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Speaker 1: Jim Raff and his back. This is going to be

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Speaker 1: part two of the presidential assassination attempt with former President Trump.

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Speaker 1: Now y'all know him, but I'm going to take you again.

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Speaker 1: He was not just a football star at LSU. He

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Speaker 1: was a decorated soldier. He was awarded the Bronze Star

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Speaker 1: in combat. He attended the Federal Law Enforcement and the

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Speaker 1: United States Secret Service academies. He protected Barack Obama and

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Speaker 1: his family. He protected Vice President Biden, presidential candidate Mitt Romney,

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Speaker 1: numerous presidents, Prime ministers, Kings, and other notable people from

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Speaker 1: around the globe. So we're not just talking to somebody

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Speaker 1: that may have an opinion. This man has done the job.

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Speaker 1: He has done the job from the gridiron to the

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Speaker 1: Secret Service. Welcome Jim Rathman to his own seven. Jim,

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Speaker 1: thank you so much for joining us again and talking

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Speaker 1: about what we now have learned to be some of

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Speaker 1: the latest information on what occurred that day and the failures.

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Speaker 2: Well, thank you so much for bringing me back. Look

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Speaker 2: forward to being able to talk with you again about this.

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Speaker 2: I'm always get to spend time with you.

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Speaker 1: Of course, that's how I feel, too, Buddy, I tell

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Speaker 1: you it's just a it's a comfort really to me,

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Speaker 1: because sometimes there's so much information coming so fast, and

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Speaker 1: you don't always know what's true, what's accurate. People will

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Speaker 1: post things as though it's factual that they heard it

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Speaker 1: from the person themselves, and then later you find out, well,

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Speaker 1: that wasn't even true. You know, it's great to have

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Speaker 1: you here so that we understand what happened. What are

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Speaker 1: some of these gaps that need to be closed, what

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Speaker 1: needs to be improved with communication and ultimately to me,

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Speaker 1: And I'm going to keep asking, and I know that

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Speaker 1: you know, you're prepared to talk to me like nobody

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Speaker 1: else could. But what keeps going through my mind is this.

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Speaker 1: We learn allegedly that there would be assassin bought the

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Speaker 1: latter just a couple of hours before. He had a

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Speaker 1: long rifle in a backpack that nobody saw sticking out.

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Speaker 1: I mean, he asked for time off of his job

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Speaker 1: just days before. In other words, it doesn't seem like

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Speaker 1: he spent six months planning this. How does a twenty

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Speaker 1: year old in days pull this off against the best

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Speaker 1: in the world.

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Speaker 2: That's a great question. It should never be able to happen, period,

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Speaker 2: And we already know that, but he did his fair

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Speaker 2: share of counter intelligence, if you will, and surveyed the site.

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Speaker 2: What blows my mind is out easily he was able

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Speaker 2: to do all that, collect his intelligence, get his information,

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Speaker 2: to be able to pull off an attempt like this.

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Speaker 2: It's hard for me to sit here and think he

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Speaker 2: did not have some sort of help. Obviously, I don't

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Speaker 2: know that. I can only speculate that, and I'm not

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Speaker 2: trying to go down the whole conspiracy theory lane, but

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Speaker 2: I find it hard that a twenty year old had

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Speaker 2: access like that. There's more information that has come to

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Speaker 2: light since in regards to the encrypted phones along with

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Speaker 2: smoll reseas bank accounts, So I think there's a lot

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Speaker 2: that went into this. But from my days in the

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Speaker 2: Secret Service and the way that I know that they operate,

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Speaker 2: he should have never have been able to get anywhere

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Speaker 2: near those buildings without going through the checkpoints. And I

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Speaker 2: would really like it and appreciate it if the information

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Speaker 2: would come out finally about where the breakdowns and the

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Speaker 2: failures within the rings of security. The rings of security

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Speaker 2: are to prevent anyone from being to do just what

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Speaker 2: this kid did, and he was able to do it,

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Speaker 2: so easily and with little to no resistance.

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Speaker 1: Absolutely, it also seems like some of the stuff that's

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Speaker 1: coming out he might have had other targets. I mean,

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Speaker 1: he was looking at the Democratic Convention too.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, I think he is. His intention was to inflict

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Speaker 2: harn He wanted to instill fear, he wanted to leave

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Speaker 2: the park, and he most certainly did that. We are

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Speaker 2: fortunate in the sense that former President Trump was not Assassinatedfortunately,

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Speaker 2: there were innocent victims that were either critically wounded or killed,

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Speaker 2: which should never happen as well. But it is going

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Speaker 2: to bring to light and change how the Secret Service operates.

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Speaker 2: And you know, I think they can only get better

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Speaker 2: from here, and I certainly can't get any worse after this.

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Speaker 1: I mean a little bit of it kind of sounds

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Speaker 1: like Oswald, because as you know, he had somebody else

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Speaker 1: that he wanted to assassinate and then you know, that

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Speaker 1: didn't pan out, so he moved on. But he at

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Speaker 1: least had some military training. This kid, from what we know,

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Speaker 1: had zero military training, zero police training. And even if

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Speaker 1: he had help, he by himself pulled off eight shots.

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Speaker 1: That's just mind boggling to me.

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Speaker 2: It's mind boggling. That he was able to get that

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Speaker 2: close get on the rooftop that wasn't protected. I know

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Speaker 2: we spoke the first time, and many of the times

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Speaker 2: that I've gone on various channels and podcasts and spoke

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Speaker 2: about this incident. I said from the very beginning that

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Speaker 2: one of the only things that raised to mind for

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Speaker 2: me as far as that roof is concerned, was somebody

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Speaker 2: had to abandon a post. And as we know now

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Speaker 2: that posted abandoned they were they felt overheated, and so

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Speaker 2: you know, they walked off from it. We're sitting inside

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Speaker 2: regardless it was ninety two degrees, not one hundred and

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Speaker 2: twenty two degrees. You know, you have to be conditioned

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Speaker 2: to withstand that kind of weather, but to not be

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Speaker 2: able to stand up there, at least for the hour.

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Speaker 2: We you know, come out with a rotation if need be.

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Speaker 2: But that should have never been vacant and so easily accessible. Again,

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Speaker 2: the breakdown goes far back before you even get to

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Speaker 2: that rooftop. How are you able to park, walk up,

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Speaker 2: go undetected, not be pulled to the side after the

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Speaker 2: rangefinder barred from the location, you know, able to go

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Speaker 2: back and forth, back and forth as many times he

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Speaker 2: has has the long rife running backpack how to ladder.

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Speaker 2: I mean, everything in the world was right there, but

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Speaker 2: he didn't even have to nobody. There was no resistance.

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Speaker 2: He was just able to go right in and do that.

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Speaker 2: So again, I think they need to go back to

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Speaker 2: the very beginning, the levels of security, the rings of security,

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Speaker 2: where was the initial breakdown and fall it all the

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Speaker 2: way through, But there's some gross breaches of security measures

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Speaker 2: and platforms that it should have never have been able

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Speaker 2: to take place.

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Speaker 1: And you know, you and I have talked about the

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Speaker 1: conspiracy theories. I was adamant. I don't want to go

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Speaker 1: down that road. I only want facts because that is

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Speaker 1: the only way to, you know, protect everybody and make

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Speaker 1: sure that everybody has a role to play. Even the

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Speaker 1: civilians on the ground that were pointing him out, screaming

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Speaker 1: there's a guy on the roof, he's got a gun.

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Speaker 1: They did their part. But here's what happens, And I

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Speaker 1: want this to be said for any junior police officer

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Speaker 1: or junior detective listening. When you failed to do exactly

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Speaker 1: what you're supposed to do, you are opening the door

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Speaker 1: to conspiracy theories. So here's one. What are the odds.

