1 00:00:03,200 --> 00:00:08,000 Speaker 1: This is Bloomberg Law with June Brusso from Bloomberg Radio. 2 00:00:10,360 --> 00:00:12,880 Speaker 1: The weed of the crime bears bitter fruit. 3 00:00:13,640 --> 00:00:14,360 Speaker 2: I like this. 4 00:00:15,360 --> 00:00:19,120 Speaker 1: Did you think you'd get away with it? What did 5 00:00:19,200 --> 00:00:26,200 Speaker 1: you think I would know? The shadow knows? 6 00:00:29,840 --> 00:00:33,839 Speaker 3: Perhaps that explains why a novel theory of the SEC's 7 00:00:34,360 --> 00:00:38,880 Speaker 3: is being called shadow trading. A corporate insider may think 8 00:00:38,920 --> 00:00:41,959 Speaker 3: he got away with it, after all, he used inside 9 00:00:42,000 --> 00:00:44,920 Speaker 3: information from his company to trade in the stock of 10 00:00:44,960 --> 00:00:48,239 Speaker 3: a rival company. But it seems like the SEC is 11 00:00:48,320 --> 00:00:52,320 Speaker 3: trying to show that, like the shadow, it knows all. 12 00:00:52,840 --> 00:00:57,880 Speaker 3: Ask former Metivation executive Matthew Panawat a California jury convicted 13 00:00:57,960 --> 00:01:02,160 Speaker 3: him in the regulator's first enforcement action targeting so called 14 00:01:02,200 --> 00:01:06,320 Speaker 3: shadow trading. Joining me is securities law expert James Park, 15 00:01:06,440 --> 00:01:10,160 Speaker 3: a professor at UCLA Law School. Jim, this case has 16 00:01:10,200 --> 00:01:14,040 Speaker 3: been called groundbreaking. Do you think it's groundbreaking and if so, 17 00:01:14,319 --> 00:01:15,360 Speaker 3: why it is? 18 00:01:15,400 --> 00:01:17,600 Speaker 4: In some ways, but in other ways, I think it's 19 00:01:17,600 --> 00:01:21,640 Speaker 4: the standard case. The reason why it's unusual is I 20 00:01:21,720 --> 00:01:25,040 Speaker 4: believe it's the first time the SDC has brought and 21 00:01:25,160 --> 00:01:29,120 Speaker 4: won a case involving something called shadow trading, which is 22 00:01:29,160 --> 00:01:34,320 Speaker 4: a type of insider trading where you're using information that 23 00:01:34,680 --> 00:01:37,800 Speaker 4: you obtained from your own company to trade in the 24 00:01:37,880 --> 00:01:40,760 Speaker 4: stock of another company. This is the first time the 25 00:01:40,840 --> 00:01:46,280 Speaker 4: SDC has brought such a case and pursued serious sanctions. 26 00:01:46,520 --> 00:01:50,560 Speaker 4: It's not all that unusual, though, in that most of 27 00:01:50,720 --> 00:01:56,120 Speaker 4: the sort of outcome hinged upon factual issues. Did you 28 00:01:56,200 --> 00:02:01,080 Speaker 4: believe that this individual got and read the email from 29 00:02:01,080 --> 00:02:03,800 Speaker 4: the CEO which said that the company was going to 30 00:02:03,840 --> 00:02:08,519 Speaker 4: be acquired? Factual issues which are fairly routine in insider 31 00:02:08,560 --> 00:02:12,080 Speaker 4: trading cases. And I think you could argue that this 32 00:02:12,240 --> 00:02:17,720 Speaker 4: is a straightforward extension of existing law that has been 33 00:02:17,760 --> 00:02:21,480 Speaker 4: in place since the US Supreme Court's decision in the 34 00:02:21,560 --> 00:02:25,040 Speaker 4: United States versus o'hagen. But I do think that it 35 00:02:25,200 --> 00:02:28,880 Speaker 4: is significant because it shows the SEC is willing to 36 00:02:28,919 --> 00:02:33,400 Speaker 4: bring these types of cases and could do so in 37 00:02:33,440 --> 00:02:34,000 Speaker 4: the future. 38 00:02:34,560 --> 00:02:38,079 Speaker 3: What was the evidence against the defendant here? 39 00:02:38,400 --> 00:02:42,240 Speaker 4: Some of the evidence was circumstantial, so they knew the 40 00:02:42,280 --> 00:02:47,359 Speaker 4: CEO sent an email that included him and other individuals 41 00:02:47,400 --> 00:02:52,079 Speaker 4: in the company. They didn't necessarily know though, whether or 42 00:02:52,120 --> 00:02:54,840 Speaker 4: not he read the email, and he claimed the trial 43 00:02:54,960 --> 00:02:57,880 Speaker 4: that he did not read the email. But what they 44 00:02:57,919 --> 00:03:03,120 Speaker 4: do know is that minutes after the email was sent 45 00:03:03,200 --> 00:03:06,080 Speaker 4: and would have been received. He spent one hundred thousand 46 00:03:06,120 --> 00:03:11,320 Speaker 4: dollars in options in this company that was likely to 47 00:03:11,520 --> 00:03:15,040 Speaker 4: go up in price upon the announcement that his company 48 00:03:15,040 --> 00:03:18,840 Speaker 4: would be acquired, And so that is circumstantial evidence. We 49 00:03:18,919 --> 00:03:21,360 Speaker 4: don't know for a fact, you know, one hundred percent 50 00:03:21,360 --> 00:03:25,600 Speaker 4: certainty that he actually knew of this inside information and 51 00:03:25,680 --> 00:03:28,800 Speaker 4: that he read the email. But you know, that's what 52 00:03:28,840 --> 00:03:32,040 Speaker 4: a jury's for. Does a jury believe his explanation for 53 00:03:32,160 --> 00:03:34,600 Speaker 4: buying all of these options, which is that he read 54 00:03:34,960 --> 00:03:38,640 Speaker 4: a research analyst report by Goldman Sachs and that he 55 00:03:38,800 --> 00:03:42,520 Speaker 4: had been following this company for a long time. You know, 56 00:03:42,600 --> 00:03:44,880 Speaker 4: that's up to the jury. And recall that this is 57 00:03:44,920 --> 00:03:47,600 Speaker 4: a civil case. It's not a criminal case where the 58 00:03:47,640 --> 00:03:51,160 Speaker 4: SEC has to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he 59 00:03:51,320 --> 00:03:55,320 Speaker 4: violated Rule ten B five, which is the major securities 60 00:03:55,320 --> 00:03:58,560 Speaker 4: fraud provision that prohibits insider trading. They only have to 61 00:03:58,640 --> 00:04:01,600 Speaker 4: prove by a propondance of the evidence. 62 00:04:02,200 --> 00:04:05,600 Speaker 3: The defense also argued that the SEC couldn't prove that 63 00:04:05,680 --> 00:04:09,640 Speaker 3: Panawat had an intent to defraud or see enter because 64 00:04:09,680 --> 00:04:11,520 Speaker 3: he didn't know it was illegal to trade in a 65 00:04:11,600 --> 00:04:15,280 Speaker 3: company that wasn't his employer and didn't conduct business with 66 00:04:15,320 --> 00:04:18,719 Speaker 3: his employer. So his attorney told the jury, the evidence 67 00:04:18,760 --> 00:04:21,799 Speaker 3: will show that the entire SEC case is an attempt 68 00:04:21,880 --> 00:04:24,919 Speaker 3: to put thoughts in mister Panawat's head that were not 69 00:04:25,120 --> 00:04:26,720 Speaker 3: there when he made the trades. 70 00:04:27,440 --> 00:04:31,919 Speaker 4: It's a substantial argument, and these cases depend on intent, 71 00:04:32,640 --> 00:04:36,120 Speaker 4: and because we don't know for sure what someone's intent is, 72 00:04:36,680 --> 00:04:39,120 Speaker 4: that's up for the jury to decide. And the jury 73 00:04:39,160 --> 00:04:42,279 Speaker 4: looked at the evidence and they believed circumstantially that he 74 00:04:42,360 --> 00:04:45,320 Speaker 4: acted with bad intent. And you know, one fact in 75 00:04:45,320 --> 00:04:48,599 Speaker 4: favor of the SEC is that he buys one hundred 76 00:04:48,640 --> 00:04:52,880 Speaker 4: thousand dollars in option. His purchase is represented around eighty 77 00:04:52,920 --> 00:04:56,479 Speaker 4: percent of the options trading in that stock on that 78 00:04:56,600 --> 00:05:01,279 Speaker 4: particular day. That is very unusual. And you know, the 79 00:05:01,360 --> 00:05:04,000 Speaker 4: other point I would make is that ignorance of the 80 00:05:04,120 --> 00:05:06,880 Speaker 4: law is not a defense. Even if you don't know 81 00:05:06,920 --> 00:05:09,200 Speaker 4: all the ins and outs of insider trading law, which 82 00:05:09,240 --> 00:05:13,880 Speaker 4: is complicated, that is not a defense to liability. Now, 83 00:05:14,120 --> 00:05:16,200 Speaker 4: he does have an argument that I just was not 84 00:05:16,360 --> 00:05:19,559 Speaker 4: conscious of doing anything wrong, because you know, I didn't 85 00:05:19,640 --> 00:05:22,839 Speaker 4: understand I couldn't trade in the stock of other companies, 86 00:05:23,080 --> 00:05:25,800 Speaker 4: and the fact of the matter is he signs the 87 00:05:25,920 --> 00:05:30,480 Speaker 4: policy saying that you cannot use company information to trade 88 00:05:30,480 --> 00:05:34,359 Speaker 4: in the securities of another publicly traded company. Now, you know, 89 00:05:34,400 --> 00:05:37,080 Speaker 4: I think, mister Pano, what would say, You know, we 90 00:05:37,279 --> 00:05:40,400 Speaker 4: sign all sorts of things when he joined a new company. 