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Speaker 1: From UFOs to psychic powers and government conspiracies. History is

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Speaker 1: riddled with unexplained events. You can turn back now or

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Speaker 1: learn this stuff they don't want you to know. A

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Speaker 1: production of iHeartRadio.

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Speaker 2: Hello, welcome back to the show. My name is Matt,

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Speaker 2: my name is Noel.

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Speaker 3: They call me Ben. We're joined as always with our

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Speaker 3: super producer Andrew the try Force Howard. Most importantly, you

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Speaker 3: are you. You are here. That makes this the stuff

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Speaker 3: they don't want you to know. Friends and neighbors, conspiracy

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Speaker 3: realist workers of the world unite. We can all agree

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Speaker 3: on this at some point in your life. Good question.

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Speaker 3: Have you ever met someone who seems almost purposely bad

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Speaker 3: at their job, like not just over their head, but

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Speaker 3: like beyond the point of incompetence.

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Speaker 4: I mean, I guess the old cliche is associated with

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Speaker 4: like government jobs and people that are like unfirable, but

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Speaker 4: that seems to no longer be the case.

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Speaker 3: Just running the clock on the pension.

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Speaker 4: One percent or you know, there's a certain level of

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Speaker 4: potentially entitlement that comes along with people who have been

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Speaker 4: in a job for a really, really long time and

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Speaker 4: they just start to kind of get bitter and resentful

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Speaker 4: and maybe kind of just give up.

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Speaker 2: You know, I've been in some restaurants where I'm pretty

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Speaker 2: sure there's at least someone in the managerial level that

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Speaker 2: is specifically attempting to sabotage their own business. The way

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Speaker 2: the restrooms look, because of how unclean everything is. Sure,

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Speaker 2: you're just going who is run this place?

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Speaker 5: Not even phoning it in, right, just like not even

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Speaker 5: making the call.

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Speaker 3: I also love to that point the this happens at

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Speaker 3: a few restaurants in Atlanta, I'm sure it's throughout the world.

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Speaker 3: Where you look at a menu. Menus, by the way,

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Speaker 3: one of my favorite forms of literature. You look at

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Speaker 3: a menu and instead of you know, immediately the pricing

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Speaker 3: or the list of dishes available, or like a cutesy

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Speaker 3: little paragraph about the origin story, you see a full

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Speaker 3: half page of the menu dedicated to rules and warnings

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Speaker 3: and regulations.

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Speaker 2: You're talking about what I've been in there? What is

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Speaker 2: that place?

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Speaker 3: There are a couple places. I'm thinking of the Vortex

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Speaker 3: that's one.

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Speaker 5: But there are a bar no children allowed.

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Speaker 4: It's like a giant It looks like a ride at

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Speaker 4: an amusement park, carnival or something.

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Speaker 5: They're very very strict about. No kids allowed.

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Speaker 4: It's a bar, but they could let kids in if

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Speaker 4: they wanted to, because.

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Speaker 2: They serve food.

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Speaker 5: It's a restaurant there though.

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Speaker 4: That yeah, there is, and they do have a comedy

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Speaker 4: brand that actually I think just got bought out. Laughing

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Speaker 4: skull skull no longer associated with that.

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Speaker 3: I think that makes sense.

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Speaker 4: I think it was bought by This is sorry too

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Speaker 4: much inside baseball.

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Speaker 5: But Taco Mac, which is like a regional chain.

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Speaker 4: Of like their Decatur locations, don't particularly care for there Mac.

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Speaker 3: They're moving their stuff around. Yeah. Also that that's a

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Speaker 3: great observation I would agree with it. Don't have a giant, cartoonish,

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Speaker 3: super fascinating looking skull that seems like it belongs on

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Speaker 3: a Putt putt course and then make people disappoint their

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Speaker 3: children driving by. Anyway, So if you are if you

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Speaker 3: have had the dubious experience of meeting someone, perhaps in

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Speaker 3: a position of authority, who seems almost like almost purposely

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Speaker 3: purpusly bad at their job, then you will be interested

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Speaker 3: in tonight's episode. This is a long waited fun when

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Speaker 3: for us folks, tonight's episode is about an instruction manual,

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Speaker 3: a short book, a novelette. Unlike other manuals or self

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Speaker 3: help guides. I don't know if you guys read self

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Speaker 3: help books. Wait, let's posit there the secret, right, do

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Speaker 3: you read the secret?

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Speaker 4: I'm always your people referencing the secret. I guess I

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Speaker 4: don't know the secret, and no one shared it with.

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Speaker 3: The secret argues popularized by talk show host in billionaire

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Speaker 3: Oprah Winfrey. The Secret argues that one must adjust one's

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Speaker 3: thoughts to manifest real world results.

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Speaker 5: Ah.

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Speaker 3: Yes, diplomatically put The issue with that is it essentially,

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Speaker 3: on some level, argues that people just aren't praying hard enough.

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Speaker 4: Oh okay, But it also is like sort of like

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Speaker 4: a self actualization power of positive thinking.

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Speaker 5: If you wanted to keep it secular.

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Speaker 3: Right, there's some validity to that. Yeah, I think so.

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Speaker 3: But you know this, look, self help guides, instruction manuals.

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Speaker 3: We've all dealt with, at least the manuals. The manual

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Speaker 3: we're talking about tonight is not about how to do

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Speaker 3: something well. It's got great instructions, for sure, about how

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Speaker 3: to assemble certain devices, and there's real mcguiver to it.

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Speaker 3: It has phenomenal hacks for the workplace and social dynamics

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Speaker 3: that all well, most of which still work and are

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Speaker 3: applicable in the modern day. But each and every piece

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Speaker 3: of this guide is meant to break a thing. It's

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Speaker 3: it's a SITH instruction manual. Back in the day, the

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Speaker 3: US government made a literal instruction book on sabotage, and folks,

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Speaker 3: we read it spoiler, it is an absolute banger. Like

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Speaker 3: it's not just well written, but for the time, it's

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Speaker 3: accurate and there's there's unexpected poetic snark throughout it.

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Speaker 5: Oh for sure.

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Speaker 4: Yeah, it's super useful if you're trying to be useless.

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Speaker 2: Well yeah, or destroy something from within by coercing pieces

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Speaker 2: of like cogs in that machine sometimes use act.

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Speaker 4: Against its own long game, right, Like, it's like its

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Speaker 4: own sabotage.

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Speaker 2: It's crazy.

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Speaker 3: So listen, all of you all, it's a sabotage. Here

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Speaker 3: are the facts, all right. This is called the Simple

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Speaker 3: Sabotage Manual, or we'll use that phrase here. To understand

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Speaker 3: what it is, we have to understand the folks who

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Speaker 3: created it, the OSS, or the Office of Strategic Services.

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Speaker 3: The OSS is the direct antecedent or predecessor of the CIA,

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Speaker 3: and it was formed. We talked about this in our

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Speaker 3: two part episode on the CIA hiring magicians. It was

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Speaker 3: formed as a reaction to the disastrous Japanese attacks on

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Speaker 3: Pearl Harbor, because before then, all of what we would

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Speaker 3: consider US intelligence apparatus it was kind of ad hoc.

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Speaker 3: You know, you might have some guys in the navies,

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Speaker 3: some guys in the army, you might have a loose

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Speaker 3: confederation of professors and diplomats. But when the US absolutely

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Speaker 3: got waxed at Pearl Harbor, they said, this is a

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Speaker 3: massive intelligence failure. Other catastrophes are on the horizon. We

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Speaker 3: have to create an organization that just does intelligence.

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Speaker 4: Would you say that maybe, prior to Pearl Harbor there

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Speaker 4: was sort of a sense of this gentlemanly understanding of

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Speaker 4: war and rules of engagement, and then that event sort

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Speaker 4: of just tossed that all out the window, and it's like, nah,

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Speaker 4: we got to play really dirty.

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Speaker 5: Moving forward to.

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Speaker 3: A degree, yeah, I would say in that historically intelligence

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Speaker 3: and trade craft was going to be largely or significantly

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Speaker 3: orbiting the upper end shalons of society.

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Speaker 5: Right.

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Speaker 3: You need people who can travel, you need people who

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Speaker 3: can speak multiple languages. You need people who can go

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Speaker 3: into any room and seem as though they belong in

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Speaker 3: that room, So the demographic is pretty limited.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, we're going to talk about this a little more,

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Speaker 2: but I just want to put out there that a

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Speaker 2: lot of the intelligence that we're talking about here is

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Speaker 2: stuff that we've discussed in many other episodes on many

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Speaker 2: other topics when it comes to counter what counter propaganda

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Speaker 2: is what they would call it, and disinformation campaigns and

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Speaker 2: all kinds of stuff that is undermining the enemy without

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Speaker 2: weapons or even explosives. And then what we're talking about

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Speaker 2: today is where you bring in the explosives and you know,

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Speaker 2: other things like rickety machines.

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Speaker 3: Right listen, and sabotage. Yeah. So after Pearl Harbor, all right,

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Speaker 3: it's nineteen forty one, there's a president of the US.

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Speaker 3: His name's Rosa Belt, and he appoints a absolute larger

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Speaker 3: than life cartoonish pill, a very clever man named William

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Speaker 3: Donovan wild Bill to his friends. And wild Bill is

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Speaker 3: originally helming this thing we talked about in our CI episode.

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Speaker 3: They originally call it the Coordinator of Information and this

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Speaker 3: becomes the OSS Office of Strategic Services goes It goes

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Speaker 3: a fish on June thirteenth, nineteen forty two, and it's

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Speaker 3: a very short lived organization. This escapes a lot of

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Speaker 3: the fiction and film about this group. Its career is

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Speaker 3: very limited. It's sort of like how the historical time

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Speaker 3: span of the quote unquote wild West is itself just

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Speaker 3: a very brief period of American history. But during its

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Speaker 3: very short existence, the OSS was powerful, it was radical,

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Speaker 3: and it was is super controversial. I mean, there's no

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Speaker 3: arguing that the OSS was anything but instrumental to Allied

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Speaker 3: victory in World War Two. But and this is the

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Speaker 3: fun this is the funny part about upper echelons and spying.

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Speaker 3: At first, I'm sure we all saw this. Other branches

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Speaker 3: of the military and the US government did not care

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Speaker 3: for the OSS because wild Bill was getting the majority

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Speaker 3: of his initial recruits from upper krusty silver spoon types,

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Speaker 3: krusty yeah yeah, upper krusty Krembrulai krusty types, wealthy East

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Speaker 3: Coast elites. And as the organization grew, that became a

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Speaker 3: problem for a moment because people in those circles, the

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Speaker 3: blue bloods, right, they saw joining the OSS, or at

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Speaker 3: least being affiliated, as a kind of social flex It

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Speaker 3: gave you social cachet. You know who, Not only am

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Speaker 3: I vander Bildt, but I'm aiding in the war effort.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, well, well it seems to me maybe I'm wrong,

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Speaker 2: correct me if I'm roud here, guys, but it seems

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Speaker 2: like a lot of the activities the OSS was getting

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Speaker 2: into required creativity, maybe a level of education that wouldn't

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Speaker 2: that you wouldn't find in a lot of places, you know,

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Speaker 2: specifically in the in the types of military operations that

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Speaker 2: were being carried out during World War Two. It's a

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Speaker 2: different type of thinking and a different type of creativity.

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Speaker 2: I think that maybe somebody who comes from those worlds,

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Speaker 2: like those Ivy League schools, might flourish in at least

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Speaker 2: when it comes to the planning and the conceptualization of

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Speaker 2: how to undermine the enemy.

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Speaker 4: Being able to move with in those circles too, is

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Speaker 4: a big deal to what Ben was saying earlier, Like

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Speaker 4: in terms of the higher echelon circles.

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Speaker 3: Yeah, like that when the Reynolds impersonate what Brian lefev

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Speaker 3: and go into the box seats at that sports game

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Speaker 3: and one of them start stealing batteries and the other

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Speaker 3: one says, damn it, act like you belong here. That's

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Speaker 3: a reference for maybe twelve people, but for this reason,

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Speaker 3: for the demographic prevalence of the upper crust. Critics in

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Speaker 3: the government and detractors of this plan, they started calling

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Speaker 3: this organization ohso social right, because now are you really

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Speaker 3: serving the war effort or do you just want to

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Speaker 3: have something nice to say at the next gala. So,

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Speaker 3: as with some of his other projects, your boy wild

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Speaker 3: Bill Donovan does have a sort of logic here. The

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Speaker 3: effective agents. They have two types, two rough categories of

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Speaker 3: agents in the OSS. The first are loosely called choir boys,

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Speaker 3: and these are men and women. They're your desk folks,

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Speaker 3: your analysts, your linguistic experts, your intelligence coalators. The other

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Speaker 3: category would be the cowboys. These are the field guys.

