1>find vulnerabilities, and it's highly unlikely we will ever produce

0:54:47.719 --> 0:54:50.480
<v Speaker 1>a system with no vulnerabilities, So it would be a

0:54:50.560 --> 0:54:55.360
<v Speaker 1>very high stakes game. Ah, so you also have problems

0:54:55.400 --> 0:54:58.279
<v Speaker 1>with transparency. How could you be sure that such a

0:54:58.640 --> 0:55:01.719
<v Speaker 1>system and internet voting syce him is accurately reflecting what

0:55:01.920 --> 0:55:05.120
<v Speaker 1>is really happening on the voter side of this right

0:55:05.200 --> 0:55:08.839
<v Speaker 1>right back to the back to the it's digital. How

0:55:08.840 --> 0:55:11.560
<v Speaker 1>do we tell exactly? Yeah, unless you're unless you're able

0:55:11.719 --> 0:55:15.360
<v Speaker 1>as a voter to say, I have cast a vote,

0:55:15.760 --> 0:55:20.000
<v Speaker 1>I see that the vote recorded is in fact reflective

0:55:20.160 --> 0:55:22.600
<v Speaker 1>of my choice, and I can see that it has

0:55:22.640 --> 0:55:25.800
<v Speaker 1>been included in the overall votes, and I can see

0:55:26.120 --> 0:55:29.520
<v Speaker 1>that in the final results, my vote is among them.

0:55:29.680 --> 0:55:34.000
<v Speaker 1>Unless you have that assurance somehow, this is a very

0:55:34.080 --> 0:55:36.520
<v Speaker 1>difficult approach. Now. Granted, you could argue you don't have

0:55:36.560 --> 0:55:40.600
<v Speaker 1>that assurance with other methods of voting either, But you

0:55:40.880 --> 0:55:45.400
<v Speaker 1>could build that into an electronic system if it weren't

0:55:45.400 --> 0:55:47.360
<v Speaker 1>for the fact that you still have the security issues

0:55:47.400 --> 0:55:52.239
<v Speaker 1>that don't magically go away. Right. Um, So, yeah, this

0:55:52.320 --> 0:55:55.359
<v Speaker 1>is something that a lot of people have pushed for,

0:55:55.400 --> 0:55:58.000
<v Speaker 1>a lot of countries have pushed for at least experimenting

0:55:58.040 --> 0:56:03.759
<v Speaker 1>with internet voting. But almost every computer security authority I

0:56:03.800 --> 0:56:10.000
<v Speaker 1>could find said this is not a practical idea. It

0:56:10.160 --> 0:56:13.160
<v Speaker 1>is at best misguided and at worst it would be catastrophic.

0:56:13.880 --> 0:56:19.080
<v Speaker 1>So uh, yikes, Um, what about other ways? What if?

0:56:20.400 --> 0:56:22.920
<v Speaker 1>Well if what let's go back to my smartphone. So

0:56:23.000 --> 0:56:24.920
<v Speaker 1>let's say all right, so let's say the calling the

0:56:24.960 --> 0:56:28.640
<v Speaker 1>American idle number doesn't work. What about something else? Well? Yeah,

0:56:28.640 --> 0:56:32.000
<v Speaker 1>other other methods have been proposed for for coming a

0:56:32.040 --> 0:56:35.759
<v Speaker 1>little bit halfway towards towards getting getting more accessibility for

0:56:35.800 --> 0:56:37.960
<v Speaker 1>people to vote, making it a little bit easier, like

0:56:37.800 --> 0:56:40.200
<v Speaker 1>a like a system where people could could download an

0:56:40.200 --> 0:56:43.839
<v Speaker 1>app on their phone precomplete a ballot, um maybe even

0:56:43.880 --> 0:56:48.320
<v Speaker 1>scan in QR codes from campaign posters if they so chose, um,

0:56:48.400 --> 0:56:50.239
<v Speaker 1>and then when you go to the polls, you just

0:56:50.320 --> 0:56:53.520
<v Speaker 1>upload it or even video conference yourself in to a

0:56:53.600 --> 0:56:56.800
<v Speaker 1>polling official and you know, for for like military personnel

0:56:56.840 --> 0:56:59.960
<v Speaker 1>overseas or sure and uh and and so that up

0:57:00.040 --> 0:57:03.040
<v Speaker 1>and could make it easier for for not just people

0:57:03.239 --> 0:57:06.560
<v Speaker 1>who are are incapable for whatever reason that day of

0:57:06.600 --> 0:57:08.640
<v Speaker 1>getting out to the polls, but but also for for

0:57:08.719 --> 0:57:12.359
<v Speaker 1>voters with disabilities with with audio or visual disabilities, who

0:57:12.480 --> 0:57:16.080
<v Speaker 1>who need a better way to to access that information. Yeah.

