WEBVTT - Credit Suisse, Financial Instability, the ECB, and Rate Hikes

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<v Speaker 1>Welcome to the Bloomberg Markets Podcast. I'm Paul Sweeney, alongside

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<v Speaker 1>my co host Matt Miller. Every business day, we bring

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<v Speaker 1>you interviews from CEOs, market pros, and Bloomberg experts, along

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<v Speaker 1>with essential market moving news. Find the Bloomberg Markets Podcast

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<v Speaker 1>on Apple Podcasts or wherever you listen to podcasts, and

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<v Speaker 1>at Bloomberg dot com slash podcast. Let's talk markets here

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<v Speaker 1>and kind of where we go from here. What should

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<v Speaker 1>we expect maybe from this Federal Reserve next week after

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<v Speaker 1>we've had this move by the ECB. Bring in Jay Halfield.

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<v Speaker 1>He's the CEO, founder and portfolio manager at Infrastructure Capital Advisors.

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<v Speaker 1>And Jay, let's just start with Europe and the ECB.

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<v Speaker 1>I mean, they're still, like the US Federal Reserve, still

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<v Speaker 1>very much on this inflation fighting path, raising their benchmark

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<v Speaker 1>raak by fifty basis points where a lot of people said,

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<v Speaker 1>maybe pause, maybe just twenty five, but no, thanks Paul

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<v Speaker 1>for having me in again. You have to keep in

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<v Speaker 1>mind the European system is radically different in the US,

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<v Speaker 1>so they were way behind our FED full percentage point

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<v Speaker 1>bard our FED. And also their inflation is worse because

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<v Speaker 1>of their natural gas crisis. It's come down, but it's

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<v Speaker 1>still a huge problem. And then thirdly, all their banks

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<v Speaker 1>are essentially money center banks, like our money center banks

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<v Speaker 1>are killing it right now. They're getting all these deposits

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<v Speaker 1>in and keep in mind that that's free money right now.

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<v Speaker 1>So that's the real problem with our system is that

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<v Speaker 1>smaller banks are losing deposits, and that's every dollar that

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<v Speaker 1>goes out costs them roughly five percent, so paying fifty

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<v Speaker 1>base points or zero if it's a demand deposit, and

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<v Speaker 1>then you borrow from the Fed at libor plus spread,

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<v Speaker 1>and so their earnings are getting smashed as we speak.

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<v Speaker 1>And that's the core issue, and that's why we've been

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<v Speaker 1>calling for a rape cut to reduce that the inversion

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<v Speaker 1>in the Yelk curve. So when you compare that to

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<v Speaker 1>then what the Federal Reserve is doing the read through,

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<v Speaker 1>I think one of the takeaways from the ECB is

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<v Speaker 1>simply that they hiked regardless of the chaos for credit squeezes.

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<v Speaker 1>If credit squeeze is a bigger bank and a bigger

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<v Speaker 1>risk than say SPB as, which I think is the consensus,

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<v Speaker 1>then does that then insinuate the Federal Reserve is going

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<v Speaker 1>to stick to twenty five or fifty or whatever the

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<v Speaker 1>calls were pre SPB. Well, that's certainly possible because they

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<v Speaker 1>have shown zero ability to process real time data. So

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<v Speaker 1>and specifically I would point to oil, which is something

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<v Speaker 1>that we fast coming from Jay Hatfield broadcast. So the

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<v Speaker 1>two key indicators of inflation are housing in oil. Oil

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<v Speaker 1>has come down seventeen percent since the financial crisis started,

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<v Speaker 1>the bank runs started. And what I don't think the

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<v Speaker 1>FED appreciates, which is strange because they have research papers

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<v Speaker 1>that demonstrate this. There's a five percent bleed through of

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<v Speaker 1>energy prices the core. In fact, if you look in

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<v Speaker 1>the seventies and draw a line where the two gigantic

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<v Speaker 1>increases occurred, so two hundred and one fifty core went

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<v Speaker 1>up shot up within three or four months. So this

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<v Speaker 1>is not this research paper just proved it, you know,

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<v Speaker 1>through through econometric models, but you can see it in

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<v Speaker 1>the data. So now we have a significant deflation CPI

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<v Speaker 1>dash R as dropping at a two percent annual rate.

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<v Speaker 1>And now if you layer in this depreciation in oil,

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<v Speaker 1>we're headed for a pretty significant deflation. I mean, essentially

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<v Speaker 1>we're in deflation right now. It's just not going to

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<v Speaker 1>show up in the indices for a year because they're

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<v Speaker 1>lagged by a year. So, you know, do you think

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<v Speaker 1>this banking situation here in the US, this run on

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<v Speaker 1>these handful of banks will prompt the FED or should

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<v Speaker 1>it prompt the Fed the pause here? If not, maybe

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<v Speaker 1>being absolutely pause that's what they should. Well, they should

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<v Speaker 1>really cut right, but they are behind every Almost every

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<v Speaker 1>market participant would agree they're behind the curve. So the

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<v Speaker 1>best case is probably that they pause. They definitely should

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<v Speaker 1>not raise rates. That would be a disaster. And again

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<v Speaker 1>they're in a much different situation where they are already

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<v Speaker 1>raised much higher and we have a bigger inversion than

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<v Speaker 1>they do in Europe. Jay, one of the common piece

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<v Speaker 1>of commentary that came out of I believe Nomura off

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<v Speaker 1>the Fed FDIC move this past weekend was that's essentially

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<v Speaker 1>stimulative and you might then see the Fed end quantity

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<v Speaker 1>of tightening as a result. Do you view this kind

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<v Speaker 1>of banking fallout and what has the pre FED has

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<v Speaker 1>been prompted to do as stimulative. Well, in the long run,

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<v Speaker 1>it will be stimulative. And that's one reason that we

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<v Speaker 1>were saying before this banking crisis that the market would

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<v Speaker 1>be weak during this period and that we would be

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<v Speaker 1>in thirty eight hundred to forty two hundred. That's without

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<v Speaker 1>a banking crisis. So the fact that that range is

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<v Speaker 1>still working is remarkable. But there's a simple reason for it.

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<v Speaker 1>Long term rates are plummeting, and it's not actually true,

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<v Speaker 1>but everybody trades tech stocks like they have a longer duration.

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<v Speaker 1>They actually don't, but they still trade it that way.

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<v Speaker 1>They're all all publicly traded companies roughly have twenty two

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<v Speaker 1>year durations. But they're also a safe haven. They don't

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<v Speaker 1>borrow money, they have tremendous cash reserves, and they're very

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<v Speaker 1>powerful companies, so they're being used as safe haven there

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<v Speaker 1>dominate the market. So if you look, there's there's an

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<v Speaker 1>enormous rotation into large cap tech safety and out of

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<v Speaker 1>things that are related to financials, including rates, which is

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<v Speaker 1>irrational because rates are dropping. That's good for them. They're

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<v Speaker 1>well capitalized, so that's why the market's not crashing, But

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<v Speaker 1>underneath it, it really is crashing. Like if you look

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<v Speaker 1>at the regional banks for obviously, from your perspective, what

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<v Speaker 1>are we seeing with these regional banks, the svbs, the

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<v Speaker 1>maybe even the FRC today the signature bank are these

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<v Speaker 1>one offs or they have a systemic background to them.

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<v Speaker 1>Do you think, well, I think it's it's not fully

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<v Speaker 1>systemic because as I mentioned, money center banks and superregionals

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<v Speaker 1>are going to benefit, and that's the dominant portion of

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<v Speaker 1>the banking system. But and this is going to be

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<v Speaker 1>an issue for politicians hopefully, is that their banks are

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<v Speaker 1>getting crushed, so the community banks and the regular regional banks.

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<v Speaker 1>Because if you think about a CFO, so there's sort

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<v Speaker 1>of an implicit guarantee, but it's kind of like the

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<v Speaker 1>commercial sort of is not good enough. So if you're

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<v Speaker 1>CFO and a bank, I'll mention any names certain bank closes,

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<v Speaker 1>like my CFO call and say hey, should we move

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<v Speaker 1>all of our reserves? Because you have to make that

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<v Speaker 1>call because you're going to be fired if you said, oh, yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>I know, Silicon Valley Bank happened, but we thought that

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<v Speaker 1>the FTI C would step in and they decided not

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<v Speaker 1>to for political reasons. You're fired. So you have to

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<v Speaker 1>move your reserves, your checking spread it out, and you're

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<v Speaker 1>going to move it to super You probably don't want

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<v Speaker 1>fifty or five hundred accounts, so you're going to move

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<v Speaker 1>it to money center bank, where then you're not going

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<v Speaker 1>to get fired, Like if city groups goes bankrupt, you're

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<v Speaker 1>not gonna get fired. So there's going to be an

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<v Speaker 1>ongoing run on small banks. It's a huge problem because

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<v Speaker 1>they're going to become unprofit. They're going to get downgraded

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<v Speaker 1>by the rating age whis which that precipitated Silicon Valley's demise,

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<v Speaker 1>along with the worst equity offering ever executed in human history.

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<v Speaker 1>I don't I'm certain there's never been an equity offering

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<v Speaker 1>that resulted in bankruptcy, right, Like, you don't need to

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<v Speaker 1>do a post meeting to see if that was a

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<v Speaker 1>good That sounds like a Morgan Stanley bank are pitching

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<v Speaker 1>against think any on any particular firms. But that is

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<v Speaker 1>the worst equity offering in the history of human quick

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<v Speaker 1>question here, and forgive my ignorance on this. That doesn't

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<v Speaker 1>necessarily seem like a new concept here naturally that if

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<v Speaker 1>you want, the bigger banks are going to be safer

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<v Speaker 1>because essentially they're too big to fail, especially since oh wait,

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<v Speaker 1>why did a lot of folks invest in these smaller banks? Anyway?

