Speaker 1: Hello, and welcome to another episode of the ad Thoughts podcast.
Speaker 1: I'm Tracy Alloway and I'm Joe. Wisn't thal so Joe.
Speaker 1: Clearly a lot still going on with Russia's invasion of Ukraine,
Speaker 1: but one of the big talking points in the past
Speaker 1: couple of weeks has been this idea of a retaliatory
Speaker 1: response from Russia, not necessarily in the sense of traditional warfare,
Speaker 1: but in the form of cyber warfare. Right, So, this
Speaker 1: has always been a source of concern, going back for
Speaker 1: several years, long before the existing conflict. What are Russia's
Speaker 1: cyber warfare capabilities, how weak is the rest of the world,
Speaker 1: how exposed is critical infrastructure and so forth? As of now,
Speaker 1: you know, I don't think this has been a huge
Speaker 1: spect of the current conflict. Traditional violent warfare is sort
Speaker 1: of being the story, but it is always lurking out
Speaker 1: there as a risk. Yeah, there have been some rumblings
Speaker 1: of potential attacks. I saw something in um der Spiegel
Speaker 1: this morning about possibly a hack of satellites that might
Speaker 1: have been impacting Ukraine. So there are sort of rumblings
Speaker 1: of this, uh, you know, some accusations lurking in the background,
Speaker 1: but we haven't seen anything. Let's say, we haven't seen
Speaker 1: anything major yet. And I feel like cyber security risks,
Speaker 1: it's one of those things that you you always see
Speaker 1: people mention as a sort of left tail risk. You
Speaker 1: see lots of analyst notes about it, but no one
Speaker 1: really talks about it in concrete terms. It always seems
Speaker 1: to be just this vague threat lurking in the background. Yes,
Speaker 1: and I think it's in part because, as you exactly say,
Speaker 1: no one precisely knows what it would look like. Um.
Speaker 1: I mean, obviously, companies are regularly getting hacked. We've seen
Speaker 1: an increase over the years, and malware and ransomware, and
Speaker 1: companies losing data, companies having to pay to bring factories
Speaker 1: and infrastructure back online. Of course, I think it was
Speaker 1: late or maybe early last year there was that pipeline
Speaker 1: on the central part of the United States. So these
Speaker 1: things recur, but I think it's very nebulous what that
Speaker 1: risk actually looks like. So today I'm very pleased to
Speaker 1: say we're going to try to get a firmer handle
Speaker 1: on what cyber warfare risk might actually look like, and
Speaker 1: we're gonna do it maybe a little bit differently um
Speaker 1: to what we normally do. But today on the show,
Speaker 1: we're gonna be talking to a hacker about what it
Speaker 1: actually means to, you know, do cyber warfare to hack
Speaker 1: into someone's systems, what the threat actually looks like, and
Speaker 1: what is possible from a technological perspective. I'm really looking
Speaker 1: forward to this sort of different from our normal path,
Speaker 1: but of something important to be uh, to learn more that. Yeah,
Speaker 1: so we're going to be speaking with Matt Swish. He
Speaker 1: is the founder of Komi and incident response startup based
Speaker 1: in Dubai, which is where I met him, and I
Speaker 1: have to say he's definitely an expert on all of us. Matt,
Speaker 1: Welcome to the show. Hi Trici, Hi Joe. Thanks for
Speaker 1: inviting me. Looking forward talking with you about what cyber
Speaker 1: war might look like. Yeah, so you have a bit
Speaker 1: of expertise in this. I mean not just from the
Speaker 1: hacking perspective, but uh, there are some Russian hackers who
Speaker 1: seem to be obsessed with you. Is that right? Uh? Yeah,
Speaker 1: so I assume you're referrain to the group called the
Speaker 1: Shadow Brokers that mentioned me like few years back. Yeah.
Speaker 1: So just for background, Uh, Matt and I met when
Speaker 1: I was working in Abu Dhabi and Dubai. And this
Speaker 1: was back when Shadow Brokers had a major um attack
Speaker 1: and there was a lot of talk about them, and
Speaker 1: they allegedly were a Russian group of hackers and they
Speaker 1: seem to really I don't know, just focus on you, Matt. Yeah,
Speaker 1: So I guess like one of the main reasons for
Speaker 1: the focus at the time was mainly due to the
Speaker 1: fact that I was analyzing a lot of the documents
Speaker 1: that they were releasing. To date, that's one of the
Speaker 1: group that released some of the most significant documents in
Speaker 1: cyber security, like partly as significant as the snow Don
Speaker 1: documents to give some context for the audience. And as
Speaker 1: part of the release, they release operational notes and exploits
Speaker 1: that belonged to the US government, particularly to the n ESSAY,
Speaker 1: which is the Man intelligence agency in the US, where
Speaker 1: they were exposing US intelligence capabilities. So those documents were released.
Speaker 1: I was of the many people who are like analyzing
Speaker 1: them and uh and like human and like you said,
Speaker 1: you know, they've been mentioning me a few times so far.
Speaker 1: Like the man assumption is that that group is affiliated
Speaker 1: to the Rusian government, and like many times you know,
Speaker 1: and that we I'm sure we're gonna talk about it
Speaker 1: more in details. With cyber it's very out to know
Speaker 1: who is doing what. Sometimes it texts years to find
Speaker 1: enough evidence. Sometimes like governments know about something, but they
Speaker 1: would not necessarily like released the information because they may
Speaker 1: burn some source that they have to collect additional intelligence.
Speaker 1: So it's always like very complicated when it comes to cyber,
Speaker 1: especially with attribution. So usually you have to use the
Speaker 1: common sense. But in terms of timing, these shadow bookers
Speaker 1: were really active around twenty seventeen, which is around the
Speaker 1: time where we start to see a lot of attacks
Speaker 1: from Russia and Ukraine. Also when you say attribution is difficult,
Speaker 1: I mean intuitively, of course that makes a lot of sense.
Speaker 1: What are the type of evidence or what do the
Speaker 1: certain like fingerprints, because you hear that a lot, there's
Speaker 1: a hag and people suspect often suspect Russians, sometimes Chinese.