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Speaker 1: This twenty year old flies a drone himself, picks out

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Speaker 1: where he wants to go, and the very place that

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Speaker 1: he picks out just days before is the only post

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Speaker 1: that's abandoned.

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Speaker 2: Well, again, I agree with you, and that's where I'm

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Speaker 2: stuck to. I don't necessarily think it's just a conspiracy.

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Speaker 2: There has to be some factual knowledge find that. How

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Speaker 2: you can have know the plans and operations, or to

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Speaker 2: know that that one building you picked out is the

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Speaker 2: only building that's not going to be secure, the one

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Speaker 2: post that was abandoned by law enforcement, whether it's from

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Speaker 2: the service or from local to have that knowledge to

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Speaker 2: be able to fly a drone, I mean a drone

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Speaker 2: should have never been able to be over that location

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Speaker 2: to begin with. There's people on the ground from the

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Speaker 2: day that they start setting up that venue. Somebody is

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Speaker 2: there to secure it. So nobody should have ever been

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Speaker 2: able to fly a drone to begin with to know

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Speaker 2: that that's the only building and that our building happens

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Speaker 2: to be abandoned. I don't feel like we're getting all

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Speaker 2: the information from the leaders on the ground that should

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Speaker 2: be giving us more information and more details. I just

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Speaker 2: feel like a lot of it is a cya and

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Speaker 2: let's push it on another agency and just keep the

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Speaker 2: waters muddy where nobody can really get a visual of

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Speaker 2: what actually happened. And I think that's what we're seeing

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Speaker 2: right now, and it's really shameful. But for me, the

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Speaker 2: hardest part is is those levels of security, the rings

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Speaker 2: of security. You happen to a flown a drone, you

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Speaker 2: happen to bring a ladder, you climb it up onto

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Speaker 2: the roof what are the only roofs available in that

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Speaker 2: entire vicinity, and knew that that was going to be

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Speaker 2: unprotected and a clear shot, clear line of slight shot.

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Speaker 2: I can't see how there was some sort of assistance.

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Speaker 2: And then when you find out that he had encrypted phones,

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Speaker 2: three encryptied phones, and apparently overseas bank accounts which I

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Speaker 2: don't even know how to even get an overseas bank account,

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Speaker 2: but they have a link to the Cayman Islands, I

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Speaker 2: think of Switzerland. And there's one other location he going

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Speaker 2: out to a million and a half dollars for a

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Speaker 2: twenty year old that to me points in the direction

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Speaker 2: that there was some sort of help.

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Speaker 1: A twenty year old that works in the kitchen at

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Speaker 1: a convalescent center. I mean, he cannot be making any

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Speaker 1: kind of money. And so again, what you're telling us

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Speaker 1: right now, it's beyond mind boggling and disturbing. Okay, Jim,

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Speaker 1: we're not going to get down this rabbit hole. We're

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Speaker 1: not going to have conspiracy theories. But there's two things

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Speaker 1: if you could touch on for me that I think

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Speaker 1: would help people. One, the black Rock commercial. Was the

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Speaker 1: shooter in that commercial? And what does that mean? If anything?

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Speaker 1: In Two, what's the guy in the gray suit and

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Speaker 1: how was he just gone dark? What is that about?

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Speaker 2: Those are two very very very good questions. So we'll

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Speaker 2: start with the first one. On the black Rock commercial. Yes,

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Speaker 2: apparently the shooter was in that commercial. Does that necessarily

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Speaker 2: mean something? I don't really know, but clearly there's some

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Speaker 2: sort of link there what I find to be interesting.

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Speaker 2: And this is completely unverified, so I want to put

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Speaker 2: that out there. But I received the call recently from

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Speaker 2: somebody that I know and trust that's very very very

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Speaker 2: big into the stock trading and so on, very well known,

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Speaker 2: extremely wealthy, has been doing this for many years. Not

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Speaker 2: only does this person, along with a couple of his

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Speaker 2: friends that are also doing that they became early suspicious

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Speaker 2: that right before the Trump assassination attempt, there's a it's

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Speaker 2: called Austin Private Capital, and there was some enormous amounts

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Speaker 2: of whether they of the trading that was so unusual,

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Speaker 2: and they had to do it with options that make

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Speaker 2: it look realistic that had President Trump been assassinated, this

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Speaker 2: would have been payoffs for people upwards to half a

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Speaker 2: billion dollars or more. And when it didn't happen, it

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Speaker 2: was immediately removed from the Bloomberg terminal, so they can't

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Speaker 2: even be found anymore. Now. Some people have captured some

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Speaker 2: data and some info off of it, but I find

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Speaker 2: that to be incredibly suspicious. And Austin Private Capital is

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Speaker 2: a part of Black Rock, so I don't Again, it's

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Speaker 2: completely unverified, but those are experts in this field are

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Speaker 2: saying this is definitely something. This was seismic and then

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Speaker 2: all of a sudden it just disappeared. It came up

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Speaker 2: at an unusual time, and then the failed assassination tempt

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Speaker 2: and boom, it's like you blink and it's gone. It's

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Speaker 2: like it didn't exist. Not really sure what's into that.

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Speaker 2: I'm sure somebody out there listening may have an idea

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Speaker 2: of what we're talking about. Again, it's unverified, and I'm

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Speaker 2: not trying to stir a pot on that, but this

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Speaker 2: is somebody that I trust, very very very much of

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Speaker 2: this industry, that I would trust with my money. For

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Speaker 2: them to have that level of experience and knowledge, it's

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Speaker 2: quite fascinating. So I don't know. I think there's something

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Speaker 2: to that, or at least need some explanations on this

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Speaker 2: trade that took place shortly before the attempt and then

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Speaker 2: immediately disappeared super creepy. The other part that you mentioned

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Speaker 2: when you talk about the man that got on the

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Speaker 2: roof with the gray suit, so to put everybody there

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Speaker 2: the shooting took place, you had your tactical officers that

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Speaker 2: went onto the rooftop. They secured the weapon because our

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Speaker 2: conspiracy theorist, how did that weapon get twenty feet fifty

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Speaker 2: feet behind the shooter if he was dead. It's because

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Speaker 2: we're always going to take the weapon and remove it

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Speaker 2: from the person, so that way, in case something were

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Speaker 2: to happen, nobody has access to that weapon. It's secured.

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Speaker 2: So on that rooftop was a person who showed up

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Speaker 2: with a gray suit that the officers the local law

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Speaker 2: enforcement officers all believed was a secret service agent, but

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Speaker 2: it was not. This person was on the roof taking

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Speaker 2: pictures of the deceased shooter, and then the photos that

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Speaker 2: were taking by the tactical officers on the roof was

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Speaker 2: asked to send those photos to this cell phone number

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Speaker 2: that demand in a gray suit. Had that person received

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Speaker 2: those messages or sent those messages to that phone when

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Speaker 2: they did the independent look, I believe it was one

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Speaker 2: of the senators was doing it. Johnson was doing an

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Speaker 2: independent look at this. They tracked down that cell phone number,

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Speaker 2: they called it allegedly it was belonging to an ATF agent.

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Speaker 2: There was no HTF agent that should have been working

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Speaker 2: the detail that day, so it doesn't fit. And then

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Speaker 2: the person went completely and utterly dark to the point

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Speaker 2: of now where that phone number doesn't even exist. So

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Speaker 2: whoever this person was is still a complete surprise, and

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Speaker 2: it's still a mystery to anyone investigating this case unless

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Speaker 2: some higher powers know it. That's been out a lot

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Speaker 2: in the public about this person in the gray suit,

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Speaker 2: and I think those are some answers. Again, it goes

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Speaker 2: to show that you don't even have your crime seed secured.

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Speaker 2: You know, and much like you mac, you know, when

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Speaker 2: you know your crime scene has to be secured, your logs,

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Speaker 2: you have to know who's in, who's out, who's you know,

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Speaker 2: and you know, so nobody can tamper with evidence or

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Speaker 2: evidence being collected. And yet you have this person that

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Speaker 2: again just walks onto the roof and starts taking pictures.

