1 00:00:04,400 --> 00:00:07,800 Speaker 1: Welcome to tech Stuff, a production from I Heart Radio. 2 00:00:12,119 --> 00:00:14,560 Speaker 1: Hey there, and welcome to tech Stuff. I'm your host, 3 00:00:14,680 --> 00:00:17,640 Speaker 1: Jonathan Strickland. I'm an executive producer with I Heart Radio. 4 00:00:17,680 --> 00:00:20,119 Speaker 1: And how the tech are you? It is time for 5 00:00:20,160 --> 00:00:24,200 Speaker 1: the tech news for March first, twenty twenty two, and 6 00:00:24,640 --> 00:00:28,760 Speaker 1: this should come as no surprise, but the vast majority 7 00:00:28,920 --> 00:00:33,120 Speaker 1: of the tech news today is revolving around the Russian 8 00:00:33,240 --> 00:00:38,279 Speaker 1: invasion of Ukraine. First up, hackers compromise the websites of 9 00:00:38,360 --> 00:00:44,360 Speaker 1: several Russian media outlets. Many of those outlets experienced outages 10 00:00:44,520 --> 00:00:47,320 Speaker 1: on their websites. A few of those sites also displayed 11 00:00:47,360 --> 00:00:51,479 Speaker 1: a message reading quote, Dear citizens, we urge you to 12 00:00:51,520 --> 00:00:55,080 Speaker 1: stop this madness. Do not send your sons and husbands 13 00:00:55,120 --> 00:00:59,000 Speaker 1: to certain deaths. Putin is forcing us to lie and 14 00:00:59,120 --> 00:01:01,840 Speaker 1: is putting us in d We have been isolated from 15 00:01:01,880 --> 00:01:04,959 Speaker 1: the whole world. They have stopped buying oil and gas. 16 00:01:05,240 --> 00:01:08,240 Speaker 1: In a few years we will be living like North Korea. 17 00:01:08,440 --> 00:01:12,240 Speaker 1: What is this for? So that Putin can get into 18 00:01:12,319 --> 00:01:16,640 Speaker 1: the history books. It's not our war. Let's stop him 19 00:01:16,720 --> 00:01:21,480 Speaker 1: end quote. So Russian media has reported that the responsible 20 00:01:21,520 --> 00:01:26,240 Speaker 1: party was the activist group Anonymous and someone at least 21 00:01:26,240 --> 00:01:30,360 Speaker 1: has claimed responsibility on behalf of Anonymous. Now, in case 22 00:01:30,400 --> 00:01:34,640 Speaker 1: you're not familiar with Anonymous, it's a very loosely organized 23 00:01:34,640 --> 00:01:40,640 Speaker 1: collection of hackers, activists, anarchists, and folks who fall on 24 00:01:40,760 --> 00:01:44,240 Speaker 1: a pretty broad spectrum of mischief makers all the way 25 00:01:44,319 --> 00:01:50,520 Speaker 1: up to cyber criminals. Occasionally, a significant percentage of Anonymous 26 00:01:50,640 --> 00:01:55,520 Speaker 1: is you know, nebulous population will align on a cause, 27 00:01:56,000 --> 00:01:59,520 Speaker 1: and a significant number of them will devote efforts to 28 00:02:00,120 --> 00:02:03,840 Speaker 1: seeing that cause through. But the group is so amorphous 29 00:02:04,000 --> 00:02:08,560 Speaker 1: that it often is pretty tricky to assign responsibility to them. 30 00:02:08,600 --> 00:02:11,280 Speaker 1: In many cases, it might be a group of people 31 00:02:11,560 --> 00:02:14,840 Speaker 1: who consider themselves part of the Anonymous, but they're acting 32 00:02:15,639 --> 00:02:19,320 Speaker 1: independently of the overall group. That being said, a Twitter 33 00:02:19,360 --> 00:02:22,799 Speaker 1: account named anonymous has called for hackers to dedicate their 34 00:02:22,840 --> 00:02:26,840 Speaker 1: skills and resources toward hindering Russia's invasion efforts in every 35 00:02:26,840 --> 00:02:30,440 Speaker 1: way possible. Of course, it's hard to say conclusively that 36 00:02:30,480 --> 00:02:33,560 Speaker 1: the Twitter accountant has any real connection to the actual group, 37 00:02:34,760 --> 00:02:37,200 Speaker 1: and this is partly how Anonymous can be so effective. 38 00:02:37,240 --> 00:02:40,400 Speaker 1: It can claim or deny responsibility for just about anything 39 00:02:40,440 --> 00:02:46,440 Speaker 1: with equal plausibility. The Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company or T SMC, 40 00:02:47,120 --> 00:02:49,600 Speaker 1: along with chip makers A M D and Intel, have 41 00:02:49,720 --> 00:02:54,160 Speaker 1: suspended all semiconductor sales to Russia. This is to comply 42 00:02:54,320 --> 00:02:58,840 Speaker 1: with US sanctions against Russia due to the Ukrainian invasion. 43 00:02:59,400 --> 00:03:02,360 Speaker 1: Tsn CE is the big dog here, as the company 44 00:03:02,400 --> 00:03:07,320 Speaker 1: produces approximately half of all semi conductors used around the world, 45 00:03:07,400 --> 00:03:10,600 Speaker 1: whether we're talking the super powerful kind or the very 46 00:03:10,639 --> 00:03:14,120 Speaker 1: simple kind in a you know, low powered mobile device. 47 00:03:14,760 --> 00:03:17,800 Speaker 1: The company has suspended sales not just to Russia directly, 48 00:03:17,840 --> 00:03:20,520 Speaker 1: but also too third parties that are known to provide 49 00:03:20,520 --> 00:03:25,680 Speaker 1: products to Russia that use these t SMC semiconductors. Now, 50 00:03:25,720 --> 00:03:28,480 Speaker 1: this is a blow to Russia, but the president of 51 00:03:28,520 --> 00:03:32,600 Speaker 1: the semi Conductor Industry Association told The Washington Post that 52 00:03:32,720 --> 00:03:35,720 Speaker 1: it's not a blow to the semiconductor industry because Russia 53 00:03:35,760 --> 00:03:39,320 Speaker 1: only represents about point one percent of all semiconductor sales. 54 00:03:39,800 --> 00:03:42,440 Speaker 1: So in other words, this is gonna hurt you a 55 00:03:42,480 --> 00:03:45,240 Speaker 1: lot more than it's gonna hurt us, is kind of 56 00:03:45,240 --> 00:03:50,760 Speaker 1: the message there. The text sanctions extend beyond hardware and 57 00:03:50,880 --> 00:03:54,400 Speaker 1: into services. Google Pay and Apple Pay are no longer 58 00:03:54,440 --> 00:03:58,360 Speaker 1: available to customers of certain Russian banks. From what I 59 00:03:58,400 --> 00:04:01,880 Speaker 1: can tell, the services aren't total unavailable in all of Russia. 60 00:04:01,960 --> 00:04:05,920 Speaker 1: There is some availability, but for anyone who uses those 61 00:04:05,960 --> 00:04:09,040 Speaker 1: that are connected to accounts that belong to major banks 62 00:04:09,320 --> 00:04:14,480 Speaker 1: targeted by the recent sanctions, those services are put Customers 63 00:04:14,480 --> 00:04:16,719 Speaker 1: of those banks are no longer able to use any 64 00:04:16,760 --> 00:04:20,120 Speaker 1: cards issued by the banks, as the foreign held assets 65 00:04:20,120 --> 00:04:23,880 Speaker 1: in those banks have been frozen. The sanctions extend beyond 66 00:04:23,920 --> 00:04:26,560 Speaker 1: that as well. Customers are not able to make online 67 00:04:26,560 --> 00:04:31,160 Speaker 1: payments to companies registered in countries that have imposed these sanctions, 68 00:04:31,240 --> 00:04:34,440 Speaker 1: namely the United States and members of the European Union. 