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Speaker 1: If it doesn't work, you're just not using enough. You're

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Speaker 1: listening to Software Radio Special Operations, military news and straight

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Speaker 1: talk with the guys and the community. Good morning, everyone,

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Speaker 1: Welcome back to Software Radio. Software Radio a long time montarget.

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Speaker 1: We're here with the best guests and topics and uh,

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Speaker 1: you know, takes care of everything that either in the military,

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Speaker 1: law enforcement, or current affairs that's going on outside our

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Speaker 1: own borders as well as for him. Today, we have

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Speaker 1: a great guest lined up for us, Jeff Nice. It

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Speaker 1: is about a thirty year member of the Montgomery County

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Speaker 1: SWAT team. And when you talk about people with practical experience,

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Speaker 1: Jeff's probably been on about three to four thousand raids

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Speaker 1: will the SWAT unit. He was involved with a DC

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Speaker 1: sniper takedown, the Discovery Building, suicide, bomber, hostage rescue. Uh.

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Speaker 1: This is the guy that's been there, He's done that,

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Speaker 1: he seems all um. He's also a survivor of a

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Speaker 1: couple of different diseases that were told to him that

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Speaker 1: he was terminal about eight to ten years ago. So

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Speaker 1: when you're talking about people that have the right attitude

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Speaker 1: and you know, hard charges, uh, this actually is uh

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Speaker 1: describes our guests to a t He just come up

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Speaker 1: with the book Failure Is Not an Option, um, and

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Speaker 1: he talks about his career and there and we're gonna

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Speaker 1: welcome them to the podcast. Chef, thanks for taking the

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Speaker 1: time with us this morning. We really appreciate it. Great

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Speaker 1: to be here. Yeah, So for listeners and just you know,

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Speaker 1: you don't have to get in too much peace. I'll

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Speaker 1: just basical overview of how do you ended up becoming

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Speaker 1: a police officer? Um, you know what what pushed you

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Speaker 1: to that type of career, and then talk a little

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Speaker 1: bit about your career and how you came to be

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Speaker 1: in SWAT. As a kid growing up, always had great

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Speaker 1: admiration for police in the military, and as a teenager

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Speaker 1: my next door neighbor was a Montgomer Chanting police officer

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Speaker 1: and he very much influenced my decision to go into

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Speaker 1: law enforcement. And then from there, I guess to kind

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Speaker 1: of satisfy on some small and the interest I had

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Speaker 1: in the military, I wanted to swap because of the

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Speaker 1: application of tactics and things of that nature as it

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Speaker 1: rates to the military. Certainly nothing compared with the military

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Speaker 1: does which so a small scale I can get a

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Speaker 1: taste of it. Yeah, and uh, what year did you

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Speaker 1: join the police department? One. I retired in two thousand

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Speaker 1: and fourteen, so third thirty three years, and almost all

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Speaker 1: of that was as a member of the Montgomery County

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Speaker 1: Squad team, wasn't it correct? I spent thirty years in

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Speaker 1: squad as an operator, team leader, and eventually a commander.

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Speaker 1: That's that's uh. You know, I was reading your book.

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Speaker 1: Was it like three to four thousand raids you've been on?

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Speaker 1: I mean, I'm sure you lost track, but that number correct,

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Speaker 1: best guests was about raids and barricades. That's that's amazing

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Speaker 1: that that much going on a course up and you

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Speaker 1: know that Montgomery coach. You know, for our listeners who

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Speaker 1: aren't familiar with that, Montgomery County Maryland border is uh

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Speaker 1: Washington d C. It's it's right over the um DC line,

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Speaker 1: and it's a very I mean, that whole area from Watchington,

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Speaker 1: d C all the way to Baltimore is pretty heavily populated.

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Speaker 1: There's a lot of stuff obviously going on there, and

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Speaker 1: we're gonna get into that. Um what was your initial

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Speaker 1: training like when I'm sure in the training that you

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Speaker 1: went through for SWAT and eight one has evolved, and

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Speaker 1: I'm sure they're doing more of it today, But what

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Speaker 1: was that like when you initially and no doubt has evolved,

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Speaker 1: Like when I first got into SWAT was an eighty

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Speaker 1: four and back then, what you do is once you

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Speaker 1: were selected, you were sent to other schools by other

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Speaker 1: outside AGCs to continue your training, you know, head Over

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Speaker 1: the course of time, I probably attended fifty schools from

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Speaker 1: outside agency's geared towards breaching, UH, sniper craft, hostage rescue,

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Speaker 1: and CQB and a host of other tactics. But again

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Speaker 1: you're I'm sorry you're constantly of alving and going to

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Speaker 1: these new schools as time evolved. Yeah, being so close

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Speaker 1: to the did you guys, um you lot the FBI

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Speaker 1: Academy at all? I mean, it's not that far from

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Speaker 1: where you're located. We had a great UH. We had

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Speaker 1: a great relationship with the f h RT and on

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Speaker 1: occasion we would go down there and they would provide

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Speaker 1: us with training. In fact, one of our former SWAD

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Speaker 1: team members was a team leader down there. And I

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Speaker 1: can't say enough pause things about f but FBI h

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Speaker 1: r T and what they had done for us. And

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Speaker 1: in addition to the training. On rare occasions we would

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Speaker 1: get a law enforcement exception to go to a military school.

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Speaker 1: I had the opportunity to go through a Marine Corps

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Speaker 1: cyper school with down in Quantico. So um, it was

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Speaker 1: a mix of things as time progressed. Yeah, that was

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Speaker 1: gonna be my next question if did you guys. I

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Speaker 1: know the military gets a little touch of sublions coming

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Speaker 1: to military schools, but where you guys are have the mission.

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Speaker 1: I was wondering if you have attended any military sniper schools,

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Speaker 1: and obviously the one in Quantico is one of the

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Speaker 1: best in all of the military. They've been doing that

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Speaker 1: for a very long time. And again it's it's right,

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Speaker 1: it's pretty close to where you guys as the flag.

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Speaker 1: It's really close. Traffic to be so much, but yeah,

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Speaker 1: quanticlees not that far. Um. Yeah, that that you know,

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Speaker 1: answer my next question with that. And um, I know

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Speaker 1: in the book you talked about you guys had a

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Speaker 1: great relationship with the obviously the state police and the

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Speaker 1: FBI I SWAT teams. Did you ever do any joint

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Speaker 1: training with any military uniits Uh, We're not do joint training.

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Speaker 1: But the one thing I will say is often we

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Speaker 1: had contractors coming and provide trading, and some of these

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Speaker 1: contracts were military UH Tier one operators from the Navy

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Speaker 1: side and the Army side. I have to tell you

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Speaker 1: that I learned a lot from the law enforcement schools,

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Speaker 1: but the Tier one guys really open your eyes to

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Speaker 1: UH tactics and things that you you are far beyond

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Speaker 1: the run you womanly exposed to on the law enforcement side. Yeah.

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Speaker 1: You know you mentioned also in the book and one

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Speaker 1: of the members on your team was the phone of

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Speaker 1: NNB seal that you obviously learned a lot from. UM.

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Speaker 1: I know I'm gonna book your name, but you made

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Speaker 1: UH would like to in uh enlighten our readers, our listeners,

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Speaker 1: I should say about this guy and UH you know

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Speaker 1: it's a little bit different from when you go from

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Speaker 1: the military to the law enforcement side. Yeah, without question,

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Speaker 1: I'll share with you his name. The guy was great

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Speaker 1: UH Robbie Lizzie, and he was the first seal that

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Speaker 1: have ever come to our team. And I have to

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Speaker 1: tell you what he brought was an insight that we

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Speaker 1: had not seen in terms of tactics c QB UH

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Speaker 1: tubular assaults would like such a host of factors which

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Speaker 1: all came into play on the law enforcement side, So

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Speaker 1: again that was I have an experience for me back

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Speaker 1: in the day. Yeah, and you know, when you're talking

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Speaker 1: about the law enforcement side, I'm sure the rules of

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Speaker 1: engagement are much much strippter when it comes to you know,

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Speaker 1: what you guys are forced to deal with because you're

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Speaker 1: dealing with American civilions. Obviously in the military, the you

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Speaker 1: know the rules of engagement and as years have gone by,

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Speaker 1: I have gotten a much strippter. But you know, you

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Speaker 1: and you talked about that a little bit in the

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Speaker 1: Discovery of Building and we're gonna get into that that

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Speaker 1: the hostage rescue situation. But you know, um, it's got

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Speaker 1: to be at times, you know, as an operator then

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Speaker 1: you were in charge of the team, it's got to

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Speaker 1: be frustrating at times because you know, with the rules

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Speaker 1: of engagement at times that I'm sure it put some

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Speaker 1: of your operators at risk. You make it a point

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Speaker 1: and really kind of touch on something that's kind of

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Speaker 1: been put out immediately which disappoints me greatly is these

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Speaker 1: new not search warrants. They've come up scrutiny, and yet

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Speaker 1: everybody knows on both the military side and the law

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Speaker 1: enforcement side the apportance of the element surprise, and that's

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Speaker 1: what a knock search one does. It gives you the

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Speaker 1: element surprise going against biolent, promote offenders who are armed,

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Speaker 1: and so forth, first say no knock social where you

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Speaker 1: have to dock your announce your press prior to entry.

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Speaker 1: So there's a lot of things that kind of have

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Speaker 1: are come in full circle right now. Yeah, and you know,

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Speaker 1: again the people in the media are focusing on a

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Speaker 1: couple of those type of no knock search forms that

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Speaker 1: went bad. You know, in the grand scheme of things,

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Speaker 1: probably nine of those don't have that kind of a

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Speaker 1: bad situation the way it ended up, and and they're

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Speaker 1: they're actually i would probably say mostly needed because of

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Speaker 1: again you're dealing with those, aren't for a guy with

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Speaker 1: traffic tickets. These are guys who are violent criminals or

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Speaker 1: women who are violent criminals and probably are well armed

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Speaker 1: behind the door. And it's you're safety as much as

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Speaker 1: their own. And you make a great point because you know,

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Speaker 1: over my career to do almost entries and we never

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Speaker 1: took fire on any of those entries because we had

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Speaker 1: the element of surprise going on with that new not

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Speaker 1: search war unfortunately because one search war has been called

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Speaker 1: scrutiny the millions that were excused seccessively uh and brought

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Speaker 1: blind pitals into custody or now you know, being through

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Speaker 1: the wayside. Yeah, and then you know, I mean you

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Speaker 1: guys were doing and again I'm quoting you from your book,

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Speaker 1: you know about two hundred rags to barricade the year.

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Speaker 1: I mean, you're talking about people with that are doing

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Speaker 1: these two almost two out of three games every year.

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Speaker 1: So it's not like your guys gonna run off half cocked,

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Speaker 1: you know. Um. And I think that's the perception that

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Speaker 1: a lot of people have our should say misconception that

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Speaker 1: a lot of people have about the police today, that

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Speaker 1: they were all running off half cocked. And you know,

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Speaker 1: when you're doing this many operations every year, I just

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Speaker 1: find it hard to believe that so many of them

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Speaker 1: are gonna go bad. I mean, otherwise will be hearing

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Speaker 1: about this every single day of the year. And you

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Speaker 1: make a great point and to the book, I think

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Speaker 1: chapter three, which takes into cuss a group of serial

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Speaker 1: bank robbers that were featured on John Walsh's America's Most Wanted.

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Speaker 1: There are nine of them, to include the leader who

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Speaker 1: was wanted on two homicide warrants, and they were armed

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Speaker 1: with a K forty seven's and body armor. We took

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Speaker 1: them to Cussy without incident when I knew not search one. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: and if you could take us back through that operational

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Speaker 1: because I thought this was a fascinating part of the book.

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Speaker 1: And actually, until I've read the book, I had never

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Speaker 1: heard of this one. I don't know whether I was

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Speaker 1: traveling at the time when I went down, but I

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Speaker 1: never remember hearing anything about this, And then reading the

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Speaker 1: book how you guys went about it, it was a

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Speaker 1: I thought it was a fascinating part of the book,

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Speaker 1: and you're talking about guys who were really dangerous, they

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Speaker 1: were very well organized, they were very well armed, and

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Speaker 1: it kind of reminded me of the movie Heat. And

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Speaker 1: you make a great point. It was back in two

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Speaker 1: thousand and four, six armed robberies were done in the

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Speaker 1: d C region. Of those six, shots were fired inside

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Speaker 1: the bank on two occasions. On a third occasion are

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Speaker 1: neighboring jurisdiction. One Peach County cruiser took twenty two hits

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Speaker 1: from AK forty seven. Unfortunately, no officers were hurt. Again,

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Speaker 1: nine individuals in this Yang and the leader of Gilmore.

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Speaker 1: We do an explosive breach using a water impulse charge

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Speaker 1: on the metal door, metal frame of the apartment the

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Speaker 1: suspects were in. And anytime we do an explosive breach

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Speaker 1: an apartment, we have a concern about the safety of

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Speaker 1: the other occupants to the other apartments on that floor.

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Speaker 1: So we're placing the charge on the door. We do

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Speaker 1: as we tie off with rope other apartment doors so

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Speaker 1: that way when the charge detonates, nobody can come out

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Speaker 1: inadvertently as we're detonating the charge. So ultimately we use

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Speaker 1: the war impulse charge UH effect entry mortals go in,

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Speaker 1: we go in support and UH suspects are taken to CUSSI.