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Speaker 2: And it's not even a United States Secret Service personnel,

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Speaker 2: it's not anybody within the local law enforcement. So you

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Speaker 2: got to ask yourself, how did this person get on

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Speaker 2: the roof? Who did they show credentials to, who verified

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Speaker 2: that they were a certified law enforcement professional, an agent

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Speaker 2: or anything. Again, another breach of security. And now you

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Speaker 2: have somebody up on the roof taking these pictures, collected

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Speaker 2: cultures and then poof, like a spook, they're just gone.

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Speaker 1: And again we don't want to go down that hole,

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Speaker 1: but they're forcing it.

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Speaker 2: I mean, look, the longer you hold out and you

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Speaker 2: keep people from getting the information that they need, and

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Speaker 2: this is what's going to happen, and they're going to

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Speaker 2: continue with the conspiracy theory. But you know, most people

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Speaker 2: have common sense. I don't know if they're banking on

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Speaker 2: the majority of the people in the United States that

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Speaker 2: they think everybody's stupid, but we're not stupid. We pay attention,

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Speaker 2: we know what's going on. Give us some facts. You know.

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Speaker 1: You and I talked last time off air. We talked

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Speaker 1: about when Amy Carter went to my high school. And

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Speaker 1: one of the things one of the Secret Service agents

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Speaker 1: told me at the time, we were just talking one

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Speaker 1: afternoon in the gym. They were super friendly, you know,

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Speaker 1: love to talk about you know, their job, and it

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Speaker 1: was fascinating to me, of course, and he said that

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Speaker 1: if the president wanted to stop, let's say it a McDonald's,

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Speaker 1: and they felt like he was not safe to do

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Speaker 1: so they could override him. Well, I know at the time,

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Speaker 1: I'm like, wait a minute, So the president on a

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Speaker 1: given moment is not the most powerful person in the

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Speaker 1: country because there's somebody that could tell him no. And

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Speaker 1: then you laughed and told a story about Barack Obama

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Speaker 1: wanting to go to five guys, which I thought, that's

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Speaker 1: the greatest thing I've ever heard. My son loves five guys,

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Speaker 1: and I thought that would just be incredible that here,

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Speaker 1: you know, Barack is craving those front fries and whatnot,

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Speaker 1: and y'all are like, Nope, not going to happen today,

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Speaker 1: And that's that's amazing, but it's also very telling that

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Speaker 1: with the right intel on that day, they could have

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Speaker 1: stopped former President Trump from going on the stage.

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Speaker 2: Well they should have stop former President Trump are going

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Speaker 2: on the stage. And the way that we work the site,

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Speaker 2: anywhere that you go, there's always a tactical communication center.

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Speaker 2: There's always some sort of designated spot to where we

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Speaker 2: have our Secret Service personnel with all the channels needed

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Speaker 2: to talk to any agency, any asset, and that is

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Speaker 2: where they're controlling it. If they have surveillance videos, that's

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Speaker 2: where they're able to monitor. There's one location that has that.

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Speaker 2: They had that for this site, and typically we will

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Speaker 2: be able to monitor what's on their law enforcement channels

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Speaker 2: or we will take their representatives, so somebody from Butler PD,

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Speaker 2: somebody from the Sheriff's Department will be in there monitoring,

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Speaker 2: and so they'll say, hey, we're going to work on

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Speaker 2: Channel TAC three or special Channel three whatever, I'm just

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Speaker 2: throwing that out there. That person will have that and

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Speaker 2: so anything that comes about, hey they're dealing with a

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Speaker 2: shooter on the roof, the Secret Service person is right there.

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Speaker 2: And they turn around and they say, hey, Southwest Building,

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Speaker 2: whatever the cation is, shoot her on the roof, get

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Speaker 2: the president off the stage. Boom. It should be seamless,

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Speaker 2: but it didn't happen, and it happens all the time

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Speaker 2: where that communication can flow. So I for we're not

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Speaker 2: on their channels. We have that capability right there. So

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Speaker 2: for them to say, well, we don't have the radio

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Speaker 2: channels that were recorded, they're always recorded. Wise it not

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Speaker 2: recorded on this one, that doesn't make sense to me,

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Speaker 2: you know, to not have that person to be there.

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Speaker 2: I just don't see how they did not know that

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Speaker 2: this is going on when they've already admitted to the

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Speaker 2: fact that there was a tactical communications center set up

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Speaker 2: at this site. Where's the disconnect? Who made that decision

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Speaker 2: to not relay this information to the detail on the ground.

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Speaker 2: I firmly believe those agents that rush the stage did

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Speaker 2: not know, but I feel there are many others outside

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Speaker 2: of there that new And even there's one video that

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Speaker 2: shows a Secret Service agent moving into position because he's

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Speaker 2: hearing something going on. He starts moving people right before

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Speaker 2: the shots have happened. So there had to have been

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Speaker 2: some sort of communication, but they knew that this threat

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Speaker 2: was out there, and hear a lot of debate. When

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Speaker 2: you listen to the hearings about what is a threat? Right,

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Speaker 2: you hear them talking about what is a threat, and

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Speaker 2: then what is suspicious or however they're wanting to name it.

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Speaker 2: If someone is showing a repeated pattern, they've already been

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Speaker 2: found with the rangefinder, they've already been identified. They keep

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Speaker 2: coming back, they keep going into areas they shouldn't. They're

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Speaker 2: no longer suspicious. That is now a threat any regardless

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Speaker 2: of however they want to interpret it or take a

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Speaker 2: deep guve on it. You need to go make contact

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Speaker 2: with that individual and escort them off the premises, and

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Speaker 2: you don't take your eyes off of them. How that

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Speaker 2: didn't happen? Here is my point. President Trump could have

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Speaker 2: delayed his speech. He could have done the speech later.

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Speaker 2: The moment that they knew there was a threat on

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Speaker 2: a rooftop, he should have been off that stage. Shouldn't

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Speaker 2: have taken more than a few seconds get off the stage.

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Speaker 2: So where was the breakdown? And it was the breakdown

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Speaker 2: intention or was it truly dereliction of your duty and

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Speaker 2: just decided not to do your job. I don't know

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Speaker 2: which one it was, but it's at that level. This

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Speaker 2: is a gross misconduct of how it was handled by

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Speaker 2: somebody at the Secret Service, and I just can't see

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Speaker 2: it any other way.

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Speaker 1: Well, let's talk about one of the top five things

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Speaker 1: I don't ever want to have to do, and that's

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Speaker 1: sit in front of Congress and answer questions. Watching the

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Speaker 1: now former director of the Secret Service answer questions was

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Speaker 1: painful at best, it was at times embarrassing, and again

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Speaker 1: at times I was without comment. But I want to

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Speaker 1: hear from you. I know you didn't watch every second

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Speaker 1: of it, but I'm sure you've seen clips and highlights.

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Speaker 1: And I know you've been busy because you just launched

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Speaker 1: a new TV show that we're going to talk about

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Speaker 1: in a minute too. You know again, for me, I

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Speaker 1: don't want to be on the hot seat. I don't

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Speaker 1: want to have to answer why did this, why this

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Speaker 1: didn't happen, why didn't do that? Because sometimes it's difficult

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Speaker 1: to really articulate everything that goes on. And you know that,

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Speaker 1: And I want to say this before we answer anything else.

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Speaker 1: I have an sop that I have to work off

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Speaker 1: of and work from. But we all know there's some

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Speaker 1: things that happen that aren't in there, or that are

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Speaker 1: a quote against policy that happen, because sometimes it just

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Speaker 1: is the easier way. It's not right, it's not okay,

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Speaker 1: it's never going to help you. I'm just saying in

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Speaker 1: the real world, it happens, and I'll leave it at

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Speaker 1: that for now. But again, I'm going to give you

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Speaker 1: the floor to talk about what you did here from

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Speaker 1: those hearings with the former director and then the new director,

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Speaker 1: how he was able to handle things just days later.