Speaker 1: Are there certain characteristics of attacks or certain things you
Speaker 1: look at to start to sort of engauge the origin
Speaker 1: of an attacker. Uh, yeah, definitely, Like different attackers have
Speaker 1: different motives and different groups organized that differently. So when
Speaker 1: it comes to hear when we're talking about hackers, who
Speaker 1: are talking about national states. We're not talking about someone
Speaker 1: who's like alone in the bedroom trying to haick a
Speaker 1: video game. Right, So, just to make sure it's clear
Speaker 1: for the audience, who are talking about nation states carrying
Speaker 1: uh intelligence, all military operations against other like nation states
Speaker 1: companies sometimes critically critical infrastructures. Uh So when it comes
Speaker 1: down to what it looks like in terms of fingerprints
Speaker 1: when you're doing an investigation, uh, it is a good
Speaker 1: question because at the beginning in the introdution chat, you're
Speaker 1: wondering what cyber war, cyber warfare might look like, and
Speaker 1: there's this conception that people have that cyber war is
Speaker 1: going to be like completely different, something we haven't seen before,
Speaker 1: that you know, it's just going to be like in
Speaker 1: the medieval time where you see like people riding a
Speaker 1: horse and instead of having salts, you know, they're gonna
Speaker 1: have vented us and they're gonna start stabbing each other,
Speaker 1: and then you use that as forensic evidence. The reality
Speaker 1: is we have been seeing a lot of those happening
Speaker 1: over the past years, probably more than ten years. You know,
Speaker 1: like even back in the two thousand's when China acts Google,
Speaker 1: you know that was a prettier signific come to one,
Speaker 1: and that was one of the first time we saw
Speaker 1: nation state attacking like an actual company and being able
Speaker 1: to track it. So what we have been seeing more
Speaker 1: and more is often like patterns between attacks, but also
Speaker 1: like motives. So whenever it comes to attacks on critical
Speaker 1: infrastructure in UH, let's say like Ukraine, so there is
Speaker 1: a very short list of suspects that comes to mind.
Speaker 1: Same thing when there's an attack happening like not Petya
Speaker 1: in twenty seventeen that gets that gets released on the
Speaker 1: independence day, So often, like the timing is very suspicious.
Speaker 1: Same thing with the article that you mentioned that you
Speaker 1: thought this morning, Tracy, with the asset, which is an
Speaker 1: American company, when the satellites have been like UH attacked,
Speaker 1: like the initial suspicion back so we're talking like back
Speaker 1: on February twenty four when like around the same time
Speaker 1: of the invasion. One of the suspicion was while that's
Speaker 1: happening the same day that Russia is invading a crane,
Speaker 1: so that was also one of the susipicition. So often
Speaker 1: you would use the common sense when it comes to
Speaker 1: a national state attackers, and then you would backtrack based
Speaker 1: on what you have found and see if your assumption
Speaker 1: makes sense or not. But it can be you would
Speaker 1: find a malaware that's on the on the system. And
Speaker 1: in some cases, like people kind of assumed that once
Speaker 1: you are hacked, you know, like your screen is gonna
Speaker 1: change color, is gonna become red or green most of
Speaker 1: the time, like Cyberry is often used for like intelligence gathering,
Speaker 1: so you not even know that people are in your system. Uh.
Speaker 1: In some cases it may take like years before an attacker,
Speaker 1: uh affected, So when you get hacked, a face doesn't
Speaker 1: come up on your screen and start laughing exactly. Okay,
Speaker 1: so now you know Joe um So you mentioned Matt
Speaker 1: that this has been ongoing for some time, and this
Speaker 1: is something that I've wondered about for a long time.
Speaker 1: But why, I mean, if you know that Russia is
Speaker 1: doing a lot of hacking, I mean along with some
Speaker 1: other countries like China, North Korea maybe, but you know
Speaker 1: that this is happening, why do nation states tolerated, Like
Speaker 1: why hasn't this become a bigger area of concern for
Speaker 1: the US in recent years? Or is it that it
Speaker 1: is a major area of concern? But we just don't
Speaker 1: see the response because it's all happening, you know, at
Speaker 1: the back end of technological systems and UM with the
Speaker 1: n s A and you know in sort of secret offices. Uh,
Speaker 1: it is a good question. Actually it is happening. If
Speaker 1: you go on the like the State Department website, you're
Speaker 1: gonna find a lot of indictment against like like for instance,
Speaker 1: like Russian officers that work for the g r U
Speaker 1: or other like intelligence agencies. So for instance, like a
Speaker 1: lot of the attacks on the twenties seventeen, there is
Speaker 1: an indictment where six officers are being mentioned for a
Speaker 1: lot of the damage that they have done, including like
Speaker 1: the Olympic Games that have been you know, one of
Speaker 1: the targets, including like the visitors, the host of the
Speaker 1: Olympic Games, one of the electricity grid in Ukraine being
Speaker 1: in target. Also the election in France at that time
Speaker 1: when the emails from Emmanuel mcron had been released. H
Speaker 1: t V five months also, which was a TV channel
Speaker 1: that was acted in the past, you know, it was
Speaker 1: linked to the delusion government. So the actual uh, proof
Speaker 1: and accusation have been like published. A lot of it
Speaker 1: is usually like policy work and don't done at a
Speaker 1: political level. So that would explain why it takes so
Speaker 1: much time and often very little UH can be done
Speaker 1: in a short period of time, and often what we
Speaker 1: would see in response would be sanctions on some of
Speaker 1: the governments. So it is happening, but I think it's
Speaker 1: happening at the pace where there are so many attacks
Speaker 1: happening from different countries, like you mentioned like North Korea, friends,
Speaker 1: and that had been like very active mostly for like
Speaker 1: financial gains, like we remember the attack of the Central
Speaker 1: Bank of Bangladesh for instance, where they try to steal
Speaker 1: like one billion dollars uh, and we're money launde being
Speaker 1: like happened in casinos in the Philippines. So like a
Speaker 1: lot of information is public and non around like modus
Speaker 1: apparently from like different like either groups that are working
Speaker 1: independently or like some independently like for like a national state.
Speaker 1: But it's such a complex problem that it's very up
Speaker 1: to fix a bit like conflict all around the world.
Speaker 1: So a nightmare scenario in the US. But I guess,
Speaker 1: but anywhere is this idea of they're gonna hackers could
Speaker 1: shut down critical infrastructure. Maybe the grid in New York
Speaker 1: City just goes dark because of some hack attack? Is
Speaker 1: that a realistic threat in your view? I mean that
Speaker 1: I think comes to mind or we can't log in
Speaker 1: to our banks or how like big pieces of infrastructure
Speaker 1: that could disrupt society. He is that a plausible threat?
Speaker 1: And be is that something that these types of hacker
Speaker 1: groups are could could conceivably work on? Uh? Yeah, No, definitely.