91 00:05:40,680 --> 00:05:43,840 Speaker 4: We may not read these things carefully. And I just 92 00:05:43,880 --> 00:05:47,479 Speaker 4: didn't understand this. The jury could have decided you are accountable, 93 00:05:47,600 --> 00:05:50,760 Speaker 4: and you are accountable because you signed the policy, and 94 00:05:51,040 --> 00:05:53,960 Speaker 4: because you signed it, you have to follow it. And 95 00:05:54,000 --> 00:05:57,360 Speaker 4: if you're not following it, you know you're deceiving your company. 96 00:05:57,600 --> 00:06:00,560 Speaker 4: And that sort of deception is a type of missuppropriation 97 00:06:01,040 --> 00:06:05,160 Speaker 4: of the company's confidential information. You know, another argument you 98 00:06:05,240 --> 00:06:07,120 Speaker 4: could make might be a you know, I found a 99 00:06:07,160 --> 00:06:09,720 Speaker 4: loophole and I'm gaving the system. I don't know how 100 00:06:09,720 --> 00:06:12,200 Speaker 4: sympathetic the jury would be to that argument, but you know, 101 00:06:12,279 --> 00:06:14,400 Speaker 4: that is the sort of argument that one could give 102 00:06:14,520 --> 00:06:17,680 Speaker 4: some weights to. But the jury rejected those arguments. 103 00:06:18,040 --> 00:06:22,200 Speaker 3: You mentioned the policy, the confidentiality agreement that Panawat signed. 104 00:06:22,680 --> 00:06:27,200 Speaker 3: Could the SEC have brought this case without that confidentiality agreement? 105 00:06:27,800 --> 00:06:28,240 Speaker 2: This is the. 106 00:06:28,240 --> 00:06:32,760 Speaker 4: Foundation of the case. Without this policy, the SEC would 107 00:06:32,800 --> 00:06:36,240 Speaker 4: not have an insider trading case, you can only misappropriate 108 00:06:36,520 --> 00:06:40,479 Speaker 4: confidential information and violate Rule ten B five based on 109 00:06:40,600 --> 00:06:45,120 Speaker 4: inside information if you have a fiduciary duty to the 110 00:06:45,120 --> 00:06:50,120 Speaker 4: corporation who stock your trading in, or you have agreed 111 00:06:50,440 --> 00:06:54,120 Speaker 4: to keep information confidential. Those are the two mechanisms by 112 00:06:54,160 --> 00:06:58,960 Speaker 4: which you can violate insider trading prohibitions. The first avenue 113 00:06:59,080 --> 00:07:02,440 Speaker 4: is called the classical theory of insider trading, and that 114 00:07:02,480 --> 00:07:07,280 Speaker 4: actually does not apply to this case because Panawat does 115 00:07:07,320 --> 00:07:10,680 Speaker 4: not have any fiduciary duties to Insight, which is the 116 00:07:10,720 --> 00:07:14,120 Speaker 4: company that he traded in. He might have some juduciary 117 00:07:14,280 --> 00:07:18,920 Speaker 4: like duties to his company metivation. But that's why you 118 00:07:19,000 --> 00:07:21,119 Speaker 4: know this is seen or was seen as a type 119 00:07:21,120 --> 00:07:25,280 Speaker 4: of loophole. It gets you around the classical theory. But 120 00:07:25,840 --> 00:07:29,200 Speaker 4: there's a second theory which has just as much status, 121 00:07:29,240 --> 00:07:32,840 Speaker 4: has been approved by the Supreme Court called the misappropriation theory. 122 00:07:33,240 --> 00:07:37,160 Speaker 4: And under that theory, the deception is when you sign 123 00:07:37,240 --> 00:07:41,120 Speaker 4: a policy of confidentiality with your company that commits you 124 00:07:41,280 --> 00:07:45,280 Speaker 4: to complying with that policy, and if you deceptively trade 125 00:07:45,280 --> 00:07:48,680 Speaker 4: and violation of that policy, you have violated Rule ten 126 00:07:48,760 --> 00:07:52,240 Speaker 4: D five. So it is absolutely essential that they had 127 00:07:52,280 --> 00:07:55,680 Speaker 4: a policy that specified you cannot trade in the securities 128 00:07:55,840 --> 00:07:59,280 Speaker 4: of another publicly traded company. If they did not have 129 00:07:59,800 --> 00:08:03,880 Speaker 4: that policy and a general policy of confidentiality, the SEC 130 00:08:03,920 --> 00:08:07,080 Speaker 4: would not have had a case. Many public companies are 131 00:08:07,120 --> 00:08:10,960 Speaker 4: adopting these types of broad insider trading policies that cover 132 00:08:11,280 --> 00:08:13,720 Speaker 4: securities of other publicly traded companies. 133 00:08:14,120 --> 00:08:17,880 Speaker 3: Do you think that this case will survive and appeal this. 134 00:08:17,880 --> 00:08:20,640 Speaker 4: Theory, It's always hard to say. I think on the 135 00:08:20,680 --> 00:08:25,120 Speaker 4: factual determinations, there's not much of a basis for overturning 136 00:08:25,160 --> 00:08:28,120 Speaker 4: the case. The vulnerable point to me, I think is 137 00:08:28,280 --> 00:08:30,840 Speaker 4: on the enter. I think that is the one argument 138 00:08:31,000 --> 00:08:34,160 Speaker 4: that a judge on the Ninth Circuit or perhaps the 139 00:08:34,200 --> 00:08:38,280 Speaker 4: Supreme Court could look at very closely on these facts 140 00:08:38,360 --> 00:08:41,760 Speaker 4: and could be a little bit skeptical of the sec 141 00:08:42,080 --> 00:08:45,080 Speaker 4: theory of the case. On the other hand, you know, 142 00:08:45,120 --> 00:08:49,240 Speaker 4: these are typically factual matters. The fraudulent intent is a 143 00:08:49,280 --> 00:08:52,800 Speaker 4: matter for the jury, and many appellate courts will defer 144 00:08:52,880 --> 00:08:55,440 Speaker 4: to that, and the Supreme Court may not think of 145 00:08:55,480 --> 00:08:58,560 Speaker 4: this as a good vessel for clarifying the boundaries of 146 00:08:58,559 --> 00:08:59,680 Speaker 4: insider trading laws. 147 00:09:00,000 --> 00:09:04,080 Speaker 3: The SEC has been criticized for pushing into new territory 148 00:09:04,200 --> 00:09:09,320 Speaker 3: and stretching its enforcement powers beyond its jurisdiction, for example, 149 00:09:09,360 --> 00:09:14,080 Speaker 3: bringing cases over McDonald's CEO's relationship with an employee, the 150 00:09:14,200 --> 00:09:18,240 Speaker 3: workplace culture at a video game developer, and several cutting 151 00:09:18,360 --> 00:09:21,840 Speaker 3: edge cases to gain greater control over cryptocurrency. 152 00:09:22,320 --> 00:09:26,439 Speaker 4: That is the criticism, and one response the SEC might 153 00:09:26,520 --> 00:09:30,160 Speaker 4: have is that these are novel problems and the reason 154 00:09:30,200 --> 00:09:33,240 Speaker 4: we were not addressing them before is the SEC was 155 00:09:33,320 --> 00:09:35,800 Speaker 4: too passive. We need to get out there, We need 156 00:09:35,800 --> 00:09:40,360 Speaker 4: to enforce the laws the novel situations and educate people 157 00:09:40,400 --> 00:09:43,760 Speaker 4: about what the law is. You can't simply ignore these 158 00:09:43,960 --> 00:09:48,200 Speaker 4: broader standards and principles. And if you're applying the definition 159 00:09:48,240 --> 00:09:51,760 Speaker 4: of insider trading in this appropriation in security and good faith, 160 00:09:52,080 --> 00:09:54,760 Speaker 4: you would know that in some cases that there are 161 00:09:54,840 --> 00:09:58,120 Speaker 4: violations of securities laws. Now, the argument on the other 162 00:09:58,200 --> 00:10:02,319 Speaker 4: side is that certainly the SEC has become more aggressive 163 00:10:02,520 --> 00:10:05,640 Speaker 4: and I would say more entrepreneurial in certain ways, and 164 00:10:05,720 --> 00:10:08,559 Speaker 4: part of that is that you have a more expansive, 165 00:10:08,640 --> 00:10:12,760 Speaker 4: aggressive regulatory policy, and enforcement is a way to develop 166 00:10:12,840 --> 00:10:16,559 Speaker 4: that policy. And you know they're positives and negatives, I think, 167 00:10:16,640 --> 00:10:18,920 Speaker 4: but recall that there are times when the SEC is 168 00:10:18,960 --> 00:10:22,960 Speaker 4: criticized as too passive, too much of a bureaucracy captured 169 00:10:22,960 --> 00:10:26,240 Speaker 4: by the industry because the lawyers want to get good 170 00:10:26,320 --> 00:10:28,840 Speaker 4: jobs with law firms, and so, you know, I think 171 00:10:28,880 --> 00:10:31,400 Speaker 4: either way, if you're too passive, if you're too aggressive, 172 00:10:31,440 --> 00:10:34,040 Speaker 4: the SEC is going to face some criticism for its 173 00:10:34,120 --> 00:10:37,200 Speaker 4: enforcement policies. But I would say that I do think 174 00:10:37,240 --> 00:10:41,200 Speaker 4: that this administration, for better or worse, has implemented a 175 00:10:41,200 --> 00:10:45,120 Speaker 4: more entrepreneurial or aggressive approach to enforcement. 