0:57:16.160 --> 0:57:20.680
<v Speaker 1>But of course, if you're main concern is increasing voter

0:57:20.840 --> 0:57:24.960
<v Speaker 1>turnout or at least accessibility. I think there are arguments

0:57:25.000 --> 0:57:28.120
<v Speaker 1>that there are other ways to increase voter turnout and

0:57:28.160 --> 0:57:31.960
<v Speaker 1>accessibility that wouldn't compromise security in the same ways, and

0:57:32.000 --> 0:57:34.680
<v Speaker 1>maybe it would be better to try those first. So,

0:57:35.200 --> 0:57:37.600
<v Speaker 1>for example, we might have mentioned this earlier, I think,

0:57:37.600 --> 0:57:41.120
<v Speaker 1>But one is making voting day of federal holiday. This

0:57:41.200 --> 0:57:44.720
<v Speaker 1>is a pretty standard proposal. Um, you know it's not

0:57:44.800 --> 0:57:50.080
<v Speaker 1>so we hold federal elections on Tuesdays in November. Why

0:57:50.080 --> 0:57:53.400
<v Speaker 1>do we do that? As we have for a minute, Yeah,

0:57:53.520 --> 0:57:55.880
<v Speaker 1>so we do that, and I love most people as

0:57:55.880 --> 0:57:58.360
<v Speaker 1>we always did it that way. That's not a reason

0:57:58.680 --> 0:58:02.160
<v Speaker 1>most people have to go to work. Work your boss.

0:58:02.160 --> 0:58:05.520
<v Speaker 1>Your boss is supposed to say it's okay for you

0:58:05.600 --> 0:58:08.840
<v Speaker 1>to leave work to vote. But you know, bosses are

0:58:08.880 --> 0:58:10.920
<v Speaker 1>supposed to do a lot of things. It doesn't always

0:58:10.960 --> 0:58:13.920
<v Speaker 1>work that way in the real world, right. Um, So

0:58:13.960 --> 0:58:16.480
<v Speaker 1>if you simply made the day on which the elections

0:58:16.480 --> 0:58:19.960
<v Speaker 1>occur a federal holiday in which nobody is supposed to

0:58:20.040 --> 0:58:23.720
<v Speaker 1>be going to work, then then that that should increase

0:58:23.800 --> 0:58:26.080
<v Speaker 1>voter turnout. It should make it easier. And this has

0:58:26.120 --> 0:58:28.160
<v Speaker 1>been advocated by a lot of people, among them Bernie

0:58:28.200 --> 0:58:31.840
<v Speaker 1>Sanders you know, Vermont senator and recent US presidential candidate,

0:58:32.640 --> 0:58:37.000
<v Speaker 1>but also universal automatic voter registration. This is a big

0:58:37.000 --> 0:58:43.200
<v Speaker 1>one because one obstacle to voting is the registration block.

0:58:43.520 --> 0:58:46.520
<v Speaker 1>So you can't just show up at the polls and say, hey,

0:58:46.560 --> 0:58:49.439
<v Speaker 1>I'm over eighteen and I'm not a felon time to vote. Yeah,

0:58:50.320 --> 0:58:53.040
<v Speaker 1>here's my ide, but yeah, you have to be registered,

0:58:53.040 --> 0:58:54.640
<v Speaker 1>and you have to be registered a certain period of

0:58:54.680 --> 0:58:57.000
<v Speaker 1>time before the elections. Yeah. And so an easy way

0:58:57.040 --> 0:58:59.160
<v Speaker 1>around this would be to say, well, why don't we

0:58:59.200 --> 0:59:03.240
<v Speaker 1>just have some some system that automatically registers everybody who's

0:59:03.280 --> 0:59:05.960
<v Speaker 1>eligible to vote. I don't understand why why don't we

0:59:06.000 --> 0:59:09.320
<v Speaker 1>do that? And that actually is not only proposed, it's

0:59:09.320 --> 0:59:12.600
<v Speaker 1>approved in five U s States as of last month.