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Speaker 1: They had body armor and they had a K forty seven,

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Speaker 1: no shots fired, none of them hurt. So again, once

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Speaker 1: again this demonstrates how effective a new knock search one

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Speaker 1: can be against violent offenders. Yeah, that water impulse charge

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Speaker 1: is interesting. That was something I hadn't heard of in

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Speaker 1: a very long time, and you talked about it in

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Speaker 1: the boat where um it's UH. It will effectively breach

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Speaker 1: the door, it doesn't create a whole lot of shrapnel

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Speaker 1: and one of the suspects was sitting in a chair

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Speaker 1: right by the door and wasn't injured by the blast

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Speaker 1: at all, and that those are the kind of things

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Speaker 1: that people need to know about when you know, when

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Speaker 1: you're talking about these things that you know, we don't

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Speaker 1: have a lot of officers trying to hurt people un necessarily,

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Speaker 1: and these granted, you know, you're trying to take them

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Speaker 1: down and your safety's paramount. At the same time, you're

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Speaker 1: not you're not trying to hurt them anymore than ask

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Speaker 1: them to take them into custody. And it doesn't, you know,

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Speaker 1: affect any of their neighbors. Uh. I was interested in

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Speaker 1: how you go about that. In the book, you talked

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Speaker 1: about roping off the neighbors doors, and I thought that

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Speaker 1: was a very interesting thing, just because you never know

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Speaker 1: when somebody, honestly, we'll walk out their door. And you

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Speaker 1: make a great point in terms of the explosive breach,

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Speaker 1: and very often people think, oh my gosh, explosives fragmentation everywhere,

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Speaker 1: And it's not that it's very calculated science. It's a

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Speaker 1: uh you know, very uh uh specific in its use

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Speaker 1: mini amount of explosives to affecting positive breach and one

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Speaker 1: suspect was fore free from the door when the charge

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Speaker 1: went he was not hurt. There's a bottle of beer

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Speaker 1: on the table in front of him that was that

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Speaker 1: turned over, and a uh landline phone was sitting on

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Speaker 1: the edge of a couch that was not disturb So

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Speaker 1: you make the point well that despite effective use explosives,

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Speaker 1: it's a very calculated science. It's searchable with precision and

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Speaker 1: has a very safe application when used right and effectively. Yeah.

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Speaker 1: And one of the other things you talked about, I

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Speaker 1: thought it was and asking about how some suspects use

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Speaker 1: dogs to protect themselves and how the flashbanks have don't

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Speaker 1: hurt the animal but neutralized and the dogs were covering

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Speaker 1: their eyes with their bogs in one surch rate And uh,

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Speaker 1: I thought that was very interestingly. And I think your

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Speaker 1: your son actually got to ride in the in the

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Speaker 1: truck with the dogs after they had obviously been removed engaged.

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Speaker 1: You make a great point. Up. When I was diagnosed

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Speaker 1: with my diseases, I knew that my time and SWAT

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Speaker 1: was over, so I wasn't sure to go to make

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Speaker 1: it until I retired two years later, So I took

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Speaker 1: my son on my last race so that he could

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Speaker 1: see what took place. He stayed a safe place back

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Speaker 1: the tackle medics. But we're hitting a place for guns

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Speaker 1: and drugs. We've been here before. We knew there were

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Speaker 1: pit bulls there. We had a previous occasion where officer

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Speaker 1: had been been discrossed them by a pit bull. Come

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Speaker 1: employee used by the drug dealers to slow down to

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Speaker 1: the access their weapons. Effective tool against the dogs. We

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Speaker 1: deploy the flash bang hand grenade with no fragmentations. The

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Speaker 1: flash and bang and what does it sends any dog running?

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Speaker 1: So in this sense, we deployed the flash bang, dog

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Speaker 1: went running and could reach a Sussex before they access

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Speaker 1: their weapons and ultimately the dogs secured turned over to

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Speaker 1: a control Sits much safer for everybody using that type

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Speaker 1: of application. You know, And when you talk about dogs,

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Speaker 1: I know you said you you had dog officers in

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Speaker 1: the swap team. Um, is it something that I know

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Speaker 1: the military they're they're going, you know, they're going more

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Speaker 1: and more you know, trained animals. Is it becoming more

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Speaker 1: of a uh factor? And what civilian swap teams are using.

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Speaker 1: And you make a great point because I can tell

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Speaker 1: you that our application of using canine and SWAT who

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Speaker 1: actually had learned from the military. We saw how well

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Speaker 1: and effective the military was using dogs and their application

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Speaker 1: of tactics. We have a very at my time when

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Speaker 1: there's only one canaan officer, actually two cana officers and

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Speaker 1: two canine dogs that we used out of the whole

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Speaker 1: group of canines, because it took a very uh specific

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Speaker 1: type of officers and specific type of dog to fit

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Speaker 1: into the needs of our SWAT team. But the application

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Speaker 1: I left was it was there to be were integrated

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Speaker 1: and select selective and how they uses dogs and so forth.

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Speaker 1: But again for us, we learned that from the military. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: and you know, um, it's it's amazing how effective those

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Speaker 1: dogs can be. H It's something that I wish we

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Speaker 1: had used a long time ago. I mean, we didn't

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Speaker 1: have any one I was in and that was something

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Speaker 1: that came about, you know, after after I was transitioning.

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Speaker 1: I just think that they're they're so loyal, they're so smart,

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Speaker 1: and you know, they're they're definitely into with what's what's

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Speaker 1: going on. I know that, you know, some of the

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Speaker 1: dogs have taken part in some of the biggest military

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Speaker 1: operations and I was curious if if the civilian world

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Speaker 1: was getting into that as well, because I think it's

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Speaker 1: they're a great resource and um, their their careers are

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Speaker 1: sometimes as short as the the the officers because they

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Speaker 1: get injured as well. But I did you know, it's

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Speaker 1: it's amazing how how good dogs can make an operation

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Speaker 1: and safer for the people involved because they're so fast.

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Speaker 1: Without question, I can't say enough positive things about a

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Speaker 1: well chained kenine in a hand is a handler in combination. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: and I wanted to talk to you a little bit

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Speaker 1: about more of the SQUATS training now as it's involved,

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Speaker 1: uh because somebody who was in there for thirty years,

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Speaker 1: I know, the military we you know our training and

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Speaker 1: we were always evolving it and now we're getting more

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Speaker 1: to the selection and assessment for our especial units, of

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Speaker 1: which in them swat is and you know, we started

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Speaker 1: obviously the physical, um you know, qualifications, interviews that you

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Speaker 1: have to have their uncompromised and I'm sure it's exactly

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Speaker 1: the same in the SWAD Games, but we started going,

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Speaker 1: you know, gearing our selection and assessment for those type

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Speaker 1: of guys around more attributes people at a different mindset

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Speaker 1: of what we were looking for. You guys immigrating that

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Speaker 1: as well into the civilian spot world. Um, over time,

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Speaker 1: certainly everything has evolved, and certainly over time, you know,

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Speaker 1: I haven't been there for thirty years. I went to

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Speaker 1: call it three generations of swad offers for lack of

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Speaker 1: other way of say it. And as we've got more

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Speaker 1: people from military side, we kind of evolved more in

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Speaker 1: that type of mindset and moving forward in that direction. Okay, yeah,

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Speaker 1: Well I wanted to move move forward, and I wanted

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Speaker 1: to talk about this DC cniper. Um, you know, that

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Speaker 1: whole situation that unfolded. I remember that. And then we

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Speaker 1: were talking off their a few minutes before we started

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Speaker 1: the podcast, and I was mentioning that it seemed like

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Speaker 1: it was only yesterday and it's been actually almost twenty years.

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Speaker 1: It's amazing that you know, so much stuff was going

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Speaker 1: on in the in the meantime, but you were right

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Speaker 1: in Bom exactly in the middle of this thing. And so, uh,

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Speaker 1: you know, explain to our listeners a little bit some

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Speaker 1: of the background in case some of them have forgotten

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Speaker 1: about this, and how you guys ex actually ended up

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Speaker 1: catching these two guys. And well, I'll share with you

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Speaker 1: if I Ken is kind of the tactical side, because

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Speaker 1: a lot of people share the investigative side on and

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Speaker 1: give you a rewind of how things started out. October

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Speaker 1: three of two thousand two was the day that Royd

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Speaker 1: kicked things off. In Montgommer County. At seven thirty that morning,

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Speaker 1: a guy, James Sunny Buchan was shot knowing the lawn

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Speaker 1: in Rockville near a car dealership. And I can tell

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Speaker 1: you that shooting was very personal for every Monthgomer County

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Speaker 1: Police officer because he was the son of of our

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Speaker 1: retired officers. Soon there after, about a half hour later,

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Speaker 1: an individual shot at a gas station in Aspen Hill.

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Speaker 1: Now this becomes problematic for us because four hundred yards

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Speaker 1: from where he is shot is a gate of Heaven Cemetery,

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Speaker 1: and at that moment in time, a funeral procession was

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Speaker 1: going to the Gate of Heaven Cemetery to bury one

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Speaker 1: of our officers who had died so cast earlier of

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Speaker 1: a heart attack. Now there's a guy named Commander Drew

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Speaker 1: Tracy who was in charge of the third District, and

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Speaker 1: he was my former swad starter years earlier. There's no

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Speaker 1: connect between the two shootings. At this point, we thought

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Speaker 1: to be prudent to defend the cemetery, so we put

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Speaker 1: sniper teams out around the cemetery and uniform patrol officers

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Speaker 1: along the route in Tracy also reached out to Peg

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Speaker 1: County for a helicopter for overwatch. As the procession made

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Speaker 1: it into the cemetery without incident. As all this is occurring,

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Speaker 1: a third shooting occurs three miles north up the road,

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Speaker 1: and then a fourth and a half hour after that,

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Speaker 1: all four shootings UH one shot, one killed, leading to

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Speaker 1: speculation of a sniper. So you know, we're working through

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Speaker 1: the day and we're working into the night, and then

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Speaker 1: that evening at nine, just inside the DC line from

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Speaker 1: Montgomery County, UM, seventy two year old Mail was shot

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Speaker 1: and killed. Investigators soon found out that the two shootings

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Speaker 1: from the UH day before that we're related to this.

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Speaker 1: It's a you actually had seven shootings in just over

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Speaker 1: twenty four hours, six of which had occurred in Montgomery County.

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Speaker 1: Now we were really kinda pushed to the limit on

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Speaker 1: the squad, and because we worked like thirty six hours straight,

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Speaker 1: we still needed to be out on the street. So

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Speaker 1: he reached out for additional tactical assets. We always had

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Speaker 1: a very good relationship with the FBI Hostage Rescue Team

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Speaker 1: in the Maryland State Police, so they provide additional taxicle operators.

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Speaker 1: What happened was we ended up with we could feel

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Speaker 1: two shifts of thirty working twelve our days, so atn

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Speaker 1: a given moment in time, twenty four hours a day,

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Speaker 1: you had thirty tactical operators out on the street. Now,

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Speaker 1: an issue was we were transitioning to a new radio

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Speaker 1: system and this created potential inter agency communication problems. So

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Speaker 1: Commander Tracy, he was in charge of the Monk and

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Speaker 1: we kind of task force. He came up with an

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Speaker 1: idea that I thought was would be problematic but actually

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Speaker 1: turned out to be brilliant. What he wanted to do

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Speaker 1: was mixed and match of teams. You wanted each vehicle

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Speaker 1: would have one FBI HRT operator, one MSP SWAT guy,

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Speaker 1: and one Montgomery County SWAT guy. The concept was that

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Speaker 1: when the call came in over the radio, all the

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Speaker 1: taxile officers were here at the same time, and he

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Speaker 1: went mont mc County officers driving because we knew the

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Speaker 1: area best and can provide a quick and efficient response.

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Speaker 1: Now my concern was we all know tactics and swat teams,

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Speaker 1: but no two teams ever do things the same. Well,

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Speaker 1: that concerned quickly disappeared because very rapidly we kind of

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Speaker 1: jelled into one team. Now I was working in the

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Speaker 1: night shift, so I was the team leader for Montgomery

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Speaker 1: County squad at night. With me was the team leader

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Speaker 1: from FBiH tre T Chuck Pierce, and the team leader

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Speaker 1: from Marylan statement UH first class started Keith Runk. We

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Speaker 1: were the command vehicle and then there were nine other

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Speaker 1: three man teams out there just like us. Our role

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Speaker 1: was to quorate response to the three agencies. Dozens of

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Speaker 1: calls that would come in each you today, you know

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Speaker 1: what would be searching up building for a suspect, or vehicles, woodline,

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Speaker 1: whatever it may be, and so forth. An issue that

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Speaker 1: came was commanding control, in other words, who would be

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Speaker 1: in charge of a tactle insid if it took place.

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Speaker 1: It was agreed that if an incidant curred in Montgomery County,

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Speaker 1: montgomer County would be the lead agency. There was also

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Speaker 1: decided that if an instant curt outside of Montgomery County,

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Speaker 1: FBI HRT would be a lead agency. Now, one thing

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Speaker 1: HRT did it was awesome is they federalized both US

431
00:26:27,400 --> 00:26:31,200
Speaker 1: and the state troopers mean that it gave us law

432
00:26:31,240 --> 00:26:35,000
Speaker 1: enforl from powers outside of normal jurisdiction. So if they

433
00:26:35,119 --> 00:26:37,320
Speaker 1: chose to, they could take us someplace else on an

434
00:26:37,359 --> 00:26:40,639
Speaker 1: operation that normally we could not. And that was how

435
00:26:40,920 --> 00:26:45,359
Speaker 1: we were functioning as these three man teams. We developed

436
00:26:45,440 --> 00:26:47,840
Speaker 1: two types of responses, one for an in county shooting

437
00:26:48,160 --> 00:26:52,479
Speaker 1: and one for an outcome out of county sheet. If

438
00:26:52,520 --> 00:26:55,040
Speaker 1: a shooting had occurred in Montgomery County, our goal was

439
00:26:55,080 --> 00:26:58,479
Speaker 1: getting only UH three man teams on scene within two

440
00:26:58,560 --> 00:27:02,840
Speaker 1: to three minutes, and their job would be site protection.

