WEBVTT - Thomas D. Gilovich Talks About Human Behavior

0:00:02.240 --> 0:00:06.800
<v Speaker 1>This is Masters in Business with Barry Ridholts on Bloomberg Radio.

0:00:09.560 --> 0:00:12.400
<v Speaker 1>This weekend. On the podcast, I have an extra special guest.

0:00:12.800 --> 0:00:15.360
<v Speaker 1>His name is Tom Gilovich. He is a professor of

0:00:15.360 --> 0:00:20.200
<v Speaker 1>psychology at Cornell University, and I have to say he

0:00:20.360 --> 0:00:24.000
<v Speaker 1>is a person who has had over the years, tremendous

0:00:24.000 --> 0:00:29.920
<v Speaker 1>influence on my career, although admittedly unknowingly. I began in

0:00:30.000 --> 0:00:34.240
<v Speaker 1>this industry as a trader, and I was frequently perplexed

0:00:34.280 --> 0:00:37.600
<v Speaker 1>and fascinated by why the people on the desk around

0:00:37.600 --> 0:00:42.600
<v Speaker 1>me were doing either poorly or well any given day, week, month.

0:00:43.240 --> 0:00:47.120
<v Speaker 1>And I eventually figured out it wasn't that one guy

0:00:47.200 --> 0:00:50.639
<v Speaker 1>was smarter than another or someone had more knowledge. It

0:00:50.720 --> 0:00:54.440
<v Speaker 1>was their own behavior that led to their successful failures.

0:00:54.880 --> 0:00:59.720
<v Speaker 1>And so I started hunting for some information about why

0:00:59.800 --> 0:01:05.000
<v Speaker 1>people made certain behavioral decisions that they did. I ended

0:01:05.160 --> 0:01:09.800
<v Speaker 1>up tracking down a book of his from How We

0:01:09.920 --> 0:01:12.240
<v Speaker 1>Know It Isn't So, and that pretty much sent me

0:01:12.319 --> 0:01:17.959
<v Speaker 1>down the rabbit hole of behavioral economics, which has been

0:01:18.000 --> 0:01:21.399
<v Speaker 1>a tremendous asset to me uh both in the world

0:01:21.520 --> 0:01:26.280
<v Speaker 1>of finance and media. Understanding what motivates people to make

0:01:26.840 --> 0:01:30.480
<v Speaker 1>either good or bad decisions with their money UH is

0:01:30.520 --> 0:01:33.840
<v Speaker 1>a tremendous asset both what you should be doing with

0:01:33.920 --> 0:01:37.520
<v Speaker 1>your money and what you should be advising other people

0:01:37.640 --> 0:01:41.119
<v Speaker 1>to do with their money. This is to me one

0:01:41.160 --> 0:01:44.759
<v Speaker 1>of the more fascinating conversations UH that you'll hear if

0:01:44.800 --> 0:01:50.960
<v Speaker 1>you are all interested in filling the blank psychology, behavioral economics, heuristics, biases,

0:01:51.320 --> 0:01:53.960
<v Speaker 1>et cetera. I could have gone on for another three

0:01:53.960 --> 0:01:56.720
<v Speaker 1>hours with him. I barely got to scratch the surface

0:01:57.440 --> 0:02:01.280
<v Speaker 1>of all my questions with no further ado my conversation

0:02:01.360 --> 0:02:08.120
<v Speaker 1>with Tom Gilovich. I have an extra special guest this week,

0:02:08.280 --> 0:02:11.880
<v Speaker 1>and his name is Professor Thomas Gilovich. He is a

0:02:11.919 --> 0:02:17.560
<v Speaker 1>professor of psychology at Cornell University. He has published numerous

0:02:18.120 --> 0:02:22.480
<v Speaker 1>pure reviewed works on cognition and heuristics and is among

0:02:22.560 --> 0:02:26.760
<v Speaker 1>the most cited academics in the field. Working on behavioral

0:02:26.840 --> 0:02:31.160
<v Speaker 1>psychology and economics. His work has debunked the idea of

0:02:31.200 --> 0:02:35.160
<v Speaker 1>the hot hand in basketball, the spotlight effect, the bias,

0:02:35.240 --> 0:02:39.799
<v Speaker 1>blind site, clustering, illusion, and numerous other cognitive issues are

0:02:39.919 --> 0:02:43.360
<v Speaker 1>in his purview. He is the author of numerous books,

0:02:43.400 --> 0:02:47.600
<v Speaker 1>including a textbook on heuristics and biases UH. He is

0:02:47.639 --> 0:02:50.720
<v Speaker 1>the co author of Why Smart People make big bunny

0:02:50.760 --> 0:02:53.640
<v Speaker 1>mistakes and what you can do to correct them. I

0:02:53.720 --> 0:02:56.520
<v Speaker 1>became familiar with his work How We Know It Isn't So,

0:02:57.160 --> 0:03:01.280
<v Speaker 1>The Fallibility of Human Reason in Everyday. It was one

0:03:01.320 --> 0:03:05.359
<v Speaker 1>of the first popular books on behavioral economics and one

0:03:05.400 --> 0:03:11.000
<v Speaker 1>that I found incredibly influential. Thomas Killovich, Welcome to Bloomberg.

0:03:11.200 --> 0:03:13.880
<v Speaker 1>Happy to be here. Let's start out with how we

0:03:13.960 --> 0:03:16.760
<v Speaker 1>Know what is? And so you begin the book with

0:03:16.800 --> 0:03:21.360
<v Speaker 1>a quote from Artemus Ward. It ain't the things we

0:03:21.440 --> 0:03:24.400
<v Speaker 1>don't know that get us into trouble. It's the things

0:03:24.440 --> 0:03:29.440
<v Speaker 1>we know that just ain't so. Tell us about that. Well,

0:03:29.880 --> 0:03:33.000
<v Speaker 1>if we're convinced of things that aren't true, we're gonna

0:03:33.160 --> 0:03:36.120
<v Speaker 1>go down certain paths that aren't going to be productive.

0:03:36.280 --> 0:03:40.720
<v Speaker 1>And uh, that quote captures that idea very well. And

0:03:40.760 --> 0:03:44.120
<v Speaker 1>what I like about that quote is that most people

0:03:44.680 --> 0:03:50.760
<v Speaker 1>attribute it to Mark Twins or Will Rogers, and the

0:03:51.040 --> 0:03:56.280
<v Speaker 1>source I thought at the time was Artemus Ward. And

0:03:56.880 --> 0:04:00.400
<v Speaker 1>maybe two years after the publication of the book, reader

0:04:00.480 --> 0:04:03.520
<v Speaker 1>wrote to me and said, Uh, well, it's really interesting.

0:04:03.680 --> 0:04:05.960
<v Speaker 1>You're sort of telling everyone they got it wrong with

0:04:06.440 --> 0:04:09.360
<v Speaker 1>Will Rogers and Mark Twain, but in fact it goes

0:04:09.440 --> 0:04:13.960
<v Speaker 1>back even earlier than Artemis forward to someone named Josh

0:04:14.000 --> 0:04:17.000
<v Speaker 1>Billings that I hadn't heard of, so uh, it's kind

0:04:17.040 --> 0:04:20.880
<v Speaker 1>of ironic. Started off a book on illusion and air

0:04:21.040 --> 0:04:24.320
<v Speaker 1>to the very first sentence of the book contains a

0:04:24.960 --> 0:04:28.800
<v Speaker 1>citation air at least, but the that citation errors did

0:04:28.800 --> 0:04:32.000
<v Speaker 1>not lead you down a path filled with errors. Let's

0:04:32.040 --> 0:04:34.960
<v Speaker 1>discuss a little bit about the things that you discovered

0:04:35.560 --> 0:04:38.039
<v Speaker 1>uh and published in the book, and will begin with

0:04:38.080 --> 0:04:43.360
<v Speaker 1>a very simple question, what are heuristics and biases? Well,

0:04:43.400 --> 0:04:45.760
<v Speaker 1>the bias part is quite easy. It's a term that

0:04:45.920 --> 0:04:51.080
<v Speaker 1>people are familiar with when there's a systematic departure between um,

0:04:51.440 --> 0:04:54.360
<v Speaker 1>a belief that you have in reality, or a tendency

0:04:54.440 --> 0:04:57.760
<v Speaker 1>to choose to veer in one direction when you should

0:04:57.800 --> 0:05:00.960
<v Speaker 1>be varying in another direction. So it's assist thematic departure

0:05:01.080 --> 0:05:06.440
<v Speaker 1>from uh reality or the best assessment of reality. Heuristics

0:05:06.520 --> 0:05:10.800
<v Speaker 1>that's a little more complicated for most folks. UM. It's

0:05:10.880 --> 0:05:15.560
<v Speaker 1>generally defined in the behavioral economics world as a rough

0:05:15.600 --> 0:05:21.119
<v Speaker 1>approximation seed of the pants uh rule of thumbs another

0:05:21.160 --> 0:05:24.600
<v Speaker 1>way of describing it. Yes, and why do these heuristics

0:05:24.680 --> 0:05:30.040
<v Speaker 1>lead people down the wrong path? Because there they generally

0:05:30.080 --> 0:05:33.559
<v Speaker 1>work pretty well. In One of the earliest examples used

0:05:33.960 --> 0:05:39.400
<v Speaker 1>UH applied to psychology was Daniel Khneman and Amos Tversky's

0:05:39.440 --> 0:05:43.320
<v Speaker 1>example to we use the clarity of the of an

0:05:43.320 --> 0:05:46.320
<v Speaker 1>image as a cue for how far away it is.

0:05:46.480 --> 0:05:50.320
<v Speaker 1>Farther things are, the harder it is to see them clearly,

0:05:50.400 --> 0:05:55.240
<v Speaker 1>so they will see more indistinct and that generally works

0:05:55.279 --> 0:05:57.840
<v Speaker 1>pretty well. We're able to see whether something's very far

0:05:57.839 --> 0:06:02.520
<v Speaker 1>away or relatively close up. But on a hazy day,

0:06:02.560 --> 0:06:07.120
<v Speaker 1>that's gonna make things seem farther away than they really are. Um.

0:06:07.240 --> 0:06:11.520
<v Speaker 1>And conversely, on a spectacularly clear day, you often have

0:06:11.640 --> 0:06:15.480
<v Speaker 1>the reaction of whoa those mountains are. I didn't realize

0:06:15.520 --> 0:06:19.720
<v Speaker 1>they were that close. Let's use another example of of

0:06:19.760 --> 0:06:23.400
<v Speaker 1>some biases. Your online in the supermarket and your line

0:06:23.400 --> 0:06:26.159
<v Speaker 1>doesn't seem to be moving, the line next to you

0:06:26.240 --> 0:06:28.240
<v Speaker 1>really looks like it's flying, or you're waiting for a

0:06:28.279 --> 0:06:30.640
<v Speaker 1>toll booth. I know parts of the country still have

0:06:30.800 --> 0:06:34.960
<v Speaker 1>toll booths. Um. And you switch lines and suddenly the

0:06:35.000 --> 0:06:38.880
<v Speaker 1>line you're on comes to a dead halt and the

0:06:38.960 --> 0:06:42.080
<v Speaker 1>line you just left seems to be moving. What is

0:06:42.120 --> 0:06:47.279
<v Speaker 1>it about our life experience that causes that illusion or

0:06:47.440 --> 0:06:51.960
<v Speaker 1>is it an illusion? Um that one. As far as

0:06:52.040 --> 0:06:55.040
<v Speaker 1>the grocery lines, I don't know if anyone has formally

0:06:55.160 --> 0:06:58.000
<v Speaker 1>studied it, but you have to ask what principle of

0:06:58.040 --> 0:07:03.159
<v Speaker 1>the universe would there be that it systematically uh distort

0:07:03.279 --> 0:07:05.839
<v Speaker 1>things such that whenever you move to a line, it

0:07:05.839 --> 0:07:07.839
<v Speaker 1>would slow down and the line that you were in

0:07:08.120 --> 0:07:11.400
<v Speaker 1>suddenly sped up. Uh. But it's easy to explain why

0:07:11.400 --> 0:07:14.240
<v Speaker 1>people would believe that, even if it's not true. That

0:07:14.400 --> 0:07:17.640
<v Speaker 1>is to say, uh, those times when you stay in

0:07:17.800 --> 0:07:22.560
<v Speaker 1>your overly busy line, you're tempted to move to another one, UM,

0:07:22.800 --> 0:07:25.960
<v Speaker 1>and it turns out that that you can see that

0:07:25.960 --> 0:07:29.040
<v Speaker 1>that would have been a better thing. Your line stays slow,

0:07:29.440 --> 0:07:31.880
<v Speaker 1>you could see people speeding through the other line. That

0:07:32.000 --> 0:07:35.720
<v Speaker 1>bothers you, but you get over it. If, on the

0:07:35.720 --> 0:07:38.160
<v Speaker 1>other hand, you make the opposite mistake, you switch to

0:07:38.400 --> 0:07:42.040
<v Speaker 1>the seemingly speedy line and it slows down, the line

0:07:42.080 --> 0:07:45.560
<v Speaker 1>you were in suddenly speeds up, you're gonna kick yourself

0:07:45.600 --> 0:07:47.440
<v Speaker 1>and say, Wow, why did I do that? I was

0:07:47.480 --> 0:07:51.239
<v Speaker 1>in the right line. I brought this on myself, And

0:07:51.440 --> 0:07:55.240
<v Speaker 1>it's more annoying. And because it's more annoying, it's more memorable,

0:07:55.680 --> 0:07:59.080
<v Speaker 1>and therefore, UH, you're gonna have a distorted sense in

0:07:59.120 --> 0:08:02.160
<v Speaker 1>your head of how common it is. UM. Very much

0:08:02.200 --> 0:08:06.760
<v Speaker 1>like UH, there's a belief in the sports world, baseball

0:08:06.800 --> 0:08:09.280
<v Speaker 1>world that if your team, your picture has a no

0:08:09.400 --> 0:08:13.960
<v Speaker 1>hitter in progress, don't comment on it. And that's partly

0:08:14.000 --> 0:08:17.520
<v Speaker 1>fed by the idea that if you're picture does have

0:08:17.560 --> 0:08:19.680
<v Speaker 1>a no hitter and you say, oh, we've got a

0:08:19.720 --> 0:08:21.760
<v Speaker 1>no hitter going, this is great, and then they lose it,

0:08:22.440 --> 0:08:25.480
<v Speaker 1>you draw an association between those two and those are

0:08:25.480 --> 0:08:28.600
<v Speaker 1>gonna stand out, and you're gonna think that it's uh,

0:08:28.640 --> 0:08:32.160
<v Speaker 1>what you've done has played some determinative role, which of

0:08:32.160 --> 0:08:34.679
<v Speaker 1>course hasn't. So so let's talk a little bit about

0:08:34.800 --> 0:08:38.319
<v Speaker 1>mean reversion. Very often, when we see things that are

0:08:38.400 --> 0:08:41.920
<v Speaker 1>outliers to the upside of the downside, we're sort of

0:08:41.960 --> 0:08:47.400
<v Speaker 1>surprised when the next item in that series is not

0:08:47.559 --> 0:08:50.480
<v Speaker 1>as extreme, be it how fast the line is moving,

0:08:50.600 --> 0:08:54.120
<v Speaker 1>or how easily a no hitter UH is lost and

0:08:54.160 --> 0:08:57.760
<v Speaker 1>goes back to normal issues. Why do people have such

0:08:57.760 --> 0:09:00.959
<v Speaker 1>a hard time with mean reversion that It's a great question,

0:09:01.120 --> 0:09:04.560
<v Speaker 1>and there are a number of things that contribute to UH.

0:09:04.800 --> 0:09:08.880
<v Speaker 1>This belief. The failure to recognize the fact that UM

0:09:09.160 --> 0:09:13.160
<v Speaker 1>regression to the mean is happening UM. And one of

0:09:13.200 --> 0:09:17.120
<v Speaker 1>them is that UH is the same story that I've

0:09:17.160 --> 0:09:22.040
<v Speaker 1>described before, which is when it reverts UM, and particularly

0:09:22.080 --> 0:09:26.080
<v Speaker 1>when it reverts after you've done something that that stands

0:09:26.120 --> 0:09:29.200
<v Speaker 1>out in your memory more and distorts your the intuitive

0:09:29.280 --> 0:09:33.720
<v Speaker 1>database that you have in your head. And so UH.

0:09:33.760 --> 0:09:37.200
<v Speaker 1>There are a lot of superstitions that are essentially a

0:09:37.240 --> 0:09:41.359
<v Speaker 1>failure to recognize the operation of regression, the Sports Illustrated

0:09:41.440 --> 0:09:44.920
<v Speaker 1>jinks being one of them. That it's believed that if

0:09:44.920 --> 0:09:47.440
<v Speaker 1>you get your picture on the cover of Sports Illustrated,

0:09:47.840 --> 0:09:51.400
<v Speaker 1>that that's bad luck UM. And it doesn't take that

0:09:51.520 --> 0:09:55.120
<v Speaker 1>much insight to recognize that really is a mean aversion account.

