Speaker 1: Hello, and welcome to another episode of the Odd Thoughts podcast.
Speaker 1: I'm Tracy Alloway. My co host Joe Wisenthal can't be
Speaker 1: with us today, but maybe it works out for the
Speaker 1: best because today we're going to be focusing on a
Speaker 1: topic that is a very close to UH, something I've
Speaker 1: been doing for the past couple of years, which is
Speaker 1: living in the Middle East, in Abu Dhabi specifically, and UH.
Speaker 1: My move to Abu Dhabi was in the spring of
Speaker 1: two thousand and sixteen. It coincided with a very very
Speaker 1: big event in finance and markets, and that was when
Speaker 1: Saudi Arabia first started talking about the potential to list
Speaker 1: part of its giant state owned national oil company, Saudi Aramco.
Speaker 1: Now fast forward two years later, we've seen those plans
Speaker 1: UH really start to get walked back. And in the meantime,
Speaker 1: we've had all sorts of developments in Saudi Arabia, including
Speaker 1: a new Crown Prince, Mohammed bin Salman, the thirty two
Speaker 1: year old Crown Prince. We've also had a diplomatic rift
Speaker 1: between the Gulf Cooperation Council nations including Saudi Arabia and
Speaker 1: catar so really a action packed two years when it
Speaker 1: comes to Middle East politics with Saudi Arabia really at
Speaker 1: the center of it all. I've now left the region,
Speaker 1: so just to book end my time there, today we
Speaker 1: are going to be diving into all things Saudi and
Speaker 1: we're going to do that with one of the best
Speaker 1: analysts on the topic. I think his name is i
Speaker 1: Him Kamel. He is the head of Middle East and
Speaker 1: North Africa research over at Eurasia Group. So I Him,
Speaker 1: thank you so much for joining me today, a pleasure
Speaker 1: to be here, and thank you for allsteeing me. So
Speaker 1: I gotta say when I think back to the start
Speaker 1: of UM let's say May two thousand and sixteen, and
Speaker 1: how much excitement we had over Saudi Arabia, the transformation
Speaker 1: of Saudi Arabia from an oil dependent economy into potentially
Speaker 1: something different, and it was all pegged to the notion
Speaker 1: of the ARAMCO listing. Things have changed so quickly over
Speaker 1: the course of two years. Just remind everyone why the
Speaker 1: ARAMCO I p O was important in the beginning and
Speaker 1: what the rationale was for actually doing the listing. Well,
Speaker 1: I think Tracy the big attraction for the powerful leader
Speaker 1: of Saudi Arabia at the time, or the emerging a
Speaker 1: new leader in the kingdom, Crown Prince Mohammad and Sandman
Speaker 1: wants to create a lot of excitement. He he needed
Speaker 1: flashy ideas. He needed bold ideas to change the kingdom,
Speaker 1: to change its dependency on oil and transform what has
Speaker 1: been relatively a large scale economy that is outside the
Speaker 1: international system or international economy. In many respects, it's a
Speaker 1: closed economy. The major players are domestic and the dependency
Speaker 1: on the government and energy revenues was high. He needed
Speaker 1: to change that, and he needed to present ideas that
Speaker 1: would create a sense of excitement internationally. Implicitly, the Crown
Speaker 1: Prince didn't only focus on the economics. I think that
Speaker 1: m Haammed binson Man wanted to present ideas that would
Speaker 1: have him present Hammed Bensman as a young, bold leader
Speaker 1: capable of changing what the Saudi system has represented for
Speaker 1: many many decades, transitioning and way from a conservative kingdom
Speaker 1: into not necessarily a liberal one, but certainly more open
Speaker 1: social society or or or open kingdom when it comes
Speaker 1: to liberal rights for women, when it comes for the
Speaker 1: rights of employment, when it comes to just social liberties.
Speaker 1: Also economically, he wanted to change what was an an
Speaker 1: e stagnating engine. Oil prices were low. He needed the
Speaker 1: oil income from around Care or from a potential sale
Speaker 1: of around Call, to fund other ventures in the Kingdom. Right,
Speaker 1: this is something I completely forgot to mention in the intro.