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<v Speaker 1>Was the incentive there? Well? I think that there's also

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<v Speaker 1>too much heat being put on the san Francisco fed

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<v Speaker 1>because no stress test ever said you're going to lose

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<v Speaker 1>all of your deposits in twenty four hours. Yeah, there's

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<v Speaker 1>never been a situation like that. Even like during the

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<v Speaker 1>financial crisis, we did guarantee the deposits, so we created

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<v Speaker 1>a system. By accident, we're having this two hundred and

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<v Speaker 1>fifty limit, which is never hasn't been increased, and there

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<v Speaker 1>have been bills to increase. It really created a tinderbox

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<v Speaker 1>that exploded. It's just like mortgage the mortgage market. There's

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<v Speaker 1>always something that hasn't been addressed that a two rapid

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<v Speaker 1>fed tightening cycle will expose. And there's been like ten

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<v Speaker 1>of them, even in my career. You know, if you

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<v Speaker 1>think about junk bond crisis, SNL crisis, commercial real estate

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<v Speaker 1>crisis in the early eighties, there's always oh tech tech

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<v Speaker 1>crash after that tightening cycle. So this is just the

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<v Speaker 1>flaw that should have been fixed. Should have guaranteed all deposits.

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<v Speaker 1>It won't even cost so much because you get a

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<v Speaker 1>low you can have a lower rate on more deposits.

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<v Speaker 1>So you know, would it would hurt the money center

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<v Speaker 1>banks and it would benefit the regional banks. All right,

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<v Speaker 1>So what do you what what what? What do you

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<v Speaker 1>think folks should be doing in the market today. There's

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<v Speaker 1>a lot of cross currents here with the FED, um

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<v Speaker 1>with this banking crisis, if you will, is this just

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<v Speaker 1>stay on the sidelines here, because I'm looking at the

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<v Speaker 1>market here and it's kind of hanging in there. Yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>so that's the rotation going on. So I'm sure we'll

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<v Speaker 1>have the SNPF, but I'm sure the tech stocks are

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<v Speaker 1>starting to rip an offset the bit here. Yeah, right,

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<v Speaker 1>So I do think that ultimately this is bullish because

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<v Speaker 1>assuming the FED, but I would wait to have the

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<v Speaker 1>FED pause, not raise rate, and hopefully good commentary about

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<v Speaker 1>even being willing to cut, and then that will take

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<v Speaker 1>the key the key overhang on the market, which I've

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<v Speaker 1>said before on your shows, is that as the FED

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<v Speaker 1>because they were just completely out to lunch and thought

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<v Speaker 1>it was fine to raise rates at this unprecedented level.

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<v Speaker 1>So now because the FED regulates banks, they can't ignore it.

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<v Speaker 1>You know, they're getting the calls from the FDC, they're

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<v Speaker 1>getting the calls from Congress, and so it's not like

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<v Speaker 1>CSFB that none of our you know, our politicians, so

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<v Speaker 1>they have to focus on this and presumably they will

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<v Speaker 1>consider rate increases there won't be at their normal level

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<v Speaker 1>of being behind by about twelve months. They can't afford

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<v Speaker 1>to be behind twelve months here, they have to cut

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<v Speaker 1>rates more quicker than that. Well, doesn't that factor in

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<v Speaker 1>things like any of the retail data, any of the

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<v Speaker 1>Chinese story, any of the eco stuff that we I

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<v Speaker 1>feel like have been paying attention to as these tailwinds

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<v Speaker 1>for inflation in the face of this banking fallout. Does

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<v Speaker 1>the rest matter? Not really? No, That's why it's important

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<v Speaker 1>to focus on those two elements that drove inflation. I'm

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<v Speaker 1>talking high inflation by way, not one versus two versus three. Yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>is housing core and energy is only six and keeping

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<v Speaker 1>my natural gas presents during an eighty percent in the

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<v Speaker 1>last four months, highly deflationary. But every business the United

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<v Speaker 1>States uses energy, and so that's the key supply shock.

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<v Speaker 1>It's not necessarily the ports or chips. I mean, chips

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<v Speaker 1>was a problem because you can't build cars. But those

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<v Speaker 1>are the key drivers. And you should look at oil.

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<v Speaker 1>It's both an indicator of inflation and it's also an

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<v Speaker 1>indicator of the potential for a global recession. Jay, we

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<v Speaker 1>can't let you go without getting kind of your thoughts

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<v Speaker 1>on energy right here, I see WTI crude oil down again. Today,

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<v Speaker 1>we're sixty six dollars at barrel. What's kind of next

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<v Speaker 1>twelve eighteen months? What are you looking for an energy space? Well,

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<v Speaker 1>before the financial crisis, we were at seventy five to

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<v Speaker 1>ninety five on WTI. Because you do have a recovery

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<v Speaker 1>in China, you do have a pretty robust US economy,

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<v Speaker 1>which is shocking, but it's because of the pandemic, and

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<v Speaker 1>you still do have an energy crisis or at least

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<v Speaker 1>an energy deficit in Europe. So those are all supportive factors.

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<v Speaker 1>But investors treat oil as a risk asset, and this

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<v Speaker 1>is a risk off environment. So you're going to crash

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<v Speaker 1>bullet well below our level, and so it's all bets

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<v Speaker 1>are off until we get clarity on the FED and

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<v Speaker 1>possibly maybe a guarantee of all deposits. I mean, that's

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<v Speaker 1>going to be hard to get through Congress, but that's

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<v Speaker 1>what's needed, all right, Jake, great stuff, Really appreciate it

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<v Speaker 1>as always. Jay Haffield, CEO, founder and portfolio mentor Infrastructure

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<v Speaker 1>Capital Visors, joining us live here in our Bloomberg Interactive

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<v Speaker 1>Brokers studio. All right, Let's get back over to Europe

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<v Speaker 1>a little bit, get a sense of kind of what

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<v Speaker 1>the feeling is here with the ECB with Credit Swiss.

0:12:24.520 --> 0:12:28.280
<v Speaker 1>We could do that with doctor Vanya Straviakva, Professor of

0:12:28.320 --> 0:12:32.719
<v Speaker 1>economics at the London Business School. Doctor, thanks so much

0:12:32.720 --> 0:12:36.160
<v Speaker 1>for joining us here. Let's start with the European Central Bank.

0:12:36.679 --> 0:12:39.720
<v Speaker 1>They came out with a fifty basis point increase given

0:12:39.720 --> 0:12:42.720
<v Speaker 1>all that's going on over there with the banking situation

0:12:42.960 --> 0:12:46.439
<v Speaker 1>and namely Credit Swiss. Do you think that was a mistake.

0:12:46.480 --> 0:12:49.240
<v Speaker 1>Should they have paused or maybe just raised the rate

0:12:49.320 --> 0:12:52.880
<v Speaker 1>twenty five basis points? What do you think? So? Thank

0:12:52.920 --> 0:12:54.320
<v Speaker 1>you so much for having me. It's a pleasure to

0:12:54.360 --> 0:12:56.400
<v Speaker 1>be here. I think actually they did the right thing.

0:12:56.760 --> 0:12:59.520
<v Speaker 1>Given the numbers for inflation. They have to establish credibility

0:12:59.520 --> 0:13:01.960
<v Speaker 1>at this point, and I think the main concern in

0:13:02.000 --> 0:13:04.880
<v Speaker 1>Europe right now is to get inflation under control. I'm

0:13:04.960 --> 0:13:08.360
<v Speaker 1>less worried about solvency issues with the banks in Europe

0:13:08.400 --> 0:13:11.400
<v Speaker 1>at this point, and I think they're probably thinking the

0:13:11.480 --> 0:13:14.440
<v Speaker 1>same way. Of course, they will be liquidity issues on

0:13:14.480 --> 0:13:16.400
<v Speaker 1>the horizon, which is what we're seeing with Credit Swist

0:13:16.440 --> 0:13:19.720
<v Speaker 1>potentially at a banks, but they're ready to provide a backstop.

0:13:19.760 --> 0:13:23.080
<v Speaker 1>For example, the Swiss National bandit the same for creditswis is.

0:13:23.120 --> 0:13:25.960
<v Speaker 1>Of course we can do that for the Eurozone banks.

0:13:26.040 --> 0:13:27.920
<v Speaker 1>So I think treating it at the moment as a

0:13:27.960 --> 0:13:30.880
<v Speaker 1>liquidity rud and a solvency crisis is the right approach.

0:13:31.360 --> 0:13:35.120
<v Speaker 1>Regulation is quite strict, especially for the large banks in Europe,

0:13:35.120 --> 0:13:38.880
<v Speaker 1>so credit Swiss is very well regulated. For example, you

0:13:38.920 --> 0:13:42.360
<v Speaker 1>know the one correcting that was done by Switzerland, and

0:13:42.360 --> 0:13:44.960
<v Speaker 1>also the UK was ring fencing the retail banking of

0:13:45.000 --> 0:13:47.400
<v Speaker 1>the large banks. So both the UK and Switzer one

0:13:47.480 --> 0:13:50.160
<v Speaker 1>realize after the global financial crisis that these countries do

0:13:50.200 --> 0:13:53.480
<v Speaker 1>not have the physical capacity to bail out their massive banks,

0:13:53.559 --> 0:13:56.480
<v Speaker 1>so ring fencing the retail bank, which is essential for

0:13:56.480 --> 0:13:59.199
<v Speaker 1>the functioning of the economy, essentially is giving them the

0:13:59.360 --> 0:14:02.360
<v Speaker 1>freedom to not worry too much about having to put

0:14:02.400 --> 0:14:05.760
<v Speaker 1>in massive bailouts. And then liquidity can be dealt with

0:14:05.880 --> 0:14:09.400
<v Speaker 1>in many ways, such as providing loans against the phase

0:14:09.480 --> 0:14:11.840
<v Speaker 1>value of the collateral, which is what the FEDS started doing,

0:14:12.480 --> 0:14:14.880
<v Speaker 1>so that they don't have to worry about the decrease

0:14:14.960 --> 0:14:20.520
<v Speaker 1>in the evaluations of long term government that Professor, I'm

0:14:20.520 --> 0:14:23.920
<v Speaker 1>curious about the timeline here, it feels like the banking

0:14:23.960 --> 0:14:27.280
<v Speaker 1>fallout to your point two pause point as well, has

0:14:27.360 --> 0:14:30.920
<v Speaker 1>kind of thrown the idea of the energy crisis, this

0:14:31.080 --> 0:14:33.400
<v Speaker 1>kind of multi year recession we were expecting in the

0:14:33.520 --> 0:14:37.840
<v Speaker 1>UK out the window. To what extent are those still

0:14:37.840 --> 0:14:40.600
<v Speaker 1>the factors that the BOE and the ECB have be

0:14:40.720 --> 0:14:44.240
<v Speaker 1>watching well. So the problems in the UK area are

0:14:44.320 --> 0:14:46.760
<v Speaker 1>separate because they have to deal with the consequences of

0:14:46.800 --> 0:14:50.000
<v Speaker 1>Brexit as well mismanagement of the economy for many, many years, sadly,

0:14:50.960 --> 0:14:53.880
<v Speaker 1>so we are seeing that in the news. The public

0:14:53.920 --> 0:14:57.360
<v Speaker 1>sector is collapsing in the UK. We are seeing strikes

0:14:57.440 --> 0:15:01.240
<v Speaker 1>daily in the news. So those issues are not going away,

0:15:01.280 --> 0:15:03.960
<v Speaker 1>those structural issues that governments will have to deal with.