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Speaker 3: They're predominantly young. They're predominantly from well to do families

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Speaker 3: in the US, mostly the East Coast. We're talking like

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Speaker 3: nineteen to twenty five years old. And all of these

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Speaker 3: agents go through this process that evaluates a pretty high

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Speaker 3: bar of admittance. To your earlier points, Nolan, that things

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Speaker 3: like fluency in other languages, which a lot of Americans

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Speaker 3: don't have at that point, frequent and believable excuses for

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Speaker 3: international travel, which very few Americans have at that point,

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Speaker 3: and then again to the point we've made earlier connections

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Speaker 3: to decision makers elites around the world. You have to

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Speaker 3: be familiar with the international set. You need to move

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Speaker 3: and look as though you belong in those environments. And

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Speaker 3: quite simply, you know, class divides and all those problems

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Speaker 3: of that time and now set aside. Those are attributes

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Speaker 3: that wealthy people are just far more likely to possess.

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Speaker 3: You know, you can find the smartest guy from rural Appalachia,

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Speaker 3: but you're gonna have to teach him Mandarin. He's not

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Speaker 3: just gonna know it from grad school, you know what

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Speaker 3: I mean.

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Speaker 4: And then but I mean, like you know, you've mentioned

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Speaker 4: multiple times been what a tall order it is to

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Speaker 4: learn that language as an adult. So who really do

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Speaker 4: have to have some acumen you know, for picking up

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Speaker 4: new languages already, because it's already an uphill climb for

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Speaker 4: such a difficult language like that.

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Speaker 3: Yeah, yeah, And they're I think also they're looking for

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Speaker 3: Japanese in this context, right, Japanese and then Central and

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Speaker 3: Eastern European languages, with German of course being a clear favorite.

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Speaker 3: There's a ton of fascinating history out there about the

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Speaker 3: oss Uh and ore pal Robert Evans over on behind

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Speaker 3: the Bastards did a fantastic deep dive into the history

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Speaker 3: of wild Bill. But for our purposes tonight, the main

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Speaker 3: thing to remember is this, due to the skills required

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Speaker 3: to be a recruit, the OSS always knew it could

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Speaker 3: not accomplish its mission through its own internal numbers. So

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Speaker 3: first problem, to use a modern phrase, they need to outsource.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, which means another really important thing that you need

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Speaker 2: to have in your arsenal when you become an OSS

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Speaker 2: recruiter someone who's going out there to outsource people, is

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Speaker 2: you've got to be able to communicate in very specific

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Speaker 2: ways and have phrases and concepts at the ready that

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Speaker 2: can manipulate and influence other human beings on the ground level.

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Speaker 3: Yeah. The OSS operatives and their allies, particularly the British,

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Speaker 3: at this point, they sought to do just what you're describing, Matt,

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Speaker 3: to establish communication with people civilian and military alike behind

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Speaker 3: denity lines in German occupied parts of Europe. And then

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Speaker 3: we could say turn them. I would say it's more

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Speaker 3: diplomatic to argue they are convincing that person to help

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Speaker 3: with a given task or mission, or in many cases

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Speaker 3: to find someone who's already up to some hijinks and say,

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Speaker 3: let's teach you out a hijinks you know exactly, Let's

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Speaker 3: teach you like high level hijinks.

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Speaker 4: For sure, And this was not necessarily the most straightforward

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Speaker 4: of tasks.

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Speaker 5: There are some.

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Speaker 4: Challenges involved, one being that making contact and successfully you know,

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Speaker 4: flipping somebody to whatever the cause may be, in this case,

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Speaker 4: the cause of the United States, that's not easy. It's

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Speaker 4: a challenging thing. It requires a lot of foresight, a

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Speaker 4: lot of planning, and a lot of a certain set

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Speaker 4: of skills. The second challenge being that you couldn't just

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Speaker 4: jump in right away with a new asset after turning them.

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Speaker 4: There is a lot of training involved. Throwing them out

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Speaker 4: into deep water, as you would say, ben could potentially

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Speaker 4: be very very dangerous and would blow their cover and

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Speaker 4: make them absolutely useless to you, and all the hard

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Speaker 4: work that you put into turning them would be for not.

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Speaker 4: So you'd really need to give them some way to

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Speaker 4: you know, make them know kung fu, like like like

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Speaker 4: Keanu in the in the Matrix, some kind of very

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Speaker 4: crash course level amount of training that could get them

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Speaker 4: the skills they need, but then put them in the

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Speaker 4: field as quickly as possible.

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Speaker 3: Yeah, yeah, that's well said. You can't. You can't find

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Speaker 3: the guy who makes the most important rotor in the

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Speaker 3: factory and then kidnap them for a month and teach

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Speaker 3: them to be a spy. You know what I mean?

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Speaker 3: You have to, as you were saying, you have to

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Speaker 3: give them the basics vicariously indirectly. And the third issue

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Speaker 3: is you want to make sure you establish reasonable limits

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Speaker 3: on behavior, because otherwise the asset may get overwhelmed, frightened off,

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Speaker 3: they may snitched enemy forces, they might accidentally bite off

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Speaker 3: more than they can chew. And what if they screw up?

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Speaker 3: What if they get caught, you know, trying to sabotage

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Speaker 3: some munitions factory right for sure?

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Speaker 4: And and maybe just to backcheck with what I was saying,

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Speaker 4: I think the biggest thing right away is not removing

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Speaker 4: them from that situation where they are expected to be

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Speaker 4: for too long, because that in and of itself is

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Speaker 4: the whole point for them to be able to use

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Speaker 4: that situation to their and our advantage.

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Speaker 2: Let's get into something really quickly here, and it's about

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Speaker 2: why would somebody who makes machines for an access power.

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Speaker 2: Let's say in Italy, decide to work with some stranger

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Speaker 2: that comes up to them, right who speaks Italian, But

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Speaker 2: you don't know this person, and they're just talking to you,

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Speaker 2: trying to convince you of something to work against the

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Speaker 2: people you're making the weapons for. Why on earth would

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Speaker 2: you do that? And we're going to get into the

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Speaker 2: specifics as we get into the manual, but one of

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Speaker 2: the main things that these OSS people were looking for

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Speaker 2: were a reason, a concrete, specific reason for an individual

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Speaker 2: to fight against the powers that they're working for. So

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Speaker 2: it's literally like, well, we'll talk about specifics, but if

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Speaker 2: you think about it in the real world right now,

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Speaker 2: and just to take it a little bit, just for

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Speaker 2: a moment to California, you would have something that enough

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Speaker 2: people or an individual is angry about, upset about, and

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Speaker 2: have reason to fight back against something, then you can

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Speaker 2: if you can use that anger, you can maybe flip

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Speaker 2: them and turn them to working against the system that

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Speaker 2: controls them.

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Speaker 5: I mean, it's not super different than assets.

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Speaker 4: Say, you know that the FBI might recruit from say

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Speaker 4: organized crime, you know, if you've seen it in the

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Speaker 4: movies or whatever. There usually has to be some beef

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Speaker 4: that they know about and that they are able to

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Speaker 4: use to their advantage and give the person a reason

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Speaker 4: or they've got some really bad dirt on them that

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Speaker 4: I guess could also potentially be an option here.

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Speaker 3: And so part of this again we have these three issues.

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Speaker 3: We will discuss the unrest in Los Angeles, which I

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Speaker 3: think we're all tuned into as we're recording on Monday,

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Speaker 3: June ninth. We'll have that coming up in our listener

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Speaker 3: mail segment as well. See, we do see some parallels

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Speaker 3: with the OSS here. Again we see the first issue

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Speaker 3: making contact, the second issue keeping people relatively unextraordinary for

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Speaker 3: management and enemy forces. And third, we want to establish

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Speaker 3: reasonable limits of behavior. Someone biting off more than they

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Speaker 3: can chew could spell disaster for the mission entire So

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Speaker 3: how do we navigate these issues? Says the OSS, Especially

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Speaker 3: with a ticking clock where every little ding against the

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Speaker 3: opponent could change the course of the war, especially if

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Speaker 3: they operate over time, The solution quickly became obvious. What

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Speaker 3: was the solution? Will tell you after word from our sponsors.

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Speaker 3: Here's where it gets crazy. They wrote a book.

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Speaker 2: There's a book club.

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Speaker 3: They wrote a book.

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Speaker 4: Sort of the like Bizarrow evil version of how to

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Speaker 4: win friends and influence people.

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Speaker 3: It's definitely about influencing people, and those parts are personally

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Speaker 3: just the way it's written, those are personally some of

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Speaker 3: my favorite parts. That's where I could I could clearly

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Speaker 3: hear a repressed stand up comic at the end of

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Speaker 3: the manual, But all right, it's a forty four and

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Speaker 3: the OSS distributes a literal book on sabotage to OSS

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Speaker 3: officers in multiple foreign countries. Outside of a relatively brief preface,

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Speaker 3: this thing, the Simple Sabotage Field Manual, which you can

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Speaker 3: freely read online or hear an audiobook of it, was

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Speaker 3: not solely written for the officers. Instead, it's like a

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Speaker 3: teacher's textbook, and it's meant for you, as an officer

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Speaker 3: to give this information to citizen saboteurs throughout areas of

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Speaker 3: Europe occupied by Germany. These guys that are the intended

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Speaker 3: audience of this instruction, they are not the upper crust

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Speaker 3: of their society, right, These are not the landed lords

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Speaker 3: and ladies. Unlike the original OSS hires. They're much more

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Speaker 3: likely to be blue collar workers and middle management. You know,

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Speaker 3: are guys on the production line. They're mid tier bosses

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Speaker 3: who do admin and set meetings. I can't wait until

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Speaker 3: we get to the art of sabotaging meetings. But it's

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Speaker 3: essentially a textbook right as the title says, it's a

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Speaker 3: textbook for simple sabotage, tons of weird, at times darkly

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Speaker 3: hilarious stuff. The CIA will later go on to call

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Speaker 3: this surprisingly relevant because get this, guys, I don't think

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Speaker 3: they were certain it would work. I don't you know

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Speaker 3: what I mean, Even back then, I think they were

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Speaker 3: a bit skeptical about how much of this instruction could

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Speaker 3: translate to real world action.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, I could see that. I don't know. I honestly

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Speaker 2: don't know, but it does seem like the first major

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Speaker 2: foray into this stuff. Although we have talked about how

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Speaker 2: the spy game goes way way way back, so there's

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Speaker 2: been little versions of this, but never maybe a wide

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Speaker 2: scale at least what it says in the introduction to

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Speaker 2: the manual, like a wide scale attempt to proliferate sabotage

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Speaker 2: amongst like civilians in I think, on three or at

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Speaker 2: least three fronts throughout the Yes.

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Speaker 3: Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, let's get to that. Let's dive

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Speaker 3: into what it taught people to do. So the preface

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Speaker 3: of the manual, it's gonna directly let's say all of us,

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Speaker 3: the three of us and try force and you listening

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Speaker 3: at home, thank you for joining us. Let's say we're

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Speaker 3: all oss agents. We get this book, this manual, and

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Speaker 3: the front of it directly addresses us. And most of

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Speaker 3: what it's trying to do is establish the context in

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Speaker 3: which citizen saboteurs, as the manual calls them, reside. It's

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Speaker 3: saying like, hey, look, these are not you know what

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Speaker 3: I mean, These are not the James Bond types. These

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Speaker 3: guys are not black block protesters, a phrase that didn't

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Speaker 3: exist at the time. We want them to do simple,

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00:25:00,480 --> 00:25:04,040
Speaker 3: easy stuff, and we want them to be safe, and

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Speaker 3: you have to understand that most of them are not

403
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Speaker 3: going to want to do this. So how do you

404
00:25:13,560 --> 00:25:14,760
Speaker 3: how do you finesse that?

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Speaker 4: Why am I picturing this like some sort of like

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Speaker 4: I don't know, boy scout manual with like an intro

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Speaker 4: sort of meant to like puff you up and make

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Speaker 4: you feel like welcome to the team, and sort of

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Speaker 4: like these are our goals and you know what it

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Speaker 4: means to be part of the part of the club.

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Speaker 3: Mm hmm, yeah, Oh, actually, let's do that for fun.

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Speaker 3: Here is a boy Scout handbook.

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Speaker 5: Let's just had it within our series that was not coordinated.

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Speaker 3: Oh, you nailed it, nol uh. Page one, Welcome to

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Speaker 3: the Adventure of Scouting.

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Speaker 5: There you go.

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Speaker 3: That's what scouting is.

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Speaker 5: Exactly.

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Speaker 4: What's the This is the adventure of sabotage.

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Speaker 3: Right right, right right They the manual defines simple sabotage

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Speaker 3: with a quote that I believe is worth us just

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Speaker 3: reading in full.

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Speaker 2: Simple sabotage does not require specially prepared tools or equipment.

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Speaker 2: It is executed by an ordinary citizen who may or

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Speaker 2: may not act individually and without the necessity for active

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Speaker 2: connection with an organized group, and it is carried out

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Speaker 2: in such a way as to involve a minimum danger

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Speaker 2: of injury, detection, and reprisal.

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Speaker 4: You too, can do simple sabotage exactly, exactly. Hey, you

430
00:26:31,000 --> 00:26:34,800
Speaker 4: don't have to be a nuclear physicist. You can just

431
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Speaker 4: realize you don't need to turn the screws all the

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Speaker 4: way and then let that pony roll off the line.

