WEBVTT - Here's What Cyber War With Russia Would Actually Look Like

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<v Speaker 1>Hello, and welcome to another episode of the ad Thoughts podcast.

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<v Speaker 1>I'm Tracy Alloway and I'm Joe. Wisn't thal so Joe.

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<v Speaker 1>Clearly a lot still going on with Russia's invasion of Ukraine,

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<v Speaker 1>but one of the big talking points in the past

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<v Speaker 1>couple of weeks has been this idea of a retaliatory

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<v Speaker 1>response from Russia, not necessarily in the sense of traditional warfare,

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<v Speaker 1>but in the form of cyber warfare. Right, So, this

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<v Speaker 1>has always been a source of concern, going back for

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<v Speaker 1>several years, long before the existing conflict. What are Russia's

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<v Speaker 1>cyber warfare capabilities, how weak is the rest of the world,

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<v Speaker 1>how exposed is critical infrastructure and so forth? As of now,

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<v Speaker 1>you know, I don't think this has been a huge

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<v Speaker 1>spect of the current conflict. Traditional violent warfare is sort

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<v Speaker 1>of being the story, but it is always lurking out

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<v Speaker 1>there as a risk. Yeah, there have been some rumblings

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<v Speaker 1>of potential attacks. I saw something in um der Spiegel

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<v Speaker 1>this morning about possibly a hack of satellites that might

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<v Speaker 1>have been impacting Ukraine. So there are sort of rumblings

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<v Speaker 1>of this, uh, you know, some accusations lurking in the background,

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<v Speaker 1>but we haven't seen anything. Let's say, we haven't seen

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<v Speaker 1>anything major yet. And I feel like cyber security risks,

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<v Speaker 1>it's one of those things that you you always see

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<v Speaker 1>people mention as a sort of left tail risk. You

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<v Speaker 1>see lots of analyst notes about it, but no one

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<v Speaker 1>really talks about it in concrete terms. It always seems

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<v Speaker 1>to be just this vague threat lurking in the background. Yes,

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<v Speaker 1>and I think it's in part because, as you exactly say,

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<v Speaker 1>no one precisely knows what it would look like. Um.

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<v Speaker 1>I mean, obviously, companies are regularly getting hacked. We've seen

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<v Speaker 1>an increase over the years, and malware and ransomware, and

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<v Speaker 1>companies losing data, companies having to pay to bring factories

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<v Speaker 1>and infrastructure back online. Of course, I think it was

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<v Speaker 1>late or maybe early last year there was that pipeline

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<v Speaker 1>on the central part of the United States. So these

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<v Speaker 1>things recur, but I think it's very nebulous what that

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<v Speaker 1>risk actually looks like. So today I'm very pleased to

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<v Speaker 1>say we're going to try to get a firmer handle

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<v Speaker 1>on what cyber warfare risk might actually look like, and

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<v Speaker 1>we're gonna do it maybe a little bit differently um

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<v Speaker 1>to what we normally do. But today on the show,

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<v Speaker 1>we're gonna be talking to a hacker about what it

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<v Speaker 1>actually means to, you know, do cyber warfare to hack

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<v Speaker 1>into someone's systems, what the threat actually looks like, and

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<v Speaker 1>what is possible from a technological perspective. I'm really looking

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<v Speaker 1>forward to this sort of different from our normal path,

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<v Speaker 1>but of something important to be uh, to learn more that. Yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>so we're going to be speaking with Matt Swish. He

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<v Speaker 1>is the founder of Komi and incident response startup based

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<v Speaker 1>in Dubai, which is where I met him, and I

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<v Speaker 1>have to say he's definitely an expert on all of us. Matt,

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<v Speaker 1>Welcome to the show. Hi Trici, Hi Joe. Thanks for

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<v Speaker 1>inviting me. Looking forward talking with you about what cyber

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<v Speaker 1>war might look like. Yeah, so you have a bit

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<v Speaker 1>of expertise in this. I mean not just from the

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<v Speaker 1>hacking perspective, but uh, there are some Russian hackers who

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<v Speaker 1>seem to be obsessed with you. Is that right? Uh? Yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>so I assume you're referrain to the group called the

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<v Speaker 1>Shadow Brokers that mentioned me like few years back. Yeah.

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<v Speaker 1>So just for background, Uh, Matt and I met when

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<v Speaker 1>I was working in Abu Dhabi and Dubai. And this

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<v Speaker 1>was back when Shadow Brokers had a major um attack

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<v Speaker 1>and there was a lot of talk about them, and

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<v Speaker 1>they allegedly were a Russian group of hackers and they

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<v Speaker 1>seem to really I don't know, just focus on you, Matt. Yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>So I guess like one of the main reasons for

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<v Speaker 1>the focus at the time was mainly due to the

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<v Speaker 1>fact that I was analyzing a lot of the documents

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<v Speaker 1>that they were releasing. To date, that's one of the

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<v Speaker 1>group that released some of the most significant documents in

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<v Speaker 1>cyber security, like partly as significant as the snow Don

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<v Speaker 1>documents to give some context for the audience. And as

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<v Speaker 1>part of the release, they release operational notes and exploits

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<v Speaker 1>that belonged to the US government, particularly to the n ESSAY,

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<v Speaker 1>which is the Man intelligence agency in the US, where

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<v Speaker 1>they were exposing US intelligence capabilities. So those documents were released.

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<v Speaker 1>I was of the many people who are like analyzing

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<v Speaker 1>them and uh and like human and like you said,

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<v Speaker 1>you know, they've been mentioning me a few times so far.

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<v Speaker 1>Like the man assumption is that that group is affiliated

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<v Speaker 1>to the Rusian government, and like many times you know,

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<v Speaker 1>and that we I'm sure we're gonna talk about it

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<v Speaker 1>more in details. With cyber it's very out to know

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<v Speaker 1>who is doing what. Sometimes it texts years to find

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<v Speaker 1>enough evidence. Sometimes like governments know about something, but they

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<v Speaker 1>would not necessarily like released the information because they may

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<v Speaker 1>burn some source that they have to collect additional intelligence.

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<v Speaker 1>So it's always like very complicated when it comes to cyber,

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<v Speaker 1>especially with attribution. So usually you have to use the

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<v Speaker 1>common sense. But in terms of timing, these shadow bookers

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<v Speaker 1>were really active around twenty seventeen, which is around the

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<v Speaker 1>time where we start to see a lot of attacks

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<v Speaker 1>from Russia and Ukraine. Also when you say attribution is difficult,

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<v Speaker 1>I mean intuitively, of course that makes a lot of sense.

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<v Speaker 1>What are the type of evidence or what do the

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<v Speaker 1>certain like fingerprints, because you hear that a lot, there's

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<v Speaker 1>a hag and people suspect often suspect Russians, sometimes Chinese.

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<v Speaker 1>Are there certain characteristics of attacks or certain things you

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<v Speaker 1>look at to start to sort of engauge the origin

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<v Speaker 1>of an attacker. Uh, yeah, definitely, Like different attackers have

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<v Speaker 1>different motives and different groups organized that differently. So when

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<v Speaker 1>it comes to hear when we're talking about hackers, who

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<v Speaker 1>are talking about national states. We're not talking about someone

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<v Speaker 1>who's like alone in the bedroom trying to haick a

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<v Speaker 1>video game. Right, So, just to make sure it's clear

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<v Speaker 1>for the audience, who are talking about nation states carrying

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<v Speaker 1>uh intelligence, all military operations against other like nation states

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<v Speaker 1>companies sometimes critically critical infrastructures. Uh So when it comes

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<v Speaker 1>down to what it looks like in terms of fingerprints

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<v Speaker 1>when you're doing an investigation, uh, it is a good

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<v Speaker 1>question because at the beginning in the introdution chat, you're

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<v Speaker 1>wondering what cyber war, cyber warfare might look like, and

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<v Speaker 1>there's this conception that people have that cyber war is

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<v Speaker 1>going to be like completely different, something we haven't seen before,

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<v Speaker 1>that you know, it's just going to be like in

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<v Speaker 1>the medieval time where you see like people riding a

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<v Speaker 1>horse and instead of having salts, you know, they're gonna

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<v Speaker 1>have vented us and they're gonna start stabbing each other,

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<v Speaker 1>and then you use that as forensic evidence. The reality

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<v Speaker 1>is we have been seeing a lot of those happening

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<v Speaker 1>over the past years, probably more than ten years. You know,

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<v Speaker 1>like even back in the two thousand's when China acts Google,

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<v Speaker 1>you know that was a prettier signific come to one,

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<v Speaker 1>and that was one of the first time we saw

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<v Speaker 1>nation state attacking like an actual company and being able

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<v Speaker 1>to track it. So what we have been seeing more

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<v Speaker 1>and more is often like patterns between attacks, but also

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<v Speaker 1>like motives. So whenever it comes to attacks on critical

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<v Speaker 1>infrastructure in UH, let's say like Ukraine, so there is

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<v Speaker 1>a very short list of suspects that comes to mind.

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<v Speaker 1>Same thing when there's an attack happening like not Petya

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<v Speaker 1>in twenty seventeen that gets that gets released on the

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<v Speaker 1>independence day, So often, like the timing is very suspicious.

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<v Speaker 1>Same thing with the article that you mentioned that you

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<v Speaker 1>thought this morning, Tracy, with the asset, which is an

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<v Speaker 1>American company, when the satellites have been like UH attacked,

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<v Speaker 1>like the initial suspicion back so we're talking like back

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<v Speaker 1>on February twenty four when like around the same time

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<v Speaker 1>of the invasion. One of the suspicion was while that's

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<v Speaker 1>happening the same day that Russia is invading a crane,

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<v Speaker 1>so that was also one of the susipicition. So often

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<v Speaker 1>you would use the common sense when it comes to

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<v Speaker 1>a national state attackers, and then you would backtrack based

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<v Speaker 1>on what you have found and see if your assumption

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<v Speaker 1>makes sense or not. But it can be you would

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<v Speaker 1>find a malaware that's on the on the system. And

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<v Speaker 1>in some cases, like people kind of assumed that once

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<v Speaker 1>you are hacked, you know, like your screen is gonna

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<v Speaker 1>change color, is gonna become red or green most of

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<v Speaker 1>the time, like Cyberry is often used for like intelligence gathering,

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<v Speaker 1>so you not even know that people are in your system. Uh.

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<v Speaker 1>In some cases it may take like years before an attacker,

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<v Speaker 1>uh affected, So when you get hacked, a face doesn't

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<v Speaker 1>come up on your screen and start laughing exactly. Okay,

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<v Speaker 1>so now you know Joe um So you mentioned Matt

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<v Speaker 1>that this has been ongoing for some time, and this

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<v Speaker 1>is something that I've wondered about for a long time.

