1
00:00:00,440 --> 00:00:04,600
Speaker 1: We had Congressman Mike Waltz on the show recently from Florida,

2
00:00:04,640 --> 00:00:07,960
Speaker 1: and he raised some important questions about Thomas Matthew Crooks,

3
00:00:08,320 --> 00:00:11,120
Speaker 1: the guy who attempted to assassinate Donald Trump. He raised

4
00:00:11,200 --> 00:00:14,240
Speaker 1: questions like why would Thomas Crooks hav ingencrypted accounts in

5
00:00:14,280 --> 00:00:17,680
Speaker 1: three different countries, also asking about, you know, how did

6
00:00:17,680 --> 00:00:21,160
Speaker 1: he learn how to build these IEDs with remote detonators,

7
00:00:21,239 --> 00:00:23,959
Speaker 1: three of which were built and ready to go. He

8
00:00:24,079 --> 00:00:27,320
Speaker 1: raised the point that it's almost as if Crooks's online

9
00:00:27,360 --> 00:00:30,880
Speaker 1: presence was sterilized on purpose. So we're going to get

10
00:00:30,920 --> 00:00:33,120
Speaker 1: to the bottom of that today and ask someone with

11
00:00:33,520 --> 00:00:36,919
Speaker 1: background in that arena. We're also going to ask her

12
00:00:37,120 --> 00:00:39,960
Speaker 1: about recent reports a group of hackers linked to the

13
00:00:40,040 --> 00:00:44,120
Speaker 1: Chinese government we're able to target US internet service providers.

14
00:00:44,200 --> 00:00:47,600
Speaker 1: We all remember recently AT and T notifying millions of

15
00:00:47,640 --> 00:00:48,720
Speaker 1: customers that their.

16
00:00:48,600 --> 00:00:49,959
Speaker 2: Data was likely stolen.

17
00:00:50,720 --> 00:00:53,240
Speaker 1: So what kind of cyber attacks can we expect in

18
00:00:53,280 --> 00:00:55,840
Speaker 1: the future, what does that look like. Finally, we'll get

19
00:00:55,840 --> 00:00:58,880
Speaker 1: to a big one with Mark Zuckerberg and this bombshell

20
00:00:59,080 --> 00:01:02,080
Speaker 1: that he just made this letter to Chairman Jim Jordan,

21
00:01:02,480 --> 00:01:06,319
Speaker 1: admitting three things. According to the Judiciary Committee one Biden

22
00:01:06,360 --> 00:01:10,880
Speaker 1: Harris administration pressured Facebook to censor Americans, two that Facebook

23
00:01:10,920 --> 00:01:14,440
Speaker 1: censored Americans, and three that Facebook throttled the Hunter Biden

24
00:01:14,520 --> 00:01:18,280
Speaker 1: laptop story. We'll get into a court case regarding TikTok

25
00:01:18,280 --> 00:01:20,360
Speaker 1: at what it means for section two thirty. So a

26
00:01:20,400 --> 00:01:25,080
Speaker 1: lot of wonkey data, cyber stuff, and who better to

27
00:01:25,120 --> 00:01:27,880
Speaker 1: have on the show than my friend Kara Frederick. She

28
00:01:28,160 --> 00:01:30,959
Speaker 1: is the director of Tech Policy at the Heritage Foundation.

29
00:01:31,080 --> 00:01:35,160
Speaker 1: She also has a long background and all of this stuff.

30
00:01:35,760 --> 00:01:40,800
Speaker 1: Team lead for Facebook Headquarters Regional Intelligence team for Facebook.

31
00:01:41,440 --> 00:01:44,679
Speaker 1: She was a senior intelligence analyst for the US Naval

32
00:01:44,800 --> 00:01:49,080
Speaker 1: Special Warfare Command. She spent six years as counterintelligence analysts

33
00:01:49,080 --> 00:01:52,360
Speaker 1: at the Department of Defense, deployed Afghanistan three times. So

34
00:01:52,440 --> 00:01:55,000
Speaker 1: she's done a bunch of different things in all these arenas.

35
00:01:55,160 --> 00:01:56,720
Speaker 1: So we're going to get to the bottom of all

36
00:01:56,760 --> 00:01:59,400
Speaker 1: of this with her. So stay tuned for my friend

37
00:01:59,480 --> 00:02:08,320
Speaker 1: care Frederick. Cara Frederick, it's great to have you on

38
00:02:08,320 --> 00:02:11,240
Speaker 1: the show. I always love when I get to see you.

39
00:02:11,240 --> 00:02:13,880
Speaker 1: You're just an awesome person and so smart, So love

40
00:02:13,919 --> 00:02:15,919
Speaker 1: having you on. Appreciate you making the time my friend.

41
00:02:16,240 --> 00:02:18,560
Speaker 3: Oh, it is mutual. Lisa booth. Thanks for having me.

42
00:02:18,880 --> 00:02:21,080
Speaker 1: You're the best, Okay, So I wanted to ask you.

43
00:02:21,160 --> 00:02:23,519
Speaker 1: I had a congress of Mike Waltz on this show

44
00:02:23,560 --> 00:02:25,680
Speaker 1: the other day, and he was just talking about raising

45
00:02:25,760 --> 00:02:29,560
Speaker 1: questions about, you know, why would Thomas Matthew Crooks, that

46
00:02:29,800 --> 00:02:31,600
Speaker 1: would be you know, the want to be assassin trying

47
00:02:31,600 --> 00:02:35,240
Speaker 1: to assassinate Donald Trump? Why would he have three encrypted

48
00:02:35,240 --> 00:02:40,160
Speaker 1: accounts and encrypted accounts in three different countries. So, as

49
00:02:40,160 --> 00:02:43,400
Speaker 1: someone who's worked in counter terrorism, national security, data, all

50
00:02:43,440 --> 00:02:47,120
Speaker 1: those things, all those things aligning, why would he have

51
00:02:47,360 --> 00:02:49,200
Speaker 1: encrypted accounts in three different countries?

52
00:02:49,240 --> 00:02:49,280
Speaker 4: Like?

53
00:02:49,320 --> 00:02:53,240
Speaker 2: What does that signal to you? How concerning is that, Lisa?

54
00:02:53,320 --> 00:02:56,000
Speaker 3: It could mean everything or it could mean nothing. So

55
00:02:56,200 --> 00:02:58,119
Speaker 3: one of the issues here when it talks about when

56
00:02:58,120 --> 00:03:01,040
Speaker 3: we talk about encrypted accounts is I've told people before,

57
00:03:01,120 --> 00:03:04,160
Speaker 3: you know, all forms of encryption are not created equal.