0:15:04.480 --> 0:15:07.600
<v Speaker 1>But getting inflation under control is absolutely crucial because if

0:15:07.600 --> 0:15:09.520
<v Speaker 1>we think that high interest rates are a problem for

0:15:09.560 --> 0:15:12.400
<v Speaker 1>the banking sector, imagine having high interest rates for a

0:15:12.440 --> 0:15:15.160
<v Speaker 1>very long period of time because we cannot get inflation

0:15:15.240 --> 0:15:18.520
<v Speaker 1>under control, Potentially the problems will be even more severe,

0:15:18.600 --> 0:15:21.920
<v Speaker 1>particularly for the mortgages of course, so Europe and the

0:15:22.040 --> 0:15:24.800
<v Speaker 1>UK the majority of the mortgages of floating rate mortgages,

0:15:24.840 --> 0:15:27.960
<v Speaker 1>and that's where the real problem will be because a

0:15:28.000 --> 0:15:30.280
<v Speaker 1>lot of the borrowers might not be able to soon

0:15:30.440 --> 0:15:33.880
<v Speaker 1>start repay their mortgages and that will generate a recession

0:15:33.920 --> 0:15:36.960
<v Speaker 1>down the road. So the longer the high interest rates remain,

0:15:37.080 --> 0:15:39.560
<v Speaker 1>which they will if we don't get inflation under control,

0:15:39.960 --> 0:15:43.400
<v Speaker 1>the bigger the cost on anyone that has a mortgage

0:15:43.400 --> 0:15:45.200
<v Speaker 1>in Europe and the UK, and that's where the real

0:15:45.200 --> 0:15:49.000
<v Speaker 1>recession is going to come. We're getting a little bit

0:15:49.080 --> 0:15:52.440
<v Speaker 1>of news. I just want to announce to our international

0:15:52.440 --> 0:15:55.280
<v Speaker 1>audience here JP Morgan and Morgan Stanley in tax to

0:15:55.440 --> 0:15:58.200
<v Speaker 1>bolster First Republic. This of course was the next bank

0:15:58.240 --> 0:16:00.920
<v Speaker 1>that was expected to kind of get down with signature

0:16:00.920 --> 0:16:03.120
<v Speaker 1>with Silicon Valley Bank. This is according to reports from

0:16:03.120 --> 0:16:05.560
<v Speaker 1>the Wall Street Journal. You are seeing farc those shares

0:16:05.920 --> 0:16:08.400
<v Speaker 1>up hair some of those losses still down twenty six percent,

0:16:08.440 --> 0:16:11.160
<v Speaker 1>but certainly off the lows of down about thirty percent.

0:16:11.560 --> 0:16:13.640
<v Speaker 1>Professor Vannia, I want to bring you back in here,

0:16:13.760 --> 0:16:16.040
<v Speaker 1>not to talk about First Republic, but perhaps a similar

0:16:16.040 --> 0:16:20.400
<v Speaker 1>situation with Credit Suis as well. Do the woes and

0:16:20.480 --> 0:16:23.920
<v Speaker 1>the European baking sector go away if someone takes over

0:16:24.160 --> 0:16:29.200
<v Speaker 1>parts of Credit Suis well? So the problem with Great

0:16:29.240 --> 0:16:32.520
<v Speaker 1>Swiss is effectively, they could never gain their footing after

0:16:32.520 --> 0:16:34.920
<v Speaker 1>the global financial crisis. They couldn't figure out what type

0:16:34.920 --> 0:16:36.960
<v Speaker 1>of bank they will be in the sense that they

0:16:36.960 --> 0:16:40.000
<v Speaker 1>were a massive bank. The asset management division and the

0:16:40.000 --> 0:16:42.360
<v Speaker 1>wealth management divisions who are a big part of the bank, however,

0:16:42.440 --> 0:16:45.360
<v Speaker 1>they're not competitive. The fees that they were charging couldn't

0:16:45.360 --> 0:16:47.680
<v Speaker 1>compete with the black Rocks and the vanguards of the world,

0:16:47.720 --> 0:16:51.560
<v Speaker 1>and essentially the decreasing fees due to the advancement of ETFs.

0:16:52.160 --> 0:16:55.040
<v Speaker 1>So I think that's a structural problem. So more generally,

0:16:55.160 --> 0:16:58.640
<v Speaker 1>people compare this stampede of depositors from banks now to

0:16:58.720 --> 0:17:01.360
<v Speaker 1>a classic bank run. I think that's not correct. So

0:17:01.360 --> 0:17:04.639
<v Speaker 1>the fundamental problem here is not about having deposit insurance

0:17:04.640 --> 0:17:08.400
<v Speaker 1>that's not credible or insufficient deposits insurance, as governments are

0:17:08.400 --> 0:17:10.840
<v Speaker 1>clearly willing to bank depositors in full, as the FAT

0:17:10.920 --> 0:17:14.360
<v Speaker 1>has shown. It's about final investors waking up and realizing

0:17:14.400 --> 0:17:17.320
<v Speaker 1>their alternatives to bank deposits that can give them both

0:17:17.320 --> 0:17:20.399
<v Speaker 1>liquidity and much high return. The banking sector will have

0:17:20.440 --> 0:17:23.880
<v Speaker 1>to shrink, so Credit Suite has been experiencing that true

0:17:23.920 --> 0:17:25.840
<v Speaker 1>the ass management division, but this will be true for

0:17:26.200 --> 0:17:29.480
<v Speaker 1>your standard depositors as well, because many banks will not

0:17:29.520 --> 0:17:31.359
<v Speaker 1>be able to afford to off a high interest rates

0:17:31.359 --> 0:17:34.719
<v Speaker 1>on depositors, right, So this is because on their assets

0:17:34.760 --> 0:17:36.840
<v Speaker 1>then they will not be able to make the interest

0:17:36.920 --> 0:17:40.120
<v Speaker 1>rates that depositors can make just by purchasing the government data.

0:17:40.160 --> 0:17:42.520
<v Speaker 1>This point, I think that's the big problem, and the

0:17:42.560 --> 0:17:47.600
<v Speaker 1>trend of bank disintermediation had already started, and the rate hikes,

0:17:47.640 --> 0:17:51.160
<v Speaker 1>together with the SVB collapse and the negative news around

0:17:51.160 --> 0:17:54.240
<v Speaker 1>credit suites, are just precipitating the adjustment. Yes, there'll be

0:17:54.320 --> 0:17:56.879
<v Speaker 1>some casualties along the way, but the old bank business

0:17:56.880 --> 0:17:59.840
<v Speaker 1>model is simply not sustainable in the new environment where

0:18:00.000 --> 0:18:02.919
<v Speaker 1>even small retail investors can open a bangered account overnight

0:18:02.960 --> 0:18:06.080
<v Speaker 1>and investing government data bays post to phrase. So now

0:18:06.080 --> 0:18:09.640
<v Speaker 1>to be honest, yeah, no, go ahead, professor. What I'm

0:18:09.680 --> 0:18:13.160
<v Speaker 1>particularly concerned about, and I don't hear being spoken about

0:18:13.359 --> 0:18:16.240
<v Speaker 1>enough in the news, is essentially there is someone on

0:18:16.320 --> 0:18:19.000
<v Speaker 1>the other end of these interest rate hedges. So the

0:18:19.040 --> 0:18:21.679
<v Speaker 1>interest rate indurvatives market is the most liquid market in

0:18:21.720 --> 0:18:25.240
<v Speaker 1>the world essentially, So presumably a lot of financial institutions

0:18:25.240 --> 0:18:28.240
<v Speaker 1>and banks are hedge induration risk, But who is providing

0:18:28.280 --> 0:18:30.680
<v Speaker 1>this hedge. So we know that this ended a very

0:18:30.680 --> 0:18:33.439
<v Speaker 1>badly for AG in two thousand and eight because there

0:18:33.440 --> 0:18:37.119
<v Speaker 1>were the sealers of insurance for the mortgage back securities.

0:18:37.640 --> 0:18:39.680
<v Speaker 1>If the risk is concentrated and there are a few

0:18:39.760 --> 0:18:44.840
<v Speaker 1>entities actually providing the interest rate essentially hedge, then I

0:18:44.880 --> 0:18:47.000
<v Speaker 1>think this will be the casualties this time. We don't

0:18:47.000 --> 0:18:48.960
<v Speaker 1>know yet where the risk is concentrated, which is a

0:18:48.960 --> 0:18:52.320
<v Speaker 1>big problem I think regulators. Okay, so professor, just kind

0:18:52.359 --> 0:18:56.160
<v Speaker 1>of getting back to the ECB here, I mean the risk.