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Speaker 2: Dude, well, just can we can just move on the

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Speaker 2: next line. There in the thing you spoke to the

435
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Speaker 2: poetic nature of this, but also the sith lord like overtones.

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Speaker 4: Just because it is pleasant like a manual in this

437
00:26:55,400 --> 00:26:57,000
Speaker 4: but it's not dry like a manual.

438
00:26:57,040 --> 00:26:57,320
Speaker 5: I don't know.

439
00:26:57,320 --> 00:27:02,400
Speaker 3: Oh yeah, no, no, it's clearly someone from a nice

440
00:27:02,440 --> 00:27:04,919
Speaker 3: school in the East Coast in the US wrote this.

441
00:27:05,040 --> 00:27:09,040
Speaker 3: All right, you want to, let's do it. Okay, I

442
00:27:09,080 --> 00:27:11,080
Speaker 3: want to do a transatlantic voice, but we're going to

443
00:27:11,160 --> 00:27:14,600
Speaker 3: give it some respect. Where destruction is involved, the weapons

444
00:27:14,600 --> 00:27:19,200
Speaker 3: of the citizen saboteur are salt, nails, candles, pebbles, thread,

445
00:27:19,560 --> 00:27:22,960
Speaker 3: or any other materials he might normally be expected to

446
00:27:23,040 --> 00:27:26,080
Speaker 3: possess as a householder or as a worker in his

447
00:27:26,240 --> 00:27:30,920
Speaker 3: particular occupation. His arsenal is the kitchen shelf, the trash pile,

448
00:27:31,160 --> 00:27:35,119
Speaker 3: his old usual kit of tools and supplies. The targets

449
00:27:35,119 --> 00:27:38,440
Speaker 3: of his sabotage are usually objects to which he has

450
00:27:38,600 --> 00:27:43,679
Speaker 3: normal and in conspicuous access in everyday life stuff.

451
00:27:43,960 --> 00:27:46,400
Speaker 2: Yeah, it's a really nice picture.

452
00:27:46,920 --> 00:27:50,080
Speaker 3: Siver each one, each one, you know what I mean?

453
00:27:50,200 --> 00:27:53,040
Speaker 3: A poor man's empty hand is a weapon. Yeah, this

454
00:27:53,200 --> 00:27:56,960
Speaker 3: is dope, honestly, the way it's written. They go on

455
00:27:57,040 --> 00:28:02,920
Speaker 3: to describe two categories of sabotage physical destruction. Right, everybody

456
00:28:03,000 --> 00:28:07,200
Speaker 3: is familiar with that, and interpersonal disruption, which is where

457
00:28:07,200 --> 00:28:10,240
Speaker 3: it gets very severence in off of Spacey and like

458
00:28:10,760 --> 00:28:14,320
Speaker 3: Dilbert comics. Also Scott Adams is a bad person.

459
00:28:14,200 --> 00:28:17,840
Speaker 5: Swing the seeds of discord, you know, among other things.

460
00:28:18,280 --> 00:28:23,199
Speaker 2: Well, and speaking of chords and even discords, there's a

461
00:28:23,240 --> 00:28:25,000
Speaker 2: thing they mentioned in here right at the end of

462
00:28:25,040 --> 00:28:28,600
Speaker 2: the introduction, the human element. That's what they call it.

463
00:28:29,680 --> 00:28:32,560
Speaker 2: The type of activity that just kind of slows down

464
00:28:32,560 --> 00:28:36,560
Speaker 2: the works, slows down the gears of the machine. And

465
00:28:36,600 --> 00:28:39,720
Speaker 2: I wonder if you guys remember the ad campaign from

466
00:28:40,000 --> 00:28:42,320
Speaker 2: the early maybe is the mid Oughts, I don't know,

467
00:28:42,400 --> 00:28:44,920
Speaker 2: it's in the two thousands where they would put the

468
00:28:45,000 --> 00:28:48,560
Speaker 2: human element, the hu human Element. Do you remember this

469
00:28:48,600 --> 00:28:50,800
Speaker 2: ad campaign at all? They were on posters.

470
00:28:51,320 --> 00:28:55,640
Speaker 3: I do remember it, but I don't remember the specificity

471
00:28:55,720 --> 00:28:58,080
Speaker 3: of what they were what they were trying to incite.

472
00:28:58,160 --> 00:29:02,280
Speaker 2: It was Dow Chemical and they were they were saying

473
00:29:02,320 --> 00:29:04,520
Speaker 2: that the thing that makes us different as a chemical

474
00:29:04,560 --> 00:29:06,600
Speaker 2: company is the human human.

475
00:29:07,800 --> 00:29:09,600
Speaker 3: Familiar with the periodic table.

476
00:29:09,920 --> 00:29:13,920
Speaker 4: It made me think of what a globocm like in

477
00:29:14,080 --> 00:29:19,120
Speaker 4: Mister Show and their original logo was people selling people

478
00:29:19,160 --> 00:29:19,680
Speaker 4: to people.

479
00:29:20,320 --> 00:29:24,480
Speaker 3: Yeah, yeah, so this is also I mean, this is

480
00:29:24,680 --> 00:29:27,280
Speaker 3: a people first enterprise.

481
00:29:27,520 --> 00:29:27,680
Speaker 2: Right.

482
00:29:27,840 --> 00:29:33,200
Speaker 3: You cannot you cannot closely supervise the citizen saboteur. You

483
00:29:33,240 --> 00:29:37,880
Speaker 3: cannot be assured of their acumen. Right. And you know

484
00:29:38,160 --> 00:29:41,280
Speaker 3: that if you are creating an agent of chaos, even

485
00:29:41,280 --> 00:29:44,840
Speaker 3: in the best of circumstances, it is chaos that will result.

486
00:29:45,080 --> 00:29:45,280
Speaker 5: Right.

487
00:29:45,640 --> 00:29:50,760
Speaker 3: So we see a lot of lessons about motivating this saboteur.

488
00:29:51,040 --> 00:29:53,440
Speaker 3: How do you get in the head of this potential asset.

489
00:29:53,680 --> 00:29:55,760
Speaker 3: And we have to remember that a lot of this

490
00:29:56,040 --> 00:30:01,160
Speaker 3: is meant for people who are in Nazi ok areas

491
00:30:01,360 --> 00:30:07,000
Speaker 3: of Europe. They're already probably pissed at the invading regime.

492
00:30:07,440 --> 00:30:12,240
Speaker 3: The manual cleverly notes that some civilians there's a non

493
00:30:12,360 --> 00:30:17,040
Speaker 3: zero chance that they're already engaged in covert disruptive acts,

494
00:30:17,360 --> 00:30:22,360
Speaker 3: but they are likely untrained. They likely have a personal

495
00:30:22,520 --> 00:30:27,920
Speaker 3: axe to grind, and the fact that they are added

496
00:30:27,960 --> 00:30:32,360
Speaker 3: to this lowers their odds of success over time, while

497
00:30:32,440 --> 00:30:37,640
Speaker 3: also increasing the likelihood that they will be caught. They

498
00:30:37,720 --> 00:30:40,760
Speaker 3: are subject matter experts right at the factory or what

499
00:30:40,920 --> 00:30:44,240
Speaker 3: have you. They know how to screw stuff up, they

500
00:30:44,280 --> 00:30:46,280
Speaker 3: may not know the best way to screw it up,

501
00:30:46,440 --> 00:30:49,320
Speaker 3: and they may not know how to cover their tracks

502
00:30:49,440 --> 00:30:55,040
Speaker 3: and the OSS therefore is attempting to teach those lessons.

503
00:30:55,440 --> 00:30:57,400
Speaker 4: Oh yeah, do you think you had to take a

504
00:30:57,440 --> 00:31:00,120
Speaker 4: little test, a little quiz to show that they that

505
00:31:00,200 --> 00:31:00,520
Speaker 4: they did this?

506
00:31:01,400 --> 00:31:05,600
Speaker 3: Unfortunately the unfortunately the tests were all live.

507
00:31:06,000 --> 00:31:08,760
Speaker 5: Got it? Okay, that makes sense, dude.

508
00:31:08,920 --> 00:31:12,640
Speaker 3: Like, does the fuse work? Did you get caught? If yes,

509
00:31:12,720 --> 00:31:16,480
Speaker 3: and then no, congrats you passed. Now onto the next one.

510
00:31:16,640 --> 00:31:16,880
Speaker 5: Yeah.

511
00:31:16,960 --> 00:31:22,720
Speaker 2: Yes. This is the section that gets into the whole like,

512
00:31:22,800 --> 00:31:25,000
Speaker 2: how do you motivate somebody to even do this kind

513
00:31:25,040 --> 00:31:28,360
Speaker 2: of thing? Because it even states quote, the ordinary citizen

514
00:31:28,840 --> 00:31:34,840
Speaker 2: very probably has no immediate personal motive for committing simple sabotage, right, Like,

515
00:31:35,520 --> 00:31:38,080
Speaker 2: so no, it's just somebody's not going to just start

516
00:31:38,120 --> 00:31:41,960
Speaker 2: doing this stuff, so he must be made to anticipate

517
00:31:42,160 --> 00:31:43,760
Speaker 2: indirect personal gain.

518
00:31:44,920 --> 00:31:48,280
Speaker 3: Yeah, yeah, that's that's the issue. Yeah, let's go to that. Like, okay,

519
00:31:48,440 --> 00:31:54,600
Speaker 3: so imply, but do not promise. Yes, indirect personal gain

520
00:31:54,720 --> 00:31:59,080
Speaker 3: the pursuit of happiness, very american. Yeah, and so you're

521
00:31:59,600 --> 00:32:06,000
Speaker 3: as SS officers in this scenario, we are instructed to

522
00:32:06,200 --> 00:32:11,160
Speaker 3: check in on our recruits when we can with suggestions, reassurance,

523
00:32:11,440 --> 00:32:15,320
Speaker 3: and pressure. Right, that's our stick to our carrot as

524
00:32:15,320 --> 00:32:20,320
Speaker 3: well as specific task and we want to eliminate feeling discouraged.

525
00:32:20,720 --> 00:32:26,360
Speaker 3: We want to motivate through ideology. That's that indirect personal gain,

526
00:32:26,600 --> 00:32:29,920
Speaker 3: but we have to bridge a cultural gap to do so.

527
00:32:30,640 --> 00:32:33,920
Speaker 3: You want people to feel like there's something they are

528
00:32:33,960 --> 00:32:37,800
Speaker 3: part of, something bigger than themselves and their individual act.

529
00:32:38,440 --> 00:32:41,440
Speaker 3: You want to make sure that they are personally safe

530
00:32:41,800 --> 00:32:45,000
Speaker 3: and as incognito as possible, so you can keep the

531
00:32:45,040 --> 00:32:49,000
Speaker 3: grift running over a window of time. But this is

532
00:32:49,040 --> 00:32:54,720
Speaker 3: so precient here. The manual also warns OSS officers. They say, look,

533
00:32:54,760 --> 00:32:59,520
Speaker 3: if you are trying to motivate people through abstract cultural concepts,

534
00:33:00,080 --> 00:33:02,440
Speaker 3: may come up with buppkis. You know, you're in a

535
00:33:02,480 --> 00:33:05,760
Speaker 3: communist country. You're talking about freedom of the press, and

536
00:33:05,800 --> 00:33:08,200
Speaker 3: they're saying, oh yeah, but also I don't want to

537
00:33:08,240 --> 00:33:10,959
Speaker 3: get shot, you know what I mean. From their perspective,

538
00:33:11,360 --> 00:33:13,520
Speaker 3: that's a that's a weak argument. So you have to

539
00:33:13,560 --> 00:33:20,640
Speaker 3: point out specific policies in that land that suck, right, Like.

540
00:33:21,000 --> 00:33:24,600
Speaker 2: Specific officers that are like local to their area.

541
00:33:24,760 --> 00:33:29,040
Speaker 3: Right, right sub aldermen whomever, right assistant deputy to the

542
00:33:29,040 --> 00:33:32,480
Speaker 3: assistant deputy of blah blah blah. That guy's food rationing

543
00:33:32,520 --> 00:33:36,560
Speaker 3: policy is whack. Dude, wouldn't it be awesome if that

544
00:33:36,800 --> 00:33:40,680
Speaker 3: was no longer there and you could have three times

545
00:33:40,720 --> 00:33:43,480
Speaker 3: as much bread. You have to meet people where they're

546
00:33:43,520 --> 00:33:46,239
Speaker 3: at if you want to take them somewhere, you know,

547
00:33:46,360 --> 00:33:49,920
Speaker 3: And that's the argument, and it is brilliant the CIA.

548
00:33:50,120 --> 00:33:54,360
Speaker 3: We will see multiple other intelligence agencies replicate that tactic.

549
00:33:55,320 --> 00:33:59,240
Speaker 3: But they also they also acknowledge this is one of

550
00:33:59,280 --> 00:34:01,920
Speaker 3: my favorite life of the whole thing. They also there's

551
00:34:01,960 --> 00:34:05,520
Speaker 3: this stroke of casual brilliance. The writers of this are amazing.