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Speaker 2: Well, thank you, and I'm glad because I think this

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Speaker 2: is a big topic that everybody wants to talk about.

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Speaker 2: Because everybody got to listen to his hearings or at

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Speaker 2: least hear snippets of it over time. It was extremely

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Speaker 2: cringe worthy and it wasn't very forthcoming, which I agree.

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Speaker 2: The American people need to know what happened, but we

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Speaker 2: need to be able to shed light on exactly what

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Speaker 2: happened here. And the former director of the Secret Service,

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Speaker 2: you know, I will say, leaders lead, and if you

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Speaker 2: are the director of the Secret Service, your number one

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Speaker 2: goal and job is to protect the protectees period. You

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Speaker 2: now had a major break in that protection and assassination

401
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Speaker 2: attempt took place. I don't care where you are in

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Speaker 2: the world, in the country, if you're having together with

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Speaker 2: your family, whatever the case is. You are the director

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Speaker 2: of the Secret Service, your entire outlook on what was

405
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Speaker 2: to come needed to change immediately at that moment, and

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Speaker 2: she should have been on a flight or in a

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Speaker 2: vehicle going to Butler Ppa. If it were me, as

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Speaker 2: a director of Secret Service, I would have I would

409
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Speaker 2: have been there immediately. I would have I understand that

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Speaker 2: the agents that were protecting Trump were still on duty

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Speaker 2: because they still had to finish their job. But there

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Speaker 2: has to be a debriefing period. My orders would have

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Speaker 2: been for that detail, those that work that site, you

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Speaker 2: are not to leave that site. You will stay put

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Speaker 2: until I get there along with an investigative team. And

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Speaker 2: I'm going to show up and be a leader and

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Speaker 2: be on the ground with my personnel, and I want

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Speaker 2: to start talking through and finding out where was the breakdown,

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Speaker 2: what exactly happened, How did this get here, how did

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Speaker 2: that get there. The fact that she could sit there

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Speaker 2: and say that one she never went to that site.

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Speaker 2: That hearing was nine days later. She never once went

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Speaker 2: to the site. That is terrible. The other part is

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Speaker 2: is who would she owed? She took her three days,

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Speaker 2: three days to talk to the agents that were involved

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Speaker 2: to get their input. Why they did work for three

427
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Speaker 2: days straight? They ed, you know, they got done with

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Speaker 2: their ship. They now have to brief, you know. And

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Speaker 2: so they shouldn't have been able to leave that location.

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Speaker 2: It should have been on hold. And you need to

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Speaker 2: be on the ground. A leader's and they lead from

432
00:24:00,800 --> 00:24:04,520
Speaker 2: the front. That is not leadership. What she displayed, the

433
00:24:04,560 --> 00:24:07,520
Speaker 2: fact that she did none of those things, she should

434
00:24:07,560 --> 00:24:11,359
Speaker 2: have been removed from that position immediately. And and I

435
00:24:11,840 --> 00:24:15,760
Speaker 2: don't like to be critical of Secret Service personnel because

436
00:24:15,960 --> 00:24:20,480
Speaker 2: I did the job. And I feel very passionate when

437
00:24:20,480 --> 00:24:22,199
Speaker 2: it comes to the Secret Service because I know the

438
00:24:22,200 --> 00:24:25,359
Speaker 2: men and women in a department are amazing men and women.

439
00:24:25,400 --> 00:24:28,960
Speaker 2: They are dedicated to what they do. But leaders have

440
00:24:29,160 --> 00:24:31,440
Speaker 2: to be able to lead. And if you cannot lead,

441
00:24:31,480 --> 00:24:33,959
Speaker 2: and you cannot do even the simplest of things like

442
00:24:34,440 --> 00:24:36,440
Speaker 2: how do you not go to the site and figure

443
00:24:36,440 --> 00:24:38,960
Speaker 2: out what happened on the ground? How do you not

444
00:24:39,080 --> 00:24:41,000
Speaker 2: talk to those people for three days?

445
00:24:41,320 --> 00:24:43,879
Speaker 1: How do you not go to your people and check

446
00:24:43,920 --> 00:24:46,240
Speaker 1: on them, you know they're hurting.

447
00:24:47,640 --> 00:24:51,439
Speaker 2: How you go into congressional hearing and not have facts,

448
00:24:51,600 --> 00:24:53,480
Speaker 2: you know, like I have a timeline, but I don't.

449
00:24:53,520 --> 00:24:55,840
Speaker 2: But I know I have a timeline what happened, but

450
00:24:55,880 --> 00:24:59,440
Speaker 2: it's not really a timeline like there was so much

451
00:25:00,119 --> 00:25:03,480
Speaker 2: like she didn't do anything. And in her defense, I

452
00:25:03,600 --> 00:25:08,840
Speaker 2: don't think I think she was ordered not to give details.

453
00:25:08,920 --> 00:25:12,200
Speaker 2: I think there's someone well above her level, whether it's

454
00:25:12,240 --> 00:25:16,840
Speaker 2: to whether it's the Director of Homeland Security, my orcus,

455
00:25:17,080 --> 00:25:19,840
Speaker 2: or is it somebody from the White House? Where is

456
00:25:19,880 --> 00:25:22,160
Speaker 2: it coming from? She was shut down of being able

457
00:25:22,200 --> 00:25:24,720
Speaker 2: to answer because I know she has some of those answers,

458
00:25:25,440 --> 00:25:27,879
Speaker 2: but she was ordered not to answer. So then the

459
00:25:27,960 --> 00:25:30,639
Speaker 2: time comes to people asked for her resignation, as they

460
00:25:30,720 --> 00:25:34,040
Speaker 2: rightfully should, she moves on. Now you have the interim

461
00:25:34,760 --> 00:25:39,120
Speaker 2: director that comes in, but again he's being more forthcoming

462
00:25:39,119 --> 00:25:41,679
Speaker 2: with some info, but also being very evasive with a

463
00:25:41,680 --> 00:25:44,280
Speaker 2: lot of info as well, which kind of confirms that

464
00:25:44,920 --> 00:25:47,760
Speaker 2: there's information coming from higher up that's not being allowed

465
00:25:47,760 --> 00:25:51,119
Speaker 2: to be disseminated amongst the people. And it's only going

466
00:25:51,200 --> 00:25:54,720
Speaker 2: to make the American people grow more and more suspicious,

467
00:25:54,920 --> 00:25:58,400
Speaker 2: be more and more conspiracy theorists more. You know, you're

468
00:25:58,440 --> 00:26:01,480
Speaker 2: probably creating copycats out there because now the public does

469
00:26:01,520 --> 00:26:05,119
Speaker 2: not trust and we look extremely vulnerable and extremely weak.

470
00:26:05,320 --> 00:26:05,720
Speaker 1: Agreed.