58
00:03:04,520 --> 00:03:07,360
Speaker 3: So some people think something as simple as a Telegram

59
00:03:07,440 --> 00:03:11,359
Speaker 3: account and they consider it encrypted, whereas it's not. There's

60
00:03:11,400 --> 00:03:13,680
Speaker 3: a lot less than meets the eye when it comes

61
00:03:13,720 --> 00:03:18,079
Speaker 3: to Telegram being a widely touted encrypted platform. So so

62
00:03:18,120 --> 00:03:20,679
Speaker 3: this could mean he just had, you know, Telegram accounts

63
00:03:20,680 --> 00:03:25,720
Speaker 3: that were bouncing off ips in different countries. Or it

64
00:03:25,760 --> 00:03:28,600
Speaker 3: could be indicative of something a little more sinister. And

65
00:03:29,080 --> 00:03:32,720
Speaker 3: my bigger question in all of this with Thomas Crooks

66
00:03:32,720 --> 00:03:36,680
Speaker 3: and that attempt is, you know, this guy, there had

67
00:03:36,720 --> 00:03:41,560
Speaker 3: to have been some form of help really that he

68
00:03:41,680 --> 00:03:44,800
Speaker 3: had people that he was talking to, because when we

69
00:03:44,800 --> 00:03:48,680
Speaker 3: were targeting all kinda first online and then isis isis

70
00:03:48,720 --> 00:03:52,360
Speaker 3: would actually send through the dark web these you know,

71
00:03:52,480 --> 00:03:55,520
Speaker 3: slick propaganda videos. Everybody knows that, but then they would

72
00:03:55,560 --> 00:03:57,560
Speaker 3: have these things like how to build a bomb in

73
00:03:57,560 --> 00:03:59,960
Speaker 3: the kitchen of your mom, and it would you know,

74
00:04:00,160 --> 00:04:03,520
Speaker 3: passed through certain hands, people would send it to other

75
00:04:03,600 --> 00:04:06,680
Speaker 3: propagandas you would have cheerleaders who would send it over.

76
00:04:06,800 --> 00:04:10,040
Speaker 3: So there should be some what we call like digital

77
00:04:10,160 --> 00:04:14,120
Speaker 3: chains of custody that Thomas Crooks left in his wake

78
00:04:14,480 --> 00:04:17,760
Speaker 3: when it came to using all of these digital platforms

79
00:04:17,800 --> 00:04:21,039
Speaker 3: that the FBI says they know about. So to me,

80
00:04:21,400 --> 00:04:26,000
Speaker 3: this just it provides more questions than it does answers,

81
00:04:26,080 --> 00:04:27,280
Speaker 3: like I'm sure it does for a lot of the

82
00:04:27,320 --> 00:04:33,000
Speaker 3: congressmen who are conducting oversight over this, But it's smacks

83
00:04:33,040 --> 00:04:38,600
Speaker 3: of something something a lot deeper in my mind than

84
00:04:38,800 --> 00:04:44,240
Speaker 3: just a really smart kid who is pretty good online,

85
00:04:44,320 --> 00:04:47,040
Speaker 3: Because you also remember the first things that we were

86
00:04:47,080 --> 00:04:50,400
Speaker 3: told about this guy is that he didn't have a

87
00:04:50,440 --> 00:04:54,640
Speaker 3: digital footprint. You know, this young guy who came of

88
00:04:54,680 --> 00:04:58,200
Speaker 3: age during COVID, when the entire world went digital, was

89
00:04:58,200 --> 00:05:01,360
Speaker 3: supposed to not have any sort of of digital exhaust,

90
00:05:01,600 --> 00:05:04,680
Speaker 3: which is nearly impossible for even us, you know, geriatric

91
00:05:04,800 --> 00:05:06,000
Speaker 3: millennials these days.

92
00:05:06,240 --> 00:05:07,480
Speaker 2: So we don't want to go that far.

93
00:05:10,160 --> 00:05:14,279
Speaker 3: Fair enough, fair enough, but something just it doesn't smell right.

94
00:05:14,320 --> 00:05:16,440
Speaker 3: As I've said before, you know, it doesn't pass the

95
00:05:16,480 --> 00:05:19,640
Speaker 3: smell test. Everything that we're being told about this guy,

96
00:05:19,680 --> 00:05:22,599
Speaker 3: and especially about his digital life, does not pass the

97
00:05:22,640 --> 00:05:25,440
Speaker 3: smell test. And the questions are piling up and the

98
00:05:25,520 --> 00:05:27,680
Speaker 3: answers are very scant at this point.

99
00:05:28,000 --> 00:05:29,920
Speaker 1: Well, you know that's what he pointed out too, because

100
00:05:29,960 --> 00:05:33,160
Speaker 1: he was asking, you know, how did Thomas Crux learn

101
00:05:33,279 --> 00:05:36,440
Speaker 1: how to build these IEDs with remote detonators, three of

102
00:05:36,480 --> 00:05:38,720
Speaker 1: which were bill and ready to go. And then you know,

103
00:05:38,720 --> 00:05:40,880
Speaker 1: I was talking about it's almost as if his online

104
00:05:40,920 --> 00:05:47,560
Speaker 1: presence was sterilized on purpose. I guess who would sterilize

105
00:05:47,600 --> 00:05:50,760
Speaker 1: his online presence and what would the intention be behind that?

106
00:05:51,400 --> 00:05:54,840
Speaker 3: Yeah, that's a good question, especially if you know there

107
00:05:54,839 --> 00:05:58,279
Speaker 3: are things that you can do beforehand, you know, basic

108
00:05:58,320 --> 00:06:02,040
Speaker 3: digital hygiene of that he could have conducted. But we

109
00:06:02,160 --> 00:06:04,880
Speaker 3: know that there are all sorts of offensive tricks that

110
00:06:05,000 --> 00:06:08,159
Speaker 3: you can get after online too, like you can spoof

111
00:06:08,200 --> 00:06:10,479
Speaker 3: IP addresses, and if he was doing that to sort

112
00:06:10,520 --> 00:06:13,640
Speaker 3: of take people off of his scent, that is a

113
00:06:13,680 --> 00:06:15,719
Speaker 3: possibility as well. We know, you know, a kid with

114
00:06:15,760 --> 00:06:18,800
Speaker 3: a computer, it's not very hard. But again, where where

115
00:06:18,800 --> 00:06:22,080
Speaker 3: are the digital forensic guys and the information that they're

116
00:06:22,320 --> 00:06:27,240
Speaker 3: supposedly exploiting? Like every time I worked with special Operations

117
00:06:27,320 --> 00:06:29,800
Speaker 3: units in the field and every time we're in Afghanistan

118
00:06:29,839 --> 00:06:31,960
Speaker 3: and those guys would hit a target, they would come

119
00:06:32,000 --> 00:06:34,440
Speaker 3: back with a bunch of cell phones with a bunch

120
00:06:34,480 --> 00:06:36,880
Speaker 3: of things to exploit, and we the nerves would get

121
00:06:36,880 --> 00:06:39,760
Speaker 3: to work figuring out, you know, who are in those contexts,

122
00:06:39,800 --> 00:06:42,920
Speaker 3: what are they saying? And we called it exploiting those devices.