0:59:13.120 --> 0:59:15.680
<v Speaker 1>So according to the Brennan Center at the n y

0:59:15.800 --> 0:59:18.920
<v Speaker 1>U School of Law, quote, eligible citizens who interact with

0:59:19.040 --> 0:59:24.000
<v Speaker 1>government agencies are registered to vote unless they decline, and

0:59:24.200 --> 0:59:29.440
<v Speaker 1>agencies transfer voter registration information electronically to election officials. So

0:59:29.480 --> 0:59:33.200
<v Speaker 1>this means you interact with any agency of state government

0:59:33.760 --> 0:59:36.160
<v Speaker 1>or federal government. I guess you, uh, you go to

0:59:36.200 --> 0:59:38.120
<v Speaker 1>the d m V or you do whatever. You know,

0:59:38.160 --> 0:59:41.080
<v Speaker 1>you interact with the government Uh, they know who you are,

0:59:41.160 --> 0:59:43.040
<v Speaker 1>and they say, Okay, by the way, I see that

0:59:43.080 --> 0:59:46.040
<v Speaker 1>you're over eighteen, and you're not a felon. You're registered

0:59:46.040 --> 0:59:49.080
<v Speaker 1>to vote unless you unless you say I don't want

0:59:49.080 --> 0:59:53.080
<v Speaker 1>to be right. That seems like an to me. That

0:59:53.120 --> 0:59:56.280
<v Speaker 1>seems like a fair way of going about it, especially

0:59:56.280 --> 1:00:00.800
<v Speaker 1>to remove that that barrier of entry where people who

1:00:00.800 --> 1:00:05.600
<v Speaker 1>are either unaware of the process of registering to vote,

1:00:05.680 --> 1:00:10.160
<v Speaker 1>or it's not built into a way that's easy for

1:00:10.200 --> 1:00:12.680
<v Speaker 1>them to get to or do or whatever, that the

1:00:12.680 --> 1:00:15.080
<v Speaker 1>barrier is just too high for them to go past

1:00:15.120 --> 1:00:18.440
<v Speaker 1>it for whatever personal reason there may be. To remove

1:00:18.560 --> 1:00:20.800
<v Speaker 1>that or as much of that as possible, I think

1:00:20.920 --> 1:00:23.440
<v Speaker 1>is that's that's a decent thing to do, doesn't It

1:00:23.480 --> 1:00:25.720
<v Speaker 1>doesn't even mean that that person has to vote. It

1:00:25.800 --> 1:00:28.200
<v Speaker 1>just means that they're registered. Right. Well, you know, sometimes

1:00:28.240 --> 1:00:30.880
<v Speaker 1>I think I hear people making an argument like, oh,

1:00:30.960 --> 1:00:32.800
<v Speaker 1>you know, how how easy does it have to be?

1:00:32.840 --> 1:00:34.880
<v Speaker 1>It's not that hard to get registered to vote, but

1:00:34.920 --> 1:00:38.040
<v Speaker 1>shouldn't be too easy. I mean, think think about your life.

1:00:38.080 --> 1:00:40.920
<v Speaker 1>You you people have a lot of things going on. Yeah,

1:00:40.960 --> 1:00:42.600
<v Speaker 1>they have a lot of things to do. They might

1:00:42.680 --> 1:00:45.680
<v Speaker 1>care a lot about politics, but they're also working very hard.

1:00:45.720 --> 1:00:48.640
<v Speaker 1>They're taking their kids, you know. Well, and let's let's

1:00:48.760 --> 1:00:52.280
<v Speaker 1>let's take I'll take myself as an example, because I

1:00:52.280 --> 1:00:55.960
<v Speaker 1>I come from an extremely privileged kind of background in

1:00:56.040 --> 1:00:59.560
<v Speaker 1>that regard, and yet even I would have a certain barrier.

