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Speaker 1: Do you like progress, technology advancements and things? Sure you do.

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Speaker 1: I do think about for a moment, how much easier

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Speaker 1: your life is today than the guy who even lived

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Speaker 1: fifty years ago. Right, I mean, if I wanted to

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Speaker 1: right now, if I wanted to right here on camera,

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Speaker 1: I could pick up my phone and order groceries and

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Speaker 1: some guy would come deliver them right here to the studio.

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Speaker 1: It's astounding, right, it's astounding. I get in my car

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Speaker 1: to drive home, not only am I able to talk

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Speaker 1: to other people on the telephone, but it actually hooks

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Speaker 1: up to the speaker system in my car, and I

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Speaker 1: just have a conversation as if they're sitting right there

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Speaker 1: with me. We take these things for granted, but this

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Speaker 1: is this is normal now. Technology advancements are awesome, right.

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Speaker 1: Mostly there's a dark side to them, though, because as

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Speaker 1: the phones get better, the cars get better, and the

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Speaker 1: groceries get delivered, weapons technology advances too, And this is

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Speaker 1: probably going to get a little dark at times. But

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Speaker 1: I do think it's important we understand the stakes. You see,

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Speaker 1: if Nation A gets mad at Nation B in the

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Speaker 1: year fifteen hundred, okay, people are gonna die, get stabbed.

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Speaker 1: Probably some horse charges in their sweet swords and stuff

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Speaker 1: like that. They'll work it out. In the end. We're

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Speaker 1: certainly not going to see a nation destroyed. Armies will die,

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Speaker 1: maybe some civilians will start, but not the end of

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Speaker 1: the world. That's the way war was for a long time.

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Speaker 1: And then weapons technology begin to advance and advance in advance,

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Speaker 1: and then we got to something like World War One,

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Speaker 1: and the world had never seen numbers like this. Now

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Speaker 1: most people don't know much about World War One, but

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Speaker 1: remember prior to that, it was all horses. That's really

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Speaker 1: how wars were fought on horseback. They tried charging people

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Speaker 1: on horseback in World War One, machine gun nessages. Shoot

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Speaker 1: all the people in all the horses. Everyone dead. We

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Speaker 1: started to see carnages like the world had never seen before.

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Speaker 1: What millions millions didn't die in wars before then World

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Speaker 1: War One they did. The killing power of weapons is incredible.

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Speaker 1: Artillery they can shoot you for miles and miles and

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Speaker 1: miles away and wipe out all of you with one shot.

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Speaker 1: Air power. And then came World War Two and all

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Speaker 1: the weapons technology was already better, right, better machine guns,

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Speaker 1: better planes, better artillery. Now we got submarines out there.

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Speaker 1: I know, they had some World War One with submarines, battleships,

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Speaker 1: aircraft carriers, amazing stuff, except the killing power was more too.

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Speaker 1: And then eventually we developed nuclear weapons and we use them,

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Speaker 1: and I don't criticize the decision. It was the right

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Speaker 1: decision to make. But let's do understand what happens when

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Speaker 1: a nuclear bomb hits. It's not like we don't know,

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Speaker 1: we've seen it. We have firsthand accounts. Should we have

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Speaker 1: pictures of before and after. It's even a little grainy

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Speaker 1: video out there. What happens is they drop a bomb,

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Speaker 1: it explodes over a civilian population, and what follows is

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Speaker 1: basically something that looks like the Biblical apocalypse. We're talking

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Speaker 1: everything melting. Can you imagine all around you, the roads

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Speaker 1: melting underneath you, so hot that people turn to ash immediately,

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Speaker 1: like Thanos snapped them out of existence. We have some

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Speaker 1: things left behind from people. It's their ash shadow on

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Speaker 1: the wall where they used to live, and that's just

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Speaker 1: the initial shock of it. Honestly, this is gonna get

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Speaker 1: a little graphic. I'm gonna try to make it. It's

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Speaker 1: always gonna be family friendly, but you understand that a

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Speaker 1: nuclear bomb going off burns so hot that it sucks

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Speaker 1: all the water out of the air. It basically flash

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Speaker 1: boils all the water in the air. One are the

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Speaker 1: stories you from. One of the most heartbreaking things you

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Speaker 1: hear about the wake of the Hiroshima or Nagasaki bombings

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Speaker 1: is people were so thirsty because it sucked all the

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Speaker 1: water out of your body too, and all the water

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Speaker 1: out of the air, except they were so dehydrated. If

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Speaker 1: they actually did find water that wasn't full of dead bodies,

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Speaker 1: they would drink it, but would drink too fast from

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Speaker 1: full dehydration and die. You see the old pictures, and

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Speaker 1: I know this is gonna sound harsh, but it's true.

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Speaker 1: We go thumb through some pictures. If you have a

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Speaker 1: strong stomach and you're not about to eat, go thumb

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Speaker 1: through some pictures of the victims that what's that look

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Speaker 1: like to you? It's kids? We don't want to think

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Speaker 1: about that. Who wants to think about that? It's women

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Speaker 1: and kids after faces melted off. If it sounds like

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Speaker 1: I'm being graphic, it's because I am. Because I want

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Speaker 1: you to understand the stakes of the weaponry that exists today.

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Speaker 1: And that was nineteen forty five. It's the year twenty

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Speaker 1: twenty two. I think so many people out there now,

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Speaker 1: they batter around things like war and no fly zones

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Speaker 1: and invade here and invade there, and they don't fully

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Speaker 1: grasp that destruction can come here. We Americans are so spoiled.

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Speaker 1: We've never really had that kind of an attack on

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Speaker 1: our main land. Geographically, we've been lucky, so we just

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Speaker 1: don't think about that. I'm right here in Houston, Texas.

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Speaker 1: It would not be at all difficult to drop a

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Speaker 1: nuclear weapon right where I sit right now. What if

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Speaker 1: those are my kids with their faces melted off. That's

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Speaker 1: the reality of the war that could come. And we

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Speaker 1: need to understand the stakes right now. The United States

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Speaker 1: and Russia or have tensions. There are ten thousand nuclear

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Speaker 1: weapons between the two nations, and that's not even mentioning China.

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Speaker 1: China is a nuclear power, a growing nuclear power, and

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Speaker 1: they're out there threatening Taiwan every other second. We've declared

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Speaker 1: that we're going to defend Taiwan. We're already getting involved

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Speaker 1: against Russia. We're going to defend Taiwan. Remember when Joe

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Speaker 1: Biden pledged that we would want to make China understand

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Speaker 1: that we are not going to step back. We are

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Speaker 1: not going to change any of our reviews. So are

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Speaker 1: you saying that the United States would come to Taiwan's

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Speaker 1: defense in China attacker? Yes, we have a commitment. Okay,

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Speaker 1: that sounds nice, right, you're rooting for the people of Taiwan.

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Speaker 1: I am too going to come to their defense. We're

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Speaker 1: going to send a carrier group over there. What can

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Speaker 1: China do back? Oh, I'm glad you brought that up,

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Speaker 1: because they just got done testing a hypersonic missile that

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Speaker 1: completely floored our intelligence community. We're talking, can't stop it,

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Speaker 1: can't see it in time, more than easy to throw

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Speaker 1: a nuclear warhead on the tip of that bad boy.

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Speaker 1: These are the stakes of the game, and the guy

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Speaker 1: currently in charge as such a doddering old fool. People

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Speaker 1: in his own party tried to take away his authority

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Speaker 1: to launch nuclear weapons. We are intense times right now,

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Speaker 1: and the destructive power of the weapons out there is scary,

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Speaker 1: and people think to themselves, what can't happen. They won't happen.