Speaker 1: And like I mentioned before, it happened in the past
Speaker 1: with the Ukrainian like power grids. It happened like you know,
Speaker 1: like in twenty fifteen and six at some point the
Speaker 1: electricity like grid was down for like a few hours.
Speaker 1: But one of the things to keep in mind is,
Speaker 1: like I asked, those attacks have been happening over the
Speaker 1: past ten years. Defense capabilities, you know also from like
Speaker 1: different companies and like countries also like became more and
Speaker 1: more um efficient because on one side you have the
Speaker 1: attack curs that are like publishing their craft and becoming
Speaker 1: more efficient. But also on the defense side, people are
Speaker 1: becoming more aware of what of attack to expect. They're
Speaker 1: becoming more resilient, like if something happens, you know, like
Speaker 1: if any incident happens, like or do you investigate it?
Speaker 1: So that's what you would usually call like incident response,
Speaker 1: but also like all the recover like a system for
Speaker 1: especially for like critical infrastructure, so regarding targeting like a
Speaker 1: critical infrastructure. So we saw it like around two weeks
Speaker 1: ago with the satellites, So with that company, Yea said,
Speaker 1: So a lot of the actual like users that have
Speaker 1: been targeted were like partly the Ukrainian military. So that's uh,
Speaker 1: one of the attempts of like interfering with the infrastructure
Speaker 1: for of like the target to like kind of slow
Speaker 1: down or make communication like more difficult. But during that
Speaker 1: that hack, you know, like unexpectedly like there's like three
Speaker 1: thousands like wind, like when the turbines in Germany that
Speaker 1: where should on you know, as like like the German
Speaker 1: government was calling it cyber collateral damage, you know. Um,
Speaker 1: so sometimes it may come in unexpected ways. But in
Speaker 1: that scenario, what it meant is the access Internet was
Speaker 1: not available anymore. But the actual electoral buying for instance,
Speaker 1: why not damaged. It is just the communication link. You know.
Speaker 1: It's like if someone would shut down like a cell
Speaker 1: phone tower, it will not damage your phone, you will
Speaker 1: just not be able to communicate. And we saw that
Speaker 1: also at the beginning of the invasion, because there also
Speaker 1: tis very weird aspect of the Russian military since the
Speaker 1: beginning of the invasion, and that's kind of why a
Speaker 1: lot of people are a bit uh skeptical on the
Speaker 1: planning and the logistics of the Russian military on that
Speaker 1: aspect is mostly around communications. They are still not necessarily
Speaker 1: like using like military equipment. They still use like an
Speaker 1: a lot of communication, but also like cell phones with
Speaker 1: like Russian numbers. So at some point some of the
Speaker 1: Ukrainian tell co Operato rejected like Russian numbers and they
Speaker 1: were not able to communicate, and that to take over
Speaker 1: a cell phone of civilians just to be able to
Speaker 1: still communicate with each other. Well, there's a lot of
Speaker 1: uh like communication aspect obviously when you conduct like a
Speaker 1: military operation so like, and that's a completely different field.
Speaker 1: You know, that's not not my specialty. But we do
Speaker 1: see it happening because cyber war on its own does
Speaker 1: not really like exist, you know, like cyber is a
Speaker 1: component of war, and that's what we're seeing now. So
Speaker 1: instead of seeing like a conventional war, we see like
Speaker 1: this hybrid warfare happening in front of our eyes, where
Speaker 1: like there's multiple aspect to it and a lot of
Speaker 1: the actual attacks that we have seen also with Russia,
Speaker 1: and that Russia is probably well known for and I'm
Speaker 1: sure as journalists you're like yeah, like familiar with it
Speaker 1: is also like disinformation and misinformation, like we have seen
Speaker 1: what they call like active measures being used for a
Speaker 1: long long time Russia today and Sputnik news have been
Speaker 1: like banned in the EU now. So it took like
Speaker 1: the invasion you know, of any Ropean country for them
Speaker 1: to shut down those media. So, like to answer your
Speaker 1: question of before like how come we don't see like
Speaker 1: more thanks response from the governments, Well, that's a perfect example,
Speaker 1: like we knew that was happening and it took the
Speaker 1: invasion of an European country for them to do something
Speaker 1: about it. Yeah. Um, I want to ask you this
Speaker 1: is it might be a tricky question, I don't know,
Speaker 1: but could you maybe walk us through a timeline of
Speaker 1: what actually happens if say a nation state like Russia
Speaker 1: hypothetically launches some store let's say some sort of malware
Speaker 1: attack on a West Earn company or infrastructure utility type
Speaker 1: thing like what happened? So the attack starts and then
Speaker 1: can you walk us through what the actual response looks
Speaker 1: like and when the attack stops. Uh yeah, I can't
Speaker 1: even give you an example. So around Christmas, there is
Speaker 1: a company called Solar Winds that was targeted. I think
Speaker 1: it targeted earned like twenty thousands of their customers. So
Speaker 1: and uh the and you have to keep in mind,
Speaker 1: so like let's say, like you have twenty thou you know,
Speaker 1: customers companies using the same software, and that was a
Speaker 1: massive problem. Uh. It means that all of them have
Speaker 1: been hacked. So what happened is what they did is
Speaker 1: what we call the supply chain attack, you know, where
Speaker 1: they managed to distribute a man issues update to all
Speaker 1: their customers and whenever that update has distributed to all
Speaker 1: their customers, that was their infection vector for all of
Speaker 1: those companies. And that was partly, like to date, the
Speaker 1: largest hack of foreign countries. That was uh your um,
Speaker 1: your scandal obviously. Uh Like the White House blamed the
Speaker 1: SVR agencies, which is like the foreign intelligence agency of
Speaker 1: Russia for that attack. Uh So in that case, Uh yeah,
Speaker 1: governments have been blaming, blaming and pointing fingers to Russia.
Speaker 1: But out of that we didn't see like Munch coming
Speaker 1: out of it. Uh in that case, and uh, in
Speaker 1: that scenario, it took one cyber security company to be
Speaker 1: a victim that I found out that they have been
Speaker 1: infected by luck, and then more and more people started
Speaker 1: to investigate and they realize, oh wow, like eighteen customers
Speaker 1: from that company have been targeting and the madaware was
Speaker 1: like spreading undetected. Our company is good at sharing cyber
Speaker 1: information with each other because it is such a sensitive
Speaker 1: topic and when you're under attack. On on the one hand,
Speaker 1: I imagine you don't necessarily want to broadcast it to
Speaker 1: the world. But on the other hand, you could argue
Speaker 1: that you have a responsibility um to your customers clearly,
Speaker 1: but also to other companies to flag a threat that
Speaker 1: is actually happening. Yeah, very good question. Actually. Uh So
Speaker 1: in the case of Solar Winds, Uh, if that cybersecurity
Speaker 1: company that was a victim of the heck, UH didn't
Speaker 1: raise the alarm saying all we found this, that's suspicious.