471
00:26:06,080 --> 00:26:09,919
Speaker 2: I think if there was top secret information that needed

472
00:26:09,920 --> 00:26:12,439
Speaker 2: to be said to those Congressional members, there are certain

473
00:26:12,480 --> 00:26:16,399
Speaker 2: members and Congress and in SIDI that have those clearances

474
00:26:16,760 --> 00:26:19,119
Speaker 2: that can go to a skiff. And for those that

475
00:26:19,200 --> 00:26:21,639
Speaker 2: don't know what a skiff is, a skiff is a

476
00:26:21,680 --> 00:26:24,520
Speaker 2: designated room where there's no cameras, there's no microphones, there's

477
00:26:24,560 --> 00:26:27,040
Speaker 2: no pens, there's no paper. You are searched and checked

478
00:26:27,080 --> 00:26:29,199
Speaker 2: before you go in there. It is a completely secure

479
00:26:29,200 --> 00:26:33,600
Speaker 2: building to where you can relay top secret information and

480
00:26:33,920 --> 00:26:36,440
Speaker 2: state what's in that room stays in that room. There

481
00:26:36,440 --> 00:26:39,520
Speaker 2: are members of Congress incentive that have that clearance for

482
00:26:39,560 --> 00:26:43,320
Speaker 2: those reasons. If there were information that was that sensitive

483
00:26:43,720 --> 00:26:46,080
Speaker 2: that the FBI has figured out or the Secret Service

484
00:26:46,080 --> 00:26:48,359
Speaker 2: has figured out, they should have headed into a skiff

485
00:26:48,800 --> 00:26:52,119
Speaker 2: divulged that information. So now those questions aren't being asked

486
00:26:52,240 --> 00:26:55,240
Speaker 2: on this on the on the hearing floor. The constant

487
00:26:55,440 --> 00:26:57,040
Speaker 2: pushing it on. You know, there was a lot of

488
00:26:57,080 --> 00:26:59,320
Speaker 2: well you go with the FBI for that, but then

489
00:26:59,359 --> 00:27:00,760
Speaker 2: you talk to the f be out of here because like,

490
00:27:00,760 --> 00:27:02,240
Speaker 2: well you need to get to the secret service of that.

491
00:27:02,960 --> 00:27:06,720
Speaker 2: It just shows the complete dysfunction and disconnect. And it's

492
00:27:06,760 --> 00:27:09,080
Speaker 2: not how you handle the investigation. It's not how it's

493
00:27:09,119 --> 00:27:09,679
Speaker 2: supposed to go.

494
00:27:10,200 --> 00:27:14,800
Speaker 1: So some of the questions that Congress had, and they

495
00:27:14,800 --> 00:27:16,720
Speaker 1: were firing at them pretty good. I mean, there was

496
00:27:16,760 --> 00:27:19,920
Speaker 1: a lot of attitude, there was some profanity. They were

497
00:27:19,960 --> 00:27:23,040
Speaker 1: not holding back. Here's one thing that always worries me.

498
00:27:23,520 --> 00:27:27,000
Speaker 1: To me, that's like a two edged sword that on

499
00:27:27,040 --> 00:27:30,240
Speaker 1: the one hand, yes, answers need to be given, people

500
00:27:30,280 --> 00:27:34,119
Speaker 1: need to understand what happened, But at the other side

501
00:27:34,160 --> 00:27:37,719
Speaker 1: of that thing, foreign countries are also paying attention. And

502
00:27:37,760 --> 00:27:39,920
Speaker 1: the other thing that came out is there was another

503
00:27:40,160 --> 00:27:44,840
Speaker 1: credible threat from a foreign country and that almost looked

504
00:27:44,920 --> 00:27:46,640
Speaker 1: like that wasn't taken seriously either.

505
00:27:47,119 --> 00:27:51,200
Speaker 2: Correct Somewhere along the line, there's a breakdown in communication,

506
00:27:51,400 --> 00:27:54,919
Speaker 2: breakdown with the threat level. To really get to the

507
00:27:54,920 --> 00:27:56,679
Speaker 2: bottom of that, I don't know if we'll ever know.

508
00:27:57,040 --> 00:27:58,880
Speaker 2: I don't know if we'll ever get the truth as

509
00:27:58,920 --> 00:28:03,320
Speaker 2: to why these credits threats we're not taking it seriously

510
00:28:03,400 --> 00:28:07,280
Speaker 2: and beefing up security like they should have. Again, there's

511
00:28:07,280 --> 00:28:10,320
Speaker 2: a breakdown in communication, but we look extremely weak, and

512
00:28:10,359 --> 00:28:13,879
Speaker 2: we are extremely vulnerable, and we're vulnerable to this happening again.

513
00:28:14,440 --> 00:28:17,400
Speaker 2: And I think anyone, and I think the reason why

514
00:28:17,400 --> 00:28:21,040
Speaker 2: there's bar bipartisan agreements on what needed to happen with

515
00:28:21,240 --> 00:28:23,720
Speaker 2: the former director of the Secret Service, and why do

516
00:28:23,760 --> 00:28:27,439
Speaker 2: you see so much tension, is because this could happen

517
00:28:27,480 --> 00:28:29,720
Speaker 2: to them too. This could happen to the members of

518
00:28:29,720 --> 00:28:32,280
Speaker 2: Congress or the Senate they have you know, they have

519
00:28:32,359 --> 00:28:35,600
Speaker 2: their own security people as well, maybe not twenty four

520
00:28:35,600 --> 00:28:37,600
Speaker 2: to seven, but they have it. This could happen to

521
00:28:37,600 --> 00:28:39,600
Speaker 2: them when they're out in the public. So this now

522
00:28:39,680 --> 00:28:43,120
Speaker 2: directly affects them. And so yeah, we want to get

523
00:28:43,160 --> 00:28:45,160
Speaker 2: to the bottom of it. We can't have this happen

524
00:28:45,160 --> 00:28:47,280
Speaker 2: in the United States. We have too big of a

525
00:28:47,320 --> 00:28:50,960
Speaker 2: mission across the world and what we do and who

526
00:28:51,000 --> 00:28:54,200
Speaker 2: we are with and everything else to have a breakdown

527
00:28:54,280 --> 00:28:57,400
Speaker 2: in security and the measures like this. So the fact

528
00:28:57,720 --> 00:29:00,880
Speaker 2: we look this week and vulnerable, it's very, very, very scary.

529
00:29:00,880 --> 00:29:03,800
Speaker 2: But this affects far more than just former President Donald Trump.

530
00:29:04,400 --> 00:29:07,640
Speaker 2: It affects the current administration and what's to come in

531
00:29:07,680 --> 00:29:08,560
Speaker 2: the future as well.

532
00:29:13,280 --> 00:29:17,400
Speaker 1: So do you remember when they said, oh, what's his name?

533
00:29:17,480 --> 00:29:20,640
Speaker 1: Said he had webs of mass destruction, and President Bush

534
00:29:20,640 --> 00:29:22,960
Speaker 1: goes over there, and you know, they serve to they

535
00:29:22,960 --> 00:29:25,600
Speaker 1: bomb and carry on, and then it turns out there

536
00:29:25,640 --> 00:29:28,280
Speaker 1: was no webs of mass destruction, and everybody got all upset.

537
00:29:28,600 --> 00:29:32,040
Speaker 1: Let me tell you something. He said he had them,

538
00:29:32,440 --> 00:29:35,280
Speaker 1: and to me, that was enough. And if somebody rolled

539
00:29:35,360 --> 00:29:37,760
Speaker 1: up in my driveway and said I've got a gun

540
00:29:37,880 --> 00:29:39,480
Speaker 1: and I'm fixed it to come to your front door,

541
00:29:39,680 --> 00:29:41,160
Speaker 1: They're not going to make it to my front door,

542
00:29:41,640 --> 00:29:44,360
Speaker 1: whether I see a gun or not. That's the way

543
00:29:44,520 --> 00:29:49,320
Speaker 1: I see it. You've got to protect this country. You've

544
00:29:49,360 --> 00:29:51,200
Speaker 1: got to protect our leaders.

545
00:29:51,520 --> 00:29:54,200
Speaker 2: With everything, I agree with you one hundred percent. I mean,

546
00:29:54,200 --> 00:29:56,120
Speaker 2: you perceive a threat, you have to take action, and

547
00:29:56,720 --> 00:30:00,440
Speaker 2: you have to be proactive. Can't always be reactive. Fortunately,

548
00:30:00,440 --> 00:30:05,000
Speaker 2: I think as a country became very reactive, and you know,

549
00:30:05,040 --> 00:30:06,600
Speaker 2: when you're on the defense all the time, you just

550
00:30:06,600 --> 00:30:08,960
Speaker 2: don't know where that threat's going to come from. Not

551
00:30:09,080 --> 00:30:12,320
Speaker 2: taking the threat serious from Iran or the Iranian regime.