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<v Speaker 1>But why, I mean, if you know that Russia is

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<v Speaker 1>doing a lot of hacking, I mean along with some

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<v Speaker 1>other countries like China, North Korea maybe, but you know

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<v Speaker 1>that this is happening, why do nation states tolerated, Like

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<v Speaker 1>why hasn't this become a bigger area of concern for

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<v Speaker 1>the US in recent years? Or is it that it

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<v Speaker 1>is a major area of concern? But we just don't

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<v Speaker 1>see the response because it's all happening, you know, at

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<v Speaker 1>the back end of technological systems and UM with the

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<v Speaker 1>n s A and you know in sort of secret offices. Uh,

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<v Speaker 1>it is a good question. Actually it is happening. If

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<v Speaker 1>you go on the like the State Department website, you're

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<v Speaker 1>gonna find a lot of indictment against like like for instance,

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<v Speaker 1>like Russian officers that work for the g r U

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<v Speaker 1>or other like intelligence agencies. So for instance, like a

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<v Speaker 1>lot of the attacks on the twenties seventeen, there is

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<v Speaker 1>an indictment where six officers are being mentioned for a

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<v Speaker 1>lot of the damage that they have done, including like

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<v Speaker 1>the Olympic Games that have been you know, one of

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<v Speaker 1>the targets, including like the visitors, the host of the

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<v Speaker 1>Olympic Games, one of the electricity grid in Ukraine being

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<v Speaker 1>in target. Also the election in France at that time

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<v Speaker 1>when the emails from Emmanuel mcron had been released. H

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<v Speaker 1>t V five months also, which was a TV channel

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<v Speaker 1>that was acted in the past, you know, it was

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<v Speaker 1>linked to the delusion government. So the actual uh, proof

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<v Speaker 1>and accusation have been like published. A lot of it

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<v Speaker 1>is usually like policy work and don't done at a

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<v Speaker 1>political level. So that would explain why it takes so

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<v Speaker 1>much time and often very little UH can be done

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<v Speaker 1>in a short period of time, and often what we

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<v Speaker 1>would see in response would be sanctions on some of

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<v Speaker 1>the governments. So it is happening, but I think it's

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<v Speaker 1>happening at the pace where there are so many attacks

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<v Speaker 1>happening from different countries, like you mentioned like North Korea, friends,

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<v Speaker 1>and that had been like very active mostly for like

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<v Speaker 1>financial gains, like we remember the attack of the Central

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<v Speaker 1>Bank of Bangladesh for instance, where they try to steal

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<v Speaker 1>like one billion dollars uh, and we're money launde being

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<v Speaker 1>like happened in casinos in the Philippines. So like a

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<v Speaker 1>lot of information is public and non around like modus

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<v Speaker 1>apparently from like different like either groups that are working

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<v Speaker 1>independently or like some independently like for like a national state.

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<v Speaker 1>But it's such a complex problem that it's very up

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<v Speaker 1>to fix a bit like conflict all around the world.

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<v Speaker 1>So a nightmare scenario in the US. But I guess,

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<v Speaker 1>but anywhere is this idea of they're gonna hackers could

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<v Speaker 1>shut down critical infrastructure. Maybe the grid in New York

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<v Speaker 1>City just goes dark because of some hack attack? Is

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<v Speaker 1>that a realistic threat in your view? I mean that

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<v Speaker 1>I think comes to mind or we can't log in

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<v Speaker 1>to our banks or how like big pieces of infrastructure

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<v Speaker 1>that could disrupt society. He is that a plausible threat?

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<v Speaker 1>And be is that something that these types of hacker

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<v Speaker 1>groups are could could conceivably work on? Uh? Yeah, No, definitely.

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<v Speaker 1>And like I mentioned before, it happened in the past

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<v Speaker 1>with the Ukrainian like power grids. It happened like you know,

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<v Speaker 1>like in twenty fifteen and six at some point the

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<v Speaker 1>electricity like grid was down for like a few hours.

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<v Speaker 1>But one of the things to keep in mind is,

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<v Speaker 1>like I asked, those attacks have been happening over the

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<v Speaker 1>past ten years. Defense capabilities, you know also from like

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<v Speaker 1>different companies and like countries also like became more and

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<v Speaker 1>more um efficient because on one side you have the

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<v Speaker 1>attack curs that are like publishing their craft and becoming

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<v Speaker 1>more efficient. But also on the defense side, people are

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<v Speaker 1>becoming more aware of what of attack to expect. They're

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<v Speaker 1>becoming more resilient, like if something happens, you know, like

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<v Speaker 1>if any incident happens, like or do you investigate it?

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<v Speaker 1>So that's what you would usually call like incident response,

0:15:11.040 --> 0:15:14.440
<v Speaker 1>but also like all the recover like a system for

0:15:14.560 --> 0:15:19.720
<v Speaker 1>especially for like critical infrastructure, so regarding targeting like a

0:15:19.840 --> 0:15:23.840
<v Speaker 1>critical infrastructure. So we saw it like around two weeks

0:15:23.880 --> 0:15:27.000
<v Speaker 1>ago with the satellites, So with that company, Yea said,

0:15:27.440 --> 0:15:32.160
<v Speaker 1>So a lot of the actual like users that have

0:15:32.240 --> 0:15:37.280
<v Speaker 1>been targeted were like partly the Ukrainian military. So that's uh,

0:15:37.400 --> 0:15:41.200
<v Speaker 1>one of the attempts of like interfering with the infrastructure

0:15:41.360 --> 0:15:44.880
<v Speaker 1>for of like the target to like kind of slow

0:15:44.960 --> 0:15:50.320
<v Speaker 1>down or make communication like more difficult. But during that

0:15:50.320 --> 0:15:53.960
<v Speaker 1>that hack, you know, like unexpectedly like there's like three

0:15:54.000 --> 0:15:58.600
<v Speaker 1>thousands like wind, like when the turbines in Germany that

0:15:59.320 --> 0:16:03.080
<v Speaker 1>where should on you know, as like like the German

0:16:03.120 --> 0:16:08.440
<v Speaker 1>government was calling it cyber collateral damage, you know. Um,

0:16:08.480 --> 0:16:11.560
<v Speaker 1>so sometimes it may come in unexpected ways. But in

0:16:11.640 --> 0:16:17.520
<v Speaker 1>that scenario, what it meant is the access Internet was

0:16:17.560 --> 0:16:21.920
<v Speaker 1>not available anymore. But the actual electoral buying for instance,

0:16:22.240 --> 0:16:25.080
<v Speaker 1>why not damaged. It is just the communication link. You know.

0:16:25.160 --> 0:16:27.920
<v Speaker 1>It's like if someone would shut down like a cell

0:16:27.960 --> 0:16:29.960
<v Speaker 1>phone tower, it will not damage your phone, you will

0:16:30.040 --> 0:16:33.000
<v Speaker 1>just not be able to communicate. And we saw that

0:16:33.080 --> 0:16:36.200
<v Speaker 1>also at the beginning of the invasion, because there also

0:16:36.280 --> 0:16:40.840
<v Speaker 1>tis very weird aspect of the Russian military since the

0:16:40.880 --> 0:16:43.880
<v Speaker 1>beginning of the invasion, and that's kind of why a

0:16:43.880 --> 0:16:46.960
<v Speaker 1>lot of people are a bit uh skeptical on the

0:16:47.400 --> 0:16:51.240
<v Speaker 1>planning and the logistics of the Russian military on that

0:16:51.360 --> 0:16:55.720
<v Speaker 1>aspect is mostly around communications. They are still not necessarily

0:16:55.800 --> 0:16:59.160
<v Speaker 1>like using like military equipment. They still use like an

0:16:59.160 --> 0:17:02.000
<v Speaker 1>a lot of communication, but also like cell phones with

0:17:02.080 --> 0:17:06.320
<v Speaker 1>like Russian numbers. So at some point some of the

0:17:06.440 --> 0:17:11.800
<v Speaker 1>Ukrainian tell co Operato rejected like Russian numbers and they

0:17:11.800 --> 0:17:13.880
<v Speaker 1>were not able to communicate, and that to take over

0:17:14.040 --> 0:17:16.239
<v Speaker 1>a cell phone of civilians just to be able to

0:17:16.440 --> 0:17:18.919
<v Speaker 1>still communicate with each other. Well, there's a lot of

0:17:21.000 --> 0:17:25.000
<v Speaker 1>uh like communication aspect obviously when you conduct like a

0:17:25.040 --> 0:17:28.879
<v Speaker 1>military operation so like, and that's a completely different field.

0:17:28.920 --> 0:17:32.639
<v Speaker 1>You know, that's not not my specialty. But we do

0:17:32.720 --> 0:17:35.760
<v Speaker 1>see it happening because cyber war on its own does

0:17:35.800 --> 0:17:38.080
<v Speaker 1>not really like exist, you know, like cyber is a

0:17:38.119 --> 0:17:41.080
<v Speaker 1>component of war, and that's what we're seeing now. So

0:17:41.200 --> 0:17:44.520
<v Speaker 1>instead of seeing like a conventional war, we see like

0:17:44.680 --> 0:17:48.560
<v Speaker 1>this hybrid warfare happening in front of our eyes, where

0:17:48.600 --> 0:17:52.080
<v Speaker 1>like there's multiple aspect to it and a lot of

0:17:52.119 --> 0:17:55.320
<v Speaker 1>the actual attacks that we have seen also with Russia,

0:17:55.680 --> 0:17:58.720
<v Speaker 1>and that Russia is probably well known for and I'm

0:17:58.720 --> 0:18:02.920
<v Speaker 1>sure as journalists you're like yeah, like familiar with it

0:18:02.960 --> 0:18:06.440
<v Speaker 1>is also like disinformation and misinformation, like we have seen

0:18:07.160 --> 0:18:11.359
<v Speaker 1>what they call like active measures being used for a

0:18:11.359 --> 0:18:14.919
<v Speaker 1>long long time Russia today and Sputnik news have been

0:18:14.960 --> 0:18:19.000
<v Speaker 1>like banned in the EU now. So it took like

0:18:19.119 --> 0:18:22.360
<v Speaker 1>the invasion you know, of any Ropean country for them

0:18:22.400 --> 0:18:25.159
<v Speaker 1>to shut down those media. So, like to answer your

0:18:25.200 --> 0:18:26.960
<v Speaker 1>question of before like how come we don't see like

0:18:27.040 --> 0:18:31.720
<v Speaker 1>more thanks response from the governments, Well, that's a perfect example,

0:18:31.840 --> 0:18:35.679
<v Speaker 1>like we knew that was happening and it took the