123
00:06:43,120 --> 00:06:45,880
Speaker 3: Those devices. If any of these intel analysts in the

124
00:06:45,880 --> 00:06:49,080
Speaker 3: government are worth their salt, they should have been exploited

125
00:06:49,360 --> 00:06:53,839
Speaker 3: twenty ways from Sunday by now. And his ability to

126
00:06:53,920 --> 00:06:57,040
Speaker 3: wipe that clean. If he actually did that, and we

127
00:06:57,200 --> 00:07:00,320
Speaker 3: can't get any information as the US government from these devices,

128
00:07:00,680 --> 00:07:03,480
Speaker 3: then all of these guys should be fired because that

129
00:07:03,640 --> 00:07:07,640
Speaker 3: is something that you know, even the most seasoned Al

130
00:07:07,720 --> 00:07:11,160
Speaker 3: Kaida operative is not as good as apparently this guy

131
00:07:11,280 --> 00:07:14,280
Speaker 3: was when it can't comes to operational security. So again

132
00:07:14,640 --> 00:07:17,600
Speaker 3: doesn't really pass the smell test.

133
00:07:17,640 --> 00:07:20,520
Speaker 1: You know. So I guess, why do we not know

134
00:07:20,640 --> 00:07:23,600
Speaker 1: more about this guy? Do you think our government does

135
00:07:23,640 --> 00:07:26,240
Speaker 1: and they're just not telling us or you know, it's

136
00:07:26,240 --> 00:07:28,480
Speaker 1: just it's just strange that we don't know more.

137
00:07:29,160 --> 00:07:31,360
Speaker 3: No, I agree. I think there's like a lack of

138
00:07:31,440 --> 00:07:34,960
Speaker 3: curiosity first and foremost from from the governments, as we

139
00:07:35,000 --> 00:07:37,360
Speaker 3: all know, because Donald Trump happens to be on the

140
00:07:37,360 --> 00:07:40,480
Speaker 3: wrong side of a lot of the faceless bureaucrats who

141
00:07:40,520 --> 00:07:46,080
Speaker 3: are employed in it. And then secondly, I I to me,

142
00:07:46,880 --> 00:07:49,920
Speaker 3: I've heard I've heard a number of things. I've heard

143
00:07:49,920 --> 00:07:54,840
Speaker 3: people say that the technical capability to exploit some of

144
00:07:54,880 --> 00:07:57,800
Speaker 3: the stuff is beyond the people that we have right

145
00:07:57,840 --> 00:08:00,960
Speaker 3: now employed by the US government. Don't really buy that,

146
00:08:01,320 --> 00:08:04,480
Speaker 3: to be quite honest. And then the other thing is,

147
00:08:04,640 --> 00:08:07,200
Speaker 3: you know, they have information, they're just sitting on it,

148
00:08:07,360 --> 00:08:10,920
Speaker 3: kind of like they released the body for cremation before

149
00:08:11,160 --> 00:08:14,240
Speaker 3: most people could actually have an interest in figuring out,

150
00:08:14,520 --> 00:08:17,040
Speaker 3: you know, how this guy actually died, et cetera, et cetera.

151
00:08:17,160 --> 00:08:21,720
Speaker 3: So to me, it's all just a lack of transparency.

152
00:08:21,880 --> 00:08:24,920
Speaker 3: And when you have a lack of transparency in the

153
00:08:24,960 --> 00:08:29,160
Speaker 3: information environment, then lots of things will quickly fill that vacuum,

154
00:08:29,480 --> 00:08:30,440
Speaker 3: and none of them good.

155
00:08:30,760 --> 00:08:32,920
Speaker 1: No, I know, my head's definitely filling that vacuum. And

156
00:08:32,960 --> 00:08:36,839
Speaker 1: I tried, I tried. I try to be careful about

157
00:08:36,840 --> 00:08:39,800
Speaker 1: how much I verbalize that without facts, so.

158
00:08:41,800 --> 00:08:44,280
Speaker 2: But you know, my mind's filling that void, I'll assure you.

159
00:08:44,520 --> 00:08:46,400
Speaker 1: All right, Well, I want to you know, we've just

160
00:08:46,559 --> 00:08:48,839
Speaker 1: seen a lot of cyber attacks. You know, there was

161
00:08:48,920 --> 00:08:51,679
Speaker 1: these reports recently that a group of hackers linked to

162
00:08:51,679 --> 00:08:56,200
Speaker 1: the Chinese government had you know, uh, you know, exposed

163
00:08:56,200 --> 00:08:59,840
Speaker 1: some vulnerability and was able to target US internet service provider.

164
00:09:00,200 --> 00:09:03,360
Speaker 1: We saw not too long ago AT and T notifying

165
00:09:03,400 --> 00:09:05,800
Speaker 1: all their customers that basically, like you know, everyone was

166
00:09:05,840 --> 00:09:07,760
Speaker 1: hacked more or less or that you know, information was

167
00:09:07,800 --> 00:09:11,560
Speaker 1: stolen for a period of time. I guess it seems

168
00:09:11,559 --> 00:09:15,680
Speaker 1: like this is becoming more frequent with these cyber attacks. One,

169
00:09:15,800 --> 00:09:18,760
Speaker 1: who do you think or behind these increased cyber attacks?

170
00:09:18,800 --> 00:09:21,720
Speaker 1: Obviously you know that one was China. Why do you

171
00:09:21,800 --> 00:09:23,960
Speaker 1: think they're happening, and and sort of what do you

172
00:09:24,000 --> 00:09:26,280
Speaker 1: expect in the future with cyber attacks?

173
00:09:26,640 --> 00:09:28,600
Speaker 3: Oh yeah, I think you know, you can't discount the

174
00:09:28,640 --> 00:09:31,640
Speaker 3: usual suspects, Right, there's China, there's around, there's North Korea,

175
00:09:31,760 --> 00:09:34,720
Speaker 3: and there's Russia. But then there's also a bevy of

176
00:09:34,800 --> 00:09:40,319
Speaker 3: what we call patriotic nedicines, so people linked to the

177
00:09:40,800 --> 00:09:44,319
Speaker 3: CCP in very indirect ways that are kind of feeling

178
00:09:44,400 --> 00:09:47,199
Speaker 3: like they're doing their duty for China. So you can't

179
00:09:47,240 --> 00:09:50,840
Speaker 3: discount those guys. There's chaos agents always and then sort

180
00:09:50,880 --> 00:09:54,080
Speaker 3: of activists that are always percolating in this environment too,

181
00:09:54,200 --> 00:09:57,560
Speaker 3: So there's a litany of actors that are all sort

182
00:09:57,600 --> 00:09:59,960
Speaker 3: of you know, creating the problems that we have now.

183
00:10:00,280 --> 00:10:02,880
Speaker 3: But I do think zeroing in on China is really

184
00:10:02,960 --> 00:10:06,319
Speaker 3: critical here because you look at from twenty fourteen onward

185
00:10:06,360 --> 00:10:09,400
Speaker 3: and even before that, of course, but twenty fourteen twenty fifteen,

186
00:10:09,480 --> 00:10:13,199
Speaker 3: you have the OPM hacks right where most of the

187
00:10:13,280 --> 00:10:18,240
Speaker 3: information of government employees was exploited by China linked actors.