0:09:55.160 --> 0:09:57.160
<v Speaker 1>That is, you only get your picture on the cover

0:09:57.240 --> 0:10:01.040
<v Speaker 1>of Sports Illustrated if you've had a run of success

0:10:01.120 --> 0:10:05.360
<v Speaker 1>and extraordinary success at time one is going to be

0:10:05.440 --> 0:10:09.840
<v Speaker 1>followed not by abject failure but by somewhat less extreme

0:10:11.160 --> 0:10:14.320
<v Speaker 1>a run of success afterwards. So you're right there on

0:10:14.360 --> 0:10:17.880
<v Speaker 1>the peak. On average, people are going to do less

0:10:17.880 --> 0:10:20.199
<v Speaker 1>well the next time, and that gives rise to this

0:10:20.280 --> 0:10:24.040
<v Speaker 1>belief that um, it's bad luck to be pictured on

0:10:24.080 --> 0:10:28.040
<v Speaker 1>the cover of Sports Illustrated magazine, and people athletes truly

0:10:28.120 --> 0:10:31.080
<v Speaker 1>believe it. Some of them have turned down the opportunity

0:10:31.120 --> 0:10:34.120
<v Speaker 1>to be on the cover of Sports Illustrated simply because

0:10:34.160 --> 0:10:37.000
<v Speaker 1>they thought it was bad luck. Let's talk a little

0:10:37.000 --> 0:10:41.120
<v Speaker 1>bit about the hot hands in basketball. You first wrote

0:10:41.160 --> 0:10:45.120
<v Speaker 1>about this effect with Amos Tversky. Is it about thirty

0:10:45.200 --> 0:10:48.840
<v Speaker 1>years ago? Is that right? Yes, paper came out, so

0:10:48.840 --> 0:10:52.400
<v Speaker 1>so tell us what your studies found and how you

0:10:52.440 --> 0:10:55.920
<v Speaker 1>went about proving that the hot hands wasn't everything it

0:10:56.000 --> 0:11:01.480
<v Speaker 1>appeared to be. Uh. The the belief in the hot

0:11:01.559 --> 0:11:05.600
<v Speaker 1>hand is just one of the most powerful and firmly

0:11:05.640 --> 0:11:09.440
<v Speaker 1>held beliefs that we have. If you've ever played or

0:11:09.440 --> 0:11:13.160
<v Speaker 1>watched the game of basketball, it just seems like people

0:11:13.320 --> 0:11:15.920
<v Speaker 1>get on these streaks where they can do no wrong.

0:11:16.080 --> 0:11:20.280
<v Speaker 1>I am in the zone, absolutely, and it's incredibly compelling

0:11:20.360 --> 0:11:24.280
<v Speaker 1>that you've made a few shots, the game just seems easier.

0:11:24.320 --> 0:11:27.240
<v Speaker 1>It seems like you don't even have to attend to

0:11:27.320 --> 0:11:30.080
<v Speaker 1>the basket as much as normal, and it just goes in.

0:11:30.240 --> 0:11:33.400
<v Speaker 1>It's absolutely compelling. Michael Jordan used to say, there are

0:11:33.480 --> 0:11:39.920
<v Speaker 1>times when the rim looks bigger, absolutely um, and we

0:11:40.000 --> 0:11:46.160
<v Speaker 1>wondered whether there was less to that belief than basketball

0:11:46.200 --> 0:11:51.360
<v Speaker 1>players think. UM, we're not. It was we don't want

0:11:51.360 --> 0:11:56.240
<v Speaker 1>to challenge the feeling. There's no question that when you've

0:11:56.280 --> 0:12:00.000
<v Speaker 1>done well, you feel different differently, and when you've done poor,

0:12:00.000 --> 0:12:04.040
<v Speaker 1>really you feel differently. The basket seems to have shrunk.

0:12:04.080 --> 0:12:06.599
<v Speaker 1>It seems like the best aim shot is going to

0:12:06.679 --> 0:12:10.479
<v Speaker 1>go partly in the cylinder and pop right out. UM,

0:12:10.480 --> 0:12:13.200
<v Speaker 1>no questioning that. But the belief in the hot hand

0:12:13.280 --> 0:12:17.240
<v Speaker 1>is really a three link chain. Previous performance affects how

0:12:17.320 --> 0:12:20.600
<v Speaker 1>you feel. How you feel affects subsequent performance, and we

0:12:20.600 --> 0:12:24.200
<v Speaker 1>were interested in the link between the second and third,

0:12:24.320 --> 0:12:27.679
<v Speaker 1>and the thought was that we exaggerate that for many

0:12:27.760 --> 0:12:32.440
<v Speaker 1>of the same UH psychological principles we've already talked about UM.

0:12:32.559 --> 0:12:36.960
<v Speaker 1>And when we tested it, UH, the our hypothesis was

0:12:37.000 --> 0:12:40.400
<v Speaker 1>that people are going to exaggerate how much heat there is,

0:12:40.440 --> 0:12:44.240
<v Speaker 1>how much streakiness there is in performance. And when we

0:12:44.320 --> 0:12:48.760
<v Speaker 1>did the analyzes, turned out there was no connection between

0:12:48.840 --> 0:12:51.880
<v Speaker 1>link two and three. That is, how you feel doesn't

0:12:51.880 --> 0:12:56.360
<v Speaker 1>seem to influence how UH you perform in the future,

0:12:56.400 --> 0:12:59.520
<v Speaker 1>at least at the professional level. So let's let's be

0:12:59.679 --> 0:13:02.520
<v Speaker 1>really precise with that. When you say there is no link.

0:13:03.000 --> 0:13:07.080
<v Speaker 1>There's not even the slight improvement. Hey, I'm lose some

0:13:07.320 --> 0:13:12.080
<v Speaker 1>hitting shots. I'm feeling good each subsequent basket. What is

0:13:12.160 --> 0:13:15.200
<v Speaker 1>the correlation with the future success whether I made a

0:13:15.200 --> 0:13:17.600
<v Speaker 1>few in a row where I missed a few row. UM.

0:13:17.920 --> 0:13:21.240
<v Speaker 1>Two things are important there. One is um, there may

0:13:21.280 --> 0:13:25.360
<v Speaker 1>be some ways in which you've experienced some success, you

0:13:25.480 --> 0:13:29.120
<v Speaker 1>feel different, and it might influence your future behavior that

0:13:29.200 --> 0:13:32.760
<v Speaker 1>we haven't studied. We put aside from the hot hand idea,

0:13:32.840 --> 0:13:36.440
<v Speaker 1>which is I've done well. Maybe I'm a more energetic player,

0:13:36.480 --> 0:13:39.520
<v Speaker 1>I played better defense, I get more rebounds. We don't

0:13:39.520 --> 0:13:41.760
<v Speaker 1>know about that, and that may be true. What we

0:13:41.800 --> 0:13:44.600
<v Speaker 1>did look at do you become a better shooter? Not

0:13:44.720 --> 0:13:46.640
<v Speaker 1>do you take more shots? You may you probably do

0:13:46.720 --> 0:13:49.400
<v Speaker 1>take more shots because you're feeling hot. The question is

0:13:49.400 --> 0:13:52.880
<v Speaker 1>are you more likely to make a shot um after

0:13:53.000 --> 0:13:56.600
<v Speaker 1>having succeeded in the past versus after having failed. And

0:13:56.679 --> 0:14:00.120
<v Speaker 1>the data show and this remains, you know, controversial or

0:14:00.200 --> 0:14:04.120
<v Speaker 1>thirty years, there's been back and forth. All the challenges

0:14:04.160 --> 0:14:06.720
<v Speaker 1>to it for decades have not stood up. There's a

0:14:06.720 --> 0:14:10.120
<v Speaker 1>recent challenge that's among the more interesting ones. So I

0:14:10.120 --> 0:14:14.840
<v Speaker 1>have to say it remains controversial. Our original hypothesis UM

0:14:15.040 --> 0:14:20.600
<v Speaker 1>isn't controversial. That is to say, UM people wildly overestimate

0:14:21.080 --> 0:14:24.680
<v Speaker 1>the extent to which people are hot or how streaky

0:14:24.760 --> 0:14:29.560
<v Speaker 1>people are. Whether there's any sort of carryover that remains

0:14:30.000 --> 0:14:33.320
<v Speaker 1>a bit controversial. So some of the pushback has been,

0:14:33.400 --> 0:14:36.920
<v Speaker 1>you know, a player gets hot and the defense collapses

0:14:37.000 --> 0:14:39.880
<v Speaker 1>on on them and they have less good looks at

0:14:39.880 --> 0:14:43.600
<v Speaker 1>the basket, and so naturally after a certain streak they're

0:14:43.640 --> 0:14:47.160
<v Speaker 1>gonna start missing. But you don't have that same defensive

0:14:47.160 --> 0:14:50.000
<v Speaker 1>pressure with foul shooting, do you. That's right? And what

0:14:50.120 --> 0:14:52.400
<v Speaker 1>is the data show with that? The data show that

0:14:52.480 --> 0:14:55.400
<v Speaker 1>the outcome of the second free throw is completely independent

0:14:55.480 --> 0:14:58.760
<v Speaker 1>of the out outcome of the first totally. So if

0:14:58.800 --> 0:15:01.720
<v Speaker 1>you hit or miss the US one, the outcome of

0:15:01.760 --> 0:15:05.840
<v Speaker 1>the second one is statistically no different. Right, And a

0:15:05.880 --> 0:15:09.000
<v Speaker 1>lot of basketball UM players and fans will say, well,

0:15:09.040 --> 0:15:11.440
<v Speaker 1>I'm not so impressed by that, because you can't really

0:15:11.480 --> 0:15:14.000
<v Speaker 1>be streaky when it comes to free throws. Now they

0:15:14.000 --> 0:15:17.000
<v Speaker 1>say that after the fact, but I mean, you're standing there,

0:15:17.080 --> 0:15:21.040
<v Speaker 1>nobody's guarding you. There are certain think of Reggie Miller

0:15:21.080 --> 0:15:24.920
<v Speaker 1>of the Yetta Paces used to shoot like free throws.

0:15:25.080 --> 0:15:30.120
<v Speaker 1>He was an outstanding free throw shooter. Why would people

0:15:30.320 --> 0:15:33.240
<v Speaker 1>not assume if there's a streak when you're on the

0:15:33.360 --> 0:15:35.560
<v Speaker 1>on the court, why would you not assume there's a

0:15:35.560 --> 0:15:39.960
<v Speaker 1>streak at the foul line. I think they say that

0:15:40.040 --> 0:15:42.800
<v Speaker 1>after having seen the data UM, and they want to

0:15:42.920 --> 0:15:46.120
<v Speaker 1>maintain that belief. But we went a step further and

0:15:46.120 --> 0:15:48.560
<v Speaker 1>we conducted UM and other people have done this too,

0:15:48.680 --> 0:15:51.560
<v Speaker 1>where UM, you have people shoot in the gym for you,

0:15:51.840 --> 0:15:54.960
<v Speaker 1>and the feeling for all of us who've played basketball

0:15:55.080 --> 0:15:57.040
<v Speaker 1>is you can feel it in warm up Sometime it

0:15:57.040 --> 0:15:58.880
<v Speaker 1>doesn't have to be in the heat of the game

0:15:58.920 --> 0:16:02.440
<v Speaker 1>that you can feel hot. And uh. We have people

0:16:02.520 --> 0:16:06.040
<v Speaker 1>take a series of shots along an arc equidistance from

0:16:06.040 --> 0:16:10.280
<v Speaker 1>the basket, and before each shot they place a bet

0:16:10.320 --> 0:16:12.960
<v Speaker 1>on themselves, take a risky bet if they're feeling hot,

0:16:13.040 --> 0:16:15.240
<v Speaker 1>or a more conservative bet if they are not feeling

0:16:15.280 --> 0:16:17.840
<v Speaker 1>so hot. It turns out we can predict the bets

0:16:17.840 --> 0:16:19.680
<v Speaker 1>they're going to make. That is, if they've made several

0:16:19.680 --> 0:16:22.560
<v Speaker 1>shots in a row, that is a very strong predictor

0:16:22.760 --> 0:16:26.400
<v Speaker 1>of whether they're going to choose the risky bet or not. However,

0:16:26.880 --> 0:16:29.840
<v Speaker 1>the bets that they choose are not very good predictors

0:16:29.880 --> 0:16:32.800
<v Speaker 1>of what's going to happen next? Again, this three linked chain,

0:16:33.440 --> 0:16:36.320
<v Speaker 1>no problem between the first and the second. How you've

0:16:36.360 --> 0:16:40.440
<v Speaker 1>done influences how you feel, But surprisingly how you feel

0:16:40.520 --> 0:16:44.640
<v Speaker 1>has um either no or very little impact on your

0:16:44.720 --> 0:16:46.920
<v Speaker 1>likelihood of making the next shot. And again I want

0:16:46.920 --> 0:16:49.480
<v Speaker 1>to stress it has to do with your ability to,

0:16:50.120 --> 0:16:53.520
<v Speaker 1>as they now say, score the basketball, get the ball

0:16:53.640 --> 0:16:55.520
<v Speaker 1>in the cylinder. It may affect you in other ways,

0:16:55.560 --> 0:16:58.120
<v Speaker 1>may make you a better defender, better pass or whatever.

0:16:58.760 --> 0:17:01.040
<v Speaker 1>So about a year a half ago I read the

0:17:01.080 --> 0:17:04.679
<v Speaker 1>book by Michael Lewis, The Undoing Project about Danny Khneman,

0:17:04.720 --> 0:17:07.760
<v Speaker 1>any of us Amos Tversky. You wrote the Hot Hand

0:17:07.760 --> 0:17:13.120
<v Speaker 1>paper with Amos Tversky? What was it like working with him?

0:17:13.160 --> 0:17:17.439
<v Speaker 1>I mean, it was certainly a highlight of my career,

0:17:17.480 --> 0:17:21.040
<v Speaker 1>and subsequently had the great opportunity to have worked with

0:17:21.119 --> 0:17:26.800
<v Speaker 1>Danny Khneman as well. Um and Amos, who's brilliant, as

0:17:26.880 --> 0:17:29.760
<v Speaker 1>you know, as as comes across in The Undoing Project,

0:17:30.160 --> 0:17:33.040
<v Speaker 1>and one of the things that I most liked about

0:17:33.880 --> 0:17:36.840
<v Speaker 1>uh working with him one of the great lessons. And

0:17:36.880 --> 0:17:41.240
<v Speaker 1>this applies equally as well to Koneman. Um. They're both

0:17:41.240 --> 0:17:45.320
<v Speaker 1>brilliant and it's fun to be in close proximity to brilliance.

0:17:46.000 --> 0:17:49.440
<v Speaker 1>But that's not enough. Both of these guys were incredibly

0:17:49.600 --> 0:17:53.119
<v Speaker 1>hard working and detailed oriented. And one of the things

0:17:53.200 --> 0:17:56.880
<v Speaker 1>I learned from Amos it's kind of similar to this,

0:17:57.240 --> 0:18:00.919
<v Speaker 1>uh saying people have about gall that you know, you

0:18:01.040 --> 0:18:05.720
<v Speaker 1>drive for show and you put for dough. Um that uh,

0:18:05.760 --> 0:18:09.480
<v Speaker 1>you know, when we were basically done with our hot

0:18:09.560 --> 0:18:12.000
<v Speaker 1>hand paper. In fact, as a young person, I thought

0:18:12.040 --> 0:18:15.320
<v Speaker 1>we were done. He would several times, Tom, come in here.

0:18:15.320 --> 0:18:17.840
<v Speaker 1>I've moved this sentence around here, and I've changed this word.

0:18:18.000 --> 0:18:20.879
<v Speaker 1>And the thought was the lesson was if someone of

0:18:21.000 --> 0:18:24.760
<v Speaker 1>his stature is really sweating the details right here at

0:18:24.840 --> 0:18:28.119
<v Speaker 1>the very end, just making the paper a little better

0:18:28.320 --> 0:18:31.720
<v Speaker 1>in these marginal ways, I can do that too. And

0:18:31.760 --> 0:18:34.399
<v Speaker 1>it's just been a very helpful lesson. You're never really

0:18:34.440 --> 0:18:38.120
<v Speaker 1>done and things can always be made better. And uh,

0:18:38.320 --> 0:18:43.240
<v Speaker 1>both Condimn and Diversky are you know, they they're they're

0:18:43.280 --> 0:18:46.600
<v Speaker 1>into what they're doing, passionately care about it, and it

0:18:46.640 --> 0:18:49.840
<v Speaker 1>shows in their ability to throw themselves into it. And

0:18:49.880 --> 0:18:54.520
<v Speaker 1>there's there's no being brilliants great, and both of them are,

0:18:54.560 --> 0:18:57.320
<v Speaker 1>but to get to their level, you also have to

0:18:57.359 --> 0:19:01.400
<v Speaker 1>have a great capacity for hard work and great enthusiasm

0:19:01.440 --> 0:19:03.960
<v Speaker 1>for what you're doing, which both of them did do.