0:18:35.720 --> 0:18:38.080
<v Speaker 1>invasion of an European country for them to do something

0:18:38.119 --> 0:18:42.000
<v Speaker 1>about it. Yeah. Um, I want to ask you this

0:18:42.040 --> 0:18:44.040
<v Speaker 1>is it might be a tricky question, I don't know,

0:18:44.119 --> 0:18:46.840
<v Speaker 1>but could you maybe walk us through a timeline of

0:18:47.080 --> 0:18:51.520
<v Speaker 1>what actually happens if say a nation state like Russia

0:18:51.640 --> 0:18:56.520
<v Speaker 1>hypothetically launches some store let's say some sort of malware

0:18:56.640 --> 0:19:05.359
<v Speaker 1>attack on a West Earn company or infrastructure utility type

0:19:05.400 --> 0:19:09.000
<v Speaker 1>thing like what happened? So the attack starts and then

0:19:09.040 --> 0:19:11.840
<v Speaker 1>can you walk us through what the actual response looks

0:19:11.880 --> 0:19:17.640
<v Speaker 1>like and when the attack stops. Uh yeah, I can't

0:19:17.640 --> 0:19:22.959
<v Speaker 1>even give you an example. So around Christmas, there is

0:19:23.000 --> 0:19:27.560
<v Speaker 1>a company called Solar Winds that was targeted. I think

0:19:27.560 --> 0:19:33.080
<v Speaker 1>it targeted earned like twenty thousands of their customers. So

0:19:34.119 --> 0:19:37.840
<v Speaker 1>and uh the and you have to keep in mind,

0:19:37.880 --> 0:19:41.320
<v Speaker 1>so like let's say, like you have twenty thou you know,

0:19:41.400 --> 0:19:45.159
<v Speaker 1>customers companies using the same software, and that was a

0:19:45.200 --> 0:19:48.240
<v Speaker 1>massive problem. Uh. It means that all of them have

0:19:48.320 --> 0:19:51.080
<v Speaker 1>been hacked. So what happened is what they did is

0:19:51.119 --> 0:19:53.840
<v Speaker 1>what we call the supply chain attack, you know, where

0:19:53.880 --> 0:19:57.320
<v Speaker 1>they managed to distribute a man issues update to all

0:19:57.359 --> 0:20:01.280
<v Speaker 1>their customers and whenever that update has distributed to all

0:20:01.320 --> 0:20:05.280
<v Speaker 1>their customers, that was their infection vector for all of

0:20:05.320 --> 0:20:09.920
<v Speaker 1>those companies. And that was partly, like to date, the

0:20:10.000 --> 0:20:17.480
<v Speaker 1>largest hack of foreign countries. That was uh your um,

0:20:18.520 --> 0:20:22.399
<v Speaker 1>your scandal obviously. Uh Like the White House blamed the

0:20:23.040 --> 0:20:28.360
<v Speaker 1>SVR agencies, which is like the foreign intelligence agency of

0:20:28.400 --> 0:20:35.280
<v Speaker 1>Russia for that attack. Uh So in that case, Uh yeah,

0:20:35.520 --> 0:20:39.400
<v Speaker 1>governments have been blaming, blaming and pointing fingers to Russia.

0:20:39.880 --> 0:20:43.840
<v Speaker 1>But out of that we didn't see like Munch coming

0:20:43.880 --> 0:20:47.879
<v Speaker 1>out of it. Uh in that case, and uh, in

0:20:48.000 --> 0:20:52.439
<v Speaker 1>that scenario, it took one cyber security company to be

0:20:52.520 --> 0:20:55.600
<v Speaker 1>a victim that I found out that they have been

0:20:55.640 --> 0:20:59.080
<v Speaker 1>infected by luck, and then more and more people started

0:20:59.119 --> 0:21:03.879
<v Speaker 1>to investigate and they realize, oh wow, like eighteen customers

0:21:03.880 --> 0:21:07.800
<v Speaker 1>from that company have been targeting and the madaware was

0:21:07.880 --> 0:21:12.720
<v Speaker 1>like spreading undetected. Our company is good at sharing cyber

0:21:12.840 --> 0:21:16.280
<v Speaker 1>information with each other because it is such a sensitive

0:21:16.320 --> 0:21:18.840
<v Speaker 1>topic and when you're under attack. On on the one hand,

0:21:18.880 --> 0:21:21.320
<v Speaker 1>I imagine you don't necessarily want to broadcast it to

0:21:21.359 --> 0:21:24.280
<v Speaker 1>the world. But on the other hand, you could argue

0:21:24.320 --> 0:21:27.479
<v Speaker 1>that you have a responsibility um to your customers clearly,

0:21:27.520 --> 0:21:31.760
<v Speaker 1>but also to other companies to flag a threat that

0:21:31.920 --> 0:21:37.560
<v Speaker 1>is actually happening. Yeah, very good question. Actually. Uh So

0:21:37.600 --> 0:21:41.920
<v Speaker 1>in the case of Solar Winds, Uh, if that cybersecurity

0:21:42.000 --> 0:21:45.280
<v Speaker 1>company that was a victim of the heck, UH didn't

0:21:45.440 --> 0:21:48.400
<v Speaker 1>raise the alarm saying all we found this, that's suspicious.

0:21:48.400 --> 0:21:50.680
<v Speaker 1>You know, then like people photoed up and that's like

0:21:50.800 --> 0:21:55.280
<v Speaker 1>you're mad where we found it present in other places? Uh,

0:21:55.480 --> 0:21:57.800
<v Speaker 1>people would not have been able to conclude that so

0:21:57.880 --> 0:22:02.520
<v Speaker 1>many customers were targeted. And in that scenario, like you're saying,

0:22:02.520 --> 0:22:08.360
<v Speaker 1>like the information sharing was very beneficial often for cyber security.

0:22:08.440 --> 0:22:10.359
<v Speaker 1>So you have like few companies that are like the

0:22:10.400 --> 0:22:16.199
<v Speaker 1>anti virus providers or endpoint security companies that have a

0:22:16.200 --> 0:22:19.280
<v Speaker 1>lot of visibility because of the telemetry they have on

0:22:19.400 --> 0:22:23.080
<v Speaker 1>millions of machines. So for them it's pretty good too

0:22:23.520 --> 0:22:28.160
<v Speaker 1>and pretty easy to see if something new like happens.

0:22:28.200 --> 0:22:31.320
<v Speaker 1>You know, in the case of Microsoft now which is

0:22:31.359 --> 0:22:34.879
<v Speaker 1>probably like the biggest cyber security company in the world,

0:22:35.280 --> 0:22:40.720
<v Speaker 1>are ironically they're very very good telemetry before the invasion.

0:22:41.359 --> 0:22:46.760
<v Speaker 1>So a wiper, which is a malaware that's designed to

0:22:46.960 --> 0:22:52.360
<v Speaker 1>erase the computer, was detected. So a few different security

0:22:52.440 --> 0:22:56.920
<v Speaker 1>vendors managed to detect it. Microsoft was one of them.

0:22:57.880 --> 0:23:00.160
<v Speaker 1>Because that's really good telemetry, they were able to take

0:23:00.280 --> 0:23:03.600
<v Speaker 1>it within like a few hours. Uh in that case.

0:23:03.680 --> 0:23:06.320
<v Speaker 1>You know, like what we noticed so far when it

0:23:06.320 --> 0:23:09.719
<v Speaker 1>comes to like cyber is there is a huge focus

0:23:09.800 --> 0:23:15.680
<v Speaker 1>on cyber before the war become actually kinetic, so either

0:23:15.760 --> 0:23:22.240
<v Speaker 1>to destabilize the enemy or to uh gather information. How

0:23:22.320 --> 0:23:25.199
<v Speaker 1>often you know you mentioned and I remember that the

0:23:25.240 --> 0:23:29.480
<v Speaker 1>Solar winds hack that used a patch uptake to distribute

0:23:29.480 --> 0:23:34.480
<v Speaker 1>mailware too solar winds clads. How often are cyber security

0:23:34.520 --> 0:23:40.240
<v Speaker 1>companies themselves the target of hackers? And this this you know,

0:23:40.320 --> 0:23:44.040
<v Speaker 1>this technique of using a cyber security update PADG to

0:23:44.160 --> 0:23:47.480
<v Speaker 1>distribute mailware? How common is that? And how interest in general?

0:23:47.480 --> 0:23:50.760
<v Speaker 1>How much of these companies themselves the target of attacks?

0:23:52.680 --> 0:23:56.000
<v Speaker 1>A very good questions? So so they are? And often

0:23:56.000 --> 0:23:58.560
<v Speaker 1>does it happen for like security companies to be like

0:23:58.640 --> 0:24:03.919
<v Speaker 1>targets Really happens all the time because of the assets

0:24:04.840 --> 0:24:07.680
<v Speaker 1>that they have, they're like toolings, like the tools, you know,

0:24:08.160 --> 0:24:12.240
<v Speaker 1>all the human resources they have, you know that could

0:24:12.280 --> 0:24:18.080
<v Speaker 1>include being targeted that conference or not. Uh, Like I

0:24:18.119 --> 0:24:22.080
<v Speaker 1>was like I was giving an example to to two traces.

0:24:22.160 --> 0:24:24.920
<v Speaker 1>So for instance, I was supposed to give a keynote

0:24:24.960 --> 0:24:29.320
<v Speaker 1>at security conference in Russia a few years ago before COVID.

0:24:29.600 --> 0:24:32.800
<v Speaker 1>So when you're before COVID, and I got denied of

0:24:33.000 --> 0:24:37.560
<v Speaker 1>entry uh in Russia, so at the airport. So I

0:24:37.600 --> 0:24:42.119
<v Speaker 1>was not able to deliver the keynote at that conference. Uh.

0:24:42.280 --> 0:24:45.720
<v Speaker 1>The official reason is because my visa was not valid.