0:18:56.359 --> 0:18:57.920
<v Speaker 1>You know, we've heard a lot of folks say, hey,

0:18:57.960 --> 0:19:01.280
<v Speaker 1>the ECB is making a stake here. They need the

0:19:01.400 --> 0:19:06.080
<v Speaker 1>pause if they're not necessarily just for the credit Swiss reason,

0:19:06.119 --> 0:19:08.760
<v Speaker 1>but for some of the reasons you outlined about you know,

0:19:08.760 --> 0:19:11.199
<v Speaker 1>there's some real stresses out there in the economy, and

0:19:11.240 --> 0:19:14.720
<v Speaker 1>then the ECB really risk breaking the European economy and

0:19:14.880 --> 0:19:19.400
<v Speaker 1>pushing into a deep recession. How viable are those risks

0:19:19.400 --> 0:19:23.320
<v Speaker 1>do you think? Well, it is true that people arguing

0:19:23.359 --> 0:19:25.040
<v Speaker 1>that they might be going at a pace that is

0:19:25.080 --> 0:19:27.959
<v Speaker 1>too fast, I think they are doing the right thing

0:19:28.000 --> 0:19:30.760
<v Speaker 1>to defend their credibility and whatever the issues there might

0:19:30.800 --> 0:19:33.000
<v Speaker 1>be with the financial sector which I don't. I do

0:19:33.040 --> 0:19:35.400
<v Speaker 1>believe they will be issues. As we discussed, they can

0:19:35.440 --> 0:19:37.919
<v Speaker 1>handle them in different ways, so they have a lot

0:19:37.960 --> 0:19:40.320
<v Speaker 1>of macropotential tools. It's not just the interest rates that

0:19:40.359 --> 0:19:43.240
<v Speaker 1>they can employ in order to handle any staguties in

0:19:43.240 --> 0:19:45.680
<v Speaker 1>the financial sector. And it's almost like time to give

0:19:45.720 --> 0:19:50.280
<v Speaker 1>the patient the essentially the medicine it needs, because the

0:19:50.359 --> 0:19:54.639
<v Speaker 1>longer we postpone normalization going back to normal interest rates,

0:19:54.800 --> 0:19:57.280
<v Speaker 1>these adjustments has to take place at some point. Okay,

0:19:58.080 --> 0:20:00.280
<v Speaker 1>all right, you just have to leave it there, doctor

0:20:00.520 --> 0:20:04.080
<v Speaker 1>doctor Vannier strev Stravia Kava, Professor of Economics of the

0:20:04.119 --> 0:20:06.320
<v Speaker 1>London School of Business. We really appreciate getting her time.

0:20:06.359 --> 0:20:10.520
<v Speaker 1>She's got some cutting edge research on the banking sector

0:20:10.560 --> 0:20:13.840
<v Speaker 1>and it's just absolutely at the forefront here as the

0:20:13.880 --> 0:20:17.159
<v Speaker 1>European regulators and the Swiss regulators look at you know,

0:20:17.200 --> 0:20:21.919
<v Speaker 1>look at credit Swiss and what to do there. All right,

0:20:22.000 --> 0:20:23.840
<v Speaker 1>let's get back to the story that just broke over

0:20:23.960 --> 0:20:26.399
<v Speaker 1>the last few minutes of Wall Street Journal reporting JP Morgan,

0:20:26.440 --> 0:20:30.119
<v Speaker 1>Morgan Stanley and others in talks to aid First Republic.

0:20:31.080 --> 0:20:33.520
<v Speaker 1>I mean, this is so obvious. I can't imagine these

0:20:33.520 --> 0:20:35.720
<v Speaker 1>bankers are actually gonna get paid this investment backers. You're

0:20:35.760 --> 0:20:38.440
<v Speaker 1>putting this deal to together. I could do this, but

0:20:38.520 --> 0:20:41.199
<v Speaker 1>let's bring in some of our banking experts, Herman Chang

0:20:41.240 --> 0:20:44.399
<v Speaker 1>and Arnod cale Kuda. Arnold covers the credit side and

0:20:44.640 --> 0:20:46.840
<v Speaker 1>Herman kind of more on the equity side. For so

0:20:46.880 --> 0:20:49.040
<v Speaker 1>we got you covered when it comes to these banks.

0:20:50.040 --> 0:20:53.240
<v Speaker 1>Herman to me, what do you make of this news?

0:20:53.280 --> 0:20:55.359
<v Speaker 1>It kind of makes complete sense to me. This isn't

0:20:55.640 --> 0:20:58.920
<v Speaker 1>I would think. And either if they're gonna put capital

0:20:58.960 --> 0:21:02.480
<v Speaker 1>in or outright buy parts are all of that seems

0:21:02.520 --> 0:21:04.600
<v Speaker 1>like an easy deal to do. Yeah, I think so.

0:21:06.000 --> 0:21:08.960
<v Speaker 1>We still think our First Republic is a really strong

0:21:09.040 --> 0:21:12.720
<v Speaker 1>franchise with a lot of wealth and managements assets that

0:21:12.760 --> 0:21:16.639
<v Speaker 1>are attractive to a potential buyer. And really it's been

0:21:16.640 --> 0:21:19.840
<v Speaker 1>sucking into the vortex with some of the uncertainty that

0:21:19.840 --> 0:21:24.920
<v Speaker 1>that proliferated with SVB and Signature. But the capitol infusion

0:21:25.280 --> 0:21:28.440
<v Speaker 1>news is definitely great news for the bank and management.

0:21:28.480 --> 0:21:31.800
<v Speaker 1>So we're looking to hear more on that front. All right, Arnold,

0:21:31.920 --> 0:21:33.800
<v Speaker 1>come on in here. We just had Alison Williams on

0:21:34.480 --> 0:21:37.000
<v Speaker 1>in the last hour we're talking about this deal, and

0:21:37.119 --> 0:21:39.760
<v Speaker 1>she said, look, this isn't an acquisition. This is a lifeline,

0:21:39.800 --> 0:21:43.679
<v Speaker 1>a lifeline that might not help the stock and bond investors. Well,

0:21:43.760 --> 0:21:45.320
<v Speaker 1>is it gonna help the bond investors at all? Do

0:21:45.400 --> 0:21:48.119
<v Speaker 1>they care? Well? I mean in terms of them. You know,

0:21:48.320 --> 0:21:51.720
<v Speaker 1>we had some big downgrade yesterday from like a you know,

0:21:51.840 --> 0:21:54.720
<v Speaker 1>A minus triple plus two you know, high yield. Yeah,

0:21:54.880 --> 0:21:56.600
<v Speaker 1>big deal. But but they only had an eight hundred

0:21:56.600 --> 0:21:59.040
<v Speaker 1>million of bonds. This is what this we call fallen

0:21:59.119 --> 0:22:02.119
<v Speaker 1>angel Yeah, but I mean relatively speaking, it's it's it's

0:22:02.160 --> 0:22:03.720
<v Speaker 1>pretty small, and they have about like three and a

0:22:03.720 --> 0:22:07.040
<v Speaker 1>half billion I preferred, So I think the risk is

0:22:07.080 --> 0:22:09.719
<v Speaker 1>contained for a lot of the investors. But definitely, Um,

0:22:09.880 --> 0:22:12.480
<v Speaker 1>you know, markets moving on all these defaults happening really

0:22:12.560 --> 0:22:15.560
<v Speaker 1>rapidly Credit Swiss. But um, you know, like you guys

0:22:15.560 --> 0:22:17.639
<v Speaker 1>have been talking about, this is a great franchise, but

0:22:17.880 --> 0:22:20.240
<v Speaker 1>I think, you know, the headlines can be sleading in

0:22:20.280 --> 0:22:22.720
<v Speaker 1>the sense of, you know, the crown jewel here is

0:22:22.720 --> 0:22:26.520
<v Speaker 1>this wealth manager's business and so and from that aspect,

0:22:26.920 --> 0:22:29.760
<v Speaker 1>you know, even the JP Morgan who's kind of prohibited

0:22:29.800 --> 0:22:32.560
<v Speaker 1>from buying any deposit franchises, they can kind of look

0:22:32.560 --> 0:22:35.719
<v Speaker 1>at the wealth franchise and say, hey, you know, Morge Stanley,

0:22:36.320 --> 0:22:38.560
<v Speaker 1>that's the crown jewel you you cannot acquire, you know,

0:22:38.600 --> 0:22:41.639
<v Speaker 1>wealth managing assets so um and and that you know,

0:22:42.240 --> 0:22:45.720
<v Speaker 1>wealth managing assets you know, um kind of spit off

0:22:45.840 --> 0:22:48.760
<v Speaker 1>fees and and that kind of stable business is great

0:22:48.760 --> 0:22:51.080
<v Speaker 1>that anybody would love to have. We did have some

0:22:51.240 --> 0:22:54.320
<v Speaker 1>or we're seeing some credit downgrades, Arnold. If I'm Moody's

0:22:54.440 --> 0:22:57.520
<v Speaker 1>or Fitch or whatever, it is one of the two

0:22:57.600 --> 0:22:59.880
<v Speaker 1>or three metrics I really look at when I think

0:23:00.000 --> 0:23:03.320
<v Speaker 1>about moving my rating. Yeah, so I think, you know,

0:23:03.520 --> 0:23:07.719
<v Speaker 1>looking at kind of what has transpired and the risks

0:23:07.720 --> 0:23:13.320
<v Speaker 1>of uninsured deposits possibly flowing out, and based on kind

0:23:13.320 --> 0:23:15.280
<v Speaker 1>of the fears that are out there, right, I think

0:23:15.280 --> 0:23:17.680
<v Speaker 1>that that's what why they made these moves. I guess

0:23:17.680 --> 0:23:21.639
<v Speaker 1>premptively for for um, for republic, given kind of all

0:23:21.640 --> 0:23:25.400
<v Speaker 1>the headlines out there. Um, you know, I think looking

0:23:25.440 --> 0:23:28.320
<v Speaker 1>at the stock reactions and people, you know, see the

0:23:28.440 --> 0:23:31.520
<v Speaker 1>uncertainty of you know, what happened with the uninsured deposits

0:23:31.600 --> 0:23:34.919
<v Speaker 1>of Silicon Valley Bank on Friday and Monday, right, you know,

0:23:35.000 --> 0:23:37.440
<v Speaker 1>a lot of the damage may have already been done

0:23:37.720 --> 0:23:39.360
<v Speaker 1>at this point. And so that's why when you see

0:23:39.400 --> 0:23:42.760
<v Speaker 1>these news things about like oh, we tapped extra liquidity

0:23:42.840 --> 0:23:47.480
<v Speaker 1>from the Fed FDIC O JP Morgan's extending US credit line.