Speaker 1: You know, then like people photoed up and that's like
Speaker 1: you're mad where we found it present in other places? Uh,
Speaker 1: people would not have been able to conclude that so
Speaker 1: many customers were targeted. And in that scenario, like you're saying,
Speaker 1: like the information sharing was very beneficial often for cyber security.
Speaker 1: So you have like few companies that are like the
Speaker 1: anti virus providers or endpoint security companies that have a
Speaker 1: lot of visibility because of the telemetry they have on
Speaker 1: millions of machines. So for them it's pretty good too
Speaker 1: and pretty easy to see if something new like happens.
Speaker 1: You know, in the case of Microsoft now which is
Speaker 1: probably like the biggest cyber security company in the world,
Speaker 1: are ironically they're very very good telemetry before the invasion.
Speaker 1: So a wiper, which is a malaware that's designed to
Speaker 1: erase the computer, was detected. So a few different security
Speaker 1: vendors managed to detect it. Microsoft was one of them.
Speaker 1: Because that's really good telemetry, they were able to take
Speaker 1: it within like a few hours. Uh in that case.
Speaker 1: You know, like what we noticed so far when it
Speaker 1: comes to like cyber is there is a huge focus
Speaker 1: on cyber before the war become actually kinetic, so either
Speaker 1: to destabilize the enemy or to uh gather information. How
Speaker 1: often you know you mentioned and I remember that the
Speaker 1: Solar winds hack that used a patch uptake to distribute
Speaker 1: mailware too solar winds clads. How often are cyber security
Speaker 1: companies themselves the target of hackers? And this this you know,
Speaker 1: this technique of using a cyber security update PADG to
Speaker 1: distribute mailware? How common is that? And how interest in general?
Speaker 1: How much of these companies themselves the target of attacks?
Speaker 1: A very good questions? So so they are? And often
Speaker 1: does it happen for like security companies to be like
Speaker 1: targets Really happens all the time because of the assets
Speaker 1: that they have, they're like toolings, like the tools, you know,
Speaker 1: all the human resources they have, you know that could
Speaker 1: include being targeted that conference or not. Uh, Like I
Speaker 1: was like I was giving an example to to two traces.
Speaker 1: So for instance, I was supposed to give a keynote
Speaker 1: at security conference in Russia a few years ago before COVID.
Speaker 1: So when you're before COVID, and I got denied of
Speaker 1: entry uh in Russia, so at the airport. So I
Speaker 1: was not able to deliver the keynote at that conference. Uh.
Speaker 1: The official reason is because my visa was not valid.
Speaker 1: Although I told them, I was like, you're the one
Speaker 1: we shoot meet the visa. What do you mean it's
Speaker 1: not valid? You know? And that I to fly back
Speaker 1: on the next flight back to Dubai. So in that case,
Speaker 1: you know, like uh and fun. You know, like there's
Speaker 1: always stories in security conferences were like security researchers you know,
Speaker 1: like are either like being followed or like someone like
Speaker 1: quenty into like the hotel room. You know, there's a
Speaker 1: bunch of like different stories like that. So when it
Speaker 1: comes to like often like security companies or security researchers
Speaker 1: are being targets, it happens a lot. It also happened
Speaker 1: like last year where like a bunch of security researchers
Speaker 1: were like active targets by North Korean hackers mostly like
Speaker 1: to try to steal like tools from them or if
Speaker 1: if they had any exploits. So for the audience and
Speaker 1: exploit is what like groups or nation states can use
Speaker 1: to directly like target the machine so they can get
Speaker 1: an authorized access to a machine. So usually they have
Speaker 1: if you have a security nobility in the software and
Speaker 1: you have the software that can take advantage of it,
Speaker 1: that's what we call an exploit. You have different tagories
Speaker 1: of them, including what we callect zero. They exploit that
Speaker 1: even software providers and not to wear off. So that
Speaker 1: could be like Microsoft happened, and in some cases it
Speaker 1: may even not even require like any user interaction to
Speaker 1: be enabled. And in the case of the national state
Speaker 1: type of hacking, because that requires a lot of R
Speaker 1: and D, it is very expensive. Some of those exploits
Speaker 1: like go for selling the like gray market for like
Speaker 1: millions of dollars. And also like it's very complicated to
Speaker 1: do because unlike traditional weapons, that's not something that you
Speaker 1: can replicate. Each security vulnerability bug is going to be different,
Speaker 1: and it requires a specific set of skill set to
Speaker 1: be able to find and write an exploit. So in
Speaker 1: the case of a full on like cyber war, a
Speaker 1: lot of people were kind of expecting countries to stop
Speaker 1: to use like exp it like left and right at
Speaker 1: each other. But to go back to your other questions, Uh,
Speaker 1: it's something that's very difficult to measure because it's not
Speaker 1: like proper unit of measures for like often it happens,
Speaker 1: that's only like when you know it happens, it's only
Speaker 1: a small subset of the information that you have. Sometimes like, uh,
Speaker 1: what's happening over the past two weeks and over the
Speaker 1: next month, I'm pretty sure we're still gonna be analyzing it,
Speaker 1: Like you know in three four years. Um, like some
Speaker 1: of the tours that have been released by the Shadow Bokers,
Speaker 1: a lot of the exploits were like four or five
Speaker 1: years old in that case, and when they got released,
Speaker 1: you know, it was uh, you know, like pretty it
Speaker 1: got a lot of attention. Some of them have been
Speaker 1: even like repurpose into some new malwares, including not Petia,
Speaker 1: which will start getting Ukraine at the time. Um. So
Speaker 1: it's very difficult to you have, yeah, pretty ironic. It's
Speaker 1: it's pretty difficult to have like data on those things.
Speaker 1: And keep in mind, like like you said before, when
Speaker 1: you get hacked, you know, you don't get like some
Speaker 1: face like showing up on your screen and some guy laughing.