0:24:46.560 --> 0:24:48.199
<v Speaker 1>Although I told them, I was like, you're the one

0:24:48.240 --> 0:24:49.760
<v Speaker 1>we shoot meet the visa. What do you mean it's

0:24:49.800 --> 0:24:52.760
<v Speaker 1>not valid? You know? And that I to fly back

0:24:52.800 --> 0:24:57.320
<v Speaker 1>on the next flight back to Dubai. So in that case,

0:24:57.359 --> 0:25:00.800
<v Speaker 1>you know, like uh and fun. You know, like there's

0:25:00.800 --> 0:25:04.040
<v Speaker 1>always stories in security conferences were like security researchers you know,

0:25:04.160 --> 0:25:07.639
<v Speaker 1>like are either like being followed or like someone like

0:25:07.720 --> 0:25:11.320
<v Speaker 1>quenty into like the hotel room. You know, there's a

0:25:11.320 --> 0:25:14.560
<v Speaker 1>bunch of like different stories like that. So when it

0:25:14.600 --> 0:25:18.080
<v Speaker 1>comes to like often like security companies or security researchers

0:25:18.080 --> 0:25:21.119
<v Speaker 1>are being targets, it happens a lot. It also happened

0:25:21.119 --> 0:25:24.320
<v Speaker 1>like last year where like a bunch of security researchers

0:25:24.359 --> 0:25:30.240
<v Speaker 1>were like active targets by North Korean hackers mostly like

0:25:30.359 --> 0:25:33.280
<v Speaker 1>to try to steal like tools from them or if

0:25:33.440 --> 0:25:37.480
<v Speaker 1>if they had any exploits. So for the audience and

0:25:37.640 --> 0:25:43.800
<v Speaker 1>exploit is what like groups or nation states can use

0:25:43.920 --> 0:25:47.360
<v Speaker 1>to directly like target the machine so they can get

0:25:47.680 --> 0:25:50.600
<v Speaker 1>an authorized access to a machine. So usually they have

0:25:51.119 --> 0:25:55.080
<v Speaker 1>if you have a security nobility in the software and

0:25:55.240 --> 0:25:58.080
<v Speaker 1>you have the software that can take advantage of it,

0:25:58.160 --> 0:26:00.480
<v Speaker 1>that's what we call an exploit. You have different tagories

0:26:00.560 --> 0:26:03.679
<v Speaker 1>of them, including what we callect zero. They exploit that

0:26:04.160 --> 0:26:07.919
<v Speaker 1>even software providers and not to wear off. So that

0:26:07.960 --> 0:26:12.159
<v Speaker 1>could be like Microsoft happened, and in some cases it

0:26:12.240 --> 0:26:16.679
<v Speaker 1>may even not even require like any user interaction to

0:26:16.840 --> 0:26:21.040
<v Speaker 1>be enabled. And in the case of the national state

0:26:21.960 --> 0:26:25.280
<v Speaker 1>type of hacking, because that requires a lot of R

0:26:25.320 --> 0:26:28.480
<v Speaker 1>and D, it is very expensive. Some of those exploits

0:26:28.480 --> 0:26:31.600
<v Speaker 1>like go for selling the like gray market for like

0:26:31.640 --> 0:26:35.520
<v Speaker 1>millions of dollars. And also like it's very complicated to

0:26:35.600 --> 0:26:38.960
<v Speaker 1>do because unlike traditional weapons, that's not something that you

0:26:39.000 --> 0:26:43.560
<v Speaker 1>can replicate. Each security vulnerability bug is going to be different,

0:26:44.200 --> 0:26:47.320
<v Speaker 1>and it requires a specific set of skill set to

0:26:47.320 --> 0:26:50.479
<v Speaker 1>be able to find and write an exploit. So in

0:26:50.520 --> 0:26:54.600
<v Speaker 1>the case of a full on like cyber war, a

0:26:54.640 --> 0:26:58.760
<v Speaker 1>lot of people were kind of expecting countries to stop

0:26:58.800 --> 0:27:01.440
<v Speaker 1>to use like exp it like left and right at

0:27:01.480 --> 0:27:06.879
<v Speaker 1>each other. But to go back to your other questions, Uh,

0:27:07.000 --> 0:27:10.240
<v Speaker 1>it's something that's very difficult to measure because it's not

0:27:10.359 --> 0:27:15.480
<v Speaker 1>like proper unit of measures for like often it happens,

0:27:15.600 --> 0:27:18.320
<v Speaker 1>that's only like when you know it happens, it's only

0:27:18.359 --> 0:27:23.119
<v Speaker 1>a small subset of the information that you have. Sometimes like, uh,

0:27:23.560 --> 0:27:26.760
<v Speaker 1>what's happening over the past two weeks and over the

0:27:26.800 --> 0:27:30.560
<v Speaker 1>next month, I'm pretty sure we're still gonna be analyzing it,

0:27:31.359 --> 0:27:36.080
<v Speaker 1>Like you know in three four years. Um, like some

0:27:36.160 --> 0:27:39.119
<v Speaker 1>of the tours that have been released by the Shadow Bokers,

0:27:39.320 --> 0:27:41.040
<v Speaker 1>a lot of the exploits were like four or five

0:27:41.119 --> 0:27:44.119
<v Speaker 1>years old in that case, and when they got released,

0:27:44.119 --> 0:27:48.119
<v Speaker 1>you know, it was uh, you know, like pretty it

0:27:48.200 --> 0:27:50.760
<v Speaker 1>got a lot of attention. Some of them have been

0:27:50.800 --> 0:27:54.760
<v Speaker 1>even like repurpose into some new malwares, including not Petia,

0:27:54.840 --> 0:27:58.959
<v Speaker 1>which will start getting Ukraine at the time. Um. So

0:27:59.040 --> 0:28:03.920
<v Speaker 1>it's very difficult to you have, yeah, pretty ironic. It's

0:28:04.000 --> 0:28:06.520
<v Speaker 1>it's pretty difficult to have like data on those things.

0:28:06.600 --> 0:28:09.199
<v Speaker 1>And keep in mind, like like you said before, when

0:28:09.240 --> 0:28:11.560
<v Speaker 1>you get hacked, you know, you don't get like some

0:28:11.720 --> 0:28:14.600
<v Speaker 1>face like showing up on your screen and some guy laughing.

0:28:14.880 --> 0:28:18.480
<v Speaker 1>But it is very important to uh to highlight actually

0:28:18.520 --> 0:28:24.240
<v Speaker 1>because cyber is mostly used for intelligence, so you want

0:28:24.320 --> 0:28:27.520
<v Speaker 1>to know what your target is doing, unless you just

0:28:27.560 --> 0:28:30.080
<v Speaker 1>want to steal money. You know, that's a completely different

0:28:30.080 --> 0:28:33.239
<v Speaker 1>category of cyber attack. So like do you have a

0:28:33.240 --> 0:28:35.639
<v Speaker 1>clear girl, you know what you're like, Okay, money's gone now,

0:28:35.840 --> 0:28:39.080
<v Speaker 1>Like if a crypto exchange is being hacked or Swift

0:28:39.480 --> 0:28:42.680
<v Speaker 1>service Brewer is being hacked, but most of the time

0:28:42.840 --> 0:28:46.720
<v Speaker 1>it is for intelligence and whenever you have access somewhere,

0:28:47.160 --> 0:28:49.720
<v Speaker 1>you want to make sure you keep your access. So

0:28:50.000 --> 0:28:55.880
<v Speaker 1>whatever though you use to enter the machines that you've

0:28:55.920 --> 0:28:59.280
<v Speaker 1>been targeting and where you are like feeling from in

0:28:59.400 --> 0:29:02.640
<v Speaker 1>terms of intelli agents, you don't want to lose that access.

0:29:02.720 --> 0:29:05.840
<v Speaker 1>And that's also one of the big suspicion, Like there

0:29:05.960 --> 0:29:10.240
<v Speaker 1>is cyber There are cyber attacks happening now, uh partly

0:29:10.280 --> 0:29:14.360
<v Speaker 1>on both sides, but we don't necessarily see them. In January,

0:29:14.520 --> 0:29:20.040
<v Speaker 1>there is uh a betar Russian group called the Cyberpartisan.

0:29:20.600 --> 0:29:23.720
<v Speaker 1>I don't know if you've heard about them, but they

0:29:23.720 --> 0:29:29.800
<v Speaker 1>are very organized, like they're all like independent, all anonymous, descentralized,

0:29:30.600 --> 0:29:34.720
<v Speaker 1>uh like twenty to thirty people. But what they did

0:29:34.760 --> 0:29:38.240
<v Speaker 1>back in January, when they started to see that Russia

0:29:38.360 --> 0:29:45.280
<v Speaker 1>started to ship military equipment from better Belarus, they started

0:29:45.320 --> 0:29:51.440
<v Speaker 1>to target the railway system of Belarrors. And this is

0:29:51.600 --> 0:29:56.680
<v Speaker 1>pretty interesting and very uh important to notice because so

0:29:56.760 --> 0:29:59.720
<v Speaker 1>far when you hear about like independent groups, you know

0:29:59.840 --> 0:30:04.920
<v Speaker 1>can of like radiated like counter attacking or doing something

0:30:05.200 --> 0:30:09.959
<v Speaker 1>mostly like shutting down website, changing a website. Here you

0:30:10.000 --> 0:30:14.520
<v Speaker 1>have an independent group that actually managed to create a

0:30:14.600 --> 0:30:20.760
<v Speaker 1>dent into like a big enemy to affect their logistics.

0:30:21.160 --> 0:30:25.400
<v Speaker 1>So by slowing down while by shutting down the railway system,

0:30:25.440 --> 0:30:30.480
<v Speaker 1>they were able to slow down the transportation of military equipment.

0:30:31.320 --> 0:30:36.640
<v Speaker 1>And the second objective, which is like suspected, is also

0:30:36.720 --> 0:30:40.160
<v Speaker 1>to create a doubt with the enemy in that case,

0:30:40.640 --> 0:30:45.600
<v Speaker 1>with versia, with the leadership, so to show that the

0:30:46.000 --> 0:30:51.120
<v Speaker 1>belaration UH allies was not were not necessarily like that reliable,

0:30:52.040 --> 0:30:58.280
<v Speaker 1>but also on their side once they realized that it

0:30:58.400 --> 0:31:01.920
<v Speaker 1>actually had been hacked, to create a doubt, saying while

0:31:02.000 --> 0:31:05.320
<v Speaker 1>if the railway system have been hacked, what Mexa on

0:31:05.560 --> 0:31:08.000
<v Speaker 1>railway system like immune to such an attack, So they

0:31:08.000 --> 0:31:10.360
<v Speaker 1>would spend like addition, like a few days or weeks

0:31:10.960 --> 0:31:18.040
<v Speaker 1>investigating their own infrastructure postponing like the transportation of military

0:31:18.080 --> 0:31:23.520
<v Speaker 1>equipment and assets. That's interesting, UM, I want to ask

0:31:23.560 --> 0:31:28.120
<v Speaker 1>more about retaliatory UM hacking, but before we do, I

0:31:28.160 --> 0:31:30.640
<v Speaker 1>just want to go back to something you said about exploits.