176 00:10:45,679 --> 00:10:48,559 Speaker 3: Finally, how big a victory is this for the SEC? 177 00:10:49,200 --> 00:10:51,240 Speaker 3: A ten on a ten scale or. 178 00:10:51,360 --> 00:10:54,320 Speaker 4: Five, it's a big victory. Every trial win is a 179 00:10:54,400 --> 00:10:57,280 Speaker 4: big thing and a good thing for the SEC, because 180 00:10:57,320 --> 00:11:00,640 Speaker 4: you're not just settling cases. That's the criticism of the 181 00:11:00,720 --> 00:11:04,160 Speaker 4: SEC is that too often they just settle cases the 182 00:11:04,200 --> 00:11:08,160 Speaker 4: defendant doesn't admit too wrongdoing or deny it, and the 183 00:11:08,200 --> 00:11:11,000 Speaker 4: SEC has been afraid or doesn't have the resources to 184 00:11:11,120 --> 00:11:14,080 Speaker 4: actually go in front of judges and juries and test 185 00:11:14,160 --> 00:11:18,520 Speaker 4: their theory. So I think this is very significant, and 186 00:11:19,120 --> 00:11:23,439 Speaker 4: you know, along with their win in the Coinbase motion 187 00:11:23,640 --> 00:11:27,640 Speaker 4: to dismiss, it's been a good few weeks for the SDC, 188 00:11:28,000 --> 00:11:31,479 Speaker 4: and these are needed wins because when you're getting criticized 189 00:11:31,559 --> 00:11:36,079 Speaker 4: for stretching the law regulating by enforcement. The suurest response 190 00:11:36,200 --> 00:11:39,400 Speaker 4: is winning cases in courts, and you know they have 191 00:11:39,520 --> 00:11:43,120 Speaker 4: won these cases. They need to keep litigating cases and 192 00:11:43,240 --> 00:11:48,040 Speaker 4: winning them fairly consistently in order to enhance the legitimacy 193 00:11:48,080 --> 00:11:49,200 Speaker 4: of their enforcement effort. 194 00:11:49,400 --> 00:11:52,760 Speaker 3: Thanks so much, Jim. That's Professor James Park of UCLA 195 00:11:52,880 --> 00:11:56,320 Speaker 3: Law School coming up. The twenty twenty four election is 196 00:11:56,400 --> 00:12:00,000 Speaker 3: already being fought out in the courts. I'm June Gross 197 00:12:00,080 --> 00:12:03,400 Speaker 3: and you're listening to Bloomberg and. 198 00:12:03,360 --> 00:12:05,959 Speaker 5: That was a rigged election and it's a shame that 199 00:12:06,000 --> 00:12:07,480 Speaker 5: we had to go through, and it's very bad for 200 00:12:07,520 --> 00:12:08,040 Speaker 5: our country. 201 00:12:08,200 --> 00:12:11,120 Speaker 3: We've heard that false claim from Donald Trump about the 202 00:12:11,160 --> 00:12:16,280 Speaker 3: twenty twenty presidential election over and over and over, despite 203 00:12:16,320 --> 00:12:19,600 Speaker 3: the fact that sixty court cases found no evidence of 204 00:12:19,640 --> 00:12:23,720 Speaker 3: fraud or illegality. It seems to be part of Trump's repertoire. 205 00:12:23,960 --> 00:12:28,080 Speaker 5: The election is being rigged by corrupt media, pushing false 206 00:12:28,120 --> 00:12:33,000 Speaker 5: allegations and outright lies in an effort to elect Hillary 207 00:12:33,040 --> 00:12:34,120 Speaker 5: Clinton president. 208 00:12:34,440 --> 00:12:38,520 Speaker 3: Of course, he dropped those rigged election claims after he won, 209 00:12:39,000 --> 00:12:42,200 Speaker 3: but they're just below the surface of this year's election. 210 00:12:42,760 --> 00:12:44,240 Speaker 5: Republicans must win. 211 00:12:44,360 --> 00:12:45,920 Speaker 3: We want to landslide. 212 00:12:45,960 --> 00:12:48,600 Speaker 5: We wanted to be too big, too rigged. 213 00:12:48,840 --> 00:12:51,480 Speaker 3: Will there be a repeat this year of the litigation 214 00:12:51,760 --> 00:12:55,320 Speaker 3: frenzy that followed the twenty twenty election. Well, the election 215 00:12:55,480 --> 00:12:58,760 Speaker 3: is more than six months away, but political groups are 216 00:12:58,840 --> 00:13:03,000 Speaker 3: filing so many lawsuits over voting rules that the numbers 217 00:13:03,080 --> 00:13:06,679 Speaker 3: could reach the record set in that bitterly contested election. 218 00:13:07,200 --> 00:13:10,679 Speaker 3: The Democratic and Republican parties have raised about forty one 219 00:13:10,760 --> 00:13:15,840 Speaker 3: point three million dollars to spend on court fights, and nonprofits, 220 00:13:15,840 --> 00:13:19,960 Speaker 3: including some dark money groups, have likely raised hundreds of 221 00:13:20,000 --> 00:13:23,840 Speaker 3: millions more. Joining me is elections law expert Derek Muller, 222 00:13:23,880 --> 00:13:27,280 Speaker 3: a professor at Notre Dame Law School. Fighting over election 223 00:13:27,440 --> 00:13:30,960 Speaker 3: rules in court is big business for lawyers and the 224 00:13:31,000 --> 00:13:33,319 Speaker 3: groups challenging them. Just how big? 225 00:13:33,640 --> 00:13:38,040 Speaker 1: So we know that the political parties can collect significant 226 00:13:38,040 --> 00:13:42,120 Speaker 1: amounts of money ear mark designated for election expenses. So 227 00:13:42,160 --> 00:13:46,200 Speaker 1: the RNC and DNC have large pools of money that 228 00:13:46,280 --> 00:13:49,520 Speaker 1: are upwards of one hundred million dollars a year now 229 00:13:49,679 --> 00:13:52,600 Speaker 1: to be thinking about these kinds of expenditures. So they 230 00:13:52,640 --> 00:13:56,280 Speaker 1: have significant funds that they can use to involve them 231 00:13:56,320 --> 00:14:00,080 Speaker 1: self mitigation to start litigation to intervene in litigation. Not 232 00:14:00,120 --> 00:14:03,680 Speaker 1: even just the parties, the growth of additional five LLANC 233 00:14:03,840 --> 00:14:08,600 Speaker 1: three's nonprofits organizations dedicated to rooting out voter fraud or 234 00:14:08,640 --> 00:14:12,280 Speaker 1: protecting democracy or whatever we might label the organizations and 235 00:14:12,320 --> 00:14:14,640 Speaker 1: those we don't even have a sense of the scope 236 00:14:14,640 --> 00:14:17,040 Speaker 1: and scale of these things. So it's significant amounts of 237 00:14:17,080 --> 00:14:20,480 Speaker 1: money coming into the system specifically for litigation. 238 00:14:21,360 --> 00:14:25,640 Speaker 3: And there are groups nonprofits where we don't know where 239 00:14:25,640 --> 00:14:28,480 Speaker 3: their money is coming from or how they're spending it. 240 00:14:28,720 --> 00:14:31,160 Speaker 1: So when it comes to the DNC or the RNC, 241 00:14:31,440 --> 00:14:33,960 Speaker 1: we know their donors, we know the individuals who have 242 00:14:34,080 --> 00:14:38,440 Speaker 1: contributed to these entities. You know, there are limitations about 243 00:14:38,440 --> 00:14:43,160 Speaker 1: what packs can contribute to parties, so we have some 244 00:14:43,200 --> 00:14:45,720 Speaker 1: transparency about where that money is coming from, at least 245 00:14:45,720 --> 00:14:48,800 Speaker 1: in terms of the direct contributions to the parties. Where 246 00:14:48,880 --> 00:14:51,520 Speaker 1: the so called dark money groups comes in would be 247 00:14:51,760 --> 00:14:54,760 Speaker 1: if there are other outside groups on the right or 248 00:14:54,760 --> 00:14:59,560 Speaker 1: the left who are starting litigation, engaged in litigation, funding litigation, 249 00:14:59,720 --> 00:15:03,920 Speaker 1: in beingian litigation, who want to support or promote certain 250 00:15:04,000 --> 00:15:06,440 Speaker 1: kinds of laws or anticipate those ahead of the twenty 251 00:15:06,480 --> 00:15:09,520 Speaker 1: twenty four election, So you've seen some of these organizations 252 00:15:09,520 --> 00:15:12,760 Speaker 1: from you know, former government officials, you know, both on 253 00:15:12,760 --> 00:15:14,960 Speaker 1: the right and the left, to support Trump who opposed Trump. 