441
00:27:05,000 --> 00:27:08,639
Speaker 1: From where the shooting occurred. We would create a concentric

442
00:27:08,680 --> 00:27:12,399
Speaker 1: circle with a raise of three or five miles. Every

443
00:27:12,800 --> 00:27:15,159
Speaker 1: UH traffic light in Montgomery County who works on an

444
00:27:15,160 --> 00:27:18,160
Speaker 1: automated system, We put every one of these traffic lights

445
00:27:18,280 --> 00:27:21,960
Speaker 1: on flashing red. And what that would do is create

446
00:27:22,040 --> 00:27:26,200
Speaker 1: a massive traffic gm and so the egress of any

447
00:27:26,240 --> 00:27:31,160
Speaker 1: suspects from the scene stage in proximity at key points

448
00:27:31,280 --> 00:27:34,760
Speaker 1: would be our plane close units who would monitor traffic

449
00:27:35,760 --> 00:27:37,399
Speaker 1: and if you're looking for any vehicle who wanted and

450
00:27:37,480 --> 00:27:41,840
Speaker 1: a lookout or suspicious persons and so forth, in proximity

451
00:27:41,880 --> 00:27:43,880
Speaker 1: to the plane close units word three man SWAT units.

452
00:27:44,680 --> 00:27:46,680
Speaker 1: If a vehicle need to be stopped, then the SWAT

453
00:27:46,720 --> 00:27:48,879
Speaker 1: would stop and investigate it. And that was kind of

454
00:27:48,960 --> 00:27:51,760
Speaker 1: our response for an in county shooting. You know, she

455
00:27:52,080 --> 00:27:54,119
Speaker 1: occurred out of the county. We had many of occurred

456
00:27:54,119 --> 00:27:59,080
Speaker 1: in virgigious south of us. Every plane close and Tactical

457
00:27:59,200 --> 00:28:02,000
Speaker 1: team had a pre determined location to respond to you

458
00:28:02,080 --> 00:28:04,520
Speaker 1: within the county. We monitored every point of entry back

459
00:28:04,560 --> 00:28:07,920
Speaker 1: into our county once again looking forward, any lookout or

460
00:28:08,119 --> 00:28:13,320
Speaker 1: suspicious vehicle playing clothes observing, and dB SWAT making the stop.

461
00:28:14,000 --> 00:28:16,880
Speaker 1: And that's how we kind of monitored our activities within

462
00:28:16,920 --> 00:28:22,359
Speaker 1: the county and so forth. And then that's uh, I'm sorry.

463
00:28:24,359 --> 00:28:25,840
Speaker 1: You go ahead and I'm taking a breath and I'll

464
00:28:25,840 --> 00:28:27,080
Speaker 1: get into how to take down to the place that

465
00:28:27,160 --> 00:28:31,480
Speaker 1: you're like, yeah, I remember reading this in the book

466
00:28:31,600 --> 00:28:35,240
Speaker 1: and you know, um at this. You know when you

467
00:28:35,320 --> 00:28:41,480
Speaker 1: talk about everyone has the same training, but you'll operate differently,

468
00:28:41,600 --> 00:28:44,360
Speaker 1: and that's that's very true. I mean, even in in

469
00:28:44,520 --> 00:28:48,560
Speaker 1: special operations in the military, it's all been through the

470
00:28:48,600 --> 00:28:52,720
Speaker 1: same train We all have the exact same you know, uh,

471
00:28:53,000 --> 00:28:57,120
Speaker 1: parameters that we we use, but each individual team will

472
00:28:57,200 --> 00:29:00,360
Speaker 1: have their own quirks and that's uh. I thought that

473
00:29:00,640 --> 00:29:03,720
Speaker 1: was brilliant the way it ended up working out, because

474
00:29:04,120 --> 00:29:07,280
Speaker 1: you guys did it actually end up working seamlessly together

475
00:29:07,800 --> 00:29:10,080
Speaker 1: and that's not always the easiest thing when you're dealing

476
00:29:10,160 --> 00:29:13,000
Speaker 1: with different agencies. And the fact that you know, there

477
00:29:13,080 --> 00:29:16,280
Speaker 1: was no that's what we've seen in different places in

478
00:29:16,360 --> 00:29:20,600
Speaker 1: our agency, jealousy or pettiness, you know. Um, that was

479
00:29:20,680 --> 00:29:23,880
Speaker 1: all put out the window in regards to you know,

480
00:29:24,920 --> 00:29:27,200
Speaker 1: getting the job done with this. And I thought that

481
00:29:27,360 --> 00:29:31,680
Speaker 1: was a really good point, a great point right there,

482
00:29:31,800 --> 00:29:34,000
Speaker 1: because I had heard at the command level there was

483
00:29:34,120 --> 00:29:36,400
Speaker 1: some conflict in stif was well, I can tell you

484
00:29:36,520 --> 00:29:40,240
Speaker 1: the tragical level. Um, I never saw any conflict. Everybody

485
00:29:40,440 --> 00:29:44,200
Speaker 1: was gun ho same page and supporting everybody. I mean,

486
00:29:44,560 --> 00:29:46,160
Speaker 1: I thought we we were all one key, even that

487
00:29:46,240 --> 00:29:51,680
Speaker 1: we were three different agencies at that point. So pick

488
00:29:51,760 --> 00:29:56,400
Speaker 1: us through the the you know, the tactical, uh takedown

489
00:29:56,480 --> 00:30:00,520
Speaker 1: of this and how it all came about. About three

490
00:30:00,560 --> 00:30:04,000
Speaker 1: weeks into it, investigators had determined who the suspects were,

491
00:30:04,760 --> 00:30:09,040
Speaker 1: Lee Boyd Malvel aged seventeen, John Allan Mohammed, who had

492
00:30:09,680 --> 00:30:13,360
Speaker 1: served in the military army prior to that, and they

493
00:30:13,520 --> 00:30:17,040
Speaker 1: believed be operating a blue Chevy Caprice when new Jersey

494
00:30:17,120 --> 00:30:20,880
Speaker 1: tags now in the shootings, all of the victims had

495
00:30:20,920 --> 00:30:26,040
Speaker 1: been hit with two caliber rounds obviously related like the

496
00:30:26,120 --> 00:30:28,880
Speaker 1: A R fifteen and M sixteen there after in various models,

497
00:30:28,960 --> 00:30:30,480
Speaker 1: so we knew it was the two two three caliber

498
00:30:30,600 --> 00:30:38,920
Speaker 1: weapons they had. The information was broadcast on local radio

499
00:30:39,120 --> 00:30:42,400
Speaker 1: and TV station, and we did this on the early

500
00:30:42,480 --> 00:30:48,040
Speaker 1: more hours of October of two thousand two. A sister

501
00:30:48,080 --> 00:30:51,920
Speaker 1: and Whitney Donahue, who was an appliance for pairman who

502
00:30:51,960 --> 00:30:53,720
Speaker 1: didn't work out in DC, was returning to his home

503
00:30:53,760 --> 00:30:57,600
Speaker 1: in Pennsylvania. What happens He pulled into a rest stop too,

504
00:30:59,640 --> 00:31:02,800
Speaker 1: catches breath and h little rest and we pulled in

505
00:31:02,880 --> 00:31:06,000
Speaker 1: the rest stop. He observed the blue Chevy Caprice backed

506
00:31:06,040 --> 00:31:09,840
Speaker 1: along the woodline and he had written down the tag

507
00:31:09,920 --> 00:31:11,840
Speaker 1: number of the suspect vehicle. Would realize that this was

508
00:31:11,960 --> 00:31:18,320
Speaker 1: the vehicle police were looking for. Now the vehicle was

509
00:31:18,520 --> 00:31:21,640
Speaker 1: backed in the defensive posture along the woodline. You can

510
00:31:21,680 --> 00:31:25,400
Speaker 1: see all the vehicles that came in from the on

511
00:31:25,640 --> 00:31:28,680
Speaker 1: ramp or off ramp to the rest stop. So he

512
00:31:28,760 --> 00:31:33,600
Speaker 1: calls Marilan State Police. Marilan State Police isolates h the

513
00:31:33,680 --> 00:31:35,960
Speaker 1: rest stop by shutting down traffic in both directions on

514
00:31:36,000 --> 00:31:40,280
Speaker 1: the interstate. They also UH covertly used a tractor trailer

515
00:31:40,480 --> 00:31:45,120
Speaker 1: to block the off ramp that returned traffic back to

516
00:31:45,240 --> 00:31:47,680
Speaker 1: the interstate. It's done out of side of the snipers

517
00:31:48,400 --> 00:31:51,400
Speaker 1: and the contact the to declare the airspace restricted so

518
00:31:51,520 --> 00:31:57,720
Speaker 1: that new media helicopters would compromise the operation. So a

519
00:31:57,800 --> 00:32:01,560
Speaker 1: nineteen man SWAT team or tackle teams of it's nine

520
00:32:01,680 --> 00:32:05,320
Speaker 1: from the FBI, FBI hostity team, five from Maryland State Police,

521
00:32:05,440 --> 00:32:12,440
Speaker 1: and five from McCanny swat. Now the team leaders for

522
00:32:12,560 --> 00:32:16,480
Speaker 1: the UH, Chuck Pierce, Keith Runk and I are transport

523
00:32:16,560 --> 00:32:19,840
Speaker 1: by helicopter to the forward staging here at Myersville, and

524
00:32:19,880 --> 00:32:23,720
Speaker 1: the idea is to get the team leaders there ahead

525
00:32:23,720 --> 00:32:26,120
Speaker 1: of time so that way the operational plan can be

526
00:32:26,200 --> 00:32:29,880
Speaker 1: in place now because we were outside of Montgomery County,

527
00:32:30,240 --> 00:32:34,120
Speaker 1: FBI h r G becomes the lead tatle agency and

528
00:32:34,480 --> 00:32:37,480
Speaker 1: the overall commander of the incident is Gary Bold, the

529
00:32:37,520 --> 00:32:41,560
Speaker 1: special Agent charge from the FBI. So you know, helicopter

530
00:32:41,680 --> 00:32:43,720
Speaker 1: lands at myers When we go over to McDonald's a

531
00:32:43,760 --> 00:32:49,400
Speaker 1: lot where everybody's staging and from their piers develops the

532
00:32:49,640 --> 00:32:56,640
Speaker 1: operational plan, and what we would do is the nineteen

533
00:32:56,680 --> 00:32:59,800
Speaker 1: man team was driven to Shy of the rest stop

534
00:33:00,440 --> 00:33:03,959
Speaker 1: and we uh get out of the vehicles and at

535
00:33:04,000 --> 00:33:07,600
Speaker 1: that point we're going to deploy. A concern that we

536
00:33:07,720 --> 00:33:13,600
Speaker 1: had was the citizen could not determine if anybody was

537
00:33:13,640 --> 00:33:16,960
Speaker 1: in the vehicle because a heavy tinted winters, there's a

538
00:33:17,000 --> 00:33:20,400
Speaker 1: possibility suspects could be out in the woodline behind the vehicles.

539
00:33:21,040 --> 00:33:25,040
Speaker 1: Once on the out structures at this site itself another

540
00:33:25,080 --> 00:33:28,480
Speaker 1: concern obviously when you think tactics, you know there's two,

541
00:33:28,680 --> 00:33:30,520
Speaker 1: it could be three. When it's three, it could be four.

542
00:33:30,720 --> 00:33:33,320
Speaker 1: Or is there anybody else involved? So these are all

543
00:33:33,360 --> 00:33:37,560
Speaker 1: concerns going through our mind. So the game plan was

544
00:33:38,120 --> 00:33:42,040
Speaker 1: we've had sniper teams with night vision gear and thermals

545
00:33:42,600 --> 00:33:46,440
Speaker 1: go into the woodline behind the suspect vehicle and what

546
00:33:46,560 --> 00:33:48,840
Speaker 1: they do is clear that woodline and make sure that

547
00:33:48,920 --> 00:33:52,120
Speaker 1: there's nobody else in it. And once they had cleared

548
00:33:52,160 --> 00:33:56,160
Speaker 1: the woodline, they would set up online covering the suspect

549
00:33:56,240 --> 00:34:01,120
Speaker 1: vehicle and the other outstructures. Some sultaneous to their deployment.