69 00:04:35,279 --> 00:04:39,400 Speaker 1: So this is really hampering a lot of Russian citizens 70 00:04:39,440 --> 00:04:43,799 Speaker 1: in their daily lives. I started this episode talking about 71 00:04:43,800 --> 00:04:47,680 Speaker 1: how hackers had compromised several Russian media sites within Russia. 72 00:04:47,800 --> 00:04:51,560 Speaker 1: Well outside Russia, the country's media is facing some pretty 73 00:04:51,600 --> 00:04:56,359 Speaker 1: tough opposition as well. Meta properties Facebook and Instagram have 74 00:04:56,600 --> 00:05:01,159 Speaker 1: restricted social media access to Russian outlets today, and spot 75 00:05:01,240 --> 00:05:05,039 Speaker 1: nick YouTube has also clamped down on those channels, as 76 00:05:05,080 --> 00:05:08,560 Speaker 1: as TikTok. The EU has similarly placed a ban on 77 00:05:08,640 --> 00:05:13,479 Speaker 1: Russian state media. So these media outlets are run by 78 00:05:13,640 --> 00:05:16,560 Speaker 1: the government of Russia. Like everything that goes out on 79 00:05:16,600 --> 00:05:20,280 Speaker 1: these outlets has been sanctioned by the government. And as such, 80 00:05:20,720 --> 00:05:24,600 Speaker 1: these outlets tend to serve as propaganda outlets. They're pushing 81 00:05:24,600 --> 00:05:28,640 Speaker 1: the government's narrative and worldview out to the public, so 82 00:05:28,920 --> 00:05:32,240 Speaker 1: you could argue it's at least a skewed view, if 83 00:05:32,279 --> 00:05:36,400 Speaker 1: not outright misinformation. In many cases, even before the Ukraine 84 00:05:36,400 --> 00:05:39,760 Speaker 1: invasion began, sites were starting to clamp down on misinformation 85 00:05:39,800 --> 00:05:43,960 Speaker 1: campaigns from these outlets that were meant to undermine support 86 00:05:44,000 --> 00:05:47,120 Speaker 1: for Ukraine or to portray the invasion as a necessary 87 00:05:47,160 --> 00:05:52,040 Speaker 1: and justified military action. Not only are we seeing sites 88 00:05:52,160 --> 00:05:56,840 Speaker 1: close off opportunities for these media outlets to spread Russian propaganda, 89 00:05:57,040 --> 00:06:01,000 Speaker 1: we've also seen Google and Meta goest ups further to 90 00:06:01,120 --> 00:06:04,680 Speaker 1: prevent the Russian media from placing ads on their properties 91 00:06:04,720 --> 00:06:09,520 Speaker 1: like YouTube or Google Search or Facebook. Meta also released 92 00:06:09,560 --> 00:06:12,279 Speaker 1: an announcement on Sunday saying it had discovered and removed 93 00:06:12,320 --> 00:06:15,880 Speaker 1: a pair of disinformation campaigns originating out of Russia and 94 00:06:15,960 --> 00:06:20,560 Speaker 1: one out of Ukraine. According to Meta, the Russian campaign 95 00:06:20,640 --> 00:06:23,880 Speaker 1: was the product of a group called ghost Writer, a 96 00:06:24,160 --> 00:06:28,040 Speaker 1: known source of disinformation. Hackers with Ghostwriter had used phishing 97 00:06:28,040 --> 00:06:31,960 Speaker 1: attacks on legit Facebook users to gain access to those 98 00:06:32,040 --> 00:06:39,280 Speaker 1: users accounts and then post disinformation videos and messages on 99 00:06:39,440 --> 00:06:43,360 Speaker 1: those accounts to try and spread the message. Meta has 100 00:06:43,400 --> 00:06:46,039 Speaker 1: since blocked the domains that the hackers had been using 101 00:06:46,040 --> 00:06:49,760 Speaker 1: in their phishing attempts and sent out notifications to affected users. 102 00:06:50,200 --> 00:06:53,559 Speaker 1: The uk Crane group was slightly different. It was also 103 00:06:54,120 --> 00:06:57,640 Speaker 1: launched in an effort to undermine Ukrainian efforts. It had 104 00:06:57,680 --> 00:07:00,760 Speaker 1: fewer than four thousand accounts following its page. Is no 105 00:07:00,839 --> 00:07:03,680 Speaker 1: telling how many of those accounts were just boughts uh 106 00:07:03,720 --> 00:07:07,880 Speaker 1: that we're just designed to elevate the disinformation campaign. Russia 107 00:07:07,920 --> 00:07:10,520 Speaker 1: has responded by saying it will restrict access to Facebook 108 00:07:10,600 --> 00:07:15,680 Speaker 1: due to the company's quote unquote censorship. On a similar note, 109 00:07:15,760 --> 00:07:20,280 Speaker 1: Netflix has reached a threshold size in Russia. Namely, it 110 00:07:20,560 --> 00:07:24,040 Speaker 1: hit a milestone of reaching more than one hundred thousand subscribers, 111 00:07:24,640 --> 00:07:26,200 Speaker 1: which you know, in the grand scheme of things, is 112 00:07:26,240 --> 00:07:29,480 Speaker 1: not that many, but it is a level that would 113 00:07:29,520 --> 00:07:34,160 Speaker 1: require Netflix to carry twenty Russian media channels on its service. 114 00:07:34,960 --> 00:07:37,480 Speaker 1: Most of those channels are entertainment and sports related, but 115 00:07:37,520 --> 00:07:40,280 Speaker 1: there are a few that are more dedicated to pushing 116 00:07:40,280 --> 00:07:44,320 Speaker 1: out the government narrative. Now, all of this is according 117 00:07:44,360 --> 00:07:48,200 Speaker 1: to a new law which is not in effect right now, 118 00:07:48,320 --> 00:07:51,160 Speaker 1: or maybe it's just gone into effect. The information is 119 00:07:51,200 --> 00:07:54,680 Speaker 1: not entirely clear. Today would have been the first day 120 00:07:54,680 --> 00:07:59,320 Speaker 1: from what I understand, but this law requires any media platform, 121 00:07:59,520 --> 00:08:02,800 Speaker 1: any ab based media platform of that size or larger, 122 00:08:02,880 --> 00:08:06,320 Speaker 1: you know, reaching a hundred thousand subscribers or more, they 123 00:08:06,320 --> 00:08:10,480 Speaker 1: would have to carry those Russian channels by this law. Netflix, however, 124 00:08:10,520 --> 00:08:13,520 Speaker 1: said it will do no such thing. A spokesperson too 125 00:08:14,040 --> 00:08:17,640 Speaker 1: said to Variety, quote, given the current situation, we have 126 00:08:17,720 --> 00:08:20,600 Speaker 1: no plans to add these channels to our service end quote. 