0:23:47.480 --> 0:23:50.000
<v Speaker 1>It's like, oh, oh my god. You know it's it's

0:23:50.000 --> 0:23:51.440
<v Speaker 1>that whole thing of like, why are you saying that

0:23:51.480 --> 0:23:54.760
<v Speaker 1>if there isn't a problem? Right? So well, Hermann hop

0:23:54.800 --> 0:23:56.840
<v Speaker 1>back on in here, because we're talking about First Republic

0:23:56.920 --> 0:24:00.760
<v Speaker 1>obviously in this capital infusion, but another that is trading

0:24:00.920 --> 0:24:02.760
<v Speaker 1>the stock in terms of his trading tick by tick

0:24:02.880 --> 0:24:06.040
<v Speaker 1>is Western Alliance w AL Folks is the ticker there.

0:24:06.560 --> 0:24:08.800
<v Speaker 1>This is the company that recently got a five point

0:24:08.880 --> 0:24:11.320
<v Speaker 1>three percent stake from Ken Griffin of Citadel. Now we

0:24:11.359 --> 0:24:14.119
<v Speaker 1>know which in its own ways its own capital infusion.

0:24:15.080 --> 0:24:17.800
<v Speaker 1>What kind of numbers are we looking at here? I mean,

0:24:18.160 --> 0:24:21.240
<v Speaker 1>Alison was very careful about saying, look, First Republic is

0:24:21.280 --> 0:24:25.360
<v Speaker 1>not being acquired yet, right, will it be? Are we

0:24:25.359 --> 0:24:27.560
<v Speaker 1>looking for a potential stake still or is this kind

0:24:27.600 --> 0:24:30.600
<v Speaker 1>of lifeline going to be enough? Yeah, that's that's a

0:24:30.680 --> 0:24:35.399
<v Speaker 1>millionailar question at this point. Does the stake by potentially

0:24:35.480 --> 0:24:39.879
<v Speaker 1>JP Morgan and Morgan Stanley stabilize the market fears and

0:24:40.000 --> 0:24:44.520
<v Speaker 1>stabilize the deposit outflow If those two things happen, then

0:24:45.160 --> 0:24:47.480
<v Speaker 1>you know that that would be great news in terms

0:24:47.520 --> 0:24:51.040
<v Speaker 1>of Western Alliance. It's another bank that operates in the

0:24:51.160 --> 0:24:55.160
<v Speaker 1>western part of the United States, and they have branches

0:24:55.160 --> 0:24:59.760
<v Speaker 1>in California and Arizona and Nevada and does have some

0:25:00.000 --> 0:25:03.440
<v Speaker 1>exposure to the venture and start up community, but it's

0:25:03.560 --> 0:25:08.160
<v Speaker 1>very small relative to what SBB did, which is the

0:25:08.320 --> 0:25:11.480
<v Speaker 1>entirety of their business. So they are unfortunately lumped into

0:25:11.480 --> 0:25:16.280
<v Speaker 1>the same situation and not having some of the duration

0:25:16.400 --> 0:25:20.360
<v Speaker 1>risk that the SVB had, So there's unfortunately they get

0:25:20.359 --> 0:25:22.720
<v Speaker 1>thrown into the mix. All right, I'm gonna throw this

0:25:22.760 --> 0:25:24.560
<v Speaker 1>out for either of you, two or both of you,

0:25:24.640 --> 0:25:26.560
<v Speaker 1>whatever you want to do. I could care less all

0:25:26.600 --> 0:25:28.240
<v Speaker 1>I want to because I'm trying to figure out, and

0:25:28.240 --> 0:25:30.600
<v Speaker 1>I think a lot of investors are trying to figure out,

0:25:30.920 --> 0:25:34.240
<v Speaker 1>how systemic is this bank issue. We're all still scarred

0:25:34.240 --> 0:25:37.959
<v Speaker 1>from two thousand and eight when everybody got pulled into it.

0:25:38.640 --> 0:25:42.080
<v Speaker 1>When the FED races rates by like five hundred bases

0:25:42.119 --> 0:25:47.000
<v Speaker 1>points within a year, what does that mean for a bank? Sure?

0:25:47.800 --> 0:25:50.320
<v Speaker 1>What's it mean for a bank is that some things

0:25:50.359 --> 0:25:53.200
<v Speaker 1>get caught off sides. They weren't expecting such a rapid

0:25:53.280 --> 0:25:55.560
<v Speaker 1>rising rates and they get caught off side. Doesn't mean

0:25:55.600 --> 0:25:59.439
<v Speaker 1>you get caught off side. You purchase securities or you

0:25:59.480 --> 0:26:03.360
<v Speaker 1>do loan at a very low rate environment and aggressively.

0:26:04.000 --> 0:26:08.480
<v Speaker 1>And when rates rise, the value of those assets decline.

0:26:09.040 --> 0:26:12.159
<v Speaker 1>And when there's a loss in confidence in a bank,

0:26:12.680 --> 0:26:15.200
<v Speaker 1>that can just spur a lot of uncertainty the market,

0:26:15.320 --> 0:26:17.800
<v Speaker 1>you know, the share price come declines. And that's really

0:26:17.880 --> 0:26:20.880
<v Speaker 1>essentially what happened with SVB. All right, we'll hop back

0:26:20.920 --> 0:26:23.240
<v Speaker 1>on in here, Arnold, and and talk to us a

0:26:23.280 --> 0:26:25.119
<v Speaker 1>little bit about where we go from here. I mean

0:26:25.160 --> 0:26:29.320
<v Speaker 1>you already mentioned that we have seen this wave of downgrades. Uh,

0:26:29.440 --> 0:26:32.840
<v Speaker 1>these wave of kind of distress for some of these banks.

0:26:33.040 --> 0:26:35.119
<v Speaker 1>Are you seeing the show up and say the hedges

0:26:35.200 --> 0:26:38.159
<v Speaker 1>or the insurance the CDSS against some of these banks. Well,

0:26:38.200 --> 0:26:41.720
<v Speaker 1>I mean I think, um, we've seen spreads widen first

0:26:41.760 --> 0:26:44.160
<v Speaker 1>on this SVP and then Kretswiss you know a lot

0:26:44.240 --> 0:26:46.080
<v Speaker 1>lot more and yeah, and you know, one metric we

0:26:46.080 --> 0:26:48.480
<v Speaker 1>look at kind of in the corporate bond spaces, you know,

0:26:48.560 --> 0:26:51.399
<v Speaker 1>the financials, how do they trade versus the overall overate

0:26:51.400 --> 0:26:54.440
<v Speaker 1>bond index? And um, you know they had wind out

0:26:54.480 --> 0:26:57.240
<v Speaker 1>in twenty twenty two until October and then we rally

0:26:57.320 --> 0:27:00.280
<v Speaker 1>back almost a flat and then obviously not now they're

0:27:00.280 --> 0:27:02.880
<v Speaker 1>training about twenty five wider again. But I think it's

0:27:02.880 --> 0:27:04.960
<v Speaker 1>going to be tough for the financials to kind of

0:27:05.359 --> 0:27:07.520
<v Speaker 1>kind of regain that, you know, unless the markets really

0:27:07.560 --> 0:27:10.320
<v Speaker 1>calm down. I think it's gonna be tough, you know,

0:27:10.359 --> 0:27:12.560
<v Speaker 1>for the financials to kind of tighten back up again

0:27:12.600 --> 0:27:15.400
<v Speaker 1>compared to the role index, given kind of the default risk,

0:27:15.440 --> 0:27:17.960
<v Speaker 1>which is real. Yeah, so we were talking about systemic

0:27:18.040 --> 0:27:20.960
<v Speaker 1>risk broadly, but let's talk about the bond space specifically

0:27:21.000 --> 0:27:23.800
<v Speaker 1>in terms of contagion, in terms of trading and sympathy.

0:27:24.119 --> 0:27:28.680
<v Speaker 1>Are you seeing the credit Swiss situation bleed into kind

0:27:28.680 --> 0:27:31.480
<v Speaker 1>of the regional bank situation because in my mind they're

0:27:31.480 --> 0:27:35.480
<v Speaker 1>two separate issues. Yeah, no, I agree with that. Um So,

0:27:36.040 --> 0:27:38.199
<v Speaker 1>you know, with the regional banks stuff, I think, you know,

0:27:38.240 --> 0:27:40.920
<v Speaker 1>for the select regional banks that are having issues, um,

0:27:41.160 --> 0:27:44.119
<v Speaker 1>you know, it was like, okay, maybe the bigger US banks,

0:27:44.160 --> 0:27:47.160
<v Speaker 1>the biggest US banks like the JPMS ba AS, that's

0:27:47.240 --> 0:27:48.760
<v Speaker 1>kind of like a safe heaven. But then when you

0:27:48.920 --> 0:27:51.760
<v Speaker 1>deal with Credit Swiss and kind of the interconnectedness to

0:27:51.840 --> 0:27:54.280
<v Speaker 1>the counterparties and all this and that then it's like okay, well,

0:27:54.440 --> 0:27:56.520
<v Speaker 1>well then the bigger banks are kind of more exposed

0:27:56.560 --> 0:27:58.439
<v Speaker 1>to that, although we haven't really seen it in the

0:27:58.440 --> 0:28:02.280
<v Speaker 1>pricing yet, you know, something were to happen, I think

0:28:02.359 --> 0:28:04.000
<v Speaker 1>you know, that's where you're going to be like, hmm,

0:28:04.160 --> 0:28:06.119
<v Speaker 1>you know, who has kind of the most ties to

0:28:06.520 --> 0:28:08.960
<v Speaker 1>kind of a you know, global systemically for an entity,

0:28:09.400 --> 0:28:11.639
<v Speaker 1>It might be the trading desks and they might be

0:28:11.720 --> 0:28:14.520
<v Speaker 1>coutaparts here and there, although at least Credit Swiss, you know,

0:28:14.640 --> 0:28:18.760
<v Speaker 1>they had been kind of shrinking their trading portago platform, right, so, um,

0:28:18.920 --> 0:28:21.320
<v Speaker 1>maybe the risks are more contain there. But but if anything,

0:28:21.640 --> 0:28:23.119
<v Speaker 1>you know, you got to look at start looking at

0:28:23.160 --> 0:28:24.840
<v Speaker 1>the biggest banks again in terms of kind of the

0:28:24.840 --> 0:28:27.760
<v Speaker 1>systemic contagion risks from the Credit Swiss and on the

0:28:27.800 --> 0:28:30.919
<v Speaker 1>regional side, the contagion and the systemic risk and the

0:28:31.000 --> 0:28:34.760
<v Speaker 1>interconnectitivity really isn't there, So so that risk should be

0:28:34.760 --> 0:28:36.920
<v Speaker 1>off the table on the regional bank side. So herman

0:28:37.040 --> 0:28:39.360
<v Speaker 1>on the regional bank side, if I were an annals

0:28:39.720 --> 0:28:42.600
<v Speaker 1>and I know about you know, fifteen minutes of experience

0:28:42.640 --> 0:28:48.040
<v Speaker 1>in this um, what percentage of a bank's deposits are

0:28:48.120 --> 0:28:50.959
<v Speaker 1>enshort on average? Yeah, it really runs the gamut um.