0:19:04.480 --> 0:19:08.800
<v Speaker 1>Brilliance is necessary, but not sufficient, well said. Let's talk

0:19:08.840 --> 0:19:13.879
<v Speaker 1>a little bit about some of your research on happiness

0:19:14.040 --> 0:19:19.760
<v Speaker 1>and how do either get happy or avoid unhappiness. Let's

0:19:19.800 --> 0:19:23.840
<v Speaker 1>begin with the discussion of regret. What is it that

0:19:23.920 --> 0:19:27.720
<v Speaker 1>people regret more the things they do or the things

0:19:27.760 --> 0:19:31.320
<v Speaker 1>that they decide not to do. I think one thing

0:19:31.359 --> 0:19:35.720
<v Speaker 1>that's interesting about that question is that it depends upon

0:19:36.200 --> 0:19:40.960
<v Speaker 1>um when you're talking about it, that in the immediate

0:19:41.000 --> 0:19:44.679
<v Speaker 1>aftermath of a mistake of action, that just hurts a

0:19:44.720 --> 0:19:49.120
<v Speaker 1>lot more than omission. And uh, you see that everywhere.

0:19:49.280 --> 0:19:51.520
<v Speaker 1>It plays out in the example that you started with

0:19:51.560 --> 0:19:54.400
<v Speaker 1>about the grocery store line, that if you switch from

0:19:54.400 --> 0:19:58.439
<v Speaker 1>a slow line to one that's seemingly faster and it

0:19:58.520 --> 0:20:00.760
<v Speaker 1>slows down, and you just kick yourself. I was in

0:20:00.800 --> 0:20:03.720
<v Speaker 1>a better line, Why did I switch? Uh? The example

0:20:03.800 --> 0:20:06.120
<v Speaker 1>at a university, of course that I think everyone can

0:20:06.200 --> 0:20:09.919
<v Speaker 1>relate to is people taking multiple choice tests and you

0:20:10.000 --> 0:20:12.879
<v Speaker 1>have the common experience of zipping along, Oh this one's

0:20:12.920 --> 0:20:16.440
<v Speaker 1>B and oh wait a minute, maybe maybe it's D,

0:20:16.600 --> 0:20:18.520
<v Speaker 1>and you go back and forth. Should I stick with

0:20:18.600 --> 0:20:21.760
<v Speaker 1>my initial hunt or should I switch to now what

0:20:21.880 --> 0:20:24.919
<v Speaker 1>I think that it is? Turns out people have studied that,

0:20:25.160 --> 0:20:28.600
<v Speaker 1>and if you face that dilemma, Uh, you're much more

0:20:28.640 --> 0:20:32.400
<v Speaker 1>likely to get the right answer by switching than staying.

0:20:32.960 --> 0:20:35.920
<v Speaker 1>Students believe the complete opposite is better to go with

0:20:36.000 --> 0:20:41.280
<v Speaker 1>your initial gut instinct. And UM, So their belief is incorrect,

0:20:41.320 --> 0:20:45.240
<v Speaker 1>doesn't fit the data that's been observed. Um. But it's

0:20:45.240 --> 0:20:47.399
<v Speaker 1>easy to see why they would believe that. That is,

0:20:47.480 --> 0:20:50.280
<v Speaker 1>if you thought it was be and then you convince

0:20:50.320 --> 0:20:53.280
<v Speaker 1>yourself let me switch to D. You erase it. Now

0:20:53.359 --> 0:20:55.720
<v Speaker 1>you're endorsing B. And it turns out you were right.

0:20:56.160 --> 0:21:00.760
<v Speaker 1>You're gonna kick yourself. I had I had the right answer.

0:21:00.800 --> 0:21:03.560
<v Speaker 1>I knew it you did. Um. So, short term, the

0:21:03.600 --> 0:21:08.080
<v Speaker 1>bias against action is a manifestation of regret aversion. We

0:21:08.160 --> 0:21:11.679
<v Speaker 1>don't want to do something that we ultimately regret. But

0:21:11.880 --> 0:21:15.080
<v Speaker 1>then how does that play out with the sort of

0:21:15.240 --> 0:21:20.120
<v Speaker 1>deathbed statements we've seen from people I should have done X. Yeah,

0:21:20.240 --> 0:21:23.320
<v Speaker 1>that's the that's the interesting part. This change from the

0:21:23.720 --> 0:21:28.399
<v Speaker 1>close temporal proximity to a distant perspective, and over time

0:21:28.880 --> 0:21:31.399
<v Speaker 1>we do things with our because our mistakes of action

0:21:31.440 --> 0:21:34.840
<v Speaker 1>are so painful, we do things about them, We make

0:21:34.880 --> 0:21:38.600
<v Speaker 1>amends to other people, We engage in what psychologists called

0:21:38.680 --> 0:21:42.240
<v Speaker 1>cognitive dissonance reduction to make ourselves feel better about it.

0:21:42.440 --> 0:21:46.000
<v Speaker 1>We identify and part of that is identifying a silver lining.

0:21:46.040 --> 0:21:49.000
<v Speaker 1>If you ask people about some of their biggest regrets,

0:21:49.080 --> 0:21:53.199
<v Speaker 1>people will say, oh, I married the wrong person. But

0:21:53.480 --> 0:21:55.680
<v Speaker 1>they will say, yeah, that was a mistake, but I

0:21:55.680 --> 0:21:57.879
<v Speaker 1>wouldn't have these great kids if I hadn't done that.

0:21:58.000 --> 0:22:00.760
<v Speaker 1>So the marriage ended but turned out to have been

0:22:00.760 --> 0:22:02.680
<v Speaker 1>a good thing because I have these kids that I love.

0:22:03.160 --> 0:22:06.600
<v Speaker 1>Um And so there's all this mental stuff you do

0:22:06.760 --> 0:22:11.440
<v Speaker 1>to make yourself more comfortable with many, at least mistakes

0:22:11.480 --> 0:22:14.960
<v Speaker 1>of action. Whereas things that you didn't do, rather than

0:22:15.000 --> 0:22:19.200
<v Speaker 1>shrinking over time, they often grow. You often think, oh,

0:22:19.359 --> 0:22:21.119
<v Speaker 1>you know, if I had only taken that class, I

0:22:21.119 --> 0:22:23.440
<v Speaker 1>would have gone into this profession rather than this one,

0:22:23.480 --> 0:22:27.159
<v Speaker 1>and you imagine all the great things that could have happened.

0:22:27.160 --> 0:22:31.919
<v Speaker 1>So over time, regrets of inaction either don't shrink like

0:22:32.000 --> 0:22:34.760
<v Speaker 1>the action ones do, or they even grow over time.

0:22:34.800 --> 0:22:38.040
<v Speaker 1>And so you, as you said, on people's deathbeds, they

0:22:39.640 --> 0:22:42.240
<v Speaker 1>regret more of the things that they didn't do. I

0:22:42.240 --> 0:22:44.159
<v Speaker 1>could have been a contender. You know, I could have

0:22:44.200 --> 0:22:46.600
<v Speaker 1>been this, I could have been that. So so actions

0:22:47.119 --> 0:22:50.720
<v Speaker 1>become rationalized and we learned to deal with our mistakes,

0:22:51.160 --> 0:22:54.199
<v Speaker 1>but in actions blow up in our minds to become

0:22:54.280 --> 0:22:58.840
<v Speaker 1>these mythic if only so, let's talk about something sort

0:22:58.840 --> 0:23:01.520
<v Speaker 1>of related to that. You've you've created a little bit

0:23:01.520 --> 0:23:06.840
<v Speaker 1>of a stir not too long ago, expressing the belief

0:23:06.960 --> 0:23:11.119
<v Speaker 1>that you know, we're a consumer society and everybody wants

0:23:11.200 --> 0:23:13.720
<v Speaker 1>the two point three kids in the four bedroom house

0:23:13.760 --> 0:23:16.600
<v Speaker 1>and the convertible car and the boat or what have you.

0:23:16.720 --> 0:23:24.119
<v Speaker 1>But your conclusion is experiences are more valuable to individuals

0:23:24.359 --> 0:23:28.639
<v Speaker 1>than these babbles and goods. Explain how you came to

0:23:28.680 --> 0:23:31.720
<v Speaker 1>that conclusion and what it means. That line of research

0:23:32.359 --> 0:23:36.240
<v Speaker 1>stemmed from a finding, probably the biggest finding in the

0:23:36.440 --> 0:23:41.520
<v Speaker 1>now quite extensive research on happiness or well being, which

0:23:41.600 --> 0:23:45.879
<v Speaker 1>is that we have a remarkable capacity to adapt to things,

0:23:46.160 --> 0:23:50.199
<v Speaker 1>and that's a good capacity when bad things happened to us.

0:23:50.560 --> 0:23:54.560
<v Speaker 1>Oh no, I've lost my job, life's going to fall apart. Well,

0:23:54.600 --> 0:23:56.560
<v Speaker 1>that is a bad thing, and you are miserable for

0:23:56.600 --> 0:23:59.680
<v Speaker 1>a while, but we tend to adapt to it. Or

0:24:00.359 --> 0:24:02.440
<v Speaker 1>many people think Oh, I don't think i'd even want

0:24:02.440 --> 0:24:05.720
<v Speaker 1>to live if I lost the use of my legs.

0:24:05.840 --> 0:24:08.359
<v Speaker 1>Let's say, well, it turns out that people who have

0:24:08.440 --> 0:24:12.639
<v Speaker 1>experienced that, yes, they are miserable right away, but they

0:24:12.680 --> 0:24:16.800
<v Speaker 1>adapt and live lives that are as fulfilling as people

0:24:16.840 --> 0:24:20.159
<v Speaker 1>who haven't had that misfortune. Um. And this is just

0:24:20.680 --> 0:24:26.639
<v Speaker 1>the probably biggest fact about the study of happiness, and

0:24:26.760 --> 0:24:31.520
<v Speaker 1>so it applying it to consumption, the things that we buy.

0:24:31.600 --> 0:24:34.720
<v Speaker 1>You know, if I trade in my camera and get Alexis,

0:24:34.760 --> 0:24:37.240
<v Speaker 1>I'll be happier. Yeah, that's true, you will be for

0:24:37.280 --> 0:24:39.800
<v Speaker 1>a little while. Pretty soon it's just a car like

0:24:39.880 --> 0:24:41.880
<v Speaker 1>the other car, and you don't notice it as much.

0:24:42.200 --> 0:24:46.720
<v Speaker 1>And so one challenge for happiness for searchers is, um,

0:24:46.760 --> 0:24:49.800
<v Speaker 1>if adaptation is an enemy of happiness, how do you

0:24:49.840 --> 0:24:54.879
<v Speaker 1>combat that enemy? And the great judgment and decision making

0:24:54.960 --> 0:24:57.639
<v Speaker 1>researcher Robin Dawes had a thought experiment where he was

0:24:57.680 --> 0:25:01.000
<v Speaker 1>talking about this hedonic treadmill. I need more and more

0:25:01.040 --> 0:25:04.920
<v Speaker 1>to get the same level of happiness, he said. Imagine

0:25:04.960 --> 0:25:10.240
<v Speaker 1>you devoted your life not too selfish pursuits accumulating more,

0:25:10.440 --> 0:25:13.720
<v Speaker 1>but selfless ones. You were just trying to do good

0:25:13.760 --> 0:25:16.560
<v Speaker 1>in the world. I don't you know, I don't know

0:25:16.600 --> 0:25:18.359
<v Speaker 1>if he used I think he did use the Mother

0:25:18.480 --> 0:25:22.919
<v Speaker 1>Teresa example. Mother Teresa saves five people this week, she

0:25:23.000 --> 0:25:25.359
<v Speaker 1>probably isn't the next week going f five people. That

0:25:25.440 --> 0:25:27.080
<v Speaker 1>doesn't cut it. I need to save more. I need

0:25:27.119 --> 0:25:30.360
<v Speaker 1>to save more. And it's a compelling thought experiment. And

0:25:30.520 --> 0:25:35.159
<v Speaker 1>it seemed like, um, those kinds of experiences at least

0:25:35.560 --> 0:25:40.480
<v Speaker 1>weren't subject to this adaptation, this idonic treadmill. And so

0:25:40.680 --> 0:25:44.240
<v Speaker 1>the question became, how broadly does that apply to experiences?

0:25:44.280 --> 0:25:48.560
<v Speaker 1>And the hypothesis was, you don't adapt to the money

0:25:48.640 --> 0:25:51.320
<v Speaker 1>that you spend, the pleasure that you get out of

0:25:51.359 --> 0:25:54.840
<v Speaker 1>your experiences, Uh, you don't adapt to them as much,

0:25:54.840 --> 0:25:57.720
<v Speaker 1>which in some ways is paradoxical. That is, most people

0:25:57.760 --> 0:26:00.560
<v Speaker 1>have limited resources, and people often say, you know, I know,

0:26:00.640 --> 0:26:04.119
<v Speaker 1>I would love a vacation right now, but uh, we

0:26:04.160 --> 0:26:07.560
<v Speaker 1>really need a new set of bookcases, or we need

0:26:07.640 --> 0:26:10.480
<v Speaker 1>a new bed, or we need a new car or whatever,

0:26:11.080 --> 0:26:13.880
<v Speaker 1>and at least that will always be there. And that's

0:26:13.920 --> 0:26:17.760
<v Speaker 1>true in a material sense, but psychologically it's the reverse.

0:26:17.840 --> 0:26:20.320
<v Speaker 1>You adapt to the new bookcase that you adapt to

0:26:20.880 --> 0:26:24.320
<v Speaker 1>the upgrade in your car, the things that you buy

0:26:24.680 --> 0:26:26.679
<v Speaker 1>and it turns out you don't adapt as much to

0:26:26.720 --> 0:26:30.280
<v Speaker 1>your experiences. Your experiences change who you are, and you're

0:26:30.280 --> 0:26:34.760
<v Speaker 1>a changed person, and you continue to benefit from that.

0:26:35.160 --> 0:26:38.760
<v Speaker 1>Your experiences connect you to other people in ways that

0:26:38.840 --> 0:26:43.479
<v Speaker 1>you're material goods don't, and that continues to be a

0:26:43.520 --> 0:26:46.800
<v Speaker 1>gift that keeps on giving. Uh. And so it turns

0:26:46.800 --> 0:26:49.639
<v Speaker 1>out uh, and a lot of research has shown this

0:26:49.800 --> 0:26:54.320
<v Speaker 1>that even though the experience comes and goes, possibly in

0:26:54.320 --> 0:26:58.480
<v Speaker 1>a flash, UH, it lives on psychologically and provides more

0:26:58.720 --> 0:27:04.360
<v Speaker 1>enduring satisfaction and enjoyment. How much of the material issues

0:27:04.720 --> 0:27:09.960
<v Speaker 1>are based on the very natural tendency of us to

0:27:10.960 --> 0:27:14.639
<v Speaker 1>not be very good at predicting our own future happiness

0:27:14.720 --> 0:27:18.520
<v Speaker 1>or own future emotional state. It seems we build up

0:27:18.600 --> 0:27:21.600
<v Speaker 1>these things we want be at a house of car, whatever,

0:27:22.200 --> 0:27:25.960
<v Speaker 1>and then when we actually get it, it disappoints our

0:27:26.040 --> 0:27:32.440
<v Speaker 1>expectations of this grand change of lifestyle. Well, you've identified

0:27:32.480 --> 0:27:35.840
<v Speaker 1>a very interesting line of research of it would seem

0:27:35.920 --> 0:27:38.040
<v Speaker 1>like one of the easiest things to predict would be

0:27:38.080 --> 0:27:41.240
<v Speaker 1>how happy we're going to be Making predictions about ourselves.

0:27:41.240 --> 0:27:43.840
<v Speaker 1>Predicting the world, of course, is hard, but it would

0:27:43.840 --> 0:27:48.320
<v Speaker 1>seem to be easy to predict how we're going to react.

0:27:48.440 --> 0:27:52.760
<v Speaker 1>And I think it's just a very compelling, uh line

0:27:52.760 --> 0:27:56.240
<v Speaker 1>of research that now many investigators have done showing that

0:27:56.600 --> 0:28:00.159
<v Speaker 1>we're not so good prognosticators about our own enjoyment. And

0:28:00.160 --> 0:28:02.960
<v Speaker 1>one of the examples that I most like in this

0:28:03.080 --> 0:28:09.040
<v Speaker 1>area is that people feel like, I'll be happier if

0:28:09.080 --> 0:28:11.920
<v Speaker 1>I have a bigger house, and when you first move

0:28:11.960 --> 0:28:16.240
<v Speaker 1>into it, you will be happier again before you adapt

0:28:16.320 --> 0:28:21.040
<v Speaker 1>to this new amount of space, and uh, that becomes

0:28:21.080 --> 0:28:23.280
<v Speaker 1>the norm, this bigger house, and now you feel like

0:28:23.280 --> 0:28:26.520
<v Speaker 1>you need even more and more. Anyway, in order to

0:28:27.240 --> 0:28:31.639
<v Speaker 1>afford that bigger house, people often have to live farther

0:28:31.720 --> 0:28:34.240
<v Speaker 1>away from their job and they have a longer commute.

