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Speaker 1: From UFOs two, ghosts and government cover ups. History is

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Speaker 1: riddled with unexplained events. You can turn back now or

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Speaker 1: learn the stuff they don't want you to now. Hello,

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Speaker 1: welcome back. This is the show about the stuff they

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Speaker 1: don't want you to know. My name is Matt uh Hi.

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Speaker 1: I'm Ben. I don't know why I did it that way.

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Speaker 1: I thought it was pretty good. Did I mess up

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Speaker 1: your flow? No? No, the flow was great. Yeah. I

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Speaker 1: thought you were killing it, you know, I was telling

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Speaker 1: you this earlier. Ben, I've been listening to way too

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Speaker 1: much sin Bay and uh, just get it out of

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Speaker 1: your system. Just do it, man, I'm not I'm not gonna.

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Speaker 1: I'm not gonna do it because I would butcher anything

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Speaker 1: that that. Man. Just do the one part. Uh No,

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Speaker 1: I see because a lot of it. I can't even

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Speaker 1: quote a lot of the music that in the rap

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Speaker 1: that I've been listening too lately, thanks to you, sir,

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Speaker 1: I can't quote anything, and I can't listen to it

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Speaker 1: loud the way I want to. In my car piece

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Speaker 1: piece piece, that's the best one that I can say

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Speaker 1: that your okay. Well, So anyway, today we're talking about

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Speaker 1: n g O S Yes, non governmental organizations and front companies,

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Speaker 1: now front companies. This is a subject that we've tackled

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Speaker 1: before via video, and it's something that happens all the

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Speaker 1: front companies happen all the time, and they're designed so

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Speaker 1: that you would never know. That's the whole point of them.

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Speaker 1: And really, if you look around you you're probably looking

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Speaker 1: at one right now. Somewhere there's one. There's a sign

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Speaker 1: somewhere in your vision that maybe a front company for something, right,

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Speaker 1: And it's important for us to point out, of course,

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Speaker 1: that not all front companies are illegal. This is a

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Speaker 1: time honored business practice. You know, quite a few corporations

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Speaker 1: own multiple uh finger quote competing brands, from your local

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Speaker 1: grocery store to your local car dealership. And the idea

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Speaker 1: of this is that they can make money off either

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Speaker 1: end of your decision. Yeah, and and they can also

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Speaker 1: make money at various points in the process of say

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Speaker 1: manufacturing a product or and then selling a product or

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Speaker 1: just if you think about the life cycle of something

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Speaker 1: like a computer, right, a massive corporation could own parts

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Speaker 1: of the software, could own parts of the hardware, could

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Speaker 1: own even parts of the users experience that happens outside

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Speaker 1: of either of those and Uh, that's that's really good

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Speaker 1: point that is often called we're talking about horizontal vertical integration, right, sure,

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Speaker 1: and of first owns the trees. Yeah, I know, that's great. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: And you should also remember that front companies come in

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Speaker 1: all different sizes. You could have, you know, a little

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Speaker 1: bodega that, let's say is a front company for I

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Speaker 1: don't know, selling drugs. Then you could have right, thank

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Speaker 1: you Dave Chappelle for teaching me about that. And then

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Speaker 1: you know, you could have something like a non governmental

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Speaker 1: organization that functions all over the world that might be

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Speaker 1: a front for an intelligence agency. Right. And that's where

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Speaker 1: we get to the heart of it. That's where we

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Speaker 1: get to the stuff they don't want you to know

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Speaker 1: about NGOs. So, by our definition of front company is

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Speaker 1: a subsidiary or shell company that shields another UH company

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Speaker 1: or entity from liability or scrutiny. One example I was

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Speaker 1: thinking about this in the United States would be a

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Speaker 1: lot of people have a problem with the Koch brothers, right,

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Speaker 1: but the Koch brothers own a boatload of companies because

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Speaker 1: we're a family show. I'm saying boatload of companies. I

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Speaker 1: saw you in your head trying to decide which word

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Speaker 1: I got close. Yeah, but this and and I'm not