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Speaker 1: Cooler heads will prevail, someone will step in, someone will stop. Bit.

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Speaker 1: I'm gonna tell you two things. One point to me,

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Speaker 1: a single time in human history, we're a nation, tribe,

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Speaker 1: whatever it is. Empire acquires a weapon's technology and doesn't

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Speaker 1: use it anyone. You got anything for me, You probably don't.

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Speaker 1: That's one two people talk a lot about. While the

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Speaker 1: Cuban missile crisis, we avoided that one. Do you understand

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Speaker 1: how close we were to nuclear war? Let me explain

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Speaker 1: something to you. Russian submarines they are not built for

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Speaker 1: warm weather. Don't worry this is going to come into

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Speaker 1: play here. They're not built for warm weather because Russian's

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Speaker 1: freaking cold. Well, Russias sent down some submarines down there,

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Speaker 1: and while all the tensions were high. The Caribbean is

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Speaker 1: really warm, and the water is warm and the air

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Speaker 1: is warm. And a submarine you got a bunch of dudes,

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Speaker 1: well women now too, but you've got a bunch of

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Speaker 1: dudes packed in a little tube underneath the water, no

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Speaker 1: fresh air, no wind a blowing. It's hot, really really

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Speaker 1: really hot. And when you get hot, you get irritable.

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Speaker 1: I know, I personally do. It's just human nature. One

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Speaker 1: of these Russian submarines that had nuclear tipped torpedoes on it,

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Speaker 1: now that's part of the story. You know what a

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Speaker 1: depth charge is. You've probably seen it In the movies,

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Speaker 1: you'll see a ship looking for a submarine or trying

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Speaker 1: to blow up a submarine, and they'll start dropping these

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Speaker 1: canisters off the side of the ship. Well, here's the

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Speaker 1: thing about a depth charge. They're set to go off

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Speaker 1: at a certain depth. It's the name depth charge. It's

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Speaker 1: actually not a big deal if a depth charge blows

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Speaker 1: up above a submarine, because the explosion itself always seeks

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Speaker 1: the path of least resistance, so it always goes up.

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Speaker 1: It's actually not the end of the world. If a

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Speaker 1: depth charge goes off beside a submarine, the charge will

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Speaker 1: go up. If it goes off underneath the submarine, everyone's dead. Said.

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Speaker 1: If they're going off around you and you're in a

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Speaker 1: steel tube under the water, and you understand, all it

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Speaker 1: takes is one you don't have a submarine get wounded.

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Speaker 1: One goes off hurts that sub everyone's dead. So you

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Speaker 1: have a bunch of hot Russians and a submarine stripped

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Speaker 1: down to their underwear. As the story goes and we

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Speaker 1: are dropping depth charges trying to find them, they're hot,

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Speaker 1: they're sweating, they're miserable. Tensions are high, and these depth

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Speaker 1: charges that are rattling out the fillings from people's heads.

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Speaker 1: The captain. The captain, the man in charge of the

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Speaker 1: depth of the submarine, ordered one of those nuclear tipped

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Speaker 1: torpedoes to be fired. Did you know that story. His

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Speaker 1: name's Valentine Savitsky, getting always screw that up. That was

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Speaker 1: his name. Fire. The nuclear weapon order was already given.

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Speaker 1: We would have, undoubtedly as soon as that nuclear tip

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Speaker 1: torpedo hits something, we would have responded in time with

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Speaker 1: nuclear weapons, nuclear war like that. By the grace of God,

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Speaker 1: his crew talked him out of it, convinced him he

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Speaker 1: was just losing his mind. That's how close we came before.

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Speaker 1: Right now we have a president who can't spell his

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Speaker 1: own name, and a deranged dictator in Russia and another

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Speaker 1: one in China, all with nuclear weapons. I didn't mean

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Speaker 1: for this to be as scary as it sounded, but

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Speaker 1: it wants you to understand nuclear is something entirely different,

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Speaker 1: something different than we've ever seen, and it can come home.

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Speaker 1: We have a great show for you tonight. We're gonna

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Speaker 1: get smarter. Don't worry. If some of the stuff seems

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Speaker 1: over your head, it's all over my head too. So

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Speaker 1: let's find out. How do you deliver these things? What

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Speaker 1: can Russia do? What can China do? Where are we going?

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Speaker 1: All that's coming up tonight? And I'm right back to

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Speaker 1: Russia Ukraine for two seconds. In my mind right, I'm

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Speaker 1: always like, Hey, could this thing ever lead to a

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Speaker 1: nuclear fallow? Could this ever be nuclear war? What is

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Speaker 1: your take on that? Is it just a scared US

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Speaker 1: citizen right now? It's watching should be scared because we

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Speaker 1: have incompetent people heading up our country who frankly got

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Speaker 1: there through a fraudulent election. But in regardless of incompetent people,

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Speaker 1: immediate threat. How serious is the threat of nuclear warfare?

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Speaker 1: Think it's serious? I think it's serious. Okay, that's not

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Speaker 1: exactly confidence inspiring. Joining me now, Major General Jeff Schlosser.

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Speaker 1: He's also the author of the book Marathon War Leadership

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Speaker 1: in Combat in Afghanistan. General, Obviously, those are not inspiring

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Speaker 1: words from former President Trump there. Obviously we know that

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Speaker 1: there's a madman invading Ukraine. China has nukes, We have nukes.

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Speaker 1: Do you think we'll see nuclear weapons blow up again

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Speaker 1: in our lifetime? Well? I sort of, I hope not.

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Speaker 1: You know, I think that now there are a large

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Speaker 1: number of people that are extremely focused on trying to

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Speaker 1: prevent any kind of a confrontation directly between NATO obviously

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Speaker 1: the United States and Russia. And it's not in Putin's

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Speaker 1: best interests to try to actually go to a nuclear confrontation.

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Speaker 1: Really now, is he going to threaten it? Absolutely? I mean,

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Speaker 1: remember we're dealing with a former spy KGB spy, worked

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Speaker 1: his way up in the intelligence apparatus. He's a master

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Speaker 1: at deceit disinformation. He's going to threaten a lot of

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Speaker 1: different things. But I think that there are a lot

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Speaker 1: of different leaders around the world that they are trying

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Speaker 1: to do the very best they possibly can to prevent

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Speaker 1: a confrontation, even on a conventional confrontation that would lead

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Speaker 1: anything like new the warfare general before we get to us, actually,

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Speaker 1: I'm going to focus mostly on America here, but you

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Speaker 1: just brought up Putin. Okay, let's say, what if he's

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Speaker 1: a madman at this point in time. I don't believe that,

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Speaker 1: but what if he's a madman? Does Vladimir Putin within

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Speaker 1: Russia have the authority to stroll into his office and

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Speaker 1: press a button and start launching nukes or is there's

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Speaker 1: some kind of system even he has to go through

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Speaker 1: before he can start them things flying. You know, I mean,

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Speaker 1: I think we don't really know exactly the system that

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Speaker 1: the Russians have more from since the Soviet Union. I

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Speaker 1: think We've done an awful lot of study, and we

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Speaker 1: believe that there are safeguards. There are people besides Putin

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Speaker 1: that have to be able to approve any kind of

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Speaker 1: a nuclear exchange. You know. All that said, though, at

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Speaker 1: the end of the day, it's been remarkable to watch

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Speaker 1: Putin and see how isolated he is. And on the

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Speaker 1: opposite end of that isolation is is that he's probably

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Speaker 1: done an awful lot to try to make sure that

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Speaker 1: he controls the elements of power within Russia. I know,

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Speaker 1: I'm giving you this kind of back and forth. The answer.