127 00:08:21,640 --> 00:08:25,400 Speaker 1: So Netflix is currently the only foreign online media platform 128 00:08:25,480 --> 00:08:29,800 Speaker 1: in Russia that meets the subscriber criteria of this new law. 129 00:08:30,120 --> 00:08:33,440 Speaker 1: So this is a precedent that we're seeing set right here. 130 00:08:34,120 --> 00:08:37,720 Speaker 1: There are other providers, like foreign providers like HBO Max 131 00:08:37,760 --> 00:08:40,160 Speaker 1: that are active in Russia, but a lot of those 132 00:08:40,240 --> 00:08:44,480 Speaker 1: providers are partnering with Russian platforms that are actually distributing 133 00:08:44,480 --> 00:08:48,079 Speaker 1: the content. So while the source of the content might 134 00:08:48,120 --> 00:08:51,400 Speaker 1: be from these other companies, the entity in Russia is 135 00:08:51,440 --> 00:08:55,640 Speaker 1: a Russian one, so it's a different matter. Netflix doesn't 136 00:08:55,640 --> 00:08:59,040 Speaker 1: do that. Netflix is going direct to Russian consumers. There's 137 00:08:59,040 --> 00:09:01,760 Speaker 1: no word yet on lot, if any response. The Russian 138 00:09:01,800 --> 00:09:05,040 Speaker 1: government will have to all of this, it is notable 139 00:09:05,080 --> 00:09:08,600 Speaker 1: that Russia. Netflix doesn't have any offices in Russia, so 140 00:09:08,840 --> 00:09:12,199 Speaker 1: while the Russian government might eventually order I s p 141 00:09:12,400 --> 00:09:15,840 Speaker 1: s in the country to block Netflix, there's no physical 142 00:09:15,960 --> 00:09:19,319 Speaker 1: location for the government to raid or lean on or 143 00:09:19,320 --> 00:09:24,480 Speaker 1: anything like that. Twitter meanwhile announced yesterday that it will 144 00:09:24,520 --> 00:09:27,599 Speaker 1: begin to label tweets from accounts that belong to or 145 00:09:27,640 --> 00:09:31,400 Speaker 1: are linked to Russian state media outlets in order to 146 00:09:31,440 --> 00:09:36,319 Speaker 1: show their affiliation their association with those outlets. So these 147 00:09:36,400 --> 00:09:40,320 Speaker 1: labels will include an orange exclamation point to get users 148 00:09:40,360 --> 00:09:44,160 Speaker 1: attention and to alert readers about the source of the information. 149 00:09:44,480 --> 00:09:47,120 Speaker 1: Twitter also announced it will be dialing back the reach 150 00:09:47,280 --> 00:09:50,800 Speaker 1: of those accounts, so that means fewer people should see 151 00:09:50,840 --> 00:09:52,720 Speaker 1: the tweets in the first place. Like, if you've ever 152 00:09:53,080 --> 00:09:57,319 Speaker 1: used Twitter, you've probably seen that there are occasionally stuff 153 00:09:57,559 --> 00:10:00,160 Speaker 1: stuff that shows up in your feed where you're are 154 00:10:00,160 --> 00:10:02,720 Speaker 1: like I don't follow this person, Like this isn't someone 155 00:10:03,280 --> 00:10:06,000 Speaker 1: that I'm actively following, Why am I seeing their tweets? Well, 156 00:10:06,040 --> 00:10:08,720 Speaker 1: you know, it's one of the ways that Twitter expands 157 00:10:09,679 --> 00:10:15,319 Speaker 1: uh engagement and allows people to discover stuff that they 158 00:10:15,400 --> 00:10:18,160 Speaker 1: might not otherwise see. So in this case, Twitter is 159 00:10:18,240 --> 00:10:22,000 Speaker 1: essentially turning that dial down for these particular accounts in 160 00:10:22,080 --> 00:10:28,760 Speaker 1: order to not have the disinformation campaigns expand. Uh. Further So, 161 00:10:29,000 --> 00:10:31,240 Speaker 1: the platform is not going so far as to prevent 162 00:10:31,240 --> 00:10:34,400 Speaker 1: the outlets from sending out messages entirely. They're not banning 163 00:10:34,440 --> 00:10:38,520 Speaker 1: the outlets. Instead, Twitter is taking steps so that users 164 00:10:38,520 --> 00:10:41,920 Speaker 1: will be aware of where information is coming from, and 165 00:10:41,960 --> 00:10:44,679 Speaker 1: then the users can be able to to draw conclusions 166 00:10:45,160 --> 00:10:48,200 Speaker 1: as to the motivations behind the messaging. So, in other words, 167 00:10:48,200 --> 00:10:51,360 Speaker 1: Twitter isn't going so far as to say this isn't true, 168 00:10:51,840 --> 00:10:54,640 Speaker 1: but rather more like, keep in mind where this tweet 169 00:10:54,679 --> 00:10:57,480 Speaker 1: is coming from and don't just accept it on its face. 170 00:10:58,559 --> 00:11:00,880 Speaker 1: All right, We've got a lot more news, including news 171 00:11:00,920 --> 00:11:03,319 Speaker 1: about Russia and Ukraine. But before we get to any 172 00:11:03,400 --> 00:11:13,480 Speaker 1: of that, let's take a quick break. After consulting with 173 00:11:13,520 --> 00:11:17,760 Speaker 1: authorities in Ukraine, Google has temporarily disabled some of the 174 00:11:17,800 --> 00:11:21,240 Speaker 1: features in Google Maps for regions within Ukraine, such as 175 00:11:21,280 --> 00:11:24,400 Speaker 1: live traffic updates. The company made this move in an 176 00:11:24,400 --> 00:11:27,240 Speaker 1: effort to protect citizens who might be seeking safety and 177 00:11:27,280 --> 00:11:30,760 Speaker 1: specific parts of the city, provening Russian forces from targeting 178 00:11:30,760 --> 00:11:35,040 Speaker 1: those areas specifically. This does, however, cut both ways, because 179 00:11:35,080 --> 00:11:37,360 Speaker 1: there have have been researchers who have been using Google 180 00:11:37,400 --> 00:11:41,160 Speaker 1: Maps to track the invasion forces, using that information to 181 00:11:41,240 --> 00:11:44,440 Speaker 1: kind of infer where Russia's forces happen to be at 182 00:11:44,480 --> 00:11:47,800 Speaker 1: any given time. Google has also said that people who 183 00:11:47,840 --> 00:11:50,360 Speaker 1: are relying on turn by turn directions will still get 184 00:11:50,400 --> 00:11:54,920 Speaker 1: information about traffic. So if there is someone navigating through 185 00:11:54,960 --> 00:11:58,400 Speaker 1: a city in Ukraine, they aren't going to be blindsided 186 00:11:58,640 --> 00:12:02,240 Speaker 1: by something it's affected traffic in the city if they're 187 00:12:02,280 --> 00:12:04,280 Speaker 1: using the turn by turn directions, which I think is 188 00:12:04,559 --> 00:12:07,760 Speaker 1: the responsible thing to do. Reddit has also taken steps 189 00:12:07,760 --> 00:12:11,480 Speaker 1: to push back on Russian disinformation campaigns. The site has 190 00:12:11,559 --> 00:12:17,280 Speaker 1: quarantined the subredits are slash Russia and are slash Russia politics, 191 00:12:17,320 --> 