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Speaker 1: saying one thing one way or the other about their

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Speaker 1: out fit politically or morally, but I am saying that

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Speaker 1: when you are a business of that level, there are

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Speaker 1: also a lot of clever accountability and responsibility things you

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Speaker 1: can get away with. In their case, a lot of

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Speaker 1: it's probably taxation. But in the case of something like

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Speaker 1: an intelligence agency, we're talking more about um being able

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Speaker 1: to have plausible deniability. And this takes us to something

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Speaker 1: that we were very interested in earlier when we did

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Speaker 1: a video on Russia and in g O's because the

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Speaker 1: number one man in Russia and that there are polls

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Speaker 1: that proved that recently ruffled some international feathers. Right, that's right.

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Speaker 1: He passed some laws requiring that foreign based NGOs and

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Speaker 1: foreign sponsored NGOs register and submit themselves to this higher

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Speaker 1: level of scrutiny that they weren't subject to before, because

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Speaker 1: he suspects that there are intelligence agencies working inside of them,

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Speaker 1: maybe just small little bits like an agent here, an

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Speaker 1: agent there. But uh, you know, he seems to think

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Speaker 1: that he's got some pretty good evidence, or at least

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Speaker 1: he truly believes it. Now We had some comments on

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Speaker 1: our video that came out about this lassie where one

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Speaker 1: person in particular, I can't remember your name right now,

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Speaker 1: but you said, why are you calling these pro democracy?

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Speaker 1: That's not cool. What I should have taken pains to

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Speaker 1: do is say that that's how the West presents them. Uh.

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Speaker 1: This was not an attempt by us to manipulate people,

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Speaker 1: but that is that is how the West presents these groups. Oh,

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Speaker 1: they're they're just idealistic students banning together for uh vague words. Yeah.

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Speaker 1: In the US, if you use in that word democracy,

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Speaker 1: it's one of those words that we've talked about in

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Speaker 1: the previous episode about perhaps thought what is it? What

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Speaker 1: is the thought term inating cliche? Yeah, I mean you

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Speaker 1: just use that word democracy here in the West and

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Speaker 1: especially in the US, it's uh, everything else around that

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Speaker 1: word seems. Oh that's totally fine, that's good. Yeah, it's

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Speaker 1: like hitting base in the great tag game of rhetoric.

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Speaker 1: You know, freedom, liberty, dignity, honor. I would say maybe,

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Speaker 1: with the exception of dignity, all three of those words

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Speaker 1: are incredibly malleable, and they've been used to make a

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Speaker 1: lot of strange things. I mean, let's not forget that

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Speaker 1: the official name of North Korea is the Democratic People's

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Speaker 1: Republic of Korea R right. Yes, and before we get

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Speaker 1: too far off topic, you know, thank you for writing

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Speaker 1: in and telling us that you want to clarify that. Also,

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Speaker 1: one of the big questions is is Vladimir Putin crazy?

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Speaker 1: I mean, we're not gonna say he's not an angel,

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Speaker 1: but we do know that, Uh, this question, this concern

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Speaker 1: of his, Uh, he's not the first to have it,

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Speaker 1: and uh maybe it sounds crazy as it sounds, So

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Speaker 1: that's the question for you. Uh, having GEO has been

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Speaker 1: used this way before as cover. Yes, yes, absolutely they have.

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Speaker 1: Oh okay, yeah, Back in the day, the CIA would

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Speaker 1: secretly fund sometimes they'd create often they would even run

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Speaker 1: supposedly private NGOs, and they'd make propaganda with these things.

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Speaker 1: They would provide cover cover for agents and operations all

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Speaker 1: over the place. One example would be the National Endowment

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Speaker 1: for Democracy or ned AH. Yes, their website describes them

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Speaker 1: as a private, nonprofit foundation dedicated to the growth and

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Speaker 1: strengthening of democratic institutions around the world. That sounds great,

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Speaker 1: it sounds beautiful. Yeah, but it turns out that this

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Speaker 1: group came about in the wake of some dirty revelations

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Speaker 1: about the CIA. Someone finally got into that dust closet

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Speaker 1: survived to tell the tale, and we learned about attempted

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Speaker 1: assassinations on heads of state, actions successful and unsuccessful at

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Speaker 1: destabilizing foreign governments, illegal spine. Way before anybody knew about

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Speaker 1: the level of spine that we would have today. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: way before there were concerns about any of that stuff.