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Speaker 1: The truth is, I don't, frankly know. I'm not sure

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Speaker 1: anybody in America exactly knows. And that's why we have

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Speaker 1: to be very careful about dealing with Putin general. Let's

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Speaker 1: focus on America. Then, what are our nuclear capabilities? I'm

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Speaker 1: obviously going over a lot on the children. I'd have

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Speaker 1: someone coming on talking about Russias and China's. We don't

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Speaker 1: really talk about hours. How many do we have how

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Speaker 1: many ways do we have to deploy them? What's our stockpile? Like? Yeah,

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Speaker 1: so we maintain a nuclear triad, so that means threes.

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Speaker 1: And so what you end up seeing is is that

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Speaker 1: we have strategic ballistic intercontinental ballistic muscles. They essentially alert

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Speaker 1: all the time. So when Putin said that he had

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Speaker 1: elevated his strategic nuclear forces, ours are like that all

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Speaker 1: the time. They are ready to respond at all times.

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Speaker 1: But over and above that, and you're gonna see that

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Speaker 1: those numbers are in the thousands, not in the two thousands,

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Speaker 1: but generally in the thousands. You're also going to see

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Speaker 1: two other elements that basically work with each other. One

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Speaker 1: is a submarine force that can be forward based quite

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Speaker 1: close to our whoever our competitors are or whoever threatens us,

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Speaker 1: and they're at sea at all times. There are there

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Speaker 1: are nuclear capabilities, you know, fired from missels under the

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Speaker 1: water at all times. And then finally you have our

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Speaker 1: bomber force with strategic strategic bombing, strategic nuclear weapons. So

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Speaker 1: it's a try it and is it possible to try

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Speaker 1: to defeat one portion of that maybe even two? Yeah,

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Speaker 1: absolutely if you attack America, but the whole concept of

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Speaker 1: mutually assured destruction that we've had with us and our

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Speaker 1: competitors over the last fifty to sixty years has been

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Speaker 1: based upon this other element that even if you try

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Speaker 1: to destroy our land based systems or our air based systems,

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Speaker 1: you know, the submarine based ones will catch you and

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Speaker 1: destroy your country as well. I know this sounds crazy,

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Speaker 1: it's right out of doctor string range love for most Americans,

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Speaker 1: they probably think I'm an idiot talking about this kind

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Speaker 1: of a level of warfare where you're basically destroying much

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Speaker 1: of the earth and most of the population. But what

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Speaker 1: that this mutually assured destruction between US and in the

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Speaker 1: former Soviet Union, now the Russians and then also the

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Speaker 1: Chinese has been able to maintain a level of peace

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Speaker 1: around the world because no one's been crazy enough to

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Speaker 1: try to violate it. We've gotten some pretty close. The

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Speaker 1: Cuban missile crisis was closer than I think most folks

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Speaker 1: wanted you to do or to talk about. That's been

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Speaker 1: a very long time. Most of our listeners viewers were

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Speaker 1: not alive during that time frame. I was a kid,

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Speaker 1: you know, general, I've been a nerd out on a

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Speaker 1: couple of details here, just because I don't know, and

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Speaker 1: I think other people don't know. You mentioned ICBMs intercontinental

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Speaker 1: ballistic missiles. What are our capabilities there? Can we fire

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Speaker 1: one from America and landed anywhere in the world? What

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Speaker 1: kind of range are we talking about on these things?

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Speaker 1: And what kind of accuracy? Yeah, so I mean both

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Speaker 1: you're nailing right and ahead, and I would say both

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Speaker 1: of those that your latter two questions, range and accuracy

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Speaker 1: are are classified if I give exact numbers. So let

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Speaker 1: me just say this. You know they are located inside

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Speaker 1: the United States. It's not really that much of a

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Speaker 1: secret in the States that they are actually are located

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Speaker 1: in in silos. They're on alert all the time, there

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Speaker 1: are people they're ready to go twenty four to seven,

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Speaker 1: and they do rehearsals all the time, and they can

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Speaker 1: hit anywhere that our foes are inside the globe and

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Speaker 1: do it in a very significant way. Let me just

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Speaker 1: say that numbers are very very high, and you know

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Speaker 1: they are multiple capabilities within each missile. Let's just leave

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Speaker 1: it at that. So the range issue, the ability to

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Speaker 1: do to reach out and strike our enemies is absolutely there.

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Speaker 1: And as I've said, you know, for seventy years. This

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Speaker 1: has been a major determ against anybody out there. Okay,

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Speaker 1: and finally the submarines, and I stand there. There's going

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Speaker 1: to be all kinds of classified stuff here too, So

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Speaker 1: I understand, you know, you can divulge with what you can't.

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Speaker 1: But you mentioned these things are always at sea. Doesn't

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Speaker 1: our enemy know where our submarines are or wouldn't he

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Speaker 1: if they approached land somewhere. So we have a number

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Speaker 1: of different submarines that see actually submarines that you know,

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Speaker 1: seek out and are ready to attack, you know, surface

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Speaker 1: vessels and other different types of missions of that nature,

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Speaker 1: some that actually do something special operations in some cases.

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Speaker 1: And then you have the large submarines that are meant

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Speaker 1: to be always at sea in a posture that they

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Speaker 1: could at almost no notice, very very quickly respond to

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Speaker 1: a nuclear attack on our country. So let me just

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Speaker 1: say that they are always prepositioned in places that you

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Speaker 1: might think makes sense. Sometimes you're going to hear about

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Speaker 1: our submarines or others wandering around getting close to a

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Speaker 1: you know, either competitor's continent or something like that. Those

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Speaker 1: are probably not the ones that we're referring to. The

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Speaker 1: ones that we are referring to are going to be

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Speaker 1: in an area where they have a quick flight, but

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Speaker 1: it doesn't necessarily need to be direct, you know, as

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Speaker 1: you know, these are going to go essentially into space

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Speaker 1: and then come back on down. Let me just say

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Speaker 1: that they're postured and they're ready, and they have been

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Speaker 1: ready for decades to be that final deterrent for our country.

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Speaker 1: That's that is cool? All right. Finally, our defense system.

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Speaker 1: What kind of defense do we have if Russia China

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Speaker 1: starts lobbing them this way? I understand we're going to

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Speaker 1: start lobbing them back the other way, but what can

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Speaker 1: we do to stop theirs? Yeah, so there's been an

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Speaker 1: awful lot of this is mainly political. I mean, you know,

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Speaker 1: the decisions about not to you know, have certain capabilities

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Speaker 1: out there that are very well known. Let me just

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Speaker 1: say that there are defense mechanisms, and obviously there are

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Speaker 1: other right now, they are basically other missiles that shoot

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Speaker 1: others out. You know, the defense system starts off at

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Speaker 1: the sense sensing and in other words, I almost think

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Speaker 1: I put as an earlier warning indications that there's going

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Speaker 1: to be uh, you know, some sort of either fueling

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Speaker 1: or movement inside our foes or potential foes missile systems,

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Speaker 1: and many of them are mobile, um, you know, including

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Speaker 1: the Russians. But these are being watched twenty four seven,

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Speaker 1: so we have a good indication then the sensing of

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Speaker 1: an actual launch, and you can actually figure that out.

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Speaker 1: During that timeframe, you've essentially got three different opportunities to

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Speaker 1: try to kill that intercontinental missile coming our way or

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Speaker 1: swarm of them. You know, it's during that initial launch

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Speaker 1: period as they're actually going up into what i'd call space.

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Speaker 1: Then you have that other area you know that is

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Speaker 1: a high altitude trajectory, and then you have it as

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Speaker 1: it's coming down. That's obviously the least best choice. Um,

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Speaker 1: you know, you don't want to do that when when

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Speaker 1: it's you know, crossed into the United States. There are

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Speaker 1: systems down out there. I'm not going to get into

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Speaker 1: them that have a variety of different ways to do

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Speaker 1: just what I've talked about about that general. Thank you

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Speaker 1: so much for making a smarter I appreciate you. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: thanks for having me on the show. I really appreciate it.