0:31:30.920 --> 0:31:34.280
<v Speaker 1>How is there a marketplace for exploits, Like how are

0:31:34.320 --> 0:31:37.040
<v Speaker 1>these things actually sold or dealt I just have this

0:31:37.160 --> 0:31:39.000
<v Speaker 1>vision in my head of like a guy with a

0:31:39.040 --> 0:31:41.600
<v Speaker 1>briefcase in a hotel room opening it up, and there's

0:31:41.680 --> 0:31:46.160
<v Speaker 1>like different exploits in the briefcase, but obviously it wouldn't

0:31:46.160 --> 0:31:51.880
<v Speaker 1>happen like that. It depends not like if Nicolas Cadge

0:31:52.000 --> 0:31:53.880
<v Speaker 1>was like selling exploits. You know, I'm sure it would

0:31:53.920 --> 0:31:57.600
<v Speaker 1>like this, But in some cases you have to keep

0:31:57.640 --> 0:32:00.320
<v Speaker 1>in mind that some of the transactions don't sell you

0:32:00.360 --> 0:32:04.040
<v Speaker 1>want to be like traced. So using cash actually would

0:32:04.120 --> 0:32:09.560
<v Speaker 1>make sense. Uh. Using payment of a cryptocurrency would make sense.

0:32:10.240 --> 0:32:12.680
<v Speaker 1>Using wire transfer, that would make sense. As long as

0:32:12.680 --> 0:32:16.880
<v Speaker 1>there is a transaction for something, you know, like everything

0:32:16.920 --> 0:32:21.960
<v Speaker 1>you can imagine does make sense, right. Uh. So like

0:32:22.160 --> 0:32:25.400
<v Speaker 1>that image you have in mind, Um, I'm sure it

0:32:25.600 --> 0:32:31.760
<v Speaker 1>happened in some scenarios, but we're getting like outside of

0:32:31.760 --> 0:32:34.719
<v Speaker 1>what the transaction might look like, what the marketplace may

0:32:34.760 --> 0:32:38.720
<v Speaker 1>look like. Obviously it's not like a Fiber or like

0:32:38.760 --> 0:32:41.800
<v Speaker 1>a Facebook marketplace where you're just selecting what you want.

0:32:43.080 --> 0:32:47.840
<v Speaker 1>So you have companies that are brokers doing this. Some

0:32:47.960 --> 0:32:49.960
<v Speaker 1>of them, you know, like are quite public in the

0:32:50.080 --> 0:32:54.240
<v Speaker 1>US or in Australia. Uh. Usually they would work with

0:32:54.280 --> 0:32:59.080
<v Speaker 1>their own government in the case of each government is

0:32:59.120 --> 0:33:02.480
<v Speaker 1>going to have different stories, like in the case of

0:33:02.560 --> 0:33:08.239
<v Speaker 1>for instance, like China, like there's um a competition that

0:33:08.320 --> 0:33:11.440
<v Speaker 1>was organized like few years back called the Chan Food

0:33:11.480 --> 0:33:15.560
<v Speaker 1>Cup where um as part of the competition. They were saying, Okay,

0:33:15.600 --> 0:33:18.800
<v Speaker 1>like if security researchers like find a bug, you know,

0:33:18.920 --> 0:33:23.440
<v Speaker 1>like we're gonna reported to vendors, et cetera. But one

0:33:23.480 --> 0:33:29.120
<v Speaker 1>of the exploits was actually linked to another exploit very

0:33:29.160 --> 0:33:36.800
<v Speaker 1>similar that was used against the wigos Ah. So regarding

0:33:36.840 --> 0:33:40.080
<v Speaker 1>like all people by exploits, you know, like there's a

0:33:40.200 --> 0:33:43.760
<v Speaker 1>demand that's higher than the supply in that scenario. So

0:33:45.120 --> 0:33:47.560
<v Speaker 1>most of the time, and the buyers are always the same.

0:33:47.640 --> 0:33:49.640
<v Speaker 1>You know, it's gonna be like governments like either like

0:33:49.720 --> 0:33:53.920
<v Speaker 1>NEATO members or like you know, like China, like like Russia,

0:33:54.000 --> 0:33:58.000
<v Speaker 1>et cetera. So most of the man governments which just

0:33:58.080 --> 0:34:01.719
<v Speaker 1>like buy those exploits. I'm sure there were some researchers

0:34:01.720 --> 0:34:05.440
<v Speaker 1>like Internity, uh finding their own bugs and writing their

0:34:05.440 --> 0:34:09.040
<v Speaker 1>own exploits. Um, but yeah, like you have a bunch

0:34:09.080 --> 0:34:28.879
<v Speaker 1>of bookers like in the front countries. So I don't

0:34:28.880 --> 0:34:31.560
<v Speaker 1>want to get sidetracked on this too much, but I

0:34:31.560 --> 0:34:34.520
<v Speaker 1>do want to ask one question because you mentioned the

0:34:34.640 --> 0:34:38.480
<v Speaker 1>use of crypto for payments, and of course there seems

0:34:38.560 --> 0:34:40.879
<v Speaker 1>you know, the two sides of this question take out

0:34:40.960 --> 0:34:43.680
<v Speaker 1>very maximalist viewpoints and don't really trust either. So you

0:34:43.719 --> 0:34:47.560
<v Speaker 1>have government saying crypto is just used for money laundering

0:34:47.680 --> 0:34:50.400
<v Speaker 1>and crime and stuff like that, and that seems to

0:34:50.480 --> 0:34:53.080
<v Speaker 1>be an exaggeration, to say the least. And then you

0:34:53.120 --> 0:34:55.759
<v Speaker 1>have this sort of crypto defenders who go to the

0:34:55.800 --> 0:34:58.879
<v Speaker 1>extreme and say, no, there's crypto is terrible for any

0:34:58.920 --> 0:35:01.080
<v Speaker 1>of this stuff because you can see it on the blockchain,

0:35:01.160 --> 0:35:04.680
<v Speaker 1>and so don't point at us as someone who is

0:35:04.719 --> 0:35:07.520
<v Speaker 1>sort of watching this. Where do you come on this

0:35:07.600 --> 0:35:11.440
<v Speaker 1>question and how do people in the hacker community think

0:35:11.560 --> 0:35:18.560
<v Speaker 1>about the advantages or disadvantages of using crypto for transactions? Well,

0:35:18.600 --> 0:35:23.160
<v Speaker 1>it depends for what in de case of ransomwhere which

0:35:23.280 --> 0:35:28.000
<v Speaker 1>is a malaware that's going to infect machines, encrypt files

0:35:28.080 --> 0:35:31.640
<v Speaker 1>and ask for like a ransom in exchange of decrypting

0:35:31.680 --> 0:35:35.200
<v Speaker 1>the files. Usually those transactions opening happening of a crypto

0:35:36.040 --> 0:35:40.319
<v Speaker 1>uh like in that specific scenario for ends somewhere like

0:35:40.360 --> 0:35:46.200
<v Speaker 1>crypto currencies literally like created the whole new market for

0:35:46.360 --> 0:35:51.760
<v Speaker 1>like criminal hikers, uh like, because otherwise, like if crypto

0:35:51.920 --> 0:35:53.640
<v Speaker 1>was not around, you know, like you not see like

0:35:53.719 --> 0:35:56.000
<v Speaker 1>ransomwhere you know you can just you cannot ask for

0:35:56.040 --> 0:36:00.839
<v Speaker 1>a payment over wh transfer or uh, you know, like

0:36:00.880 --> 0:36:03.319
<v Speaker 1>all of the paper. Although like in some attacks you know,

0:36:03.360 --> 0:36:05.600
<v Speaker 1>for like phishing emails, you know when they change invoices,

0:36:05.640 --> 0:36:08.719
<v Speaker 1>you know they put a fact bank account, you still

0:36:08.800 --> 0:36:11.600
<v Speaker 1>end up doing like a wire transparentlarge amount of money

0:36:11.920 --> 0:36:14.839
<v Speaker 1>are being transferred. But if that would be the case,

0:36:15.000 --> 0:36:18.160
<v Speaker 1>no following enforcement, it's much easier to actually like trace

0:36:19.320 --> 0:36:22.799
<v Speaker 1>who is behind it and to find okay, like that

0:36:22.920 --> 0:36:25.799
<v Speaker 1>attacker was there, to like the people who pen the account, okay,

0:36:25.840 --> 0:36:30.200
<v Speaker 1>the mules, and then to like trades back efficiently. Um,

0:36:30.920 --> 0:36:36.440
<v Speaker 1>we're getting like cryptocurrency in the context of Ukraine and Russia,

0:36:36.560 --> 0:36:39.839
<v Speaker 1>Like there's very uh, Like there's a bunch of intern

0:36:40.080 --> 0:36:44.440
<v Speaker 1>interesting things happening. For instance, like the money that the

0:36:44.560 --> 0:36:47.960
<v Speaker 1>Ukrainian government has been raising over crypto, Like a bunch

0:36:48.000 --> 0:36:51.239
<v Speaker 1>of like uh, like the founder of Ethereum donati, the

0:36:51.320 --> 0:36:55.040
<v Speaker 1>founder of like Solna Donati, the founder of pol donated

0:36:55.400 --> 0:36:59.400
<v Speaker 1>and they managed to like buy equipment with it and

0:36:59.640 --> 0:37:02.960
<v Speaker 1>the ex cetera. Uh. They're also talking about launching their

0:37:02.960 --> 0:37:05.799
<v Speaker 1>own n FT campaign, you know, like an ex change

0:37:05.880 --> 0:37:10.440
<v Speaker 1>for like people, etcetera. So they're like uh using like

0:37:10.480 --> 0:37:14.279
<v Speaker 1>crypto in a way. Uh that makes sense for like

0:37:14.320 --> 0:37:19.920
<v Speaker 1>financial transactions, but my personal opinion also it's also like

0:37:20.640 --> 0:37:24.400
<v Speaker 1>what we're witnessing is obviously there is an actual conventional

0:37:24.440 --> 0:37:28.720
<v Speaker 1>war where people are being killed in in in that sense,

0:37:29.239 --> 0:37:34.040
<v Speaker 1>but on the other side, Ukraine has been doing very

0:37:34.080 --> 0:37:38.640
<v Speaker 1>well in terms of like fighting uh disinformation, which is

0:37:38.680 --> 0:37:43.200
<v Speaker 1>like uh like widely used by the Russian government, like

0:37:43.280 --> 0:37:47.319
<v Speaker 1>when they're spending spreading fact news about like Ukrainian soldiers

0:37:47.760 --> 0:37:52.319
<v Speaker 1>a like being defeated to kind of like reducing like

0:37:52.400 --> 0:37:56.960
<v Speaker 1>the mole of the troops. Uh. Instead, what we see

0:37:57.239 --> 0:38:01.960
<v Speaker 1>is Ukraine uh promoting like news of like oh like

0:38:02.080 --> 0:38:04.680
<v Speaker 1>look at those farmers I've been stealing a tank with