0:28:34.520 --> 0:28:38.240
<v Speaker 1>And one of the exceptions in this tendency that I described,

0:28:38.320 --> 0:28:42.760
<v Speaker 1>this remarkable capacity for adaptation, is that people don't tend

0:28:42.760 --> 0:28:48.080
<v Speaker 1>to adapt to the trauma of a long commute. And

0:28:48.480 --> 0:28:51.640
<v Speaker 1>it's not surprising why that would be the case. That is,

0:28:51.680 --> 0:28:56.040
<v Speaker 1>it's a it's a a morphous, highly variable thing. It's

0:28:56.040 --> 0:28:59.360
<v Speaker 1>a different version of hell each time you're driving. Sometimes

0:28:59.400 --> 0:29:03.160
<v Speaker 1>it's a snarl over here, other time it's a nasty

0:29:03.200 --> 0:29:06.840
<v Speaker 1>motorist there. It's different, but and you don't adapt to it,

0:29:07.120 --> 0:29:10.120
<v Speaker 1>and so you've made this terrible trade off. You think

0:29:10.120 --> 0:29:12.680
<v Speaker 1>you're gonna be happier with the bigger house. You get

0:29:12.720 --> 0:29:15.520
<v Speaker 1>the bigger house, you are happy for a while than

0:29:15.600 --> 0:29:18.520
<v Speaker 1>you adapt to it. You're saddled with this long commute

0:29:18.520 --> 0:29:21.640
<v Speaker 1>to which you don't adapt, and so you've lost out

0:29:21.640 --> 0:29:24.040
<v Speaker 1>in the bargain. So here's a quote from one of

0:29:24.080 --> 0:29:28.440
<v Speaker 1>your books. People do not hold questionable beliefs because they

0:29:28.480 --> 0:29:32.959
<v Speaker 1>have not been exposed to the relevant evidence. Why do

0:29:33.040 --> 0:29:38.400
<v Speaker 1>they hold questionable beliefs? Well, for a variety of reasons,

0:29:38.440 --> 0:29:42.120
<v Speaker 1>and and the that's what the book was about, was exploring, um,

0:29:42.160 --> 0:29:47.560
<v Speaker 1>those different reasons. Um. And one is that the world

0:29:47.600 --> 0:29:51.640
<v Speaker 1>doesn't play fair. That is, it doesn't it's not doesn't

0:29:51.920 --> 0:29:55.840
<v Speaker 1>put you through a series of controlled experiments. Um. It

0:29:56.320 --> 0:29:59.240
<v Speaker 1>highlights certain data and says, hey, look at me, and

0:29:59.560 --> 0:30:04.280
<v Speaker 1>puts their data in the shadows. And as a result

0:30:04.320 --> 0:30:07.840
<v Speaker 1>of that, the database we have in our head is

0:30:07.880 --> 0:30:11.600
<v Speaker 1>going to be somewhat biased. And we've already talked about

0:30:11.600 --> 0:30:14.440
<v Speaker 1>a few examples of that. That is to say, when

0:30:14.480 --> 0:30:17.560
<v Speaker 1>you switch lines and it slows down, that's gonna leave

0:30:17.680 --> 0:30:20.160
<v Speaker 1>more of an impression than when you switch lines and

0:30:20.240 --> 0:30:25.040
<v Speaker 1>it uh speeds up, and that's going to distort your database. Um.

0:30:25.920 --> 0:30:29.560
<v Speaker 1>Cornell University, when it decides who gets to go there,

0:30:29.760 --> 0:30:33.280
<v Speaker 1>it probably congratulates itself because we look around at the

0:30:33.280 --> 0:30:35.440
<v Speaker 1>student body and they're terrific, and we say, boy, we're

0:30:35.440 --> 0:30:38.080
<v Speaker 1>really good at selecting people. Now, of course, we don't

0:30:38.120 --> 0:30:40.960
<v Speaker 1>really know that because we don't know about the people

0:30:41.080 --> 0:30:44.600
<v Speaker 1>who we rejected who could be there. And maybe they

0:30:44.640 --> 0:30:48.040
<v Speaker 1>do just as well. That is, people self select them

0:30:48.320 --> 0:30:51.960
<v Speaker 1>only really good students by and large, or even applying

0:30:52.000 --> 0:30:54.360
<v Speaker 1>to Cornell, and maybe we don't do as good a

0:30:54.440 --> 0:30:57.440
<v Speaker 1>job is we think the world can't show us the

0:30:57.520 --> 0:31:02.640
<v Speaker 1>people that we didn't accept, and therefore it's um hard

0:31:02.760 --> 0:31:05.360
<v Speaker 1>to really know whether we're doing a good job. But

0:31:05.520 --> 0:31:10.240
<v Speaker 1>the impression is every bit. It's there. We look around

0:31:10.240 --> 0:31:12.560
<v Speaker 1>at the student body. You can't turn that impression off,

0:31:12.600 --> 0:31:14.160
<v Speaker 1>and the students look great, and so we think we

0:31:14.160 --> 0:31:17.840
<v Speaker 1>did a good job. You once, cold confirmation bias, the

0:31:17.920 --> 0:31:22.200
<v Speaker 1>mother of all biases. Tell us why, um boy, that's

0:31:22.240 --> 0:31:25.840
<v Speaker 1>a term that has been in the news all over lately,

0:31:26.080 --> 0:31:32.200
<v Speaker 1>and there there are many things uh that people mean

0:31:32.440 --> 0:31:35.680
<v Speaker 1>by the subject confirmation bias. So let me break that

0:31:35.720 --> 0:31:39.240
<v Speaker 1>down to three things go. There is some nuance in

0:31:39.240 --> 0:31:43.520
<v Speaker 1>in confirmation bias and in the academic study of that.

0:31:43.680 --> 0:31:47.000
<v Speaker 1>So I think what most people think of when they

0:31:47.000 --> 0:31:50.560
<v Speaker 1>think of confirmation bias, if we're talking about Facebook and

0:31:50.600 --> 0:31:56.520
<v Speaker 1>fake news, people go out seeking things that confirm existing beliefs.

0:31:56.880 --> 0:32:00.440
<v Speaker 1>That that's a broad definition of confirmation bias. But in

0:32:00.520 --> 0:32:03.120
<v Speaker 1>some of your research and some of your studies, I

0:32:03.200 --> 0:32:07.360
<v Speaker 1>was kind of fascinated by this. When people are presented

0:32:07.400 --> 0:32:12.000
<v Speaker 1>with a problem, rather than seeking disproving evidence, they go

0:32:12.080 --> 0:32:16.479
<v Speaker 1>out and seek confirming evidence, even though you can end

0:32:16.560 --> 0:32:19.760
<v Speaker 1>up with the exact wrong answer or the same answer

0:32:19.800 --> 0:32:22.920
<v Speaker 1>regardless of the question, based on how it is. The

0:32:22.960 --> 0:32:26.160
<v Speaker 1>example in one of the books is you have a

0:32:26.200 --> 0:32:29.200
<v Speaker 1>court that has to decide which parent to award custody

0:32:29.200 --> 0:32:33.400
<v Speaker 1>of a child. Too parents A is pretty much average

0:32:33.440 --> 0:32:37.440
<v Speaker 1>across all the major characteristics. The court looks at. Parent

0:32:37.520 --> 0:32:40.240
<v Speaker 1>B has some very high points and some very low points,

0:32:40.720 --> 0:32:44.280
<v Speaker 1>depending on how the question is phrased, which parents should

0:32:44.280 --> 0:32:48.400
<v Speaker 1>be awarded custody, which parents should not be awarded custody.

0:32:48.880 --> 0:32:52.320
<v Speaker 1>Everybody ends up looking at the parent with the high

0:32:52.360 --> 0:32:55.560
<v Speaker 1>points and low points, because it's confirming whatever the question

0:32:55.720 --> 0:32:58.440
<v Speaker 1>is asking is that what you were referring to the

0:32:58.480 --> 0:33:02.360
<v Speaker 1>more nuanced aspect. Very, that's great that you broke it

0:33:02.400 --> 0:33:05.440
<v Speaker 1>down that way. That is to say, UM, people are

0:33:05.640 --> 0:33:09.400
<v Speaker 1>very familiar with the idea that we're easier on evidence

0:33:09.440 --> 0:33:12.000
<v Speaker 1>that supports what we want to believe, and we're hard

0:33:12.080 --> 0:33:15.360
<v Speaker 1>on evidence that robuts what we want to believe. And

0:33:15.400 --> 0:33:18.480
<v Speaker 1>that's now part of the confirmation bias. That's the thing

0:33:18.560 --> 0:33:22.680
<v Speaker 1>we recognize that. Great people are also aware of the

0:33:22.720 --> 0:33:25.880
<v Speaker 1>fact that, UM, if I want something to be true,

0:33:26.360 --> 0:33:29.920
<v Speaker 1>I actively go out and look for evidence consistent with it.

0:33:30.080 --> 0:33:32.920
<v Speaker 1>If I want something not to be true, I'll go

0:33:33.160 --> 0:33:36.560
<v Speaker 1>actively look for evidence that's inconsistent with it. We can

0:33:36.600 --> 0:33:39.960
<v Speaker 1>call that the confirmation bias. That's true, there's evidence to

0:33:40.040 --> 0:33:44.560
<v Speaker 1>support that. But the confirmation bias is even more insidious,

0:33:44.600 --> 0:33:47.320
<v Speaker 1>more pervasive than that. That is, even if you don't

0:33:47.360 --> 0:33:52.480
<v Speaker 1>care about what the um the situation or question what

0:33:52.560 --> 0:33:55.520
<v Speaker 1>the answer, what the right answer might be like should

0:33:55.520 --> 0:33:58.680
<v Speaker 1>you award custody to this person or that person, we

0:33:58.800 --> 0:34:01.640
<v Speaker 1>still engage in. So One example that I think makes

0:34:01.680 --> 0:34:06.360
<v Speaker 1>this clear is, UM, suppose I'm hosting a dinner party

0:34:06.840 --> 0:34:10.120
<v Speaker 1>and I tell you you're gonna be sitting next to John.

0:34:10.239 --> 0:34:13.799
<v Speaker 1>I think John's politically conservative. You just might want to

0:34:14.000 --> 0:34:15.680
<v Speaker 1>but you might want to test that out. I'm not sure.

0:34:15.960 --> 0:34:18.239
<v Speaker 1>How would you test that out? Well, you would ask

0:34:18.840 --> 0:34:23.680
<v Speaker 1>conservative oriented questions. You would say, John, don't you think

0:34:23.719 --> 0:34:27.839
<v Speaker 1>the government is too intrusive sometimes? And then he, as

0:34:27.840 --> 0:34:32.160
<v Speaker 1>a conservative, would say yes. But even a liberal would say, well, sometime, sure,

0:34:32.200 --> 0:34:36.200
<v Speaker 1>the government's too intrusive. If I told you, hey, you're

0:34:36.200 --> 0:34:38.600
<v Speaker 1>gonna be sitting next to John, I think he's politically liberal,

0:34:38.640 --> 0:34:41.439
<v Speaker 1>you might want to check that out. You might ask

0:34:41.480 --> 0:34:44.480
<v Speaker 1>a very different question, John, don't you think we need

0:34:44.520 --> 0:34:46.759
<v Speaker 1>to do something about global warming? Don't you think we

0:34:46.800 --> 0:34:49.920
<v Speaker 1>need to do something about income inequality? And if he's liberal,

0:34:49.960 --> 0:34:53.040
<v Speaker 1>he'll say yes. But if you're a conservative, at least

0:34:53.040 --> 0:34:55.239
<v Speaker 1>when it comes to income inequality, you're gonna say, yeah,

0:34:55.239 --> 0:34:56.840
<v Speaker 1>we need to do things about it. Might be different

0:34:56.840 --> 0:35:00.399
<v Speaker 1>things than a liberal, but the thrust is you're gonna

0:35:00.400 --> 0:35:05.680
<v Speaker 1>get answers that support what you initially believed. Um And

0:35:05.800 --> 0:35:08.120
<v Speaker 1>it's so. All of this is to say that the

0:35:08.120 --> 0:35:11.680
<v Speaker 1>confirmation bias runs really deep. And one of my favorite

0:35:11.680 --> 0:35:15.200
<v Speaker 1>examples of this is an old study of conomen divers

0:35:15.239 --> 0:35:18.799
<v Speaker 1>keys excuse me of amos diverse. Key's who this was

0:35:18.880 --> 0:35:23.000
<v Speaker 1>before he was interested in the kind of judgmental biases

0:35:23.040 --> 0:35:27.120
<v Speaker 1>that economists have become interested in. He was just interested

0:35:27.120 --> 0:35:31.080
<v Speaker 1>in judgments of similarity. How do we say that? Why

0:35:31.120 --> 0:35:36.879
<v Speaker 1>do we say that, um, um, having a kid is

0:35:37.280 --> 0:35:41.080
<v Speaker 1>a little bit like having a dog, But having a

0:35:41.080 --> 0:35:43.640
<v Speaker 1>dog is nothing like having a kid. Uh? You know

0:35:43.719 --> 0:35:47.560
<v Speaker 1>why that discrepancy? Why is North Korea a lot like China?

0:35:47.640 --> 0:35:50.680
<v Speaker 1>But China is not really much like North Korea. And

0:35:51.200 --> 0:35:54.080
<v Speaker 1>so he did this study where he asked people which

0:35:54.120 --> 0:35:56.560
<v Speaker 1>two countries this was in the nineteen eighties are more

0:35:56.600 --> 0:35:59.640
<v Speaker 1>similar to one another East Germany and West Germany or Ceylon.

0:35:59.680 --> 0:36:02.360
<v Speaker 1>And the all the respondents no more about East Germany

0:36:02.400 --> 0:36:04.759
<v Speaker 1>and West Germany, so they can think of more reasons,

0:36:05.280 --> 0:36:07.839
<v Speaker 1>more ways in which they are similar. And so they say,

0:36:07.840 --> 0:36:10.080
<v Speaker 1>East Germany and West Germany is more similar. Okay, no

0:36:10.160 --> 0:36:12.359
<v Speaker 1>big deal there, No one's made a problem, No one's

0:36:12.360 --> 0:36:15.480
<v Speaker 1>made in air. Um. He asked another group of participants

0:36:15.480 --> 0:36:17.799
<v Speaker 1>which two countries are more dissimilar to one another, East

0:36:17.840 --> 0:36:21.200
<v Speaker 1>Germany and West Germany. And they say East Germany West

0:36:21.200 --> 0:36:23.560
<v Speaker 1>Germany are more dissimilar to one another because they know

0:36:23.600 --> 0:36:26.040
<v Speaker 1>more about East Germany and West Germany. They can think

0:36:26.040 --> 0:36:28.560
<v Speaker 1>of ways in which they are different, and you end

0:36:28.640 --> 0:36:32.320
<v Speaker 1>up with the paradoxical result, with uh East Germany and

0:36:32.320 --> 0:36:36.719
<v Speaker 1>West Germany being both more similar and more dissimilar. Logically impossible,

0:36:37.040 --> 0:36:41.759
<v Speaker 1>but psychologically the rules of similarity and dissimilarity judgments are

0:36:41.800 --> 0:36:44.319
<v Speaker 1>such that both can seem very compelling. And it's the

0:36:44.360 --> 0:36:47.000
<v Speaker 1>confirmation bias. You asked me how similar they are. I

0:36:47.040 --> 0:36:49.560
<v Speaker 1>look for evidence of similarity, and I can find it

0:36:49.680 --> 0:36:51.960
<v Speaker 1>for the countries I know more about than the countries

0:36:52.000 --> 0:36:54.520
<v Speaker 1>I know less about. You ask me which two countries

0:36:54.560 --> 0:36:58.759
<v Speaker 1>are more dissimilar. I'm looking for evidence of dissimilarity. I

0:36:58.800 --> 0:37:01.840
<v Speaker 1>don't care which to entries are more similar dissimilar. Just

0:37:01.880 --> 0:37:05.439
<v Speaker 1>shows you how deep the confirmation bias runs. So there

0:37:05.520 --> 0:37:08.040
<v Speaker 1>was a slip of the tongue that you referenced where

0:37:08.080 --> 0:37:11.320
<v Speaker 1>you said somebody said I'll see it when I believe it,

0:37:11.440 --> 0:37:13.600
<v Speaker 1>as opposed to saying I believe it when I see it.