552
00:30:12,840 --> 00:30:15,440
Speaker 2: Speaking of former President Trump, if he's asking for a

553
00:30:15,480 --> 00:30:17,719
Speaker 2: beafs up and security and it's coming from the agents

554
00:30:17,760 --> 00:30:20,000
Speaker 2: within the detail, you have to take that very serious.

555
00:30:20,760 --> 00:30:23,320
Speaker 2: You know, when you're talking about the issue you just

556
00:30:23,360 --> 00:30:26,440
Speaker 2: spoke of with Saddam Hussein, and you know, saying you

557
00:30:26,440 --> 00:30:29,040
Speaker 2: have the weapons of mass destruction. We know that in

558
00:30:29,080 --> 00:30:31,400
Speaker 2: the Gulf War and other times he used mustard gas

559
00:30:31,480 --> 00:30:34,320
Speaker 2: against people. So it's not like you didn't have biological

560
00:30:34,440 --> 00:30:37,480
Speaker 2: warfare and chemical warfare that he launched on the people

561
00:30:37,800 --> 00:30:41,080
Speaker 2: and that killed thousands upon thousands. So if he's going

562
00:30:41,160 --> 00:30:42,560
Speaker 2: to sit there and say, well, I have weapons of

563
00:30:42,600 --> 00:30:44,520
Speaker 2: mass destruction, well we can't wait for him to show

564
00:30:44,520 --> 00:30:46,640
Speaker 2: those cards because now we can't stop it. So you

565
00:30:46,760 --> 00:30:50,240
Speaker 2: have to be proactive. It's things like that, and I

566
00:30:50,400 --> 00:30:55,360
Speaker 2: just feel, you know, we've gotten away and I don't

567
00:30:55,360 --> 00:30:58,480
Speaker 2: want to go on a political speech here, but essentially

568
00:30:59,400 --> 00:31:02,520
Speaker 2: we have gotten away from the core principles that kept

569
00:31:02,600 --> 00:31:05,320
Speaker 2: us safe and kept this country running and the way

570
00:31:05,360 --> 00:31:07,960
Speaker 2: that it's supposed to to keep all of our citizens safe.

571
00:31:08,280 --> 00:31:10,080
Speaker 2: We know we have opened up borders to people we

572
00:31:10,120 --> 00:31:12,680
Speaker 2: have no idea who they are. We know that drug

573
00:31:12,720 --> 00:31:16,040
Speaker 2: cartels can smuggle in weapons, drug cartels can smuggle in people.

574
00:31:16,080 --> 00:31:19,960
Speaker 2: They're doing it every single day. How many tariffs cells

575
00:31:19,960 --> 00:31:22,040
Speaker 2: are here in the United States that have come from

576
00:31:22,080 --> 00:31:25,520
Speaker 2: foreign countries because we allowed it to come in Those

577
00:31:25,560 --> 00:31:28,560
Speaker 2: are things that we didn't do before. And I'm not

578
00:31:28,600 --> 00:31:31,880
Speaker 2: saying that people from foreign countries don't have an opportunity

579
00:31:31,920 --> 00:31:34,240
Speaker 2: to live the American dream here. They do. Would love

580
00:31:34,240 --> 00:31:36,440
Speaker 2: for you to come over here and bring your businesses

581
00:31:36,480 --> 00:31:40,840
Speaker 2: and bring your skills and your trade from your country

582
00:31:40,920 --> 00:31:43,080
Speaker 2: to better the United States and to be here as

583
00:31:43,080 --> 00:31:45,880
Speaker 2: a US citizen. I believe in that. But there's a process.

584
00:31:46,080 --> 00:31:48,200
Speaker 2: Everybody has to go through the same process, and we've

585
00:31:48,200 --> 00:31:51,600
Speaker 2: broken that process. And now I think we are extremely

586
00:31:51,680 --> 00:31:55,520
Speaker 2: vulnerable inside a tax here in the United States. We

587
00:31:55,640 --> 00:31:57,640
Speaker 2: have tunnels that we find all the time where the

588
00:31:57,680 --> 00:32:00,959
Speaker 2: drug cartels have been able to smuggle in years and years.

589
00:32:01,840 --> 00:32:04,240
Speaker 2: How are they're not smuggling weapons of mass destruction that

590
00:32:04,280 --> 00:32:07,240
Speaker 2: way right? How are they not paying the cartels for passage?

591
00:32:07,480 --> 00:32:09,920
Speaker 2: These are things that are legitimate threats, and now we're

592
00:32:09,960 --> 00:32:12,320
Speaker 2: just like, hey, just walk free and go wherever you

593
00:32:12,360 --> 00:32:14,040
Speaker 2: want to go. And we have no clue what was

594
00:32:14,080 --> 00:32:16,560
Speaker 2: out there, So now we have now we're blind, and

595
00:32:17,320 --> 00:32:20,720
Speaker 2: those are things that we just cannot do. And again,

596
00:32:20,760 --> 00:32:22,800
Speaker 2: I'm not trying to go on a political speech. I'm

597
00:32:22,800 --> 00:32:25,720
Speaker 2: just talking about the vulnerabilities, threats and what is the

598
00:32:25,760 --> 00:32:26,560
Speaker 2: most scariest to me.

599
00:32:27,120 --> 00:32:29,480
Speaker 1: So you've got people here, we don't know who they are.

600
00:32:29,800 --> 00:32:33,440
Speaker 1: They're committing crimes here, we can't find them. If they're

601
00:32:33,480 --> 00:32:36,960
Speaker 1: plotting and planning and scheming, we're sitting by and allowing

602
00:32:37,000 --> 00:32:38,120
Speaker 1: that time to happen.

603
00:32:38,560 --> 00:32:42,120
Speaker 2: Well, now you've got credible threats that a there's at

604
00:32:42,200 --> 00:32:44,800
Speaker 2: least a thousand gang members from a foreign country. I

605
00:32:44,840 --> 00:32:47,040
Speaker 2: don't know if it's MS thirteen or which gang it

606
00:32:47,120 --> 00:32:51,080
Speaker 2: is that has now been authorized to engage in firefights

607
00:32:51,200 --> 00:32:53,880
Speaker 2: with law enforcement personnel here in the United States. And

608
00:32:53,880 --> 00:32:56,200
Speaker 2: we're talking about a thousand gang members. We have no

609
00:32:56,280 --> 00:32:58,680
Speaker 2: idea where they are. Now are now going to start

610
00:32:58,720 --> 00:33:01,720
Speaker 2: ambushing our police office and bringing these fights to the streets.

611
00:33:02,160 --> 00:33:06,440
Speaker 2: It's shameful, and you know, we need to get a

612
00:33:06,440 --> 00:33:08,000
Speaker 2: lot of these people out of here that shouldn't be

613
00:33:08,160 --> 00:33:11,000
Speaker 2: especially the ones that have committed crimes. We have to

614
00:33:11,000 --> 00:33:12,600
Speaker 2: secure our own country. We have to be able to

615
00:33:12,600 --> 00:33:15,680
Speaker 2: secure and keep our own people safe. You know, it

616
00:33:16,200 --> 00:33:19,320
Speaker 2: sounds great when you have open borders, but it doesn't work.