550
00:34:01,160 --> 00:34:04,280
Speaker 1: A perimeter team was deployed. There's a small wooded area

551
00:34:04,360 --> 00:34:08,000
Speaker 1: on the left flank of the rest stop that separated

552
00:34:08,040 --> 00:34:11,240
Speaker 1: the interstate from the rest stop itself, so a perier

553
00:34:11,320 --> 00:34:13,920
Speaker 1: team went into this position. So in essence, what you

554
00:34:13,960 --> 00:34:16,800
Speaker 1: had was a tactical l You had the online the

555
00:34:16,960 --> 00:34:20,160
Speaker 1: sniper teams behind the suspect vehicle covering the lot and

556
00:34:20,280 --> 00:34:21,920
Speaker 1: so forth, and to the left of them along that

557
00:34:22,040 --> 00:34:26,440
Speaker 1: left flank was the UH Perier team. Again between the

558
00:34:26,520 --> 00:34:28,759
Speaker 1: two in combination at tactical else that the whole area

559
00:34:28,880 --> 00:34:33,200
Speaker 1: was covered with overlapping blocking fills of fire, and by

560
00:34:33,320 --> 00:34:35,560
Speaker 1: having the sniper teams in place and clearing that woodline,

561
00:34:36,239 --> 00:34:38,440
Speaker 1: that did clear a path for the assault team to

562
00:34:38,520 --> 00:34:42,480
Speaker 1: the vehicle. We would approach the vehicle from behind with

563
00:34:42,600 --> 00:34:46,440
Speaker 1: the trunk facing us. There was six of us on

564
00:34:46,520 --> 00:34:50,440
Speaker 1: the SALT team, four from FBI, HRT, Keith Runk from

565
00:34:50,640 --> 00:34:54,480
Speaker 1: Marrin State Police, and myself from Montgoming County. And the

566
00:34:54,560 --> 00:34:57,880
Speaker 1: game plan was HRT who would handle the breach of extraction,

567
00:34:58,840 --> 00:35:01,680
Speaker 1: Keith Runk and I would host as designated shooters on

568
00:35:01,840 --> 00:35:05,320
Speaker 1: the trunk UH covering the inside of the vehicle. So

569
00:35:05,400 --> 00:35:07,880
Speaker 1: you basically would have two elements, a left side element

570
00:35:07,960 --> 00:35:11,560
Speaker 1: and a right side element. It was thought the suspects

571
00:35:11,680 --> 00:35:14,320
Speaker 1: probably have one guy as the lookout in the driver's

572
00:35:14,320 --> 00:35:17,320
Speaker 1: seat and maybe somebody else in the back seat, so

573
00:35:17,480 --> 00:35:20,160
Speaker 1: we'd come up behind him through the woods and the

574
00:35:20,200 --> 00:35:23,480
Speaker 1: would start to thin. We're able to get without twenty

575
00:35:23,560 --> 00:35:26,560
Speaker 1: yards a suspect vehicle, and from here we break into

576
00:35:26,600 --> 00:35:31,120
Speaker 1: our two elements, left and right side. Here's the HRT

577
00:35:31,480 --> 00:35:34,160
Speaker 1: leader gives us the countdown with fingers three to one.

578
00:35:34,280 --> 00:35:37,640
Speaker 1: We move. I posted on the left side of the trunk.

579
00:35:38,040 --> 00:35:41,160
Speaker 1: My field of fire is everything on the interior of

580
00:35:41,239 --> 00:35:45,480
Speaker 1: the vehicle on the left side. Simultaneous to me posting

581
00:35:45,880 --> 00:35:49,839
Speaker 1: to HRT, guys moved forward in bridge extracted Malvo, who

582
00:35:49,880 --> 00:35:53,040
Speaker 1: had fallen asleep in the driver's seat. He's quickly extracted

583
00:35:53,320 --> 00:35:56,080
Speaker 1: and placed down the left side in the parking lot.

584
00:35:57,400 --> 00:35:58,800
Speaker 1: Hand suddenly come up right in front of me in

585
00:35:58,840 --> 00:36:01,200
Speaker 1: the back seat, and that's my Hommed in the back seat.

586
00:36:01,800 --> 00:36:04,279
Speaker 1: Simultaneous to our action on the left side, the red

587
00:36:04,440 --> 00:36:08,360
Speaker 1: side elemented Keith Runk had posted as a shooter on

588
00:36:08,480 --> 00:36:11,440
Speaker 1: the right side of the vehicle, covering the rights interior

589
00:36:11,520 --> 00:36:15,880
Speaker 1: of the vehicle, and to HRT operators breach and extracted

590
00:36:16,160 --> 00:36:19,839
Speaker 1: Muhammed out of the right in your passenger seat. At

591
00:36:19,880 --> 00:36:22,799
Speaker 1: this point, I looking, I take about three steps back

592
00:36:22,880 --> 00:36:25,720
Speaker 1: because both suspects are the crustody I'm covering the trunk.

593
00:36:27,080 --> 00:36:30,040
Speaker 1: I called to a runk to grab the tree keys

594
00:36:30,440 --> 00:36:32,839
Speaker 1: from the addition. He quickly grabbed the keys, comes back

595
00:36:33,239 --> 00:36:36,080
Speaker 1: drops to ny Um. I give him a nod. He

596
00:36:36,160 --> 00:36:39,680
Speaker 1: pops the trunk open. HRT operator had also picked up

597
00:36:39,680 --> 00:36:41,879
Speaker 1: coverage from the trunk. He called its clear. Eye called clear.

598
00:36:43,320 --> 00:36:47,200
Speaker 1: So at this point both suspects are down left and right,

599
00:36:47,400 --> 00:36:50,319
Speaker 1: the trunk is clear. I would say it's probably thirty

600
00:36:50,400 --> 00:36:51,960
Speaker 1: or four or five seconds total from the time we

601
00:36:52,120 --> 00:36:55,399
Speaker 1: left the woodline reach extraction to both suspects and clear

602
00:36:55,480 --> 00:36:58,520
Speaker 1: the trunk. Now, one thing I struck me as I

603
00:36:58,600 --> 00:37:02,160
Speaker 1: was looking at the on the car was pretty beat

604
00:37:02,239 --> 00:37:05,880
Speaker 1: up in appearance, and I noticed this whole above the

605
00:37:05,960 --> 00:37:10,320
Speaker 1: license plate, and it was almost considerably the overall damage

606
00:37:10,360 --> 00:37:13,359
Speaker 1: associated with the car all beat up, and I didn't

607
00:37:13,360 --> 00:37:16,360
Speaker 1: recognize that for what it was. One of the HRT

608
00:37:16,440 --> 00:37:20,000
Speaker 1: operators landman standing next to me. He points out that

609
00:37:20,040 --> 00:37:23,840
Speaker 1: there's a sock in this hole for camouflaging it. He

610
00:37:24,000 --> 00:37:26,840
Speaker 1: recognized it for what it was. I did not. It

611
00:37:26,960 --> 00:37:31,520
Speaker 1: was a shooting port. The snipers were using the trunk

612
00:37:31,719 --> 00:37:34,839
Speaker 1: as a sniper hide and the small hole was cut

613
00:37:34,880 --> 00:37:39,440
Speaker 1: out where they were taking their shots from. Now Malvin

614
00:37:39,520 --> 00:37:42,880
Speaker 1: Mohammed or you know, taking into custody and we go

615
00:37:43,080 --> 00:37:46,359
Speaker 1: back to the academy to brief the morning team that's

616
00:37:46,400 --> 00:37:48,840
Speaker 1: coming on. And when we get to the academy, we

617
00:37:48,960 --> 00:37:52,280
Speaker 1: find out that the evidence of technicians when they searched

618
00:37:52,320 --> 00:37:56,120
Speaker 1: the car behind the cushions in the back seat, they

619
00:37:56,200 --> 00:37:59,840
Speaker 1: pulled down and found a Bushmaster caliber rifle that was

620
00:38:00,120 --> 00:38:04,160
Speaker 1: jet in place, had a loaded magazine, and uh uh

621
00:38:04,719 --> 00:38:09,680
Speaker 1: won the chamber at that time. So, um, when I'm

622
00:38:09,680 --> 00:38:12,719
Speaker 1: back at the academy, there's something I really want to

623
00:38:12,760 --> 00:38:15,560
Speaker 1: talk to Pierce about the HRT team. He had done

624
00:38:15,560 --> 00:38:19,320
Speaker 1: a great job on the operation. I thank him for

625
00:38:19,440 --> 00:38:23,320
Speaker 1: keeping montgomer County SWAT involved in MSP involved. And the

626
00:38:23,400 --> 00:38:26,960
Speaker 1: reason I thanked him is because HRT had sufficient numbers.

627
00:38:27,239 --> 00:38:29,840
Speaker 1: If they wanted, they could have handled this instant themselves.

628
00:38:30,560 --> 00:38:33,080
Speaker 1: But it was very personal for everybody in Montgomery County.

629
00:38:33,719 --> 00:38:38,080
Speaker 1: Once again, the first victim on October three was the

630
00:38:38,160 --> 00:38:41,520
Speaker 1: son of one of our retired officers. The effected our

631
00:38:41,560 --> 00:38:43,320
Speaker 1: ability to bury one of rowing in peace at the

632
00:38:43,360 --> 00:38:46,239
Speaker 1: Gate of Heaven Cemetery and mortgomer County had suffered the

633
00:38:46,280 --> 00:38:51,239
Speaker 1: most casualties. Of the ten killed, six were in Montgomery County. Ultimately,

634
00:38:51,400 --> 00:38:53,960
Speaker 1: UH the snipers will be tied to twenty three shootings

635
00:38:54,200 --> 00:39:01,359
Speaker 1: across the country. Mohammed was convened and sentenced to death

636
00:39:01,480 --> 00:39:05,920
Speaker 1: by lethal injection November of two thousand nine, and Malvill

637
00:39:06,040 --> 00:39:10,040
Speaker 1: is currently serving consecutive life sentences. That's kind of the

638
00:39:10,239 --> 00:39:17,560
Speaker 1: UH story behind the tackle side you. While you're ketched

639
00:39:17,600 --> 00:39:20,120
Speaker 1: in your breath there, let me just pause for a

640
00:39:20,200 --> 00:39:25,040
Speaker 1: moment and read something from one of our sponsors real quickly,

641
00:39:25,160 --> 00:39:28,560
Speaker 1: and we'll we'll get back to that in just a second.

642
00:39:28,640 --> 00:39:31,720
Speaker 1: But have you ever had a time when you search

643
00:39:31,840 --> 00:39:35,400
Speaker 1: for something online and you didn't want others knowing about it?

644
00:39:35,920 --> 00:39:38,000
Speaker 1: And then most of you are probably thinking, well, you

645
00:39:38,080 --> 00:39:41,960
Speaker 1: could just use incognitimo, But let me tell you some main.

646
00:39:42,040 --> 00:39:45,439
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647
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648
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649
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650
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669
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Speaker 1: vpn dot com slash slot up to learn even more so, Uh,

670
00:41:17,480 --> 00:41:20,920
Speaker 1: we're gonna come back to our podcast right now. We're

671
00:41:21,000 --> 00:41:25,600
Speaker 1: talking with Jeff Nice. We're talking about the dc cnipers. Uh.

672
00:41:26,440 --> 00:41:30,600
Speaker 1: He just talks through the tactical part of the operation

673
00:41:30,719 --> 00:41:34,520
Speaker 1: where the you know, FBI Hrt and his own people

674
00:41:35,400 --> 00:41:39,400
Speaker 1: um took down these two guys. Was there one thing

675
00:41:39,440 --> 00:41:42,360
Speaker 1: I forgot to ask and I didn't mention it in

676
00:41:42,400 --> 00:41:44,640
Speaker 1: the book. I know it was like three o'clock in

677
00:41:44,680 --> 00:41:47,160
Speaker 1: the morning that this rest area. Was there a lot

678
00:41:47,239 --> 00:41:51,319
Speaker 1: of other people, like just people who are traveling through

679
00:41:51,400 --> 00:41:53,960
Speaker 1: the Maryland Power Pike on on the road at that

680
00:41:54,080 --> 00:41:59,440
Speaker 1: time or was the was the the breast area pretty

681
00:41:59,440 --> 00:42:01,759
Speaker 1: empty at that point? It was pretty empty. I think

682
00:42:01,760 --> 00:42:03,480
Speaker 1: it's one of the vehicles at that time. And again

683
00:42:03,560 --> 00:42:06,000
Speaker 1: Maryon State Police had quickly shut down the interstate so

684
00:42:06,080 --> 00:42:09,759
Speaker 1: nobody could get to the rest area. Yeah, because I mean,

685
00:42:09,880 --> 00:42:11,520
Speaker 1: that wouldn't have been a good time to be walking

686
00:42:11,560 --> 00:42:15,479
Speaker 1: your dog along the wood line. You're on a trip,

687
00:42:15,560 --> 00:42:18,160
Speaker 1: and you you know, talk about bad timing if you're

688
00:42:18,320 --> 00:42:20,480
Speaker 1: walking your dog in the wood line and all that's

689
00:42:20,520 --> 00:42:25,360
Speaker 1: going down. But the other thing that I found interesting

690
00:42:25,440 --> 00:42:28,560
Speaker 1: in your book, we talked about that slot that the

691
00:42:30,360 --> 00:42:33,680
Speaker 1: that the snipers were using to fire from the trunk

692
00:42:34,200 --> 00:42:36,840
Speaker 1: and they had their bushmash the rifle, you know in

693
00:42:36,920 --> 00:42:42,080
Speaker 1: the backs. Um. It was a technique that the IRA used,

694
00:42:42,280 --> 00:42:45,120
Speaker 1: and you guys found that out afterwards. I would imagine

695
00:42:45,160 --> 00:42:49,600
Speaker 1: from the FBI UM that's where they got that from,

696
00:42:49,760 --> 00:43:00,560
Speaker 1: by searching the internet and coming across that. It was

697
00:43:00,640 --> 00:43:03,200
Speaker 1: inferred that they had copied it from the i RA,

698
00:43:03,600 --> 00:43:06,440
Speaker 1: and I keep from one of the investigators thereafter. But

699
00:43:06,960 --> 00:43:12,120
Speaker 1: so I'm not really sure. M. One thing you just oh, true,

700
00:43:12,200 --> 00:43:14,279
Speaker 1: go ahead, is that you made a good point on

701
00:43:14,400 --> 00:43:17,200
Speaker 1: occasion here I may appear to be a little out

702
00:43:17,239 --> 00:43:23,160
Speaker 1: of breath, and that's just relative to my uh medical addition. Emily,

703
00:43:23,239 --> 00:43:26,120
Speaker 1: there's this cordiac Emily does no worries. It's just kind

704
00:43:26,120 --> 00:43:29,239
Speaker 1: of the nature of the new norm if you will, No, No,

705
00:43:29,760 --> 00:43:32,600
Speaker 1: not a problem at all for us. I just I

706
00:43:32,719 --> 00:43:34,800
Speaker 1: know I was asking you to talk through there, and

707
00:43:34,840 --> 00:43:37,239
Speaker 1: I didn't want you to get, you know, out of

708
00:43:37,280 --> 00:43:41,560
Speaker 1: breath doing so. That's uh, you know, I was just

709
00:43:41,640 --> 00:43:44,120
Speaker 1: trying to give you a little bit of a breather there.