0:38:04.800 --> 0:38:08.440
<v Speaker 1>their attractor and they're sharing videos that are going viral

0:38:08.880 --> 0:38:11.239
<v Speaker 1>and we see them, Oh, we're using crypto to raise

0:38:11.280 --> 0:38:14.680
<v Speaker 1>money like a people from the internet, like we need

0:38:14.719 --> 0:38:17.480
<v Speaker 1>your support. Oh, we're also gonna do an n f

0:38:17.520 --> 0:38:21.360
<v Speaker 1>T you know, like uh support Ukraine n FT. So

0:38:21.840 --> 0:38:23.920
<v Speaker 1>I think it's sorts of part of the response to

0:38:24.040 --> 0:38:27.280
<v Speaker 1>Russian attacks, but not only from like the actual cyber

0:38:27.320 --> 0:38:30.200
<v Speaker 1>attack point of view, but also like from a disinformation

0:38:30.320 --> 0:38:32.839
<v Speaker 1>point of view, because if you keep the news like

0:38:32.920 --> 0:38:35.960
<v Speaker 1>positive around it and people engage people on your side

0:38:36.920 --> 0:38:42.120
<v Speaker 1>while uh, sanctions are happening on your enemy. That's very efficient,

0:38:42.200 --> 0:38:45.759
<v Speaker 1>and I think that's like the way where Ukraine has

0:38:45.800 --> 0:38:49.000
<v Speaker 1>been very innovative in how to use crypto since the

0:38:49.719 --> 0:38:54.279
<v Speaker 1>burgaining of the invasion UM. I want to go back

0:38:54.320 --> 0:38:58.800
<v Speaker 1>to Russia and Ukraine specifically. So you know, you mentioned

0:38:59.000 --> 0:39:04.279
<v Speaker 1>the one group UM and its attacks on Belarusian railways.

0:39:04.840 --> 0:39:10.000
<v Speaker 1>What are the options for retaliation from UM, you know,

0:39:10.040 --> 0:39:13.440
<v Speaker 1>either the West or from independent groups who want to

0:39:13.440 --> 0:39:18.719
<v Speaker 1>create trouble for Russia. Uh. Well, in the case of

0:39:18.760 --> 0:39:21.640
<v Speaker 1>like what's happening with yes that so we have the

0:39:21.640 --> 0:39:25.680
<v Speaker 1>German government saying, okay, like we we think we've been

0:39:25.680 --> 0:39:29.880
<v Speaker 1>a victim of cyber collectoral damage from the conflict. So

0:39:30.000 --> 0:39:34.400
<v Speaker 1>they recognized they have been a victim from that. I

0:39:34.400 --> 0:39:37.879
<v Speaker 1>guess we're gonna see like the response to it reading that.

0:39:38.800 --> 0:39:46.520
<v Speaker 1>I'm sure a lot of NETO countries also like radiating

0:39:47.040 --> 0:39:52.040
<v Speaker 1>uh in private, not necessarily like communicating about it. That's

0:39:52.040 --> 0:39:53.480
<v Speaker 1>all I was saying, a lot of the things we're

0:39:53.480 --> 0:39:56.520
<v Speaker 1>probably gonna like see more, you know, like in a

0:39:56.560 --> 0:39:59.759
<v Speaker 1>few years actually, And actually I'm glad that podcast is

0:39:59.800 --> 0:40:02.480
<v Speaker 1>that being like a few weeks after the invasion because

0:40:02.480 --> 0:40:04.840
<v Speaker 1>it also give us some time to kind of what

0:40:05.120 --> 0:40:08.040
<v Speaker 1>what was happening and staff the speculating of like Okay,

0:40:08.120 --> 0:40:10.799
<v Speaker 1>we're gonna go in full on like cyber war, are

0:40:10.880 --> 0:40:13.120
<v Speaker 1>like all the countries you know in Europe gonna have

0:40:13.200 --> 0:40:16.319
<v Speaker 1>like the electricity being shut down for like days you know,

0:40:17.200 --> 0:40:22.040
<v Speaker 1>so far that's not the case. And regarding the response

0:40:22.600 --> 0:40:26.960
<v Speaker 1>from the governments, so they are like a few aspects

0:40:27.000 --> 0:40:31.000
<v Speaker 1>to it, I think a lot of government so far

0:40:32.239 --> 0:40:36.360
<v Speaker 1>also realizing that they have been over estimating the capabilities

0:40:36.360 --> 0:40:40.879
<v Speaker 1>of Russia. Uh. And that's not necessarily like only from

0:40:40.920 --> 0:40:43.399
<v Speaker 1>a cyber point of view, because like I was saying

0:40:43.400 --> 0:40:46.400
<v Speaker 1>at the beginning, there is what we can see now

0:40:46.520 --> 0:40:49.200
<v Speaker 1>is like the poor planning and the logistics since the

0:40:49.239 --> 0:40:53.360
<v Speaker 1>beginning of the invasion from Russia. In terms of cyber yes,

0:40:53.840 --> 0:40:57.239
<v Speaker 1>more can be done from both sides, but like I

0:40:57.280 --> 0:41:01.360
<v Speaker 1>was saying, most of it is for intelligence. At the

0:41:01.360 --> 0:41:05.640
<v Speaker 1>beginning of instance, the satellites that we act you know,

0:41:05.840 --> 0:41:11.560
<v Speaker 1>was mostly to uh disrupt the military infrastructure. But as

0:41:11.600 --> 0:41:15.240
<v Speaker 1>we see now, like two weeks later, the military military

0:41:15.280 --> 0:41:19.759
<v Speaker 1>infrastructure of Ukraine is still like functioning like probably efficiently.

0:41:20.480 --> 0:41:25.360
<v Speaker 1>So if they could have done it, they probably would

0:41:25.360 --> 0:41:29.280
<v Speaker 1>have done it by now instead of just like dragging

0:41:29.400 --> 0:41:33.640
<v Speaker 1>the you know, like in the conflict like longer. Ah.

0:41:33.840 --> 0:41:36.440
<v Speaker 1>But yeah, in terms of response from like NETO and

0:41:36.800 --> 0:41:40.279
<v Speaker 1>in general for like cyber attacks, you know, I think

0:41:40.320 --> 0:41:43.480
<v Speaker 1>we're gonna see a lot of like policy being changed

0:41:43.640 --> 0:41:46.160
<v Speaker 1>over like the next months, you know, probably like new

0:41:46.200 --> 0:41:50.919
<v Speaker 1>bills being passed, you know, not that it's becoming one

0:41:50.960 --> 0:41:53.680
<v Speaker 1>of the priority for governments in the probably some cases

0:41:53.680 --> 0:41:57.000
<v Speaker 1>you know that they don't listen to before. But I

0:41:57.040 --> 0:42:02.239
<v Speaker 1>would not expect much interm like traditional response, like you know,

0:42:02.280 --> 0:42:05.520
<v Speaker 1>I think it's just like response in the sense of like, Okay,

0:42:05.560 --> 0:42:08.160
<v Speaker 1>there is a war happening potentially like a world war,

0:42:08.640 --> 0:42:12.120
<v Speaker 1>like are we going to respond, And it's probably gonna

0:42:12.320 --> 0:42:14.719
<v Speaker 1>be like more sanctions like what we are witnessing now.

0:42:14.880 --> 0:42:18.600
<v Speaker 1>Those are like part of the actual response. Uh. And

0:42:18.719 --> 0:42:20.840
<v Speaker 1>it also implies you know, like if they obviously like

0:42:20.920 --> 0:42:26.560
<v Speaker 1>hack need to governments, so that maybe like like we

0:42:26.600 --> 0:42:30.480
<v Speaker 1>have seen like Russia being disconnected from swift, then some

0:42:30.520 --> 0:42:34.400
<v Speaker 1>tech companies you know, like um like Apple and Microsoft

0:42:34.400 --> 0:42:37.520
<v Speaker 1>not sending their softwares anymore at the month is still

0:42:37.560 --> 0:42:40.360
<v Speaker 1>unclear if software updates are still going to be like

0:42:40.400 --> 0:42:45.040
<v Speaker 1>deployed uh in Russia, because if they are not deploid,

0:42:45.120 --> 0:42:48.960
<v Speaker 1>it means they will not have access to security updates. Also,

0:42:49.520 --> 0:42:52.280
<v Speaker 1>so so far they're just talking about like payments and

0:42:52.400 --> 0:42:56.000
<v Speaker 1>selling uh so like a steam you know, like a

0:42:56.080 --> 0:43:00.319
<v Speaker 1>video game company, was like that Microsoft Apple, you know,

0:43:00.440 --> 0:43:05.600
<v Speaker 1>like like stop providing access to the app store. Um.

0:43:05.640 --> 0:43:07.520
<v Speaker 1>But those are like the response to us seeing so

0:43:07.560 --> 0:43:12.040
<v Speaker 1>far like swift uh mostly like sanctions either by governments

0:43:12.080 --> 0:43:15.320
<v Speaker 1>or like major tech companies. You know, we talked about

0:43:16.120 --> 0:43:20.920
<v Speaker 1>Russian hacking teams mentioned North Korea, China. Is it safe

0:43:20.920 --> 0:43:26.239
<v Speaker 1>to assume that anything that's being done by those countries

0:43:26.520 --> 0:43:31.480
<v Speaker 1>that US and NATO government have the equivalent teams and capabilities.

0:43:32.239 --> 0:43:35.720
<v Speaker 1>Oh yeah, definitely. I mean one of the big release

0:43:35.800 --> 0:43:39.640
<v Speaker 1>from these shadow workers was to show the capabilities of

0:43:39.640 --> 0:43:44.280
<v Speaker 1>the US government. Uh. And some of that was also

0:43:44.360 --> 0:43:48.920
<v Speaker 1>like including you know, like targets from the US government.

0:43:49.719 --> 0:43:53.960
<v Speaker 1>Same thing when Snowdon released some of the documents. We

0:43:54.040 --> 0:43:57.120
<v Speaker 1>also soo some of the targets from the US government,

0:43:57.239 --> 0:44:02.240
<v Speaker 1>including European like telco companies or though they are allies,

0:44:02.400 --> 0:44:07.160
<v Speaker 1>there are not enemies. Spies are just continuing to spy.

0:44:07.239 --> 0:44:11.600
<v Speaker 1>You know. It's just like spying stuff everywhere, So that

0:44:11.840 --> 0:44:14.640
<v Speaker 1>that actually it leads to one a question that's been

0:44:14.640 --> 0:44:16.960
<v Speaker 1>on the back of my mind this whole conversation. The

0:44:17.000 --> 0:44:20.160
<v Speaker 1>spies are always going to be spies? Is it worth

0:44:20.239 --> 0:44:26.080
<v Speaker 1>thinking of cyber warfare as a sort of discreet um event?