Speaker 1: But it is very important to uh to highlight actually
Speaker 1: because cyber is mostly used for intelligence, so you want
Speaker 1: to know what your target is doing, unless you just
Speaker 1: want to steal money. You know, that's a completely different
Speaker 1: category of cyber attack. So like do you have a
Speaker 1: clear girl, you know what you're like, Okay, money's gone now,
Speaker 1: Like if a crypto exchange is being hacked or Swift
Speaker 1: service Brewer is being hacked, but most of the time
Speaker 1: it is for intelligence and whenever you have access somewhere,
Speaker 1: you want to make sure you keep your access. So
Speaker 1: whatever though you use to enter the machines that you've
Speaker 1: been targeting and where you are like feeling from in
Speaker 1: terms of intelli agents, you don't want to lose that access.
Speaker 1: And that's also one of the big suspicion, Like there
Speaker 1: is cyber There are cyber attacks happening now, uh partly
Speaker 1: on both sides, but we don't necessarily see them. In January,
Speaker 1: there is uh a betar Russian group called the Cyberpartisan.
Speaker 1: I don't know if you've heard about them, but they
Speaker 1: are very organized, like they're all like independent, all anonymous, descentralized,
Speaker 1: uh like twenty to thirty people. But what they did
Speaker 1: back in January, when they started to see that Russia
Speaker 1: started to ship military equipment from better Belarus, they started
Speaker 1: to target the railway system of Belarrors. And this is
Speaker 1: pretty interesting and very uh important to notice because so
Speaker 1: far when you hear about like independent groups, you know
Speaker 1: can of like radiated like counter attacking or doing something
Speaker 1: mostly like shutting down website, changing a website. Here you
Speaker 1: have an independent group that actually managed to create a
Speaker 1: dent into like a big enemy to affect their logistics.
Speaker 1: So by slowing down while by shutting down the railway system,
Speaker 1: they were able to slow down the transportation of military equipment.
Speaker 1: And the second objective, which is like suspected, is also
Speaker 1: to create a doubt with the enemy in that case,
Speaker 1: with versia, with the leadership, so to show that the
Speaker 1: belaration UH allies was not were not necessarily like that reliable,
Speaker 1: but also on their side once they realized that it
Speaker 1: actually had been hacked, to create a doubt, saying while
Speaker 1: if the railway system have been hacked, what Mexa on
Speaker 1: railway system like immune to such an attack, So they
Speaker 1: would spend like addition, like a few days or weeks
Speaker 1: investigating their own infrastructure postponing like the transportation of military
Speaker 1: equipment and assets. That's interesting, UM, I want to ask
Speaker 1: more about retaliatory UM hacking, but before we do, I
Speaker 1: just want to go back to something you said about exploits.
Speaker 1: How is there a marketplace for exploits, Like how are
Speaker 1: these things actually sold or dealt I just have this
Speaker 1: vision in my head of like a guy with a
Speaker 1: briefcase in a hotel room opening it up, and there's
Speaker 1: like different exploits in the briefcase, but obviously it wouldn't
Speaker 1: happen like that. It depends not like if Nicolas Cadge
Speaker 1: was like selling exploits. You know, I'm sure it would
Speaker 1: like this, But in some cases you have to keep
Speaker 1: in mind that some of the transactions don't sell you
Speaker 1: want to be like traced. So using cash actually would
Speaker 1: make sense. Uh. Using payment of a cryptocurrency would make sense.
Speaker 1: Using wire transfer, that would make sense. As long as
Speaker 1: there is a transaction for something, you know, like everything
Speaker 1: you can imagine does make sense, right. Uh. So like
Speaker 1: that image you have in mind, Um, I'm sure it
Speaker 1: happened in some scenarios, but we're getting like outside of
Speaker 1: what the transaction might look like, what the marketplace may
Speaker 1: look like. Obviously it's not like a Fiber or like
Speaker 1: a Facebook marketplace where you're just selecting what you want.
Speaker 1: So you have companies that are brokers doing this. Some
Speaker 1: of them, you know, like are quite public in the
Speaker 1: US or in Australia. Uh. Usually they would work with
Speaker 1: their own government in the case of each government is
Speaker 1: going to have different stories, like in the case of
Speaker 1: for instance, like China, like there's um a competition that
Speaker 1: was organized like few years back called the Chan Food
Speaker 1: Cup where um as part of the competition. They were saying, Okay,
Speaker 1: like if security researchers like find a bug, you know,
Speaker 1: like we're gonna reported to vendors, et cetera. But one
Speaker 1: of the exploits was actually linked to another exploit very
Speaker 1: similar that was used against the wigos Ah. So regarding
Speaker 1: like all people by exploits, you know, like there's a
Speaker 1: demand that's higher than the supply in that scenario. So
Speaker 1: most of the time, and the buyers are always the same.