0:37:13.920 --> 0:37:18.120
<v Speaker 1>But really there's some Freudian truth in that i'll see

0:37:18.120 --> 0:37:21.719
<v Speaker 1>it when I believe it. Tells us how much our

0:37:21.800 --> 0:37:25.640
<v Speaker 1>own um, ownership of ideas and desire to see things

0:37:25.640 --> 0:37:30.879
<v Speaker 1>we already believe actually impacts that. How does this manifest

0:37:30.960 --> 0:37:35.759
<v Speaker 1>itself in the field of investing? How do you see

0:37:35.840 --> 0:37:42.839
<v Speaker 1>confirmation bias impacting the way people put capital at risk? Um, Well,

0:37:42.840 --> 0:37:45.560
<v Speaker 1>it plays out there the way it plays out everywhere.

0:37:45.600 --> 0:37:48.080
<v Speaker 1>That is to say, or let's back up a step

0:37:48.200 --> 0:37:50.960
<v Speaker 1>that you know, when you cite that quote, it can

0:37:51.120 --> 0:37:54.640
<v Speaker 1>sound silly in some ways, it does sound silly. On

0:37:54.680 --> 0:37:58.560
<v Speaker 1>the other hand, what job does our brain have. It's

0:37:58.640 --> 0:38:01.280
<v Speaker 1>to make sense of the world. And we draw upon

0:38:01.320 --> 0:38:05.799
<v Speaker 1>every possible cues that would make that job easier. And

0:38:06.000 --> 0:38:07.920
<v Speaker 1>one cue that we draw upon is what we already know,

0:38:08.120 --> 0:38:11.359
<v Speaker 1>or what we already think we know. And therefore what

0:38:11.480 --> 0:38:15.319
<v Speaker 1>we know has to influence new information that comes in.

0:38:15.360 --> 0:38:18.319
<v Speaker 1>And so if we have a strong prior belief that

0:38:18.480 --> 0:38:23.560
<v Speaker 1>in this industry is better positioned for the environment we

0:38:23.640 --> 0:38:27.000
<v Speaker 1>now face rather than that industry, of course we should

0:38:27.560 --> 0:38:32.040
<v Speaker 1>take that into account. Pre existing beliefs, Uh, if they're

0:38:32.120 --> 0:38:36.319
<v Speaker 1>based on a solid foundation, they should influence our evaluation

0:38:36.360 --> 0:38:39.799
<v Speaker 1>of new information. So let me ask you, um a

0:38:39.880 --> 0:38:43.680
<v Speaker 1>question about the money illusion. Why is it that we

0:38:43.760 --> 0:38:49.120
<v Speaker 1>have these unfounded beliefs about values of different things? Define

0:38:49.200 --> 0:38:53.040
<v Speaker 1>what the money illusion is? The money illusions really interesting

0:38:53.800 --> 0:38:59.719
<v Speaker 1>to psychologists because it's another version of uh, something you

0:38:59.760 --> 0:39:03.120
<v Speaker 1>see all over the place, which is a difficulty we

0:39:03.200 --> 0:39:09.120
<v Speaker 1>have in taking context into account. And so in psychology

0:39:09.120 --> 0:39:13.520
<v Speaker 1>there's this phenomenon known as the fundamental attribution air that UM,

0:39:13.640 --> 0:39:16.640
<v Speaker 1>if you see, UM, a dad and a kid in

0:39:16.719 --> 0:39:19.000
<v Speaker 1>line at the grocery store and the dad yells at

0:39:19.000 --> 0:39:22.400
<v Speaker 1>the kid, you can't help but think that's a mean father.

0:39:23.360 --> 0:39:25.960
<v Speaker 1>We don't know what the context was that led up

0:39:25.960 --> 0:39:28.520
<v Speaker 1>to it, what's gone on in the person's life, and

0:39:28.640 --> 0:39:31.560
<v Speaker 1>how exceptional that might have been the only time that

0:39:31.600 --> 0:39:35.160
<v Speaker 1>the dad ever yelled at his kid. But we can't

0:39:35.160 --> 0:39:37.879
<v Speaker 1>help but look at the stimulus in front of us

0:39:37.920 --> 0:39:43.560
<v Speaker 1>and draw conclusions. Um. And with respect to the money illusion,

0:39:43.680 --> 0:39:47.480
<v Speaker 1>twenty thous dollars sounds a lot more than ten thousand dollars,

0:39:47.480 --> 0:39:50.319
<v Speaker 1>and we can lose sight of the context, that is

0:39:50.360 --> 0:39:53.960
<v Speaker 1>to say, how much has inflation changed from when you

0:39:54.000 --> 0:39:59.520
<v Speaker 1>had ten thousand to UH. They're obviously circumstances in which

0:40:00.120 --> 0:40:02.960
<v Speaker 1>real dollars, the twenty thousand is less than the ten

0:40:03.000 --> 0:40:06.160
<v Speaker 1>thousand used to have, but it's hard to to get

0:40:06.200 --> 0:40:10.160
<v Speaker 1>over that first impression of just being taken by the

0:40:10.160 --> 0:40:14.080
<v Speaker 1>the monetary value and to ignore context. What is the

0:40:14.160 --> 0:40:18.800
<v Speaker 1>issue with mental accounting? Well, economists tell us UH. Decision

0:40:18.840 --> 0:40:20.680
<v Speaker 1>makers tell us, if we want to make the best

0:40:20.680 --> 0:40:23.480
<v Speaker 1>decisions with our money, we should think of all of

0:40:23.520 --> 0:40:28.160
<v Speaker 1>our assets and liabilities in terms of one overall integrated

0:40:28.360 --> 0:40:31.200
<v Speaker 1>balance sheet. And in fact that turns out to be true,

0:40:31.200 --> 0:40:34.840
<v Speaker 1>we will make better decisions that way. Great, But those

0:40:35.400 --> 0:40:38.439
<v Speaker 1>we don't have the kinds of minds that UH either

0:40:38.480 --> 0:40:41.560
<v Speaker 1>are capable of doing that or inclined to do that. Instead,

0:40:41.600 --> 0:40:46.040
<v Speaker 1>we put money into different accounts um and we treat

0:40:46.080 --> 0:40:49.680
<v Speaker 1>it differently. We treat money differently depending upon where it

0:40:49.840 --> 0:40:53.880
<v Speaker 1>came from, how we got it, um and. There are

0:40:53.920 --> 0:40:57.279
<v Speaker 1>all sorts of examples. It's very easy to illustrate. If

0:40:57.360 --> 0:41:01.839
<v Speaker 1>you received an inheritance UM and aunt, let's say, who

0:41:01.920 --> 0:41:05.839
<v Speaker 1>was very careful with her money, You're probably gonna be

0:41:05.920 --> 0:41:10.080
<v Speaker 1>more careful with that money than if your aunt was

0:41:10.400 --> 0:41:14.720
<v Speaker 1>a wild and crazy person who liked to spread money around.

0:41:14.840 --> 0:41:18.080
<v Speaker 1>You're gonna feel like I should spread this around. Money

0:41:18.160 --> 0:41:23.759
<v Speaker 1>comes with almost a personality um and. People often talk

0:41:23.840 --> 0:41:27.400
<v Speaker 1>about this in the context of getting a smallish bonus.

0:41:27.480 --> 0:41:30.440
<v Speaker 1>You didn't expect you get a tax return, and it's small.

0:41:30.880 --> 0:41:33.880
<v Speaker 1>It feels like, Hey, this is great, let's go spend it,

0:41:33.920 --> 0:41:37.120
<v Speaker 1>And people do, and they often spend it several times. Uh.

0:41:37.280 --> 0:41:40.880
<v Speaker 1>Just it's used to justify going to this restaurant you

0:41:40.920 --> 0:41:44.240
<v Speaker 1>always wanted to go to, getting tickets to the Celtic

0:41:44.280 --> 0:41:47.160
<v Speaker 1>game or whatever, and you've spent it several times. If

0:41:47.239 --> 0:41:50.640
<v Speaker 1>in fact it were a big inheritance, it comes with

0:41:50.680 --> 0:41:53.719
<v Speaker 1>a lot of waitiness associated with it, and you're even

0:41:53.760 --> 0:41:55.640
<v Speaker 1>though you have more money, you're less likely to spend

0:41:55.719 --> 0:41:59.439
<v Speaker 1>it on that restaurant or those Celtic tickets and instead, um,

0:42:00.400 --> 0:42:03.240
<v Speaker 1>do something serious with it, because it's a serious amount

0:42:03.280 --> 0:42:06.480
<v Speaker 1>of money. In white more people make big money mistakes.

0:42:07.040 --> 0:42:11.680
<v Speaker 1>You tell the joke of the honeymooners in Vegas. Uh,

0:42:11.719 --> 0:42:15.760
<v Speaker 1>with mental accounting, the groom, while the wife is sleeping,

0:42:15.880 --> 0:42:19.200
<v Speaker 1>takes five dollars and goes down to the roulette table.

0:42:19.280 --> 0:42:23.040
<v Speaker 1>Share that story. I love that story. Uh well, do

0:42:23.120 --> 0:42:25.400
<v Speaker 1>you recall it? Yeah, of course I recall. It's a

0:42:25.480 --> 0:42:29.040
<v Speaker 1>it's a it's a long story. Takes the money goes

0:42:29.160 --> 0:42:36.160
<v Speaker 1>you know, bets here wins long double animulation of money,

0:42:36.280 --> 0:42:40.800
<v Speaker 1>UM that ultimately goes one round too far and loses

0:42:40.840 --> 0:42:43.160
<v Speaker 1>when he returns. How honey how did you do? Oh

0:42:43.239 --> 0:42:46.040
<v Speaker 1>not bad. I lost five dollars right the last round

0:42:46.239 --> 0:42:48.440
<v Speaker 1>it doubled and doubled and doubled. It was tens of

0:42:48.480 --> 0:42:50.240
<v Speaker 1>millions of dollars. He had to go to a different

0:42:50.280 --> 0:42:54.000
<v Speaker 1>hotel that would take the bigger stakes, and he bets it,

0:42:54.080 --> 0:42:57.799
<v Speaker 1>loses it all. Honey, I lost five dollars. I love

0:42:57.880 --> 0:42:59.640
<v Speaker 1>that story. I find that and you tell it better

0:42:59.640 --> 0:43:04.080
<v Speaker 1>than I. We have been speaking with Professor Tom Gilovich

0:43:04.200 --> 0:43:07.799
<v Speaker 1>of Cornell University. If you enjoy this conversation, be sure

0:43:07.800 --> 0:43:10.400
<v Speaker 1>and check out our podcast extras when we keep the

0:43:10.400 --> 0:43:15.080
<v Speaker 1>tape rolling and continue discussing all things cognitive. Be sure

0:43:15.080 --> 0:43:17.440
<v Speaker 1>and check out my daily column. You can find that

0:43:17.520 --> 0:43:20.319
<v Speaker 1>on Bloomberg View dot com. You can follow me on

0:43:20.320 --> 0:43:23.960
<v Speaker 1>Twitter at rit Halts. We love your comments, feedback and

0:43:24.080 --> 0:43:28.800
<v Speaker 1>suggestions right to us at m IB podcast at Bloomberg

0:43:28.880 --> 0:43:32.520
<v Speaker 1>dot net. I'm Barry rid Halts. You're listening to Master's

0:43:32.560 --> 0:43:50.120
<v Speaker 1>in Business on Bloomberg Radio. Welcome to the podcast. Thank you,

0:43:50.440 --> 0:43:53.279
<v Speaker 1>as Tom. I feel odd calling you Tom because I

0:43:53.320 --> 0:43:57.040
<v Speaker 1>know you as Professor Gillibit. I only say Thomas when

0:43:57.080 --> 0:43:59.319
<v Speaker 1>I've made him With Thomas, I've made a mistake of

0:43:59.360 --> 0:44:03.080
<v Speaker 1>something get that backhand into the net. So so there's

0:44:03.120 --> 0:44:05.000
<v Speaker 1>a lot of stuff I want to go over with

0:44:05.040 --> 0:44:08.719
<v Speaker 1>you that we didn't get to during the broadcast. But

0:44:08.840 --> 0:44:14.439
<v Speaker 1>I have to start with the discussion about experiences over

0:44:15.080 --> 0:44:20.480
<v Speaker 1>consumer um material goods, because there are some stories from

0:44:20.560 --> 0:44:24.400
<v Speaker 1>that really have stayed with me, that have experiences that

0:44:24.440 --> 0:44:26.600
<v Speaker 1>have stayed with me that have forced me down that

0:44:26.719 --> 0:44:30.120
<v Speaker 1>rabbit hole. A little bit about five years ago, my

0:44:30.120 --> 0:44:33.439
<v Speaker 1>wife and I were on vacation in St. Lucia and

0:44:33.560 --> 0:44:36.880
<v Speaker 1>one of the things that was an option at the hotel.

0:44:36.920 --> 0:44:38.360
<v Speaker 1>We were all the way on the north part of

0:44:38.360 --> 0:44:41.200
<v Speaker 1>the island and the Grand Tetons are on the south part,

0:44:41.760 --> 0:44:45.080
<v Speaker 1>and you could rent a sailboat and a crew, a

0:44:45.120 --> 0:44:48.400
<v Speaker 1>two man crew for the day. And at the time

0:44:48.440 --> 0:44:50.840
<v Speaker 1>it seemed like an ungodly amount of money. It was

0:44:50.920 --> 0:44:53.600
<v Speaker 1>less than a thousand dollars, but it's a day. That's

0:44:53.600 --> 0:44:56.440
<v Speaker 1>a lot of money, and I ended up just grinding

0:44:56.520 --> 0:45:00.160
<v Speaker 1>my teeth and doing it, and that experience she Ill

0:45:00.239 --> 0:45:04.640
<v Speaker 1>talks about consistently. I could have brought a thousand dollar

0:45:04.719 --> 0:45:07.960
<v Speaker 1>piece of jewelry or spent it on any babble, would

0:45:08.000 --> 0:45:12.160
<v Speaker 1>never have gotten the ongoing mileage out of that, and

0:45:12.320 --> 0:45:16.160
<v Speaker 1>that's my favorite example of that. On the other hand,

0:45:16.600 --> 0:45:21.800
<v Speaker 1>there are purchases I've made where I continue to derive

0:45:22.560 --> 0:45:28.600
<v Speaker 1>years later pleasure from the consumer purchase. And my best

0:45:28.640 --> 0:45:33.280
<v Speaker 1>explanation for that is has to do with my expectations

0:45:33.320 --> 0:45:35.000
<v Speaker 1>of what I'm gonna get. And I'm gonna give you

0:45:35.400 --> 0:45:39.400
<v Speaker 1>two quick examples. Uh. We we moved houses, and we

0:45:39.480 --> 0:45:42.960
<v Speaker 1>lived in a fairly suburban neighborhood where you feel like

0:45:43.000 --> 0:45:46.560
<v Speaker 1>you're the center square um with houses next to you,

0:45:46.640 --> 0:45:49.920
<v Speaker 1>behind you forward, And we hadn't plans on moving, and

0:45:49.960 --> 0:45:54.920
<v Speaker 1>this really fascinating modern house popped up. My wife trolls

0:45:55.000 --> 0:45:58.560
<v Speaker 1>Zillo all the time, and we ended up. It's adjacent

0:45:58.640 --> 0:46:02.600
<v Speaker 1>to a big preserve, so during in the winter, I

0:46:02.600 --> 0:46:05.160
<v Speaker 1>could see the house across the street from me on

0:46:05.239 --> 0:46:08.120
<v Speaker 1>the other about a hundred yards away. But during the summer,

0:46:08.640 --> 0:46:11.520
<v Speaker 1>I feel like I'm living in a forest and you

0:46:11.560 --> 0:46:14.719
<v Speaker 1>can't see any neighbors and I and I've only been

0:46:14.760 --> 0:46:18.200
<v Speaker 1>there three years, but I still walk around and think,

0:46:18.239 --> 0:46:20.600
<v Speaker 1>I can't believe we live here. I'm astonished by it.

0:46:21.480 --> 0:46:27.480
<v Speaker 1>That house has not hit the adaptation level yet. But

0:46:27.640 --> 0:46:29.600
<v Speaker 1>when we're in the old house and I was shopping

0:46:29.600 --> 0:46:32.320
<v Speaker 1>for new stereo. We were in that house for seven years.