0:44:26.200 --> 0:44:28.719
<v Speaker 1>And so of course when we think of conventional warfare,

0:44:28.960 --> 0:44:31.920
<v Speaker 1>there's often a start, there's an invasion, maybe there's a

0:44:31.960 --> 0:44:36.800
<v Speaker 1>ceasefire hopefully at some point soon. Uh, the war ends

0:44:37.520 --> 0:44:40.359
<v Speaker 1>is is cyber warfare an event or is it just

0:44:40.440 --> 0:44:44.840
<v Speaker 1>a is it an occurring sort of ongoing, persistent element

0:44:45.080 --> 0:44:49.480
<v Speaker 1>of the interaction between nations these days that doesn't have

0:44:49.520 --> 0:44:52.879
<v Speaker 1>any sort of like starter end I would I would

0:44:52.880 --> 0:44:55.600
<v Speaker 1>say it's a component of wall. So that's why I

0:44:55.640 --> 0:44:57.680
<v Speaker 1>had the beginning was talking about, like I bread wall.

0:44:57.800 --> 0:45:01.680
<v Speaker 1>There's this like a convention on the wall, and uh,

0:45:02.120 --> 0:45:07.400
<v Speaker 1>mostly it is used here for intelligence gathering or to

0:45:07.440 --> 0:45:13.319
<v Speaker 1>collect information on troops, enemies capabilities. Uh, it may be

0:45:13.520 --> 0:45:18.200
<v Speaker 1>used for disruption like we've seen with the satellite h

0:45:18.600 --> 0:45:23.960
<v Speaker 1>like a few weeks ago of the cyberpartisan in January,

0:45:24.040 --> 0:45:27.960
<v Speaker 1>but in that case working as an independent, independent group

0:45:28.480 --> 0:45:31.400
<v Speaker 1>because the goal is like to protect the Belarus and

0:45:31.960 --> 0:45:37.759
<v Speaker 1>the democracy. Uh So it may have some strategic of

0:45:37.840 --> 0:45:42.120
<v Speaker 1>the objectives, like in the case of like the railway

0:45:42.160 --> 0:45:47.239
<v Speaker 1>system in Belarush, but it may also just be like intelligence,

0:45:47.280 --> 0:45:50.920
<v Speaker 1>and I think here it is mostly used for intelligence

0:45:51.280 --> 0:45:54.800
<v Speaker 1>for disruption. It does not make that merch sense once

0:45:54.840 --> 0:45:59.200
<v Speaker 1>you enter in a kinetic mode because if you can

0:45:59.239 --> 0:46:03.160
<v Speaker 1>just if you have soldiers like physically present in the country,

0:46:03.239 --> 0:46:06.279
<v Speaker 1>you can just shut down like cell phone towers, you

0:46:06.320 --> 0:46:11.120
<v Speaker 1>can engage in electronic warfare, you can start jamming, you know,

0:46:11.280 --> 0:46:14.920
<v Speaker 1>like whatever like ways of communication there is, so you

0:46:14.920 --> 0:46:19.759
<v Speaker 1>don't necessarily need to use like cyber. Um. Cyber makes

0:46:19.800 --> 0:46:25.759
<v Speaker 1>sense before the kinetic like war happening, because you're gonna

0:46:25.760 --> 0:46:29.640
<v Speaker 1>collect information. You may do some light disruption, but at

0:46:29.719 --> 0:46:34.280
<v Speaker 1>some point, like once the war is starting, you becomes

0:46:34.320 --> 0:46:37.400
<v Speaker 1>more of a conventional war where well you need the

0:46:37.440 --> 0:46:40.040
<v Speaker 1>winner and a loser, you need an agreement or you

0:46:40.080 --> 0:46:44.640
<v Speaker 1>have like a ceasefire um, and then cyber just like

0:46:45.400 --> 0:46:49.680
<v Speaker 1>uh you know, kind of like this background element depending

0:46:49.719 --> 0:46:53.480
<v Speaker 1>if you include you know, like disinformation, propanganda and misinformation

0:46:53.520 --> 0:46:56.319
<v Speaker 1>as part of cyber or not. Because as we can

0:46:56.320 --> 0:47:00.160
<v Speaker 1>see now on social media, a bit like when the

0:47:00.200 --> 0:47:03.160
<v Speaker 1>Arab Spring was happening when a lot of people were

0:47:03.200 --> 0:47:06.839
<v Speaker 1>like sharing information on Twitter. Uh. Now we can see

0:47:06.840 --> 0:47:10.880
<v Speaker 1>people sharing a lot of information on Facebook, Instagram, Twitter

0:47:11.840 --> 0:47:15.000
<v Speaker 1>around the war, not like the donation and like the stories,

0:47:15.080 --> 0:47:16.680
<v Speaker 1>not like the stories that I was saying about the

0:47:16.719 --> 0:47:21.319
<v Speaker 1>tanks being stolen and being shared going viral. Uh. That's

0:47:21.360 --> 0:47:25.759
<v Speaker 1>part of the information warfare. And that's a very new

0:47:26.480 --> 0:47:31.480
<v Speaker 1>component because like things like TikTok didn't use in the past.

0:47:31.560 --> 0:47:35.600
<v Speaker 1>And know that having also like their role within this

0:47:35.920 --> 0:47:39.800
<v Speaker 1>information warfare, does that mean that those of us sitting

0:47:40.040 --> 0:47:43.040
<v Speaker 1>in the US or Europe, we don't need to be

0:47:43.080 --> 0:47:46.319
<v Speaker 1>worrying about, you know, an attack on critical infrastructure that

0:47:46.440 --> 0:47:50.440
<v Speaker 1>suddenly um takes away our electricity or empties out our

0:47:50.480 --> 0:47:53.960
<v Speaker 1>bank accounts or something like that. Uh. Yeah, No, I

0:47:53.960 --> 0:47:56.160
<v Speaker 1>would not be worried about it. Uh. And even if

0:47:56.200 --> 0:47:58.160
<v Speaker 1>we would happen, you know, I'm sure, like you know,

0:47:58.200 --> 0:48:00.520
<v Speaker 1>electricity would be done for like a very short paiod

0:48:00.560 --> 0:48:03.120
<v Speaker 1>of time because the process in place on all the

0:48:03.320 --> 0:48:08.400
<v Speaker 1>recover like system just like if something is faulty, especially

0:48:08.440 --> 0:48:13.440
<v Speaker 1>for like critical infrastructure, so I would not really worry. UM.

0:48:13.560 --> 0:48:16.080
<v Speaker 1>One of the big story of getting like critical infrastructure

0:48:16.200 --> 0:48:19.200
<v Speaker 1>was like the stext Net story, which is more than

0:48:19.239 --> 0:48:23.280
<v Speaker 1>ten years old. Now back in Iran when that joint

0:48:23.280 --> 0:48:26.080
<v Speaker 1>operation between Israel and the US was targetting one of

0:48:26.120 --> 0:48:29.279
<v Speaker 1>the nuclear central, uh, they kind of just stopped it.

0:48:29.440 --> 0:48:32.360
<v Speaker 1>And then back then, you know, like some movies like

0:48:32.440 --> 0:48:36.479
<v Speaker 1>came out was then with Chris Sens Wolf Black Cats.

0:48:36.520 --> 0:48:39.279
<v Speaker 1>You know, like this is nuclear central that's exploding at

0:48:39.320 --> 0:48:42.480
<v Speaker 1>the end, except as it's like the Holywood version, but

0:48:42.640 --> 0:48:45.680
<v Speaker 1>in reality, okay, like it's down. You know, like what

0:48:45.680 --> 0:48:47.640
<v Speaker 1>are the guys doing? You know, because they already have

0:48:47.680 --> 0:48:51.080
<v Speaker 1>like process in place, and if you like the the

0:48:51.160 --> 0:48:53.239
<v Speaker 1>U S or Europe, you know, like you definitely like

0:48:53.280 --> 0:48:57.080
<v Speaker 1>a plan for like faulty issues, regardless if it's like

0:48:57.120 --> 0:49:01.400
<v Speaker 1>cyber or something that's not working anymore. But yeah, in

0:49:01.520 --> 0:49:04.240
<v Speaker 1>terms of like money being drained from your account, although

0:49:05.600 --> 0:49:09.040
<v Speaker 1>you won't have your money like being drained directly, um,

0:49:09.080 --> 0:49:12.640
<v Speaker 1>but you know, like our low like stock markets are

0:49:12.640 --> 0:49:14.839
<v Speaker 1>gonna go down now or is it gonna effect like

0:49:14.920 --> 0:49:17.759
<v Speaker 1>you know, like the inflation, Like we can sit with

0:49:17.840 --> 0:49:21.320
<v Speaker 1>the ruble now like it's completely crashing, so technically money

0:49:21.320 --> 0:49:23.560
<v Speaker 1>is not running out of your account, but you know

0:49:23.600 --> 0:49:25.440
<v Speaker 1>you can do less with your money or like your

0:49:26.360 --> 0:49:28.719
<v Speaker 1>like whatever you have is less valuable, you know, So

0:49:29.160 --> 0:49:30.759
<v Speaker 1>I think that's kind of like one of the side

0:49:30.800 --> 0:49:34.560
<v Speaker 1>consequences that we would say. Last question for me is

0:49:34.920 --> 0:49:37.000
<v Speaker 1>what is the skill set of a good hacker? And

0:49:37.080 --> 0:49:39.240
<v Speaker 1>thinking about Okay, if you're a Russia or any government

0:49:39.239 --> 0:49:41.960
<v Speaker 1>you're recruiting, what do you look for? What what makes

0:49:41.960 --> 0:49:46.399
<v Speaker 1>what makes a good hacker? Uh? Well, I just want

0:49:46.440 --> 0:49:50.160
<v Speaker 1>to clarify I'm not recruiting like hackers for the Russian government,

0:49:50.280 --> 0:49:54.719
<v Speaker 1>you know, of course, of course, what would they be

0:49:54.760 --> 0:49:57.719
<v Speaker 1>looking for or what would any government be looking for? Yeah,

0:49:57.920 --> 0:50:02.040
<v Speaker 1>or like like like private company needs not because actually

0:50:03.520 --> 0:50:06.200
<v Speaker 1>most of really good executive researchers I know are just

0:50:06.280 --> 0:50:10.440
<v Speaker 1>like either independent or working for like tech companies because

0:50:10.440 --> 0:50:13.160
<v Speaker 1>they tend to pay like the best you work on

0:50:13.239 --> 0:50:17.200
<v Speaker 1>building cool technologies. And yeah, usually if people are like

0:50:17.239 --> 0:50:19.400
<v Speaker 1>really good, just like end up doing a lot of research.