00:12:22,560 Speaker 1: so a quarantine subreddit won't show up in searches or recommendations. Uh, 192 00:12:22,880 --> 00:12:27,679 Speaker 1: the discovery ends up being cut way back. So essentially 193 00:12:28,200 --> 00:12:31,440 Speaker 1: a redditor has to purposefully go to one of those 194 00:12:31,440 --> 00:12:33,800 Speaker 1: subredits in order to see what's going on there, and 195 00:12:33,840 --> 00:12:36,720 Speaker 1: they can. It's not it's not like wiped off the 196 00:12:36,720 --> 00:12:38,959 Speaker 1: face of the earth or anything, or or locked down. 197 00:12:39,480 --> 00:12:41,679 Speaker 1: You can go to them. You will be presented with 198 00:12:41,720 --> 00:12:44,439 Speaker 1: a message that warns you about it before you do so, 199 00:12:44,960 --> 00:12:48,319 Speaker 1: so like Twitter, Reddit has an outright banned Russian outlets 200 00:12:48,400 --> 00:12:52,240 Speaker 1: or users from participation, but has instead limited the reach 201 00:12:52,600 --> 00:12:55,560 Speaker 1: of that activity in an effort to mitigate disinformation and 202 00:12:55,559 --> 00:12:59,800 Speaker 1: propaganda campaigns. In addition, like I said, if you do 203 00:12:59,840 --> 00:13:02,160 Speaker 1: go to the r Russia subredit, you'll first see a 204 00:13:02,200 --> 00:13:05,840 Speaker 1: message saying that the subredit contains a quote high volume 205 00:13:05,920 --> 00:13:09,880 Speaker 1: of information not supported by credible sources end quote. So again, 206 00:13:10,160 --> 00:13:13,480 Speaker 1: not outright saying that the stuff in that subredit is 207 00:13:13,559 --> 00:13:15,360 Speaker 1: just a bunch of lies, or even that a lot 208 00:13:15,400 --> 00:13:19,520 Speaker 1: of it might contain misinformation. Instead, it's a warning the 209 00:13:19,600 --> 00:13:22,800 Speaker 1: visitors need to use discretion and critical thinking, something that 210 00:13:23,600 --> 00:13:25,240 Speaker 1: might be a little bit of a stretch for a 211 00:13:25,280 --> 00:13:28,160 Speaker 1: lot of creditors. There's this longstanding meme that a ton 212 00:13:28,200 --> 00:13:30,400 Speaker 1: of people on Reddit never bother to read any further 213 00:13:30,480 --> 00:13:34,840 Speaker 1: than a headline, though I think that's mostly a gross exaggeration. 214 00:13:34,920 --> 00:13:37,920 Speaker 1: At least in some subredits, some are better than others. 215 00:13:37,960 --> 00:13:40,720 Speaker 1: So again, it's not that everything in these subredits is 216 00:13:41,040 --> 00:13:46,680 Speaker 1: toxic or wrong or or a misinformation campaign, just that 217 00:13:48,000 --> 00:13:51,160 Speaker 1: there's a much higher percentage of things that are purposefully 218 00:13:51,320 --> 00:13:55,200 Speaker 1: posted there in order to spread misinformation, and that users 219 00:13:55,240 --> 00:13:58,560 Speaker 1: need to be aware of that. According to Elon Musk, 220 00:13:58,800 --> 00:14:01,840 Speaker 1: SpaceX has reached out to help Ukraine by delivering a 221 00:14:01,840 --> 00:14:05,200 Speaker 1: shipment of satellite Internet dishes that can link to space 222 00:14:05,360 --> 00:14:09,640 Speaker 1: X's Starlink network. Starlink is a satellite system that uses 223 00:14:09,679 --> 00:14:13,040 Speaker 1: small satellites in lowerth orbit to deliver Internet access to 224 00:14:13,120 --> 00:14:17,880 Speaker 1: remote locations. It's currently in a a beta program with 225 00:14:18,000 --> 00:14:20,800 Speaker 1: just a couple of thousand satellites in orbit. There is 226 00:14:20,840 --> 00:14:24,240 Speaker 1: supposed to be tens of thousands in orbit to provide 227 00:14:24,840 --> 00:14:29,160 Speaker 1: full coverage, so Starlink customers use a tripod mounted dish 228 00:14:29,200 --> 00:14:31,960 Speaker 1: that can actually track the progress of satellites as they 229 00:14:31,960 --> 00:14:35,520 Speaker 1: pass overhead, and they can switch to new satellites as 230 00:14:35,800 --> 00:14:40,240 Speaker 1: the older satellite moves out of range. Um hackers reportedly 231 00:14:40,320 --> 00:14:43,920 Speaker 1: launched a cyber attack against a different satellite internet provider, 232 00:14:44,080 --> 00:14:47,680 Speaker 1: via sat, which is another American company but operates in 233 00:14:47,720 --> 00:14:51,520 Speaker 1: Europe as well. So this could create expanded access to 234 00:14:51,560 --> 00:14:54,520 Speaker 1: the Internet in Ukraine, though it is unclear how many 235 00:14:54,600 --> 00:14:57,920 Speaker 1: kits SpaceX actually sent, or how those kits are going 236 00:14:57,960 --> 00:15:01,080 Speaker 1: to be distributed, and how extensive the coverage of Starlink's 237 00:15:01,200 --> 00:15:04,920 Speaker 1: coverage over Ukraine actually is. And I realized I was 238 00:15:04,960 --> 00:15:09,640 Speaker 1: being redundant with coverage there. On a semi related note, 239 00:15:09,880 --> 00:15:13,760 Speaker 1: the hacker responsible for setting up a Twitter account specifically 240 00:15:13,800 --> 00:15:18,400 Speaker 1: to track Elon Musk's movements his movements via private jet, 241 00:15:18,880 --> 00:15:21,680 Speaker 1: which is something that the CEO and billionaire has denounced 242 00:15:21,680 --> 00:15:25,560 Speaker 1: as a gross invasion of privacy. Well he this hacker 243 00:15:25,640 --> 00:15:27,280 Speaker 1: has now done the same thing for a group of 244 00:15:27,360 --> 00:15:33,120 Speaker 1: Russian oligarchs. The account, fittingly titled Russian oligarch Jets, tracks 245 00:15:33,160 --> 00:15:37,120 Speaker 1: the aircraft that's owned by Russia's wealthiest business folks. The 246 00:15:37,160 --> 00:15:40,880 Speaker 1: Twitter feed updates automatically, so it's it's essentially tapping into 247 00:15:41,000 --> 00:15:45,080 Speaker 1: air traffic information that regards specific takeoffs and landings. It 248 00:15:45,080 --> 00:15:50,080 Speaker 1: looks for identifiers of aircraft belonging to these oligarchs and 249 00:15:50,120 --> 00:15:54,680 Speaker 1: then posts that update whenever new information pops up around 250 00:15:54,680 --> 00:15:57,520 Speaker 1: the world. So the Twitter feed shows that while the 251 00:15:57,520 --> 00:16:00,560 Speaker 1: EU and the US are imposing sanctions on Russia meant 252 00:16:00,600 --> 00:16:07,040 Speaker 1: to really clamped down on the activities of these these billionaires, 253 00:16:07,160 --> 00:16:12,480 Speaker 1: who are often buddy buddy with Putin, uh, the Russian 254 00:16:12,520 --> 00:16:14,560 Speaker 1: elite