0:28:51.160 --> 0:28:53.600
<v Speaker 1>So for I could just screen on that, right, Yeah,

0:28:53.600 --> 0:28:55.240
<v Speaker 1>you can. You can screen on that. You have to

0:28:55.280 --> 0:28:57.720
<v Speaker 1>dig deep into the regular portory filings, but you could

0:28:57.960 --> 0:29:00.680
<v Speaker 1>theoretically do it. Because I know you're a smart person.

0:29:01.560 --> 0:29:04.200
<v Speaker 1>I would say that it runs a gamut SBB was

0:29:04.240 --> 0:29:08.240
<v Speaker 1>about five percent, signature was about ten percent. You want

0:29:08.240 --> 0:29:11.240
<v Speaker 1>as an investor, I want as higher percentage as positive, correct,

0:29:11.400 --> 0:29:14.760
<v Speaker 1>because I would both because they had these big deposits,

0:29:14.880 --> 0:29:17.760
<v Speaker 1>well above to a big commercial deposits. Okay, and you

0:29:17.840 --> 0:29:23.200
<v Speaker 1>want fifteen minutes, I got ten together. It's twenty five exactly.

0:29:23.240 --> 0:29:28.280
<v Speaker 1>So you want them high. Your former employer, M ANDT Bank,

0:29:28.400 --> 0:29:31.000
<v Speaker 1>what was their insured deposit? It's more about the fifty

0:29:31.040 --> 0:29:34.000
<v Speaker 1>percent or around that level. Yep. See, that's what I'm

0:29:34.000 --> 0:29:36.000
<v Speaker 1>looking forward to see. Why can't I just screen on that.

0:29:36.080 --> 0:29:38.120
<v Speaker 1>I'm sure I can on the Bloomberg terminal and I

0:29:38.280 --> 0:29:40.200
<v Speaker 1>buy the good ones and I sell the bad ones.

0:29:41.000 --> 0:29:44.760
<v Speaker 1>That sounds like a very good idea. But I presume

0:29:44.840 --> 0:29:47.760
<v Speaker 1>that if with Silicon Valley Bank, I'm willing to take

0:29:47.800 --> 0:29:49.960
<v Speaker 1>that deposit risk. I just called it deposit risk. I

0:29:49.960 --> 0:29:51.760
<v Speaker 1>don't know what you guys call it. Why do I

0:29:51.840 --> 0:29:56.320
<v Speaker 1>take that deposit risk because you were not expecting a

0:29:56.360 --> 0:30:01.600
<v Speaker 1>deposit flight, because you know, a week ago the strength

0:30:01.680 --> 0:30:05.240
<v Speaker 1>of the institution was the venture capital relationships and the

0:30:05.280 --> 0:30:08.240
<v Speaker 1>startup relationships. That became a weakness when there was a

0:30:08.280 --> 0:30:12.840
<v Speaker 1>loss in confidence. Boy, I could now be a bank's analyst.

0:30:13.000 --> 0:30:18.080
<v Speaker 1>I think I've learned so much. Paul Sweeney here with

0:30:18.160 --> 0:30:22.040
<v Speaker 1>Pretty Gupta Matt Miller out Today we've been focusing on

0:30:23.000 --> 0:30:26.560
<v Speaker 1>testimony from Secretary General Secretary of the Treasury Jennet Yellen.

0:30:27.040 --> 0:30:29.200
<v Speaker 1>She is testifying in front of Congress. We started off

0:30:29.200 --> 0:30:32.840
<v Speaker 1>the day with some news out of the European Central

0:30:32.880 --> 0:30:35.840
<v Speaker 1>Bank raising the benchmark rate by fifty basis points, and

0:30:35.840 --> 0:30:38.360
<v Speaker 1>there were calls for maybe a pause, maybe just a

0:30:38.440 --> 0:30:41.480
<v Speaker 1>twenty five twenty five basis point increase, if for no

0:30:41.560 --> 0:30:44.040
<v Speaker 1>other reason than to just cool the market's given some

0:30:44.080 --> 0:30:46.640
<v Speaker 1>of the turmoil we've seen in there with the banking sector.

0:30:46.720 --> 0:30:48.160
<v Speaker 1>Let's go back to Europe and get a sense of

0:30:48.480 --> 0:30:50.920
<v Speaker 1>kind of how the market's dealing with it today. Marianne Squadell,

0:30:51.200 --> 0:30:54.600
<v Speaker 1>founder of Bougeville Consulting, joins us. Marianne, I'd love to

0:30:54.600 --> 0:30:57.840
<v Speaker 1>get your thoughts, so kind of what you believe or

0:30:57.920 --> 0:31:01.680
<v Speaker 1>kind of your takeaways from Steam regards fifty basis point

0:31:01.680 --> 0:31:05.560
<v Speaker 1>move at the ECB. Yes, well, you know, I've been reading.

0:31:05.680 --> 0:31:07.720
<v Speaker 1>I used to work as a regulator a very long

0:31:07.760 --> 0:31:10.600
<v Speaker 1>time ago, and what I'm hearing from my previous colleagues

0:31:10.680 --> 0:31:13.600
<v Speaker 1>is that the regulators are quite confident that the banking

0:31:13.640 --> 0:31:16.320
<v Speaker 1>sector is a little bit stronger in Europe because I

0:31:16.400 --> 0:31:20.720
<v Speaker 1>didn't realize the rules, you know, on a mid sized landers.

0:31:20.760 --> 0:31:24.120
<v Speaker 1>So in the stress test, they're confident that they're strong enough.

0:31:24.280 --> 0:31:27.480
<v Speaker 1>And so I think there's there's this sense in Europe

0:31:27.520 --> 0:31:31.320
<v Speaker 1>at the moment. I think that's what that's might take

0:31:31.320 --> 0:31:34.000
<v Speaker 1>on it. Obviously nobody knows what's going to happen, and

0:31:34.040 --> 0:31:37.400
<v Speaker 1>it's obviously a question of confidence at this stage. So

0:31:38.080 --> 0:31:41.960
<v Speaker 1>you know, the backdrop of some concerns, obviously a major

0:31:42.000 --> 0:31:44.800
<v Speaker 1>concerns a credit Swiss. How do you think that played

0:31:44.840 --> 0:31:48.280
<v Speaker 1>into the ECB's decision here, because there are a lot

0:31:48.280 --> 0:31:49.920
<v Speaker 1>of people saying, boy, if you take a look at

0:31:49.920 --> 0:31:54.080
<v Speaker 1>some of the potential wider risk from continued challenges a

0:31:54.440 --> 0:31:57.160
<v Speaker 1>credit Swiss, that in and of itself might suggest that

0:31:57.200 --> 0:32:00.400
<v Speaker 1>they pause. So I don't know, but you know, in

0:32:00.440 --> 0:32:03.240
<v Speaker 1>the UK we still have this memory of like there

0:32:03.320 --> 0:32:06.320
<v Speaker 1>was even before the financial the financial crisis in two

0:32:06.320 --> 0:32:08.720
<v Speaker 1>thousand and seven, there was a run on a bank

0:32:08.760 --> 0:32:10.760
<v Speaker 1>which I'm don't know in the US if you heard

0:32:10.840 --> 0:32:12.880
<v Speaker 1>much about it. It was Northern Rocket was a big

0:32:12.960 --> 0:32:15.680
<v Speaker 1>lander and we saw in the streets of London people

0:32:15.840 --> 0:32:18.720
<v Speaker 1>lining up to get their money back, and that was

0:32:18.840 --> 0:32:22.040
<v Speaker 1>something major. So the governments in the UK, in the

0:32:22.040 --> 0:32:24.880
<v Speaker 1>European Union, it's maybe a bit different, but in the UK,

0:32:25.440 --> 0:32:28.080
<v Speaker 1>which at the time was part of the European Union obviously,

0:32:28.880 --> 0:32:33.800
<v Speaker 1>So in the UK, you know, the government worked throughout

0:32:33.840 --> 0:32:39.640
<v Speaker 1>the weekend. There's HSBC that bought SVB for one pound

0:32:40.480 --> 0:32:45.000
<v Speaker 1>and I have a friend who invest in a startup.