Speaker 1: But of course it was really a driving force of
Speaker 1: a lot of the stuff that we've seen happen in
Speaker 1: the Gulf. And that's the fact that in early twenty sixteen,
Speaker 1: of course oil prices were still relatively low. Eventually you
Speaker 1: had OPEK get together and agree to curb their crude
Speaker 1: production in order to boost prices, so kind of a
Speaker 1: different environment. I'm still curious though, when it comes to
Speaker 1: the listing itself. You know, Mohammed bin Salman MBS as
Speaker 1: we often call him, he didn't have to pursue an
Speaker 1: I p O. Did he. He had this big set
Speaker 1: plan vision twenty thirty that really set out how he
Speaker 1: wanted the Saudi economy to look like in a fifteen
Speaker 1: or fourteen years time. So why the element of the
Speaker 1: listing specifically, Well, I absolutely agree, Tracy, and in part
Speaker 1: the vision was comprehensive. They didn't really need to make
Speaker 1: the I p O or core part of that plan.
Speaker 1: But oil prices were low, and Mahammad bin Salman needed
Speaker 1: to find a way to generate income to invest in
Speaker 1: the local economy, to have the public investment fund that
Speaker 1: really the sovereign fund Wealth Fund of Saudiary. We have
Speaker 1: more money to invest both domestically and internationally, and that
Speaker 1: would have have been possible with oil around forty or
Speaker 1: fifty dollars a barrel. It's really the opaque non opaque agreement,
Speaker 1: primarily a deal between hammadans and Man and President Putin
Speaker 1: of Russia that allowed oil prices to jump high into
Speaker 1: the seventies and really touched the eighties. Today, Saudi Arabia
Speaker 1: doesn't necessarily need to rush with an i p O.
Speaker 1: They have the income they're breaking even when it comes
Speaker 1: to their budget, they don't need to rush with an
Speaker 1: i p O. But the environment was different. I think broadly,
Speaker 1: I agree with you that Saudi Arabia did not have
Speaker 1: to make the i p O or core part of
Speaker 1: Vision twenty thirty. They could have separated the vision and
Speaker 1: the transformation plan from the I p O. The attachment
Speaker 1: was probably not appropriate at the time, and I think
Speaker 1: they're probably paying a price for that connection right right now.
Speaker 1: So what's your sense of how much domestic support there
Speaker 1: is for the transformation plan, including the around co listing,
Speaker 1: because of course, you know, every once in a while
Speaker 1: we would hear a little bit of Saudi grumbling that
Speaker 1: maybe the country, the kingdom was selling off it's it's
Speaker 1: prized assets at an inopportune time. Is that still the
Speaker 1: case and where those um where those grumblings ever serious
Speaker 1: enough to force the authorities to rethink that plan. I
Speaker 1: think that that there was and there still remains resistance
Speaker 1: in Saudi Arabia. True I p owing or or putting
Speaker 1: any piece of around called the crown jewel of the
Speaker 1: country as many people see it floated, be it in
Speaker 1: internationally or domestically. There are two elements of this. I
Speaker 1: think the public part of the public has been against it,
Speaker 1: but also members of the ruling family that's so disclosure
Speaker 1: or more transparency as a threat to their income sources.
Speaker 1: It's very clearly an engine that funds the Saud family
Speaker 1: in the kingdom, and members of the ruling family did
Speaker 1: not want to see those numbers exposed or how much
Speaker 1: they would receive on an annual basis from the state.
Speaker 1: So I think the pressure was probably higher amongst members
Speaker 1: of the ruling family, but the public also did not
Speaker 1: see what the rationale was, at least at the very beginning.
Speaker 1: So definitely not not a popular move, and I think
Speaker 1: the the leadership in Saudi Arabia reconsidered partly because they
Speaker 1: don't need it, and partly because the political cost of
Speaker 1: putting around call on on the talk exchange would have
Speaker 1: been relatively high. What I would emphasize over here, I
Speaker 1: don't think that this is out of the way completely.