seemed to be globe trotting as if nothing was 255 00:16:14,600 --> 00:16:18,560 Speaker 1: different from any other week. They don't seem terribly hindered 256 00:16:18,640 --> 00:16:21,960 Speaker 1: by what's happened so far. Jack Sweeney, the person who 257 00:16:22,000 --> 00:16:24,360 Speaker 1: made the account, has warned folks that while the tracking 258 00:16:24,440 --> 00:16:28,480 Speaker 1: data tends to be pretty accurate outside of Russia, within Russia, 259 00:16:28,520 --> 00:16:30,920 Speaker 1: it's a different story because air tracking data is not 260 00:16:31,040 --> 00:16:34,360 Speaker 1: as readily available there. And on the space front, Russia 261 00:16:34,400 --> 00:16:37,520 Speaker 1: has suspended its involvement in some joint space missions with 262 00:16:37,560 --> 00:16:40,920 Speaker 1: the European Space Agency and also has booted the United 263 00:16:40,920 --> 00:16:43,320 Speaker 1: States from a joint mission to send a probe to 264 00:16:43,360 --> 00:16:47,320 Speaker 1: the planet Venus. The rose caused most Space Agency issued 265 00:16:47,360 --> 00:16:51,239 Speaker 1: a statement saying it would be inappropriate to continue cooperation 266 00:16:51,360 --> 00:16:55,360 Speaker 1: after the EU and the US imposed sanctions on Russia. 267 00:16:55,640 --> 00:16:59,240 Speaker 1: The country's withdrawal from the spaceport at the Guyana Space 268 00:16:59,320 --> 00:17:02,040 Speaker 1: Center could be a long term obstacle for the e 269 00:17:02,280 --> 00:17:05,720 Speaker 1: s A, which partly depends on Russian spacecraft to launch missions. 270 00:17:06,160 --> 00:17:09,080 Speaker 1: Without Russia's involvement, those future missions are in a kind 271 00:17:09,080 --> 00:17:13,679 Speaker 1: of limbo. The Russian Space Agency has also indicated potential 272 00:17:13,760 --> 00:17:17,560 Speaker 1: issues with the International Space Station. A good portion of 273 00:17:17,600 --> 00:17:20,000 Speaker 1: the I s S is made up of Russian modules. 274 00:17:20,119 --> 00:17:23,040 Speaker 1: In fact, a Russian module was the first module up 275 00:17:23,040 --> 00:17:26,320 Speaker 1: in orbit, and the thrusters on some of those Russian 276 00:17:26,359 --> 00:17:29,040 Speaker 1: modules are part of what helped the I S S 277 00:17:29,080 --> 00:17:33,080 Speaker 1: maintain its altitude above the Earth to to maintain the 278 00:17:33,119 --> 00:17:36,879 Speaker 1: correct orbit. While there have been no official movements to 279 00:17:36,960 --> 00:17:39,040 Speaker 1: separate the Russian section with the rest of the I 280 00:17:39,280 --> 00:17:42,400 Speaker 1: S S or to withdraw cosmonauts and leave everyone else 281 00:17:42,440 --> 00:17:44,080 Speaker 1: just floating up there without a way to use the 282 00:17:44,160 --> 00:17:47,360 Speaker 1: Russian thrusters, which are controlled from the ground in Russia, 283 00:17:48,119 --> 00:17:51,480 Speaker 1: the agency has at least implied that such outcomes are 284 00:17:51,520 --> 00:17:54,600 Speaker 1: not entirely out of the question, and now we can 285 00:17:54,640 --> 00:18:00,320 Speaker 1: transition away from Russia and the Ukraine. Satish Kumbine, the 286 00:18:00,440 --> 00:18:04,359 Speaker 1: founder of cryptocurrency exchange bit connect, has been indicted on 287 00:18:04,480 --> 00:18:07,560 Speaker 1: charges that he used bit connect to run a Ponzi 288 00:18:07,600 --> 00:18:11,760 Speaker 1: scheme that amounted to more than two billion dollars. Now, 289 00:18:11,800 --> 00:18:14,320 Speaker 1: as a quick reminder, a ponzi scheme is a type 290 00:18:14,320 --> 00:18:18,480 Speaker 1: of pyramid scheme. So the head of the scheme gets 291 00:18:18,520 --> 00:18:21,600 Speaker 1: investors to pour money into it, and then the head 292 00:18:21,640 --> 00:18:23,800 Speaker 1: of the scheme lives high on the hawk uses that 293 00:18:23,880 --> 00:18:27,359 Speaker 1: investor money to, you know, go buy eluxury yacht or something. 294 00:18:27,920 --> 00:18:30,720 Speaker 1: But you know that that investment money, that initial round 295 00:18:30,840 --> 00:18:33,800 Speaker 1: is not going to stretch forever and Eventually, the people 296 00:18:33,840 --> 00:18:36,080 Speaker 1: who invested money are going to expect a return on 297 00:18:36,119 --> 00:18:40,280 Speaker 1: their investment, and if you're bilking wealthy people, they might 298 00:18:40,320 --> 00:18:43,080 Speaker 1: also have the means to make your life really difficult. 299 00:18:43,320 --> 00:18:46,639 Speaker 1: So to satisfy that initial round of investors, you go 300 00:18:46,720 --> 00:18:49,760 Speaker 1: out and you get a second round of investors. So 301 00:18:49,800 --> 00:18:53,640 Speaker 1: the second round of investors pours money into your scheme, 302 00:18:54,200 --> 00:18:57,240 Speaker 1: and you use some of that influx of cash to 303 00:18:57,280 --> 00:19:00,359 Speaker 1: pay out returns to your first round of investor. Stairs 304 00:19:01,240 --> 00:19:03,720 Speaker 1: the first round says, oh wow, I'm making money off 305 00:19:03,760 --> 00:19:06,679 Speaker 1: my investment. Look at this this dividend I got. This 306 00:19:06,760 --> 00:19:09,400 Speaker 1: is really paying off. And some of them might even 307 00:19:09,440 --> 00:19:12,240 Speaker 1: go and reinvest in the scheme, putting even more of 308 00:19:12,280 --> 00:19:15,080 Speaker 1: their money into it, thinking they're gonna get even larger 309 00:19:15,160 --> 00:19:18,760 Speaker 1: payouts further down the road. Meanwhile, the head of the 310 00:19:18,800 --> 00:19:21,480 Speaker 1: scheme continues to live the lush life for as long 311 00:19:21,520 --> 00:19:25,040 Speaker 1: as this can last, and you might think, hey, Jonathan, 312 00:19:25,560 --> 00:19:29,120 Speaker 1: that doesn't sound sustainable. Surely, at some point you reach 313 00:19:29,160 --> 00:19:31,320 Speaker 1: a stage where there's no way to attract a new 314 00:19:31,400 --> 00:19:34,560 Speaker 1: round of investments to pay out all the previous investors, 315 00:19:34,560 --> 00:19:38,080 Speaker 1: and the whole thing will come crashing down. And you're right, 316 00:19:38,800 --> 00:19:41,320 Speaker 1: it can take a long time, but these things are 317 00:19:41,359 --> 00:19:46,199 Speaker 1: inherently unstable and unsustainable. Anyway, the Justice Department says that 318 00:19:46,240 --> 00:19:50,040 Speaker 1: Kombani and his associates effectively ran a ponzi scheme with 319 00:19:50,200 --> 00:19:53,359 Speaker 1: bit connect as the platform, and we've seen this crop 320 00:19:53,440 --> 00:19:56,160 Speaker 1: up in a few crypto companies. As I've said before, 321 00:19:56,240 --> 00:19:59,320 Speaker 1: one of the big problems with crypto is that most 322 00:19:59,359 --> 00:20:03,000 Speaker 1: people don't really understand how it works, so they just 323 00:20:03,040 --> 00:20:06,320 Speaker 1: see crypto as being this kind of license to print money. 