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Speaker 1: And it led to the formation of the Select Committee

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Speaker 1: to supervise the agency to the CIA, and the Select

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Speaker 1: Committee on Intelligence is this purpose was to oversee the

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Speaker 1: federal intelligence stuff like that all of their activities and

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Speaker 1: and while oversight and stability came in, it seemed to

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Speaker 1: signal that the CIA, at least their uh, their party,

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Speaker 1: that they were having over there assassinating people and uh

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Speaker 1: all kinds of coups and plots that they were forming.

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Speaker 1: It seems like it was over. It seemed that way. Ah.

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Speaker 1: But here's here's one of the problems with this. The

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Speaker 1: the idea of intervening in the affairs of a foreign

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Speaker 1: government outside of the declarations of war has always been very,

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Speaker 1: very sticky. It's one of those rules that many governments

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Speaker 1: seemed to break, some more than others. But uh, you know,

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Speaker 1: there's no secret that most countries, even allies, have have

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Speaker 1: a couple of backup plans in case something goes wrong,

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Speaker 1: and they always want to have more information, right. They

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Speaker 1: want an asymmetrical uh information relationship mean they want to

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Speaker 1: know more than even their friends know. Uh, and they

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Speaker 1: don't want to tell other people. So spine is part

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Speaker 1: of the game. Uh. So they didn't really stop spying. No,

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Speaker 1: they started in g O's Uh. Like as we said,

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Speaker 1: the National Endowment for Democracy was meant to be part

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Speaker 1: of US foreign policy from the jump. Uh. The guy

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Speaker 1: who made it was named Alan Weinstein. He worked at

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Speaker 1: Brown Georgetown beforehand, the Washington Post, the Washington Quarterly, the

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Speaker 1: Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies. Uh, and he

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Speaker 1: also had some ties with Zebeg new Brazilski and Henry Kissinger.

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Speaker 1: In Matt this guy says a lot of what we

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Speaker 1: do today was done covertly twenty five years ago by

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Speaker 1: the CIA, so he admits it. Well, there we go.

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Speaker 1: We have a guy who ran one of these NGOs

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Speaker 1: talking about it and admitting to it. And of course

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Speaker 1: we have to say, I feel like you and I

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Speaker 1: both should point this out Uh, we're not saying that

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Speaker 1: all NGOs are bad. Just like we said in the video.

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Speaker 1: It's such a large definition, right, there are millions of

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Speaker 1: them best in the US. Right, So, uh, we're just

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Speaker 1: talking about the ones that you could think of as

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Speaker 1: the squeaky wheels. You could say that we're just talking

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Speaker 1: about the bad ones, or you could say that we're

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Speaker 1: just talking about the ones they got caught. Both of

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Speaker 1: those would be true. Well, there you go, Thank you,

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Speaker 1: thank you for that copy of ben. I think we're safe.

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Speaker 1: So there are a couple other places where NGOs were

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Speaker 1: accused of being clandestine, like in egypt Um where these

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Speaker 1: U S proxies and two two thousand twelve were basically

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Speaker 1: looked at and said and they said, hey, some fishiness

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Speaker 1: going on here. Like who specifically, Well, Salon, as in

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Speaker 1: Salon dot com specifically lists the Center for International Private

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Speaker 1: Enterprise c i PE, the International Republican Institute, and the

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Speaker 1: National Democratic Institute. There's democratic in there again, and also

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Speaker 1: the a f L c i OS Free Trade Union Institute,

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Speaker 1: which this one had a long history of working closely

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Speaker 1: with the CIA. Now, ladies and gentlemen, listening to this show,