617
00:33:20,360 --> 00:33:22,280
Speaker 2: You have to have the system and process. I'm not

618
00:33:22,360 --> 00:33:24,560
Speaker 2: saying they can't have the same freedoms of liberties as

619
00:33:24,600 --> 00:33:26,800
Speaker 2: everybody else. Once they get in through the right channels,

620
00:33:27,200 --> 00:33:29,240
Speaker 2: but you have to go through the right channels, and

621
00:33:29,320 --> 00:33:32,640
Speaker 2: we can't just skip that for whatever reason. And that's

622
00:33:32,680 --> 00:33:34,800
Speaker 2: the problem. And I'm scared to death of what's going

623
00:33:34,840 --> 00:33:36,800
Speaker 2: to happen in the years to come. I mean, they

624
00:33:36,840 --> 00:33:39,440
Speaker 2: could pop off any day now and we could have

625
00:33:39,640 --> 00:33:42,840
Speaker 2: full out streets, you know, firefights going on in the

626
00:33:42,880 --> 00:33:45,800
Speaker 2: streets of our own cities and our own towns, and

627
00:33:45,840 --> 00:33:46,880
Speaker 2: we don't know when it's coming.

628
00:33:47,520 --> 00:33:52,200
Speaker 1: We cannot afford to look weak, much less be weak.

629
00:33:52,680 --> 00:33:55,840
Speaker 2: We have to be strong, we have to be diligent,

630
00:33:55,960 --> 00:33:58,120
Speaker 2: and we have to be the leaders of the free world.

631
00:33:58,520 --> 00:34:01,680
Speaker 1: Amen. All right, let's talk about your TV show, sir.

632
00:34:02,080 --> 00:34:04,800
Speaker 1: Tell everybody about it where they can watch it.

633
00:34:05,120 --> 00:34:09,120
Speaker 2: Everything this show is, it's really amazing. It's called Under

634
00:34:09,120 --> 00:34:12,759
Speaker 2: the Radar Secrets of a Swedish serial Killer. When Peter

635
00:34:12,960 --> 00:34:15,719
Speaker 2: was convicted of his crimes, his serial killings in Sweden,

636
00:34:16,200 --> 00:34:19,000
Speaker 2: the Swedish authorities, you know, when they arrested him, they

637
00:34:19,840 --> 00:34:23,440
Speaker 2: seized his computer and all these various items, and he

638
00:34:23,480 --> 00:34:27,320
Speaker 2: went to trial, was convicted. Well, he had a clinical

639
00:34:27,360 --> 00:34:29,799
Speaker 2: psychologist he was talking to while in prison, where he

640
00:34:29,840 --> 00:34:33,000
Speaker 2: admits to doing some murders in the United States, specifically

641
00:34:33,000 --> 00:34:37,000
Speaker 2: in Florida. He ended up writing songs because he was

642
00:34:37,040 --> 00:34:40,080
Speaker 2: a professional musician by trade, so he wrote songs and

643
00:34:40,160 --> 00:34:44,160
Speaker 2: lyrics that hinted toward these homicides that he admitted to

644
00:34:44,160 --> 00:34:48,800
Speaker 2: to the clinical psychologists. The clinical psychologist became termally ill

645
00:34:49,000 --> 00:34:53,719
Speaker 2: and right before passing gave it to a film a

646
00:34:53,760 --> 00:35:00,200
Speaker 2: criminal journalist documentarist named John Mark, who then got this

647
00:35:00,360 --> 00:35:02,880
Speaker 2: info and started following on it. So they contacted me

648
00:35:02,920 --> 00:35:05,879
Speaker 2: a few years ago wanting to know if I could

649
00:35:05,920 --> 00:35:08,280
Speaker 2: assist in this project of trying to follow these clues

650
00:35:08,320 --> 00:35:10,160
Speaker 2: and see if we can figure out which homicides had

651
00:35:10,200 --> 00:35:13,040
Speaker 2: committed in Florida. What I didn't know at the time,

652
00:35:13,040 --> 00:35:15,440
Speaker 2: which became very fascinating, is a lot of this took

653
00:35:15,520 --> 00:35:18,600
Speaker 2: place in Bokrits in Florida, which is where I grew up.

654
00:35:19,680 --> 00:35:22,040
Speaker 2: Some of these crimes happened less than a mile from

655
00:35:22,080 --> 00:35:26,359
Speaker 2: where I lived, So it became incredibly interesting. So we

656
00:35:27,000 --> 00:35:29,480
Speaker 2: you know, we got there, We got all the info

657
00:35:29,520 --> 00:35:32,160
Speaker 2: from the Swedish authorities, their photos, and we just started

658
00:35:32,200 --> 00:35:35,400
Speaker 2: following the clues and then all our findings went to

659
00:35:35,800 --> 00:35:39,080
Speaker 2: the local law enforcement agencies for them to be able

660
00:35:39,120 --> 00:35:42,239
Speaker 2: to follow up and further investigate to hopefully solve some

661
00:35:42,360 --> 00:35:45,800
Speaker 2: of these unsolved cases. One of them being the biggest,

662
00:35:46,040 --> 00:35:48,640
Speaker 2: Uh Well, it's a double homicide that happened that Boca

663
00:35:48,680 --> 00:35:51,799
Speaker 2: Atone seventeen years ago that's still going unsolved. So we're

664
00:35:51,800 --> 00:35:55,080
Speaker 2: hoping that these were the finishing pieces that they needed

665
00:35:55,120 --> 00:35:57,720
Speaker 2: to finally bring someone the justice to bring that family

666
00:35:57,760 --> 00:36:02,280
Speaker 2: some closure. So it's extremely interesting show. I'm very proud

667
00:36:02,280 --> 00:36:04,640
Speaker 2: of it. I like the work that we did, and

668
00:36:04,680 --> 00:36:09,240
Speaker 2: it's just launched on Tuesday. You can access it through

669
00:36:09,560 --> 00:36:12,200
Speaker 2: what's called via play and you can get that through

670
00:36:12,239 --> 00:36:16,040
Speaker 2: Prime Video, Roku or Exfinity. It's just an ad on

671
00:36:16,160 --> 00:36:19,840
Speaker 2: subscription and it's a tremendous show. It's actually catching on

672
00:36:19,960 --> 00:36:22,480
Speaker 2: like a wildfire right now in South Florida, which is amazing.

673
00:36:22,920 --> 00:36:26,120
Speaker 1: So you talked a little while ago about repeated patterns.

674
00:36:26,719 --> 00:36:29,440
Speaker 1: I tell people all the time when you're working a

675
00:36:29,440 --> 00:36:33,600
Speaker 1: cold case, that's the first thing. I look for. Patterns. Patterns.

676
00:36:33,880 --> 00:36:38,000
Speaker 1: They will lead you, whether it's through words, music in

677
00:36:38,080 --> 00:36:44,080
Speaker 1: this case, statements made photographs, travel, So you look for

678
00:36:44,120 --> 00:36:48,279
Speaker 1: those patterns. Honey, you're gonna be able to I have

679
00:36:48,360 --> 00:36:49,800
Speaker 1: no doubt linked this thing.

680
00:36:50,080 --> 00:36:52,399
Speaker 2: It's a great show. I'd actually love to get your

681
00:36:52,440 --> 00:36:54,480
Speaker 2: perspective on it if you get a chance to watch it.

682
00:36:54,560 --> 00:36:57,520
Speaker 2: Just with your extensive background with what you do, it

683
00:36:57,560 --> 00:36:59,279
Speaker 2: would be really interesting to get your point of view

684
00:36:59,360 --> 00:37:01,719
Speaker 2: on it. Love to hear it, so let me know

685
00:37:01,800 --> 00:37:02,800
Speaker 2: whenever you have time.

686
00:37:03,160 --> 00:37:05,440
Speaker 1: Well, the clip that you already sent me, here's the

687
00:37:05,440 --> 00:37:08,480
Speaker 1: first thing. I was like, I do not want this

688
00:37:08,520 --> 00:37:12,719
Speaker 1: clip to end. It was so good and I was

689
00:37:12,800 --> 00:37:16,440
Speaker 1: captivated immediately. But I think what is so critical is

690
00:37:16,480 --> 00:37:20,879
Speaker 1: you're walking the streets, you know, dealing with people, you understand,

691
00:37:21,360 --> 00:37:24,839
Speaker 1: when you're working a case on your home turf. There's

692
00:37:24,880 --> 00:37:25,600
Speaker 1: nothing like it.