254 00:15:15,120 --> 00:15:16,800 Speaker 1: I think often think of it in those terms, maybe 255 00:15:16,880 --> 00:15:20,480 Speaker 1: rather than a Republican and Democrats these days. But those organizations, 256 00:15:20,680 --> 00:15:23,720 Speaker 1: you know, we don't necessarily know where their funding's coming from, 257 00:15:23,920 --> 00:15:26,680 Speaker 1: who's supporting them? Are the reasons why they're litigating. But 258 00:15:26,680 --> 00:15:28,280 Speaker 1: when it comes to the parties, at least we have 259 00:15:28,360 --> 00:15:30,400 Speaker 1: some some pretty good transparency. 260 00:15:30,800 --> 00:15:35,160 Speaker 6: This, you know, sort of fierce challenging of election laws 261 00:15:35,240 --> 00:15:39,440 Speaker 6: and venus election laws. Did it start after Bush v. 262 00:15:39,600 --> 00:15:42,920 Speaker 6: Gore or did it start in twenty twenty? 263 00:15:44,600 --> 00:15:48,120 Speaker 1: It keeps rising, So there's lots of inflection points. So 264 00:15:48,240 --> 00:15:51,200 Speaker 1: Professor Rickhats in his tracked how Bush versus Gore was 265 00:15:51,240 --> 00:15:53,760 Speaker 1: sort of the first wave of these things because Bush 266 00:15:53,800 --> 00:15:55,680 Speaker 1: versus Gore, it's not just that, you know, a very 267 00:15:55,760 --> 00:15:57,960 Speaker 1: small margin to Florida could affect the outcome of a 268 00:15:58,000 --> 00:16:01,200 Speaker 1: presidential election. It also signified the federal courts were open 269 00:16:01,280 --> 00:16:04,240 Speaker 1: for business about how you get a recount right, how 270 00:16:04,240 --> 00:16:08,600 Speaker 1: your machines were counting ballots. So we see a steady 271 00:16:08,680 --> 00:16:12,800 Speaker 1: uptick in election litigation after the two thousand election. But again, 272 00:16:12,840 --> 00:16:15,760 Speaker 1: there are different inflection points that arise, you know, throughout 273 00:16:15,760 --> 00:16:19,760 Speaker 1: this period of time, as states introduce vot identification laws 274 00:16:19,760 --> 00:16:22,520 Speaker 1: and those become a sort of rallying cry and a 275 00:16:22,680 --> 00:16:26,560 Speaker 1: challenging point for different groups or different legislatures. We see 276 00:16:26,560 --> 00:16:29,920 Speaker 1: just the significant uptick in litigation around those things FROMNIBUS 277 00:16:30,000 --> 00:16:33,720 Speaker 1: Bill twenty fourteen. Twenty fifteen creates this mechanism for more 278 00:16:33,800 --> 00:16:37,200 Speaker 1: funding and elections. You know, after the twenty sixteen election 279 00:16:37,400 --> 00:16:40,520 Speaker 1: we see Green Party candidate Jill Steine pressing for recounts 280 00:16:40,560 --> 00:16:43,160 Speaker 1: around the United States, and twenty twenty we see the 281 00:16:43,240 --> 00:16:45,920 Speaker 1: run up to the election is a lot of changes 282 00:16:46,000 --> 00:16:49,000 Speaker 1: due to COVID, and then there's just tons of litigation 283 00:16:49,160 --> 00:16:52,960 Speaker 1: being filed to challenge the rules or to last accommodations 284 00:16:52,960 --> 00:16:55,840 Speaker 1: from the rules, followed by all those challenges after the 285 00:16:55,880 --> 00:16:59,280 Speaker 1: twenty twenty election. So every cycle just seems to be 286 00:16:59,280 --> 00:17:03,880 Speaker 1: bringing its own new challenges, new crises, new rallying points 287 00:17:03,920 --> 00:17:06,639 Speaker 1: to fundraise off of. You know, a lot of election 288 00:17:06,800 --> 00:17:09,720 Speaker 1: laws that were enacted by legislatures in the past that 289 00:17:09,840 --> 00:17:12,160 Speaker 1: might have been ignored or sort of just moved beyond, 290 00:17:12,240 --> 00:17:15,440 Speaker 1: and party organizers would have accommoded them or handled them 291 00:17:15,640 --> 00:17:19,280 Speaker 1: now are being challenged. Almost any change to your election 292 00:17:19,440 --> 00:17:21,919 Speaker 1: machinery in very basic terms, from the buying of a 293 00:17:21,960 --> 00:17:26,000 Speaker 1: machine to the list maintenance of your voter roles, gets 294 00:17:26,080 --> 00:17:28,320 Speaker 1: challenged by some group on the right or left. So 295 00:17:28,359 --> 00:17:30,760 Speaker 1: we're just seeing this escalation, and I think part of 296 00:17:30,760 --> 00:17:32,760 Speaker 1: it is the availability of funding, and maybe part of 297 00:17:32,800 --> 00:17:35,439 Speaker 1: it is the awareness that parties think that very small 298 00:17:35,440 --> 00:17:38,480 Speaker 1: differences can matter, and so they want to challenge as 299 00:17:38,560 --> 00:17:41,359 Speaker 1: much as they can, anticipating that a small change might 300 00:17:41,400 --> 00:17:42,240 Speaker 1: matter in their election. 301 00:17:42,680 --> 00:17:47,119 Speaker 6: And are the big groups that are challenging and defending 302 00:17:47,160 --> 00:17:50,560 Speaker 6: these laws. Are they all tied to a party or 303 00:17:50,600 --> 00:17:53,480 Speaker 6: a candidate, or any of them independent? 304 00:17:54,200 --> 00:17:57,480 Speaker 1: So a number are at least extensively independent right, But 305 00:17:57,560 --> 00:17:59,520 Speaker 1: a number of them do tend to file on one 306 00:17:59,560 --> 00:18:01,680 Speaker 1: side or the other. So some of them will have 307 00:18:01,920 --> 00:18:05,560 Speaker 1: former Republican officials think about restoring integrity and trust and elections, 308 00:18:05,640 --> 00:18:08,359 Speaker 1: the Honest Elections Project or things like that, or some 309 00:18:08,400 --> 00:18:10,760 Speaker 1: of them will have former Democratic officials or of never 310 00:18:10,800 --> 00:18:13,880 Speaker 1: Trump officials who are participating. Some of them States, United 311 00:18:13,920 --> 00:18:16,920 Speaker 1: Democracy Center, Protect Democracy, or some of these organizations tend 312 00:18:16,920 --> 00:18:18,920 Speaker 1: to file much more heavily on the democratic side, and 313 00:18:18,960 --> 00:18:22,280 Speaker 1: the Republican side, so you can trace what these organizations 314 00:18:22,280 --> 00:18:25,359 Speaker 1: are doing and see where their officials are. And they 315 00:18:25,440 --> 00:18:28,679 Speaker 1: can't formally coordinate with the parties because if you have 316 00:18:28,760 --> 00:18:33,119 Speaker 1: that coordination, it creates campaign finance problems. But it's that 317 00:18:33,240 --> 00:18:36,280 Speaker 1: they are going around. They're filing litigation and again places 318 00:18:36,280 --> 00:18:38,719 Speaker 1: maybe where the party doesn't have the resources to do it, 319 00:18:38,840 --> 00:18:41,639 Speaker 1: or isn't aware of it, or wants another group president 320 00:18:41,720 --> 00:18:43,919 Speaker 1: the party to be involved. That said, the parties do 321 00:18:44,000 --> 00:18:46,840 Speaker 1: still have some significant involvement. I'sk the most significant party 322 00:18:46,920 --> 00:18:50,560 Speaker 1: level litigation right now. It's Democratic National Committee leading a 323 00:18:50,600 --> 00:18:53,640 Speaker 1: number of challenges to keep Robert F. Kennedy's name off 324 00:18:53,680 --> 00:18:55,960 Speaker 1: the ballot in a number of states, I think, viewing 325 00:18:56,000 --> 00:18:58,040 Speaker 1: him as a third party threat. I think the R 326 00:18:58,080 --> 00:18:59,520 Speaker 1: and T might view him as a threat too, but 327 00:18:59,600 --> 00:19:03,120 Speaker 1: hasn't all those challenges. So again, it's hard to pin 328 00:19:03,280 --> 00:19:06,520 Speaker 1: down exactly who's leading the litigation in some of these places. 329 00:19:06,560 --> 00:19:10,080 Speaker 1: It's following the headlines, seeing who's led on the docket, 330 00:19:10,119 --> 00:19:12,080 Speaker 1: what the lead party's name is, and then trying to 331 00:19:12,080 --> 00:19:15,679 Speaker 1: identify who they tend to support or where their attorneys 332 00:19:15,760 --> 00:19:16,879 Speaker 1: have come from. 333 00:19:17,359 --> 00:19:21,000 Speaker 3: And it seems like so many of these lawsuits. 334 00:19:21,080 --> 00:19:25,240 Speaker 6: Are not helping to clarify things, but they're attacking this 335 00:19:25,560 --> 00:19:27,959 Speaker 6: minutia to deter the process. 336 00:19:28,680 --> 00:19:31,200 Speaker 1: So I think about this from kind of an economic standpoint. 