0:32:45.040 --> 0:32:49.040
<v Speaker 1>The startup decided to stay a client of SVB, and

0:32:49.720 --> 0:32:52.880
<v Speaker 1>they feel from a client's perspective, but deposit takers perspective,

0:32:52.960 --> 0:32:56.240
<v Speaker 1>they are feeling fairly reassured and the sentiment at the

0:32:56.280 --> 0:33:00.680
<v Speaker 1>moment is not as panicky as as you know. Maybe,

0:33:00.800 --> 0:33:03.680
<v Speaker 1>so that may have played a part obviously in the

0:33:03.720 --> 0:33:07.200
<v Speaker 1>decision of the Central Bank. So, Marian, you know, I'm

0:33:07.200 --> 0:33:10.320
<v Speaker 1>a former employee of Credit Swiss, so I'm paying very

0:33:10.320 --> 0:33:14.280
<v Speaker 1>close attention there. Um yeah, and I do, and I

0:33:14.920 --> 0:33:16.200
<v Speaker 1>a lot of things that I think a lot of

0:33:16.280 --> 0:33:19.480
<v Speaker 1>us learned during the financial crisis is, particularly for these

0:33:19.480 --> 0:33:24.440
<v Speaker 1>investment banks, is counterparty risk and that concept that at boy,

0:33:24.480 --> 0:33:27.080
<v Speaker 1>if the market doesn't have confidence in your institution, it

0:33:27.320 --> 0:33:29.800
<v Speaker 1>is game over. I don't care who you are and

0:33:29.800 --> 0:33:32.560
<v Speaker 1>what the name is on the door. How do you

0:33:32.600 --> 0:33:37.160
<v Speaker 1>assess that risk for credit Swiss at this point? Hmm,

0:33:37.520 --> 0:33:40.080
<v Speaker 1>that's a very good question. That's it's really too early

0:33:40.120 --> 0:33:44.040
<v Speaker 1>to tell. I think, Um, it's it's a very good question. Um,

0:33:44.120 --> 0:33:48.880
<v Speaker 1>we don't know. That's that's SIANSO. Um, right, we don't know.

0:33:49.120 --> 0:33:52.080
<v Speaker 1>All right. So what's the next step here for the

0:33:52.600 --> 0:34:00.280
<v Speaker 1>central bank? Do you believe? Um? In Frankfurt? Um? Well,

0:34:00.320 --> 0:34:02.520
<v Speaker 1>I don't know what they're going to decide, of course,

0:34:02.560 --> 0:34:05.280
<v Speaker 1>but at the moment everybody is kind of weighing up

0:34:05.280 --> 0:34:08.479
<v Speaker 1>the poison cons you know of what's going to happen.

0:34:08.520 --> 0:34:10.800
<v Speaker 1>But as you said, it's a question of confidence. If

0:34:10.880 --> 0:34:14.359
<v Speaker 1>you know depositors stay put, you know, there's the risk

0:34:14.760 --> 0:34:18.400
<v Speaker 1>the inflation becomes obviously more of a priority. Otherwise it

0:34:18.480 --> 0:34:21.520
<v Speaker 1>would be you know, the confidence of deposit takers. That

0:34:21.920 --> 0:34:24.680
<v Speaker 1>is a priority. All right, Marian, thank you so much.

0:34:24.800 --> 0:34:27.080
<v Speaker 1>We appreciate getting some of your time. Marian Scordell, founder

0:34:27.120 --> 0:34:33.560
<v Speaker 1>of Bougeville Consulting. We started out the day we want

0:34:33.560 --> 0:34:34.799
<v Speaker 1>to get back to We start off the day with

0:34:34.840 --> 0:34:39.319
<v Speaker 1>the ECB really focusing on Christine Lagarde. The ECB, they

0:34:39.360 --> 0:34:42.920
<v Speaker 1>stayed true to what they were saying, fifty basis point move.

0:34:43.239 --> 0:34:45.759
<v Speaker 1>So whenever we get news out of the Bank of

0:34:45.800 --> 0:34:48.160
<v Speaker 1>England or the ECB, there are two people we have

0:34:48.239 --> 0:34:50.759
<v Speaker 1>to talk to. Marcus Ashworth Boom we take that off

0:34:50.760 --> 0:34:54.280
<v Speaker 1>this morning, Bloomberg Surveillance and John Authors. These are two

0:34:55.080 --> 0:34:57.839
<v Speaker 1>cranky Brits who if they've got something to say, they

0:34:57.840 --> 0:35:00.640
<v Speaker 1>don't mind saying it. Folks, John, what do you make

0:35:00.840 --> 0:35:06.120
<v Speaker 1>of Christine Leguard that European Central banks fifty basis points move.

0:35:06.719 --> 0:35:08.719
<v Speaker 1>Don't we have the risk of a recession. Don't we

0:35:08.760 --> 0:35:12.879
<v Speaker 1>have a big bank that's in trouble? What's going on? Well,

0:35:12.920 --> 0:35:15.120
<v Speaker 1>I'm not feeling that cranky just at this moment, just

0:35:15.239 --> 0:35:18.600
<v Speaker 1>to get that on the record, and it's also rather

0:35:18.640 --> 0:35:21.680
<v Speaker 1>wonderful just watching Bloomberg Technology on Bloomberg TV at the

0:35:21.719 --> 0:35:24.360
<v Speaker 1>moment where for some reason we have two cranky Brits

0:35:24.520 --> 0:35:29.560
<v Speaker 1>introducing the America curmudgeonly. Yeah, I like that. I like that.

0:35:29.640 --> 0:35:32.680
<v Speaker 1>I might go with being a curmudgeon, if not a crank.

0:35:34.000 --> 0:35:38.000
<v Speaker 1>In terms of what the CB has done, they have

0:35:38.840 --> 0:35:42.880
<v Speaker 1>you know, they have a dilemma and they've decided to

0:35:43.040 --> 0:35:48.320
<v Speaker 1>go all out on the belief a inflation really matters

0:35:48.360 --> 0:35:52.600
<v Speaker 1>and it isn't beaten yet and B and this is

0:35:52.640 --> 0:35:58.200
<v Speaker 1>the critical one that you can separate the functions of

0:35:58.440 --> 0:36:06.520
<v Speaker 1>fighting inflation and maintaining financial stability. Certainly it ought to

0:36:06.560 --> 0:36:11.040
<v Speaker 1>be the case if credit suisses issue, and of the

0:36:11.120 --> 0:36:15.000
<v Speaker 1>different banks that have fallen in this country is if

0:36:15.200 --> 0:36:21.880
<v Speaker 1>that issue is merely liquidity as opposed to solvency, then

0:36:22.120 --> 0:36:26.360
<v Speaker 1>they should be safe. They should be within their rights

0:36:27.160 --> 0:36:32.800
<v Speaker 1>to carry on tightening rates. That said, the fact I

0:36:32.880 --> 0:36:37.640
<v Speaker 1>personally gasped when the news came this morning, and I

0:36:37.680 --> 0:36:39.680
<v Speaker 1>think plenty of other people have done as well, it

0:36:39.960 --> 0:36:45.239
<v Speaker 1>is pretty seriously courageous that they've pressed ahead with this.

0:36:47.360 --> 0:36:51.840
<v Speaker 1>They are very strongly signaling that they don't think the

0:36:51.920 --> 0:36:58.560
<v Speaker 1>banking sector is in that much trouble, and courageous is

0:36:58.640 --> 0:37:02.440
<v Speaker 1>not always something you want to be as a central banker.

0:37:02.680 --> 0:37:05.120
<v Speaker 1>But what measure do they come up with that conclusion

0:37:05.200 --> 0:37:08.080
<v Speaker 1>that the banking sector is not in that much of

0:37:08.080 --> 0:37:12.440
<v Speaker 1>a crisis. Well, if you look at priced book multiple,

0:37:12.480 --> 0:37:16.160
<v Speaker 1>suggected in my column last night for the year of

0:37:16.200 --> 0:37:21.600
<v Speaker 1>the Eurozone banks, Yeah, they're trading below book but they've

0:37:21.640 --> 0:37:26.799
<v Speaker 1>been trading below book value for fifteen years and there's

0:37:26.920 --> 0:37:32.640
<v Speaker 1>really nothing particularly crisis written or scary about the trading

0:37:32.640 --> 0:37:35.719
<v Speaker 1>in those in fact, in the actual share price given

0:37:36.120 --> 0:37:39.839
<v Speaker 1>the greatest risk here is buying the stock in one

0:37:39.880 --> 0:37:44.920
<v Speaker 1>of these banks rather than taking out a deposit. Plainly,

0:37:44.960 --> 0:37:49.440
<v Speaker 1>shareholders are much greater risk of being wiped out than depositors.

0:37:50.640 --> 0:37:54.400
<v Speaker 1>Oddly enough, we are still not showing as much stress

0:37:54.560 --> 0:38:00.880
<v Speaker 1>as either eight or eleven twelve, which for the European

0:38:01.000 --> 0:38:04.080
<v Speaker 1>banks was actually in many ways a bigger deal than

0:38:04.640 --> 0:38:06.799
<v Speaker 1>O eight was. And I think in a way we

0:38:06.840 --> 0:38:10.560
<v Speaker 1>all became experts on the TED spread. Can you give

0:38:10.600 --> 0:38:15.640
<v Speaker 1>us the dummies explanation spread the TED spreads? It's the

0:38:15.760 --> 0:38:20.839
<v Speaker 1>TED spreads is the comparison between the short term rates

0:38:20.840 --> 0:38:26.680
<v Speaker 1>at which which banks lend to each other. Still, although

0:38:27.560 --> 0:38:30.759
<v Speaker 1>libel has had an interesting history in the years since

0:38:30.760 --> 0:38:33.240
<v Speaker 1>the global financial crisis, it's what we think of as libel.

0:38:33.280 --> 0:38:34.759
<v Speaker 1>It's the rate at which they lent to each other

0:38:35.520 --> 0:38:39.880
<v Speaker 1>compared to the rate you can get on T bills.

0:38:41.400 --> 0:38:44.120
<v Speaker 1>So generally those two numbers are very close to each other,

0:38:44.200 --> 0:38:47.840
<v Speaker 1>and the banks are very slightly higher. When the spread rises,

0:38:48.040 --> 0:38:52.080
<v Speaker 1>it indicates that banks really have a problem trusting each other.

0:38:52.960 --> 0:38:58.800
<v Speaker 1>The TED spread at the moment is still unremarkable. Banks

0:38:59.080 --> 0:39:03.319
<v Speaker 1>don't have any great degree of distrust with each other.