Speaker 1: I think that Mammad bunsan Man doesn't need it right now,
Speaker 1: and he's going to reassess whether he needs it three,
Speaker 1: four or five years down the line, if the appropriate
Speaker 1: conditions emerged, if he needs the money, and if there's
Speaker 1: a right global stock exchange that can host the I
Speaker 1: p O. And that has been a big problem for
Speaker 1: the company right well in terms of the messaging on this,
Speaker 1: you know, even though we've had several stories not just
Speaker 1: from Bloomberg but elsewhere in the world talking about the
Speaker 1: Saudi's really scaling back plans for the I p O,
Speaker 1: the authorities there have been sort of reluctant to admit
Speaker 1: that it might be on ice, at least for the
Speaker 1: time being. Why do you think that is Is the
Speaker 1: i p O so essential to um you know the
Speaker 1: Saudi story at the moment, This this notion that here
Speaker 1: you have a market that was to date very very
Speaker 1: closed and now it's beginning to open up. Is it
Speaker 1: that important that they can't walk it back? No, I don't,
Speaker 1: I don't. I don't necessarily think so. I think the
Speaker 1: core idea here is that the leadership hasn't fully thrown
Speaker 1: these plans in the bin, and they're not convinced that
Speaker 1: they might not have to resort to some form of
Speaker 1: of a sale of part of around calling the future.
Speaker 1: But they certainly don't see the conditions right now, be
Speaker 1: at the market conditions or the political conditions in Savidi Arabia,
Speaker 1: primarily the resistance to the i p O as appropriate.
Speaker 1: Right in the future, they might have to still do
Speaker 1: some form of i p O or sale of around
Speaker 1: called completely abandoned in their plans, and then a few
Speaker 1: years down the line announcing an i p O would
Speaker 1: not make any sense. There is there is really very
Speaker 1: limited cost to saying that this i p O is
Speaker 1: on but not now, as in not fully abandoning the plans,
Speaker 1: and if they need to do so in the future
Speaker 1: three or four or five years down the line, and
Speaker 1: to really say that an I p O is no
Speaker 1: longer part of our reformed story. We don't need it.
Speaker 1: We have alternatives. They certainly do that, but at in
Speaker 1: the meantime there is very little value add politically or
Speaker 1: economically to announce the di PO is off. Alright, Well,
Speaker 1: let's zero in on the man behind the I p O,
Speaker 1: Mohammed bin Salman. It's so rare that we get to
Speaker 1: talk about palace intrigue on the Odd Thoughts podcast, So
Speaker 1: I'm going to take every opportunity that i can get here.
Speaker 1: But you know, this really interesting figure thirty two years
Speaker 1: old has a very specific economic and social policy, a
Speaker 1: social policy that many people would um describe as liberalizing
Speaker 1: at least compared to what other Saudi rulers had in
Speaker 1: place before. But on the foreign policy side, quite hawkish,
Speaker 1: quite aggressive. Saudi has been fighting this war in Yemen
Speaker 1: for some time now. How would you characterize Mohammed bin
Speaker 1: Salman's ruling style over the past two years or so.
Speaker 1: I would say that Mohammad batson Man's character is evolving.
Speaker 1: It is changing the man that we've known two years
Speaker 1: ago is probably a different one today. He has made mistakes,
Speaker 1: and in private conversations he would even admit that he
Speaker 1: has made some in Yemen or elsewhere. I think part
Speaker 1: of the challenge here from Hammad binson Man is that
Speaker 1: he's trying to do so much in a very short
Speaker 1: period of time. I think he recognizes this that the
Speaker 1: system in Saudi Arabia is broken, and he does not
Speaker 1: like people or advisors or counselors that tell him no.
Speaker 1: He wants bold ideas and he wants to move forward
Speaker 1: with these ideas as fast as possible. I think part
Speaker 1: of his the challenge or the problems with his plans
Speaker 1: is that their contradictory. Uh. That's certainly the case when
Speaker 1: it comes to the foreign policy agenda that directly contradicts
Speaker 1: the domestic agenda. Saudi Arabia needs for investment, needs to
Speaker 1: liberalize its economy, and is diversifying effectively in very small steps.