0:46:32.360 --> 0:46:36.680
<v Speaker 1>My wife was constantly canceling the stairs. No, no, don't

0:46:36.719 --> 0:46:40.080
<v Speaker 1>spend that money on this, and ultimately said, tell you what,

0:46:40.200 --> 0:46:42.799
<v Speaker 1>when you moved. We moved to a new house one day,

0:46:43.120 --> 0:46:46.520
<v Speaker 1>get whatever you want. So we move and I remind

0:46:46.600 --> 0:46:49.839
<v Speaker 1>her of this and go out and spent probably too

0:46:49.880 --> 0:46:53.280
<v Speaker 1>much money on an audio system, and truth be told,

0:46:53.880 --> 0:46:57.600
<v Speaker 1>I hardly ever use it. Who has time to pop

0:46:57.640 --> 0:47:01.320
<v Speaker 1>in a CD and sit and listen uninterrupted to music

0:47:01.800 --> 0:47:05.439
<v Speaker 1>for forty five minutes? It just doesn't happen. And I'm

0:47:05.560 --> 0:47:11.279
<v Speaker 1>shocked at how little actual pleasure I've derived from that

0:47:11.360 --> 0:47:15.840
<v Speaker 1>purchase versus other things cars and houses and what have you.

0:47:16.200 --> 0:47:21.680
<v Speaker 1>And it it's always intriguing me how adaptable are we

0:47:21.760 --> 0:47:26.359
<v Speaker 1>to things and how much is it reliance upon our

0:47:26.440 --> 0:47:31.319
<v Speaker 1>own expectations or whether they're too high or too low. Well,

0:47:31.440 --> 0:47:34.600
<v Speaker 1>we're doing research. It's interesting that you raise that question.

0:47:34.640 --> 0:47:40.920
<v Speaker 1>We're doing research right now on people's reasons for making

0:47:40.960 --> 0:47:44.680
<v Speaker 1>certain purchases, and are those reasons born out in the

0:47:44.800 --> 0:47:49.840
<v Speaker 1>particular question is um We saw in our other research

0:47:50.000 --> 0:47:54.040
<v Speaker 1>that people often by certain material possessions with the thought

0:47:54.560 --> 0:47:57.640
<v Speaker 1>that that's going to give a boost to their social life.

0:47:57.640 --> 0:48:01.040
<v Speaker 1>The prototypical example is, yeah, and need to get forty

0:48:01.360 --> 0:48:05.280
<v Speaker 1>flat screen TV, UM because I want to have everyone

0:48:05.320 --> 0:48:09.000
<v Speaker 1>over for the Oscars and the super Bowl. And uh,

0:48:09.320 --> 0:48:13.080
<v Speaker 1>sometimes that does happen, but people end up watching the

0:48:13.080 --> 0:48:16.359
<v Speaker 1>Oscars by themselves or the super Bowl by themselves more

0:48:16.400 --> 0:48:20.960
<v Speaker 1>often than they expect. So the prediction is that you

0:48:21.040 --> 0:48:24.040
<v Speaker 1>buy certain material things with the expectation it's going to

0:48:24.120 --> 0:48:26.680
<v Speaker 1>connect you to other people, and that turns out to

0:48:26.800 --> 0:48:30.520
<v Speaker 1>be true less often than you expect, Whereas the experience

0:48:31.360 --> 0:48:34.320
<v Speaker 1>thinks some of those you buy also with an eye

0:48:34.360 --> 0:48:37.120
<v Speaker 1>toward doing it with other people, and those tend to

0:48:37.120 --> 0:48:41.440
<v Speaker 1>get confirmed more and that's part of the experiential advantage. UM.

0:48:41.560 --> 0:48:44.200
<v Speaker 1>So we have several studies in the hopper are ready

0:48:44.200 --> 0:48:47.480
<v Speaker 1>to run on on that subject. And I think your

0:48:47.840 --> 0:48:50.799
<v Speaker 1>example of buying this place that you love so much

0:48:50.840 --> 0:48:54.520
<v Speaker 1>and it hasn't diminished you right away talked about we

0:48:54.640 --> 0:48:57.040
<v Speaker 1>moved to this neighborhood and we're sort of connected to

0:48:57.160 --> 0:49:00.799
<v Speaker 1>the and like the other people around you. And that's

0:49:00.800 --> 0:49:04.720
<v Speaker 1>a case where you bought it for a social reason

0:49:04.760 --> 0:49:07.160
<v Speaker 1>and it turns out to have been confirmed and you've

0:49:07.200 --> 0:49:11.319
<v Speaker 1>got the great hiking ability and vista in the back. Um.

0:49:11.600 --> 0:49:14.799
<v Speaker 1>Compare that to a frequent motivation of people buying a

0:49:14.840 --> 0:49:17.239
<v Speaker 1>new house, So we need more square footage, or we

0:49:17.280 --> 0:49:20.960
<v Speaker 1>need three bathrooms rather than two. Well, people with big

0:49:20.960 --> 0:49:23.239
<v Speaker 1>families used to live in really tiny houses and never

0:49:23.320 --> 0:49:26.239
<v Speaker 1>really one They yeah, and they functioned just fine. We

0:49:26.280 --> 0:49:28.920
<v Speaker 1>could function just fine. And those are the kinds of

0:49:28.960 --> 0:49:32.160
<v Speaker 1>things that people adapt to. But if you move your

0:49:32.200 --> 0:49:36.120
<v Speaker 1>house and suddenly you're in a better neighborhood in the woods,

0:49:36.200 --> 0:49:39.080
<v Speaker 1>I'm literally you know, there are foxes running down the

0:49:39.080 --> 0:49:41.560
<v Speaker 1>street and we sort of I live in Long Island.

0:49:41.600 --> 0:49:43.800
<v Speaker 1>There was not supposed to be deer in Nassau County.

0:49:44.120 --> 0:49:47.160
<v Speaker 1>A deer went bounding across the front yard the other day.

0:49:47.680 --> 0:49:49.319
<v Speaker 1>I was trying to figure out where the dogs were

0:49:49.360 --> 0:49:51.880
<v Speaker 1>going crazy? Why is there a deer in our street?

0:49:51.920 --> 0:49:55.560
<v Speaker 1>That it never ceases to amaze me? And those bigger

0:49:55.600 --> 0:49:58.880
<v Speaker 1>TV you adapt to three months you don't even notice

0:49:58.880 --> 0:50:01.279
<v Speaker 1>the size of the TV. Whereas for you, it's gonna

0:50:01.320 --> 0:50:03.239
<v Speaker 1>be a fox one day, it's going to be a

0:50:03.360 --> 0:50:06.840
<v Speaker 1>sunset another day, a sunrise a third day, et cetera.

0:50:07.040 --> 0:50:09.640
<v Speaker 1>It's going to be a different little gift each time

0:50:10.160 --> 0:50:14.440
<v Speaker 1>that has provided this continuing enjoyment that you've received. I'm

0:50:14.440 --> 0:50:21.520
<v Speaker 1>curious as to how our Since you've discussed investing and

0:50:22.520 --> 0:50:28.200
<v Speaker 1>monetary issues, financial issues, I'm curious how our own recognition

0:50:28.280 --> 0:50:30.560
<v Speaker 1>of whether or not we're getting a bargain or not.

0:50:30.719 --> 0:50:34.920
<v Speaker 1>What whether you know there are lots of fast, beautiful cars.

0:50:35.680 --> 0:50:38.160
<v Speaker 1>I have a hard time wrapping my head around walking

0:50:38.200 --> 0:50:41.520
<v Speaker 1>into a Ferrari dealer and saying, here's two hundred and

0:50:41.560 --> 0:50:44.400
<v Speaker 1>fifty thousand dollars, I'll take the red one. Seems like

0:50:44.440 --> 0:50:47.359
<v Speaker 1>an awful lot of money. On the other hands, when

0:50:47.400 --> 0:50:49.200
<v Speaker 1>if you pick up a car that's two or three

0:50:49.239 --> 0:50:52.640
<v Speaker 1>years old and it's half of the new price, it

0:50:52.760 --> 0:50:56.800
<v Speaker 1>seems like a little more of a rational um decision.

0:50:56.920 --> 0:50:59.760
<v Speaker 1>I'm curious if you've looked at how people feel about

0:51:00.360 --> 0:51:03.480
<v Speaker 1>the cost or relative cost of what the purchasing to

0:51:03.680 --> 0:51:06.839
<v Speaker 1>its value, if that has any impact on how they

0:51:06.960 --> 0:51:12.160
<v Speaker 1>either adapt or continue to enjoy whatever that consumer bubble is. Yeah, sure,

0:51:12.280 --> 0:51:15.319
<v Speaker 1>there's um. You know, we get utility from all sorts

0:51:15.360 --> 0:51:18.279
<v Speaker 1>of things, and there's utility from the simple knowledge that

0:51:18.360 --> 0:51:22.720
<v Speaker 1>it's a deal that that provides pleasure, and that fact

0:51:22.840 --> 0:51:28.680
<v Speaker 1>is related to I think the single biggest psychological fact

0:51:28.719 --> 0:51:33.560
<v Speaker 1>about human beings. It's so simple. It's such a simple idea,

0:51:34.239 --> 0:51:37.840
<v Speaker 1>but it's really powerful. Um says something about us, and

0:51:38.000 --> 0:51:41.680
<v Speaker 1>UM it's sort of fallen to psychologists to remind the

0:51:41.719 --> 0:51:45.080
<v Speaker 1>world of this. Economists often want to say that, well,

0:51:45.120 --> 0:51:47.640
<v Speaker 1>let's just incentivize it and then we'll get more of

0:51:47.680 --> 0:51:51.800
<v Speaker 1>this behavior. Incentives work pretty well for things, but people

0:51:51.840 --> 0:51:55.520
<v Speaker 1>don't respond to the incentives themselves. They respond to the

0:51:55.560 --> 0:51:59.680
<v Speaker 1>meaning that they assigned to uh those incentives. And more broadly,

0:51:59.719 --> 0:52:03.600
<v Speaker 1>we don't respond to the stimuli we encounter. We respond

0:52:03.680 --> 0:52:06.920
<v Speaker 1>to the meaning that we assigned to them. Man, there's

0:52:06.960 --> 0:52:11.320
<v Speaker 1>so much flexibility in terms of how we construe things

0:52:11.960 --> 0:52:17.120
<v Speaker 1>that um, the same purchase thought of for whatever reason

0:52:17.239 --> 0:52:20.200
<v Speaker 1>as a deal versus not thought that way. It just

0:52:21.200 --> 0:52:24.600
<v Speaker 1>makes all the difference in terms of how much how

0:52:24.640 --> 0:52:27.960
<v Speaker 1>we feel about it, how much continued enjoyment we get it. Uh.

0:52:28.040 --> 0:52:32.719
<v Speaker 1>The same thing about virtually everything in in our lives. UH.

0:52:32.760 --> 0:52:37.319
<v Speaker 1>And therefore, the determinants of understanding how people are going

0:52:37.360 --> 0:52:41.240
<v Speaker 1>to interpret a given stimulus is the key to understanding

0:52:41.239 --> 0:52:42.920
<v Speaker 1>how people are going to behave. It's the key to

0:52:43.120 --> 0:52:45.719
<v Speaker 1>running a successful company, and certainly it's the key to

0:52:45.840 --> 0:52:50.799
<v Speaker 1>running a successful political campaign. So the other issue I

0:52:50.840 --> 0:52:53.880
<v Speaker 1>wanted to bring up relevant to this was the endowment

0:52:53.920 --> 0:52:58.439
<v Speaker 1>effects and how people place more value on things their own.

0:52:58.520 --> 0:53:01.319
<v Speaker 1>And and we'll stay with cars for a moment. My

0:53:01.520 --> 0:53:05.600
<v Speaker 1>favorite experience with this is speaking someone. I get this

0:53:05.640 --> 0:53:08.640
<v Speaker 1>all the time. Hey, you're a car guy. I'm thinking

0:53:08.680 --> 0:53:11.719
<v Speaker 1>about buying this or that. The most recent time it

0:53:11.800 --> 0:53:14.040
<v Speaker 1>was I'm looking at a cut. You mentioned a camera

0:53:14.640 --> 0:53:19.360
<v Speaker 1>or the Honda Accord. Which which car do you suggest? Um?

0:53:19.600 --> 0:53:21.880
<v Speaker 1>I get And I've learned it's like when someone says,

0:53:22.280 --> 0:53:24.439
<v Speaker 1>I'm thinking of leaving my wife, what do you think?

0:53:24.760 --> 0:53:26.799
<v Speaker 1>Whatever answer is going to come back to bite you.

0:53:27.160 --> 0:53:29.600
<v Speaker 1>So I usually say, those are both really good cars.

0:53:30.080 --> 0:53:32.319
<v Speaker 1>What's your experience with each of them? And I'll get

0:53:32.320 --> 0:53:34.520
<v Speaker 1>a laundry list of all the great things about the

0:53:34.600 --> 0:53:38.120
<v Speaker 1>Camera and then all the great things about the Accord. Well,

0:53:38.280 --> 0:53:40.239
<v Speaker 1>I don't think you could do poorly with either of them.

0:53:40.320 --> 0:53:43.200
<v Speaker 1>Let me know what you decide. Six months later, you

0:53:43.239 --> 0:53:47.120
<v Speaker 1>speak to that person and whichever car they picked, I'm

0:53:47.160 --> 0:53:50.120
<v Speaker 1>so glad I picked the Accord. It is the greatest

0:53:50.200 --> 0:53:53.279
<v Speaker 1>thing since that was that's a boring plane. This is

0:53:53.360 --> 0:53:56.640
<v Speaker 1>really it doesn't matter which one they select, but whicheveryone

0:53:56.760 --> 0:54:00.000
<v Speaker 1>they select, that's the one, that's the winning car, that's

0:54:00.000 --> 0:54:03.120
<v Speaker 1>the one they should have picked. It's amazing how what

0:54:03.239 --> 0:54:05.640
<v Speaker 1>was a coin to us at one point? Oh no,

0:54:05.760 --> 0:54:09.000
<v Speaker 1>this was the only way the decision could have gone. Yeah,

0:54:09.000 --> 0:54:11.200
<v Speaker 1>And I think there's an important lesson there that is,

0:54:11.239 --> 0:54:14.879
<v Speaker 1>when we find ourselves in these circumstances where, oh my god,

0:54:14.920 --> 0:54:18.120
<v Speaker 1>this is a weighty decision, I don't know, uh, you know,

0:54:18.680 --> 0:54:20.560
<v Speaker 1>six of one half dozen of the other. Well, if

0:54:20.600 --> 0:54:23.719
<v Speaker 1>you find yourself where you really are torn and there

0:54:23.719 --> 0:54:28.200
<v Speaker 1>are strong arguments either way it's a close call, then

0:54:28.280 --> 0:54:31.799
<v Speaker 1>just pick one. And what you just described, all that

0:54:31.920 --> 0:54:35.359
<v Speaker 1>psychology that uh you bring to bear to make you

0:54:35.440 --> 0:54:38.680
<v Speaker 1>happy with what you've chosen, will be brought to bear

0:54:38.719 --> 0:54:42.640
<v Speaker 1>and you'll be pretty happy with it. Um. And those decisions,

0:54:42.680 --> 0:54:45.719
<v Speaker 1>because it's six of one half dozen of the other,

0:54:45.760 --> 0:54:49.480
<v Speaker 1>they feel like hard ones, but in reality they aren't.

0:54:49.640 --> 0:54:54.960
<v Speaker 1>Um because if it's so much uh an unbalanced decision,

0:54:55.320 --> 0:54:56.920
<v Speaker 1>you can go either way and you'll end up feeling

0:54:56.920 --> 0:55:00.840
<v Speaker 1>pretty good about it. So there's a concept discussed, and

0:55:01.360 --> 0:55:03.640
<v Speaker 1>I believe it was how we know what isn't so

0:55:04.400 --> 0:55:07.440
<v Speaker 1>that I have to bring up because It just cracks

0:55:07.480 --> 0:55:10.440
<v Speaker 1>me up so much. We're all familiar with the Kubler

0:55:10.560 --> 0:55:14.640
<v Speaker 1>Ross five Stages of grief that has been, you know,

0:55:14.880 --> 0:55:20.319
<v Speaker 1>dogma for years. Your research more or less fines that

0:55:20.760 --> 0:55:24.000
<v Speaker 1>it's pretty meaningless and there is no data that backs

0:55:24.040 --> 0:55:26.680
<v Speaker 1>it up. Am I overstating that or is that a

0:55:26.680 --> 0:55:31.279
<v Speaker 1>fair assessment of that? I talk about that in the

0:55:31.280 --> 0:55:33.239
<v Speaker 1>book in the same chapter that I talked about the

0:55:33.280 --> 0:55:35.400
<v Speaker 1>hot hand, And both of them are reflection of the

0:55:35.440 --> 0:55:38.880
<v Speaker 1>fact that, Um, we tend to see more patterns in

0:55:38.920 --> 0:55:42.719
<v Speaker 1>the world than are actually there. Um. We've got this

0:55:42.880 --> 0:55:48.080
<v Speaker 1>incredible pattern detection machinery in our heads and it goes

0:55:48.120 --> 0:55:52.080
<v Speaker 1>out and finds patterns, but no system is perfect, and

0:55:52.120 --> 0:55:55.560
<v Speaker 1>so it overshoots sometimes, and so we see faces and

0:55:55.640 --> 0:55:58.319
<v Speaker 1>clouds and a man on the moon and canals on

0:55:58.440 --> 0:56:02.640
<v Speaker 1>Mars that aren't there are. UM and the hot hand,

0:56:03.160 --> 0:56:06.359
<v Speaker 1>Uh is you are seeing more streakiness than is really

0:56:06.400 --> 0:56:11.560
<v Speaker 1>There's another manifestation of that. Psychologists are very fond of

0:56:11.640 --> 0:56:15.200
<v Speaker 1>stage theories that we go through the systematic stages to

0:56:15.760 --> 0:56:18.960
<v Speaker 1>take us from the starting point to the endpoint. Kubler

0:56:19.040 --> 0:56:22.560
<v Speaker 1>Ross's is just one of them, and it I'm not

0:56:22.600 --> 0:56:25.959
<v Speaker 1>saying it's random. That is to say, people willy narly

0:56:26.040 --> 0:56:28.879
<v Speaker 1>go through all sorts of stages at different times. Maybe

0:56:28.880 --> 0:56:33.120
<v Speaker 1>there is some order there, but certainly there's less than people.