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Speaker 1: you'll start to notice a pattern. A lot of these

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Speaker 1: means are just vague, kind of dry sounding. How could

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Speaker 1: you are you with them? Positive? Just yeah, yeah, you

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Speaker 1: know it would be like the Southwestern Association for Good Things, right,

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Speaker 1: How would you disagree with that? Or the International Coalition

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Speaker 1: for Fun Times. You know, I, I know I'm being

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Speaker 1: a little bit cynical, but the thing of the matter

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Speaker 1: is that there's so many institutions like this, not just

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Speaker 1: think tanks, right, And we know that think tanks play

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Speaker 1: a instrumental role in policy, especially in the West, but

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Speaker 1: they're they're all around us and in many ways for

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Speaker 1: the average person, at least here in the United States,

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Speaker 1: these are unknown factors that are moving the world in

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Speaker 1: ways we don't really imagine, and you can't see it

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Speaker 1: most of the time. No, It's like what I c

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Speaker 1: P said about music. Do you remember that? Yeah, time

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Speaker 1: and a Place is that? How does it work? Yeah? Right? Um? Now,

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Speaker 1: I know we've also probably got some listeners who are saying, hey, guys,

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Speaker 1: I volunteered with the nin GIO, or I have worked

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Speaker 1: with the nin GIO, I was in the Peace Corps

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Speaker 1: for instance, or something like that, and we are not

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Speaker 1: at all saying that you were involved in some sort

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Speaker 1: of skull degree. Nor are we saying that many of

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Speaker 1: these organizations are inherently bad. The Peace Corps actually, because

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Speaker 1: of concerns about this, they have a a pretty strong

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Speaker 1: stance on anyone with military experience trying to join the Core.

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Speaker 1: They can't let it happen because if it, if in

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Speaker 1: any way they're in GEO is seen as a UM

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Speaker 1: as seen as a threat or a compromise or tool

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Speaker 1: of US policy, then a lot of innocent people could die. Frankly,

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Speaker 1: well yeah, and a lot of their good work that

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Speaker 1: they do wouldn't be able to be done because I

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Speaker 1: get kicked out of places. Probably. So what do you

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Speaker 1: think though? This is one of my favorite parts of

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Speaker 1: the show, And what what do you think about Vladimir

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Speaker 1: Putin's claim? I think I don't think he's crazy. I

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Speaker 1: think he's paying attention. I mean, you gotta remember, every

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Speaker 1: country does this. It's not just the US putting people

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Speaker 1: in NGO's intelligence companies. He I'm sure he has done

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Speaker 1: it during his decades with the k g B. Oh. Yeah, well,

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Speaker 1: I'm sure he knows things. I'm sure there's intelligence that

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Speaker 1: he has that you and I don't have. UM. You know,

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Speaker 1: and it's it's also this weird thing because just the

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Speaker 1: fact that an intelligence agency works with an NGO doesn't

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Speaker 1: mean it's bad, because you get intelligence needs to be

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Speaker 1: gathered by you know, the good guys, whatever that means,

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Speaker 1: by the side that you know that is represented by you.

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Speaker 1: It's a great thing if your country or your whatever

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Speaker 1: it is that you live under his gathering intelligence. It's

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Speaker 1: gonna keep you safer the rightically, theoretically, But the bad

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Speaker 1: thing is when it's abused. And you know, that's a

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Speaker 1: that's a tough subject as well, are a tough thing

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Speaker 1: to really think about. How do you abuse an intelligence agency? Well,

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Speaker 1: assassinations seems to be an abuse, right, yes, and that's

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Speaker 1: I think that's well said in their defense, because we

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Speaker 1: do want to show both sides of this argument. The CIA,

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Speaker 1: we found some quotations from their website regarding in geos.

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Speaker 1: They have a fairly extensive, um thorough explanation their stance,

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Speaker 1: and one of their big concerns seems to be how

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Speaker 1: they share information within geos, what sort of information they share?