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Speaker 1: All right, that's us. What about Russia? What can they do?

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Speaker 1: We'll find out next. Can you reassure the world, that

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Speaker 1: Russia would not fire a nuclear weapon in anger, would

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Speaker 1: not fire a first strike. We don't have insane people,

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Speaker 1: we have our military doctrine. Well that's not a no.

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Speaker 1: Joining me. Now, someone who would know Brent Sadler. He's

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Speaker 1: a Navy veteran, a nuclear engineer, and the senior Fellow

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Speaker 1: for Naval Warfare Advanced Technology at the Heritage Foundation, So

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Speaker 1: basically he knows what he's talking about, all right, Brett?

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Speaker 1: Before we get to what they can do or what

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Speaker 1: they can't do, and what we can and can't do,

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Speaker 1: what's your opinion on what they would do? I mean,

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Speaker 1: it's easy to think of Vladimir Putin as something deranged maniac?

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Speaker 1: Is he? Well? No, I don't think Putin or any

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Speaker 1: of his close advisors are certainly not crazy. They're all

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Speaker 1: very calculating. It's just maybe how they go about their

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Speaker 1: calculus may seem very shocking to ours, and certainly the

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Speaker 1: value of human life is low on that calculus. That

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Speaker 1: being said, focusing in on their capabilities is a safe

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Speaker 1: place to go because capabilities beget options, and those options

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Speaker 1: are what people like Putin way, and the reactions to

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Speaker 1: those choices that they have before them and so you

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Speaker 1: can talk more at length about it, but there are

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Speaker 1: several that are quite stark and doesn't necessarily mean they

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Speaker 1: have it off the table of a nuclear weapons use. Okay, Brent,

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Speaker 1: the average person, there's just the average Joe go to work,

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Speaker 1: sport and a family. When he thinks about Russia and

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Speaker 1: nuclear weapons, he thinks about the hunt for Red October

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Speaker 1: or something like that. That it's always some submarine can

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Speaker 1: hit any city in the world with the press of

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Speaker 1: a button. If someone turns that key, it's on. But

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Speaker 1: what's the reality. It's twenty twenty two. What is Russia's

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Speaker 1: capability to deploy nuclear weapons? And what kind of nuclear

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Speaker 1: weapons do they have? So they have an array so

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Speaker 1: from very small to call them tactical field weapons. And

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Speaker 1: these are where the highest danger of miscalculation, like the

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Speaker 1: pictures like you're seeing right now, shooting something out of

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Speaker 1: an artillery piece or even a nuclear mortar round. So

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Speaker 1: these are's low yield tactical use. The authority of that

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Speaker 1: can be delegated down very low to feel great officers.

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Speaker 1: Even this was a fear and a very real one

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Speaker 1: we found out later in the Cuban missile crisis. To

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Speaker 1: medium and longer range ballistic missiles. Think of like what

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Speaker 1: the Iranians and North Koreans have, and there's scuds they

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Speaker 1: could launch against Western Europe. Then of course the city killers,

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Speaker 1: these the thermonuclear bombs that have intercontinental bllistic missiles to

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Speaker 1: carry them, deployed on rockets as well as on submarines,

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Speaker 1: and of course their long range strategic bombers which they

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Speaker 1: could fly and cruise cruise missiles tip with the nuclear

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Speaker 1: weapon on the end of them. It won't come necessarily

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Speaker 1: if it goes nuclear won't start that way. Most likely

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Speaker 1: it might be a strategic loss in Ukraine that triggers

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Speaker 1: a tactical nuclear use which then rapidly escalates. Okay, how's

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Speaker 1: that play that out? Continue with that in your mind, please,

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Speaker 1: what are you talking about a loss in Ukraine tact

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Speaker 1: What do you mean? So? I mean, it's interesting that

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Speaker 1: Lavrov says they don't have crazy people, but we follow

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Speaker 1: the doctrine. With the doctrine quite frankly, to a Western mind,

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Speaker 1: is crazy. And what I mean by that is if

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Speaker 1: the battle that they chose to wage in Ukraine starts

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Speaker 1: to go poorly and it looks like the Russian people

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Speaker 1: and the Russian military don't have the stomach for it,

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Speaker 1: and they start to turn on the regime. This particularly

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00:26:01,680 --> 00:26:04,840
Speaker 1: then that he'll start to calculate that as a strategic loss,

428
00:26:05,480 --> 00:26:09,840
Speaker 1: and that strategic loss equates to a strategic weapons used

429
00:26:09,840 --> 00:26:13,120
Speaker 1: that might flip the table on him from a tactical defeat.

430
00:26:13,400 --> 00:26:15,720
Speaker 1: So if he's losing in Ukraine as military is getting

431
00:26:15,720 --> 00:26:18,400
Speaker 1: pushed back and they're losing them arale, he may resort

432
00:26:18,440 --> 00:26:22,240
Speaker 1: to use of a tactical nuke that basically shock as

433
00:26:22,280 --> 00:26:25,919
Speaker 1: well as to overwhelm the resistance that's in Ukraine, and

434
00:26:25,960 --> 00:26:28,359
Speaker 1: then he can basically pull out a victory at the last.

435
00:26:28,840 --> 00:26:33,639
Speaker 1: Problem with that thinking is yeah, go ahead, no, no, no, okay,

436
00:26:33,720 --> 00:26:36,919
Speaker 1: it's just sorry to interrupt it. Yeah again, the average

437
00:26:36,960 --> 00:26:40,159
Speaker 1: citizen thinks that we have satellites in the sky with

438
00:26:40,240 --> 00:26:42,439
Speaker 1: a tracker on every nuclear weapon out there, and we

439
00:26:42,480 --> 00:26:45,680
Speaker 1: know where they all are. What's the case with a

440
00:26:45,760 --> 00:26:48,760
Speaker 1: tactical nuclear weapon? How tactical are we talking about here?

441
00:26:48,800 --> 00:26:51,720
Speaker 1: We talking a backpack a truck? What's it look like?

442
00:26:51,840 --> 00:26:54,679
Speaker 1: And do we know where they are? Well, certainly wouldn't

443
00:26:54,720 --> 00:26:56,360
Speaker 1: be a backpack. In the height of the Cold War,

444
00:26:56,400 --> 00:26:59,439
Speaker 1: they had these things called suitcase bombs which were more

445
00:26:59,520 --> 00:27:03,040
Speaker 1: than just a suitcase, and the reality being I guess

446
00:27:03,040 --> 00:27:04,960
Speaker 1: your real question is can we track them? Do we

447
00:27:05,040 --> 00:27:06,720
Speaker 1: know where they are on a minute to minute or

448
00:27:06,800 --> 00:27:09,480
Speaker 1: hour to our basis? And the answer sadly is no.