0:56:33.239 --> 0:56:35.520
<v Speaker 1>People are complicated and their act in all sorts of

0:56:35.560 --> 0:56:38.600
<v Speaker 1>different ways. And there is a lot of research on

0:56:38.760 --> 0:56:42.760
<v Speaker 1>people's reactions to grief, not so much about in reactions

0:56:42.800 --> 0:56:45.600
<v Speaker 1>to their own death, and there's research on that too, um.

0:56:45.760 --> 0:56:48.200
<v Speaker 1>And people are all over the map. Uh. Some people

0:56:48.400 --> 0:56:51.719
<v Speaker 1>the most common pattern, of course is you're devastated initially

0:56:52.160 --> 0:56:57.000
<v Speaker 1>and then you get over it and um. But many

0:56:57.000 --> 0:57:00.360
<v Speaker 1>people never get over it, and the world treats them like,

0:57:00.400 --> 0:57:02.000
<v Speaker 1>what's wrong with you? I who It's supposed to take

0:57:02.000 --> 0:57:04.560
<v Speaker 1>about a year, and you seem to have you seem

0:57:04.600 --> 0:57:07.080
<v Speaker 1>to still be troubled by this. We're adding an extra

0:57:07.160 --> 0:57:10.600
<v Speaker 1>burden onto those people. Some people aren't troubled right to

0:57:10.800 --> 0:57:13.160
<v Speaker 1>be from the beginning, and that can seem perverse weight.

0:57:13.239 --> 0:57:15.600
<v Speaker 1>You just lost a child, What what's wrong with you

0:57:15.640 --> 0:57:20.000
<v Speaker 1>that you didn't feel that way? Well, that happens, um.

0:57:20.720 --> 0:57:24.800
<v Speaker 1>And the problem with a firm belief in stage theories

0:57:24.960 --> 0:57:28.040
<v Speaker 1>is that they take on this normative stance, this is

0:57:28.080 --> 0:57:32.000
<v Speaker 1>what you should do. In fact, there are certain practitioners.

0:57:32.280 --> 0:57:35.160
<v Speaker 1>That sounds like I'm making this up, but it's uh,

0:57:35.200 --> 0:57:40.240
<v Speaker 1>and I wish I were UM, But there's a practitioners

0:57:40.320 --> 0:57:44.360
<v Speaker 1>manual for nurses that refers to people who don't go

0:57:44.480 --> 0:57:52.680
<v Speaker 1>through Kuberas's five stages in the order specified as pathological diers. Uh.

0:57:52.720 --> 0:57:54.960
<v Speaker 1>And just think how insidious that is. You've gotten the

0:57:54.960 --> 0:57:58.520
<v Speaker 1>worst news you could possibly get that your life here

0:57:58.640 --> 0:58:01.560
<v Speaker 1>is you don't know if much time left on earth.

0:58:01.840 --> 0:58:03.840
<v Speaker 1>You've got to deal with that. And now, in addition

0:58:03.880 --> 0:58:05.920
<v Speaker 1>to that, you have to deal with the fact that

0:58:05.960 --> 0:58:08.920
<v Speaker 1>the people presumably there to help you think that you

0:58:08.960 --> 0:58:12.800
<v Speaker 1>aren't doing it right. It's just adding a horrible injury

0:58:12.800 --> 0:58:16.960
<v Speaker 1>insult to an already terrible injury. And you link in

0:58:17.040 --> 0:58:19.440
<v Speaker 1>one of your presentations, you linked to the video of

0:58:19.600 --> 0:58:23.680
<v Speaker 1>Homer Simpson going through the five stages, which is absolutely hilarious.

0:58:23.680 --> 0:58:26.840
<v Speaker 1>I'll add the link to this. I have to ask

0:58:26.880 --> 0:58:30.440
<v Speaker 1>the related question, what sort of pushback did you get

0:58:30.520 --> 0:58:35.760
<v Speaker 1>from the the establishment uh in in this area when

0:58:35.800 --> 0:58:40.200
<v Speaker 1>you basically said, hey, the data doesn't really support the

0:58:40.240 --> 0:58:43.800
<v Speaker 1>classic Kubler Ross five stages as much as we think

0:58:43.840 --> 0:58:46.400
<v Speaker 1>it does. Compared to the amount of pushback I got

0:58:46.400 --> 0:58:49.040
<v Speaker 1>on the hot hand hardly any at all. Really, Yeah,

0:58:49.440 --> 0:58:52.960
<v Speaker 1>that's amazing. Well, basketball is serious dying. Hey, you know,

0:58:53.080 --> 0:58:55.800
<v Speaker 1>we can't really pay much attention to that. So so

0:58:55.920 --> 0:58:59.560
<v Speaker 1>let me ask you the question about UM. About the

0:58:59.600 --> 0:59:03.880
<v Speaker 1>Basket Bowl hot hand issue. You mentioned, there's some new

0:59:03.920 --> 0:59:08.439
<v Speaker 1>evidence that perhaps moderates a little bit. I know, when

0:59:08.440 --> 0:59:11.600
<v Speaker 1>you first came out with it, everybody from Red Hour

0:59:11.720 --> 0:59:15.680
<v Speaker 1>back to whoever, weighed in on it. What was some

0:59:15.800 --> 0:59:19.480
<v Speaker 1>of the crazier push back you got on this and

0:59:20.320 --> 0:59:26.520
<v Speaker 1>how accurate do you think the original assessment is? Um? Well,

0:59:26.520 --> 0:59:29.480
<v Speaker 1>I wouldn't say any of the pushback is crazy. It was.

0:59:29.600 --> 0:59:32.200
<v Speaker 1>It was very firm, and you know I understand that.

0:59:32.320 --> 0:59:37.680
<v Speaker 1>And UM, again be precisely because it's such a compelling phenomenon.

0:59:37.880 --> 0:59:39.480
<v Speaker 1>When you're out there in the heat of the game

0:59:39.560 --> 0:59:42.160
<v Speaker 1>and you've made several shots in a row, UM, and

0:59:42.200 --> 0:59:47.320
<v Speaker 1>then you hear about these psychologist statisticians doing some analysis,

0:59:47.320 --> 0:59:51.919
<v Speaker 1>it's easy to um just that that can't be and

0:59:52.080 --> 0:59:56.440
<v Speaker 1>just dismiss it. UM. And they're very dismissive that what

0:59:56.480 --> 1:00:00.000
<v Speaker 1>do they know, they're a bunch of psychologists. Well, um,

1:00:00.000 --> 1:00:03.840
<v Speaker 1>ecologists play basketball too, and and UM, you know, maybe

1:00:03.840 --> 1:00:06.000
<v Speaker 1>we wouldn't have the hot hand as much as a

1:00:06.080 --> 1:00:09.440
<v Speaker 1>more skilled player, but we do have it and UM,

1:00:09.480 --> 1:00:13.320
<v Speaker 1>so it wasn't crazy, but it was pretty um dismissive.

1:00:13.480 --> 1:00:19.080
<v Speaker 1>And again with respect to our initial hypothesis, are people

1:00:19.640 --> 1:00:23.320
<v Speaker 1>overestimating any streaked pinus that might be there? That the

1:00:23.400 --> 1:00:25.640
<v Speaker 1>answer to that is very clear. In fact, we're running

1:00:26.000 --> 1:00:30.880
<v Speaker 1>additional studies right now where um, we have people shoot

1:00:30.920 --> 1:00:33.520
<v Speaker 1>for us, UM and they identify just tell us when

1:00:33.520 --> 1:00:36.120
<v Speaker 1>you're hot, um, and then afterwards we say, you know

1:00:36.160 --> 1:00:38.760
<v Speaker 1>you said you were hot, Uh, some number of times

1:00:38.840 --> 1:00:41.840
<v Speaker 1>you didn't say that, some number of times. What percentage

1:00:41.920 --> 1:00:43.880
<v Speaker 1>of the shots do you think you made after you

1:00:43.920 --> 1:00:46.760
<v Speaker 1>said you were hot versus uh, the times when you

1:00:46.800 --> 1:00:51.200
<v Speaker 1>didn't say that? And the overestimation is staggering. They you know,

1:00:51.320 --> 1:00:54.200
<v Speaker 1>we know what percentage of shots they made when they

1:00:54.240 --> 1:00:58.320
<v Speaker 1>said they were hot, and they're wildly overestimating that. They're

1:00:58.400 --> 1:01:01.880
<v Speaker 1>modestly underestimating how well they did when they said they

1:01:01.880 --> 1:01:07.320
<v Speaker 1>weren't hot. So again a departure between ah belief in reality.

1:01:07.640 --> 1:01:10.720
<v Speaker 1>So so let me not look for confirming data on

1:01:10.720 --> 1:01:13.080
<v Speaker 1>on the thesis. Uh that there was a lot of

1:01:13.120 --> 1:01:17.280
<v Speaker 1>pushback and ask did anybody at either the professional or

1:01:17.360 --> 1:01:20.400
<v Speaker 1>college level get back to you and say, I want

1:01:20.440 --> 1:01:26.040
<v Speaker 1>to adapt the data of the non hot hands. Here's

1:01:26.080 --> 1:01:28.880
<v Speaker 1>how we think it could affect our player rotation or

1:01:28.920 --> 1:01:31.600
<v Speaker 1>a game strategy. Did you ever hear anybody who said,

1:01:32.680 --> 1:01:34.720
<v Speaker 1>as hard as this might be to believe, we think

1:01:34.720 --> 1:01:37.560
<v Speaker 1>you're accurate and here's how it's going to change our

1:01:37.680 --> 1:01:41.560
<v Speaker 1>coaching or playing strategy. Um, I you know, I've talked

1:01:41.600 --> 1:01:44.840
<v Speaker 1>to a lot of coaches who will say, you know,

1:01:44.880 --> 1:01:48.680
<v Speaker 1>one thing I have taken from that is that it

1:01:48.720 --> 1:01:53.520
<v Speaker 1>reinforces really what my job is, which is to um

1:01:53.560 --> 1:01:57.360
<v Speaker 1>to get my team the best shots. And I used

1:01:57.400 --> 1:02:01.040
<v Speaker 1>to factor in how hot some one is. Now I'm

1:02:01.080 --> 1:02:04.640
<v Speaker 1>gonna factor that in less it's really getting the ball

1:02:04.680 --> 1:02:07.720
<v Speaker 1>in the hands of my best players on the best

1:02:07.720 --> 1:02:11.200
<v Speaker 1>spots of the floor. And so it's it's reinforcing an

1:02:11.200 --> 1:02:15.240
<v Speaker 1>alternative belief that they already have more than UM, trying

1:02:15.240 --> 1:02:18.640
<v Speaker 1>to get them to extinguish this other belief. So there's

1:02:18.680 --> 1:02:21.360
<v Speaker 1>a ton of other biases. I wanted to go over,

1:02:21.520 --> 1:02:24.960
<v Speaker 1>the spotlight effect, the there's there's just a run of stuff.

1:02:25.000 --> 1:02:28.040
<v Speaker 1>But I have to get to my favorite questions. Um,

1:02:28.120 --> 1:02:31.600
<v Speaker 1>these are the standard questions we ask all of our guests. Okay,

1:02:31.880 --> 1:02:34.840
<v Speaker 1>tell us the most important thing that people don't know

1:02:35.040 --> 1:02:39.200
<v Speaker 1>about your background. I'm the first person in my family

1:02:39.240 --> 1:02:41.640
<v Speaker 1>to go to college. That could sound like, oh, that's

1:02:41.640 --> 1:02:46.240
<v Speaker 1>a bad thing. Um, I feel I've been studying gratitude

1:02:46.240 --> 1:02:48.320
<v Speaker 1>a lot, and I think part of it stems from

1:02:48.360 --> 1:02:51.760
<v Speaker 1>having grown up in an amazing part of the world

1:02:51.760 --> 1:02:55.320
<v Speaker 1>at an amazing time. That is Silicon Valley before it

1:02:55.360 --> 1:02:58.960
<v Speaker 1>was Silicon Valley. It's just a great place. It's pretty

1:02:59.000 --> 1:03:02.760
<v Speaker 1>egalitary in world. Those of us whose parents didn't go

1:03:02.800 --> 1:03:05.920
<v Speaker 1>to college mingled with those who did, and you never

1:03:06.000 --> 1:03:08.240
<v Speaker 1>felt like you were part of a lower cast as

1:03:08.240 --> 1:03:12.320
<v Speaker 1>a result of that. UM And obviously the weather there

1:03:12.400 --> 1:03:16.360
<v Speaker 1>was sensational. You've got the beaches very close, Yosemite Valley

1:03:16.480 --> 1:03:19.360
<v Speaker 1>very close. It was just an incredible place to have

1:03:19.440 --> 1:03:24.000
<v Speaker 1>grown up. Tell us about some of your early mentors, Um,

1:03:24.040 --> 1:03:27.920
<v Speaker 1>I've had the great pleasure of going to Stanford University,

1:03:28.040 --> 1:03:31.880
<v Speaker 1>the number one psychology department then and now for a

1:03:31.880 --> 1:03:35.760
<v Speaker 1>long time. It's it's had that ranking, UM at a

1:03:35.880 --> 1:03:39.560
<v Speaker 1>great time. It was the height of the cognitive revolution

1:03:39.760 --> 1:03:42.840
<v Speaker 1>in psychology. It's a lot of very exciting things happening,

1:03:43.360 --> 1:03:45.680
<v Speaker 1>which is why I chose to go there, and then

1:03:45.720 --> 1:03:49.320
<v Speaker 1>there were the surprising things. Uh Amos Diversky and Daniel

1:03:49.360 --> 1:03:53.000
<v Speaker 1>Conneman were visiting there my very first year and started

1:03:53.040 --> 1:03:55.520
<v Speaker 1>talking about this stuff I hadn't heard of that just

1:03:55.560 --> 1:03:58.760
<v Speaker 1>seemed so compelling. It was sort of the dawn of

1:03:58.800 --> 1:04:01.840
<v Speaker 1>the revolution and in judgment and decision making, and it

1:04:01.920 --> 1:04:04.960
<v Speaker 1>was just a very heady time, and they were generous

1:04:04.960 --> 1:04:09.880
<v Speaker 1>with their time. My advisers, Mark Leper and Lee Ross too,

1:04:10.520 --> 1:04:15.640
<v Speaker 1>incredibly insightful psychologists, were very helpful. So it was just

1:04:15.720 --> 1:04:20.280
<v Speaker 1>a felt like being in Wittgenstein's Vienna. I was just

1:04:20.400 --> 1:04:24.880
<v Speaker 1>a great place at a great time, with terrific people

1:04:25.160 --> 1:04:29.440
<v Speaker 1>and terrifically giving people. So let me diverge from my

1:04:30.600 --> 1:04:33.320
<v Speaker 1>normal questions and ask you two things about this. First,

1:04:34.000 --> 1:04:36.280
<v Speaker 1>you write that you originally planning on going to law

1:04:36.320 --> 1:04:39.000
<v Speaker 1>school until you happen to see to Versking and Kaneman

1:04:40.000 --> 1:04:44.480
<v Speaker 1>at school. Did did you really completely shift your career

1:04:44.520 --> 1:04:48.240
<v Speaker 1>plans based on No, not not quite. Those are there's

1:04:49.000 --> 1:04:52.440
<v Speaker 1>Those two components are true, but they're melded together. That

1:04:52.560 --> 1:04:54.200
<v Speaker 1>is to say, I went to college again. I was

1:04:54.240 --> 1:04:56.000
<v Speaker 1>the first most of my family to go to college.