1:01:00.160 --> 1:01:03.880
<v Speaker 1>Uh you know, I don't I don't drive, for instance, right,

1:01:03.960 --> 1:01:06.360
<v Speaker 1>so I don't get a driver's license. I do have

1:01:06.600 --> 1:01:09.160
<v Speaker 1>an I D because I need one for lots of

1:01:09.160 --> 1:01:12.160
<v Speaker 1>different reasons. So going to get an I D though,

1:01:12.240 --> 1:01:16.240
<v Speaker 1>that's a that's a pretty that's that's a lot of

1:01:16.280 --> 1:01:18.520
<v Speaker 1>work for me to get there. I mean that's before

1:01:18.520 --> 1:01:20.480
<v Speaker 1>I even get into the point where you enter the

1:01:20.560 --> 1:01:22.560
<v Speaker 1>d m V and you have, you know, the the

1:01:22.600 --> 1:01:25.760
<v Speaker 1>whole U Labrinthian line system that you have to go through,

1:01:25.800 --> 1:01:28.560
<v Speaker 1>and the waiting times and everything before you even get

1:01:28.600 --> 1:01:31.240
<v Speaker 1>to that. It's hard for me to get to the

1:01:31.280 --> 1:01:33.560
<v Speaker 1>place where I'm going to get my I D H

1:01:33.680 --> 1:01:35.800
<v Speaker 1>if it if it weren't for the fact that voter

1:01:35.880 --> 1:01:38.840
<v Speaker 1>registration is just immediately lumped into that too, like I

1:01:38.880 --> 1:01:40.840
<v Speaker 1>can just register to vote as I get my I D.

1:01:41.280 --> 1:01:43.720
<v Speaker 1>If I had to do something similar to that, I

1:01:43.720 --> 1:01:45.360
<v Speaker 1>could see it being one of those things where I've

1:01:45.400 --> 1:01:47.800
<v Speaker 1>got to really, I've got to really be like dude,

1:01:47.600 --> 1:01:51.520
<v Speaker 1>I it's my responsibility as a citizen to participate in this.

1:01:51.560 --> 1:01:54.240
<v Speaker 1>I've got to push myself. But it would be pushing myself,

1:01:54.280 --> 1:01:57.200
<v Speaker 1>it would not It would not be just so simple. Uh,

1:01:57.400 --> 1:02:00.600
<v Speaker 1>same thing for participating in the voting process. In my case,

1:02:01.880 --> 1:02:06.640
<v Speaker 1>very very fortunate in this sense, the polling place that

1:02:06.720 --> 1:02:10.640
<v Speaker 1>I have to report to happens to be the walking

1:02:10.720 --> 1:02:14.280
<v Speaker 1>route on the walking route to work. If it weren't,

1:02:15.120 --> 1:02:18.080
<v Speaker 1>imagine a work day where I have to walk the

1:02:18.160 --> 1:02:22.600
<v Speaker 1>opposite direction, I'm already walking three miles to get to work. Um,

1:02:22.640 --> 1:02:25.680
<v Speaker 1>it would be uh more of a hardship. And I

1:02:25.720 --> 1:02:29.640
<v Speaker 1>realize I am lucky in that sense. There are thousands

1:02:29.680 --> 1:02:32.800
<v Speaker 1>of people out there who the situation I am in

1:02:33.080 --> 1:02:36.680
<v Speaker 1>would seem like a dream to them. Yeah, at the

1:02:36.760 --> 1:02:39.200
<v Speaker 1>very least you could call an uber or whatever if

1:02:39.240 --> 1:02:42.080
<v Speaker 1>he really needed to. Not Not everyone is is in

1:02:42.200 --> 1:02:45.800
<v Speaker 1>that is an that position, right. So again, like you know,

1:02:46.520 --> 1:02:50.200
<v Speaker 1>making the argument of well, how difficult can it be

1:02:50.760 --> 1:02:54.280
<v Speaker 1>often comes from such a position of well, yeah, in

1:02:54.320 --> 1:02:57.240
<v Speaker 1>your situation, it may not be that big of a barrier.