Speaker 1: But the foreign policy agenda, which is very hawkish, as
Speaker 1: you have mentioned, beat against Iran or against the Hothy
Speaker 1: rebels in Yemen, that is compromising regional stability or creating
Speaker 1: additional tensions. Very difficult to in my view, to convince
Speaker 1: the investors to put more money in Saudi Arabia or
Speaker 1: put any money at all given these challenges. So I
Speaker 1: think part of really the critical problem that the Saudi
Speaker 1: leadership and Hammad Binson Man needs to address is how
Speaker 1: effectively is he going to manage these contradictions. And you
Speaker 1: can find these contradictions across the board, even in the
Speaker 1: local economy, so there are no easy solutions or Saudi Arabia.
Speaker 1: That's something that he has, I think, to begin to
Speaker 1: accept as a reality for the kingdom. The kingdom is
Speaker 1: clearly a big energy producer, but getting it to become
Speaker 1: a diversified economy is going to be a completely different
Speaker 1: transformation than anything Saudi Arabia has witnessed in the last
Speaker 1: five or six decades, and he needs to accept that
Speaker 1: there will be painful steps along the way, and in
Speaker 1: certain times he needs to recalibrate or reconsider elements of
Speaker 1: his his strategy. Right, what do you think is the
Speaker 1: biggest roadblock when it comes to that transformation or diversification project.
Speaker 1: And do you think NBS has a sort of end
Speaker 1: state goal in mind or an idea of what he
Speaker 1: wants Saudi to look like in terms of an entertate.
Speaker 1: I think he does have an idea here. He wants
Speaker 1: to see a more powerful Saudi Arabia regionally, he wants
Speaker 1: to see a more open and diverse economy, one where
Speaker 1: the Saudi labor force is not actually employed by the
Speaker 1: government only, but also by the private sector. He wants
Speaker 1: to see a more open society, but not necessarily open
Speaker 1: in a in a Western way. He wants to see
Speaker 1: women at work, but he also realizes that there are
Speaker 1: conservative values in the kingdom that he needs to preserve himself.
Speaker 1: So it's really about modernizing the state rather than liberalizing it.
Speaker 1: So he has an idea on on what he would
Speaker 1: like Saudi Area to be, not now, but ten fifteen
Speaker 1: years down the line. What I think he does not
Speaker 1: appreciate at times is the challenge or the series of
Speaker 1: challenges he faces. The country hasn't changed much over the
Speaker 1: last three or four decades, and the steps, the series
Speaker 1: of reforms and that he's introduced, you see or divisit,
Speaker 1: they're creating enemies for him. They're creating or exposing contradictions
Speaker 1: in Saudi society, and that's something that that he has
Speaker 1: to manage very carefully. So in my view, it is
Speaker 1: not really about the strategy, but it's how he gets
Speaker 1: there and whether he accepts that along the way there
Speaker 1: would be no voices or there'll be voices that tell
Speaker 1: tell him to slow down, that things cannot be done
Speaker 1: that quickly. It's finding the right balance of pushing your
Speaker 1: head but also moderating when he needs to do so.
Speaker 1: So it's interesting that you mentioned making enemies just then, because,
Speaker 1: of course a large part of the Saudi economy and
Speaker 1: society basically operates on the principle of a social pact,
Speaker 1: which is that Saudia's get a lot of money from
Speaker 1: the state, either in terms of gifts or you know,
Speaker 1: guaranteed employment at large government firms or entities. And I
Speaker 1: remember when they announced that Mohammed bin Salman was becoming
Speaker 1: Crown Prince. It was a few months after the king
Speaker 1: had decided to roll back some of the payments for
Speaker 1: government workers, which of course was very controversial, and when
Speaker 1: they made the announcement, they said they were reinstating those payments,
Speaker 1: so they seem to, you know, on the one hand,
Speaker 1: they were promoting this prince who had a very strong
Speaker 1: agenda of economic reform, but on the other hand, that
Speaker 1: same day they were going back to the old ways
Speaker 1: of just sort of dolling out government handouts. It seems
Speaker 1: like a really difficult line to be walking. Absolutely. I
Speaker 1: think that's where you see some form of contradiction between
Speaker 1: the domestic agenda and the really the economic agenda. Hammad
Speaker 1: Bin Saman wants to be king of Saudi Arabia. It's
Speaker 1: not popular for a new emerging leader, even a new
Speaker 1: crown prince, to begin to to really cut the benefits
Speaker 1: for Saudi citizens across the board. So I think he
Speaker 1: walked those back, or the leadership did walk those back,
Speaker 1: because it would have compromised his domestic standing and made
Speaker 1: it very difficult for Saudis to support him or to
Speaker 1: support his rise over the long term. I think what
Speaker 1: he needs to do is begin to introduce more concrete
Speaker 1: changes to the Saudi welfare state. Now, there is a
Speaker 1: problem here, which is that Saudi Arabia's citizens are also
Speaker 1: not ready to hear the message that there is less,
Speaker 1: that there is less now and there's going to be
Speaker 1: less in the future, and that the welfare state cannot
Speaker 1: survive over the long term, be it in Saudi Arabia
Speaker 1: or any other economy, any other country in the world.