Speaker 1: You know, it's gonna be like governments like either like
Speaker 1: NEATO members or like you know, like China, like like Russia,
Speaker 1: et cetera. So most of the man governments which just
Speaker 1: like buy those exploits. I'm sure there were some researchers
Speaker 1: like Internity, uh finding their own bugs and writing their
Speaker 1: own exploits. Um, but yeah, like you have a bunch
Speaker 1: of bookers like in the front countries. So I don't
Speaker 1: want to get sidetracked on this too much, but I
Speaker 1: do want to ask one question because you mentioned the
Speaker 1: use of crypto for payments, and of course there seems
Speaker 1: you know, the two sides of this question take out
Speaker 1: very maximalist viewpoints and don't really trust either. So you
Speaker 1: have government saying crypto is just used for money laundering
Speaker 1: and crime and stuff like that, and that seems to
Speaker 1: be an exaggeration, to say the least. And then you
Speaker 1: have this sort of crypto defenders who go to the
Speaker 1: extreme and say, no, there's crypto is terrible for any
Speaker 1: of this stuff because you can see it on the blockchain,
Speaker 1: and so don't point at us as someone who is
Speaker 1: sort of watching this. Where do you come on this
Speaker 1: question and how do people in the hacker community think
Speaker 1: about the advantages or disadvantages of using crypto for transactions? Well,
Speaker 1: it depends for what in de case of ransomwhere which
Speaker 1: is a malaware that's going to infect machines, encrypt files
Speaker 1: and ask for like a ransom in exchange of decrypting
Speaker 1: the files. Usually those transactions opening happening of a crypto
Speaker 1: uh like in that specific scenario for ends somewhere like
Speaker 1: crypto currencies literally like created the whole new market for
Speaker 1: like criminal hikers, uh like, because otherwise, like if crypto
Speaker 1: was not around, you know, like you not see like
Speaker 1: ransomwhere you know you can just you cannot ask for
Speaker 1: a payment over wh transfer or uh, you know, like
Speaker 1: all of the paper. Although like in some attacks you know,
Speaker 1: for like phishing emails, you know when they change invoices,
Speaker 1: you know they put a fact bank account, you still
Speaker 1: end up doing like a wire transparentlarge amount of money
Speaker 1: are being transferred. But if that would be the case,
Speaker 1: no following enforcement, it's much easier to actually like trace
Speaker 1: who is behind it and to find okay, like that
Speaker 1: attacker was there, to like the people who pen the account, okay,
Speaker 1: the mules, and then to like trades back efficiently. Um,
Speaker 1: we're getting like cryptocurrency in the context of Ukraine and Russia,
Speaker 1: Like there's very uh, Like there's a bunch of intern
Speaker 1: interesting things happening. For instance, like the money that the
Speaker 1: Ukrainian government has been raising over crypto, Like a bunch
Speaker 1: of like uh, like the founder of Ethereum donati, the
Speaker 1: founder of like Solna Donati, the founder of pol donated
Speaker 1: and they managed to like buy equipment with it and
Speaker 1: the ex cetera. Uh. They're also talking about launching their
Speaker 1: own n FT campaign, you know, like an ex change
Speaker 1: for like people, etcetera. So they're like uh using like
Speaker 1: crypto in a way. Uh that makes sense for like
Speaker 1: financial transactions, but my personal opinion also it's also like
Speaker 1: what we're witnessing is obviously there is an actual conventional
Speaker 1: war where people are being killed in in in that sense,
Speaker 1: but on the other side, Ukraine has been doing very
Speaker 1: well in terms of like fighting uh disinformation, which is
Speaker 1: like uh like widely used by the Russian government, like
Speaker 1: when they're spending spreading fact news about like Ukrainian soldiers
Speaker 1: a like being defeated to kind of like reducing like
Speaker 1: the mole of the troops. Uh. Instead, what we see
Speaker 1: is Ukraine uh promoting like news of like oh like
Speaker 1: look at those farmers I've been stealing a tank with
Speaker 1: their attractor and they're sharing videos that are going viral
Speaker 1: and we see them, Oh, we're using crypto to raise
Speaker 1: money like a people from the internet, like we need
Speaker 1: your support. Oh, we're also gonna do an n f
Speaker 1: T you know, like uh support Ukraine n FT. So
Speaker 1: I think it's sorts of part of the response to
Speaker 1: Russian attacks, but not only from like the actual cyber
Speaker 1: attack point of view, but also like from a disinformation
Speaker 1: point of view, because if you keep the news like
Speaker 1: positive around it and people engage people on your side
Speaker 1: while uh, sanctions are happening on your enemy. That's very efficient,
Speaker 1: and I think that's like the way where Ukraine has
Speaker 1: been very innovative in how to use crypto since the
Speaker 1: burgaining of the invasion UM. I want to go back
Speaker 1: to Russia and Ukraine specifically. So you know, you mentioned
Speaker 1: the one group UM and its attacks on Belarusian railways.
Speaker 1: What are the options for retaliation from UM, you know,
Speaker 1: either the West or from independent groups who want to
Speaker 1: create trouble for Russia. Uh. Well, in the case of
Speaker 1: like what's happening with yes that so we have the
Speaker 1: German government saying, okay, like we we think we've been
Speaker 1: a victim of cyber collectoral damage from the conflict. So
Speaker 1: they recognized they have been a victim from that. I
Speaker 1: guess we're gonna see like the response to it reading that.
Speaker 1: I'm sure a lot of NETO countries also like radiating
Speaker 1: uh in private, not necessarily like communicating about it. That's
Speaker 1: all I was saying, a lot of the things we're
Speaker 1: probably gonna like see more, you know, like in a
Speaker 1: few years actually, And actually I'm glad that podcast is
Speaker 1: that being like a few weeks after the invasion because
Speaker 1: it also give us some time to kind of what
Speaker 1: what was happening and staff the speculating of like Okay,
Speaker 1: we're gonna go in full on like cyber war, are
Speaker 1: like all the countries you know in Europe gonna have
Speaker 1: like the electricity being shut down for like days you know,
Speaker 1: so far that's not the case. And regarding the response
Speaker 1: from the governments, so they are like a few aspects
Speaker 1: to it, I think a lot of government so far
Speaker 1: also realizing that they have been over estimating the capabilities
Speaker 1: of Russia. Uh. And that's not necessarily like only from
Speaker 1: a cyber point of view, because like I was saying
Speaker 1: at the beginning, there is what we can see now
Speaker 1: is like the poor planning and the logistics since the
Speaker 1: beginning of the invasion from Russia. In terms of cyber yes,
Speaker 1: more can be done from both sides, but like I
Speaker 1: was saying, most of it is for intelligence. At the
Speaker 1: beginning of instance, the satellites that we act you know,
Speaker 1: was mostly to uh disrupt the military infrastructure. But as
Speaker 1: we see now, like two weeks later, the military military
Speaker 1: infrastructure of Ukraine is still like functioning like probably efficiently.
Speaker 1: So if they could have done it, they probably would
Speaker 1: have done it by now instead of just like dragging
Speaker 1: the you know, like in the conflict like longer. Ah.
Speaker 1: But yeah, in terms of response from like NETO and
Speaker 1: in general for like cyber attacks, you know, I think
Speaker 1: we're gonna see a lot of like policy being changed
Speaker 1: over like the next months, you know, probably like new
Speaker 1: bills being passed, you know, not that it's becoming one
Speaker 1: of the priority for governments in the probably some cases
Speaker 1: you know that they don't listen to before. But I
Speaker 1: would not expect much interm like traditional response, like you know,
Speaker 1: I think it's just like response in the sense of like, Okay,
Speaker 1: there is a war happening potentially like a world war,
Speaker 1: like are we going to respond, And it's probably gonna
Speaker 1: be like more sanctions like what we are witnessing now.
Speaker 1: Those are like part of the actual response. Uh. And
Speaker 1: it also implies you know, like if they obviously like
Speaker 1: hack need to governments, so that maybe like like we
Speaker 1: have seen like Russia being disconnected from swift, then some
Speaker 1: tech companies you know, like um like Apple and Microsoft
Speaker 1: not sending their softwares anymore at the month is still
Speaker 1: unclear if software updates are still going to be like
Speaker 1: deployed uh in Russia, because if they are not deploid,
Speaker 1: it means they will not have access to security updates. Also,
Speaker 1: so so far they're just talking about like payments and
Speaker 1: selling uh so like a steam you know, like a
Speaker 1: video game company, was like that Microsoft Apple, you know,
Speaker 1: like like stop providing access to the app store. Um.