449
00:27:10,240 --> 00:27:12,800
Speaker 1: So we don't know where all those are. And once

450
00:27:12,840 --> 00:27:16,840
Speaker 1: they get into a combat zone or deployed near acombat zone,

451
00:27:16,880 --> 00:27:23,359
Speaker 1: it's even harder to track. Okay, Now, where would he

452
00:27:23,480 --> 00:27:26,000
Speaker 1: deploy one that would change things? Right? I guess that's

453
00:27:26,000 --> 00:27:28,760
Speaker 1: always a question I've wondered if Yeah, okay, I understand

454
00:27:28,840 --> 00:27:31,720
Speaker 1: you can duc a city. I get that, but how

455
00:27:31,800 --> 00:27:34,880
Speaker 1: does deploying one, especially one of the smaller tactical ones,

456
00:27:34,920 --> 00:27:37,480
Speaker 1: how does it change the equation for someone like Pootin

457
00:27:37,520 --> 00:27:41,879
Speaker 1: at all? Yes, so if he thinks that the resistance

458
00:27:41,960 --> 00:27:44,679
Speaker 1: in Key, for example, the capital, and he knows that

459
00:27:44,760 --> 00:27:47,440
Speaker 1: the prisons of the Lensky is there, but he can't

460
00:27:47,480 --> 00:27:51,000
Speaker 1: break through the forces around Kevin, it starts to turn

461
00:27:51,040 --> 00:27:54,520
Speaker 1: into a strategic loss for him. Maybe deploying a tactical nuke.

462
00:27:54,560 --> 00:27:58,080
Speaker 1: And again this is just my you know, is speculation

463
00:27:58,680 --> 00:28:03,800
Speaker 1: that if the Ukrainians are are focused in on certain

464
00:28:03,880 --> 00:28:07,679
Speaker 1: avenues of attack or approaches, makes a tactical nuke a

465
00:28:07,720 --> 00:28:11,520
Speaker 1: possible military use. You basically take out a whole division

466
00:28:12,040 --> 00:28:15,400
Speaker 1: or a large dug in forces on the approaches to Kiev,

467
00:28:15,920 --> 00:28:19,000
Speaker 1: and that actually might open up some military options to

468
00:28:19,080 --> 00:28:22,040
Speaker 1: them they didn't have before. Again, they're thinking about these

469
00:28:22,080 --> 00:28:26,240
Speaker 1: tactical nuclear weapons as just like another artillery piece, not

470
00:28:26,520 --> 00:28:30,919
Speaker 1: a nuclear weapon, like we in the West with you. Okay,

471
00:28:31,080 --> 00:28:35,320
Speaker 1: Now let's go beyond the tactical one. Can Vladimir putin

472
00:28:36,080 --> 00:28:38,200
Speaker 1: New York City? And can we stop it if he

473
00:28:38,280 --> 00:28:44,560
Speaker 1: wants to? So the answer to that it depends. If

474
00:28:44,560 --> 00:28:48,400
Speaker 1: it's a single launch, maybe it can be targeted and

475
00:28:48,440 --> 00:28:52,320
Speaker 1: defended against. Our missile defense systems have been developed and

476
00:28:52,360 --> 00:28:56,320
Speaker 1: designed in the censor's place, really against a rogue regime

477
00:28:56,360 --> 00:29:01,160
Speaker 1: like North Korea or Iran, not a massive attack from

478
00:29:01,240 --> 00:29:05,480
Speaker 1: China or Russia. So for an intercontenta ballistic missile launch,

479
00:29:05,680 --> 00:29:07,800
Speaker 1: we would probably have some warning about it from the

480
00:29:07,880 --> 00:29:11,760
Speaker 1: censors from satellite that you mentioned earlier. But the ability

481
00:29:11,800 --> 00:29:15,320
Speaker 1: to take it out, that's that's a big question mark.

482
00:29:15,520 --> 00:29:20,640
Speaker 1: It's not a good answer for that one, satelling. Okay, Ukraine.

483
00:29:20,920 --> 00:29:24,560
Speaker 1: Ukraine had nuclear weapons, didn't they what happened to them?

484
00:29:26,400 --> 00:29:28,320
Speaker 1: So this is part of the genesis of where we

485
00:29:28,360 --> 00:29:33,160
Speaker 1: are today. So ninety four ninety five timeframe, Ukraine inherits,

486
00:29:33,760 --> 00:29:36,640
Speaker 1: you know, I think it's well over a thousand warheads,

487
00:29:37,160 --> 00:29:40,840
Speaker 1: and the West and the Russian Republic came to a

488
00:29:40,960 --> 00:29:45,280
Speaker 1: deal that we would all acknowledge and honor the boundaries

489
00:29:45,280 --> 00:29:48,239
Speaker 1: of Ukraine as they existed then, which included Crimea and

490
00:29:48,280 --> 00:29:52,320
Speaker 1: of course all of the dome Bats. In return, Ukraine

491
00:29:52,320 --> 00:29:55,120
Speaker 1: would give up all its nuclear weapons back to the Russians,

492
00:29:55,200 --> 00:29:58,440
Speaker 1: the successors state to the Soviet Union. In return, the

493
00:29:58,520 --> 00:30:00,959
Speaker 1: United States had one less nucle ar power that had

494
00:30:01,000 --> 00:30:04,000
Speaker 1: to worry about in his calculation. The problem is the

495
00:30:04,080 --> 00:30:08,080
Speaker 1: Russian people, more specifically Putin himself never really wanted to

496
00:30:08,120 --> 00:30:12,280
Speaker 1: acknowledge the Dombas or Crimea as part of Ukraine. And

497
00:30:12,320 --> 00:30:15,440
Speaker 1: there's a deep and interesting history that goes back, specifically

498
00:30:15,440 --> 00:30:19,840
Speaker 1: on nineteen fifty four when Kruscheff so al will say,

499
00:30:19,840 --> 00:30:22,760
Speaker 1: on a drunken night of binge drinking, offered to give

500
00:30:22,840 --> 00:30:26,840
Speaker 1: and gave the Dombas and Crimea to the Soviet Republic

501
00:30:26,920 --> 00:30:30,200
Speaker 1: of Ukraine. So the borders that we see today actually

502
00:30:30,280 --> 00:30:33,959
Speaker 1: date back to nineteen fifty four that evening, and for

503
00:30:34,000 --> 00:30:36,080
Speaker 1: a short while after the fall of the Soviet Union,

504
00:30:36,120 --> 00:30:40,320
Speaker 1: Crimea even was its own independent republic, separate from Ukraine.

505
00:30:40,640 --> 00:30:42,520
Speaker 1: But all part of the deal to get rid of

506
00:30:42,520 --> 00:30:46,120
Speaker 1: the nuclear weapons was an acknowledgement that all parties would

507
00:30:46,120 --> 00:30:50,000
Speaker 1: honor the boundaries that are Ukraine today. Sadly, the Russians

508
00:30:50,000 --> 00:30:52,560
Speaker 1: never really despite the signing a piece of paper, never

509
00:30:52,600 --> 00:30:55,640
Speaker 1: really honored it. Hold on, Brett, We're not just going

510
00:30:55,720 --> 00:30:58,720
Speaker 1: to skip over this part. Khrushchev got blasted and handed

511
00:30:58,720 --> 00:31:00,840
Speaker 1: away part of his own country. What please give me

512
00:31:00,880 --> 00:31:05,000
Speaker 1: the story? So the insight, so the the official story

513
00:31:05,120 --> 00:31:09,760
Speaker 1: is that because of the sacrifice the Ukrainian people during

514
00:31:10,080 --> 00:31:12,520
Speaker 1: the Great Patriotic War what we call World War Two,

515
00:31:12,920 --> 00:31:16,880
Speaker 1: that they were given the Dome Bass, the Lohanskin Donuts

516
00:31:17,160 --> 00:31:20,360
Speaker 1: regions as well as Crimea, and it was it wasn't

517
00:31:20,360 --> 00:31:23,120
Speaker 1: really something that anyone really cared or paid much attention

518
00:31:23,120 --> 00:31:26,240
Speaker 1: to in the Soviet Union because they were all Soviet citizens.