324 00:20:06,359 --> 00:20:10,080 Speaker 1: At least back when crypto was performing well, so people 325 00:20:10,119 --> 00:20:13,960 Speaker 1: would very easily get swept up into cons because crypto 326 00:20:14,040 --> 00:20:16,680 Speaker 1: just seemed to be like a magic word that could 327 00:20:16,840 --> 00:20:21,639 Speaker 1: make your money turn into lots more money. And this 328 00:20:21,960 --> 00:20:25,720 Speaker 1: was okay back when you know crypto was doing well. Obviously, 329 00:20:25,840 --> 00:20:29,480 Speaker 1: things have changed because we've seen some dramatic fluctuations in 330 00:20:29,520 --> 00:20:35,240 Speaker 1: crypto values recently, like some crypto has crashed super hard, recovered, 331 00:20:35,240 --> 00:20:39,879 Speaker 1: a bit crashed again. That makes investors a little less 332 00:20:40,280 --> 00:20:43,760 Speaker 1: enthusiastic about jumping on board. So that has mitigated this 333 00:20:43,840 --> 00:20:46,800 Speaker 1: a little bit, but we've still seen a lot of 334 00:20:46,800 --> 00:20:50,840 Speaker 1: of scam artists try and cash in on the crypto craze. Anyway, 335 00:20:50,920 --> 00:20:54,440 Speaker 1: Kambani will now go to trial. So he's been indicted, 336 00:20:54,480 --> 00:20:56,919 Speaker 1: but that was just an indictment, so now he'll have 337 00:20:56,960 --> 00:20:59,040 Speaker 1: to go to trial. If he's found guilty on the 338 00:20:59,119 --> 00:21:02,080 Speaker 1: charges against him, which include charges like wire fraud and 339 00:21:02,119 --> 00:21:06,160 Speaker 1: money laundering, he could face up to seventy years in prison. 340 00:21:06,720 --> 00:21:08,840 Speaker 1: We have a few more stories to go through before 341 00:21:08,880 --> 00:21:12,280 Speaker 1: we conclude today, but first let's take another quick break. 342 00:21:19,800 --> 00:21:23,600 Speaker 1: A Japanese supplier called Kojima Industries Corporation, which plays a 343 00:21:23,640 --> 00:21:28,120 Speaker 1: pivotal role in supplying automaker Toyota with critical components, has 344 00:21:28,160 --> 00:21:31,280 Speaker 1: been hit by a cyber attack. That attack created a 345 00:21:31,320 --> 00:21:35,440 Speaker 1: domino effect which led to Toyota stopping all vehicle production 346 00:21:35,880 --> 00:21:40,119 Speaker 1: in all of its Japanese manufacturing facilities. So this is 347 00:21:40,160 --> 00:21:44,680 Speaker 1: because Toyota uses a just in time approach, which means 348 00:21:44,960 --> 00:21:49,359 Speaker 1: Toyota only brings in components in order to install them 349 00:21:49,400 --> 00:21:53,040 Speaker 1: into vehicles at that time, and that way, Toyota doesn't 350 00:21:53,119 --> 00:21:57,800 Speaker 1: have to maintain warehouse facilities to just hold an inventory 351 00:21:57,840 --> 00:22:01,640 Speaker 1: of parts. They just bring in parts when they need them. 352 00:22:01,680 --> 00:22:05,960 Speaker 1: But because Cogima Industries operations were affected, that strategy then 353 00:22:06,000 --> 00:22:09,439 Speaker 1: had a massive impact on Toyota itself because it doesn't 354 00:22:09,480 --> 00:22:12,359 Speaker 1: have that large inventory of parts that it can rely 355 00:22:12,440 --> 00:22:16,280 Speaker 1: on while Cogima Industries recovers from the cyber attack. Now, 356 00:22:16,320 --> 00:22:19,000 Speaker 1: as of this recording, I do not have information about 357 00:22:19,000 --> 00:22:22,040 Speaker 1: who was responsible for that cyber attack, nor do I 358 00:22:22,080 --> 00:22:24,360 Speaker 1: know about the nature of the attack itself. I would 359 00:22:24,400 --> 00:22:27,000 Speaker 1: not be shocked to learn it was a ransomware attack, 360 00:22:27,400 --> 00:22:29,879 Speaker 1: but that's pure speculation on my part. It could be 361 00:22:29,960 --> 00:22:35,720 Speaker 1: something totally different. Amazon continues to battle employee attempts to unionize. Now, 362 00:22:35,760 --> 00:22:39,680 Speaker 1: the Retail Wholesale and Department Store Union, or r w 363 00:22:39,960 --> 00:22:43,600 Speaker 1: D s U, has filed an official list of misconduct 364 00:22:43,720 --> 00:22:47,760 Speaker 1: charges against them Amazon with the United States National Labor 365 00:22:47,800 --> 00:22:52,000 Speaker 1: Relations Board otherwise known as the n l RB. So, 366 00:22:52,280 --> 00:22:55,520 Speaker 1: the r w D s U is alleging that Amazon 367 00:22:55,600 --> 00:22:59,240 Speaker 1: has continued and even stepped up anti union measures in 368 00:22:59,320 --> 00:23:03,520 Speaker 1: an Amazon warehouse in Bessemer, Alabama. Now, you might remember 369 00:23:03,560 --> 00:23:07,199 Speaker 1: that employees at that warehouse previously attempted to hold a 370 00:23:07,280 --> 00:23:11,160 Speaker 1: vote to unionize, but that vote failed to secure enough 371 00:23:11,200 --> 00:23:16,359 Speaker 1: support from employees to move forward. Subsequently, however, the n 372 00:23:16,520 --> 00:23:20,600 Speaker 1: l RB found that Amazon had illegally instituted policies to 373 00:23:20,720 --> 00:23:24,639 Speaker 1: discourage employees from voting on the matter and interfered in 374 00:23:24,680 --> 00:23:28,320 Speaker 1: the voting process. So these new charges. You know, that 375 00:23:28,400 --> 00:23:30,479 Speaker 1: was last year, but this year, these new charges are 376 00:23:30,520 --> 00:23:34,560 Speaker 1: accusing Amazon of essentially doing the same thing. Now that 377 00:23:34,760 --> 00:23:37,159 Speaker 1: n l RB has actually ordered a redo of the 378 00:23:37,240 --> 00:23:40,000 Speaker 1: union vote. They said the first vote is not legitimate. 379 00:23:40,359 --> 00:23:42,960 Speaker 1: It does not necessarily show that employees didn't support a 380 00:23:43,080 --> 00:23:47,439 Speaker 1: union because Amazon interfered, So we're gonna rehold that vote. 381 00:23:48,280 --> 00:23:52,160 Speaker 1: And now the r w DSU was saying Amazon's back 382 00:23:52,200 --> 00:23:58,480 Speaker 1: to trying to leverage its its power against employees. Amazon 383 00:23:58,560 --> 00:24:00,920 Speaker 1: reps have said that they are finite the company has 384 00:24:00,960 --> 00:24:06,879 Speaker 1: done nothing illegal, which doesn't exactly give you a full warm, 385 00:24:06,920 --> 00:24:09,720 Speaker 1: fuzzy feeling, right like, hey, nothing we've done is illegal. 