1:04:56.520 --> 1:04:58.400
<v Speaker 1>I didn't know what I wanted to do. But I

1:04:58.680 --> 1:05:00.560
<v Speaker 1>kind of like to argue with people, and I thought

1:05:00.600 --> 1:05:04.800
<v Speaker 1>that would be a good uh field the law, and

1:05:05.160 --> 1:05:09.280
<v Speaker 1>but there's there's no pre law. You can take anything

1:05:09.440 --> 1:05:12.240
<v Speaker 1>as a pre law person. And so I took a

1:05:12.280 --> 1:05:16.680
<v Speaker 1>bunch of stuff and some of them psychology courses like them,

1:05:16.720 --> 1:05:20.240
<v Speaker 1>took another, like that, took another, and then suddenly don

1:05:20.320 --> 1:05:22.880
<v Speaker 1>dun me, Hey, I seem to like the psychology stuff.

1:05:23.400 --> 1:05:25.960
<v Speaker 1>Can I make a career out of this? And took

1:05:25.960 --> 1:05:28.960
<v Speaker 1>a year off after undergraduate to sort of do I

1:05:29.000 --> 1:05:31.080
<v Speaker 1>want to take that plunge and go to graduate school?

1:05:31.080 --> 1:05:34.440
<v Speaker 1>And the answer was yes. And I'm really really glad

1:05:35.160 --> 1:05:38.440
<v Speaker 1>that the answer was yes. So one of the themes

1:05:38.480 --> 1:05:41.720
<v Speaker 1>that comes up in all these conversations with people who

1:05:41.760 --> 1:05:46.840
<v Speaker 1>have achieved either personal or financial success is surprisingly the

1:05:46.960 --> 1:05:50.680
<v Speaker 1>role of luck and randomness in their careers. And I

1:05:50.720 --> 1:05:53.680
<v Speaker 1>can't count how many people have said, you know, but

1:05:53.960 --> 1:05:59.640
<v Speaker 1>for this one thing happening, my entire professional career, personal life, whatever,

1:06:00.080 --> 1:06:03.280
<v Speaker 1>could have easily gone in a different direction you referenced

1:06:03.520 --> 1:06:07.840
<v Speaker 1>in and again I think it was the white smart

1:06:07.880 --> 1:06:11.960
<v Speaker 1>people make big money mistakes. The experience of of seeing

1:06:12.040 --> 1:06:15.560
<v Speaker 1>to Versking condiment at Stanford am I reading too much

1:06:15.600 --> 1:06:17.840
<v Speaker 1>into that. Was that a big deal? Or was that

1:06:17.920 --> 1:06:20.720
<v Speaker 1>just hmm? This is really interesting and I want to

1:06:20.760 --> 1:06:25.320
<v Speaker 1>stay with with psychology. I maybe put I may be

1:06:25.400 --> 1:06:27.400
<v Speaker 1>reading too much into it. No, you're not. I mean

1:06:27.520 --> 1:06:31.200
<v Speaker 1>it's uh well, I'll tell an embarrassing story about myself,

1:06:31.280 --> 1:06:33.960
<v Speaker 1>which is I go to Stanford. It's chock full of

1:06:34.040 --> 1:06:38.120
<v Speaker 1>these famous people. Walter Michelle of the Marshmallow Test, Gordon Bauer,

1:06:38.200 --> 1:06:41.680
<v Speaker 1>a giant, and the cognitive revolution. The people I planned

1:06:41.680 --> 1:06:45.080
<v Speaker 1>to study with, Mark Leper, Lee ross Um, and Lee

1:06:45.200 --> 1:06:49.880
<v Speaker 1>Ross ran a seminar on an introduction to the faculty. Um.

1:06:49.920 --> 1:06:52.520
<v Speaker 1>Each week you'd bring in two other members of the faculty.

1:06:52.560 --> 1:06:56.080
<v Speaker 1>We'd read their papers and find out what's going on

1:06:56.200 --> 1:07:00.680
<v Speaker 1>there among the faculty. Great way to start a program. Um,

1:07:00.760 --> 1:07:04.960
<v Speaker 1>And in the first organizational meeting, Lee says, Okay, that's

1:07:04.960 --> 1:07:07.160
<v Speaker 1>what we're gonna do. But the first week, we've got

1:07:07.160 --> 1:07:11.360
<v Speaker 1>these visitors here, Amos Tversky and Daniel Kneman Um, and

1:07:11.400 --> 1:07:14.280
<v Speaker 1>so we're gonna start with them. And internally, I say

1:07:14.320 --> 1:07:17.320
<v Speaker 1>to myself, why these guys? Why I can't I want

1:07:17.320 --> 1:07:20.520
<v Speaker 1>to hear from the famous people. Because my undergraduate education

1:07:20.560 --> 1:07:23.000
<v Speaker 1>was such I hadn't heard of them. And I'm now

1:07:23.080 --> 1:07:27.800
<v Speaker 1>embarrassed by that. Um but at least and they they

1:07:28.440 --> 1:07:33.640
<v Speaker 1>had us read the now epic u N paper and

1:07:33.720 --> 1:07:37.800
<v Speaker 1>science on heuristics and biases. And so it's an embarrassing

1:07:37.840 --> 1:07:40.400
<v Speaker 1>story that I would say, um gee, when are we

1:07:40.440 --> 1:07:42.920
<v Speaker 1>going to hear from the famous people? But one thing

1:07:42.960 --> 1:07:44.920
<v Speaker 1>I can say in my defense, at least one thing

1:07:44.960 --> 1:07:47.160
<v Speaker 1>that makes me feel better is at least I recognized

1:07:47.640 --> 1:07:49.880
<v Speaker 1>when we read that paper, Hey man, this is this

1:07:49.960 --> 1:07:53.520
<v Speaker 1>is really great stuff. Um. And and that changed what

1:07:53.560 --> 1:07:56.840
<v Speaker 1>I planned to do in graduate school. That's fascinating. Tell

1:07:56.920 --> 1:08:00.520
<v Speaker 1>us about some of your favorite books. Man, there's so

1:08:00.560 --> 1:08:05.720
<v Speaker 1>many great books. Uh, well, I'll give you a category

1:08:05.840 --> 1:08:09.960
<v Speaker 1>for one. Anything that Ian McEwen writes is just brilliant

1:08:10.040 --> 1:08:13.160
<v Speaker 1>and and um you know it's it's it's fiction, but

1:08:13.200 --> 1:08:17.240
<v Speaker 1>it's fiction that touches on and it's fiction that touches

1:08:17.280 --> 1:08:20.280
<v Speaker 1>on so many different areas of life and so many

1:08:20.320 --> 1:08:22.680
<v Speaker 1>different themes, but some of it having to do very

1:08:22.720 --> 1:08:25.320
<v Speaker 1>related to judgment and decision making in game theory. The

1:08:25.439 --> 1:08:30.519
<v Speaker 1>beginning the opening scene to his novel Enduring Love, it's

1:08:31.560 --> 1:08:35.040
<v Speaker 1>a brilliant fictional depiction of game theory. It's all you

1:08:35.080 --> 1:08:37.439
<v Speaker 1>need to know about game theory happens in that first

1:08:37.640 --> 1:08:43.040
<v Speaker 1>very riveting uh scene, So anything by Ian McEwen. Another

1:08:43.760 --> 1:08:47.479
<v Speaker 1>moving out of fiction to oh and his kind of

1:08:47.520 --> 1:08:53.600
<v Speaker 1>recent one Nutshell that which is a little bizarrely fascinating

1:08:53.680 --> 1:08:59.360
<v Speaker 1>take on the Hamlet tail is brilliant um. Moving out

1:08:59.360 --> 1:09:03.479
<v Speaker 1>of fiction to nonfiction guns, germs and steel, just sort

1:09:03.479 --> 1:09:05.880
<v Speaker 1>of the scope of it, and the you know, he

1:09:05.920 --> 1:09:08.920
<v Speaker 1>asks so many questions that would never occur to me

1:09:09.000 --> 1:09:13.559
<v Speaker 1>at least to ask and uh and then bring some

1:09:13.880 --> 1:09:16.799
<v Speaker 1>interesting analysis to bear on them, some of them convincing,

1:09:16.840 --> 1:09:19.439
<v Speaker 1>some of them less so. But the ambitiousness of it

1:09:19.560 --> 1:09:26.240
<v Speaker 1>and the questions asked for just uh, just terrific um.

1:09:26.280 --> 1:09:29.200
<v Speaker 1>And you know, we started with conoman diversky and so

1:09:30.320 --> 1:09:34.040
<v Speaker 1>it feels right to say Thinking Fast and Slow is

1:09:34.640 --> 1:09:40.800
<v Speaker 1>chock full of wisdom and just a brilliant explication of

1:09:40.840 --> 1:09:44.800
<v Speaker 1>all the research in this area with h Danny Knomans

1:09:44.880 --> 1:09:50.800
<v Speaker 1>just gift for putting things just right. I love that book.

1:09:51.040 --> 1:09:53.640
<v Speaker 1>It was tremendous. Um. You work with a lot of

1:09:53.640 --> 1:09:55.960
<v Speaker 1>students and a lot of millennials. What sort of advice

1:09:55.960 --> 1:09:59.920
<v Speaker 1>would you give someone who was interested in psychology as

1:10:00.000 --> 1:10:03.839
<v Speaker 1>a career? A bit of a complicated answer to that question.

1:10:04.120 --> 1:10:07.680
<v Speaker 1>That is to say, people are often taught, oh, just

1:10:07.760 --> 1:10:11.120
<v Speaker 1>follow your passion so on. And I chafe at that

1:10:11.200 --> 1:10:13.719
<v Speaker 1>a little bit because I know a lot of kids.

1:10:14.240 --> 1:10:16.519
<v Speaker 1>It makes a lot of kids feel bad because they think, oh,

1:10:16.600 --> 1:10:18.600
<v Speaker 1>I don't have a passion, and then the problem is

1:10:18.640 --> 1:10:21.360
<v Speaker 1>finding it. And it's okay to not have a passion.

1:10:21.600 --> 1:10:25.600
<v Speaker 1>It's okay to be a person who does a variety

1:10:25.640 --> 1:10:27.680
<v Speaker 1>of different jobs. And you know, you can be a

1:10:27.720 --> 1:10:30.559
<v Speaker 1>good person and live a good life as just be

1:10:30.640 --> 1:10:33.200
<v Speaker 1>a taxpayer, be someone who's a good neighbor, and so on.

1:10:33.320 --> 1:10:36.439
<v Speaker 1>You don't have to to have a great passion and

1:10:36.479 --> 1:10:39.519
<v Speaker 1>be a giant success. So I want to put that

1:10:40.240 --> 1:10:44.280
<v Speaker 1>out there because I firmly believe that because the advice

1:10:44.280 --> 1:10:47.000
<v Speaker 1>I'm going to give it could sound like, oh, you're

1:10:47.120 --> 1:10:51.040
<v Speaker 1>recommending that and I'm not, which is, um, just do stuff.

1:10:51.600 --> 1:10:54.439
<v Speaker 1>Do what's engaging to you. Take take you know. Um,

1:10:54.479 --> 1:10:58.160
<v Speaker 1>if you're a student, don't worry so much about getting

1:10:58.200 --> 1:11:01.200
<v Speaker 1>your undergraduate business May Jersey, so you can go right

1:11:01.240 --> 1:11:04.320
<v Speaker 1>away into a job. Um, because if you do that

1:11:05.200 --> 1:11:07.080
<v Speaker 1>and it's a job you like, they're probably gonna want

1:11:07.120 --> 1:11:08.680
<v Speaker 1>you to get your m b a anyway, and you're

1:11:08.680 --> 1:11:11.760
<v Speaker 1>gonna relearn that stuff. Um. You never know what you're

1:11:11.760 --> 1:11:14.280
<v Speaker 1>gonna draw upon in your life. So take the kinds

1:11:14.320 --> 1:11:17.840
<v Speaker 1>of courses, do the kinds of things that you're really

1:11:18.200 --> 1:11:21.960
<v Speaker 1>engaged in. Push yourself a little bit um, That's what

1:11:22.000 --> 1:11:24.120
<v Speaker 1>I would say. You know, the world changes so quickly

1:11:24.200 --> 1:11:28.240
<v Speaker 1>you can't anticipate what the skills of the marketplace are

1:11:28.280 --> 1:11:30.679
<v Speaker 1>going to be with that much accuracy. So just keep

1:11:30.680 --> 1:11:34.400
<v Speaker 1>building your your intellectual capital and don't worry so much

1:11:34.439 --> 1:11:37.680
<v Speaker 1>about the outcome. And our final question, what is it

1:11:37.720 --> 1:11:41.240
<v Speaker 1>that you know about psychology today that you wish you

1:11:41.320 --> 1:11:44.960
<v Speaker 1>knew thirty plus years ago when you were first starting out. Yeah,

1:11:45.040 --> 1:11:47.760
<v Speaker 1>great question and a simple answer to it. Uh. I

1:11:47.840 --> 1:11:50.960
<v Speaker 1>knew this a lot in psychology, but I kept it

1:11:51.080 --> 1:11:56.400
<v Speaker 1>sort of walled off there um and didn't appreciate its breadth.

1:11:56.439 --> 1:12:00.160
<v Speaker 1>Which is an idea often attributed to Kurt Lewin, which

1:12:00.280 --> 1:12:04.280
<v Speaker 1>is when we're trying to change behavior other people's are

1:12:04.280 --> 1:12:07.560
<v Speaker 1>our own, we often try to do it by increasing motivation.

1:12:07.680 --> 1:12:12.000
<v Speaker 1>Psych people up higher motivational speakers to get the salesforce

1:12:12.120 --> 1:12:14.760
<v Speaker 1>charged up and so on. And there are times in

1:12:14.760 --> 1:12:18.880
<v Speaker 1>which that is helpful when motivation. When motivation is the problem.

1:12:19.000 --> 1:12:22.759
<v Speaker 1>Getting more motivation is great, but oftentimes that's not the problem.

1:12:22.800 --> 1:12:25.320
<v Speaker 1>People are perfectly well motivated and they just can't figure

1:12:25.320 --> 1:12:29.400
<v Speaker 1>out how to translate their strong motivations into effective action.

1:12:29.760 --> 1:12:33.439
<v Speaker 1>And Lewin's idea very simple one is when that's the case,

1:12:33.640 --> 1:12:37.240
<v Speaker 1>don't try to push people more. Figure out what's preventing

1:12:37.280 --> 1:12:42.240
<v Speaker 1>them and take away those blockages. And behavioral economists have

1:12:42.320 --> 1:12:46.160
<v Speaker 1>been using that a lot, uh to exemplified best in

1:12:46.240 --> 1:12:50.599
<v Speaker 1>the Richard Taylor and Cass Sunstein book Nudge. Figure out

1:12:50.680 --> 1:12:56.120
<v Speaker 1>what's preventing this and uh rearrange the environment a little

1:12:56.120 --> 1:12:58.800
<v Speaker 1>bit that makes the behavior easier. You want more of this,

1:12:59.360 --> 1:13:03.480
<v Speaker 1>make it a little a bit easier. And I think if, um,

1:13:03.520 --> 1:13:06.760
<v Speaker 1>if I knew that uh sooner, I would be more

1:13:06.840 --> 1:13:11.320
<v Speaker 1>effective in you know, consulting on political campaigns or helping

1:13:11.360 --> 1:13:15.640
<v Speaker 1>people in their personal lives as well. That that's absolutely fascinating.

1:13:16.240 --> 1:13:21.160
<v Speaker 1>We have been speaking with Professor Tom Gilovich of Cornell University.

1:13:21.200 --> 1:13:23.519
<v Speaker 1>If you enjoy this conversation, be sure and look up

1:13:23.520 --> 1:13:26.559
<v Speaker 1>an Inch or down an inch on Apple, iTunes or

1:13:26.600 --> 1:13:29.679
<v Speaker 1>wherever finer podcasts are sold, and you can see any

1:13:29.720 --> 1:13:32.880
<v Speaker 1>of the other hundred and eighty or so such conversations

1:13:32.880 --> 1:13:35.880
<v Speaker 1>that we've had. I would be remiss if I did

1:13:35.880 --> 1:13:39.280
<v Speaker 1>not thank the Cracks staff who helps put this podcast

1:13:39.320 --> 1:13:43.240
<v Speaker 1>together each week. Taylor Riggs is our booker, Michael Batnick

1:13:43.320 --> 1:13:46.360
<v Speaker 1>is my head of research, and Medina Parwanner is our

1:13:46.439 --> 1:13:50.640
<v Speaker 1>audio engineer slash producer. We love your comments, feedback in

1:13:50.760 --> 1:13:54.760
<v Speaker 1>suggestions right to us at m IB podcast at Bloomberg

1:13:54.800 --> 1:13:57.920
<v Speaker 1>dot net. I'm Barry Retults. You're listening to Masters in

1:13:57.960 --> 1:14:06.479
<v Speaker 1>Business on Bloomberg Radio in the Canting Tin and the

1:14:06.760 --> 1:14:06.800
<v Speaker 1>so