337 00:19:31,400 --> 00:19:37,240 Speaker 1: If you have limited resources to challenge the rules governing elections, 338 00:19:37,760 --> 00:19:40,360 Speaker 1: you are going to challenge the things that you think 339 00:19:40,400 --> 00:19:43,600 Speaker 1: are the biggest deal, right, the most important ones, the 340 00:19:43,600 --> 00:19:47,000 Speaker 1: ones that you think are really truly changing the game. 341 00:19:47,280 --> 00:19:49,320 Speaker 1: And that's also the case that if you didn't have 342 00:19:49,400 --> 00:19:52,879 Speaker 1: money earmarked for litigation as a campaign, you would have 343 00:19:52,960 --> 00:19:55,160 Speaker 1: to make a judgment call, do I think this two 344 00:19:55,200 --> 00:19:59,720 Speaker 1: hundred and fifty thousand dollars is better spent on advertisements 345 00:20:00,080 --> 00:20:04,720 Speaker 1: in our district or on litigating you know, this absentee 346 00:20:04,800 --> 00:20:08,159 Speaker 1: voter rule or this drop box rule or whatever it is. 347 00:20:08,400 --> 00:20:12,080 Speaker 1: So in the past, you would focus your resources on 348 00:20:12,200 --> 00:20:15,159 Speaker 1: those things that were the most salient, issues that you 349 00:20:15,240 --> 00:20:17,640 Speaker 1: thought had the highest likelihood of winning, and those things 350 00:20:17,680 --> 00:20:21,480 Speaker 1: that you thought were better uses of resources than sort 351 00:20:21,480 --> 00:20:25,280 Speaker 1: of ordinary political expenses. Now, when you earmark the funds, 352 00:20:25,359 --> 00:20:28,120 Speaker 1: you are saying this money is for only litigation. These 353 00:20:28,160 --> 00:20:31,560 Speaker 1: contributions can only be for litigation purposes, So you don't 354 00:20:31,600 --> 00:20:34,400 Speaker 1: have to make that trade off, and the more resources 355 00:20:34,440 --> 00:20:36,960 Speaker 1: you have, the more money you have to spend on litigation, 356 00:20:37,359 --> 00:20:40,400 Speaker 1: then the more things you can challenge, and the more 357 00:20:40,400 --> 00:20:43,520 Speaker 1: things you challenge, by definition, you are challenging weaker and 358 00:20:43,560 --> 00:20:46,439 Speaker 1: weaker claims, or more and more marginal claims, more and 359 00:20:46,440 --> 00:20:49,240 Speaker 1: more minutia of elections. To say, you know, we're dealing 360 00:20:49,280 --> 00:20:52,160 Speaker 1: with a very small subset of what we think could 361 00:20:52,200 --> 00:20:54,560 Speaker 1: be at stake here. So if we can say, you know, 362 00:20:54,680 --> 00:20:57,080 Speaker 1: at a very high level, of course, we want elections 363 00:20:57,080 --> 00:20:59,960 Speaker 1: to be run fairly and with integrity. We want every 364 00:21:00,080 --> 00:21:03,040 Speaker 1: eligible voter to have a reasonable opportunity to vote, and 365 00:21:03,080 --> 00:21:07,000 Speaker 1: we don't want that vote unreasonably burdened. But we now 366 00:21:07,080 --> 00:21:10,119 Speaker 1: expect a lot of things, even what we could describe 367 00:21:10,160 --> 00:21:13,879 Speaker 1: as fairly small things about how elections are run, on 368 00:21:14,200 --> 00:21:18,600 Speaker 1: how counties are purchasing voting equipment, or the methods they 369 00:21:18,680 --> 00:21:21,919 Speaker 1: use to tabulate ballots. They're just being routinely challenged. So 370 00:21:22,080 --> 00:21:24,320 Speaker 1: many of these lawsuits just don't go anywhere. They're not 371 00:21:24,400 --> 00:21:26,560 Speaker 1: going to end up being successful, or even if they're 372 00:21:26,560 --> 00:21:28,639 Speaker 1: successful at the district court level, they're likely to be 373 00:21:28,720 --> 00:21:33,080 Speaker 1: reversed and appeal. We're watching that escalation and trying to 374 00:21:33,080 --> 00:21:36,040 Speaker 1: calculate what's the actual added value at the end of 375 00:21:36,080 --> 00:21:38,320 Speaker 1: the day, how much of it is win loss rate, 376 00:21:38,400 --> 00:21:41,640 Speaker 1: and how much of it is convincing donors. They're convincing 377 00:21:41,640 --> 00:21:43,960 Speaker 1: those are your fund raised from to say, hey, we've 378 00:21:44,240 --> 00:21:46,479 Speaker 1: filed lawsuit, we're fighting the fight, and then even if 379 00:21:46,520 --> 00:21:49,160 Speaker 1: we lose, the point is we're fighting. So that's been 380 00:21:49,520 --> 00:21:51,280 Speaker 1: a change in the dynamic, I would say, over the 381 00:21:51,359 --> 00:21:52,280 Speaker 1: last couple of decades. 382 00:21:52,560 --> 00:21:55,760 Speaker 3: So could this year be worse in terms of election 383 00:21:55,920 --> 00:22:02,080 Speaker 3: litigation than the seemingly endless litigation we saw in twenty twenty. 384 00:22:02,880 --> 00:22:05,600 Speaker 1: Well, it could be. It always depends on how close 385 00:22:05,640 --> 00:22:08,560 Speaker 1: it is, right, the closer the margin, the more lidiation. 386 00:22:08,760 --> 00:22:10,679 Speaker 1: Now we say that, you know, twenty twenty in a 387 00:22:10,720 --> 00:22:13,840 Speaker 1: way wasn't particularly close because you would have had to 388 00:22:13,880 --> 00:22:19,080 Speaker 1: flip several states with somewhat significant margins of victory in 389 00:22:19,080 --> 00:22:23,320 Speaker 1: those jurisdictions, even after a recount in places like Georgia. 390 00:22:23,400 --> 00:22:25,639 Speaker 1: So we'll have to see, you know, if it's a 391 00:22:25,720 --> 00:22:29,440 Speaker 1: Republican loss or an apparent Republican loss. There are a 392 00:22:29,520 --> 00:22:32,960 Speaker 1: number of attorneys who promoted things in twenty twenty and 393 00:22:33,040 --> 00:22:36,200 Speaker 1: filed lawsuits who are facing sanctions or have been disbarred, 394 00:22:36,320 --> 00:22:38,000 Speaker 1: and I don't know if that's going to be sobering 395 00:22:38,040 --> 00:22:41,000 Speaker 1: for attorneys on the Republican side to think about the 396 00:22:41,080 --> 00:22:43,639 Speaker 1: quality of the claims they bring. And again it depends 397 00:22:43,680 --> 00:22:45,639 Speaker 1: on the side of the loss, the scope of the laws, 398 00:22:45,920 --> 00:22:48,320 Speaker 1: and many of the strategies in twenty twenty turn on 399 00:22:48,440 --> 00:22:51,440 Speaker 1: allegations that states change their laws in the middle of 400 00:22:51,440 --> 00:22:54,120 Speaker 1: the pandemic inappropriately. You're not going to see that kind 401 00:22:54,160 --> 00:22:57,840 Speaker 1: of dynamic effect in twenty twenty four, And there are 402 00:22:57,920 --> 00:23:00,879 Speaker 1: changes to Electoral Account Reform Act that sort of tighten 403 00:23:00,960 --> 00:23:04,400 Speaker 1: some of the deadlines and force governors to submit certificates 404 00:23:04,480 --> 00:23:07,000 Speaker 1: in an earlier and more timely fashion. So I think 405 00:23:07,160 --> 00:23:10,399 Speaker 1: there's a decent chance we would see less litigation on 406 00:23:10,480 --> 00:23:13,320 Speaker 1: that front for Democrats and a close loss. Again, it's 407 00:23:13,359 --> 00:23:15,639 Speaker 1: hard to know exactly what that would look like. You know, 408 00:23:15,840 --> 00:23:18,879 Speaker 1: how many resources would be focused on certain jurisdictions to 409 00:23:18,920 --> 00:23:22,359 Speaker 1: allege their violations of federal law. Again, I think it 410 00:23:22,400 --> 00:23:26,480 Speaker 1: depends on the kinds of jurisdictions where places like Pennsylvania, 411 00:23:26,680 --> 00:23:30,239 Speaker 1: where you have more disparate methods in how ballots are 412 00:23:30,240 --> 00:23:33,600 Speaker 1: counted across counties, you have more opportunities to bring those 413 00:23:33,680 --> 00:23:36,640 Speaker 1: challenges and to try to get more absentee other kinds 414 00:23:36,640 --> 00:23:39,960 Speaker 1: of ballots counted, which might redound to the benefits of 415 00:23:40,160 --> 00:23:42,920 Speaker 1: whichever candidate is trailing at the time. But it's a 416 00:23:42,960 --> 00:23:46,080 Speaker 1: high degree of uncertainty. We might see more in twenty 417 00:23:46,440 --> 00:23:48,480 Speaker 1: twenty four. And you know, I go back to the 418 00:23:48,480 --> 00:23:50,960 Speaker 1: two thousand elections. We didn't see a lot of states 419 00:23:50,960 --> 00:23:53,639 Speaker 1: with litigation. We just saw a lot of litigation concentrated 420 00:23:53,640 --> 00:23:56,040 Speaker 1: in one state. I think the thing about twenty twenty 421 00:23:56,040 --> 00:23:58,399 Speaker 1: that was more remarkable with seeing how diffuse and spread 422 00:23:58,440 --> 00:24:01,240 Speaker 1: out the litigation was. I think that's less likely to 423 00:24:01,280 --> 00:24:03,760 Speaker 1: see that kind of litigation spread out. But if the 424 00:24:03,840 --> 00:24:07,439 Speaker 1: election turns on a close result in one or two states, 425 00:24:07,560 --> 00:24:09,720 Speaker 1: not just four or five states, I would not be 426 00:24:09,760 --> 00:24:11,800 Speaker 1: surprised to see a significant uptake in litigation. 