188
00:10:18,480 --> 00:10:21,440
Speaker 3: You have the Anthem hack this is a healthcare You

189
00:10:21,440 --> 00:10:24,240
Speaker 3: have the Equifax that's money obviously credit, and then you

190
00:10:24,280 --> 00:10:27,079
Speaker 3: have the Marriott hack, which most people know. You know,

191
00:10:27,160 --> 00:10:32,040
Speaker 3: a lot of government especially DOOD personnel, use Marriott to travel.

192
00:10:32,480 --> 00:10:34,520
Speaker 3: That's sort of their where they get their points, their

193
00:10:34,520 --> 00:10:37,760
Speaker 3: system and whatnot. So you have China taking all of

194
00:10:37,800 --> 00:10:42,120
Speaker 3: these data sets state linked actors rather and you know,

195
00:10:42,200 --> 00:10:44,560
Speaker 3: being able to at this point integrate them and then

196
00:10:44,720 --> 00:10:48,880
Speaker 3: use artificial intelligence to single people out for blackmail, for espionage,

197
00:10:49,480 --> 00:10:53,320
Speaker 3: for future exploitation, or anything really they want to do

198
00:10:53,400 --> 00:10:56,640
Speaker 3: with it. They tend to hack first and ask questions later.

199
00:10:57,280 --> 00:10:59,400
Speaker 3: I think this is the biggest problem that we face

200
00:10:59,440 --> 00:11:04,600
Speaker 3: in terms of the cybersecurity environment. That is China. Iran's

201
00:11:04,720 --> 00:11:07,120
Speaker 3: really really good. We don't really think about them too

202
00:11:07,160 --> 00:11:10,520
Speaker 3: often when it comes to cyberspace, but they are very good,

203
00:11:10,559 --> 00:11:13,320
Speaker 3: and they've been probing our critical infrastructure just like China

204
00:11:13,760 --> 00:11:17,760
Speaker 3: for a long time, and probing attacks are really interesting.

205
00:11:17,800 --> 00:11:20,720
Speaker 3: They're almost like hey, come and get me, or like

206
00:11:20,800 --> 00:11:25,600
Speaker 3: sort of a big manning the US in specific ways

207
00:11:25,640 --> 00:11:28,199
Speaker 3: because they're like, look, we're in your systems. We haven't

208
00:11:28,240 --> 00:11:30,400
Speaker 3: done anything yet, but we just want you to know

209
00:11:30,480 --> 00:11:32,600
Speaker 3: that we're here, and we could if we wanted to.

210
00:11:33,000 --> 00:11:37,400
Speaker 3: So that's another interesting element to the cybersecurity environment that

211
00:11:37,520 --> 00:11:40,320
Speaker 3: I don't think many people talk about. And it's very

212
00:11:40,320 --> 00:11:43,600
Speaker 3: problematic because then you can sort of turn on those

213
00:11:43,640 --> 00:11:46,600
Speaker 3: bigger attacks that eventually cripple and take down elements of

214
00:11:46,600 --> 00:11:50,440
Speaker 3: our critical infrastructure whenever they want or at critical times,

215
00:11:50,440 --> 00:11:54,080
Speaker 3: say maybe if Iran and Israel start to get into

216
00:11:54,120 --> 00:11:57,480
Speaker 3: a big hot war, that kind of thing. So cybersecurity,

217
00:11:57,520 --> 00:12:00,840
Speaker 3: I tell people this, you might not be interested in cybersecurity,

218
00:12:00,920 --> 00:12:04,240
Speaker 3: but cybersecurity is interested in you. So you've got to

219
00:12:04,240 --> 00:12:07,720
Speaker 3: be eternally vigilant when it comes to the cyberspace environment,

220
00:12:07,800 --> 00:12:09,079
Speaker 3: in particular in America.

221
00:12:09,120 --> 00:12:11,640
Speaker 1: Now, yeah, and god forbid, like the electrical grid or

222
00:12:11,679 --> 00:12:13,800
Speaker 1: anything like that. I was on a panel one time,

223
00:12:13,840 --> 00:12:16,880
Speaker 1: I was moderating it, and one of the guys said

224
00:12:16,920 --> 00:12:18,960
Speaker 1: that there's two types of businesses, the ones who know

225
00:12:18,960 --> 00:12:20,560
Speaker 1: they've been hacked and the ones who don't know they've

226
00:12:20,559 --> 00:12:23,720
Speaker 1: been hacked, you know, basically implying that everyone's been hacked.

227
00:12:23,920 --> 00:12:26,160
Speaker 2: We've got to take a quick commercial break. More with care.

228
00:12:26,240 --> 00:12:31,240
Speaker 1: On the other side, you had mentioned like a sort

229
00:12:31,240 --> 00:12:34,600
Speaker 1: of for usage of espionage, and is that for like coercion,

230
00:12:34,840 --> 00:12:37,200
Speaker 1: you know? And then if so, like how many members

231
00:12:37,200 --> 00:12:43,040
Speaker 1: of Congress do you think have been compromised at then yeah, that's.

232
00:12:42,920 --> 00:12:45,120
Speaker 3: Part of it too. I think with their sort of

233
00:12:45,320 --> 00:12:49,920
Speaker 3: United frontwork, you know, they've been pretty successful in softer ways.

234
00:12:50,400 --> 00:12:52,280
Speaker 3: I really think Peter Swipes are who I think you've

235
00:12:52,280 --> 00:12:53,600
Speaker 3: probably had him on your show.

236
00:12:53,720 --> 00:12:55,640
Speaker 2: He's great. I love him, excellent.

237
00:12:55,720 --> 00:12:58,319
Speaker 3: He's excellent. And I like to think of when I

238
00:12:58,360 --> 00:13:01,200
Speaker 3: think of American politicians and how their compromise, I think

239
00:13:01,240 --> 00:13:04,160
Speaker 3: of that that phrase that he is really brought to

240
00:13:04,240 --> 00:13:07,200
Speaker 3: our consciousness big help with a little bad mouth, you know,

241
00:13:07,280 --> 00:13:10,680
Speaker 3: Tim Waltz comes to mind in particular. It's the whole

242
00:13:10,720 --> 00:13:13,640
Speaker 3: idea is, you know, you have American politicians that are

243
00:13:13,679 --> 00:13:17,160
Speaker 3: really helping the efforts of the Chinese Communist Party, but

244
00:13:17,200 --> 00:13:20,280
Speaker 3: then they'll say bad things about them every now and then, like, oh,

245
00:13:20,400 --> 00:13:23,720
Speaker 3: you know the wigers in concentration camps. That's not great.