710
00:43:44,200 --> 00:43:48,160
Speaker 1: But I'll take it any time I wanted. Yeah, if

711
00:43:48,200 --> 00:43:51,040
Speaker 1: you if you ever need to take a break for

712
00:43:51,080 --> 00:43:53,719
Speaker 1: a second, just say the word and will little Paul

713
00:43:53,760 --> 00:43:56,240
Speaker 1: I was there, but I wanted to also talk about

714
00:43:56,320 --> 00:44:00,640
Speaker 1: the Discovery Building suicide bomber case. And again you were

715
00:44:00,719 --> 00:44:04,960
Speaker 1: right in the middle of it. And again this happened.

716
00:44:05,719 --> 00:44:13,359
Speaker 1: You know. Uh, I believe that was the Discovery that's

717
00:44:13,360 --> 00:44:17,320
Speaker 1: in Rockville, isn't It was that especially that spring. It

718
00:44:17,480 --> 00:44:21,560
Speaker 1: was September one, Spring thousand and ten. It's one mile

719
00:44:21,680 --> 00:44:26,480
Speaker 1: north of DC line in Silver Spring and Business District. Yeah.

720
00:44:26,600 --> 00:44:30,520
Speaker 1: And again for some of our listeners who might not

721
00:44:30,719 --> 00:44:35,359
Speaker 1: be um remembering all of that, if you could talk

722
00:44:35,360 --> 00:44:37,080
Speaker 1: to us through a little bit of the background and

723
00:44:37,160 --> 00:44:40,799
Speaker 1: I was started them, We'll go from there. Look at

724
00:44:40,920 --> 00:44:43,000
Speaker 1: one thing I'd like to talk about prior to because

725
00:44:43,160 --> 00:44:46,880
Speaker 1: it was big into us having a successful resolution with

726
00:44:47,040 --> 00:44:51,479
Speaker 1: some train we had done prior to this incident. Prior

727
00:44:51,600 --> 00:44:53,560
Speaker 1: to this incident, we had developed we called her Code

728
00:44:53,600 --> 00:44:57,120
Speaker 1: Red Counter Terre Teams, and they were to help us

729
00:44:57,200 --> 00:45:01,160
Speaker 1: respond to potential post nine eleven type incidents. And what

730
00:45:01,239 --> 00:45:03,640
Speaker 1: we did is we took on personnel in the police department.

731
00:45:04,040 --> 00:45:07,439
Speaker 1: We trained them in a variety attacks. Two months prior

732
00:45:07,520 --> 00:45:11,600
Speaker 1: to Discovery was the culmination of this training. We've done

733
00:45:11,600 --> 00:45:14,160
Speaker 1: a bunch of scenarios. Now, most scenarios were geared towards

734
00:45:14,239 --> 00:45:17,480
Speaker 1: active shooter and I d S. But just by chance,

735
00:45:17,719 --> 00:45:21,560
Speaker 1: one scenario we did was for a suicide bomber with hostages.

736
00:45:22,920 --> 00:45:26,120
Speaker 1: Just by chance, again, the scenario when we didn't we

737
00:45:26,200 --> 00:45:29,000
Speaker 1: didn't need building a similar to size and design of Discovery,

738
00:45:30,480 --> 00:45:33,279
Speaker 1: And just by chance, one more time we did. The

739
00:45:34,160 --> 00:45:36,960
Speaker 1: scenario we did in the lobby of the building. As

740
00:45:37,040 --> 00:45:41,160
Speaker 1: Discovery played out, it occurred in the lobby. Another important

741
00:45:41,200 --> 00:45:44,160
Speaker 1: thing is that during this training we integrated our bomb tex.

742
00:45:45,280 --> 00:45:47,799
Speaker 1: Bomb texts usually are on the police side, but Montgomery

743
00:45:47,880 --> 00:45:49,799
Speaker 1: County are actually on the fire rescue side, were they

744
00:45:50,640 --> 00:45:53,919
Speaker 1: or bomb trecks and fire marshals. I guess the point

745
00:45:53,920 --> 00:45:56,919
Speaker 1: I'm making that because we had code read teams in place,

746
00:45:57,280 --> 00:46:00,320
Speaker 1: because we had integrated with our bomb text and because

747
00:46:00,400 --> 00:46:04,320
Speaker 1: we had trained for a identical scenario two months prior,

748
00:46:04,920 --> 00:46:09,719
Speaker 1: just provide huge dividends as we roll into this incident. Yeah.

749
00:46:09,800 --> 00:46:13,440
Speaker 1: And I remember from reading in a book when you

750
00:46:13,520 --> 00:46:19,759
Speaker 1: talked about like the cold Red Emergency Response Team, you

751
00:46:19,840 --> 00:46:23,440
Speaker 1: said that the and again it doesn't seem like that

752
00:46:23,600 --> 00:46:25,960
Speaker 1: long ago, but it was November two thousand and eight.

753
00:46:26,520 --> 00:46:32,759
Speaker 1: The terrorists attacked in Mumbai, Mumbai, Mumbai's India, and you

754
00:46:32,920 --> 00:46:36,160
Speaker 1: guys recognized that as a you know, a swat team

755
00:46:36,200 --> 00:46:40,440
Speaker 1: in a large, you know, uh population area that you

756
00:46:40,560 --> 00:46:44,120
Speaker 1: guys weren't prepared for something of that kind of magnitude.

757
00:46:44,160 --> 00:46:47,239
Speaker 1: And again, I mean, I think of Mumbai and it

758
00:46:47,360 --> 00:46:50,120
Speaker 1: doesn't seem like that longer than we're parking twelve years.

759
00:46:50,320 --> 00:46:55,680
Speaker 1: But um, again, something that played out somewhere else in

760
00:46:55,719 --> 00:46:59,520
Speaker 1: the world, it drove the fact that you guys prepared

761
00:46:59,600 --> 00:47:02,240
Speaker 1: for that, and it just so happened that the timing

762
00:47:02,400 --> 00:47:07,040
Speaker 1: was right because you're you're you're training. This situation unfolded.

763
00:47:09,440 --> 00:47:13,600
Speaker 1: And one thing that was kind of a little crazy

764
00:47:13,640 --> 00:47:17,560
Speaker 1: early on is an off duty officers named Ed Paydon.

765
00:47:17,640 --> 00:47:20,040
Speaker 1: He did a great job. He responded off duty and

766
00:47:20,840 --> 00:47:26,760
Speaker 1: came to Discovery, uh to help isolate the suspect. Um Initially,

767
00:47:26,800 --> 00:47:30,480
Speaker 1: what we had was an individual who was in the

768
00:47:30,719 --> 00:47:35,320
Speaker 1: lobby fire shots, took hostages and had a p b

769
00:47:35,480 --> 00:47:38,840
Speaker 1: I D on his person and paid an off duty

770
00:47:39,719 --> 00:47:44,080
Speaker 1: announces the dispatcheries off duty playing clothes h yellow police

771
00:47:44,160 --> 00:47:48,239
Speaker 1: band on his left shoulder with vanilla shotgun goes in

772
00:47:48,400 --> 00:47:51,680
Speaker 1: to help contain the suspect because he was familiar with

773
00:47:51,680 --> 00:47:56,480
Speaker 1: Discovery body. Unfortunately, Ed Payton was misidentified by a person

774
00:47:56,600 --> 00:48:00,239
Speaker 1: high up in that building as a second gunman armed

775
00:48:00,280 --> 00:48:02,759
Speaker 1: with machine gun in the garden area of Discovery. So,

776
00:48:02,960 --> 00:48:05,839
Speaker 1: going to back what you said about Mumbai, I sort

777
00:48:05,880 --> 00:48:08,560
Speaker 1: of think of similarities between Mumbai and what was happening here.

778
00:48:09,760 --> 00:48:14,640
Speaker 1: In Mumbai you had a Tais Mahau Hotel overtaken. Here

779
00:48:14,680 --> 00:48:19,080
Speaker 1: you have Discoveryboliey, the world's number one largest nonfiction media

780
00:48:19,120 --> 00:48:22,560
Speaker 1: outlet being taken over. And Mumbai you had active shooters

781
00:48:22,600 --> 00:48:26,279
Speaker 1: on the railway platform where our officer was misidentified as

782
00:48:26,320 --> 00:48:28,360
Speaker 1: a gun and a machine gun two yards away was

783
00:48:28,440 --> 00:48:31,920
Speaker 1: a railway platform. So once again early on there was

784
00:48:31,960 --> 00:48:33,600
Speaker 1: some factors thinking that this might have been a multi

785
00:48:33,680 --> 00:48:36,239
Speaker 1: side attack, so we activated our code write teams. Part

786
00:48:36,280 --> 00:48:43,479
Speaker 1: of his response as well, Yeah, and you you talked

787
00:48:43,520 --> 00:48:48,759
Speaker 1: about paydon Um quite extensively in the book, and you

788
00:48:48,840 --> 00:48:51,319
Speaker 1: know he was an offshooty cop and he ended up

789
00:48:52,200 --> 00:48:54,560
Speaker 1: you talked about, I mean, if there was a hero

790
00:48:54,760 --> 00:48:58,520
Speaker 1: involved in that day, uh, it was it was Payden

791
00:48:58,600 --> 00:49:01,839
Speaker 1: And the other thing that stood out again, going back

792
00:49:01,880 --> 00:49:05,640
Speaker 1: to your boat, you had a slew of you know,

793
00:49:05,719 --> 00:49:10,200
Speaker 1: photographs of the area that Discovery building the bottom floor,

794
00:49:10,280 --> 00:49:14,239
Speaker 1: that big, huge lobby area, and while all this is

795
00:49:14,280 --> 00:49:18,360
Speaker 1: going on, there's uh, motorcycles and and stand up like

796
00:49:19,960 --> 00:49:22,840
Speaker 1: cardboard cutouts of the guys from Orange count of Chopplers

797
00:49:22,880 --> 00:49:27,600
Speaker 1: and just it seems it seems like it doesn't Man,

798
00:49:27,719 --> 00:49:30,759
Speaker 1: you're talking about a hostage situation and the guys you're

799
00:49:30,800 --> 00:49:34,160
Speaker 1: seeing on TV building bikes yelling at each other are

800
00:49:34,280 --> 00:49:36,479
Speaker 1: standing there in the lobby because it looks like they're

801
00:49:36,600 --> 00:49:40,640
Speaker 1: actually there in the portal. And you make a great point. Now,

802
00:49:40,800 --> 00:49:45,440
Speaker 1: Hunt describe the lobby and how the scenaria unfolded. The

803
00:49:45,560 --> 00:49:49,120
Speaker 1: lobby is about two hundred feet wide and eight ft

804
00:49:49,160 --> 00:49:53,520
Speaker 1: deep and has glass on three sides. The Alpha side

805
00:49:53,600 --> 00:49:56,319
Speaker 1: faced the Georgia Abbey side. You had double lobby doors

806
00:49:56,400 --> 00:49:59,880
Speaker 1: on the broader side and glass and glass on the

807
00:50:00,040 --> 00:50:03,759
Speaker 1: Charlie side as well. And the ceiling is probably high

808
00:50:03,800 --> 00:50:06,600
Speaker 1: and he had three concrete pillars ore evenly space that

809
00:50:06,680 --> 00:50:10,359
Speaker 1: the lobby is much like the museum marble floors. There's

810
00:50:10,360 --> 00:50:13,320
Speaker 1: a skeleton of a t Rex and their artifacts suspended

811
00:50:13,360 --> 00:50:15,800
Speaker 1: from the ceiling and card pud cutouts of the guys

812
00:50:16,120 --> 00:50:20,640
Speaker 1: from American Chopper and uh, that's kind of what the

813
00:50:20,719 --> 00:50:24,040
Speaker 1: layout of the lobby is. So on September one, two

814
00:50:24,120 --> 00:50:28,080
Speaker 1: thousand ten, James Lee and Asian Mayle, who in his

815
00:50:28,160 --> 00:50:30,680
Speaker 1: early forties. He comes to the lobby. He's pushing the

816
00:50:30,800 --> 00:50:34,800
Speaker 1: court and on that court is an alice pack that

817
00:50:34,920 --> 00:50:37,920
Speaker 1: contains a p B I D person Born Improvisus supposed

818
00:50:37,920 --> 00:50:41,920
Speaker 1: to device. He comes into the lobby, displays a handgun,

819
00:50:42,160 --> 00:50:44,760
Speaker 1: fires several shots in the air, and takes the security

820
00:50:44,800 --> 00:50:51,120
Speaker 1: guard Fisher hostage Fishers thirty seven years old and prior military.