Speaker 1: I think it's very difficult to break that message to
Speaker 1: to your citizens or for the leadership to promote an
Speaker 1: idea that we have to live with less, not more
Speaker 1: in the future. Certainly much more difficult for a leader
Speaker 1: that wants to become king. Is there anything he can
Speaker 1: do to soften that blow to the domestic population? Is
Speaker 1: there anything that could offset that. I think part of
Speaker 1: it could could offset that is really the social liberalization measures,
Speaker 1: which don't appeal to everyone, certainly not to conservative Saudi Is,
Speaker 1: but part of the youth population sees that as a positive,
Speaker 1: having more liberty and ability to experienced life entertainment. The
Speaker 1: social reforms aren't aren't really something that the government needs
Speaker 1: to fund, but they do matter for for a big
Speaker 1: part of Saudi Arabia's population, the youth population, So I
Speaker 1: think that might help along the way incrementalism. The the
Speaker 1: benefits were reintroduced, but only on a temporary basis, So
Speaker 1: I think he has to deal with it in terms
Speaker 1: of shocks, doing it over a few steps rather than
Speaker 1: one big one along the way, and at the end
Speaker 1: of the day, I think it's going to be still
Speaker 1: challenging even if you create them very clear strategy and
Speaker 1: implemented perfectly. I think the message is going to be
Speaker 1: difficult and it's it's certainly not going to be popular
Speaker 1: for a large base of Saudi Arabia society that is
Speaker 1: not ready for modern employment in some respects or I
Speaker 1: don't necessarily see as this as a good deal from
Speaker 1: this state, or that the state should be cutting their
Speaker 1: benefits in the future. Right as we're talking, all these
Speaker 1: big Saudi or GCC developments are sort of um filtering
Speaker 1: up in my mind and jogging my memory. And one
Speaker 1: thing that I just remembered is we are coming up
Speaker 1: pretty close to the one year and a versary of
Speaker 1: the corruption crackdown, or the alleged corruption crackdown. This is
Speaker 1: when Mohammed bin Salman and the Saudi authorities arrested a
Speaker 1: bunch of Saudias, lots of businessmen, lots of royals and
Speaker 1: accused them of corruption in various ways and stealing from
Speaker 1: the state, imprisoned them in the Ritz Carlton where they
Speaker 1: had just been having a big investment forum that was
Speaker 1: largely aimed at foreign investors getting them to invest in
Speaker 1: the country. A year on from that, or almost a
Speaker 1: year on from that, what do we think the point
Speaker 1: of that exercise was Was it about rooting out corruption,
Speaker 1: Was it about sending a message about dissent. Was it
Speaker 1: about recouping some money, because of course the authorities were
Speaker 1: said to have gotten about a hundred billion dollars as
Speaker 1: a result of those actions. What do we think? I am?