552
00:34:06,160 --> 00:34:10,919
Speaker 3: They acknowledge almost as a throwaway, that what is being

553
00:34:11,000 --> 00:34:17,560
Speaker 3: asked of these civilians fundamentally goes against everyone's idea of

554
00:34:17,600 --> 00:34:20,480
Speaker 3: being competent no matter where you go, whether it's a

555
00:34:20,480 --> 00:34:23,360
Speaker 3: good person, an evil person, or like the majority of

556
00:34:23,400 --> 00:34:26,919
Speaker 3: people and in between, they want to be good at

557
00:34:27,000 --> 00:34:31,560
Speaker 3: what they do. And the manual says, quote, purposeful stupidity

558
00:34:31,800 --> 00:34:33,960
Speaker 3: is contrary to human nature.

559
00:34:34,320 --> 00:34:37,360
Speaker 5: Boom, But is it? It's interesting?

560
00:34:37,480 --> 00:34:37,680
Speaker 3: Right?

561
00:34:37,760 --> 00:34:41,680
Speaker 4: Like they like classifying it that way, purposeful stupidity. It's

562
00:34:41,719 --> 00:34:46,040
Speaker 4: not really stupidity incompetence, right, I mean, if you're being

563
00:34:46,080 --> 00:34:49,200
Speaker 4: intentional about it right to an end, it's actually kind

564
00:34:49,200 --> 00:34:49,600
Speaker 4: of smart.

565
00:34:49,680 --> 00:34:50,560
Speaker 5: You got to cover it up.

566
00:34:51,120 --> 00:34:53,920
Speaker 2: Yeah, it's pretending to be just bad at what you do.

567
00:34:54,000 --> 00:34:56,560
Speaker 2: So let's go back to let's just right here, jump

568
00:34:56,680 --> 00:35:00,319
Speaker 2: back to number two. I think the heading number twoossible

569
00:35:00,360 --> 00:35:03,239
Speaker 2: effects because they describe some of the things that would

570
00:35:03,280 --> 00:35:07,360
Speaker 2: be like purposefully being stupid or you know whoop sees

571
00:35:07,960 --> 00:35:11,720
Speaker 2: and just making things bad, slashing tires, draining fuel, tanks,

572
00:35:11,719 --> 00:35:17,120
Speaker 2: starting fires, starting arguments, acting stupidly, short circuiting electric systems,

573
00:35:17,239 --> 00:35:22,239
Speaker 2: upbraiding machine parts, wasting materials, manpower and time. Yes, so

574
00:35:22,320 --> 00:35:25,520
Speaker 2: like doing these little things like again we're saying acting stupidly,

575
00:35:25,920 --> 00:35:28,400
Speaker 2: Like you're a machine worker, right, and you accidentally do

576
00:35:28,480 --> 00:35:32,520
Speaker 2: something that screws up the machine that makes that fabricates

577
00:35:32,560 --> 00:35:34,480
Speaker 2: the parts for like three days.

578
00:35:35,040 --> 00:35:38,560
Speaker 3: Oh that's the wrong oil in the engine. Yep, oh geez,

579
00:35:38,600 --> 00:35:39,560
Speaker 3: it's too late now.

580
00:35:39,640 --> 00:35:41,560
Speaker 4: But it also doesn't serve the mission if you get

581
00:35:41,600 --> 00:35:44,719
Speaker 4: pegged as an incompetent employee that it canned, right, So

582
00:35:44,800 --> 00:35:47,080
Speaker 4: you guys really tread that line.

583
00:35:47,160 --> 00:35:49,960
Speaker 3: There's a tight rope to walk, which they discuss as well,

584
00:35:50,080 --> 00:35:53,200
Speaker 3: you know, because now you're asking people to endanger themselves

585
00:35:53,520 --> 00:35:56,920
Speaker 3: if you go too hard and paying as an incompetent worker.

586
00:35:57,480 --> 00:36:00,799
Speaker 3: Then you will be of fire. You will meet that

587
00:36:00,920 --> 00:36:03,719
Speaker 3: reprisal you're trying to avoid. So it's best for the

588
00:36:03,800 --> 00:36:09,799
Speaker 3: mistakes to be untraceable, attributed to organizational dynamics or to

589
00:36:10,160 --> 00:36:16,520
Speaker 3: the roaring horde of coworkers. The golden goose, obviously, is

590
00:36:16,600 --> 00:36:20,040
Speaker 3: to not just persuade someone that the risk to their

591
00:36:20,080 --> 00:36:24,200
Speaker 3: livelihood and their family is worth it, but to convince

592
00:36:24,239 --> 00:36:28,880
Speaker 3: them that in this case it is superbly rational to

593
00:36:28,960 --> 00:36:34,239
Speaker 3: take irrational action. And the absolute holy grail of it

594
00:36:34,280 --> 00:36:39,160
Speaker 3: is to motivate a civilian saboteur such that they themselves

595
00:36:39,920 --> 00:36:42,280
Speaker 3: believe in the mission to the point where they recruit

596
00:36:42,680 --> 00:36:47,080
Speaker 3: and educate other civilians. Right, Take a little celluloid from

597
00:36:47,120 --> 00:36:51,960
Speaker 3: an old comb, Take a candle and some paper, Light

598
00:36:52,040 --> 00:36:54,280
Speaker 3: some stuff up. That's the idea.

599
00:36:54,400 --> 00:36:57,799
Speaker 2: It's viral in nature. Is designed to be viral in

600
00:36:57,880 --> 00:37:01,440
Speaker 2: nature because the own manual states it only really works

601
00:37:01,440 --> 00:37:05,040
Speaker 2: if you've got thousands of people in an occupied place

602
00:37:05,120 --> 00:37:06,040
Speaker 2: doing this kind.

603
00:37:05,840 --> 00:37:08,879
Speaker 3: Of stuff, right right, paper cuts.

604
00:37:08,920 --> 00:37:11,920
Speaker 2: Exactly, So you kind of have to you have to

605
00:37:11,960 --> 00:37:15,799
Speaker 2: reach that if it's going to be effective. Just two

606
00:37:15,800 --> 00:37:18,000
Speaker 2: little extra things to add to this, because I think

607
00:37:18,040 --> 00:37:19,920
Speaker 2: it's a great point and it's a great place to

608
00:37:20,120 --> 00:37:23,080
Speaker 2: end this section here, but just to point out that

609
00:37:23,440 --> 00:37:26,319
Speaker 2: they even state one of the main things that's going

610
00:37:26,400 --> 00:37:29,880
Speaker 2: to motivate people in this realm is to have the

611
00:37:30,040 --> 00:37:35,719
Speaker 2: sense that they are working for some unseen organization, basically,

612
00:37:35,840 --> 00:37:39,320
Speaker 2: like some unknown group like the rebels, the Rebel Alliance.

613
00:37:39,520 --> 00:37:41,920
Speaker 2: We're working for them, and we're just one cog in

614
00:37:41,920 --> 00:37:45,640
Speaker 2: that machine now that's working against this bigger thing. Because

615
00:37:45,640 --> 00:37:49,680
Speaker 2: if they ever had that internal realization of oh, well,

616
00:37:49,719 --> 00:37:53,719
Speaker 2: I'm just like or well, no, the internal maybe, but

617
00:37:53,840 --> 00:37:56,160
Speaker 2: the for me, the internal realization of oh, I'm just

618
00:37:56,239 --> 00:38:02,080
Speaker 2: like one little person standing up against this giant machine, demoralizing, Yeah,

619
00:38:02,160 --> 00:38:04,359
Speaker 2: you wouldn't probably take the action that's sary.

620
00:38:04,440 --> 00:38:06,000
Speaker 4: But if you feel like you're part of a network,

621
00:38:06,000 --> 00:38:09,279
Speaker 4: this unseen, vast network of people just like you, and

622
00:38:09,320 --> 00:38:13,319
Speaker 4: you're working in lockstep, than you are greater than the star.

623
00:38:13,719 --> 00:38:16,759
Speaker 3: But like we said, cultivate the perception that the civilian

624
00:38:16,800 --> 00:38:18,640
Speaker 3: is part of something bigger than themselves.

625
00:38:18,719 --> 00:38:23,600
Speaker 2: Oh yeah, but specifically this unseen, unknown thing, right is

626
00:38:23,680 --> 00:38:26,160
Speaker 2: the way to keep them there and then and then

627
00:38:26,239 --> 00:38:30,719
Speaker 2: to get them over that line. It says, quote a

628
00:38:30,760 --> 00:38:34,480
Speaker 2: reasonable amount of humor in the presentation of suggestions for

629
00:38:34,560 --> 00:38:39,200
Speaker 2: simple sabotage will relax tensions of fear. Just this idea

630
00:38:39,239 --> 00:38:43,200
Speaker 2: of that go in with some humor about it, hey like,

631
00:38:43,239 --> 00:38:45,440
Speaker 2: and I've just I could see that character in my mind.

632
00:38:45,920 --> 00:38:49,000
Speaker 3: Yeah, you gotta you gotta work the cultural type rope

633
00:38:49,080 --> 00:38:52,000
Speaker 3: of humor there as well. Right, they're asking a lot

634
00:38:52,160 --> 00:38:59,600
Speaker 3: of the civilian saboteurs, but of the OSS ambassadors in addition, Right,

635
00:39:00,200 --> 00:39:03,520
Speaker 3: and they're asking them to traverse some cultural chasms. But

636
00:39:03,640 --> 00:39:07,239
Speaker 3: when you get past those cultural chasms, which are again

637
00:39:07,320 --> 00:39:10,200
Speaker 3: the most interesting part, I'm not going to stop teasing that.

638
00:39:10,239 --> 00:39:13,080
Speaker 3: We're getting to that at the end. When you move

639
00:39:13,120 --> 00:39:17,440
Speaker 3: on through this the motivations, the context and so on,

640
00:39:18,040 --> 00:39:23,120
Speaker 3: the behavioral manipulation, you get to tactics, tools, targets, and

641
00:39:23,200 --> 00:39:27,640
Speaker 3: timing and specifically what they call it. These are divided

642
00:39:27,840 --> 00:39:33,799
Speaker 3: into three categories, and they're time based, situational based categories.

643
00:39:34,120 --> 00:39:38,920
Speaker 3: General conditions, how to screw things up during general day

644
00:39:38,960 --> 00:39:43,040
Speaker 3: to day things, and then prior to an imminent military

645
00:39:43,080 --> 00:39:46,680
Speaker 3: offensive that's the second category, and then during a military

646
00:39:46,719 --> 00:39:52,799
Speaker 3: offensive that's the third category. And every section attempts to

647
00:39:52,920 --> 00:39:58,120
Speaker 3: instruct civilian assets on how to behave like Grimlins in

648
00:39:58,239 --> 00:40:02,480
Speaker 3: wartime folklore, right, we all remember, I don't want to

649
00:40:02,480 --> 00:40:07,719
Speaker 3: make assumptions, all right, So during the days of wartime aviation,

650
00:40:08,000 --> 00:40:12,680
Speaker 3: back in the day, there was this great lore that

651
00:40:12,800 --> 00:40:16,280
Speaker 3: grew up around the idea of gremlins. It's probably most

652
00:40:17,440 --> 00:40:21,800
Speaker 3: well known in the West through the Fantastic Twilight Zone

653
00:40:21,800 --> 00:40:23,560
Speaker 3: episode with William Shatner.

654
00:40:23,880 --> 00:40:26,360
Speaker 4: There's also a great Looney Tunes episode where Bugs Bunny

655
00:40:26,520 --> 00:40:29,520
Speaker 4: literally does battle with a gremlin.

656
00:40:29,120 --> 00:40:32,319
Speaker 5: And it's really red and stimpy, level fed up, like

657
00:40:33,440 --> 00:40:34,359
Speaker 5: tortured by that guy.

658
00:40:34,400 --> 00:40:37,359
Speaker 4: And usually it's bugs doing the torturing, but in this one,

659
00:40:37,640 --> 00:40:40,200
Speaker 4: this little gremlin runs him through the ringer.

660
00:40:40,760 --> 00:40:47,680
Speaker 3: Yeah, gremlins in this milieu are largely invisible, untraceable pest

661
00:40:48,120 --> 00:40:51,560
Speaker 3: that bedevil enemy capabilities. And they don't do it through

662
00:40:51,600 --> 00:40:55,240
Speaker 3: grand cinematic acts of destruction, but they do it instead

663
00:40:55,520 --> 00:41:01,120
Speaker 3: via a constant, unending barrage of tiny inconvenient Oh this

664
00:41:01,280 --> 00:41:04,680
Speaker 3: is the wrong wrench. Where's the right wrench? Oh crap,

665
00:41:04,680 --> 00:41:08,520
Speaker 3: we're running out of time to assemble this and things

666
00:41:08,680 --> 00:41:11,080
Speaker 3: just break down. Oh now we have to stop everything

667
00:41:11,120 --> 00:41:15,480
Speaker 3: and figure out how how this breakdown occurred. And all

668
00:41:15,520 --> 00:41:19,440
Speaker 3: these small acts accumulate, they aggregate, they create a domino

669
00:41:19,520 --> 00:41:23,160
Speaker 3: effect of logistical chaos. At least that's the idea, right.