0:50:19.440 --> 0:50:21.480
<v Speaker 1>So you want to work with the very, very best.

0:50:21.520 --> 0:50:24.959
<v Speaker 1>And now it's such a it's a film that's moving

0:50:25.000 --> 0:50:26.799
<v Speaker 1>like so fast that at the end of the day,

0:50:26.840 --> 0:50:29.240
<v Speaker 1>you know, like you you need to like surround yourself

0:50:29.280 --> 0:50:32.279
<v Speaker 1>with the best, otherwise like you won't learn like everything, right,

0:50:33.160 --> 0:50:35.960
<v Speaker 1>So I don't know if there's like you know, like

0:50:36.040 --> 0:50:38.800
<v Speaker 1>the there is not like equivalent of like word street

0:50:38.800 --> 0:50:40.960
<v Speaker 1>bet for like hackers per se you know, where like

0:50:40.960 --> 0:50:44.440
<v Speaker 1>people are just like sharing like random information around. But

0:50:44.600 --> 0:50:46.480
<v Speaker 1>in terms of skill set, you know, like I keep

0:50:46.520 --> 0:50:50.000
<v Speaker 1>reminding people that hacking or being a hacker is a

0:50:50.080 --> 0:50:52.480
<v Speaker 1>skill set first. You know, it's not an ethical or

0:50:52.480 --> 0:50:56.680
<v Speaker 1>political position that comes like secondary. It's like if you're

0:50:56.680 --> 0:50:58.319
<v Speaker 1>a lawyer, you know, like you don't ask him if

0:50:58.360 --> 0:51:01.160
<v Speaker 1>it's like ethical and ethical. And we've seen in the

0:51:01.200 --> 0:51:03.560
<v Speaker 1>past with like Panama papers and all those things. You know,

0:51:03.640 --> 0:51:06.480
<v Speaker 1>like you could ask the question as well for like lawyers.

0:51:07.040 --> 0:51:10.160
<v Speaker 1>But yeah, most of like good security researchers or hackers know,

0:51:11.120 --> 0:51:16.080
<v Speaker 1>um they all have different background, different skills set because

0:51:16.160 --> 0:51:20.200
<v Speaker 1>it can go from physical security to radio frequency to

0:51:20.400 --> 0:51:26.720
<v Speaker 1>like software security, hardware security, film more security, like open

0:51:26.800 --> 0:51:29.280
<v Speaker 1>source intelligence. You know, we see more and more people

0:51:30.680 --> 0:51:33.040
<v Speaker 1>even like groups you know, like a building cats, you know,

0:51:33.120 --> 0:51:36.840
<v Speaker 1>like that tracking a lot of the military activity or

0:51:37.640 --> 0:51:44.960
<v Speaker 1>from online resources you know, like different groups. Uh that's

0:51:45.000 --> 0:51:47.719
<v Speaker 1>you know, like those are like all like different fields

0:51:47.760 --> 0:51:52.799
<v Speaker 1>that come from like information security. Um. So I mean

0:51:52.880 --> 0:51:56.440
<v Speaker 1>like yeah, everyone who is curious you know and like

0:51:56.440 --> 0:51:59.279
<v Speaker 1>likes to put the time into the research is A

0:51:59.520 --> 0:52:01.719
<v Speaker 1>is A. He's a good haicker. You know, I've seen

0:52:01.719 --> 0:52:04.920
<v Speaker 1>like journists were like really good at doing their research,

0:52:05.040 --> 0:52:08.719
<v Speaker 1>you know, exit like sometimes they have more knowledge and

0:52:08.760 --> 0:52:12.920
<v Speaker 1>more skills than some of actual professionals. So it's really

0:52:12.960 --> 0:52:19.480
<v Speaker 1>something that's very uh across like multiple disciplines. M H. Well, Matt,

0:52:19.520 --> 0:52:21.120
<v Speaker 1>I think that's a good place to leave it. Thank

0:52:21.120 --> 0:52:23.800
<v Speaker 1>you so much for coming on all thoughts and spending

0:52:23.840 --> 0:52:27.160
<v Speaker 1>time with us to explain hacking and what it could

0:52:27.160 --> 0:52:30.080
<v Speaker 1>actually look like in those contexts. Thank you, Thank you

0:52:45.680 --> 0:52:48.400
<v Speaker 1>so Joe. I really enjoyed that conversation. I don't think

0:52:48.440 --> 0:52:51.000
<v Speaker 1>we talked about it, but the Shadow Brokers actually called

0:52:51.040 --> 0:52:54.160
<v Speaker 1>Matt a fun guy at one point, um, and he

0:52:54.320 --> 0:52:56.480
<v Speaker 1>is a very fun guy. He's really good at explaining

0:52:56.520 --> 0:52:58.880
<v Speaker 1>some of the more technical aspects of this. But I

0:52:58.920 --> 0:53:04.360
<v Speaker 1>thought his aiming of cyber as a component of conventional warfare,

0:53:04.640 --> 0:53:09.000
<v Speaker 1>I mean that seems right at least so far, Like,

0:53:09.520 --> 0:53:12.160
<v Speaker 1>given what we've seen so far, I think that's right

0:53:12.400 --> 0:53:14.000
<v Speaker 1>or two or let's put it this way. I think

0:53:14.000 --> 0:53:16.400
<v Speaker 1>I found that to be really helpful because when I

0:53:16.440 --> 0:53:18.480
<v Speaker 1>think of you know, when you think of cyber attacks.

0:53:18.880 --> 0:53:22.120
<v Speaker 1>I think we oft have to have these very dramatic

0:53:22.920 --> 0:53:25.800
<v Speaker 1>visions of some big grid being taken down, and obviously

0:53:25.840 --> 0:53:28.400
<v Speaker 1>that's possible, and you you mentioned examples, You mentioned the

0:53:28.440 --> 0:53:31.760
<v Speaker 1>example of the Belarusian real ray of the Ukrainian grid,

0:53:32.160 --> 0:53:37.800
<v Speaker 1>But that more the more common impulse is intelligence gathering,

0:53:37.800 --> 0:53:40.719
<v Speaker 1>and that's that's the big thing. Collecting data is sort

0:53:40.760 --> 0:53:44.839
<v Speaker 1>of a useful way of thinking thinking about its role. Yeah.

0:53:44.880 --> 0:53:47.920
<v Speaker 1>And the other thing that it's sort of coalesced for

0:53:48.000 --> 0:53:51.520
<v Speaker 1>me was the idea of a lot of governments happened

0:53:51.600 --> 0:53:56.000
<v Speaker 1>tolerating these attacks for a long time. Um. And this

0:53:56.040 --> 0:53:58.560
<v Speaker 1>seems like a crunch point at least when it comes

0:53:58.600 --> 0:54:02.319
<v Speaker 1>to Russia. Right, Like I was reading, Goldman Sacks put

0:54:02.320 --> 0:54:05.000
<v Speaker 1>out a note right before we came on to record

0:54:05.040 --> 0:54:08.520
<v Speaker 1>this talking about cyber warfare, and they had a statin

0:54:08.560 --> 0:54:12.440
<v Speaker 1>there something like six of state sponsored cyber attacks are

0:54:12.480 --> 0:54:16.120
<v Speaker 1>thought to have come from Russia, which seems extreme, but

0:54:16.239 --> 0:54:21.319
<v Speaker 1>for some reason, no one really did anything about it. Yes,

0:54:21.360 --> 0:54:24.600
<v Speaker 1>there were some sanctions in place, but now we've seen, um,

0:54:24.600 --> 0:54:26.960
<v Speaker 1>you know, a very dramatic form of sanctions rolled out,

0:54:26.960 --> 0:54:29.320
<v Speaker 1>and it seems doubtful that that kind of behavior is

0:54:29.320 --> 0:54:32.640
<v Speaker 1>going to be tolerated going forward. Yeah, and but on

0:54:32.680 --> 0:54:35.239
<v Speaker 1>the other hand, it's so nimbulous, it's so difficult to

0:54:35.239 --> 0:54:36.799
<v Speaker 1>know what we're going to do about it. And the point,

0:54:36.960 --> 0:54:39.799
<v Speaker 1>you know, as as Matt was saying, at texts that

0:54:39.840 --> 0:54:43.080
<v Speaker 1>are happening right now, of which they're certainly going on,

0:54:43.640 --> 0:54:45.960
<v Speaker 1>we'll be talking about in three or four years perhaps

0:54:46.239 --> 0:54:49.799
<v Speaker 1>that we learn about them, and how how difficult it

0:54:49.920 --> 0:54:53.080
<v Speaker 1>is to know often when you're being hacked or what

0:54:53.120 --> 0:54:55.880
<v Speaker 1>the scope of the damage is that in in that

0:54:55.960 --> 0:54:59.080
<v Speaker 1>element very different. I think hu's the word, you know,

0:54:59.160 --> 0:55:01.080
<v Speaker 1>maybe I don't know if used the word metrics, but

0:55:01.160 --> 0:55:05.400
<v Speaker 1>this idea we have metrics to measure the devastation of

0:55:05.480 --> 0:55:09.360
<v Speaker 1>conventional warfare. We don't have and it seems very implausible

0:55:09.400 --> 0:55:13.320
<v Speaker 1>that we would have anytime soon sort of equivalent metrics

0:55:13.360 --> 0:55:18.600
<v Speaker 1>for cyber warfare. Yeah, it seems like it. All right, Well,

0:55:18.680 --> 0:55:21.640
<v Speaker 1>shall we leave it there. Let's leave it there, all right.

0:55:21.840 --> 0:55:24.680
<v Speaker 1>This has been another episode of the All Thoughts podcast.

0:55:24.760 --> 0:55:27.359
<v Speaker 1>I'm Tracy Alloway. You can follow me on Twitter at

0:55:27.400 --> 0:55:30.319
<v Speaker 1>Tracy Alloway and I'm Joe wi Isn't Though. You can

0:55:30.400 --> 0:55:33.840
<v Speaker 1>follow me on Twitter at the Stalwart. This episode was

0:55:33.920 --> 0:55:37.240
<v Speaker 1>produced by Magnus Hendrickson, who is smartly not on Twitter.

0:55:37.920 --> 0:55:41.560
<v Speaker 1>Follow the Bloomberg head of podcast, Francesco Leavi at Francesco Today,

0:55:41.719 --> 0:55:44.439
<v Speaker 1>and check out all of our podcasts at Bloomberg under

0:55:44.520 --> 0:56:10.400
<v Speaker 1>the handle at podcasts. Thanks for listening to year to