1:02:57.600 --> 1:03:01.280
<v Speaker 1>But not everyone is in your situation. But everyone who

1:03:01.360 --> 1:03:05.720
<v Speaker 1>is eligible to vote should still be capable of going

1:03:05.760 --> 1:03:08.160
<v Speaker 1>through that process. And I guess we should say, you know,

1:03:08.560 --> 1:03:10.760
<v Speaker 1>for all the things we've just been talking about, they

1:03:10.800 --> 1:03:14.080
<v Speaker 1>do simply assume that increasing voter turnout is a goal

1:03:14.120 --> 1:03:16.840
<v Speaker 1>we want to achieve. Now, personally, I'm fairly convinced that's

1:03:16.880 --> 1:03:19.920
<v Speaker 1>a good thing, But I guess somebody can make the

1:03:20.000 --> 1:03:23.200
<v Speaker 1>argument that as long as everyone has the opportunity to vote,

1:03:23.760 --> 1:03:26.280
<v Speaker 1>we shouldn't bother enacting measures to try to pump up

1:03:26.320 --> 1:03:28.680
<v Speaker 1>the turnout. You know, maybe some people just don't care.

1:03:29.880 --> 1:03:31.880
<v Speaker 1>You know, maybe I think it's kind of a weak

1:03:32.000 --> 1:03:35.560
<v Speaker 1>argument against making it easier to vote, because many people

1:03:35.680 --> 1:03:38.120
<v Speaker 1>may feel they want to vote, but they're unable to

1:03:38.200 --> 1:03:40.919
<v Speaker 1>because of other pressures on their time or something like that.

1:03:41.280 --> 1:03:44.120
<v Speaker 1>But as for people who genuinely don't care, I guess

1:03:44.280 --> 1:03:46.320
<v Speaker 1>that you genuinely don't care, I don't see a good

1:03:46.320 --> 1:03:48.600
<v Speaker 1>reason to try to pressure you to vote, right, I

1:03:49.120 --> 1:03:52.760
<v Speaker 1>think the registering thing makes sense. I think compulsory voting

1:03:52.800 --> 1:03:58.080
<v Speaker 1>doesn't make sense personally, personally compulsory not so much compulsory,

1:03:58.120 --> 1:04:02.280
<v Speaker 1>but automatic registration. I'm in favor of compulsory voting, not

1:04:02.400 --> 1:04:06.040
<v Speaker 1>so much. If you don't care, you should at least

1:04:06.240 --> 1:04:09.400
<v Speaker 1>not if you haven't formed an educated opinion and don't

1:04:10.680 --> 1:04:13.200
<v Speaker 1>bothered to read anything. You know, are we really that

1:04:13.320 --> 1:04:16.560
<v Speaker 1>eager to get you involved? I'm not. I'm not so

1:04:16.640 --> 1:04:18.800
<v Speaker 1>worried about so much worried about that. But I'm you know,

1:04:18.880 --> 1:04:23.160
<v Speaker 1>someone who someone who for whatever reason doesn't feel like

1:04:23.240 --> 1:04:28.080
<v Speaker 1>they want to participate in that particular uh voting process.

1:04:28.160 --> 1:04:30.600
<v Speaker 1>I totally get it, and they should not be forced

1:04:30.600 --> 1:04:32.960
<v Speaker 1>to do so. Well, that's another thing for somebody, whether

1:04:33.040 --> 1:04:34.920
<v Speaker 1>or not you agree with the wisdom of this. For

1:04:34.960 --> 1:04:38.400
<v Speaker 1>some people also, they regard not voting as a legitimate

1:04:38.440 --> 1:04:42.760
<v Speaker 1>form of protests. So absolutely, yeah, as you were saying,

1:04:42.800 --> 1:04:45.600
<v Speaker 1>like the people who argue against making voting easier, and

1:04:46.000 --> 1:04:49.520
<v Speaker 1>I was reminded of the The Bit and Hitchhiker's Guide

1:04:49.560 --> 1:04:52.919
<v Speaker 1>to the Galaxy of where the city plans for Arthur

1:04:52.960 --> 1:04:55.760
<v Speaker 1>Dense's house was being demolished, like it was in a

1:04:56.000 --> 1:04:58.880
<v Speaker 1>basement in a disused lavatory that had a sign on

1:04:58.920 --> 1:05:03.760
<v Speaker 1>it saying beware of the leopard. Right, like to some

1:05:03.840 --> 1:05:06.520
<v Speaker 1>people the process they have to go through to either

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<v Speaker 1>register or to vote is while not that exact thing,

1:05:11.920 --> 1:05:15.480
<v Speaker 1>at least you could empathize with that passage right, and

1:05:15.520 --> 1:05:18.240
<v Speaker 1>we don't. I think that's the bad way to go personally.