670
00:41:23,239 --> 00:41:28,359
Speaker 3: It's like, for anybody familiar with StarCraft StarCraft two, I

671
00:41:28,400 --> 00:41:31,880
Speaker 3: want to say you you have the thing called like

672
00:41:31,960 --> 00:41:35,400
Speaker 3: the Zerg swarm. Do you guys remember that an individual

673
00:41:35,520 --> 00:41:41,120
Speaker 3: Zerg is not itself extraordinary, but they mob you. They

674
00:41:41,160 --> 00:41:42,560
Speaker 3: move in a huge swarm.

675
00:41:44,120 --> 00:41:47,920
Speaker 2: The little teeny tiny guys that are on land. When

676
00:41:47,960 --> 00:41:51,120
Speaker 2: you've got a specific amount of them that is too many.

677
00:41:51,360 --> 00:41:54,680
Speaker 2: Just if you just imagine too many tiny little characters,

678
00:41:54,800 --> 00:41:57,400
Speaker 2: then your your space is going to get overrun.

679
00:41:58,000 --> 00:42:00,959
Speaker 3: Yeah, it's like how many year olds can you fight?

680
00:42:01,760 --> 00:42:04,520
Speaker 2: Yeah? You know how many you got those pylons? You know,

681
00:42:04,680 --> 00:42:06,440
Speaker 2: those pilons will get taken out real quick, and then

682
00:42:06,480 --> 00:42:08,839
Speaker 2: once you don't have power, you're there to get out

683
00:42:08,840 --> 00:42:09,160
Speaker 2: of luck.

684
00:42:09,680 --> 00:42:12,319
Speaker 4: It is funny though, the way Gremlin's been personified as

685
00:42:12,400 --> 00:42:15,840
Speaker 4: these little green monsters. I mean, when the lore was

686
00:42:15,880 --> 00:42:18,360
Speaker 4: coming up, was was that how they were described? And

687
00:42:18,400 --> 00:42:20,799
Speaker 4: obviously it's a joke. You don't be believed in this.

688
00:42:20,880 --> 00:42:23,719
Speaker 4: It was more of a personification of the concept of

689
00:42:23,760 --> 00:42:25,320
Speaker 4: this kind of chaos, right.

690
00:42:25,560 --> 00:42:27,840
Speaker 2: But it was real things right there. There were pilots

691
00:42:27,880 --> 00:42:30,719
Speaker 2: that would report like that all of a sudden, the

692
00:42:31,440 --> 00:42:33,719
Speaker 2: mechanical stuff on one of the wings is like not

693
00:42:33,840 --> 00:42:36,319
Speaker 2: working right all of a sudden while we're mid flight,

694
00:42:36,400 --> 00:42:37,400
Speaker 2: mid mission or something.

695
00:42:37,560 --> 00:42:40,000
Speaker 4: So they believed in little green fellas that were at

696
00:42:40,239 --> 00:42:40,960
Speaker 4: fing their stuff up.

697
00:42:41,239 --> 00:42:43,359
Speaker 3: Well, base, we've got a food fighter.

698
00:42:45,360 --> 00:42:46,399
Speaker 2: But that was real too.

699
00:42:49,000 --> 00:42:51,560
Speaker 4: I guess I'm just wondering the specifics around, like true

700
00:42:51,560 --> 00:42:55,200
Speaker 4: belief in gremlins as a real entity rather than just

701
00:42:55,280 --> 00:43:00,840
Speaker 4: this concept of this is the personification of chaos and sabotage.

702
00:43:00,960 --> 00:43:04,480
Speaker 3: It's like full Cole's pendulum. Right. People can create a

703
00:43:04,480 --> 00:43:08,760
Speaker 3: conspiracy knowing that they created it, but then over time

704
00:43:08,960 --> 00:43:12,560
Speaker 3: other people don't know it was purposely made up. You know,

705
00:43:12,680 --> 00:43:15,760
Speaker 3: so someone and especially you know wartime, when you're always

706
00:43:15,760 --> 00:43:19,319
Speaker 3: about to die, like playing sports for a living, it

707
00:43:19,480 --> 00:43:23,600
Speaker 3: encourages superstition. So there probably there's a non zero amount

708
00:43:23,680 --> 00:43:26,759
Speaker 3: of airplane mechanics of World War Two who are like,

709
00:43:27,280 --> 00:43:29,239
Speaker 3: I don't believe in God, but there might be something

710
00:43:29,280 --> 00:43:30,360
Speaker 3: to this gremlin story.

711
00:43:30,680 --> 00:43:35,359
Speaker 2: Well, yes, because in this manual where we're talking about,

712
00:43:35,440 --> 00:43:36,960
Speaker 2: they split it up as we're about to get to

713
00:43:37,080 --> 00:43:40,680
Speaker 2: like a regular time when there's it's not wartime, right

714
00:43:40,680 --> 00:43:44,240
Speaker 2: before some kind of mobilization, and then during a mobilization

715
00:43:44,440 --> 00:43:48,160
Speaker 2: of war, right, so you imagine that we our side

716
00:43:48,200 --> 00:43:51,400
Speaker 2: is encouraging other people to sabotage in all of those times,

717
00:43:52,640 --> 00:43:57,600
Speaker 2: can't we probably imagine that this type of sabotage is

718
00:43:57,640 --> 00:44:00,560
Speaker 2: also happening on American soil and British soil, oil, on

719
00:44:00,880 --> 00:44:05,239
Speaker 2: the Allied powers soil. So in the hangars where the

720
00:44:05,280 --> 00:44:08,720
Speaker 2: planes are being built, maybe there's one or two people,

721
00:44:09,080 --> 00:44:12,000
Speaker 2: ten people, maybe dozens of people who are doing these

722
00:44:12,040 --> 00:44:15,080
Speaker 2: little things like not tightening the bolts quite as much

723
00:44:15,120 --> 00:44:17,200
Speaker 2: as they need to be. I don't know.

724
00:44:17,960 --> 00:44:21,279
Speaker 3: And also there's a very effective I like that point.

725
00:44:21,280 --> 00:44:25,680
Speaker 3: There's a very effective weaponization of misogyny too in the

726
00:44:25,719 --> 00:44:29,360
Speaker 3: factory line, like ah, I'm just the woman. That's why,

727
00:44:30,160 --> 00:44:33,160
Speaker 3: that's why these bombs keep exploded at the wrong time.

728
00:44:33,280 --> 00:44:38,480
Speaker 3: And this is a it's a grand manipulation of human

729
00:44:38,800 --> 00:44:43,640
Speaker 3: prejudices and assumptions. And the manual here is suggesting that

730
00:44:44,360 --> 00:44:48,799
Speaker 3: in this juncture, it's suggesting how you prioritize what to

731
00:44:48,920 --> 00:44:59,640
Speaker 3: hit you want to hit industrial manufacturing, any transportation facilities, roads, railroads, automobiles, trucks, motorcycles,

732
00:44:59,640 --> 00:45:03,720
Speaker 3: bicycle even bicycles, screw up the bikes, right, and especially trains.

733
00:45:04,280 --> 00:45:06,520
Speaker 3: And then they say, you also want to hit anything

734
00:45:06,560 --> 00:45:10,920
Speaker 3: that could be a communication vector or facility for enemy

735
00:45:11,000 --> 00:45:15,160
Speaker 3: comms or propaganda, which plays a big role in World

736
00:45:15,160 --> 00:45:18,839
Speaker 3: War Two. They do this was interesting to me. They

737
00:45:18,880 --> 00:45:24,560
Speaker 3: do have a strong asterisk or caveat on direct attacks

738
00:45:25,000 --> 00:45:30,560
Speaker 3: toward what they call developing military factors. They were saying

739
00:45:30,600 --> 00:45:35,960
Speaker 3: this because if you are a civilian and you happen

740
00:45:36,080 --> 00:45:40,320
Speaker 3: to let's say, work at a very high value emergent

741
00:45:40,520 --> 00:45:46,080
Speaker 3: military facility or to a military base, attacking them greatly

742
00:45:46,120 --> 00:45:49,120
Speaker 3: increases the risk of discovery, which means they're going to

743
00:45:49,160 --> 00:45:52,400
Speaker 3: find you and they will learn everything that you know,

744
00:45:53,000 --> 00:45:55,600
Speaker 3: which is why you know. The USS officers are also

745
00:45:55,800 --> 00:46:00,359
Speaker 3: limiting the civilian saboteur's understanding of the large or lay

746
00:46:00,400 --> 00:46:03,799
Speaker 3: of the land. But if the enemy gains that intelligence,

747
00:46:03,920 --> 00:46:08,719
Speaker 3: then they could establish a predictive pattern for destruction and

748
00:46:08,840 --> 00:46:13,239
Speaker 3: could say, hey, things go wrong when the following factors

749
00:46:13,280 --> 00:46:17,319
Speaker 3: coincide with US spinning up a military initiative, right, or

750
00:46:17,360 --> 00:46:21,120
Speaker 3: things die down when something is of a lesser priority,

751
00:46:22,080 --> 00:46:25,000
Speaker 3: and then you give away the whole game. You got

752
00:46:25,040 --> 00:46:28,160
Speaker 3: to keep it simple, keep it small, and as we'll

753
00:46:28,200 --> 00:46:30,000
Speaker 3: see after a word from our sponsors.

754
00:46:30,640 --> 00:46:33,319
Speaker 5: Keep it stupid, keep it so stupid.

755
00:46:40,520 --> 00:46:43,600
Speaker 3: We returned, all right, This is where we get to

756
00:46:43,640 --> 00:46:48,520
Speaker 3: the good stuff. Specific suggestions for simple sabotage. It's an

757
00:46:48,520 --> 00:46:55,720
Speaker 3: exhaustively numbered list. It explores monopoly of various Sith Macguiver

758
00:46:55,960 --> 00:47:02,080
Speaker 3: level ways of destroyed stuff, destroying building by fire, destroying

759
00:47:02,120 --> 00:47:04,960
Speaker 3: them by or destroying things by water. I don't know

760
00:47:05,360 --> 00:47:08,600
Speaker 3: how about this. This is our primary source, so I

761
00:47:08,760 --> 00:47:13,360
Speaker 3: argue we should share at least a few quotations directly

762
00:47:13,520 --> 00:47:17,799
Speaker 3: from the Sabotage Field Manual so you can see how

763
00:47:17,920 --> 00:47:22,600
Speaker 3: specific they get, especially with like this improvised fuse stuff

764
00:47:22,800 --> 00:47:24,960
Speaker 3: is great. It's up there with bag of moths at

765
00:47:24,960 --> 00:47:26,720
Speaker 3: the propaganda film for sure.

766
00:47:27,040 --> 00:47:29,640
Speaker 4: Yeah, let's just jump right in whenever possible, arrange to

767
00:47:29,680 --> 00:47:32,960
Speaker 4: have the fire start after you've gone away. Okay, jacky,

768
00:47:33,520 --> 00:47:36,400
Speaker 4: use a candle and paper combination, setting it as close

769
00:47:36,560 --> 00:47:40,160
Speaker 4: as possible to the inflammable material you want to burn.

770
00:47:40,440 --> 00:47:42,440
Speaker 4: From a sheet of paper, tear a strip three or

771
00:47:42,440 --> 00:47:44,680
Speaker 4: four centimeters wide and wrap it around the base of

772
00:47:44,719 --> 00:47:48,279
Speaker 4: the candle. Two or three times. Twist more sheets of

773
00:47:48,320 --> 00:47:51,400
Speaker 4: paper into loose ropes and place them around the base

774
00:47:51,440 --> 00:47:54,600
Speaker 4: of the candle. When the candle flame reaches the encircling strip,

775
00:47:54,600 --> 00:47:56,440
Speaker 4: it will be ignited and in turn will ignite the

776
00:47:56,480 --> 00:47:59,920
Speaker 4: surrounding paper. The size, heat, and duration of the resulting

777
00:48:00,080 --> 00:48:02,480
Speaker 4: flame will depend on how much paper you use and

778
00:48:02,520 --> 00:48:05,840
Speaker 4: how much of it you can cramp in a small space.

779
00:48:06,239 --> 00:48:10,120
Speaker 2: Hey, now, let's talk about the conditions that might even

780
00:48:10,280 --> 00:48:13,719
Speaker 2: help that fire go further. This is number six on

781
00:48:13,760 --> 00:48:18,640
Speaker 2: their list here. A clean factory is not susceptible to fire,

782
00:48:19,040 --> 00:48:23,000
Speaker 2: but a dirty one is. Workers should be careless with refuse,

783
00:48:23,080 --> 00:48:26,439
Speaker 2: and janitors should be inefficient in cleaning if enough dirt

784
00:48:26,440 --> 00:48:29,520
Speaker 2: and trash can be accumulated in an otherwise fireproof building

785
00:48:29,560 --> 00:48:30,920
Speaker 2: will become inflammable.