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Speaker 1: All right, And here's that quote. Information sharing is part

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Speaker 1: of a larger story of the rise of NGOs and

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Speaker 1: they're growing competence of the need for reform of intelligence

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Speaker 1: culture so that government analysts are rewarded for integrating all

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Speaker 1: available source material into their work and engaging with non

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Speaker 1: governmental experts, and of globalization, where agile partnerships between formal

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Speaker 1: state structures and civil society are constantly emerging. The need

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Speaker 1: to share is recognized by government and NGOs. It already

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Speaker 1: occurs in many places between professionals who have learned to

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Speaker 1: cross this cultural divide. Ah, there we go. That last

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Speaker 1: sentence might be the most important there, Matt, the cultural divide, Right,

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Speaker 1: it already occurs, I think too. It already occurs between

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Speaker 1: professionals who have learned to cross the cultural divide. So

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Speaker 1: what they're implying here, of course, is that, uh, the

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Speaker 1: CIA and various NGOs have already worked together extensively, and

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Speaker 1: that's that's understood. We also know that other intelligence agencies

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Speaker 1: and other countries are doing this as well. But what

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Speaker 1: it really says to me is that the CIA isn't

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Speaker 1: necessarily inside a lot of these ngo those, or at

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Speaker 1: least the little tendrils of these NGOs. They're just gathering

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Speaker 1: the information from the people who are not maybe not

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Speaker 1: officially CIA operatives or on the payroll, maybe just assets. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: they're just they are they're sharing this information between that

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Speaker 1: cultural divides. What it seems. Well, they could also be moonlighting,

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Speaker 1: Let's remember, because the best sort of covert intelligence operative

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Speaker 1: is the one that nobody knows about. Right. I I

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Speaker 1: know this. I know this sounds so paranoid and and

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Speaker 1: so much like uh Cold War mentality, But it is

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Speaker 1: true that this stuff came from the Cold War, and

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Speaker 1: it's also true that it still happens. So one of

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Speaker 1: my concerns or something I'd like people to think about

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Speaker 1: after you listen to this show, is that when you

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Speaker 1: hear about protests rising in countries, you know, the so

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Speaker 1: called Arab Spring for instance, and when you or about

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Speaker 1: protests in Eastern Europe brother hotspots around the world, it's

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Speaker 1: important to ask yourself how did these come about? Where

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Speaker 1: did these groups come from? Where do they derive their income? Uh?

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Speaker 1: And you know, even in the case of terrorist groups

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Speaker 1: that have formed, Like one thing that was really interesting

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Speaker 1: about that isis video we did is when we found

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Speaker 1: out that people have claimed they had their funding from

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Speaker 1: robbing a central bank and then said, yeah, we're not

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Speaker 1: really sure that that happened, right. Yeah, So we have

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Speaker 1: access to so much information now that it's very easy

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Speaker 1: to get uh, sort of overwhelmed. But ask yourself the

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Speaker 1: next time that you hear, oh, the uh, Students Union

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Speaker 1: for a Better Republic of Democratic Freedom has started protests

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Speaker 1: and and the government is reacting violent, like you know,

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Speaker 1: an insert country here, Maybe look them up and see

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Speaker 1: see where they come from, and who funds them, and

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Speaker 1: how long they've been around and what they want, you know,

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Speaker 1: look at leaflets. It's so interesting to look at the

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Speaker 1: small groups organizing and say that what you mentioned, the

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Speaker 1: Arab spring in Egypt, it's interesting when you look at

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Speaker 1: the materials that were handed out. And then also remember

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Speaker 1: when the Occupy protests were going on here in the

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Speaker 1: United States and you had hipped me to reports that

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Speaker 1: there were people planted in the crowd who were trying

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Speaker 1: to incite violence. Was that ever proven agent provocateurs? Yeah,

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Speaker 1: it's difficult to prove an agent provocateur. One thing that

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Speaker 1: I have found through various studyings of video is look

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Speaker 1: at the boots. Look at the shoes. Yeah, yep, because

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Speaker 1: they're specifically issued shoes for police officers. And if you

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Speaker 1: if you suspect an agent provocateur. Look at the shoes.