Speaker 1: But those are like the response to us seeing so
Speaker 1: far like swift uh mostly like sanctions either by governments
Speaker 1: or like major tech companies. You know, we talked about
Speaker 1: Russian hacking teams mentioned North Korea, China. Is it safe
Speaker 1: to assume that anything that's being done by those countries
Speaker 1: that US and NATO government have the equivalent teams and capabilities.
Speaker 1: Oh yeah, definitely. I mean one of the big release
Speaker 1: from these shadow workers was to show the capabilities of
Speaker 1: the US government. Uh. And some of that was also
Speaker 1: like including you know, like targets from the US government.
Speaker 1: Same thing when Snowdon released some of the documents. We
Speaker 1: also soo some of the targets from the US government,
Speaker 1: including European like telco companies or though they are allies,
Speaker 1: there are not enemies. Spies are just continuing to spy.
Speaker 1: You know. It's just like spying stuff everywhere, So that
Speaker 1: that actually it leads to one a question that's been
Speaker 1: on the back of my mind this whole conversation. The
Speaker 1: spies are always going to be spies? Is it worth
Speaker 1: thinking of cyber warfare as a sort of discreet um event?
Speaker 1: And so of course when we think of conventional warfare,
Speaker 1: there's often a start, there's an invasion, maybe there's a
Speaker 1: ceasefire hopefully at some point soon. Uh, the war ends
Speaker 1: is is cyber warfare an event or is it just
Speaker 1: a is it an occurring sort of ongoing, persistent element
Speaker 1: of the interaction between nations these days that doesn't have
Speaker 1: any sort of like starter end I would I would
Speaker 1: say it's a component of wall. So that's why I
Speaker 1: had the beginning was talking about, like I bread wall.
Speaker 1: There's this like a convention on the wall, and uh,
Speaker 1: mostly it is used here for intelligence gathering or to
Speaker 1: collect information on troops, enemies capabilities. Uh, it may be
Speaker 1: used for disruption like we've seen with the satellite h
Speaker 1: like a few weeks ago of the cyberpartisan in January,
Speaker 1: but in that case working as an independent, independent group
Speaker 1: because the goal is like to protect the Belarus and
Speaker 1: the democracy. Uh So it may have some strategic of
Speaker 1: the objectives, like in the case of like the railway
Speaker 1: system in Belarush, but it may also just be like intelligence,
Speaker 1: and I think here it is mostly used for intelligence
Speaker 1: for disruption. It does not make that merch sense once
Speaker 1: you enter in a kinetic mode because if you can
Speaker 1: just if you have soldiers like physically present in the country,
Speaker 1: you can just shut down like cell phone towers, you
Speaker 1: can engage in electronic warfare, you can start jamming, you know,
Speaker 1: like whatever like ways of communication there is, so you
Speaker 1: don't necessarily need to use like cyber. Um. Cyber makes
Speaker 1: sense before the kinetic like war happening, because you're gonna
Speaker 1: collect information. You may do some light disruption, but at
Speaker 1: some point, like once the war is starting, you becomes
Speaker 1: more of a conventional war where well you need the
Speaker 1: winner and a loser, you need an agreement or you
Speaker 1: have like a ceasefire um, and then cyber just like
Speaker 1: uh you know, kind of like this background element depending
Speaker 1: if you include you know, like disinformation, propanganda and misinformation
Speaker 1: as part of cyber or not. Because as we can
Speaker 1: see now on social media, a bit like when the
Speaker 1: Arab Spring was happening when a lot of people were
Speaker 1: like sharing information on Twitter. Uh. Now we can see
Speaker 1: people sharing a lot of information on Facebook, Instagram, Twitter
Speaker 1: around the war, not like the donation and like the stories,
Speaker 1: not like the stories that I was saying about the
Speaker 1: tanks being stolen and being shared going viral. Uh. That's
Speaker 1: part of the information warfare. And that's a very new
Speaker 1: component because like things like TikTok didn't use in the past.
Speaker 1: And know that having also like their role within this
Speaker 1: information warfare, does that mean that those of us sitting
Speaker 1: in the US or Europe, we don't need to be
Speaker 1: worrying about, you know, an attack on critical infrastructure that
Speaker 1: suddenly um takes away our electricity or empties out our
Speaker 1: bank accounts or something like that. Uh. Yeah, No, I
Speaker 1: would not be worried about it. Uh. And even if
Speaker 1: we would happen, you know, I'm sure, like you know,
Speaker 1: electricity would be done for like a very short paiod
Speaker 1: of time because the process in place on all the
Speaker 1: recover like system just like if something is faulty, especially
Speaker 1: for like critical infrastructure, so I would not really worry. UM.
Speaker 1: One of the big story of getting like critical infrastructure
Speaker 1: was like the stext Net story, which is more than
Speaker 1: ten years old. Now back in Iran when that joint
Speaker 1: operation between Israel and the US was targetting one of
Speaker 1: the nuclear central, uh, they kind of just stopped it.
Speaker 1: And then back then, you know, like some movies like
Speaker 1: came out was then with Chris Sens Wolf Black Cats.
Speaker 1: You know, like this is nuclear central that's exploding at
Speaker 1: the end, except as it's like the Holywood version, but
Speaker 1: in reality, okay, like it's down. You know, like what
Speaker 1: are the guys doing? You know, because they already have
Speaker 1: like process in place, and if you like the the
Speaker 1: U S or Europe, you know, like you definitely like
Speaker 1: a plan for like faulty issues, regardless if it's like
Speaker 1: cyber or something that's not working anymore. But yeah, in
Speaker 1: terms of like money being drained from your account, although
Speaker 1: you won't have your money like being drained directly, um,
Speaker 1: but you know, like our low like stock markets are
Speaker 1: gonna go down now or is it gonna effect like
Speaker 1: you know, like the inflation, Like we can sit with
Speaker 1: the ruble now like it's completely crashing, so technically money
Speaker 1: is not running out of your account, but you know
Speaker 1: you can do less with your money or like your
Speaker 1: like whatever you have is less valuable, you know, So
Speaker 1: I think that's kind of like one of the side
Speaker 1: consequences that we would say. Last question for me is
Speaker 1: what is the skill set of a good hacker? And
Speaker 1: thinking about Okay, if you're a Russia or any government
Speaker 1: you're recruiting, what do you look for? What what makes
Speaker 1: what makes a good hacker? Uh? Well, I just want
Speaker 1: to clarify I'm not recruiting like hackers for the Russian government,
Speaker 1: you know, of course, of course, what would they be
Speaker 1: looking for or what would any government be looking for? Yeah,
Speaker 1: or like like like private company needs not because actually
Speaker 1: most of really good executive researchers I know are just
Speaker 1: like either independent or working for like tech companies because
Speaker 1: they tend to pay like the best you work on
Speaker 1: building cool technologies. And yeah, usually if people are like
Speaker 1: really good, just like end up doing a lot of research.