Speaker 1: I think this is about dealing with corruption. It is
Speaker 1: about sending a message to Saudis society that there's a
Speaker 1: new leader in town, Hammad binsan Man, that is willing
Speaker 1: and able to consolidate power. And it is about finding
Speaker 1: revenue or new sources of of funding that could help
Speaker 1: the Public Investment Fund put some money in the domestic
Speaker 1: economy and into international projects. But I think what matters
Speaker 1: here more than anything is that Saudi Arabia isn't trying
Speaker 1: to build a Western style capitalist society. I think that
Speaker 1: when when it comes to Hammad binsan Man, he doesn't
Speaker 1: look at the U S or Europe as examples. He
Speaker 1: wants to build a state capitalist structure in which he
Speaker 1: or the state have influenced over the decision making process
Speaker 1: of the private sector. Think China or Russia, one where
Speaker 1: the leader of the state isn't necessarily outside the private
Speaker 1: sector and has extensions and has an ability to influence
Speaker 1: what the private sector does in its everyday affairs. So
Speaker 1: it's I think the idea that Saudi Arabia was ever
Speaker 1: going to be a European style economy or US study
Speaker 1: economy was probably a mistake. And we can see that
Speaker 1: already with Hammad bunsen Man and the style that he's introducing. Well,
Speaker 1: let's focus on the the US relationship for a second,
Speaker 1: because even if Saudi Arabia doesn't want to replicate the
Speaker 1: US economic model, it's certainly seems to be developing closer
Speaker 1: ties with the US as a political ally, or maybe
Speaker 1: I should say with um with one US politician in particular,
Speaker 1: and that is, of course Donald Trump. And we saw
Speaker 1: him make that visit to Saudi Arabia where we had
Speaker 1: a lot of memorable imagery such as him holding the
Speaker 1: glowing or the king. And there's a sense that Donald
Speaker 1: Trump and his friendship with the Saudi rulers may have
Speaker 1: emboldened some of Saudi's foreign policies, certainly the anti Iran
Speaker 1: part of it. Do you think that view is justified? Absolutely?
Speaker 1: I think it would be very difficult to imagine Saudi
Speaker 1: Arabia introducing adopting and committing to such hawkish policies against Iran,
Speaker 1: the Yemen War included. Had it not been for an
Speaker 1: explicit message of support from President Donald Trump. There's a
Speaker 1: marriage of convenience here. Trump was hosted in Saudi Arabia,
Speaker 1: was presented with multiplion dollar arms agreements that helped him domestically,
Speaker 1: and the Saudis wanted something back or in return, And
Speaker 1: we do have a relationship that works at least between
Speaker 1: these leaders. Transactional politics is effective. It's not necessarily about
Speaker 1: long term strategy or stability in the Middle East, but
Speaker 1: certainly the two sides see something to win from each
Speaker 1: other over the short term, and that that means that
Speaker 1: the relationship with the US has improved, at least with
Speaker 1: the current administration. I wouldn't necessarily say that over the
Speaker 1: long term the Saudi US relationship does not face critical challenges.
Speaker 1: We still have that, but certainly over the short term
Speaker 1: it's working with the US and the Trump Mohammad binsa
Speaker 1: Man relationship is very positive. It's not just the real visit.
Speaker 1: It's coordination between the two sides on a host of
Speaker 1: different issues, and the Iran strategy the hawkish Iran anti
Speaker 1: Iran strategy that we're seeing from Saudi Arabia really was
Speaker 1: just an introduction to what we've seen from the US.
Speaker 1: The US with rowal from the nuclear agreement with Iran
Speaker 1: and the introduction of sanctions against Tehran. This is this
Speaker 1: is the era of the return of containment against Iran,
Speaker 1: and what the Saudis did would have not been possible
Speaker 1: without US support. Just to try to tie everything together.
Speaker 1: Is there a oil price component in that transactional relationship
Speaker 1: between the US and Saudi, because, of course we saw
Speaker 1: Donald Trump tweeting about the oil price recently that gas
Speaker 1: prices at the pump were too high as a result
Speaker 1: of the OPEC production cut agreement, And then we did
Speaker 1: see the Saudi's respond or appear to respond to that
Speaker 1: tweet with the energy minister. They're saying that they would
Speaker 1: do whatever it takes to balance the market. Is there
Speaker 1: a sense that Saudi is now be holden maybe two
Speaker 1: US wishes when it comes to gas prices. Well, I
Speaker 1: think that the Saudi leadership has always been careful in
Speaker 1: terms of dealing with the US and US interests, giving
Speaker 1: the strategic nature of the relationship and the dependence on
Speaker 1: the US for security, but I think with with the
Speaker 1: Trump administration, this is much more important given that Hammad
Speaker 1: binsan Man is planning his rise in the Kingdom and
Speaker 1: and his consolidation of power across different institutions in the Kingdom.