786
00:48:31,760 --> 00:48:36,200
Speaker 3: And the manual list that as one of the circumstances.

787
00:48:36,360 --> 00:48:40,120
Speaker 3: After it lists several more types of improvised fuses. And

788
00:48:40,160 --> 00:48:42,720
Speaker 3: we got to tell you, folks, it's a little dicey

789
00:48:42,800 --> 00:48:46,600
Speaker 3: with our HR and legal department. We don't recommend trying

790
00:48:46,680 --> 00:48:49,839
Speaker 3: these at home, but you do need to know they

791
00:48:49,880 --> 00:48:53,239
Speaker 3: are easy to create and replicate, and trust us, they

792
00:48:53,280 --> 00:48:56,960
Speaker 3: do work, especially in a dirty factory, you know what

793
00:48:57,000 --> 00:49:00,600
Speaker 3: I mean? Like, Hey, I'm middle management. It all the

794
00:49:01,280 --> 00:49:05,200
Speaker 3: let's put all the oily rags paint. Yeah, over by,

795
00:49:05,480 --> 00:49:09,040
Speaker 3: over by the furnace, because that's our new policy. We

796
00:49:09,160 --> 00:49:11,560
Speaker 3: have a committee on that. There are six people on

797
00:49:11,640 --> 00:49:15,560
Speaker 3: the committee, and after four weeks we agreed. Yeah, that's

798
00:49:15,600 --> 00:49:16,799
Speaker 3: a nice teaser, guy.

799
00:49:17,320 --> 00:49:20,320
Speaker 4: I think one of the most clever like improvised fused

800
00:49:20,360 --> 00:49:22,920
Speaker 4: situations I've ever seen was I believe it was in

801
00:49:23,040 --> 00:49:26,680
Speaker 4: Better Call Saul, where Gus Fring is trying to burn

802
00:49:26,760 --> 00:49:30,000
Speaker 4: down his own business and he takes a frozen turkey

803
00:49:30,239 --> 00:49:33,840
Speaker 4: and sits it on like a pan, like a govern

804
00:49:33,920 --> 00:49:37,080
Speaker 4: pan that's sort of tilted down towards a fryar, and

805
00:49:37,160 --> 00:49:40,080
Speaker 4: so as the heat from the friars starts to defrost

806
00:49:40,120 --> 00:49:43,000
Speaker 4: the turkey, it slides down until it goes in the.

807
00:49:42,960 --> 00:49:44,880
Speaker 5: Fryer and causes a massive grease explosion.

808
00:49:45,920 --> 00:49:46,719
Speaker 3: Isn't that incredible?

809
00:49:47,120 --> 00:49:49,399
Speaker 5: Yeah, that's not in the manual, but that's good.

810
00:49:50,280 --> 00:49:53,319
Speaker 3: It would it would work there, especially, I remember what

811
00:49:53,360 --> 00:49:58,280
Speaker 3: you're describing their no, because look, the manual does spend

812
00:49:58,360 --> 00:50:04,879
Speaker 3: time on attacks, on livestock attacks, but because of food scarcity,

813
00:50:05,320 --> 00:50:08,760
Speaker 3: they probably wouldn't have pulled off a turkey. You simply

814
00:50:08,840 --> 00:50:12,759
Speaker 3: couldn't trust. You couldn't trust the civilian saboteur at this

815
00:50:12,840 --> 00:50:14,440
Speaker 3: time to not take the turkey.

816
00:50:14,760 --> 00:50:16,319
Speaker 2: Oh yeah, of course, you know what I mean. Well,

817
00:50:16,600 --> 00:50:20,480
Speaker 2: while they're actively encouraging, you know, folks to target food

818
00:50:20,480 --> 00:50:24,920
Speaker 2: supplies right like it is. It is crazy, like fuel, food, water,

819
00:50:25,160 --> 00:50:28,759
Speaker 2: any of the basic supplies. This this thing says, go

820
00:50:28,840 --> 00:50:30,719
Speaker 2: after those. You gotta prioritize these things.

821
00:50:31,400 --> 00:50:34,920
Speaker 3: Yeah, let's cut to that one feed crop. They say,

822
00:50:35,239 --> 00:50:38,920
Speaker 3: crops and livestock will probably be destroyed only in areas

823
00:50:38,920 --> 00:50:43,000
Speaker 3: where there are large food surpluses or where the enemy

824
00:50:43,080 --> 00:50:45,839
Speaker 3: is known to be stealing food from the people. I'm

825
00:50:45,840 --> 00:50:50,200
Speaker 3: paraphrasing there, But they say, let crops harvest you early

826
00:50:50,280 --> 00:50:54,280
Speaker 3: to late, spoil stores of grains, fruit and vegs, soak

827
00:50:54,320 --> 00:50:57,640
Speaker 3: them in water, feed crops, the livestock, leaf stuff in

828
00:50:57,680 --> 00:51:01,960
Speaker 3: the sun. This is sabotage not just by direct action,

829
00:51:02,239 --> 00:51:06,839
Speaker 3: but by neglect. And sabotage by neglect and negligence is

830
00:51:06,960 --> 00:51:11,719
Speaker 3: quite clever, and I would argue occurs with great success today.

831
00:51:11,760 --> 00:51:13,560
Speaker 3: This is the thing. They also say, Look, you can

832
00:51:13,680 --> 00:51:17,160
Speaker 3: compromise any water system. You can attack it. You can

833
00:51:17,400 --> 00:51:19,600
Speaker 3: you can flood the pipes in a way that no

834
00:51:19,640 --> 00:51:22,759
Speaker 3: one will catch because you might have Look, we've all

835
00:51:22,800 --> 00:51:25,359
Speaker 3: been there. You could if you get caught, you could

836
00:51:25,360 --> 00:51:28,120
Speaker 3: just say sorry, I had a bad bem. I had

837
00:51:28,160 --> 00:51:31,520
Speaker 3: a war crime in the bathroom. I'm not working for anybody.

838
00:51:31,640 --> 00:51:34,320
Speaker 3: I just ate the wrong you know, the wrong block.

839
00:51:34,120 --> 00:51:36,600
Speaker 4: Is well, I love your death by one thousand paper

840
00:51:36,680 --> 00:51:39,920
Speaker 4: cuts analogy, Ben, because you never want to overplay your

841
00:51:39,960 --> 00:51:42,320
Speaker 4: hand on any of these. And I think that's the

842
00:51:42,440 --> 00:51:47,839
Speaker 4: key and the sort of ideology that this manual communicates.

843
00:51:47,840 --> 00:51:49,720
Speaker 5: It really is sort of like a way of life,

844
00:51:49,800 --> 00:51:50,160
Speaker 5: you know.

845
00:51:50,200 --> 00:51:52,360
Speaker 3: I mean it's got to bed. Yeah.

846
00:51:52,440 --> 00:51:54,640
Speaker 2: Well, the stuff Ben is describing is it's one of

847
00:51:54,640 --> 00:51:56,600
Speaker 2: those things that if you're a commanding officer and you

848
00:51:56,680 --> 00:51:58,960
Speaker 2: just get word that something like that happening, like oh

849
00:51:59,120 --> 00:52:01,239
Speaker 2: dang it, what the hell, Hell gods, come on, we

850
00:52:01,280 --> 00:52:02,000
Speaker 2: gotta do better.

851
00:52:02,600 --> 00:52:06,359
Speaker 3: There'll bevich over here. Oh yeah, my gosh, this guy

852
00:52:06,480 --> 00:52:08,360
Speaker 3: is like a serial killer of kmmodes.

853
00:52:08,520 --> 00:52:12,640
Speaker 2: Well yeah, exactly. But then there's a random warehouse fire, right,

854
00:52:12,719 --> 00:52:15,120
Speaker 2: you know, like, oh crap, we really needed those things. Well,

855
00:52:15,120 --> 00:52:16,799
Speaker 2: they and they also describe, you know, if you're not

856
00:52:16,800 --> 00:52:19,719
Speaker 2: gonna use fire, use water, as Ben is saying, make

857
00:52:19,760 --> 00:52:22,080
Speaker 2: the sprinkler system go off and ruin the stuff that's

858
00:52:22,080 --> 00:52:24,960
Speaker 2: stored in a in a specific area of a warehouse

859
00:52:25,239 --> 00:52:27,480
Speaker 2: doesn't have to be the whole thing. Hit one sprinkler

860
00:52:27,480 --> 00:52:30,920
Speaker 2: with a hammer, and you've ruined a bunch of important stuff.

861
00:52:31,040 --> 00:52:32,880
Speaker 4: Well, and if we know anything about like things like

862
00:52:32,960 --> 00:52:36,040
Speaker 4: insurance fraud, like this stuff is hard to pull off

863
00:52:36,160 --> 00:52:39,480
Speaker 4: because investigations are going to determine that there was some

864
00:52:39,600 --> 00:52:42,000
Speaker 4: foul play or that there was, you know, something going

865
00:52:42,040 --> 00:52:44,759
Speaker 4: on behind the scenes. So it's really important to not

866
00:52:44,960 --> 00:52:46,600
Speaker 4: tip your hand in that way, right.

867
00:52:46,520 --> 00:52:49,400
Speaker 3: Yeah, Yeah, but whom is the responsible?

868
00:52:51,440 --> 00:52:53,240
Speaker 4: So a lot of times they maybe would know something

869
00:52:53,360 --> 00:52:56,600
Speaker 4: was funky, but they couldn't really figure out because you

870
00:52:56,640 --> 00:52:58,960
Speaker 4: can't fire everybody right right.

871
00:52:59,160 --> 00:53:03,080
Speaker 2: Well, the authority wherever they are in these situations are

872
00:53:03,160 --> 00:53:07,319
Speaker 2: planning attacks and military movements and large scale stuff. So

873
00:53:07,680 --> 00:53:11,040
Speaker 2: who is gonna waste resources figuring out how the fire

874
00:53:11,160 --> 00:53:11,680
Speaker 2: got set?

875
00:53:12,000 --> 00:53:15,480
Speaker 3: Feels like a demotion, yeah, because there's a bigger mission.

876
00:53:15,520 --> 00:53:17,640
Speaker 3: And don't you don't you want to move up to

877
00:53:17,719 --> 00:53:21,000
Speaker 3: colonel then why don't you make one of your underleans

878
00:53:21,239 --> 00:53:23,560
Speaker 3: look at this, and that underlean is going to make

879
00:53:23,560 --> 00:53:26,480
Speaker 3: another underly and look at this. You know, for anybody

880
00:53:26,520 --> 00:53:29,680
Speaker 3: who's worked in manufacturing, you know, if you've been on

881
00:53:29,719 --> 00:53:33,719
Speaker 3: an assembly line, that there are tons of ways machinery

882
00:53:33,760 --> 00:53:37,359
Speaker 3: can go wrong accidentally, right, and that that means there

883
00:53:37,360 --> 00:53:40,960
Speaker 3: are tons of ways to sabotage machinery. Fun fact for

884
00:53:41,000 --> 00:53:44,799
Speaker 3: our fellow etymology nerds, the word sabotage comes from the

885
00:53:44,800 --> 00:53:49,239
Speaker 3: French word saboteur, which means to bungle, to screw up,

886
00:53:49,280 --> 00:53:52,600
Speaker 3: to wreck. It originally did refer to the act of

887
00:53:52,680 --> 00:53:56,000
Speaker 3: damaging and employer's property, but I love it.

888
00:53:56,080 --> 00:53:59,719
Speaker 4: Initially it was like unintentional, it's it's referring to being

889
00:53:59,760 --> 00:54:02,359
Speaker 4: care being sort of a dumb dumb but then it's

890
00:54:02,360 --> 00:54:05,200
Speaker 4: sort of co opted and there is this layer of

891
00:54:05,280 --> 00:54:08,040
Speaker 4: intent that's built in. When people say sabotage or even

892
00:54:08,120 --> 00:54:12,280
Speaker 4: self sabotage, they're talking about kind of knowingly doing something

893
00:54:12,320 --> 00:54:14,839
Speaker 4: even though you know it's bad or you know it's bad.

894
00:54:14,920 --> 00:54:16,160
Speaker 5: This is going to be a bad result.