427 00:24:12,160 --> 00:24:15,639 Speaker 3: So I guess what we do is hope for wide margins. 428 00:24:16,280 --> 00:24:19,320 Speaker 3: Thanks so much for your insights, Derek. That's Professor Derek 429 00:24:19,400 --> 00:24:22,760 Speaker 3: Muller of Notre Dame Law School. I'm June Grosso and 430 00:24:22,800 --> 00:24:24,199 Speaker 3: you're listening to Bloomberg. 431 00:24:35,880 --> 00:24:41,119 Speaker 5: Thirty plus years of service calmbat note citation. If you 432 00:24:41,200 --> 00:24:44,959 Speaker 5: can't get a promotion, you won't retire and despite your 433 00:24:44,960 --> 00:24:45,880 Speaker 5: best effort. 434 00:24:45,600 --> 00:24:48,960 Speaker 4: To refuse to die the kindest headed for extinction. 435 00:24:50,080 --> 00:24:52,120 Speaker 1: Maybe so, sir, but. 436 00:24:52,160 --> 00:24:58,080 Speaker 3: Not today, Certainly not today or even tomorrow. In fact, 437 00:24:58,119 --> 00:25:02,080 Speaker 3: there's already another seat to the sequel in the works, 438 00:25:02,600 --> 00:25:06,560 Speaker 3: Top Gun three. After all, Top Gun Maverick gross nearly 439 00:25:06,640 --> 00:25:10,160 Speaker 3: one point five billion dollars at the box office, Tom 440 00:25:10,240 --> 00:25:14,159 Speaker 3: Cruise's biggest film, So Paramount must have been breathing a 441 00:25:14,280 --> 00:25:17,080 Speaker 3: huge sigh of relief when a judge threw out a 442 00:25:17,119 --> 00:25:20,840 Speaker 3: copyright lawsuit seeking some of the profits from that twenty 443 00:25:20,880 --> 00:25:24,520 Speaker 3: twenty two sequel. A California federal judge found that the 444 00:25:24,560 --> 00:25:29,320 Speaker 3: sequel featured a plot, settings, characters, and themes that diverged 445 00:25:29,480 --> 00:25:32,639 Speaker 3: far from anything found in the article that inspired the 446 00:25:32,680 --> 00:25:36,040 Speaker 3: first Top Gun movie. Here to unravel all this is 447 00:25:36,160 --> 00:25:41,359 Speaker 3: intellectual property litigator Terrence Ross a partner Katon Nutchen Rosenman Terry. 448 00:25:41,480 --> 00:25:44,240 Speaker 3: This suit was by the heirs of the writer who 449 00:25:44,280 --> 00:25:48,199 Speaker 3: wrote the article that inspired the original movie. Why were 450 00:25:48,240 --> 00:25:50,800 Speaker 3: they suing Paramount over Top Gun Maverick? 451 00:25:51,560 --> 00:25:55,240 Speaker 2: Way back in nineteen eighty three, coud Yunai wrote this 452 00:25:55,920 --> 00:26:00,400 Speaker 2: article in California Magazine on the Top Gun program. DANNQS 453 00:26:00,520 --> 00:26:03,160 Speaker 2: Navy Fighter weapons school, but wrote it in a sort 454 00:26:03,200 --> 00:26:05,040 Speaker 2: of an interesting way where he wrote it from the 455 00:26:05,080 --> 00:26:08,280 Speaker 2: perspective of a pilot in his backseat going through the program, 456 00:26:08,400 --> 00:26:12,480 Speaker 2: and it caught somebody's eye in Hollywood, and bear Mount 457 00:26:12,520 --> 00:26:15,040 Speaker 2: went out and got an assignment of rights for a 458 00:26:15,080 --> 00:26:17,600 Speaker 2: movie from him. When I look at such agreements, I 459 00:26:17,680 --> 00:26:20,359 Speaker 2: was focused on what's the credit being called for, you know, 460 00:26:20,359 --> 00:26:22,320 Speaker 2: at the end of the movie. And he got the 461 00:26:22,359 --> 00:26:25,240 Speaker 2: lowest possible credit you could get, which is suggested by 462 00:26:25,440 --> 00:26:29,600 Speaker 2: story written by Jinay I mean suggested by is like 463 00:26:29,640 --> 00:26:32,439 Speaker 2: the lowest language you can get and still get some 464 00:26:32,480 --> 00:26:34,720 Speaker 2: sort of credit. But they have complete rights in the 465 00:26:34,800 --> 00:26:37,280 Speaker 2: article for purposes of a movie, and they went out made 466 00:26:37,320 --> 00:26:40,520 Speaker 2: the movie unclear whether they really needed those rights, but 467 00:26:40,600 --> 00:26:43,359 Speaker 2: they did it. So the you know, I said, Copyright 468 00:26:43,400 --> 00:26:46,399 Speaker 2: Act has a provision in it that allows heirs to 469 00:26:46,840 --> 00:26:51,359 Speaker 2: a copyright to terminate a license in the copyright years 470 00:26:51,440 --> 00:26:54,240 Speaker 2: after the license was given, on sort of the theory 471 00:26:54,359 --> 00:26:58,160 Speaker 2: that young up and coming writers artists often get cheated 472 00:26:58,359 --> 00:27:01,080 Speaker 2: in these licenses, and so we have to leave a 473 00:27:01,119 --> 00:27:03,560 Speaker 2: window of opportunity later on if the work has been 474 00:27:03,600 --> 00:27:06,760 Speaker 2: worth something for them to recover some value. So they're 475 00:27:06,760 --> 00:27:10,560 Speaker 2: allowed to terminate the license, and after Yone's death in 476 00:27:10,600 --> 00:27:14,640 Speaker 2: twenty eighteen, his son and widow did exactly that. They 477 00:27:14,840 --> 00:27:19,040 Speaker 2: sent a letter to Paramount saying they've terminated the rights 478 00:27:19,080 --> 00:27:23,120 Speaker 2: in the nineteen eighty three California Magazine article because they 479 00:27:23,200 --> 00:27:26,920 Speaker 2: had seen somewhere that there was a sequel being worked on, 480 00:27:27,200 --> 00:27:29,400 Speaker 2: and that sort of got us up to the top 481 00:27:29,400 --> 00:27:30,000 Speaker 2: gun Maverick. 482 00:27:30,080 --> 00:27:34,400 Speaker 3: The sequel, the judge seemed to address every possible angle here. 483 00:27:34,800 --> 00:27:38,040 Speaker 3: One thing he said was similarities between the two works 484 00:27:38,040 --> 00:27:42,160 Speaker 3: based on facts can't be protected. So doesn't that pretty 485 00:27:42,240 --> 00:27:47,520 Speaker 3: much cover everything? Because the initial magazine article was nonfiction, right, 486 00:27:47,600 --> 00:27:49,000 Speaker 3: it was about real people. 487 00:27:49,400 --> 00:27:52,480 Speaker 2: So I agree with you, June. As the judge found 488 00:27:52,720 --> 00:27:55,600 Speaker 2: at one point the magazine article was really just a 489 00:27:55,680 --> 00:28:01,520 Speaker 2: factual recitation of what went on at Navy Cider Weapons 490 00:28:01,520 --> 00:28:05,040 Speaker 2: Skull dan A Miramar, and therefore there really wasn't much 491 00:28:05,320 --> 00:28:07,960 Speaker 2: that could be protected by copyright. And I have to say, 492 00:28:08,040 --> 00:28:09,560 Speaker 2: I mean, you said the judge went through this carefully. 493 00:28:09,520 --> 00:28:13,000 Speaker 2: I agree with you completely. Judge Anderson did a very 494 00:28:13,280 --> 00:28:17,639 Speaker 2: careful job here with this decision. He went through every 495 00:28:17,880 --> 00:28:23,240 Speaker 2: possible argument raised by the plaintiffs and succinctly described what 496 00:28:23,480 --> 00:28:26,160 Speaker 2: was wrong with those arguments as a matter of law, 497 00:28:26,280 --> 00:28:28,919 Speaker 2: which is going to make it very hard to appeal 498 00:28:29,000 --> 00:28:30,320 Speaker 2: this case to the Ninth Circuit. 499 00:28:30,880 --> 00:28:34,560 Speaker 3: Why did Paramount even get a license for the first movie? 500 00:28:34,720 --> 00:28:36,480 Speaker 3: It seems like they wouldn't have needed a license. 