386 00:24:10,040 --> 00:24:16,640 Speaker 1: That's that's that's not really uh a good response, I think. 387 00:24:17,000 --> 00:24:20,160 Speaker 1: But according to Amazon union supporters, company reps have been 388 00:24:20,200 --> 00:24:24,199 Speaker 1: removing pro union flyers and information that union supporters have 389 00:24:24,280 --> 00:24:28,320 Speaker 1: put up next to anti union flyers. The pro union 390 00:24:28,359 --> 00:24:30,520 Speaker 1: folks are doing this on their time off, which is 391 00:24:30,560 --> 00:24:34,440 Speaker 1: allowed by law. You are on your own time allowed 392 00:24:34,480 --> 00:24:38,679 Speaker 1: to put up pro union stuff, but apparently Amazon reps 393 00:24:38,680 --> 00:24:40,760 Speaker 1: have been taking that down while leaving up the anti 394 00:24:40,880 --> 00:24:46,480 Speaker 1: union stuff. The the n w DS you also accuses 395 00:24:46,640 --> 00:24:51,240 Speaker 1: Amazon of holding mandatory anti union meetings to discourage workers 396 00:24:51,280 --> 00:24:54,159 Speaker 1: from supporting the efforts, just as they said the company 397 00:24:54,200 --> 00:24:58,320 Speaker 1: had done last year. Also later this month, in New York, 398 00:24:58,840 --> 00:25:02,359 Speaker 1: Amazon employees at a totally different warehouse are going to 399 00:25:02,400 --> 00:25:04,800 Speaker 1: hold a vote on whether or not to unionize. That 400 00:25:04,880 --> 00:25:09,000 Speaker 1: happens the week of March. Now, I'm pretty sure that 401 00:25:09,080 --> 00:25:12,720 Speaker 1: Amazon is trying to squash these individual efforts out of 402 00:25:12,760 --> 00:25:16,200 Speaker 1: concern that we could see other warehouses in other states 403 00:25:16,200 --> 00:25:19,920 Speaker 1: and cities follow suit. I think what Amazon is trying 404 00:25:19,960 --> 00:25:22,880 Speaker 1: to do is prevent this from turning into a massive 405 00:25:23,000 --> 00:25:26,840 Speaker 1: labor movement. But there's been a lot of momentum on 406 00:25:26,880 --> 00:25:33,120 Speaker 1: that front. Recently. State House representatives in West Virginia are 407 00:25:33,160 --> 00:25:36,800 Speaker 1: considering a bill that would outlaw over the air updates 408 00:25:36,840 --> 00:25:41,760 Speaker 1: from car manufacturers directly to vehicles. And if that part 409 00:25:41,840 --> 00:25:43,600 Speaker 1: of the bill, because that's just part of it. The 410 00:25:43,640 --> 00:25:45,800 Speaker 1: bill covers a lot of other stuff, But if that 411 00:25:45,920 --> 00:25:48,679 Speaker 1: part has passed into law, it would mean that people 412 00:25:48,720 --> 00:25:51,879 Speaker 1: in West Virginia would be required to bring their vehicle 413 00:25:52,040 --> 00:25:55,880 Speaker 1: to a dealership in order to get software updates. Now, 414 00:25:55,920 --> 00:26:00,000 Speaker 1: as we've seen over the years, manufacturers have built more 415 00:26:00,040 --> 00:26:03,960 Speaker 1: more computer systems into vehicles, and there's been a rising 416 00:26:04,000 --> 00:26:07,320 Speaker 1: need to be able to update those computer systems with 417 00:26:07,480 --> 00:26:11,560 Speaker 1: patches and such. Right now, car manufacturers can issue such 418 00:26:11,640 --> 00:26:15,280 Speaker 1: updates themselves, and cars will receive them directly from the 419 00:26:15,359 --> 00:26:18,000 Speaker 1: manufacturer over the air, kind of similar to how your 420 00:26:18,040 --> 00:26:22,560 Speaker 1: smartphone will regularly receive updates to its operating system. But 421 00:26:22,680 --> 00:26:27,160 Speaker 1: House Bill HBT sixty would make it illegal for car 422 00:26:27,200 --> 00:26:30,800 Speaker 1: manufacturers to do that in West Virginia. Now, the bill 423 00:26:30,880 --> 00:26:35,320 Speaker 1: does allow for software updates to entertainment and navigation systems, 424 00:26:36,359 --> 00:26:39,600 Speaker 1: primarily so that folks wouldn't be stuck with outdated maps 425 00:26:39,680 --> 00:26:43,120 Speaker 1: as they drive around, but otherwise, for any other type 426 00:26:43,160 --> 00:26:45,040 Speaker 1: of software update, they would have to go into a 427 00:26:45,080 --> 00:26:47,879 Speaker 1: dealership in order to get it, likely with a pretty 428 00:26:47,880 --> 00:26:51,240 Speaker 1: hefty charge, when otherwise they would just get those updates 429 00:26:51,240 --> 00:26:55,040 Speaker 1: for free over the air. Meanwhile, dealerships are marking up 430 00:26:55,080 --> 00:26:59,000 Speaker 1: car prices to insane levels, largely due to chip shortages 431 00:26:59,040 --> 00:27:03,520 Speaker 1: that have impacted some apply while demand remains high, and 432 00:27:03,680 --> 00:27:07,560 Speaker 1: car manufacturers are not allowed to market directly to consumers, 433 00:27:07,640 --> 00:27:10,840 Speaker 1: generally speaking, because of laws that were meant to protect 434 00:27:10,840 --> 00:27:14,280 Speaker 1: small businesses. The idea was, you know, the individual dealership 435 00:27:14,320 --> 00:27:17,159 Speaker 1: like the mom and pop car dealership would not be 436 00:27:17,200 --> 00:27:20,520 Speaker 1: able to compete against, say GM, if GM we're selling 437 00:27:20,520 --> 00:27:24,400 Speaker 1: cars directly to consumers. So these laws were put into 438 00:27:24,440 --> 00:27:27,800 Speaker 1: place to protect those smaller businesses. But the problem is 439 00:27:28,359 --> 00:27:32,679 Speaker 1: those small businesses are now effectively monopolies, at least in 440 00:27:32,880 --> 00:27:36,840 Speaker 1: regional areas UH themselves. So I guess you could say 441 00:27:36,920 --> 00:27:41,000 Speaker 1: I am against this particular section of this bill, especially 442 00:27:41,000 --> 00:27:44,000 Speaker 1: since it could lead to dangerous situations. I mean, if 443 00:27:44,040 --> 00:27:47,960 Speaker 1: an update is meant to address a safety issue, and 444 00:27:48,000 --> 00:27:50,160 Speaker 1: if that means that people will have to take time 445 00:27:50,200 --> 00:27:53,399 Speaker 1: out of their lives to go to a dealership in 446 00:27:53,480 --> 00:27:56,800 Speaker 1: order to get a software patch to address something that 447 00:27:56,880 --> 00:28:01,159 Speaker 1: is largely invisible. Right, software