0:39:04.920 --> 0:39:08.239
<v Speaker 1>There is a danger in taking O eight, which most

0:39:08.280 --> 0:39:10.560
<v Speaker 1>of us who lived through eight find it difficult not

0:39:10.600 --> 0:39:13.319
<v Speaker 1>to take O eight as a base of comparison. What

0:39:13.440 --> 0:39:15.600
<v Speaker 1>happened to the TED spread, what happened to banks trust

0:39:15.640 --> 0:39:20.480
<v Speaker 1>in each other in a eight was extreme. Because we've

0:39:20.600 --> 0:39:23.400
<v Speaker 1>gone through all this, just nobody knew who was sitting

0:39:23.400 --> 0:39:25.440
<v Speaker 1>on the bad loans. They didn't even know whether they

0:39:25.440 --> 0:39:27.680
<v Speaker 1>themselves were sitting on the bad loans, and trust was

0:39:28.320 --> 0:39:34.360
<v Speaker 1>completely destroyed. There is nothing like O eight on the picture.

0:39:34.440 --> 0:39:40.400
<v Speaker 1>The possibility that this is a liquidity problem that will

0:39:40.440 --> 0:39:43.600
<v Speaker 1>require banks to put up with far less in the

0:39:43.640 --> 0:39:46.400
<v Speaker 1>way of profits and will be part of a slowdown

0:39:46.400 --> 0:39:52.280
<v Speaker 1>in the economy, that's a really serious issue. There really

0:39:52.320 --> 0:39:57.640
<v Speaker 1>shouldn't be any risk of a true repetition of two

0:39:57.680 --> 0:40:02.120
<v Speaker 1>thousand and eight, and again I'm startled that they had

0:40:02.120 --> 0:40:04.600
<v Speaker 1>the courage to go through with this, But perhaps the

0:40:04.680 --> 0:40:09.640
<v Speaker 1>ECB view is by being deviated from the path Fate's

0:40:09.719 --> 0:40:13.760
<v Speaker 1>clearly spelt out before, they would have increased the risks

0:40:14.560 --> 0:40:18.640
<v Speaker 1>that people would say, Okay, BCB is running scared. They

0:40:18.719 --> 0:40:22.760
<v Speaker 1>must know something. We should run for the hills. John,

0:40:22.760 --> 0:40:27.040
<v Speaker 1>you mentioned your reference to your opinion piece, and folks,

0:40:27.040 --> 0:40:29.240
<v Speaker 1>you can find that at Bloomberg dot com slash opinion

0:40:29.440 --> 0:40:34.360
<v Speaker 1>or OPI n go on the terminal. John's pieces entitled

0:40:34.400 --> 0:40:40.160
<v Speaker 1>move along, there's no crisis to see here? Um headline

0:40:40.960 --> 0:40:44.640
<v Speaker 1>exactly yes. Um. Here in the United States, I would

0:40:44.640 --> 0:40:48.520
<v Speaker 1>say the consensus is soft landing, no landing, something on

0:40:49.000 --> 0:40:52.920
<v Speaker 1>those lines. Probably not a hard landing. Isn't the same

0:40:53.360 --> 0:40:56.959
<v Speaker 1>in Europe? Would you say? Or it seems a little

0:40:57.000 --> 0:41:00.080
<v Speaker 1>bit more precarious there. I'm not sure that consensus this

0:41:00.200 --> 0:41:03.680
<v Speaker 1>is quite so clearly that we get a soft landing

0:41:03.800 --> 0:41:06.359
<v Speaker 1>here as it was a couple of weeks ago, And

0:41:07.600 --> 0:41:09.760
<v Speaker 1>if it is, I don't quite know why people are

0:41:09.800 --> 0:41:13.480
<v Speaker 1>expecting rates to come down quite as aggressively as they

0:41:13.520 --> 0:41:19.280
<v Speaker 1>do in Europe. The situation is very much murkier because

0:41:19.320 --> 0:41:25.000
<v Speaker 1>of this big extra factor of the energy crisis, So

0:41:25.120 --> 0:41:28.360
<v Speaker 1>at one point that was a big reason to expect

0:41:28.400 --> 0:41:33.960
<v Speaker 1>a really serious slowdown in economic activity this year, a

0:41:34.040 --> 0:41:40.040
<v Speaker 1>perfectly reasonable one. And because the weather in Europe turns

0:41:40.040 --> 0:41:43.840
<v Speaker 1>out to have been I gather to standard deviations better

0:41:43.880 --> 0:41:47.520
<v Speaker 1>than you would normally expect a really mild winter, that's

0:41:47.600 --> 0:41:51.400
<v Speaker 1>had much less of a drastic impact than would have

0:41:51.400 --> 0:41:57.640
<v Speaker 1>been expected. So the risk of a hard landing has

0:41:58.520 --> 0:42:03.960
<v Speaker 1>moved out of the well, sorry it hasn't gone away,

0:42:04.000 --> 0:42:08.320
<v Speaker 1>but it is reduced very significantly, and that in turn

0:42:08.640 --> 0:42:12.560
<v Speaker 1>has increased the pressure on the ECB to be somewhat

0:42:12.640 --> 0:42:16.000
<v Speaker 1>more hawkish than they were previously setting out to be.

0:42:16.640 --> 0:42:22.279
<v Speaker 1>But that, certainly, that energy factor, plus the way that

0:42:22.320 --> 0:42:28.799
<v Speaker 1>the the the European financial system works through banks more

0:42:28.840 --> 0:42:31.360
<v Speaker 1>than it does through markets, and its banks have never

0:42:31.400 --> 0:42:34.400
<v Speaker 1>really totally recovered from what happened to it at the

0:42:34.400 --> 0:42:37.360
<v Speaker 1>turn of the last decade, that that does make the

0:42:37.440 --> 0:42:41.839
<v Speaker 1>situation very different. Usually it's the feather goes first, right,

0:42:42.840 --> 0:42:46.520
<v Speaker 1>the timing of the calendar that has the ECB going first.

0:42:46.560 --> 0:42:49.360
<v Speaker 1>Does J Powell take any queue from Christine Legard this

0:42:49.520 --> 0:42:52.240
<v Speaker 1>time around? It makes it harder for him to pause altogether,

0:42:52.640 --> 0:42:54.799
<v Speaker 1>I think, But we don't know what's going to happen

0:42:54.840 --> 0:42:57.799
<v Speaker 1>in the next I've still got We've still got four

0:42:57.840 --> 0:43:02.240
<v Speaker 1>and a half days before before he he. The FOMC

0:43:02.400 --> 0:43:10.240
<v Speaker 1>has to make its decision absent a significant new banking

0:43:10.480 --> 0:43:14.400
<v Speaker 1>issue flaring up somewhere, and I have no opinion on

0:43:14.680 --> 0:43:19.359
<v Speaker 1>right the probability of that is, but absent that, I

0:43:19.400 --> 0:43:24.719
<v Speaker 1>think twenty five basis points hike next week is very

0:43:24.800 --> 0:43:29.319
<v Speaker 1>likely that the we don't need to get into all

0:43:29.360 --> 0:43:35.320
<v Speaker 1>of it. The data does not suggest that that inflation

0:43:35.360 --> 0:43:38.600
<v Speaker 1>on its own is still too high for them to

0:43:39.800 --> 0:43:44.680
<v Speaker 1>stop hiking. Then the folks that are pricing in cuts

0:43:44.800 --> 0:43:46.879
<v Speaker 1>for next year, for this year, I'm sorry, the back

0:43:46.880 --> 0:43:48.920
<v Speaker 1>half of this year again, that's what we see on

0:43:48.960 --> 0:43:51.719
<v Speaker 1>the bloomer term of the futures market very much. So, yeah,

0:43:51.760 --> 0:43:53.400
<v Speaker 1>I mean, what do you make of that? And for

0:43:53.560 --> 0:43:56.400
<v Speaker 1>thirty seconds, like I said, that's why I'm nervous about

0:43:56.480 --> 0:43:59.719
<v Speaker 1>you're saying, soft landing is still the is still the

0:44:00.160 --> 0:44:02.799
<v Speaker 1>dominant scenario if we need to cut rates the way

0:44:02.880 --> 0:44:05.080
<v Speaker 1>the monket currently implies before the end of the year,

0:44:05.120 --> 0:44:11.920
<v Speaker 1>that's in plies a landing with somewhat op and obviously

0:44:11.920 --> 0:44:15.160
<v Speaker 1>there's a risk of that and a banking crisis would

0:44:15.200 --> 0:44:17.759
<v Speaker 1>deliver that. It's still not clear to me that we

0:44:17.840 --> 0:44:21.520
<v Speaker 1>have as serious a banking crisis as something all right,

0:44:21.719 --> 0:44:24.160
<v Speaker 1>very very good as always. We got Marcus Ashworth, we

0:44:24.280 --> 0:44:28.399
<v Speaker 1>got John Authors, We've got the euro and UK cover.

0:44:28.560 --> 0:44:30.600
<v Speaker 1>That's how I like to think about it. John Authors,

0:44:30.600 --> 0:44:33.080
<v Speaker 1>thanks so much for joining us here from Bloomberg Opinion.

0:44:33.120 --> 0:44:34.799
<v Speaker 1>He works on the Markets team, does all that kind

0:44:34.840 --> 0:44:37.160
<v Speaker 1>of great stuff. He joins us here on our Bloomberg

0:44:37.200 --> 0:44:40.440
<v Speaker 1>Interactive Broker Studio, so he gets that gold star for

0:44:40.520 --> 0:44:43.400
<v Speaker 1>showing up as opposed to phoning it in. Thanks for

0:44:43.400 --> 0:44:46.840
<v Speaker 1>listening to the Bloomberg Markets podcast. You can subscribe and

0:44:46.960 --> 0:44:51.040
<v Speaker 1>listen to interviews an Apple Podcasts or whatever podcast platform

0:44:51.080 --> 0:44:54.440
<v Speaker 1>you prefer. I'm Matt Miller. I'm on Twitter at Matt

0:44:54.440 --> 0:44:57.760
<v Speaker 1>Miller nineteen seventy three. On ball Sweeney, I'm on Twitter

0:44:57.800 --> 0:45:00.840
<v Speaker 1>at pt Sweeney. Before the podcast, you can always catches

0:45:00.880 --> 0:45:02.320
<v Speaker 1>worldwide at Bloomberg Radient