246
00:13:23,920 --> 00:13:27,760
Speaker 3: But overall, China is not a competitor. They're really just

247
00:13:27,840 --> 00:13:31,040
Speaker 3: our ally, you know, they're not an adversary, They're they're

248
00:13:31,080 --> 00:13:34,240
Speaker 3: a challenger at times. So I think they've pretty much

249
00:13:34,280 --> 00:13:36,960
Speaker 3: got that whole big help with a little big badmouth

250
00:13:37,800 --> 00:13:41,360
Speaker 3: and United Front work sort of going. And the United

251
00:13:41,360 --> 00:13:45,000
Speaker 3: frontwork is the more softer aspects of it, so not

252
00:13:45,040 --> 00:13:49,040
Speaker 3: necessarily those hard cybersecurity vulnerabilities that we're talking about in

253
00:13:49,120 --> 00:13:52,920
Speaker 3: terms of getting troves of information to integrate and then

254
00:13:53,000 --> 00:13:56,960
Speaker 3: potentially use later for dossier's and whatnot. But when it

255
00:13:57,000 --> 00:14:00,880
Speaker 3: comes to that kind of that kind of work, we

256
00:14:01,040 --> 00:14:06,400
Speaker 3: know that they have long and fullsome dossiers on Australian politicians,

257
00:14:06,679 --> 00:14:09,440
Speaker 3: and obviously there's a proximity issue there, So they've been

258
00:14:09,480 --> 00:14:13,520
Speaker 3: targeting the West via Australia for a very long time.

259
00:14:13,760 --> 00:14:16,960
Speaker 3: And we know that they also have dossier's on UK

260
00:14:17,200 --> 00:14:21,160
Speaker 3: politicians as well too, So I'm sure that there's some

261
00:14:21,360 --> 00:14:25,160
Speaker 3: element of, hey, we know all of these things, we

262
00:14:25,360 --> 00:14:29,000
Speaker 3: could you know, let the American people know, or you

263
00:14:29,040 --> 00:14:31,600
Speaker 3: could you know, work with us in in other ways.

264
00:14:31,600 --> 00:14:36,320
Speaker 3: So I'm sure those elements have occurred before. Obviously, we

265
00:14:36,360 --> 00:14:39,320
Speaker 3: know the Biden family is in deep via the University

266
00:14:39,360 --> 00:14:42,760
Speaker 3: of Pennsylvania and their think tanks and whatnot, and all

267
00:14:42,800 --> 00:14:47,680
Speaker 3: of the reporting on Hunter Biden's associations with people in

268
00:14:47,720 --> 00:14:51,080
Speaker 3: the intelligence world in China, So I have no doubt

269
00:14:51,160 --> 00:14:54,880
Speaker 3: that that the espionage, of the exploitation, the blackmail game

270
00:14:54,920 --> 00:14:58,080
Speaker 3: has been occurring in the corridors of Washington, DC and

271
00:14:58,120 --> 00:14:58,960
Speaker 3: elsewhere as well.

272
00:14:58,840 --> 00:15:02,920
Speaker 1: By China I wanted to get your take on this

273
00:15:03,040 --> 00:15:07,280
Speaker 1: bombshell from Mark Zuckerberg, you know, writing a letter to

274
00:15:07,480 --> 00:15:11,560
Speaker 1: Chairman Jim Jordan saying the letter in twenty twenty one,

275
00:15:11,680 --> 00:15:14,360
Speaker 1: senior officials from the bid administration, including the White House,

276
00:15:14,760 --> 00:15:17,640
Speaker 1: repeatedly pressured our teams for months to center certain to

277
00:15:17,760 --> 00:15:21,960
Speaker 1: censor certain COVID nineteen content. You know, it goes on,

278
00:15:22,040 --> 00:15:24,600
Speaker 1: but basically just you know, admitting what we had known,

279
00:15:24,600 --> 00:15:27,520
Speaker 1: admitting that the FBI was meddling with the Russian you know,

280
00:15:27,560 --> 00:15:31,400
Speaker 1: the fake Russian disinformation story ahead of the twenty twenty

281
00:15:31,440 --> 00:15:35,760
Speaker 1: election as well. What do you make of this bombshell

282
00:15:35,880 --> 00:15:37,160
Speaker 1: and why now?

283
00:15:38,000 --> 00:15:40,760
Speaker 3: Yeah, this is a great question. And what I've been

284
00:15:40,760 --> 00:15:43,800
Speaker 3: trying to do right now is to tell Republicans put

285
00:15:43,840 --> 00:15:47,680
Speaker 3: the ticker tape parade away. Stop everybody, stop this, because

286
00:15:47,880 --> 00:15:50,960
Speaker 3: stop taking a victory lap for free speech and thinking

287
00:15:50,960 --> 00:15:52,880
Speaker 3: that your work here is done and packing up and

288
00:15:52,880 --> 00:15:56,160
Speaker 3: going home like this is not that the timing is critical,

289
00:15:56,240 --> 00:15:59,000
Speaker 3: as you noted, because what I think Mark Zuckerberg has

290
00:15:59,040 --> 00:16:01,880
Speaker 3: done here because he is a very savvy actor. He

291
00:16:01,960 --> 00:16:04,920
Speaker 3: is a very smart man, and his instincts are very

292
00:16:04,960 --> 00:16:08,120
Speaker 3: good when it comes to some of the political environment.

293
00:16:08,400 --> 00:16:11,280
Speaker 3: You know, I've said that he gets his pr people

294
00:16:11,400 --> 00:16:13,640
Speaker 3: and some of the politicals and the building to kind

295
00:16:13,640 --> 00:16:16,240
Speaker 3: of mess him up and mess with what he really

296
00:16:16,240 --> 00:16:18,240
Speaker 3: wants to do and get him to make bad decisions.

297
00:16:18,280 --> 00:16:21,400
Speaker 3: But when he's left to his own devices, he's really

298
00:16:21,440 --> 00:16:23,960
Speaker 3: really smart. And what I think he's done here is

299
00:16:24,040 --> 00:16:27,080
Speaker 3: taking a look at the landscape and basically said, Okay.

300
00:16:27,640 --> 00:16:31,560
Speaker 3: It's In June, the Supreme Court and a decision in

301
00:16:31,840 --> 00:16:36,080
Speaker 3: Murphy v. Missouri, the Court found no standing for plaintiffs

302
00:16:36,080 --> 00:16:39,440
Speaker 3: that were demanding an end to this exact type of

303
00:16:39,480 --> 00:16:43,320
Speaker 3: collusion between Big Tech and the Biden administration and Biden

304
00:16:43,360 --> 00:16:46,800
Speaker 3: campaign officials at the time, and they rejected. This is

305
00:16:46,800 --> 00:16:49,960
Speaker 3: the Supreme Court again rejected state efforts to permanently block

306
00:16:50,000 --> 00:16:53,520
Speaker 3: the Biden administration from working with big Tech to censor speech.