895
00:54:16,719 --> 00:54:20,239
Speaker 3: Yeah, And the idea is to earlier point Noel, the

896
00:54:20,360 --> 00:54:24,920
Speaker 3: manual is communicating acts of sabotage committed in a way

897
00:54:24,960 --> 00:54:28,960
Speaker 3: that reduces overall recognition of a problem until it is

898
00:54:29,160 --> 00:54:32,719
Speaker 3: past the point of fixing, and several of the acts

899
00:54:32,760 --> 00:54:37,799
Speaker 3: are structured. We mentioned this earlier as a such that

900
00:54:37,880 --> 00:54:40,800
Speaker 3: you could have a form of temporary cover by getting

901
00:54:40,800 --> 00:54:44,000
Speaker 3: caught and shrugging and saying, my bad, I didn't know

902
00:54:44,080 --> 00:54:47,200
Speaker 3: that was the wrong oil for this engine. Right. That's

903
00:54:47,239 --> 00:54:49,759
Speaker 3: an extreme example, because anybody at that level of a

904
00:54:49,840 --> 00:54:52,399
Speaker 3: line would know the correct oil. But then you can

905
00:54:52,400 --> 00:54:55,040
Speaker 3: blame it on someone else and say, you know, obviously

906
00:54:55,080 --> 00:54:58,360
Speaker 3: you want to blame another department, not another individual. So

907
00:54:58,480 --> 00:55:01,960
Speaker 3: you say, whomever is wreck wasditioning the fuel, sent us

908
00:55:02,040 --> 00:55:05,359
Speaker 3: the wrong thing. They sent us the wrong lubricant. And

909
00:55:05,560 --> 00:55:09,760
Speaker 3: this explanation can only work a finite number of times

910
00:55:09,800 --> 00:55:14,520
Speaker 3: before the employee is fired unless is why recruitment is

911
00:55:14,560 --> 00:55:17,840
Speaker 3: a golden goose, unless their boss is also on the grift,

912
00:55:18,120 --> 00:55:21,920
Speaker 3: at which point the bad employee gets promoted.

913
00:55:22,080 --> 00:55:24,840
Speaker 4: Yeah, and it also kind of capitalizes or takes advantage

914
00:55:24,880 --> 00:55:29,040
Speaker 4: of the inherent inefficiency of large operations. Right, and like there,

915
00:55:29,080 --> 00:55:30,520
Speaker 4: we're going to get to you in a minute. Some

916
00:55:30,640 --> 00:55:34,440
Speaker 4: of the ways that that discord from within can be

917
00:55:34,520 --> 00:55:38,000
Speaker 4: so and also just kind of creating confusion, not by

918
00:55:38,040 --> 00:55:42,000
Speaker 4: doing the acts, but by messing with the communication and

919
00:55:42,040 --> 00:55:45,080
Speaker 4: messing with the way all the pieces fit together to

920
00:55:45,719 --> 00:55:49,320
Speaker 4: further obscure what's actually going on. This is where it

921
00:55:49,440 --> 00:55:51,879
Speaker 4: really gets fascinating and almost satirical.

922
00:55:52,320 --> 00:55:54,279
Speaker 3: This is my favorite part as well. Let's play the

923
00:55:54,280 --> 00:56:00,160
Speaker 3: groundwork for that. So the section about specific industrial sabotage,

924
00:56:00,360 --> 00:56:04,839
Speaker 3: it is clearly the result of fascinating, intense research. And

925
00:56:05,000 --> 00:56:13,040
Speaker 3: I strongly suspect that OSS analysts visited manufacturing facilities in

926
00:56:13,120 --> 00:56:16,720
Speaker 3: the United States and they asked what the most common

927
00:56:16,800 --> 00:56:20,880
Speaker 3: or troublesome malfunctions can be. Right, So, like we're talking

928
00:56:20,880 --> 00:56:24,080
Speaker 3: to the you know, the head of widget making, what's

929
00:56:24,120 --> 00:56:26,680
Speaker 3: the worst thing that could happen to the widget line?

930
00:56:27,000 --> 00:56:30,959
Speaker 3: And the Supervisor's like, well, you know Mac in thirty four,

931
00:56:31,120 --> 00:56:33,480
Speaker 3: blah blah blah, that was a whole pickle, that was

932
00:56:33,520 --> 00:56:35,520
Speaker 3: a bag of badgers. And they go, great, thank you

933
00:56:35,600 --> 00:56:38,880
Speaker 3: for the information. They get back to their HQ, their layer,

934
00:56:39,160 --> 00:56:42,160
Speaker 3: and they reverse engineer that issue and they figure out

935
00:56:42,200 --> 00:56:46,239
Speaker 3: the easiest, most cost effective way to create that issue.

936
00:56:46,320 --> 00:56:49,319
Speaker 3: It is brilliant. It is fucking evil, and I am

937
00:56:49,360 --> 00:56:54,399
Speaker 3: so impressed with their acumen. But yeah, Rail systems, that's

938
00:56:54,440 --> 00:56:59,000
Speaker 3: where we start to see in the manual, the behavioral tampering,

939
00:56:59,320 --> 00:57:03,600
Speaker 3: the inter personal sabotage. The wildest stuff is at the

940
00:57:03,760 --> 00:57:06,160
Speaker 3: very end. We'll save you the time folks. It's called

941
00:57:06,280 --> 00:57:11,440
Speaker 3: quote general interference with organizations and production. This is the

942
00:57:11,480 --> 00:57:14,560
Speaker 3: film office space. You know. The protagonist says he doesn't

943
00:57:14,560 --> 00:57:18,440
Speaker 3: love his job, he stops trying. It's a weaponized version

944
00:57:18,480 --> 00:57:23,280
Speaker 3: of the same principles. Insist on doing everything through official channels.

945
00:57:23,760 --> 00:57:29,280
Speaker 3: Never have shortcuts. Always make speeches, talk as frequently as possible,

946
00:57:29,520 --> 00:57:33,200
Speaker 3: at great length. Illustrate your points with long anecdotes.

947
00:57:33,440 --> 00:57:36,240
Speaker 4: Some of this just sounds like the way people act

948
00:57:36,320 --> 00:57:39,160
Speaker 4: on company calls, like yeah, really, yeah.

949
00:57:38,760 --> 00:57:39,120
Speaker 5: None of this.

950
00:57:40,000 --> 00:57:42,400
Speaker 4: That's why I'm refer to it as almost being satirical,

951
00:57:42,400 --> 00:57:45,840
Speaker 4: because you're describing here just some of the obnoxious parts

952
00:57:45,880 --> 00:57:48,560
Speaker 4: of working in a bureaucracy or working for a big company.

953
00:57:48,680 --> 00:57:51,200
Speaker 3: Yeah. To finish that part, illustrate your points by long

954
00:57:51,280 --> 00:57:55,160
Speaker 3: anecdotes and accounts of personal experiences. Never hesitate to make

955
00:57:55,200 --> 00:57:58,000
Speaker 3: a few appropriate patriotic comments.

956
00:57:58,760 --> 00:58:04,880
Speaker 2: It sounds we're as we continue. It is describing Congress,

957
00:58:05,040 --> 00:58:11,280
Speaker 2: it is describing government. It is describing every every slow

958
00:58:11,880 --> 00:58:14,800
Speaker 2: timing thing that you've ever been a part of.

959
00:58:15,240 --> 00:58:19,760
Speaker 3: And Rand Corporation also goes on piggybacking from this research

960
00:58:20,000 --> 00:58:24,680
Speaker 3: or this manual to weaponize some research when possible, refer

961
00:58:24,840 --> 00:58:26,160
Speaker 3: all matters.

962
00:58:25,680 --> 00:58:27,080
Speaker 2: To committees congress.

963
00:58:27,120 --> 00:58:30,200
Speaker 3: Even before emails, people were thinking this could have been

964
00:58:30,200 --> 00:58:33,200
Speaker 3: a letter. Say that you're say that you're doing this

965
00:58:33,320 --> 00:58:36,360
Speaker 3: for further study considerations.

966
00:58:35,520 --> 00:58:37,640
Speaker 5: Not how it's supposed to work. This is the bad way.

967
00:58:37,960 --> 00:58:40,960
Speaker 3: Make sure the committees are as large as possible. There

968
00:58:40,960 --> 00:58:45,200
Speaker 3: should never be fewer than five members. Hurt feelings, Always

969
00:58:45,240 --> 00:58:49,720
Speaker 3: bring up irrelevant issues as frequently as possible, Haggle over

970
00:58:49,840 --> 00:58:54,440
Speaker 3: precise wording of communications, ad minutes and resolutions. And when

971
00:58:54,520 --> 00:58:59,000
Speaker 3: you start a meeting, always refer to matters decided upon

972
00:58:59,120 --> 00:59:03,320
Speaker 3: at the last meet and try to relitigate them, reopen

973
00:59:03,400 --> 00:59:06,040
Speaker 3: the question of the whether or not that's.

974
00:59:05,840 --> 00:59:06,680
Speaker 5: A good decision.

975
00:59:07,000 --> 00:59:10,560
Speaker 2: Waste time. And that's that's on the large scale stuff. Now,

976
00:59:10,600 --> 00:59:13,760
Speaker 2: what if you're just a manager and you're getting orders

977
00:59:13,800 --> 00:59:15,960
Speaker 2: then from all these committees to do stuff?

978
00:59:16,120 --> 00:59:16,720
Speaker 5: What do you do?

979
00:59:16,800 --> 00:59:17,000
Speaker 4: Then?

980
00:59:17,560 --> 00:59:18,800
Speaker 3: I'm not sure I understand you.

981
00:59:20,120 --> 00:59:26,440
Speaker 2: For clarification, that's literally, that's literally been said. The first

982
00:59:26,480 --> 00:59:29,720
Speaker 2: thing that it says to do in there, just misunderstand

983
00:59:29,880 --> 00:59:31,840
Speaker 2: everything that comes your way as a manager.

984
00:59:32,480 --> 00:59:35,880
Speaker 3: Right, and the best, the ideal version the OSS wants

985
00:59:35,960 --> 00:59:38,680
Speaker 3: is not just to say I misunderstood you, but to

986
00:59:38,720 --> 00:59:41,960
Speaker 3: say right on that sounds great. I'm referring to this

987
00:59:42,560 --> 00:59:46,479
Speaker 3: to this subcommittee that submits questions to the committee upon

988
00:59:46,600 --> 00:59:51,800
Speaker 3: clarification policies, and once we get our clarification policies signed off,

989
00:59:52,040 --> 00:59:57,040
Speaker 3: then we can reopen this conversation according to those policies,

990
00:59:57,240 --> 00:59:59,880
Speaker 3: which will help us refer this to the correct committee

991
00:59:59,880 --> 01:00:00,720
Speaker 3: for that decision.

992
01:00:00,920 --> 01:00:03,520
Speaker 5: It's that moment when you realize that these type of

993
01:00:03,560 --> 01:00:06,400
Speaker 5: operations are inefficient by design.

994
01:00:06,920 --> 01:00:10,960
Speaker 4: Oh yeah, yeah, but that's what's making me so upset

995
01:00:11,480 --> 01:00:13,880
Speaker 4: or to frustrated. What we're describing here is meant to

996
01:00:13,920 --> 01:00:17,400
Speaker 4: be something that you do to tear down an organization

997
01:00:17,640 --> 01:00:21,040
Speaker 4: or to disassemble it from within. And yet all of

998
01:00:21,080 --> 01:00:24,200
Speaker 4: these things could read like a manual how to manual

999
01:00:24,200 --> 01:00:26,800
Speaker 4: of how to conduct parliamentary procedure.

1000
01:00:26,520 --> 01:00:30,920
Speaker 3: One hundred percent. Yeah, it's weaponized parliamentary procedure. And you

1001
01:00:31,000 --> 01:00:33,120
Speaker 3: don't have to be a saboteur to do that. To

1002
01:00:33,120 --> 01:00:39,400
Speaker 3: those excellent points earlier, we see elected members of Congress

1003
01:00:39,520 --> 01:00:45,120
Speaker 3: enacting these things specifically to advance their agendas and stymy

1004
01:00:45,360 --> 01:00:49,240
Speaker 3: progress of their enemies or arguably the American public.

1005
01:00:50,080 --> 01:00:53,200
Speaker 2: Boom agree do everything.

1006
01:00:52,920 --> 01:00:56,200
Speaker 3: Possible to delay the delivery of orders. They already just

1007
01:00:56,240 --> 01:01:00,720
Speaker 3: straight up said filibuster, you guys, filibuster about everything. If

1008
01:01:00,760 --> 01:01:04,480
Speaker 3: there are parts of an order for manufacturing and assembly

1009
01:01:04,520 --> 01:01:09,120
Speaker 3: that are ready beforehand, just don't send them through. Just

1010
01:01:09,160 --> 01:01:12,200
Speaker 3: hold off. Take forever to write train tickets, right.

1011
01:01:13,520 --> 01:01:17,280
Speaker 5: Yeah you know, Oh no, there they are. Oh my mistake.

1012
01:01:17,640 --> 01:01:20,120
Speaker 3: Don't order stuff until well after you needed it.

1013
01:01:20,680 --> 01:01:21,760
Speaker 2: Yes, a bad job.

1014
01:01:22,280 --> 01:01:23,400
Speaker 5: Just do a bad job.

1015
01:01:24,120 --> 01:01:28,760
Speaker 2: In making work assignments, always sign out the unimportant jobs. First,

1016
01:01:29,080 --> 01:01:32,240
Speaker 2: see that the important jobs are assigned to inefficient workers

1017
01:01:32,360 --> 01:01:37,880
Speaker 2: of poor machines. Yes. When training new workers, give incomplete

1018
01:01:37,920 --> 01:01:40,200
Speaker 2: and misleading instructions.