Speaker 1: So you want to work with the very, very best.
Speaker 1: And now it's such a it's a film that's moving
Speaker 1: like so fast that at the end of the day,
Speaker 1: you know, like you you need to like surround yourself
Speaker 1: with the best, otherwise like you won't learn like everything, right,
Speaker 1: So I don't know if there's like you know, like
Speaker 1: the there is not like equivalent of like word street
Speaker 1: bet for like hackers per se you know, where like
Speaker 1: people are just like sharing like random information around. But
Speaker 1: in terms of skill set, you know, like I keep
Speaker 1: reminding people that hacking or being a hacker is a
Speaker 1: skill set first. You know, it's not an ethical or
Speaker 1: political position that comes like secondary. It's like if you're
Speaker 1: a lawyer, you know, like you don't ask him if
Speaker 1: it's like ethical and ethical. And we've seen in the
Speaker 1: past with like Panama papers and all those things. You know,
Speaker 1: like you could ask the question as well for like lawyers.
Speaker 1: But yeah, most of like good security researchers or hackers know,
Speaker 1: um they all have different background, different skills set because
Speaker 1: it can go from physical security to radio frequency to
Speaker 1: like software security, hardware security, film more security, like open
Speaker 1: source intelligence. You know, we see more and more people
Speaker 1: even like groups you know, like a building cats, you know,
Speaker 1: like that tracking a lot of the military activity or
Speaker 1: from online resources you know, like different groups. Uh that's
Speaker 1: you know, like those are like all like different fields
Speaker 1: that come from like information security. Um. So I mean
Speaker 1: like yeah, everyone who is curious you know and like
Speaker 1: likes to put the time into the research is A
Speaker 1: is A. He's a good haicker. You know, I've seen
Speaker 1: like journists were like really good at doing their research,
Speaker 1: you know, exit like sometimes they have more knowledge and
Speaker 1: more skills than some of actual professionals. So it's really
Speaker 1: something that's very uh across like multiple disciplines. M H. Well, Matt,
Speaker 1: I think that's a good place to leave it. Thank
Speaker 1: you so much for coming on all thoughts and spending
Speaker 1: time with us to explain hacking and what it could
Speaker 1: actually look like in those contexts. Thank you, Thank you
Speaker 1: so Joe. I really enjoyed that conversation. I don't think
Speaker 1: we talked about it, but the Shadow Brokers actually called
Speaker 1: Matt a fun guy at one point, um, and he
Speaker 1: is a very fun guy. He's really good at explaining
Speaker 1: some of the more technical aspects of this. But I
Speaker 1: thought his aiming of cyber as a component of conventional warfare,
Speaker 1: I mean that seems right at least so far, Like,
Speaker 1: given what we've seen so far, I think that's right
Speaker 1: or two or let's put it this way. I think
Speaker 1: I found that to be really helpful because when I
Speaker 1: think of you know, when you think of cyber attacks.
Speaker 1: I think we oft have to have these very dramatic
Speaker 1: visions of some big grid being taken down, and obviously
Speaker 1: that's possible, and you you mentioned examples, You mentioned the
Speaker 1: example of the Belarusian real ray of the Ukrainian grid,
Speaker 1: But that more the more common impulse is intelligence gathering,
Speaker 1: and that's that's the big thing. Collecting data is sort
Speaker 1: of a useful way of thinking thinking about its role. Yeah.
Speaker 1: And the other thing that it's sort of coalesced for
Speaker 1: me was the idea of a lot of governments happened
Speaker 1: tolerating these attacks for a long time. Um. And this
Speaker 1: seems like a crunch point at least when it comes
Speaker 1: to Russia. Right, Like I was reading, Goldman Sacks put
Speaker 1: out a note right before we came on to record
Speaker 1: this talking about cyber warfare, and they had a statin
Speaker 1: there something like six of state sponsored cyber attacks are
Speaker 1: thought to have come from Russia, which seems extreme, but
Speaker 1: for some reason, no one really did anything about it. Yes,
Speaker 1: there were some sanctions in place, but now we've seen, um,
Speaker 1: you know, a very dramatic form of sanctions rolled out,
Speaker 1: and it seems doubtful that that kind of behavior is
Speaker 1: going to be tolerated going forward. Yeah, and but on
Speaker 1: the other hand, it's so nimbulous, it's so difficult to
Speaker 1: know what we're going to do about it. And the point,
Speaker 1: you know, as as Matt was saying, at texts that
Speaker 1: are happening right now, of which they're certainly going on,
Speaker 1: we'll be talking about in three or four years perhaps
Speaker 1: that we learn about them, and how how difficult it
Speaker 1: is to know often when you're being hacked or what
Speaker 1: the scope of the damage is that in in that
Speaker 1: element very different. I think hu's the word, you know,
Speaker 1: maybe I don't know if used the word metrics, but
Speaker 1: this idea we have metrics to measure the devastation of
Speaker 1: conventional warfare. We don't have and it seems very implausible
Speaker 1: that we would have anytime soon sort of equivalent metrics
Speaker 1: for cyber warfare. Yeah, it seems like it. All right, Well,
Speaker 1: shall we leave it there. Let's leave it there, all right.
Speaker 1: This has been another episode of the All Thoughts podcast.
Speaker 1: I'm Tracy Alloway. You can follow me on Twitter at
Speaker 1: Tracy Alloway and I'm Joe wi Isn't Though. You can
Speaker 1: follow me on Twitter at the Stalwart. This episode was
Speaker 1: produced by Magnus Hendrickson, who is smartly not on Twitter.
Speaker 1: Follow the Bloomberg head of podcast, Francesco Leavi at Francesco Today,
Speaker 1: and check out all of our podcasts at Bloomberg under
Speaker 1: the handle at podcasts. Thanks for listening to year to