693
00:37:25,719 --> 00:37:26,600
Speaker 2: Definitely true.

694
00:37:27,040 --> 00:37:30,640
Speaker 1: Well, Jim, I appreciate you. I will look forward to

695
00:37:30,680 --> 00:37:34,399
Speaker 1: maybe even doing a follow up as more information comes out.

696
00:37:34,920 --> 00:37:39,040
Speaker 1: But I just appreciate you being so factual, you being

697
00:37:39,080 --> 00:37:45,520
Speaker 1: so calm, reassuring, and also very deliberate in that we

698
00:37:45,680 --> 00:37:48,560
Speaker 1: do not need to let our guard down, and we

699
00:37:48,680 --> 00:37:53,120
Speaker 1: do not need to even appear week even if we're not.

700
00:37:53,520 --> 00:37:55,840
Speaker 1: We can't afford to appear week.

701
00:37:56,560 --> 00:37:58,560
Speaker 2: I agree, we can't. We can't do it. We can

702
00:37:58,680 --> 00:38:01,200
Speaker 2: show such disconnect all across the world. We need to

703
00:38:01,239 --> 00:38:04,600
Speaker 2: be united as one and strong and make everyone think

704
00:38:04,640 --> 00:38:08,319
Speaker 2: that our country is completely there's no way that you

705
00:38:08,360 --> 00:38:12,720
Speaker 2: can infiltrate and create wreak havoc within our own country,

706
00:38:12,840 --> 00:38:16,879
Speaker 2: within our own security platforms and everything else. We've got

707
00:38:16,880 --> 00:38:18,960
Speaker 2: to change that narrative, and we got to change it quickly.

708
00:38:19,600 --> 00:38:21,200
Speaker 1: And there's one last thing I want you to do

709
00:38:21,280 --> 00:38:25,279
Speaker 1: for me. Right now, there are Secret Service agents with

710
00:38:25,400 --> 00:38:31,080
Speaker 1: President Carter, with the Obama children all across the globe.

711
00:38:31,239 --> 00:38:35,160
Speaker 1: They are protecting people right now, and I know they're hurting.

712
00:38:35,840 --> 00:38:38,440
Speaker 1: I know they've seen the memes. I know they've probably

713
00:38:38,440 --> 00:38:41,439
Speaker 1: gotten text messages and phone calls from people that hadn't

714
00:38:41,440 --> 00:38:44,000
Speaker 1: talked to them in twenty years but now have something

715
00:38:44,040 --> 00:38:46,520
Speaker 1: to say negative. You want to just give them a

716
00:38:46,560 --> 00:38:49,000
Speaker 1: little morale boost if you want to.

717
00:38:49,640 --> 00:38:51,640
Speaker 2: Absolutely you know from the time that I spend the

718
00:38:51,640 --> 00:38:53,920
Speaker 2: Secret Service, every one of the men and women of

719
00:38:53,960 --> 00:38:57,719
Speaker 2: the United States Secret Service are hardcore, dedicated to their job.

720
00:38:57,800 --> 00:39:00,480
Speaker 2: They do it day in and day out. They do itmendous,

721
00:39:00,880 --> 00:39:04,400
Speaker 2: tremendous job. It's unfortunate that we had one incident that

722
00:39:04,480 --> 00:39:08,399
Speaker 2: took place in Butler, Pennsylvania that has changed that right now,

723
00:39:08,880 --> 00:39:11,560
Speaker 2: and it's incredibly difficult for them to be able to

724
00:39:11,560 --> 00:39:13,759
Speaker 2: do their job under such scrutiny. But they are such

725
00:39:13,800 --> 00:39:17,040
Speaker 2: professionals and they're so dedicated to what they do. They

726
00:39:17,080 --> 00:39:20,520
Speaker 2: are kicking butt every day and they are protecting those assets.

727
00:39:20,560 --> 00:39:23,760
Speaker 2: You know, we had one incident in thirty something years

728
00:39:24,320 --> 00:39:26,840
Speaker 2: or forty years old, President Reagan was shot what nineteen

729
00:39:26,840 --> 00:39:30,080
Speaker 2: eighty one, So you know all those years in between,

730
00:39:30,280 --> 00:39:34,239
Speaker 2: every single day, countless amounts of times, every single day,

731
00:39:35,080 --> 00:39:38,759
Speaker 2: not one incident, and he only had one incident Butler, Pennsylvania.

732
00:39:39,400 --> 00:39:42,000
Speaker 2: That needs to never be repeated ever. But the men

733
00:39:42,000 --> 00:39:44,480
Speaker 2: and women are so dedicated they continue to do their

734
00:39:44,560 --> 00:39:47,000
Speaker 2: job and you don't hear this tough happening all the time.

735
00:39:47,320 --> 00:39:50,640
Speaker 2: So I am just incredibly proud of them, and I

736
00:39:50,680 --> 00:39:53,240
Speaker 2: hope they continue to do exactly what they've been doing,

737
00:39:53,680 --> 00:39:56,440
Speaker 2: and hopefully with the leadership, we'll get the right leadership

738
00:39:56,480 --> 00:39:59,480
Speaker 2: into the Secret Service to make the necessary changes. If

739
00:39:59,520 --> 00:40:02,560
Speaker 2: there were some bad apples involved with what happens Butler, Pennsylvania,

740
00:40:03,280 --> 00:40:05,799
Speaker 2: they will be removed and we will move on to

741
00:40:05,840 --> 00:40:08,719
Speaker 2: a much bigger, better place. But I'm super proud of

742
00:40:08,719 --> 00:40:10,359
Speaker 2: the men and women that I person you served with

743
00:40:10,440 --> 00:40:12,680
Speaker 2: and the ones they continue this job every day they

744
00:40:12,680 --> 00:40:17,720
Speaker 2: are true heroes. They are protectors of our most elite

745
00:40:17,719 --> 00:40:21,080
Speaker 2: and dedicated leadership, and they just need to continue with

746
00:40:21,120 --> 00:40:22,000
Speaker 2: that mission and doing what.

747
00:40:22,000 --> 00:40:25,120
Speaker 1: They're doing right on. And I'm going to need to

748
00:40:25,160 --> 00:40:27,960
Speaker 1: know more information about that skiff because that's going to

749
00:40:28,040 --> 00:40:30,239
Speaker 1: be how I need to communicate with my mother in law.

750
00:40:30,280 --> 00:40:30,680
Speaker 1: For now on.

751
00:40:31,000 --> 00:40:37,080
Speaker 3: No cameras, no recover what happens in their stays in there.

752
00:40:37,480 --> 00:40:40,279
Speaker 3: That sounds like a room. That's a room I need

753
00:40:40,280 --> 00:40:44,360
Speaker 3: in my house. Well, listen, I appreciate you. I appreciate

754
00:40:44,400 --> 00:40:48,560
Speaker 3: you building up your comrades and the secret service. I

755
00:40:48,600 --> 00:40:51,880
Speaker 3: appreciate you being with us, and I appreciate all of

756
00:40:51,920 --> 00:40:52,960
Speaker 3: your service.

757
00:40:52,640 --> 00:40:56,920
Speaker 2: Sir, my pleasure. Thank you so very much. And anytime

758
00:40:56,960 --> 00:40:58,840
Speaker 2: you want me to come back, you know I'm always

759
00:40:59,239 --> 00:41:01,040
Speaker 2: always well, all right.

760
00:41:01,000 --> 00:41:05,160
Speaker 1: While viz hell watch your show, and y'all, I'm Cheryl

761
00:41:05,239 --> 00:41:21,440
Speaker 1: McCollum and this is own seven h