307
00:16:53,640 --> 00:16:55,120
Speaker 3: What they did is they kicked it down to the

308
00:16:55,160 --> 00:16:57,960
Speaker 3: lower court. They had a chance to say this is

309
00:16:58,200 --> 00:17:01,840
Speaker 3: a violation of the First amend this cannot stand, but

310
00:17:01,920 --> 00:17:04,679
Speaker 3: they didn't. They were more like, m lower course, you

311
00:17:04,720 --> 00:17:06,600
Speaker 3: decide it, like, we're not going to decide this case

312
00:17:06,600 --> 00:17:09,200
Speaker 3: on the merits. We're gonna sort of have a process

313
00:17:09,280 --> 00:17:12,040
Speaker 3: decision here, Like you guys do it in the lower

314
00:17:12,080 --> 00:17:15,639
Speaker 3: course again, so that was a big blow to our

315
00:17:15,720 --> 00:17:18,600
Speaker 3: efforts on my side to hold big tech accountable. And

316
00:17:18,760 --> 00:17:21,720
Speaker 3: obviously Mark Zuckerberg did not release his letter when that

317
00:17:21,920 --> 00:17:25,000
Speaker 3: lawsuit was going on, before that decision was occurring. So

318
00:17:25,000 --> 00:17:28,360
Speaker 3: that's point one. Point two is that he knows. Democrats

319
00:17:28,640 --> 00:17:31,760
Speaker 3: like what had happened here. They like what's continuing to

320
00:17:31,800 --> 00:17:36,680
Speaker 3: happen on Facebook's platform, aka helping the left censoring conservative speech,

321
00:17:36,720 --> 00:17:39,440
Speaker 3: so they're not going to do anything to him. Republicans,

322
00:17:39,760 --> 00:17:44,240
Speaker 3: they are amazing at writing these strongly worded letters at fundraising,

323
00:17:44,400 --> 00:17:46,639
Speaker 3: but ultimately, when it comes down to it, they're really

324
00:17:46,680 --> 00:17:48,800
Speaker 3: not going to do anything to Facebook because it's a

325
00:17:48,800 --> 00:17:52,120
Speaker 3: private company, and private companies are the enngines of innovation

326
00:17:52,160 --> 00:17:54,400
Speaker 3: in America and you can't touch him that kind of thing.

327
00:17:54,480 --> 00:17:56,760
Speaker 3: So Mark's like, all right, we don't know what's going

328
00:17:56,800 --> 00:17:59,320
Speaker 3: to happen in at the end of this year for

329
00:17:59,440 --> 00:18:02,120
Speaker 3: the election, So I'm going to pander a little bit

330
00:18:02,160 --> 00:18:04,159
Speaker 3: to the Joe Rogan crowd. I'm going to get on

331
00:18:04,200 --> 00:18:06,000
Speaker 3: my you know, UFC. I'm going to roll on the

332
00:18:06,040 --> 00:18:08,040
Speaker 3: mat a little bit. I'm going to surf with an

333
00:18:08,080 --> 00:18:10,920
Speaker 3: American flag and I'm going to say, you know, Trump,

334
00:18:11,280 --> 00:18:13,680
Speaker 3: the you know, when he stood up after he got shot,

335
00:18:13,720 --> 00:18:16,760
Speaker 3: that was a bad mammagama kind of action to do.

336
00:18:17,200 --> 00:18:19,840
Speaker 3: And I'm going to give them this little nugget and

337
00:18:19,880 --> 00:18:23,040
Speaker 3: they'll probably be happy, and they'll probably you know, take

338
00:18:23,080 --> 00:18:25,640
Speaker 3: the pressure off me a little bit. So I think

339
00:18:25,720 --> 00:18:28,600
Speaker 3: that's all this is. Because the last thing that you'll

340
00:18:28,640 --> 00:18:30,520
Speaker 3: have to remember and then I promise I'll stop, is

341
00:18:30,560 --> 00:18:33,840
Speaker 3: that all the while this is happening, Facebook is still

342
00:18:34,240 --> 00:18:40,120
Speaker 3: censoring conservative and conservative coded and heterodox information. Twenty nine

343
00:18:40,200 --> 00:18:44,720
Speaker 3: out thirty days ago. At this point, Facebook apologized for

344
00:18:44,880 --> 00:18:48,840
Speaker 3: considering Trump the iconic picture of him raising his fist

345
00:18:48,920 --> 00:18:53,760
Speaker 3: in the air. They labeled it misinformation. And again, these mistakes,

346
00:18:53,880 --> 00:18:58,040
Speaker 3: these content moderation quote unquote mistakes, only seem to go

347
00:18:58,200 --> 00:19:00,679
Speaker 3: in one direction, the one that benefits the left. So

348
00:19:00,720 --> 00:19:02,480
Speaker 3: Mark and say what do it has to say? But

349
00:19:02,560 --> 00:19:05,439
Speaker 3: Facebook is still crushing conservative speech.

350
00:19:06,520 --> 00:19:10,399
Speaker 1: Do you is there any world where he might start

351
00:19:10,480 --> 00:19:12,720
Speaker 1: liking Trump and you know, with the you had mentioned

352
00:19:12,760 --> 00:19:14,919
Speaker 1: the fact that he you know, because he does like

353
00:19:15,040 --> 00:19:16,639
Speaker 1: Mma and like these different you know, do you think

354
00:19:16,640 --> 00:19:19,320
Speaker 1: there's any world where he really did see Trump get

355
00:19:19,320 --> 00:19:21,160
Speaker 1: shot and get back up and was like, all right,

356
00:19:21,320 --> 00:19:24,960
Speaker 1: like that, that's pretty cool. Yeah, we've seen in Silicon

357
00:19:25,040 --> 00:19:28,520
Speaker 1: Valley move a little bit more, you know, towards Trump

358
00:19:28,560 --> 00:19:31,399
Speaker 1: via David Sachs do that big fundraiser I think it

359
00:19:31,440 --> 00:19:34,840
Speaker 1: was back in June. You've got more people coming out

360
00:19:35,000 --> 00:19:36,920
Speaker 1: in the tech world being like I, you know, I

361
00:19:36,960 --> 00:19:38,040
Speaker 1: actually kind of like Trump.

362
00:19:38,040 --> 00:19:38,920
Speaker 2: I was fooled before.

363
00:19:39,000 --> 00:19:40,879
Speaker 1: So I don't know, like, do you think there's a

364
00:19:40,920 --> 00:19:44,239
Speaker 1: world where maybe he is kind of like part of

365
00:19:44,280 --> 00:19:47,479
Speaker 1: that group that are sort of coming around to Donald Trump,

366
00:19:47,880 --> 00:19:49,879
Speaker 1: or do you think it's just for safe, you know,

367
00:19:50,080 --> 00:19:53,040
Speaker 1: face saving purposes as you pointed out, No, I think

368
00:19:53,040 --> 00:19:53,840
Speaker 1: it's actually both.

369
00:19:53,880 --> 00:19:56,280
Speaker 3: So, like I said, his instincts like, this is the

370
00:19:56,320 --> 00:19:59,960
Speaker 3: guy who in October twenty nineteen, he went to Georgetown

371
00:20:00,040 --> 00:20:02,679
Speaker 3: and he gave a speech and he basically said, China

372
00:20:02,760 --> 00:20:07,760
Speaker 3: censors people. China is overly censorious and awful, and Facebook

373
00:20:07,840 --> 00:20:10,959
Speaker 3: is going to be the free speech platform that you

374
00:20:11,040 --> 00:20:14,000
Speaker 3: guys should basically cling to. We are going to be

375
00:20:14,119 --> 00:20:18,760
Speaker 3: that counterweight to a authoritarian, digitally minded China. And I

376
00:20:18,840 --> 00:20:20,639
Speaker 3: remember I listened to it live. I was like, wow,

377
00:20:20,800 --> 00:20:23,760
Speaker 3: this is okay, okay, and it really tracked with some

378
00:20:23,800 --> 00:20:25,719
Speaker 3: of the things that I heard from him say in

379
00:20:25,760 --> 00:20:27,840
Speaker 3: some of his you know, public quarterly meetings and whatnot.