1:05:18.400 --> 1:05:22.160
<v Speaker 1>That's my personal opinion. Um, this was a really interesting

1:05:22.200 --> 1:05:24.120
<v Speaker 1>topic and like we said, you know, this just covered

1:05:24.160 --> 1:05:28.720
<v Speaker 1>the voting aspect, uh and what is the future of voting.

1:05:28.760 --> 1:05:33.400
<v Speaker 1>I imagine we're going to see some other uh probably

1:05:33.520 --> 1:05:36.480
<v Speaker 1>other groups dip their toe into the idea of internet voting.

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<v Speaker 1>I hope to a level that is done responsibly and

1:05:42.760 --> 1:05:47.800
<v Speaker 1>with the guidance from real computer security personnel. I don't

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<v Speaker 1>expect that to become widely adopted because of the vulnerabilities

1:05:51.200 --> 1:05:54.000
<v Speaker 1>we've already mentioned. You know, if we do, I suspect

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<v Speaker 1>there will be extreme prank voting hacks that will, like

1:05:58.840 --> 1:06:02.640
<v Speaker 1>for example, Kang and photos will actually win elections. It

1:06:02.640 --> 1:06:05.360
<v Speaker 1>would it would be really odd. It would mean it

1:06:05.360 --> 1:06:08.760
<v Speaker 1>would mean that it would mean an unprecedented approach, right

1:06:08.800 --> 1:06:11.400
<v Speaker 1>like the point where a government would have to say

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<v Speaker 1>the results of this election are not valid because that's

1:06:15.640 --> 1:06:18.960
<v Speaker 1>a cartoon character. We got to totally do a do over. Guys.

1:06:19.080 --> 1:06:21.800
<v Speaker 1>It's like, think about any time you've ever seen a

1:06:22.280 --> 1:06:25.720
<v Speaker 1>corporate identity or brand try to do a voting campaign

1:06:25.800 --> 1:06:30.120
<v Speaker 1>on social media or something. Every single time, what happens,

1:06:30.160 --> 1:06:33.360
<v Speaker 1>it gets hijacked by people trying to make fun of it. Yeah,

1:06:33.360 --> 1:06:35.040
<v Speaker 1>as soon as you I mean, we've talked about this

1:06:35.080 --> 1:06:37.560
<v Speaker 1>before to right, Like, as soon as you create a system,

1:06:37.600 --> 1:06:39.200
<v Speaker 1>people want to see how far you can push the

1:06:39.240 --> 1:06:41.960
<v Speaker 1>system before it breaks. And when you're talking about something

1:06:42.200 --> 1:06:46.200
<v Speaker 1>this big and this this important, that has lots of

1:06:46.200 --> 1:06:48.960
<v Speaker 1>different implications, not just on the voting side, but the

1:06:48.960 --> 1:06:51.920
<v Speaker 1>privacy side, the security side. If you let me generate

1:06:51.960 --> 1:06:53.880
<v Speaker 1>my own Coca Cola ads, I'm going to try to

1:06:53.920 --> 1:06:56.600
<v Speaker 1>find a way to make one about demons. It's I mean,

1:06:56.760 --> 1:06:59.280
<v Speaker 1>that's just who Joe is. Alright, guys. Well, that wraps

1:06:59.320 --> 1:07:03.280
<v Speaker 1>up this discussion about voting. Uh. I am curious to

1:07:03.320 --> 1:07:06.160
<v Speaker 1>see how this continues for I mean, obviously because it

1:07:06.200 --> 1:07:08.640
<v Speaker 1>has such a huge impact on millions of people and

1:07:08.640 --> 1:07:11.480
<v Speaker 1>and uh, not just obviously in the United States but

1:07:11.520 --> 1:07:14.680
<v Speaker 1>around the world. Uh. If you guys have suggestions for

1:07:14.760 --> 1:07:17.280
<v Speaker 1>future episodes of Forward Thinking, you get an idea for

1:07:17.320 --> 1:07:19.680
<v Speaker 1>a topic that you would like us to cover, please

1:07:19.760 --> 1:07:23.080
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1:07:23.160 --> 1:07:26.800
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1:07:26.800 --> 1:07:30.520
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1:07:30.560 --> 1:07:32.840
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1:07:32.880 --> 1:07:34.880
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1:07:35.320 --> 1:07:43.800
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1:07:43.880 --> 1:07:46.680
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1:07:46.720 --> 1:08:00.360
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