501 00:28:37,160 --> 00:28:41,760 Speaker 2: So in the age of copyright lawsuits, at the drop 502 00:28:41,800 --> 00:28:44,800 Speaker 2: of a hat that we live in, lawyers in house 503 00:28:45,200 --> 00:28:48,960 Speaker 2: at creative organizations such as Paramount Pictures had to be 504 00:28:49,040 --> 00:28:53,240 Speaker 2: very careful and the cost of getting a license here 505 00:28:53,400 --> 00:28:56,800 Speaker 2: was relatively inexpensive. They didn't have to give away much 506 00:28:56,920 --> 00:29:00,960 Speaker 2: credit in the movie for getting a license Swiss relatively 507 00:29:01,000 --> 00:29:03,400 Speaker 2: low as these things go. So I mean it made 508 00:29:03,440 --> 00:29:06,600 Speaker 2: sense even if the in house lawyer thought there was 509 00:29:06,640 --> 00:29:10,080 Speaker 2: no need to get a copyright license, why not get 510 00:29:10,120 --> 00:29:12,360 Speaker 2: it as an insurance mechanism. I sort of get it. 511 00:29:12,440 --> 00:29:15,360 Speaker 2: Although it did lead to these problems down the road 512 00:29:15,480 --> 00:29:18,640 Speaker 2: at that point in time, back in nineteen eighty four, 513 00:29:19,200 --> 00:29:22,320 Speaker 2: I think it was a very reasonable decision and the 514 00:29:22,360 --> 00:29:23,640 Speaker 2: part of the Paramount lawyers. 515 00:29:24,120 --> 00:29:26,400 Speaker 3: So Terry, will you go through some of what the 516 00:29:26,520 --> 00:29:29,040 Speaker 3: judge considered in making this decision. 517 00:29:29,640 --> 00:29:34,120 Speaker 2: So you know, the planet raised a number of alleged 518 00:29:34,200 --> 00:29:40,080 Speaker 2: similarities between the top the Maverick and this California magazine article. 519 00:29:40,560 --> 00:29:43,959 Speaker 2: I think I saw somewhere in the opinion as on 520 00:29:44,160 --> 00:29:49,200 Speaker 2: the order magnitude of seventy seven zero different alleged similarity. 521 00:29:49,680 --> 00:29:52,480 Speaker 2: And the judge source said they all fit into certain categories, 522 00:29:52,640 --> 00:29:55,400 Speaker 2: and he went through the category by category and pointed 523 00:29:55,440 --> 00:29:58,200 Speaker 2: out there are certain things that just not protected by copyright. 524 00:29:58,360 --> 00:30:01,440 Speaker 2: We talked about facts not protected. So the fact that 525 00:30:01,480 --> 00:30:04,160 Speaker 2: there is this top gun program, the fact that Navy 526 00:30:04,200 --> 00:30:06,560 Speaker 2: pilots that are selected to go through are the best 527 00:30:06,600 --> 00:30:09,600 Speaker 2: in the navy. Those are all factual elements that get 528 00:30:09,640 --> 00:30:13,920 Speaker 2: no protection whatsoever. But then there are literary expression elements 529 00:30:14,040 --> 00:30:17,440 Speaker 2: that also get no protection. So general plot ideas a 530 00:30:17,520 --> 00:30:21,000 Speaker 2: murder mystery, you can't protect that. You know, stock characters, 531 00:30:21,480 --> 00:30:26,400 Speaker 2: the detective solving the mystery, the British secret agent, you 532 00:30:26,400 --> 00:30:28,960 Speaker 2: don't get protection for that. And then there certain SEMs 533 00:30:28,960 --> 00:30:33,400 Speaker 2: are fair, which are sort of situations that arise naturally 534 00:30:33,520 --> 00:30:35,560 Speaker 2: out of the plot. So if you've got a World 535 00:30:35,600 --> 00:30:38,600 Speaker 2: War II drama set in Europe, the bad guys are 536 00:30:38,600 --> 00:30:40,400 Speaker 2: gonna be Nazis, right, and they're gonna be wearing SATs 537 00:30:40,440 --> 00:30:43,040 Speaker 2: Because you don't get to copyright that. All those things 538 00:30:43,080 --> 00:30:47,560 Speaker 2: are unprotected and the bulk of what was in the 539 00:30:47,600 --> 00:30:50,880 Speaker 2: California magazine article, which is the allegedly in French work, 540 00:30:51,080 --> 00:30:52,880 Speaker 2: fit into a category such as that. 541 00:30:53,400 --> 00:30:56,959 Speaker 3: The plaintiff's attorney said they disagree with the court's ruling, 542 00:30:57,120 --> 00:31:01,000 Speaker 3: particularly on summary judgment, and they will appear now. The 543 00:31:01,120 --> 00:31:06,040 Speaker 3: Ninth Circuit has warned against dismissing copyright lawsuits before allowing 544 00:31:06,200 --> 00:31:10,440 Speaker 3: experts to testify and hear. The judge excluded testimony from 545 00:31:10,440 --> 00:31:12,840 Speaker 3: the plaintiff's expert. How does that play in? 546 00:31:13,240 --> 00:31:16,680 Speaker 2: So the Ninth Circuit has caution district court judges about 547 00:31:16,960 --> 00:31:20,520 Speaker 2: dismissing copyright lawsuits at too early a point in the case, 548 00:31:20,680 --> 00:31:24,840 Speaker 2: particularly prior to jury trial. The defendants had brought a 549 00:31:24,920 --> 00:31:28,360 Speaker 2: motion to dismiss right after the complaint was filed, the 550 00:31:28,400 --> 00:31:31,800 Speaker 2: earliest possible time to get a dismissal. It's basically an 551 00:31:31,840 --> 00:31:35,120 Speaker 2: attack on the pleating itself, saying the way you've played 552 00:31:35,120 --> 00:31:39,600 Speaker 2: this doesn't amount to a cognizable legal claim. And the 553 00:31:39,760 --> 00:31:42,360 Speaker 2: court had heard that way back in November of twenty 554 00:31:42,440 --> 00:31:45,160 Speaker 2: twenty two. If I recall correctly and said, look, this 555 00:31:45,200 --> 00:31:47,720 Speaker 2: is way too early. I think within the four corners 556 00:31:47,840 --> 00:31:50,080 Speaker 2: of the complaints the judge that have within this, I 557 00:31:50,080 --> 00:31:53,320 Speaker 2: think there's enough to make out a cognizable legal claim, 558 00:31:53,360 --> 00:31:55,640 Speaker 2: but I'm not going to comment upon where this might 559 00:31:55,640 --> 00:31:58,080 Speaker 2: go in the future. So we go through discovery, we 560 00:31:58,120 --> 00:32:01,280 Speaker 2: get expert reports, and Paramount comes back at the end 561 00:32:01,520 --> 00:32:04,640 Speaker 2: of discovery. The last thing you do before the jury 562 00:32:04,680 --> 00:32:07,560 Speaker 2: trial and files most for summary judgment says you're on. 563 00:32:07,760 --> 00:32:10,080 Speaker 2: We're back. You said we needed to allow the facts 564 00:32:10,080 --> 00:32:12,560 Speaker 2: to be developed and get expert testimony. We did, and 565 00:32:12,640 --> 00:32:16,040 Speaker 2: we say this is still not a legally cognizable claim, 566 00:32:16,200 --> 00:32:19,200 Speaker 2: and therefore we should be entitled summery judgment. And at 567 00:32:19,200 --> 00:32:22,040 Speaker 2: that point I think the judge was perfectly within his 568 00:32:22,240 --> 00:32:27,360 Speaker 2: rights to consider such emotion and given what we now 569 00:32:27,400 --> 00:32:32,160 Speaker 2: know about those various alleged points of infringement, I think 570 00:32:32,160 --> 00:32:33,920 Speaker 2: the judge got it right and was allowed to do 571 00:32:33,960 --> 00:32:37,280 Speaker 2: this on summary judgment. Now there's a second question that's 572 00:32:37,440 --> 00:32:40,720 Speaker 2: raised by the plaintiff, which is, well, yes, you did 573 00:32:40,960 --> 00:32:46,560 Speaker 2: allow experts to give testimony, but you refuse to accept 574 00:32:46,560 --> 00:32:50,360 Speaker 2: the testimony of our expert. This is where it gets complicated. 575 00:32:50,480 --> 00:32:53,160 Speaker 2: In my view, it was not that the plaintiff wasn't 576 00:32:53,160 --> 00:32:55,880 Speaker 2: allowed to put up expert testimony in my view, I 577 00:32:55,880 --> 00:32:59,320 Speaker 2: think in the judges the plaintiff copyright owners put up 578 00:32:59,400 --> 00:33:04,560 Speaker 2: expert testimony that wasn't competent and relevant to the case. 579 00:33:04,880 --> 00:33:08,680 Speaker 2: The expert for the plaintiff had failed to take into 580 00:33:08,800 --> 00:33:12,680 Speaker 2: account any of these defenses to copyright and infringement. You 581 00:33:12,720 --> 00:33:15,320 Speaker 2: know that they're just facts, that their sins are fair, 582 00:33:15,600 --> 00:33:18,160 Speaker 2: that they're non protectable elements. The expert for the plaianffs 583 00:33:18,200 --> 00:33:21,000 Speaker 2: have just assumed everything was copyrightable. And the judge said, 584 00:33:21,200 --> 00:33:22,760 Speaker 2: you know, that's what this case is all about, whether 585 00:33:22,840 --> 00:33:25,080 Speaker 2: or not it's copyrightable, whether it's protectable in the first place. 