821
00:50:53,120 --> 00:50:56,720
Speaker 1: At that point, um Lee starts to don his alice

822
00:50:56,800 --> 00:50:58,640
Speaker 1: pack with the p B I D and goes to

823
00:50:58,719 --> 00:51:01,440
Speaker 1: the process of arming device. There's a process he has

824
00:51:01,480 --> 00:51:04,640
Speaker 1: to go through to arm it. As he's arming his device,

825
00:51:04,960 --> 00:51:07,640
Speaker 1: a second hostage comes through the double lobby doors. He

826
00:51:07,760 --> 00:51:11,000
Speaker 1: prones that hostage out at gunpoint, and then he goes

827
00:51:11,040 --> 00:51:14,400
Speaker 1: back to arming his device again, and as he does that,

828
00:51:14,520 --> 00:51:16,720
Speaker 1: a third hostage comes in who he prones out at gunpoint.

829
00:51:17,760 --> 00:51:20,680
Speaker 1: So ultimately he ends up with three hostages and he's

830
00:51:20,719 --> 00:51:24,680
Speaker 1: isolated to the lobby area. On the back side of

831
00:51:24,760 --> 00:51:27,640
Speaker 1: the lobby are two corridors that feed to the rest

832
00:51:27,760 --> 00:51:31,680
Speaker 1: of the building. Early on ed Paydon in conjunction with

833
00:51:31,880 --> 00:51:35,840
Speaker 1: other responding unites covertly out of sight of the suspect,

834
00:51:36,719 --> 00:51:40,239
Speaker 1: sealed off that back area. So altenly what we ended

835
00:51:40,320 --> 00:51:43,520
Speaker 1: up was with the suspect in the lobby with three

836
00:51:43,600 --> 00:51:46,520
Speaker 1: hostages and P B I E D. And we had

837
00:51:46,600 --> 00:51:49,520
Speaker 1: bomb texts who were giving us assessments of the P

838
00:51:49,640 --> 00:51:55,799
Speaker 1: B I D. You guys had I'm sorry, I mean interrupted,

839
00:51:56,400 --> 00:52:02,520
Speaker 1: but you had some some some eyes on on the

840
00:52:02,640 --> 00:52:07,120
Speaker 1: floor there. And also I remember reading in the book

841
00:52:07,160 --> 00:52:10,040
Speaker 1: that one of the hostages, I think he had a

842
00:52:10,200 --> 00:52:14,200
Speaker 1: role in briefcase. And at the time during your initial assessment,

843
00:52:14,320 --> 00:52:18,959
Speaker 1: it wasn't clear if that was part of Lee's bomb

844
00:52:19,080 --> 00:52:22,000
Speaker 1: making stuff or was that part of, you know, an

845
00:52:22,040 --> 00:52:25,239
Speaker 1: innocent guy just pushing his briefcase. Is that correct? You

846
00:52:25,360 --> 00:52:28,480
Speaker 1: make a great point. First, let's talk about the security office. Um,

847
00:52:28,840 --> 00:52:31,680
Speaker 1: there are two corridors coming off the back of the lobby,

848
00:52:31,960 --> 00:52:34,760
Speaker 1: and we designated on the Delta one in Delta two corridor.

849
00:52:35,120 --> 00:52:36,960
Speaker 1: The Delta one corridor was the one that was the

850
00:52:37,160 --> 00:52:40,880
Speaker 1: closest proximity to where Lee was that security desk significance

851
00:52:40,880 --> 00:52:43,120
Speaker 1: of the other core where the Delta two there was

852
00:52:43,160 --> 00:52:45,680
Speaker 1: a security office in there and and that's the cruity office.

853
00:52:45,719 --> 00:52:48,720
Speaker 1: Were cameras so we could get real time into study

854
00:52:48,800 --> 00:52:52,799
Speaker 1: the suspect, study device, and the hostages and so forth. Now,

855
00:52:52,880 --> 00:52:54,920
Speaker 1: this had all the appearance of being a planned event

856
00:52:55,680 --> 00:52:58,320
Speaker 1: from what Lee had done. We had other items on

857
00:52:58,400 --> 00:53:02,880
Speaker 1: the part as well. We know that common practice in

858
00:53:03,120 --> 00:53:06,719
Speaker 1: planned events are secondary devices. A fear that I had

859
00:53:06,880 --> 00:53:09,480
Speaker 1: was that maybe some of these other items contained a

860
00:53:09,640 --> 00:53:13,200
Speaker 1: time device, which would have meant that with every passing moment, uh,

861
00:53:13,440 --> 00:53:16,560
Speaker 1: we're getting closer to the moment of detonation. When the

862
00:53:16,640 --> 00:53:19,439
Speaker 1: second hostice came into the lobby, he had a rolling

863
00:53:19,520 --> 00:53:23,359
Speaker 1: briefcase and that was now left unattended. Now I don't

864
00:53:23,360 --> 00:53:26,240
Speaker 1: want the idea of anything being unattended. And he planned incident.

865
00:53:26,840 --> 00:53:28,920
Speaker 1: And while this guy had all the appearance of being

866
00:53:28,960 --> 00:53:32,279
Speaker 1: a true hostage, we had special protocol for dealing with

867
00:53:32,400 --> 00:53:35,160
Speaker 1: him because we kind of saw him as a wild card.

868
00:53:35,640 --> 00:53:37,640
Speaker 1: While it was ninety nine point nine pers not sure

869
00:53:37,680 --> 00:53:39,520
Speaker 1: he was in fact that your hostage. We didn't want

870
00:53:39,560 --> 00:53:42,719
Speaker 1: to take any risk factor. So the fact that we

871
00:53:42,760 --> 00:53:49,799
Speaker 1: had another unintended item gave us a measure of concern. Yeah,

872
00:53:49,920 --> 00:53:52,840
Speaker 1: and uh, you know, you guys talked about that in

873
00:53:53,040 --> 00:53:57,759
Speaker 1: in your book, um, and you know, I mean you're

874
00:53:57,800 --> 00:54:02,320
Speaker 1: going through you you're going through all your protocols and

875
00:54:02,400 --> 00:54:06,080
Speaker 1: then you you developed a what do you call it,

876
00:54:07,520 --> 00:54:12,960
Speaker 1: um trying wild card. Yeah, well you had the wild card.

877
00:54:13,040 --> 00:54:17,040
Speaker 1: But you all we're developing a delivered assalled plan and

878
00:54:17,080 --> 00:54:21,080
Speaker 1: an emergency assall plan in case something happened before you were,

879
00:54:22,600 --> 00:54:27,040
Speaker 1: you know, prepared to go in or keep escalated the situation.

880
00:54:27,160 --> 00:54:32,080
Speaker 1: So it's at this time, it's a pretty fluid situation.

881
00:54:32,400 --> 00:54:37,680
Speaker 1: You know, you're you're dealing with a suspect who's obviously

882
00:54:38,719 --> 00:54:42,600
Speaker 1: I remember again reading in the book where the hostage

883
00:54:42,680 --> 00:54:47,640
Speaker 1: negotiator was trying to them and he was extremely upset,

884
00:54:47,760 --> 00:54:50,200
Speaker 1: and at that time, you guys weren't sure he would

885
00:54:50,239 --> 00:54:54,080
Speaker 1: be able to be talked down. We actually had poor

886
00:54:54,160 --> 00:54:59,080
Speaker 1: plans in place. Our profounce was surrender specific plan for

887
00:54:59,120 --> 00:55:02,360
Speaker 1: how that would occur. We want to do a sniper

888
00:55:02,400 --> 00:55:04,720
Speaker 1: option if we went to a tactical resolution. Obviously sniper

889
00:55:04,800 --> 00:55:08,600
Speaker 1: shot is a good thing. Why distance from target with

890
00:55:08,719 --> 00:55:11,719
Speaker 1: explosive vice is great. But ultimately our sniper option from

891
00:55:11,719 --> 00:55:14,399
Speaker 1: the outside is eliminated for a number of reasons which

892
00:55:14,400 --> 00:55:15,919
Speaker 1: I can talk about. If you choose in a moment,

893
00:55:16,560 --> 00:55:18,759
Speaker 1: and then the other options were a deliverer soul and

894
00:55:18,800 --> 00:55:25,680
Speaker 1: the emergency soul. And in the sniper option, again it

895
00:55:25,800 --> 00:55:30,160
Speaker 1: came down to some of the equipment um because the

896
00:55:30,640 --> 00:55:36,399
Speaker 1: the optics didn't give the well the police go ahead. Yeah,

897
00:55:36,880 --> 00:55:39,319
Speaker 1: actually it was the first word talk about sniper shot

898
00:55:39,360 --> 00:55:42,879
Speaker 1: from the outside in and in the perfect world. Well,

899
00:55:43,239 --> 00:55:46,640
Speaker 1: the glass at Discovery was thought to be Hurricane class,

900
00:55:46,719 --> 00:55:49,440
Speaker 1: which is impact resistant, and my understanding that that's a

901
00:55:49,520 --> 00:55:53,960
Speaker 1: labinate lament with two other glasses bonded and a protective cover,

902
00:55:54,320 --> 00:55:56,320
Speaker 1: and with a three or a caliber rifle, which what

903
00:55:56,400 --> 00:55:59,960
Speaker 1: we had is my understand that can impact once glasses three.

904
00:56:00,719 --> 00:56:03,000
Speaker 1: The flight of the path can be impacted by that.

905
00:56:03,520 --> 00:56:06,719
Speaker 1: In addition, because this place was like a museum, you

906
00:56:06,760 --> 00:56:09,239
Speaker 1: had all these artifacts hanging on the ceiling which also

907
00:56:09,440 --> 00:56:12,440
Speaker 1: could affect the flight of the boat. In the perfect world,

908
00:56:12,480 --> 00:56:14,440
Speaker 1: where sniper takes a shot, we'd like the suspect to

909
00:56:14,480 --> 00:56:16,080
Speaker 1: be three to five feet on the other side of

910
00:56:16,120 --> 00:56:18,880
Speaker 1: the class, depend upon which sniper team we had to

911
00:56:18,920 --> 00:56:22,080
Speaker 1: take the shot. We had three teams out once around

912
00:56:22,320 --> 00:56:24,879
Speaker 1: reached class that had travel in digital seventy five feet

913
00:56:24,960 --> 00:56:29,200
Speaker 1: which is target and our three sniper teams. Ideally we

914
00:56:29,280 --> 00:56:31,040
Speaker 1: want them to have a straight on shot to the target,

915
00:56:31,640 --> 00:56:35,000
Speaker 1: but two or three three teams had poor angling with

916
00:56:35,040 --> 00:56:37,799
Speaker 1: glass and their position was necessary because I told our

917
00:56:37,800 --> 00:56:40,239
Speaker 1: sniper teams, I want a team on the Alpha and

918
00:56:40,320 --> 00:56:43,320
Speaker 1: Charlie's side in case the suspect tries to breach class

919
00:56:43,520 --> 00:56:46,880
Speaker 1: and UH break the perimeter, they'll be in a position

920
00:56:46,920 --> 00:56:48,880
Speaker 1: to take him out. The only King that had a

921
00:56:48,920 --> 00:56:50,960
Speaker 1: straight on shot from the nine o'clock position had to

922
00:56:51,000 --> 00:56:54,239
Speaker 1: shoot through the double glass lobby doors. So for all

923
00:56:54,280 --> 00:56:58,480
Speaker 1: these reasons collectively, a sniper shot UH from the outside

924
00:56:58,680 --> 00:57:04,000
Speaker 1: was taken out of our option to speak right. And

925
00:57:04,040 --> 00:57:06,600
Speaker 1: then you talked about there was a possibility of an

926
00:57:06,680 --> 00:57:10,879
Speaker 1: interiors sniper shot that and that's where I mistakenly talked

927
00:57:10,880 --> 00:57:19,240
Speaker 1: about you know you're you're Likapold scopes kind of Um,

928
00:57:21,320 --> 00:57:24,160
Speaker 1: I would say, if your field of vision at that

929
00:57:24,320 --> 00:57:27,440
Speaker 1: point is pretty limited with the with the Bold scope

930
00:57:27,840 --> 00:57:30,480
Speaker 1: at that short distance and your spot on there, the

931
00:57:30,560 --> 00:57:32,720
Speaker 1: issue for us was that it would only be like

932
00:57:32,840 --> 00:57:36,480
Speaker 1: a thirty fourty foot shot and the hostages would be

933
00:57:36,600 --> 00:57:38,960
Speaker 1: looking back at us from the doctor one cool where

934
00:57:39,040 --> 00:57:41,600
Speaker 1: we took that shot, and the currencern was even at

935
00:57:41,640 --> 00:57:45,000
Speaker 1: a minimum setting, the only thing that sniper would have

936
00:57:45,680 --> 00:57:49,200
Speaker 1: is the head of the suspect, and if this hostage

937
00:57:49,280 --> 00:57:54,320
Speaker 1: reacted move laterally, our fear was that the shooter would

938
00:57:54,320 --> 00:57:55,840
Speaker 1: not be able to pick us up in time, and

939
00:57:55,920 --> 00:57:58,240
Speaker 1: we didn't want something bad to happen. So from that end,

940
00:57:58,320 --> 00:58:02,040
Speaker 1: we often take the interior sniper shot off. I thought

941
00:58:02,080 --> 00:58:05,880
Speaker 1: that our MPs UM would be sufficient in dropping the

942
00:58:05,920 --> 00:58:12,520
Speaker 1: suspect right. And then this entire scenario from start to

943
00:58:12,600 --> 00:58:17,400
Speaker 1: finish only took about a couple to three hours, and

944
00:58:17,480 --> 00:58:22,000
Speaker 1: then it turned down to the hostages kind of drove

945
00:58:22,120 --> 00:58:26,400
Speaker 1: the train, so to speak, by I guess, make it

946
00:58:26,440 --> 00:58:30,680
Speaker 1: a run for it, and that that kind of forced