380
00:20:27,840 --> 00:20:29,800
Speaker 3: When I worked at Facebook, I was like, this guy

381
00:20:29,840 --> 00:20:33,080
Speaker 3: is really compelling. Like his vision if he could enact

382
00:20:33,119 --> 00:20:36,359
Speaker 3: it purely, like is kind of interesting. And again, his

383
00:20:36,480 --> 00:20:38,720
Speaker 3: instincts are pretty good. And then you have you know,

384
00:20:38,760 --> 00:20:41,439
Speaker 3: the logan Paul's, these famous golfers like all sort of

385
00:20:41,480 --> 00:20:45,399
Speaker 3: like gravitating toward the common man nature that Trump evinces.

386
00:20:45,600 --> 00:20:48,760
Speaker 3: So I think there's something in Mark Zuckerberg, who also

387
00:20:48,880 --> 00:20:52,399
Speaker 3: said I believe the antidote to bad speech is more speech.

388
00:20:52,600 --> 00:20:57,200
Speaker 3: There's something in Mark that wants to be a good guy. Right,

389
00:20:57,280 --> 00:21:00,919
Speaker 3: There's something in him that just wants to be good

390
00:21:01,119 --> 00:21:04,720
Speaker 3: and wants to understand the truth with a capital T.

391
00:21:05,240 --> 00:21:11,239
Speaker 3: But again, everyone he gets so bamboozled, I think by

392
00:21:11,800 --> 00:21:14,840
Speaker 3: all of the voices that are around him. And then

393
00:21:14,960 --> 00:21:18,440
Speaker 3: and generally right, like, let's be honest, Facebook is probably

394
00:21:18,480 --> 00:21:21,000
Speaker 3: a net negative for the world. And I have said

395
00:21:21,000 --> 00:21:23,439
Speaker 3: this before, like it is not a good thing. This

396
00:21:23,520 --> 00:21:27,480
Speaker 3: platform and Instagram that you know, connects perverts with young children.

397
00:21:27,560 --> 00:21:30,439
Speaker 3: And Wall Street Journal has done tons and tons of

398
00:21:30,600 --> 00:21:34,280
Speaker 3: very technical, great expose as of what these algorithms do,

399
00:21:34,359 --> 00:21:36,880
Speaker 3: and what these platforms do and what they knowingly do

400
00:21:36,960 --> 00:21:39,479
Speaker 3: and double down on, especially when it comes to children.

401
00:21:39,720 --> 00:21:42,880
Speaker 3: So on balance, not a great guy, not a great

402
00:21:42,920 --> 00:21:45,280
Speaker 3: thing in my mind that Facebook came into the world.

403
00:21:45,840 --> 00:21:48,640
Speaker 3: But there's something inside of Mark Zuckerberg I do think

404
00:21:48,760 --> 00:21:50,760
Speaker 3: can be turned. In the end. We might see it

405
00:21:50,800 --> 00:21:53,080
Speaker 3: in about twenty years, but we're not quite there yet.

406
00:21:53,359 --> 00:21:56,359
Speaker 2: Well, Mark, if you're listening, we'll have you if you

407
00:21:56,520 --> 00:21:57,560
Speaker 2: promised to be a good boy.

408
00:21:57,640 --> 00:22:00,480
Speaker 1: We've got more with carap but first we are quickly

409
00:22:00,520 --> 00:22:03,880
Speaker 1: approaching the one year anniversary of the horrific Commas attacks

410
00:22:03,880 --> 00:22:06,760
Speaker 1: on Israel, and still the Holy Land continues to be

411
00:22:06,800 --> 00:22:11,600
Speaker 1: attacked on multiple fronts. Deadly threats are increasing in northern Israel.

412
00:22:12,200 --> 00:22:15,399
Speaker 1: Constant rocket attacks from Hesbola have been fired at Israel,

413
00:22:15,440 --> 00:22:20,720
Speaker 1: causing widespread damage, with raging wildfires destroying precious farmland. Since

414
00:22:20,760 --> 00:22:23,600
Speaker 1: the war started, the International Fellowship of Christians and Jews

415
00:22:23,600 --> 00:22:26,240
Speaker 1: has been on the forefront at Israel, addressing the needs

416
00:22:26,240 --> 00:22:29,800
Speaker 1: of the most vulnerable. That's why I'm partnering with IFCJ today.

417
00:22:30,280 --> 00:22:33,119
Speaker 1: Your life saving donation will help provide emergency food as

418
00:22:33,160 --> 00:22:36,840
Speaker 1: well as critical security needs such as black jackets, firefighting equipment,

419
00:22:36,960 --> 00:22:40,520
Speaker 1: armored vehicles, bomb shelters and more. We're looking for five

420
00:22:40,600 --> 00:22:43,840
Speaker 1: hundred listeners to join the fellowship and me by donating

421
00:22:43,880 --> 00:22:46,919
Speaker 1: one hundred and fifty dollars to meet these urgent security needs.

422
00:22:47,320 --> 00:22:50,240
Speaker 1: And thanks to a generous IFCJ supporter, your gift will

423
00:22:50,240 --> 00:22:53,080
Speaker 1: be matched, doubling your impact in the Holy Land. Call

424
00:22:53,160 --> 00:22:55,760
Speaker 1: to make your gift right now at eight eight eight

425
00:22:55,960 --> 00:22:59,760
Speaker 1: four eight eight IFCJ. That's eight eight eight four eight

426
00:22:59,840 --> 00:23:03,760
Speaker 1: eight IFCJ or four three two five, or go online

427
00:23:03,880 --> 00:23:08,080
Speaker 1: to support IFCJ dot org to give. That's one word

428
00:23:08,480 --> 00:23:12,600
Speaker 1: support IFCJ dot org is real needs or support. Now,

429
00:23:15,840 --> 00:23:19,719
Speaker 1: I wanted to ask you about this TikTok case that

430
00:23:20,160 --> 00:23:23,479
Speaker 1: has ramifications for Section two thirty, you know, sort of

431
00:23:23,560 --> 00:23:27,400
Speaker 1: explain the significance of this and how it might then impact,

432
00:23:27,840 --> 00:23:29,720
Speaker 1: you know, some of these other social media companies.

433
00:23:30,160 --> 00:23:34,040
Speaker 3: Yeah, so this is interesting, potentially huge, potentially bigger than

434
00:23:34,160 --> 00:23:37,720
Speaker 3: the Zuckerberg bombshell. And what it is is a third

435
00:23:37,800 --> 00:23:42,159
Speaker 3: circuit circuit court decided to start to pierce the armor

436
00:23:42,359 --> 00:23:45,679
Speaker 3: of big tech when it comes to Section two thirty

437
00:23:46,560 --> 00:23:49,719
Speaker 3: immunity from civil liability. So a lot of people have

438
00:23:49,800 --> 00:23:52,720
Speaker 3: now heard of this famous section two thirty. What it is.