519
00:31:27,160 --> 00:31:30,520
Speaker 1: Fast forward and again the story at the story that's

520
00:31:30,520 --> 00:31:33,800
Speaker 1: come out later is that Kruschev was on a night

521
00:31:33,800 --> 00:31:37,520
Speaker 1: of drinking and having you know, Ukrainian background, and decided

522
00:31:37,560 --> 00:31:40,080
Speaker 1: that he would give in and give those those areas

523
00:31:40,080 --> 00:31:43,480
Speaker 1: over to the Ukrainian people, and that eventually became formalized.

524
00:31:44,480 --> 00:31:47,160
Speaker 1: So that's the the insight stories. He was a long

525
00:31:47,240 --> 00:31:51,680
Speaker 1: night of drinking. But oh those Russians, Brent, thank you

526
00:31:51,720 --> 00:31:55,160
Speaker 1: so much for that. Appreciate you, all right, thank you

527
00:31:55,200 --> 00:32:00,200
Speaker 1: for having me on joining us. Next, Stephen Yates? What

528
00:32:00,280 --> 00:32:15,880
Speaker 1: can China do? Hang on? Well, I don't know if

529
00:32:15,880 --> 00:32:20,880
Speaker 1: you've heard, China's pretty big, big economy, a lot of people,

530
00:32:20,920 --> 00:32:25,280
Speaker 1: big military and nuclear weapons as well. What do they have?

531
00:32:25,360 --> 00:32:27,320
Speaker 1: What don't they have? I don't know. I'm not smart enough.

532
00:32:27,320 --> 00:32:29,920
Speaker 1: But Stephen Yates is Stephen Yates joins us now. He's

533
00:32:29,960 --> 00:32:33,080
Speaker 1: the chair of the China Policy Initiative at the America

534
00:32:33,200 --> 00:32:37,120
Speaker 1: First Policy Institute. All right, Stephen, we're all learning a

535
00:32:37,120 --> 00:32:40,440
Speaker 1: lot of things about nuclear and nuclear capabilities because I'm

536
00:32:40,440 --> 00:32:42,560
Speaker 1: an idiot and I don't know anything about it. Tell

537
00:32:42,600 --> 00:32:45,080
Speaker 1: me it's China overall. Before you get specifics. We are

538
00:32:45,080 --> 00:32:48,120
Speaker 1: going to get specifics, but overall, it's China. This huge

539
00:32:48,240 --> 00:32:52,280
Speaker 1: nuclear power. Are they kind of okay, what's China like? No,

540
00:32:52,400 --> 00:32:56,800
Speaker 1: it's China has a substantial nuclear power. They had for decades,

541
00:32:57,480 --> 00:33:00,480
Speaker 1: way back during the Cold War, maintained what they called

542
00:33:00,480 --> 00:33:04,880
Speaker 1: a minimal nuclear deterrent. So they definitely had achieved nuclear

543
00:33:04,920 --> 00:33:08,360
Speaker 1: weapons capabilities, and they had the ability to deliver some

544
00:33:09,280 --> 00:33:12,960
Speaker 1: if they needed to retaliate was the rationality time. But

545
00:33:13,080 --> 00:33:18,080
Speaker 1: in recent decades they have deliberately accelerated that program and

546
00:33:18,360 --> 00:33:23,360
Speaker 1: they have minimum hundreds, if not thousands, of deliverable nuclear

547
00:33:23,400 --> 00:33:28,280
Speaker 1: weapons at this point. Okay, well that doesn't sound good, Steven.

548
00:33:28,320 --> 00:33:31,800
Speaker 1: All right. First of all, let's rewind a little bit China.

549
00:33:31,920 --> 00:33:34,840
Speaker 1: I mean, everyone knows Mao took over forty nine obviously

550
00:33:34,840 --> 00:33:37,520
Speaker 1: because he's a communist scumbag, had a bunch of ecnot

551
00:33:37,600 --> 00:33:39,800
Speaker 1: problems and whatnot. How did China end up with a

552
00:33:39,840 --> 00:33:42,960
Speaker 1: nuclear weapon at all? Well, it is one of the

553
00:33:43,000 --> 00:33:45,000
Speaker 1: great mysteries of the world how some of the most

554
00:33:45,000 --> 00:33:48,560
Speaker 1: decrepit regimes seemed to find a way to be able

555
00:33:48,600 --> 00:33:50,640
Speaker 1: to develop the world's worst weapons. I mean, after all,

556
00:33:50,680 --> 00:33:53,560
Speaker 1: the North Koreans have nuclear weapons capability at this point.

557
00:33:54,280 --> 00:33:58,280
Speaker 1: Pakistan got to this level of technology also, probably in

558
00:33:58,320 --> 00:34:01,800
Speaker 1: both cases with the help of the Chinese. And so

559
00:34:01,840 --> 00:34:05,160
Speaker 1: it turns out it isn't in twenty twenty two high

560
00:34:05,280 --> 00:34:08,160
Speaker 1: tech to be able to develop a weapons of mass destruction.

561
00:34:08,280 --> 00:34:12,560
Speaker 1: It was back in the thirties and forties. Okay, Stephen,

562
00:34:12,600 --> 00:34:14,480
Speaker 1: can you explain? And I know this is dumb and

563
00:34:14,600 --> 00:34:16,719
Speaker 1: way below your skis, but I'm dumb and I need

564
00:34:16,760 --> 00:34:19,000
Speaker 1: someone to explain it to me. How does one go

565
00:34:19,160 --> 00:34:23,000
Speaker 1: from nuclear energy to a nuclear weapon? I know that's

566
00:34:23,000 --> 00:34:24,959
Speaker 1: been a big problem with Iran for a long time.

567
00:34:25,040 --> 00:34:27,040
Speaker 1: They want, hey, we just want the power from it,

568
00:34:27,080 --> 00:34:28,719
Speaker 1: and then it looks like they're trying to make a

569
00:34:28,760 --> 00:34:31,040
Speaker 1: weapon from it. Can't you just make a weapon a

570
00:34:31,160 --> 00:34:35,120
Speaker 1: weapon from the reactor? Thinking yeah, well, I'm also not

571
00:34:35,200 --> 00:34:39,759
Speaker 1: a nuclear engineer, and I don't, as Homeland Security should know,

572
00:34:39,840 --> 00:34:42,480
Speaker 1: I don't make these things at home in my spare time,

573
00:34:43,600 --> 00:34:47,920
Speaker 1: but it would be cool if I could. Yeah, But

574
00:34:48,400 --> 00:34:51,840
Speaker 1: I think that basically the science of it is that

575
00:34:51,960 --> 00:34:55,040
Speaker 1: you end up with thistle material as a product of

576
00:34:55,560 --> 00:34:59,560
Speaker 1: generation of nuclear energy, and that can be further enriched

577
00:35:00,440 --> 00:35:05,040
Speaker 1: through certain processes. When people start talking about centrifuges, there's

578
00:35:05,080 --> 00:35:07,560
Speaker 1: a time in the Iran nuclear deals when people are

579
00:35:07,600 --> 00:35:10,360
Speaker 1: talking about, well, they have X number of centrifuges that

580
00:35:10,480 --> 00:35:14,399
Speaker 1: could spin at these speeds, and that takes the uranium

581
00:35:14,800 --> 00:35:18,240
Speaker 1: from this level to that level. And I'm just speaking

582
00:35:18,239 --> 00:35:20,719
Speaker 1: at a level that I understand that most other people

583
00:35:20,719 --> 00:35:24,480
Speaker 1: can understand that they're basically taking the byproduct of nuclear

584
00:35:24,600 --> 00:35:28,080
Speaker 1: energy development, enriching it and changing it in a way

585
00:35:28,120 --> 00:35:30,880
Speaker 1: that allows it to be weaponized to generate a wepon