947
00:58:30,720 --> 00:58:34,880
Speaker 1: your hand to I guess take to your emergency options,

948
00:58:34,880 --> 00:58:39,360
Speaker 1: assault plan option, UH your spot on what happened was

949
00:58:39,400 --> 00:58:42,440
Speaker 1: they were giving hands it was and ultimately they made

950
00:58:42,480 --> 00:58:46,440
Speaker 1: a break to try to running it away. So we

951
00:58:46,520 --> 00:58:48,840
Speaker 1: end up doing an emergency Sultan during the emergency, so

952
00:58:49,040 --> 00:58:51,800
Speaker 1: we were able to UH eliminate the suspect as is

953
00:58:52,040 --> 00:58:55,240
Speaker 1: trying to detonate device and chase the suspects with his

954
00:58:55,320 --> 00:59:03,400
Speaker 1: handgun and ultimately UH rushing three hostages unharmed, new police

955
00:59:03,480 --> 00:59:07,680
Speaker 1: casualties and safe evacuation of nineteen hundred employees in educational

956
00:59:07,720 --> 00:59:11,960
Speaker 1: a daycare center in the building that day. And it

957
00:59:12,160 --> 00:59:16,440
Speaker 1: was amazing because he uh and then going back to

958
00:59:16,560 --> 00:59:20,400
Speaker 1: the book, he had an emergency like safety in his

959
00:59:20,560 --> 00:59:23,480
Speaker 1: hand and he had removed so at that time he

960
00:59:23,560 --> 00:59:27,200
Speaker 1: could have actually detonated this device, which turned out to

961
00:59:27,280 --> 00:59:30,840
Speaker 1: be a live one. I remember hearing on the news

962
00:59:31,640 --> 00:59:34,160
Speaker 1: when all this unfolded. They weren't sure if he had

963
00:59:34,200 --> 00:59:37,760
Speaker 1: an actual device or it was a one of those

964
00:59:37,880 --> 00:59:41,680
Speaker 1: fake ones that some people, oh God knows, why would

965
00:59:41,720 --> 00:59:45,200
Speaker 1: they do that? But uh, you know, he actually had

966
00:59:45,400 --> 00:59:48,760
Speaker 1: an actual device that would have caused a ton of

967
00:59:48,880 --> 00:59:52,680
Speaker 1: damage there was inside that lobby. He had four I

968
00:59:52,920 --> 00:59:56,120
Speaker 1: d S four improvised series devices that were filled with

969
00:59:56,280 --> 00:59:59,880
Speaker 1: a four yellow tanks filled with map gas. He had

970
00:59:59,880 --> 01:00:03,280
Speaker 1: a red oxygen take in the middle, which would enhance

971
01:00:03,360 --> 01:00:06,680
Speaker 1: the thermal effect of the map gasp gas can reach

972
01:00:07,960 --> 01:00:10,880
Speaker 1: when it's enhanced with oxygen. In addition, he had a

973
01:00:11,000 --> 01:00:13,880
Speaker 1: pipe pomb on his right leg, the equivalent of military

974
01:00:13,960 --> 01:00:18,040
Speaker 1: fragmentation grenade that caused death and injury to those when

975
01:00:18,040 --> 01:00:20,840
Speaker 1: they told me to rates. These are all wired sequence

976
01:00:20,920 --> 01:00:24,560
Speaker 1: to essentially go off as one device and if they had,

977
01:00:24,680 --> 01:00:26,600
Speaker 1: you know, it would be a catastrophic for everybody that

978
01:00:26,680 --> 01:00:32,200
Speaker 1: lobby area, right, and you know it's amazing that it

979
01:00:32,400 --> 01:00:35,760
Speaker 1: didn't go off. But you also talked about when he

980
01:00:35,880 --> 01:00:41,000
Speaker 1: took the hostages, it might have interrupted his sequence of

981
01:00:41,200 --> 01:00:45,760
Speaker 1: arming though, is that is that word turned out in

982
01:00:45,840 --> 01:00:47,520
Speaker 1: a nutshell? You know God was on our side that

983
01:00:47,640 --> 01:00:51,280
Speaker 1: day because what happened is his device, his foreign device

984
01:00:51,400 --> 01:00:55,040
Speaker 1: was what's called a dead man switch. It was released activated,

985
01:00:55,080 --> 01:00:56,920
Speaker 1: meaning that if you let go of it and it released,

986
01:00:57,560 --> 01:01:00,800
Speaker 1: his devices would go off. And he had a box safety.

987
01:01:01,000 --> 01:01:03,240
Speaker 1: They could certain into this dead man to prevent it

988
01:01:03,360 --> 01:01:07,120
Speaker 1: from going off. We did the emergency assault. The pause

989
01:01:07,240 --> 01:01:09,720
Speaker 1: box safety was out of the firing place, so by

990
01:01:09,760 --> 01:01:14,680
Speaker 1: all accounts, the device should have gone off. So the

991
01:01:14,800 --> 01:01:17,880
Speaker 1: reason that device did not go off that day, it

992
01:01:18,080 --> 01:01:22,040
Speaker 1: was if you remember early on, when he took the

993
01:01:22,200 --> 01:01:24,720
Speaker 1: first hostage, he started to go through the process of

994
01:01:24,800 --> 01:01:28,360
Speaker 1: arming his device. He got interrupted. Why second hats came

995
01:01:28,400 --> 01:01:31,200
Speaker 1: through the double lobby doors. They goes back to arming

996
01:01:31,200 --> 01:01:34,200
Speaker 1: the device again when a third hostage comes in. When

997
01:01:34,240 --> 01:01:36,720
Speaker 1: the third hostage came in, it interrupted him and he

998
01:01:36,840 --> 01:01:39,080
Speaker 1: failed to do The last sequence was for the power

999
01:01:39,160 --> 01:01:41,680
Speaker 1: switch if he had thrown the Paris, which he still

1000
01:01:41,680 --> 01:01:44,040
Speaker 1: could have done while he was pursuing the suspects, that

1001
01:01:44,120 --> 01:01:47,040
Speaker 1: device would have going off into a catastrophic for everybody.

1002
01:01:47,840 --> 01:01:53,120
Speaker 1: But fortunately, um he was a proficient bomb maker because

1003
01:01:53,920 --> 01:01:57,400
Speaker 1: we actually search one was executed as house following day

1004
01:01:58,360 --> 01:02:00,560
Speaker 1: and they found a thumb drive and on that thumb

1005
01:02:00,640 --> 01:02:03,520
Speaker 1: drive it shows him testing his device in a wood area.

1006
01:02:03,800 --> 01:02:06,640
Speaker 1: And the thing is, you know, successful would be in

1007
01:02:06,680 --> 01:02:09,400
Speaker 1: cash tropic even had gone off, and he had come

1008
01:02:09,440 --> 01:02:11,760
Speaker 1: there to die that day because he had entered on

1009
01:02:11,840 --> 01:02:15,920
Speaker 1: his outlaw calendar in August early August, September one the

1010
01:02:16,000 --> 01:02:18,600
Speaker 1: final day, so he had come to Discovery that day

1011
01:02:18,960 --> 01:02:22,240
Speaker 1: to to die and the epic I ultimately determined that

1012
01:02:22,280 --> 01:02:26,320
Speaker 1: he was a loan with domestic terrorists, the first suicide

1013
01:02:26,360 --> 01:02:29,680
Speaker 1: bombera hosts in the United States. Unfortunately for us, things

1014
01:02:29,760 --> 01:02:32,720
Speaker 1: played out in a positive way, but have no allusion

1015
01:02:32,800 --> 01:02:36,080
Speaker 1: that the outcomes could could have been very different. The

1016
01:02:36,520 --> 01:02:40,560
Speaker 1: date of September one of any significance or did he

1017
01:02:40,720 --> 01:02:43,960
Speaker 1: just picked that out of the out of the blue, huh.

1018
01:02:44,400 --> 01:02:46,280
Speaker 1: I don't know that it had any significance to I

1019
01:02:46,320 --> 01:02:49,360
Speaker 1: think he might have picked out of the blue. Yeah,

1020
01:02:49,520 --> 01:02:52,440
Speaker 1: I mean that that was again. And going back to

1021
01:02:52,560 --> 01:02:55,720
Speaker 1: the book, I was reading all this and I was

1022
01:02:55,920 --> 01:02:59,480
Speaker 1: wondering why because it said September one was, you know,

1023
01:02:59,600 --> 01:03:02,720
Speaker 1: the final day, and you know, I was trying to

1024
01:03:02,800 --> 01:03:06,320
Speaker 1: come up with the um, I guess a scenario or

1025
01:03:06,840 --> 01:03:10,160
Speaker 1: what would be significant for September one, but I couldn't

1026
01:03:10,160 --> 01:03:12,560
Speaker 1: come up with anything. I don't know if it was

1027
01:03:12,680 --> 01:03:15,320
Speaker 1: just something that you didn't mention in the book, or

1028
01:03:15,520 --> 01:03:18,640
Speaker 1: it's just something he picked out of the blue with that.

1029
01:03:18,840 --> 01:03:24,120
Speaker 1: But it's amazing that all that happened and no one

1030
01:03:24,160 --> 01:03:28,080
Speaker 1: other than the suspect was heard that day. We're fortunate

1031
01:03:28,800 --> 01:03:33,000
Speaker 1: that no casualties. And what was kind of frustrating you

1032
01:03:33,080 --> 01:03:34,920
Speaker 1: probably saw in the book is that we had an

1033
01:03:34,920 --> 01:03:37,560
Speaker 1: opportunity to do to deliver salt. We had an opportunity

1034
01:03:38,040 --> 01:03:40,520
Speaker 1: at the two hour mark to do the assault with

1035
01:03:40,640 --> 01:03:43,840
Speaker 1: the positive box safety in place, knowing that the device

1036
01:03:43,880 --> 01:03:46,480
Speaker 1: will not go off. But there were some issues that

1037
01:03:46,680 --> 01:03:50,320
Speaker 1: time fell through on the command side. From my perspective,

1038
01:03:50,520 --> 01:03:53,840
Speaker 1: that we should have go on. We didn't go right.

1039
01:03:53,960 --> 01:03:57,440
Speaker 1: There was wasn't it some working that you know, if

1040
01:03:57,680 --> 01:04:01,840
Speaker 1: if the device was somehow you know, detonated that it

1041
01:04:01,920 --> 01:04:10,720
Speaker 1: would harm people through loop upstairs or your correct. Command

1042
01:04:10,800 --> 01:04:13,959
Speaker 1: was concerned the best estimate from the h bomb text

1043
01:04:14,040 --> 01:04:16,080
Speaker 1: on scene, I t every best estimate they gave us

1044
01:04:16,080 --> 01:04:18,920
Speaker 1: that they was spot on, was that if the device

1045
01:04:18,960 --> 01:04:22,320
Speaker 1: went off, it would kill or seriously injure everybody in

1046
01:04:22,440 --> 01:04:24,760
Speaker 1: the lobby, but it would not travel up to the

1047
01:04:24,840 --> 01:04:27,880
Speaker 1: floors and would not compromise the integrity of the building.

1048
01:04:28,440 --> 01:04:31,200
Speaker 1: Command staff was concerned that maybe the bomb text estimation

1049
01:04:31,400 --> 01:04:33,520
Speaker 1: was off, and if so, what have it traveled up

1050
01:04:33,560 --> 01:04:36,880
Speaker 1: to the floors injured others. Others will compromise the integrity

1051
01:04:36,880 --> 01:04:38,520
Speaker 1: of the point for those reasons. They want to play

1052
01:04:38,520 --> 01:04:41,480
Speaker 1: it safe, and we were told to stand down at

1053
01:04:41,720 --> 01:04:47,360
Speaker 1: what I perceived as a moment of opportunity. UM now

1054
01:04:47,440 --> 01:04:50,080
Speaker 1: I want to get to probably a little bit uncomfortable

1055
01:04:50,160 --> 01:04:53,320
Speaker 1: part for you. And that's when you got sick. You've

1056
01:04:53,360 --> 01:04:55,720
Speaker 1: been in a spot team member for a long time,

1057
01:04:55,800 --> 01:04:57,640
Speaker 1: and all of a sudden, all the things that you've

1058
01:04:57,720 --> 01:05:00,960
Speaker 1: been trying to do for all these years, you're finding

1059
01:05:01,000 --> 01:05:05,400
Speaker 1: it more difficult to do. And you know you're you're

1060
01:05:05,480 --> 01:05:09,000
Speaker 1: sore at night, you're thinking, because you know, sleep on

1061
01:05:09,120 --> 01:05:12,880
Speaker 1: with ice bags. I saw in your book where you

1062
01:05:13,120 --> 01:05:18,320
Speaker 1: just think that it's you know, the price you pay

1063
01:05:18,440 --> 01:05:21,000
Speaker 1: for being in that type of a unit. Can you

1064
01:05:22,000 --> 01:05:26,560
Speaker 1: explain to our listeners how all that unfolded and you

1065
01:05:26,640 --> 01:05:29,360
Speaker 1: know some of the difficult times that you went through

1066
01:05:29,440 --> 01:05:33,919
Speaker 1: with that you can do and SPAT every three months,

1067
01:05:33,960 --> 01:05:36,160
Speaker 1: were required to take a physical training test. If you

1068
01:05:36,160 --> 01:05:39,040
Speaker 1: don't pass that test, then you're no longer qualified for SWAT.