439
00:23:52,760 --> 00:23:55,800
Speaker 3: It's part of the nineteen ninety six Communications Decency Act

440
00:23:56,040 --> 00:23:59,960
Speaker 3: that basically says, Okay, big tech, you are not liable

441
00:24:00,480 --> 00:24:02,480
Speaker 3: for You're not gonna have to face all of these

442
00:24:02,560 --> 00:24:07,040
Speaker 3: lawsuits that could potentially inhibit your growth as nascent platforms

443
00:24:07,080 --> 00:24:10,240
Speaker 3: for third party content that's hosted on your platform. So

444
00:24:10,520 --> 00:24:13,719
Speaker 3: if someone's in the comment section saying like really gross, horrible,

445
00:24:13,760 --> 00:24:17,560
Speaker 3: it's seen disgusting things and somebody wants to sue you

446
00:24:17,640 --> 00:24:21,320
Speaker 3: for it, you are going to be safe from civiliability

447
00:24:21,600 --> 00:24:25,200
Speaker 3: because what you are a platform. You're not a publisher,

448
00:24:25,240 --> 00:24:28,560
Speaker 3: You're a platform. So big tech companies have really hidden

449
00:24:28,600 --> 00:24:33,760
Speaker 3: behind this when their platforms have really, i would say

450
00:24:33,760 --> 00:24:38,080
Speaker 3: propagated all manner of evil and really ridiculous things. And

451
00:24:38,280 --> 00:24:42,480
Speaker 3: one of these platforms, TikTok, more evil than most. They

452
00:24:42,840 --> 00:24:46,760
Speaker 3: faced a lawsuit based off of a Pennsylvania mother whose

453
00:24:46,840 --> 00:24:49,840
Speaker 3: ten year old was in her feed. She by the

454
00:24:49,920 --> 00:24:53,680
Speaker 3: for you algorithm of TikTok. She was fed the blackout challenge,

455
00:24:54,080 --> 00:24:57,160
Speaker 3: where kids try to choke themselves until they pass out.

456
00:24:57,440 --> 00:25:00,000
Speaker 3: She watched one of these videos, she went to the closet.

457
00:25:00,320 --> 00:25:02,240
Speaker 3: She tried to use I believe it was her mother's

458
00:25:02,280 --> 00:25:04,679
Speaker 3: belt or a belt in the closet to attempt the

459
00:25:04,680 --> 00:25:09,000
Speaker 3: blackout challenge, and she killed herself on accident, and her

460
00:25:09,040 --> 00:25:12,160
Speaker 3: mother ended up suing. It was tossed out based off

461
00:25:12,160 --> 00:25:15,919
Speaker 3: of Section two thirty protections, but the third circuit actually

462
00:25:15,960 --> 00:25:19,560
Speaker 3: said no, no, TikTok, you could be liable because of

463
00:25:19,600 --> 00:25:23,440
Speaker 3: your algorithms for pushing this kind of thing to this

464
00:25:23,600 --> 00:25:27,800
Speaker 3: child who eventually killed herself because without that algorithm surfacing

465
00:25:28,160 --> 00:25:30,440
Speaker 3: that content, she never would have seen it, never would

466
00:25:30,440 --> 00:25:33,639
Speaker 3: have done this. So this could be the first chink

467
00:25:33,640 --> 00:25:36,359
Speaker 3: in the armor of Section two thirty that big tech

468
00:25:36,400 --> 00:25:40,080
Speaker 3: has really coded itself in for the past few decades,

469
00:25:40,119 --> 00:25:43,800
Speaker 3: which which we believe, and my here's my mantra, this

470
00:25:43,880 --> 00:25:47,000
Speaker 3: is axiomatic at this point. If Justice Thomas says it,

471
00:25:47,000 --> 00:25:47,480
Speaker 3: it's right.

472
00:25:47,840 --> 00:25:53,359
Speaker 4: So Justice Thomas has really really been questioning the expanded

473
00:25:53,400 --> 00:25:57,040
Speaker 4: interpretation of Section two thirty when tech companies don't really

474
00:25:57,080 --> 00:26:01,560
Speaker 4: have any responsibilities in tandem with this immunity, So the

475
00:26:01,600 --> 00:26:03,000
Speaker 4: decision really expands.

476
00:26:03,040 --> 00:26:05,600
Speaker 3: At least one of the judges says there's something too

477
00:26:06,040 --> 00:26:11,880
Speaker 3: claras Thomas's interpretation of this overly broad Section two thirty protection.

478
00:26:12,240 --> 00:26:14,840
Speaker 3: It's too extended. It's been interpreted by the courts over

479
00:26:14,880 --> 00:26:17,320
Speaker 3: the years in too broad a fashion. Maybe it's time

480
00:26:17,359 --> 00:26:20,600
Speaker 3: to rein it in. So, my friend Matt Stoller, kind

481
00:26:20,600 --> 00:26:24,480
Speaker 3: of a famous anti trust influencer, he's gone so far

482
00:26:24,520 --> 00:26:28,720
Speaker 3: as to say big text business model is over because

483
00:26:28,760 --> 00:26:32,440
Speaker 3: section two thirty might not be that perfect set of armor,

484
00:26:32,480 --> 00:26:35,240
Speaker 3: and that big tech's been using against families, against children,

485
00:26:35,320 --> 00:26:36,679
Speaker 3: against the American people.

486
00:26:36,800 --> 00:26:39,600
Speaker 1: Really, yeah, I think we need bracelet, says say, what

487
00:26:39,640 --> 00:26:40,840
Speaker 1: would Clarence Thomas do?

488
00:26:42,480 --> 00:26:44,399
Speaker 2: Wait, he'll have one. I've got one.

489
00:26:44,640 --> 00:26:49,120
Speaker 1: He's a good barometer of wrong versus rights. So I agree.

490
00:26:49,400 --> 00:26:52,280
Speaker 1: Hi Kera Frederick, love YOUO. Thanks so much for coming on.

491
00:26:52,359 --> 00:26:54,720
Speaker 1: You're so smart. Always appreciate you making the time. I

492
00:26:54,760 --> 00:26:58,040
Speaker 1: always love saying you anything for you all right, come

493
00:26:58,040 --> 00:26:58,840
Speaker 1: to Florida and visit.

494
00:26:59,119 --> 00:27:00,440
Speaker 3: I'm well done.

495
00:27:00,640 --> 00:27:03,879
Speaker 1: That was Kara Frederick with heritage. Appreciate her making the

496
00:27:03,920 --> 00:27:05,600
Speaker 1: time to come on the show. Appreciate you guys at

497
00:27:05,600 --> 00:27:08,560
Speaker 1: home for listening every Monday and Thursday, but of course

498
00:27:08,600 --> 00:27:10,080
Speaker 1: you can listen throughout the week. I want to thank

499
00:27:10,119 --> 00:27:12,240
Speaker 1: John Cassio and my producer for putting the show together.

500
00:27:12,359 --> 00:27:13,080
Speaker 1: Until next time