586
00:35:30,920 --> 00:35:33,680
Speaker 1: and mass destruction. But there's two parts of this. One

587
00:35:33,880 --> 00:35:39,360
Speaker 1: is making the actual explosion. The other is developing something

588
00:35:39,440 --> 00:35:42,960
Speaker 1: that can deliver that weapon in the right time or place,

589
00:35:43,040 --> 00:35:47,920
Speaker 1: whether it's missile, torpedo by sea, whether something that's dropped

590
00:35:47,920 --> 00:35:50,120
Speaker 1: from a plane like was done in World War Two,

591
00:35:50,800 --> 00:35:54,720
Speaker 1: or the unfortunate variance of these that could be dirty

592
00:35:54,760 --> 00:35:58,200
Speaker 1: bombs that are just laid into a populous area and

593
00:35:58,239 --> 00:36:02,399
Speaker 1: go boom because of terror makes it happen, or as

594
00:36:02,440 --> 00:36:05,200
Speaker 1: they now refer to as tactical nuclear weapons, so you

595
00:36:05,200 --> 00:36:08,200
Speaker 1: don't end up with the mushroom cloud effect. You end

596
00:36:08,280 --> 00:36:12,080
Speaker 1: up with a terrible nuclear explosion, but in a more

597
00:36:12,120 --> 00:36:16,080
Speaker 1: confined space. So those that's the kind of devil's menu

598
00:36:16,239 --> 00:36:20,960
Speaker 1: going to a Chinese restaurant and ordering up your nuclear weapons.

599
00:36:22,520 --> 00:36:24,920
Speaker 1: All right, Steve, you just brought up a dirty bomb,

600
00:36:24,920 --> 00:36:26,520
Speaker 1: and people hear that term of a lot. They're worried

601
00:36:26,520 --> 00:36:30,480
Speaker 1: about a dirty bomb. A dirty bomb? What's that mean? Well,

602
00:36:30,719 --> 00:36:34,000
Speaker 1: usually what it means is something that is not kind

603
00:36:34,040 --> 00:36:40,759
Speaker 1: of the fully engineered military quality kind of device where

604
00:36:40,840 --> 00:36:43,080
Speaker 1: you have a lot of science and engineering that goes

605
00:36:43,120 --> 00:36:45,640
Speaker 1: into it, so you have a high degree of reliability

606
00:36:45,880 --> 00:36:49,080
Speaker 1: that you can keep it safe when you are storing it.

607
00:36:49,200 --> 00:36:52,040
Speaker 1: You presumably don't want to blow yourself up and to

608
00:36:52,120 --> 00:36:54,840
Speaker 1: be able to deliver it reliably to a target, and

609
00:36:54,880 --> 00:36:59,120
Speaker 1: that's what professional militaries and responsible governments would do. A

610
00:36:59,160 --> 00:37:03,640
Speaker 1: dirty bomb is something that could deliver a chemical, biological,

611
00:37:03,880 --> 00:37:08,600
Speaker 1: or even maybe not a fully formed nuclear device that

612
00:37:08,880 --> 00:37:12,640
Speaker 1: you know is that being damaging is good enough, and

613
00:37:12,719 --> 00:37:14,680
Speaker 1: so it's not something that's put on the head of

614
00:37:14,680 --> 00:37:18,879
Speaker 1: a multimillion dollar tried and missile, or it's something that

615
00:37:18,960 --> 00:37:25,000
Speaker 1: basically just goes boom in a community. Stephen, you brought

616
00:37:25,080 --> 00:37:27,920
Speaker 1: up the delivery system and then we're all learning a

617
00:37:27,920 --> 00:37:30,440
Speaker 1: lot about that in torpedoes and like you said, someone

618
00:37:30,680 --> 00:37:33,880
Speaker 1: you know has one in a backpack basically. Or I

619
00:37:34,000 --> 00:37:38,560
Speaker 1: remember a headline recently about China testing a hypersonic missile,

620
00:37:38,960 --> 00:37:41,160
Speaker 1: and I can't help but put two and two together

621
00:37:41,239 --> 00:37:45,640
Speaker 1: and think nuclear China hypersonic missile. That doesn't sound good?

622
00:37:45,760 --> 00:37:48,240
Speaker 1: Am I overthinking this? Can they put a nuclear warhead

623
00:37:48,280 --> 00:37:51,640
Speaker 1: on that bad boy. Well, I think that the science

624
00:37:51,719 --> 00:37:55,839
Speaker 1: is very very clear that they could, and China has

625
00:37:55,920 --> 00:38:00,600
Speaker 1: made enormous strides in its missile capabilities, and it's one

626
00:38:00,600 --> 00:38:03,680
Speaker 1: of the harder things to defend against. We have reached

627
00:38:03,760 --> 00:38:06,520
Speaker 1: the sort of miracle stage of being able to do

628
00:38:06,680 --> 00:38:09,400
Speaker 1: what we're told for a generation was impossible to have

629
00:38:09,800 --> 00:38:13,000
Speaker 1: some degree of missile defense. But what that did was

630
00:38:13,080 --> 00:38:15,680
Speaker 1: provoke the Chinese and others who could afford to do it.

631
00:38:15,960 --> 00:38:18,960
Speaker 1: And they have enough prisoner engineers that they put into

632
00:38:18,960 --> 00:38:23,920
Speaker 1: their system to keep churning and churning. More capable missiles

633
00:38:24,040 --> 00:38:27,160
Speaker 1: able to go farther with a greater degree of accuracy

634
00:38:27,480 --> 00:38:31,560
Speaker 1: and are harder to detect. So, yes, being hypersonic is

635
00:38:31,600 --> 00:38:34,200
Speaker 1: a big deal. And why would you want to be

636
00:38:34,239 --> 00:38:36,240
Speaker 1: able to do that? But to be able to deliver

637
00:38:36,360 --> 00:38:39,520
Speaker 1: this And the only real debate is is for deterrence

638
00:38:39,920 --> 00:38:42,680
Speaker 1: to scare people off so that you have to compromise

639
00:38:42,719 --> 00:38:45,799
Speaker 1: in advance with their wishes, or because you actually aim

640
00:38:45,880 --> 00:38:49,200
Speaker 1: to deliver this kind of death to a target sometime

641
00:38:49,239 --> 00:38:52,719
Speaker 1: in the future. Okay, Stephen, can you and you may

642
00:38:52,719 --> 00:38:55,040
Speaker 1: not know that's fine, but can you help me understand

643
00:38:55,040 --> 00:38:57,560
Speaker 1: all right, China, they have a missile, whether it's hypersonic

644
00:38:57,640 --> 00:38:59,600
Speaker 1: or not, and they slap the big old fat nuclear

645
00:38:59,640 --> 00:39:02,160
Speaker 1: war to the tip of it. What do they have

646
00:39:02,400 --> 00:39:05,120
Speaker 1: the ability to do? Like right now, if trying to

647
00:39:05,160 --> 00:39:07,560
Speaker 1: woke up this morning, Shujan Ping wakes up and he's

648
00:39:07,560 --> 00:39:10,080
Speaker 1: got murder on his mind, can he walk down and

649
00:39:10,160 --> 00:39:12,680
Speaker 1: press a button and blow up Houston in twenty minutes?