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Speaker 1: That's so. That's so strange though, because you would think

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Speaker 1: that if someone were doing something like that, they would

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Speaker 1: have also considered their outfit. You would think that the

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Speaker 1: best evidence that I've seen, that's how that's how you

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Speaker 1: prove it, but not in a court of law, just

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Speaker 1: to you know, the hearts and minds of people that

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Speaker 1: want to believe that that was an agent provocateur. So

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Speaker 1: now it's time for us to hear what you guys think.

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Speaker 1: We're really fascinated by this, this concept of these protests

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Speaker 1: groups maybe not being quite what they seem because it's

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Speaker 1: something that I don't know about you, but it reminds

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Speaker 1: me of that propaganda book, you know, fomenting discent, yes,

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Speaker 1: against a certain thing, but then you can manipulate that

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Speaker 1: descent if you if you can steer the group right.

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Speaker 1: Yeah by written by the father of public relations, who

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Speaker 1: we seem to continually return to on this show. But

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Speaker 1: enough about us, uh, let us know what you think

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Speaker 1: about the idea of these uh four an NGOs or

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Speaker 1: even protest groups being something more than they appear to be.

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Speaker 1: Have you ever worked at an NGO? Tell us about it.

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Speaker 1: Do you ever see anything weird or maybe you can't

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Speaker 1: tell us about it? We'd love to hear either way. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: that's a really good point. We'd also love to hear

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Speaker 1: any ideas you have for upcoming topics or episodes that

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Speaker 1: we should cover. And oh, we should just take a

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Speaker 1: moment too and say thank you so much for writing

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Speaker 1: to us about the ghost story. We appreciate that we

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Speaker 1: will hopefully be doing that more. Right, No, all super

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Speaker 1: producer and all not given a shout out to our

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Speaker 1: super producer Noll. He just raised, uh raised a hand

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Speaker 1: in solidarity there. Okay, alright, So on that note, we

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Speaker 1: are heading out for the week. We hope you have

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Speaker 1: a good one. If you are a fan of the internet,

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Speaker 1: check out our stuff. You can find us on Twitter

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Speaker 1: and Facebook, where we are always posting things that don't

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Speaker 1: always make it into our show. We just had some

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Speaker 1: revelations about some just uh long lost ships discovered in

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Speaker 1: the Arctic and possible identity of Jack the Ripper, although

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Speaker 1: we're pretty skeptical. Yeah, we're a little skeptical that. And

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Speaker 1: then also, uh, everything that they're finding in Stonehenge. Oh man,

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Speaker 1: that is cool. Yeah, this is probably old news by

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Speaker 1: the time you hear this episode, but check out our

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Speaker 1: Facebook for the latest things that you might not see

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Speaker 1: on the mainstream news. Oh and one last thing, I

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Speaker 1: would like to say thank you from Ben and I

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Speaker 1: to all of you if you subscribe to our YouTube channel,

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Speaker 1: because as of this publishing, we should be at two

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Speaker 1: hundred thousand subscribers. That's amazing. Yeah. I I know that

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Speaker 1: that might not be a big deal to a lot

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Speaker 1: of people, but we are pro foundly grateful because just

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Speaker 1: being a couple of guys on the internet, well, I

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Speaker 1: don't I didn't think either of us expected. I don't understand.

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Speaker 1: We appreciate it and it's amazing and join us as

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Speaker 1: we continue searching the void for those dark things they

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Speaker 1: don't want you to know. You can email us, use

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Speaker 1: that old email. It's okay, it's not gonna hurt you.

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Speaker 1: It's it's it's fine. We are conspiracy at how stuff

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Speaker 1: works dot com. From more on this topic another unexplained phenomenon,

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00:23:34,480 --> 00:23:38,399
Speaker 1: visit test tube dot com slash conspiracy stuff. You can

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Speaker 1: also get in touch on Twitter at the handle at

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Speaker 1: conspiracy stuff.