1019
01:01:39,960 --> 01:01:44,760
Speaker 3: Yes, yeah yeah, and also insist on perfect work with

1020
01:01:44,880 --> 01:01:48,640
Speaker 3: stuff that doesn't matter, and with important stuff, approve the

1021
01:01:48,680 --> 01:01:53,160
Speaker 3: heck out of it. Also screw up morale overall by

1022
01:01:53,240 --> 01:01:58,480
Speaker 3: promoting and praising visibly praising inefficient and bad workers. And

1023
01:01:58,520 --> 01:02:02,200
Speaker 3: then do your best to discribt inminate against the competent ones.

1024
01:02:02,680 --> 01:02:09,959
Speaker 3: Never do paperwork on time, Always spread rumors. This is great, man.

1025
01:02:10,080 --> 01:02:14,320
Speaker 3: This is like the necronomicon for middle office management. But

1026
01:02:14,440 --> 01:02:17,880
Speaker 3: this okay, this sounds familiar, unfortunately to a lot of us.

1027
01:02:18,240 --> 01:02:22,240
Speaker 3: The final section is real, sith lord. It's for an

1028
01:02:22,280 --> 01:02:26,760
Speaker 3: employee non management, screwing up the workplace, things like always

1029
01:02:26,800 --> 01:02:31,000
Speaker 3: complain and never teach other people, never pass on your

1030
01:02:31,000 --> 01:02:34,439
Speaker 3: skill or experience. If someone asks you for help, tell

1031
01:02:34,480 --> 01:02:38,320
Speaker 3: them the wrong way to do it. God dude, it's

1032
01:02:38,360 --> 01:02:40,760
Speaker 3: so petty. It feels like it's asking a lot too.

1033
01:02:40,800 --> 01:02:45,560
Speaker 3: Because these these folks practicing this simple sabotage, especially on

1034
01:02:45,600 --> 01:02:49,320
Speaker 3: an interpersonal level, they are going to get caught. I mean,

1035
01:02:49,400 --> 01:02:53,040
Speaker 3: there will be consequences unless it's like a Cambridge five

1036
01:02:53,120 --> 01:02:56,000
Speaker 3: thing where the you know, the compromise goes all the way.

1037
01:02:55,880 --> 01:02:58,040
Speaker 4: Up and then the subterfusion of it all just the

1038
01:02:58,160 --> 01:03:01,600
Speaker 4: like dishonesty, like if this one, if possible, join or

1039
01:03:01,640 --> 01:03:05,040
Speaker 4: help organize a group for presenting employee problems to management.

1040
01:03:05,560 --> 01:03:07,120
Speaker 5: Why so that you can then be.

1041
01:03:07,000 --> 01:03:09,720
Speaker 4: Like the spokesperson of the wrong thing, see that the

1042
01:03:09,720 --> 01:03:13,720
Speaker 4: procedures adopted are as inconvenient as possible for the management

1043
01:03:13,960 --> 01:03:16,720
Speaker 4: involving the presence of a large number of employees at

1044
01:03:16,720 --> 01:03:17,600
Speaker 4: each presentation.

1045
01:03:17,960 --> 01:03:22,320
Speaker 5: We're talking about community meetings here. We're talking about, oh my.

1046
01:03:22,360 --> 01:03:25,200
Speaker 2: God, a little meeting that we have like every week,

1047
01:03:27,320 --> 01:03:28,400
Speaker 2: even like where can stit?

1048
01:03:28,440 --> 01:03:30,080
Speaker 5: You you know, town halls and things.

1049
01:03:29,880 --> 01:03:32,160
Speaker 3: Like that too, you know, Yeah, I've got more of

1050
01:03:32,200 --> 01:03:37,680
Speaker 3: a comment than a question. Yes, yeah. And also make

1051
01:03:37,760 --> 01:03:41,960
Speaker 3: sure that each grievance gets its own separate meeting, and

1052
01:03:42,200 --> 01:03:45,760
Speaker 3: need all the people there for every meeting bring up

1053
01:03:45,840 --> 01:03:52,160
Speaker 3: problems that are largely imaginary and then misunderstand as employee everything.

1054
01:03:52,760 --> 01:03:55,440
Speaker 3: Maybe we'ven ended on this one of the final and

1055
01:03:55,480 --> 01:03:57,560
Speaker 3: weirdest instructions for employees.

1056
01:03:58,440 --> 01:04:00,760
Speaker 2: Can I give you mind bripe off? Or that is

1057
01:04:00,840 --> 01:04:03,440
Speaker 2: my favorite one of the whole manual. Just before we

1058
01:04:03,560 --> 01:04:08,440
Speaker 2: jump to these last two, uh, jam paper, bits of wood, hairpins,

1059
01:04:08,640 --> 01:04:11,320
Speaker 2: and anything else that will fit into the locks of

1060
01:04:11,600 --> 01:04:21,520
Speaker 2: all unguarded entrances to all public buildings. Somebody going around put.

1061
01:04:21,440 --> 01:04:24,960
Speaker 4: Gum into the payphones, you know, like yeah, it's a

1062
01:04:24,960 --> 01:04:29,040
Speaker 4: little anarchist cookbook at that level. Here's my favorite line,

1063
01:04:29,800 --> 01:04:34,080
Speaker 4: which is strange. This is towards the end quote cry

1064
01:04:34,160 --> 01:04:39,080
Speaker 4: and sob hysterically at every occasion, especially when confronted by

1065
01:04:39,120 --> 01:04:39,880
Speaker 4: government clerk.

1066
01:04:39,920 --> 01:04:41,440
Speaker 5: I'm about to do that thing.

1067
01:04:42,080 --> 01:04:45,440
Speaker 3: So what says soon says why are you always making

1068
01:04:45,520 --> 01:04:50,000
Speaker 3: us have all these crazy meetings? You immediately fucking break down.

1069
01:04:50,320 --> 01:04:52,280
Speaker 3: I'd say, why are you guys bullying me?

1070
01:04:53,360 --> 01:04:56,680
Speaker 4: You know that's a rhetorical device, a manipulation that is

1071
01:04:56,720 --> 01:04:59,680
Speaker 4: often employed by folks, even in relationships where someone calls

1072
01:04:59,680 --> 01:05:01,919
Speaker 4: you on something and then you immediately cry and say,

1073
01:05:02,080 --> 01:05:03,160
Speaker 4: why are you so mean to me?

1074
01:05:03,240 --> 01:05:05,400
Speaker 5: Or I'm just I'm just such a bad person.

1075
01:05:05,520 --> 01:05:07,080
Speaker 4: I can't you know, like I mean, it's just a

1076
01:05:07,120 --> 01:05:10,800
Speaker 4: way of deflecting the actual thing of value and kicking

1077
01:05:10,800 --> 01:05:12,600
Speaker 4: the can down the road because now you have this

1078
01:05:12,720 --> 01:05:15,400
Speaker 4: new problem to deal with, and it kicks that important

1079
01:05:15,440 --> 01:05:17,640
Speaker 4: thing right out of your mind because you're being presented

1080
01:05:17,880 --> 01:05:19,560
Speaker 4: with a person literally losing it.

1081
01:05:19,680 --> 01:05:20,600
Speaker 3: The histrionics.

1082
01:05:20,960 --> 01:05:23,280
Speaker 2: Yeah, I do feel like you can see a lot

1083
01:05:23,320 --> 01:05:26,400
Speaker 2: of this at work, not just in government, but just

1084
01:05:26,480 --> 01:05:28,160
Speaker 2: in society in general.

1085
01:05:28,280 --> 01:05:32,840
Speaker 3: In five yeah, like how Jonathan Strickland keeps calling those

1086
01:05:32,880 --> 01:05:36,240
Speaker 3: meetings and then he cries, oh, well, we can't make it.

1087
01:05:36,480 --> 01:05:40,120
Speaker 2: He misunderstands everything, everything, folks.

1088
01:05:40,160 --> 01:05:44,000
Speaker 3: This is just a rough overview of the Simple Sabotage Manual.

1089
01:05:44,480 --> 01:05:46,880
Speaker 3: It is short. We encourage you to read it. You

1090
01:05:47,480 --> 01:05:50,360
Speaker 3: can check it out now for yourself in audio or

1091
01:05:50,400 --> 01:05:54,600
Speaker 3: print form anywhere online. It was not declassified until two

1092
01:05:54,640 --> 01:05:58,480
Speaker 3: thousand and eight, and due to the circumstances surrounding the publication,

1093
01:05:58,680 --> 01:06:02,360
Speaker 3: the dissemination, we'll never know how many copies were made.

1094
01:06:02,400 --> 01:06:05,280
Speaker 3: We don't know to what degree these instructions were enacted

1095
01:06:05,320 --> 01:06:08,080
Speaker 3: in the field, but we do know this, and this

1096
01:06:08,240 --> 01:06:12,680
Speaker 3: is troubling. The concept had to have worked to some extent,

1097
01:06:13,160 --> 01:06:17,200
Speaker 3: because we can assume this because the OSS's later form,

1098
01:06:17,520 --> 01:06:22,000
Speaker 3: the CIA, went on to publish more sketchy subversive manuals,

1099
01:06:22,040 --> 01:06:25,280
Speaker 3: The Assassination Manual in the nineteen fifties. You can read

1100
01:06:25,320 --> 01:06:28,480
Speaker 3: a version of that online and the Freedom Fighter's Manual

1101
01:06:28,680 --> 01:06:33,480
Speaker 3: in the nineteen eighties, dropped by air throughout Nicaragua. So

1102
01:06:34,280 --> 01:06:37,360
Speaker 3: it's got to work, and it makes us wonder what

1103
01:06:37,400 --> 01:06:40,320
Speaker 3: else is out there, what has yet to be declassified,

1104
01:06:40,520 --> 01:06:44,080
Speaker 3: What manuals are being used now for tonight. That's the

1105
01:06:44,120 --> 01:06:46,040
Speaker 3: stuff they don't want you to know. We can't wait

1106
01:06:46,080 --> 01:06:48,720
Speaker 3: to hear your thoughts. Find us online, give us a

1107
01:06:48,760 --> 01:06:52,240
Speaker 3: call on the phone, or drop us a note on

1108
01:06:52,400 --> 01:06:55,439
Speaker 3: our good old fashioned email. But for the Internet while

1109
01:06:55,480 --> 01:06:56,360
Speaker 3: we still have it.

1110
01:06:56,720 --> 01:06:59,560
Speaker 4: Jeez, oh man, we didn't even talk about how this

1111
01:06:59,560 --> 01:07:03,960
Speaker 4: stuff can be applied to sewing chaos and disinformation and

1112
01:07:04,280 --> 01:07:08,440
Speaker 4: general you know, just awfulness on the Internet. Yeah, it

1113
01:07:08,760 --> 01:07:10,680
Speaker 4: all is applicable, and yeah, let us know. You can

1114
01:07:10,720 --> 01:07:12,520
Speaker 4: find us all over the Internet as long as it's

1115
01:07:12,520 --> 01:07:15,240
Speaker 4: still there. Like Ben was saying at the handle conspiracy stuffhere,

1116
01:07:15,280 --> 01:07:17,640
Speaker 4: we exist on Facebook with our Facebook group Here's where

1117
01:07:17,680 --> 01:07:21,160
Speaker 4: it gets crazy, on xfka, Twitter, and on YouTube where

1118
01:07:21,160 --> 01:07:23,760
Speaker 4: we have video content color for you to enjoy. On

1119
01:07:23,800 --> 01:07:26,400
Speaker 4: Instagram and TikTok where conspiracy Stuff show.

1120
01:07:27,360 --> 01:07:29,640
Speaker 2: If you want to call us, our number is one

1121
01:07:29,760 --> 01:07:34,920
Speaker 2: eight three three std WYTK. Call us. Let us know

1122
01:07:34,960 --> 01:07:38,080
Speaker 2: your thoughts on the mayhem machine that is outlined in

1123
01:07:38,080 --> 01:07:41,040
Speaker 2: this manual. Do give yourself a cool nickname and let

1124
01:07:41,160 --> 01:07:42,840
Speaker 2: us know within the message if we can use your

1125
01:07:42,880 --> 01:07:44,880
Speaker 2: name and message on the air. If you'd like to

1126
01:07:44,920 --> 01:07:46,640
Speaker 2: send us an email, we are.

1127
01:07:47,160 --> 01:07:50,240
Speaker 3: The entities that read each piece of correspondence we receive.

1128
01:07:50,360 --> 01:07:53,200
Speaker 3: Don't need for a committee. Be well aware, yet unafree.

1129
01:07:53,240 --> 01:07:58,760
Speaker 3: Sometimes the void writes back. Tell us your favorite weaponized

1130
01:07:59,160 --> 01:08:02,600
Speaker 3: sabotage attempts in your line of work, in your neck

1131
01:08:02,640 --> 01:08:25,240
Speaker 3: of the global woods. Conspiracy at iHeartRadio dot com.

1132
01:08:25,400 --> 01:08:27,400
Speaker 2: Stuff they don't want you to know is a production

1133
01:08:27,560 --> 01:08:32,080
Speaker 2: of iHeartRadio. For more podcasts from iHeartRadio, visit the iHeartRadio app,

1134
01:08:32,160 --> 01:08:35,440
Speaker 2: Apple Podcasts, or wherever you listen to your favorite shows.