1069
01:05:39,960 --> 01:05:42,560
Speaker 1: One thing's in the test is a three mile running

1070
01:05:42,600 --> 01:05:46,080
Speaker 1: which must be done in under twenty six minutes. Now,

1071
01:05:46,360 --> 01:05:48,920
Speaker 1: at age fifty two, eyes running in twenty thirty had

1072
01:05:48,960 --> 01:05:51,160
Speaker 1: never been an issue for me. Instead, like over the

1073
01:05:51,240 --> 01:05:54,640
Speaker 1: last year, my legs felt like lead every time I ran,

1074
01:05:54,800 --> 01:05:57,600
Speaker 1: and I had difficulty breathing and so forth. And unknown

1075
01:05:57,640 --> 01:06:01,400
Speaker 1: to me, that's because I had h cancer, very rare cancer,

1076
01:06:01,520 --> 01:06:04,800
Speaker 1: and correac amilydosies with walls of my heart were becoming

1077
01:06:04,920 --> 01:06:08,320
Speaker 1: very thick and making it difficult to breathe. So for

1078
01:06:08,520 --> 01:06:11,840
Speaker 1: these reasons, you know, I went and uh so medical

1079
01:06:11,880 --> 01:06:13,640
Speaker 1: help because it was clear to me that I wasn't

1080
01:06:13,680 --> 01:06:16,840
Speaker 1: able to pass the SWAT test anymore, which was what

1081
01:06:17,000 --> 01:06:19,840
Speaker 1: was my passion, and I need to do something about it,

1082
01:06:19,960 --> 01:06:24,080
Speaker 1: and ultimately didoes in two tho multimole mile and the

1083
01:06:24,200 --> 01:06:28,160
Speaker 1: cancer which is a blood cancer and infectasy immune system

1084
01:06:28,280 --> 01:06:32,400
Speaker 1: and coreac amilydosis. The amilydosies was for more problematic than

1085
01:06:32,680 --> 01:06:36,280
Speaker 1: the cancer itself, because that was the one that was

1086
01:06:36,320 --> 01:06:40,280
Speaker 1: really gonna from my perspective, taking me out right off

1087
01:06:40,320 --> 01:06:43,600
Speaker 1: the bat. So what had you developed how I was

1088
01:06:43,640 --> 01:06:46,680
Speaker 1: going to survive these diseases? And the name of my book,

1089
01:06:47,000 --> 01:06:51,680
Speaker 1: failure is not an option? UM has two meetings. First,

1090
01:06:51,760 --> 01:06:55,600
Speaker 1: mean applies to SWAT one. I told you I was

1091
01:06:55,680 --> 01:06:59,920
Speaker 1: a operator, team leader, and commander, and when he became command.

1092
01:07:00,000 --> 01:07:01,800
Speaker 1: There are three things I always asked the men and

1093
01:07:01,840 --> 01:07:05,520
Speaker 1: they delivered every time. You never complain, you never quit,

1094
01:07:06,600 --> 01:07:10,360
Speaker 1: and failure is not an option as it rates the mission,

1095
01:07:11,200 --> 01:07:14,160
Speaker 1: so you cannot fail in your mission ever. So I

1096
01:07:14,200 --> 01:07:19,040
Speaker 1: took that same perspective towards my diseases. I said, I

1097
01:07:19,080 --> 01:07:22,760
Speaker 1: will never complain, I will never quit, and failures not

1098
01:07:22,800 --> 01:07:25,440
Speaker 1: an option as it relates to my mission. And my

1099
01:07:25,520 --> 01:07:28,640
Speaker 1: missuings survived, so I have no choice. Budget survived based

1100
01:07:28,640 --> 01:07:32,960
Speaker 1: on my SWAT training. Yeah, and you talked about it

1101
01:07:33,000 --> 01:07:36,560
Speaker 1: in the book where you know the prognosis that's wasn't

1102
01:07:36,640 --> 01:07:41,760
Speaker 1: very promising whatsoever. UM, I mean that has to be

1103
01:07:42,240 --> 01:07:44,960
Speaker 1: for somebody like yourself is at the tip of the

1104
01:07:45,040 --> 01:07:48,680
Speaker 1: spear and you're in tremendous physical condition and then to

1105
01:07:48,840 --> 01:07:52,720
Speaker 1: be told that you have bliss in two years, that's

1106
01:07:52,840 --> 01:07:56,000
Speaker 1: gonna be I'm sorry. When I was going it's gonna

1107
01:07:56,000 --> 01:07:59,200
Speaker 1: be it. For the cancer, the average survival rate was

1108
01:07:59,200 --> 01:08:04,280
Speaker 1: three or four years. For undiagnosed uh and like doses

1109
01:08:04,320 --> 01:08:06,920
Speaker 1: which I had, the average survival rate was eight months.

1110
01:08:07,200 --> 01:08:10,000
Speaker 1: And I had survived two years before it was determined

1111
01:08:10,040 --> 01:08:12,400
Speaker 1: what I had through those force of my doctors becos

1112
01:08:12,400 --> 01:08:16,280
Speaker 1: had a very rare disease. But were you're faced with

1113
01:08:16,400 --> 01:08:19,639
Speaker 1: the type progresses that I had, you basically have a choice.

1114
01:08:20,439 --> 01:08:22,680
Speaker 1: You can want to die or choose to live. I

1115
01:08:22,800 --> 01:08:25,479
Speaker 1: chose to live. It's very simple. I believe every man

1116
01:08:25,680 --> 01:08:29,840
Speaker 1: is his own legacy. It matters not what happened to

1117
01:08:29,880 --> 01:08:31,720
Speaker 1: those before me. And I told my doctors from day one,

1118
01:08:32,000 --> 01:08:37,200
Speaker 1: I will survive this and I intend to. Yeah, and

1119
01:08:37,320 --> 01:08:42,240
Speaker 1: that has been twelve years, so uh and now you're

1120
01:08:42,280 --> 01:08:46,320
Speaker 1: in remission as well. Know, Yeah, I've achieved remission and

1121
01:08:46,560 --> 01:08:50,000
Speaker 1: uh yeah, the I was with some stats. Stats have

1122
01:08:50,120 --> 01:08:53,960
Speaker 1: changed because obviously how long as you survived through novel

1123
01:08:54,600 --> 01:08:58,040
Speaker 1: research and clinical studies. Things improved. Now the average life

1124
01:08:58,080 --> 01:09:01,880
Speaker 1: expectancy for the cancer at ten years is ten percent,

1125
01:09:02,720 --> 01:09:06,200
Speaker 1: and I've survived beyond ten years. The average life expectancy

1126
01:09:06,280 --> 01:09:08,519
Speaker 1: at ten years for the Korean family this is four

1127
01:09:08,600 --> 01:09:11,519
Speaker 1: point seven percent. But you know, I just keep trying

1128
01:09:11,560 --> 01:09:13,920
Speaker 1: to use that same SQUAT attitude in mindset to keep

1129
01:09:14,080 --> 01:09:20,480
Speaker 1: pushing forward. And we'll talk offline before we started the recording,

1130
01:09:20,560 --> 01:09:27,200
Speaker 1: and having your your SWAT team members nearby, having your

1131
01:09:27,360 --> 01:09:31,840
Speaker 1: your wife who's also a police opposer, um, having that

1132
01:09:32,040 --> 01:09:35,559
Speaker 1: team around you and that positive mental attitude with those

1133
01:09:35,640 --> 01:09:39,840
Speaker 1: people has to be tremendous help for you to were

1134
01:09:39,880 --> 01:09:43,640
Speaker 1: going through the tough time. Absolutely amazing. And I'll tell

1135
01:09:43,640 --> 01:09:46,200
Speaker 1: you what Roy struck me. The first day I went

1136
01:09:46,320 --> 01:09:49,960
Speaker 1: from my chemo treatment. I show up at the doctor's office,

1137
01:09:50,680 --> 01:09:54,120
Speaker 1: walk into the office. My entire SWAT team is there,

1138
01:09:54,520 --> 01:09:58,040
Speaker 1: and then some executive officers, my wife, and some other people.

1139
01:09:58,920 --> 01:10:01,080
Speaker 1: So I was like, my god, it's probably thirty people

1140
01:10:01,080 --> 01:10:05,280
Speaker 1: inside there. So they allowed four back into the treatment here.

1141
01:10:05,320 --> 01:10:06,920
Speaker 1: So I go back. So I'm there for about an

1142
01:10:06,920 --> 01:10:09,519
Speaker 1: hour when they come back out and every one of

1143
01:10:09,560 --> 01:10:13,120
Speaker 1: them is still their way providing support, and that moment

1144
01:10:13,200 --> 01:10:15,280
Speaker 1: told me right there that these guys are my brother's

1145
01:10:15,320 --> 01:10:20,400
Speaker 1: for life. Period in my counterpart, the other commanders watch

1146
01:10:20,439 --> 01:10:23,720
Speaker 1: team with me, Brian Dilman. He set up irritation so

1147
01:10:23,800 --> 01:10:26,759
Speaker 1: that every time my chemo treatment, three or four SUAVE

1148
01:10:26,760 --> 01:10:29,280
Speaker 1: officers were there and they stayed for the entire duration

1149
01:10:29,360 --> 01:10:32,479
Speaker 1: of my treatment. And having that type of support from

1150
01:10:32,520 --> 01:10:35,560
Speaker 1: your team is absolutely unbelievable in terms of strength and

1151
01:10:35,600 --> 01:10:47,800
Speaker 1: motivation gives you. Yeah, that's uh, that's great stuff. And

1152
01:10:49,160 --> 01:10:52,519
Speaker 1: you know it's amazing that you're you're been able to

1153
01:10:52,640 --> 01:10:57,240
Speaker 1: keep your positive mental outlook on things and uh, you're

1154
01:10:57,280 --> 01:11:00,240
Speaker 1: you're beating the odds and now and you're had to

1155
01:11:00,240 --> 01:11:03,840
Speaker 1: watch your sun grow up. Oh, no doubt. He was

1156
01:11:03,880 --> 01:11:07,040
Speaker 1: a motivation. He's ten years old, ones diagnosed, and you

1157
01:11:07,120 --> 01:11:09,160
Speaker 1: make a great point. You know, I wanted to see him.

1158
01:11:09,880 --> 01:11:12,000
Speaker 1: He is early achieved once you give his driver's lecense

1159
01:11:12,040 --> 01:11:13,320
Speaker 1: and once he made his first job. I want to

1160
01:11:13,360 --> 01:11:16,439
Speaker 1: see him graduate from high school. Unfortunately, by the grace

1161
01:11:16,520 --> 01:11:22,320
Speaker 1: of God, you know, I've had these things happen. Well again,

1162
01:11:22,880 --> 01:11:25,759
Speaker 1: we want to thank you. Thank you for your service

1163
01:11:26,000 --> 01:11:29,960
Speaker 1: to our country. Thank you for taking the time today

1164
01:11:30,080 --> 01:11:32,640
Speaker 1: with us. I know, you know we asked you to

1165
01:11:32,720 --> 01:11:35,960
Speaker 1: talk a lot him with the disease that you're still

1166
01:11:36,080 --> 01:11:40,880
Speaker 1: fighting it. It didn't cast your your wind a little bit,

1167
01:11:41,000 --> 01:11:44,639
Speaker 1: but we we really appreciate all that and the book

1168
01:11:44,760 --> 01:11:48,320
Speaker 1: was fantastic. It's a great reed. We encourage all of

1169
01:11:48,400 --> 01:11:50,160
Speaker 1: our listeners to go out there and check it out.

1170
01:11:50,520 --> 01:11:54,439
Speaker 1: Failure is not an option that DC snipers Takedown, Discovery Building,

1171
01:11:54,880 --> 01:11:59,280
Speaker 1: suicide bomba Hasta dress You and Surviving Terminal Diseases by

1172
01:11:59,400 --> 01:12:04,280
Speaker 1: Jazz Nice along with Richard Zigfield, who you talked about

1173
01:12:04,320 --> 01:12:07,160
Speaker 1: it at length in your book, your attitude and you're

1174
01:12:07,280 --> 01:12:10,960
Speaker 1: very very close with who has now passed away. Um,

1175
01:12:12,120 --> 01:12:14,679
Speaker 1: we want to thanks thank you once again for taking

1176
01:12:14,720 --> 01:12:17,280
Speaker 1: the time with us. But before we let you go,

1177
01:12:18,560 --> 01:12:22,280
Speaker 1: I have to read our add one more time for

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1215
01:14:37,520 --> 01:14:39,960
Speaker 1: So we want to thank all of our listeners today

1216
01:14:40,080 --> 01:14:43,800
Speaker 1: for for joining us. We especially want to thank you

1217
01:14:43,960 --> 01:14:47,479
Speaker 1: Jeff for joining us today. It's been a pleasure. In

1218
01:14:47,600 --> 01:14:51,560
Speaker 1: the book, I was very entertained by it. It's a

1219
01:14:51,840 --> 01:14:55,840
Speaker 1: really fast read once you get into it, um because

1220
01:14:55,960 --> 01:14:57,639
Speaker 1: once you start you don't want to put it down.

1221
01:14:58,240 --> 01:15:01,559
Speaker 1: And again, thank you for all your service for somebody

1222
01:15:01,600 --> 01:15:03,720
Speaker 1: who's at the tip of the sphere, you know in

1223
01:15:03,840 --> 01:15:10,360
Speaker 1: the law enforcement type world. Somebody was on probably you

1224
01:15:10,439 --> 01:15:15,439
Speaker 1: know take times of barricades. Uh. We we appreciate your service.

1225
01:15:15,560 --> 01:15:19,800
Speaker 1: And once again, God blessed and take care and we

1226
01:15:19,920 --> 01:15:23,080
Speaker 1: hope have your back when you write your next book.

1227
01:15:38,760 --> 01:15:41,000
Speaker 1: You've been listening to Self Recreate