Speaker 1: Accommodating Trump, I think was a natural choice for the
Speaker 1: Saudia leadership finding a way really not to bring prices
Speaker 1: or oil prices down to sixty or or sow a barrels,
Speaker 1: but to push it below eighty two, to keep it
Speaker 1: in the seventy two eighty dollars range. Given that the
Speaker 1: Trump is administration is introducing sanctions, sanctions against Iran, given
Speaker 1: that every Iranian barrel that leaves the market is probably
Speaker 1: going to go to either Saudia, a b or Russia.
Speaker 1: There was also a win in the process. So definitely,
Speaker 1: I think that there is an oil component, a willingness
Speaker 1: to really accommodate what is a challenge in the mid
Speaker 1: mid term election in the US or supporting Trump and
Speaker 1: hoping that oil prices lower oil prices prices would help
Speaker 1: him in the mid term elections. They've done that, and
Speaker 1: I think in the future they'll try to accommodate different
Speaker 1: priorities for the Trump administration. Alright, so I'm going to
Speaker 1: try to survey, you know, the past two years and
Speaker 1: just think again. When I arrived in the region, it
Speaker 1: was right after the Saudi Aramco announcement, so many foreign
Speaker 1: investors were excited about the Saudi story, this narrative of
Speaker 1: opening up. And since then we've seen some successes, especially
Speaker 1: on the social side, such as women now allowed to drive.
Speaker 1: We've seen some setbacks. The Yemen War continue to drag on.
Speaker 1: The Iranian relationship is getting worse. Um. The corruption crackdown,
Speaker 1: in some eyes, was done without the rule of law
Speaker 1: and it wasn't really clear what was achieved. We have
Speaker 1: oil prices that have certainly recovered, um, but we have
Speaker 1: an overriding question mark about the future of OPEC itself.
Speaker 1: We have the catch are blockade uh, and I'm probably
Speaker 1: forgetting something else. But really, any number of things have
Speaker 1: happened in a short amount of time. So net Net,
Speaker 1: putting it all together, are you bearish or bullish on
Speaker 1: the Saudi story? I think I'm mildly bullish on the
Speaker 1: Saudis story, as in the new system is by definition
Speaker 1: going to be a better system than the old one.
Speaker 1: Because the old one, where the Saudi state would remain
Speaker 1: dependent on hydrocarbons and the welfare state remaining as it is,
Speaker 1: would have imploded the old system where where conservative preachers
Speaker 1: dominated the system, would have also created a lot of
Speaker 1: security challenges for the world over the long term. The
Speaker 1: new one won't be much better. It will probably be
Speaker 1: a model through for Saudi Arabia and the economic transformation
Speaker 1: will be very difficult. So mildly bullish, but with a
Speaker 1: lot of risks emerging as Mamma bin Saman tries to
Speaker 1: change this very complex place called Saudi Arabia. All right,
Speaker 1: I think complex is exactly the right description. I am Kammel,
Speaker 1: the head of Middle East and North Africa research for
Speaker 1: Eurasia Group. Thank you so much for joining us. Thank
Speaker 1: you so much for walking us through really a laundry
Speaker 1: list of things that have happened in Saudi in a
Speaker 1: relatively short amount of time. Thank you so much for
Speaker 1: holsting me and I've explited. So that was another episode
Speaker 1: of odd lots, uh really book ending a two and
Speaker 1: a bit your experience in the Middle East. We will
Speaker 1: be back to our regular scheduling next week, but in
Speaker 1: the meantime, You can follow me on Twitter at Tracy Alloway.
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Speaker 1: haas T. And you should follow Francesca Leave, the head
Speaker 1: of Bloomberg Podcasts, at Francesca Today. Thanks for listening to