586 00:33:25,240 --> 00:33:28,240 Speaker 2: You can't assume that away. Therefore, your expert opinion is 587 00:33:28,280 --> 00:33:30,320 Speaker 2: of no value here and we're not going to allow it. 588 00:33:30,440 --> 00:33:33,600 Speaker 2: And I again think the judge got that right, and 589 00:33:33,640 --> 00:33:36,360 Speaker 2: therefore I really do not think that that's a legitimate 590 00:33:36,360 --> 00:33:39,800 Speaker 2: complaint on appeal. I'm sure the plaintiffs will appeal to 591 00:33:39,840 --> 00:33:43,040 Speaker 2: the Ninth Circuit and raise this point, but judges have 592 00:33:43,440 --> 00:33:47,600 Speaker 2: enormous discretion at the trial court level into what testimony 593 00:33:47,800 --> 00:33:50,200 Speaker 2: they will allow into evidence what they will not, And 594 00:33:50,240 --> 00:33:53,480 Speaker 2: I just don't see the Ninth Circuit overturning his decision here. 595 00:33:53,480 --> 00:33:55,760 Speaker 3: And let me just say that you are on record 596 00:33:56,040 --> 00:33:58,480 Speaker 3: that when we discussed this case, when the suit was 597 00:33:58,480 --> 00:34:02,600 Speaker 3: first filed, you said it wasn't going to fly, so 598 00:34:02,680 --> 00:34:05,000 Speaker 3: to speak. So I just want to credit you for that. 599 00:34:05,280 --> 00:34:07,040 Speaker 2: Terry Well, I appreciate the question. 600 00:34:09,000 --> 00:34:09,480 Speaker 3: Anything. 601 00:34:10,120 --> 00:34:12,120 Speaker 2: You know, when you've been doing this as long as 602 00:34:12,160 --> 00:34:15,160 Speaker 2: I have, you sort of get a flavor for the 603 00:34:15,200 --> 00:34:18,440 Speaker 2: types of cases that get brought. And you know, one 604 00:34:18,480 --> 00:34:21,160 Speaker 2: of the really telling things to me was the planners 605 00:34:21,200 --> 00:34:26,600 Speaker 2: were only able to identify a single sentence, and the 606 00:34:26,640 --> 00:34:29,120 Speaker 2: sentences being generous because it's only a two word sentence, 607 00:34:29,280 --> 00:34:33,040 Speaker 2: a single sentence of dialogue that was similar between the 608 00:34:33,160 --> 00:34:37,279 Speaker 2: article and Top Gun Maverick the sequel. And that's one 609 00:34:37,280 --> 00:34:38,960 Speaker 2: of the things I always look for. Are there a 610 00:34:39,040 --> 00:34:43,719 Speaker 2: lot of similarities in dialogue? Are there really unique settings 611 00:34:43,840 --> 00:34:47,360 Speaker 2: that are similar? And here the only dialogue that was 612 00:34:47,400 --> 00:34:52,359 Speaker 2: similar was a phrase fight on, which apparently is the 613 00:34:52,400 --> 00:34:55,280 Speaker 2: code word at the Top Gun school that these pilots 614 00:34:55,360 --> 00:34:59,400 Speaker 2: used to say that the mock engagement is starting. And 615 00:34:59,680 --> 00:35:03,680 Speaker 2: again that's telling that that's the only dialogue similarity they 616 00:35:03,680 --> 00:35:06,239 Speaker 2: could come up with. And quite frankly, Idi itself is 617 00:35:06,239 --> 00:35:10,000 Speaker 2: not copyrightable because the Copyright Office does not allow copyrights 618 00:35:10,239 --> 00:35:13,880 Speaker 2: in short phrases that would come within that exception to 619 00:35:13,920 --> 00:35:15,720 Speaker 2: the rules. So when you look at and you see 620 00:35:15,719 --> 00:35:19,400 Speaker 2: no dialogue, similar, no settings that are really unique, and 621 00:35:19,520 --> 00:35:22,719 Speaker 2: just all these generalities, it's impossible to not have those 622 00:35:22,760 --> 00:35:25,560 Speaker 2: gut reactions that this isn't go anywhere. Do's greg get dismissed. 623 00:35:25,600 --> 00:35:26,799 Speaker 2: I guess I got it right this one. 624 00:35:27,360 --> 00:35:29,280 Speaker 3: You always get it right. But why appeal? 625 00:35:29,400 --> 00:35:29,560 Speaker 2: Then? 626 00:35:30,080 --> 00:35:32,480 Speaker 3: I'd say they're looking for some sort of settlement. But 627 00:35:32,760 --> 00:35:35,839 Speaker 3: is Paramount going to want to settle when top Gune 628 00:35:35,920 --> 00:35:38,080 Speaker 3: three is coming out and they have the win. 629 00:35:38,520 --> 00:35:42,920 Speaker 2: I don't know what this plaintiff's specific motivation will be 630 00:35:43,000 --> 00:35:45,760 Speaker 2: to appeal, And I can only tell you in general 631 00:35:46,160 --> 00:35:48,839 Speaker 2: how attorneys think about this. And you know, there's no 632 00:35:48,880 --> 00:35:50,360 Speaker 2: doubt that this had to have been I have no 633 00:35:50,400 --> 00:35:52,480 Speaker 2: inside information, but this had to be a contingent V 634 00:35:52,600 --> 00:35:55,319 Speaker 2: litigation where the lawyer only gets paid if they win. 635 00:35:55,760 --> 00:35:59,440 Speaker 2: So that's the factor. Second, Tops the Maverick made enormous. 636 00:36:00,280 --> 00:36:04,320 Speaker 2: I believe the box office gross was one point five billion. Yeah, 637 00:36:04,360 --> 00:36:05,759 Speaker 2: And I think it had to do something with the 638 00:36:05,800 --> 00:36:07,759 Speaker 2: timing of being one of the first released after the 639 00:36:07,800 --> 00:36:10,320 Speaker 2: pandemic and people are coming back in theaters and desperate 640 00:36:10,360 --> 00:36:12,640 Speaker 2: for content. But if you can believe this June, that 641 00:36:12,800 --> 00:36:16,279 Speaker 2: is the largest gross of any Tom Cruise movie of 642 00:36:16,320 --> 00:36:18,760 Speaker 2: all time. It's bigger than the Jackie Reach your movies, 643 00:36:18,840 --> 00:36:20,600 Speaker 2: bigger than any of the I don't all. We're up 644 00:36:20,640 --> 00:36:23,560 Speaker 2: to six or seven missions possible series. This is the 645 00:36:23,760 --> 00:36:26,520 Speaker 2: enormous amount of money. And you know, the argument for 646 00:36:26,640 --> 00:36:29,920 Speaker 2: damages if there was copyright infringement is that we're entitled 647 00:36:29,960 --> 00:36:32,600 Speaker 2: to the reasonable royalty based on that amount. And so 648 00:36:32,920 --> 00:36:35,440 Speaker 2: the amount at steak is enormous. And so when you 649 00:36:35,560 --> 00:36:38,319 Speaker 2: have large amounts at steak, even if you have a 650 00:36:38,560 --> 00:36:41,680 Speaker 2: minimal chance of success, you know, the math works out 651 00:36:41,719 --> 00:36:44,600 Speaker 2: that you ought to pursue the appeal on the off 652 00:36:44,719 --> 00:36:46,800 Speaker 2: chance that you get two out of three judges on 653 00:36:46,800 --> 00:36:49,560 Speaker 2: the appellate panels have some problem with what the district 654 00:36:49,600 --> 00:36:51,919 Speaker 2: court did. And of course the longer it drags out, 655 00:36:52,080 --> 00:36:54,520 Speaker 2: the hope on the planet side is always that defendants 656 00:36:54,560 --> 00:36:58,320 Speaker 2: get tired of paying their attorneys because this is expensive 657 00:36:58,400 --> 00:37:00,560 Speaker 2: sort of litigation, and then they might just consent to 658 00:37:00,560 --> 00:37:02,680 Speaker 2: the settlement and so they get some money out of it, 659 00:37:02,880 --> 00:37:05,840 Speaker 2: and you're right, pop gun free. The script is already 660 00:37:05,880 --> 00:37:09,920 Speaker 2: being written, their negotiations with director and other principal roles, 661 00:37:10,120 --> 00:37:13,160 Speaker 2: so it looks like it semi green. Lena ready, and 662 00:37:13,239 --> 00:37:15,200 Speaker 2: so there's that much more money to be had, and 663 00:37:15,520 --> 00:37:18,840 Speaker 2: that's my speculation in my opinion, based on past experience, 664 00:37:18,840 --> 00:37:20,160 Speaker 2: as to why they might appeal. 665 00:37:20,600 --> 00:37:22,720 Speaker 3: Well, you have a winning record on this show, Terry, 666 00:37:22,760 --> 00:37:26,200 Speaker 3: so I trust your opinions. Thanks so much. That's Terrence 667 00:37:26,280 --> 00:37:29,040 Speaker 3: Ross of Kata, Nutchen Rosenmann, and that's it for this 668 00:37:29,200 --> 00:37:32,320 Speaker 3: edition of the Bloomberg Law Podcast. Remember you've can always 669 00:37:32,320 --> 00:37:35,080 Speaker 3: get the latest legal news by subscribing and listening to 670 00:37:35,120 --> 00:37:39,280 Speaker 3: the show on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, and at Bloomberg dot com, 671 00:37:39,320 --> 00:37:43,560 Speaker 3: slash podcast, slash Law. I'm June Grosso and this is 672 00:37:43,600 --> 00:37:44,200 Speaker 3: Bloomberg