650
00:39:12,719 --> 00:39:15,400
Speaker 1: That's where I'm sitting right now. What What do the

651
00:39:15,400 --> 00:39:17,960
Speaker 1: capabilities look like? What can they target? Can they land

652
00:39:18,000 --> 00:39:19,759
Speaker 1: one of these things in a tomato can from a

653
00:39:19,800 --> 00:39:23,560
Speaker 1: thousand miles away? What are the capabilities? Well, first, just

654
00:39:23,640 --> 00:39:25,480
Speaker 1: to help you sleep at night, they don't have to

655
00:39:25,520 --> 00:39:28,719
Speaker 1: do that. The Port of Houston has a ton of

656
00:39:28,800 --> 00:39:32,680
Speaker 1: container traffic that comes and goes through that area. And

657
00:39:32,760 --> 00:39:36,680
Speaker 1: the first best way for low tech bad guys to

658
00:39:36,800 --> 00:39:39,960
Speaker 1: be able to do horrible things is to get things

659
00:39:40,000 --> 00:39:43,640
Speaker 1: in by more conventional means than having to send it

660
00:39:43,719 --> 00:39:46,480
Speaker 1: up to space or send it at crazy fast speed

661
00:39:46,480 --> 00:39:50,040
Speaker 1: to defeat our detection. So that you know, when people

662
00:39:50,080 --> 00:39:54,000
Speaker 1: talk about dirty bombs or even planned explosions, this is

663
00:39:54,200 --> 00:39:58,000
Speaker 1: the number one threat that we face, and we've we've

664
00:39:58,040 --> 00:40:01,120
Speaker 1: been dealing with this for some time. But I don't

665
00:40:01,120 --> 00:40:06,040
Speaker 1: think the average American has any concept whatsoever of the

666
00:40:06,120 --> 00:40:09,319
Speaker 1: amount of container traffic that comes in and out of

667
00:40:09,320 --> 00:40:12,160
Speaker 1: the United States, sits in our ports, and then makes

668
00:40:12,200 --> 00:40:15,000
Speaker 1: its way through our country. That's the number one threat

669
00:40:15,040 --> 00:40:17,920
Speaker 1: in my view. Missiles come second to that. But they

670
00:40:17,920 --> 00:40:20,120
Speaker 1: can also bring a submarine all the way up near

671
00:40:20,200 --> 00:40:23,520
Speaker 1: our shores and something goes up and most of our

672
00:40:23,560 --> 00:40:26,080
Speaker 1: missile defense systems are not going to catch it in

673
00:40:26,120 --> 00:40:29,319
Speaker 1: that immediate launch phase. We needed to sort of catch flight,

674
00:40:29,360 --> 00:40:31,239
Speaker 1: and that's where we can meet it and try to

675
00:40:31,280 --> 00:40:34,399
Speaker 1: take a bullet out with a bullet. And so they

676
00:40:34,440 --> 00:40:37,600
Speaker 1: have nuclear capable submarines that can be more quiet than

677
00:40:37,640 --> 00:40:41,400
Speaker 1: diesel submarines, go greater distances. They could come up within

678
00:40:41,560 --> 00:40:46,640
Speaker 1: a short distance of our shores, possibly undetected, and launch

679
00:40:46,719 --> 00:40:51,239
Speaker 1: from there if we just wanted to be scared even more. Okay,

680
00:40:51,320 --> 00:40:54,160
Speaker 1: well that was a little dark, but thank you for that.

681
00:40:54,200 --> 00:40:55,560
Speaker 1: And by the way, I do want to echo what

682
00:40:55,600 --> 00:40:58,160
Speaker 1: Stephen just said. I happen to live in a port area.

683
00:40:58,200 --> 00:41:01,160
Speaker 1: I've been to several different ports. If you haven't go

684
00:41:01,280 --> 00:41:03,880
Speaker 1: down to one, if not, just to see how huge

685
00:41:04,000 --> 00:41:07,320
Speaker 1: the operation is, of how giant these ships are loading

686
00:41:07,320 --> 00:41:09,920
Speaker 1: and offloading, and how easy it really would be to

687
00:41:09,960 --> 00:41:11,680
Speaker 1: get something in there. But you did bring one thing

688
00:41:11,760 --> 00:41:14,359
Speaker 1: up at last question for you, Stephen. They could get

689
00:41:14,400 --> 00:41:18,080
Speaker 1: a submarine up here. Now, history buffs will know you

690
00:41:18,120 --> 00:41:21,080
Speaker 1: can see Nazi submarines blowing things up off off to

691
00:41:21,120 --> 00:41:23,719
Speaker 1: our Atlantic coast in World War Two. But I think

692
00:41:23,880 --> 00:41:27,520
Speaker 1: the average American probably thinks, well, no, the Navy has

693
00:41:27,640 --> 00:41:30,640
Speaker 1: radar and stuff and they could never get here. Could

694
00:41:30,640 --> 00:41:34,480
Speaker 1: they get here? Well, we do have excellent technology. We

695
00:41:34,520 --> 00:41:38,280
Speaker 1: should be investing more in what our naval capabilities are

696
00:41:39,000 --> 00:41:41,080
Speaker 1: all of these kinds of things, because I think, frankly

697
00:41:41,120 --> 00:41:46,000
Speaker 1: a lot of our establishment policy makers have undervalued the

698
00:41:46,160 --> 00:41:48,520
Speaker 1: will and the nature of the threats we face. And

699
00:41:48,520 --> 00:41:51,399
Speaker 1: I think Putin is just the latest wake up call

700
00:41:51,480 --> 00:41:55,160
Speaker 1: in that China is no less. But there are all

701
00:41:55,280 --> 00:41:57,759
Speaker 1: kinds of stealth technologies that we were ahead of the

702
00:41:57,840 --> 00:42:02,960
Speaker 1: curve on Chinese engineers of their own, but also clever

703
00:42:03,080 --> 00:42:06,600
Speaker 1: ones that steal technology. Bike I think a little bit

704
00:42:06,680 --> 00:42:10,080
Speaker 1: loosey goosey controls on our part or our allies parts.

705
00:42:10,400 --> 00:42:15,480
Speaker 1: China's submarine capabilities and stealth capabilities have improved a significant degree.

706
00:42:15,520 --> 00:42:17,800
Speaker 1: I think they can get close enough for a missile

707
00:42:17,840 --> 00:42:21,520
Speaker 1: to be a real problem for US. Steve and Yates,

708
00:42:21,560 --> 00:42:23,400
Speaker 1: that was beyond outstanding. I wish I could have you

709
00:42:23,400 --> 00:42:25,000
Speaker 1: for another hour, but I know you're a busy man.

710
00:42:25,040 --> 00:42:30,239
Speaker 1: Thank you so much, Thank you, Jesse my pleasure. I

711
00:42:30,360 --> 00:42:32,160
Speaker 1: was dying to my I'm so much smarter now. I'm

712
00:42:32,160 --> 00:42:33,920
Speaker 1: gonna act like I came up with all that myself.

713
00:42:34,360 --> 00:42:50,920
Speaker 1: All right, we have final thoughts next. I hope we

714
00:42:50,960 --> 00:42:53,160
Speaker 1: don't get blown up. But if I can make you

715
00:42:53,200 --> 00:42:55,719
Speaker 1: feel better about something as we wrap up the show here,

716
00:42:57,320 --> 00:43:00,640
Speaker 1: if we die in a nuclear bomb one, that's kind

717
00:43:00,640 --> 00:43:03,000
Speaker 1: of a cool way to die too. It's got to

718
00:43:03,000 --> 00:43:05,960
Speaker 1: be pretty fast, right, I mean, go into a million

719
00:43:05,960 --> 00:43:11,000
Speaker 1: degrees in an instant. Doesn't sound that bad. Now, Look, pray, hope.

720
00:43:11,520 --> 00:43:13,839
Speaker 1: I think we'll be all right at least, Look, at

721
00:43:13,920 --> 00:43:15,880
Speaker 1: least we're in one of the countries that has them

722
00:43:15,880 --> 00:43:20,040
Speaker 1: incentivizing other people. Not all right, we'll do it again,