patches typically you know, you 448 00:28:01,200 --> 00:28:04,520 Speaker 1: don't really you're not really cognizant of them. You're not 449 00:28:04,600 --> 00:28:08,520 Speaker 1: aware of changes unless it's something massive. So for a 450 00:28:08,560 --> 00:28:11,400 Speaker 1: lot of people, they probably just say, like, I can't 451 00:28:11,400 --> 00:28:13,840 Speaker 1: deal with that, I'll do that later, I'll put that off. 452 00:28:14,400 --> 00:28:17,160 Speaker 1: I suspect actually a ton of people would just failed 453 00:28:17,200 --> 00:28:20,000 Speaker 1: to go and get their systems upgraded, and then you 454 00:28:20,040 --> 00:28:23,479 Speaker 1: could have some really bad safety problems follow suit, like 455 00:28:23,600 --> 00:28:27,160 Speaker 1: accidents and deaths and stuff. Now the bill will still 456 00:28:27,200 --> 00:28:30,239 Speaker 1: have to pass state Senate before it can become a law, 457 00:28:30,280 --> 00:28:32,040 Speaker 1: and to also have to be signed into law by 458 00:28:32,080 --> 00:28:36,000 Speaker 1: the governor. So there's still a chance that the language 459 00:28:36,000 --> 00:28:38,960 Speaker 1: could be changed, that this whole section of this law 460 00:28:39,040 --> 00:28:41,240 Speaker 1: could be removed before it goes forward, and that's what 461 00:28:41,280 --> 00:28:44,880 Speaker 1: I'm hoping for. Finally, some sad news, David Boggs, who 462 00:28:44,960 --> 00:28:49,200 Speaker 1: was a researcher at Xerox Park, has passed away. Bog's 463 00:28:49,320 --> 00:28:53,200 Speaker 1: co invented the Ethernet PC connection. You know, that's the 464 00:28:53,320 --> 00:28:56,560 Speaker 1: connection that allows one computer to communicate with another over 465 00:28:56,680 --> 00:29:01,240 Speaker 1: Ethernet cable or you know how a computer connect to 466 00:29:01,440 --> 00:29:05,480 Speaker 1: a network of other computers and computer devices. The either 467 00:29:05,520 --> 00:29:08,600 Speaker 1: net connection was one of many necessary components that allowed 468 00:29:08,640 --> 00:29:11,800 Speaker 1: us to have computer networks in general and the Internet 469 00:29:11,840 --> 00:29:15,360 Speaker 1: in particular. Uh. The other co inventor of Ethernet was 470 00:29:15,560 --> 00:29:20,000 Speaker 1: Bob Metcalfe. He coined Metcalf's law. Metcalf's law states that 471 00:29:20,040 --> 00:29:23,520 Speaker 1: the value of a telecommunications network is proportional to the 472 00:29:23,560 --> 00:29:26,880 Speaker 1: square of the number of connected users of the system. 473 00:29:26,920 --> 00:29:31,560 Speaker 1: So as you add people to a communications network, the 474 00:29:31,640 --> 00:29:35,280 Speaker 1: value of that network increases dramatically, which makes sense, right 475 00:29:35,400 --> 00:29:38,960 Speaker 1: because you have more potential connections. Every time you add 476 00:29:39,000 --> 00:29:41,480 Speaker 1: a person, that new person can connect to everyone who 477 00:29:41,560 --> 00:29:45,040 Speaker 1: was already part of that that network. Thus the value 478 00:29:45,040 --> 00:29:49,840 Speaker 1: of the network in general increases dramatically. Anyway, Boggs was 479 00:29:49,880 --> 00:29:52,480 Speaker 1: an engineering genius. He was the guy who was the 480 00:29:52,520 --> 00:29:55,040 Speaker 1: hardware guy, and that that group Metcalf was kind of 481 00:29:55,640 --> 00:30:00,320 Speaker 1: a conceptual idea kind of part of the partnership, and 482 00:30:00,440 --> 00:30:04,200 Speaker 1: Boggs was sort of the the engineer making those ideas 483 00:30:04,280 --> 00:30:08,240 Speaker 1: become reality, kind of of part a very necessary part 484 00:30:08,480 --> 00:30:12,280 Speaker 1: to make this happen. And his work made it possible 485 00:30:12,320 --> 00:30:14,840 Speaker 1: for computers to send information back and forth to each 486 00:30:14,840 --> 00:30:18,440 Speaker 1: other on local networks. The original Ethernet cable was able 487 00:30:18,440 --> 00:30:21,000 Speaker 1: to send data at just two point nine four megabits 488 00:30:21,040 --> 00:30:25,040 Speaker 1: per second. These days, according to c net anyway, the 489 00:30:25,080 --> 00:30:27,720 Speaker 1: average Ethernet connection is closer to eight megabits per second. 490 00:30:27,800 --> 00:30:30,600 Speaker 1: So it's not like it's screaming fast. Uh, they're even 491 00:30:30,640 --> 00:30:33,800 Speaker 1: gigabit Ethernet networks, but the speeds that you find on 492 00:30:33,840 --> 00:30:36,200 Speaker 1: the network tend to be a fraction of a gigabit 493 00:30:36,240 --> 00:30:41,280 Speaker 1: per second. This is largely due not to downfalls or 494 00:30:41,400 --> 00:30:46,200 Speaker 1: or or our flaws in the Ethernet cables or the connections, 495 00:30:46,640 --> 00:30:50,920 Speaker 1: but rather just the nature of network traffic and how 496 00:30:51,000 --> 00:30:53,360 Speaker 1: that can impact things, or how far you are from 497 00:30:53,600 --> 00:30:57,160 Speaker 1: the source of the data the distance actually take matters 498 00:30:57,200 --> 00:31:02,200 Speaker 1: as well anyway. Ether that was one part of the 499 00:31:02,280 --> 00:31:06,000 Speaker 1: very large jigsaw puzzle that made computer networking possible, and 500 00:31:06,040 --> 00:31:09,520 Speaker 1: our world would not be what it is now without 501 00:31:09,560 --> 00:31:15,080 Speaker 1: that capability. David Boggs was seventy one years old, and um, 502 00:31:15,200 --> 00:31:19,200 Speaker 1: you know, tech Stuff salutes your work, Boggs. Pretty amazing stuff. 503 00:31:20,560 --> 00:31:23,880 Speaker 1: All right, that's it for the news for Tuesday, March first, 504 00:31:23,880 --> 00:31:27,000 Speaker 1: twenty two. If you have suggestions for topics I should 505 00:31:27,040 --> 00:31:30,360 Speaker 1: cover in future episodes of tech Stuff, please reach out 506 00:31:30,400 --> 00:31:32,560 Speaker 1: to me and let me know. The best way to 507 00:31:32,600 --> 00:31:35,120 Speaker 1: do that is on Twitter. The handle for our show 508 00:31:35,240 --> 00:31:38,360 Speaker 1: is text Stuff H s W and I'll talk to 509 00:31:38,400 --> 00:31:47,120 Speaker 1: you again really soon. Text Stuff is an I Heart 510 00:31:47,200 --> 00:31:50,960 Speaker 1: Radio production. For more podcasts from my Heart Radio, visit 511 00:31:51,000 --> 00:31:54,040 Speaker 1: the i Heart Radio app, Apple Podcasts, or wherever you 512 00:31:54,120 --> 00:31:55,480 Speaker 1: listen to your favorite shows.