1 00:00:04,200 --> 00:00:07,160 Speaker 1: Get in touch with technology with text stuff from how 2 00:00:07,240 --> 00:00:14,680 Speaker 1: stuff dot com either and welcome to text stuff. I'm 3 00:00:14,760 --> 00:00:17,360 Speaker 1: Jonathan Strickland and I'm Lauren Bock Obama, and I'm in 4 00:00:17,400 --> 00:00:21,639 Speaker 1: the dark. That the dark, the dark dark net, dark 5 00:00:21,760 --> 00:00:24,680 Speaker 1: dark Web. I don't think we're actually in the dark snet. No, 6 00:00:24,800 --> 00:00:27,000 Speaker 1: Actually we're pretty much on the light. But we're gonna 7 00:00:27,040 --> 00:00:29,960 Speaker 1: talk a little bit about the dark net. Really, what 8 00:00:29,960 --> 00:00:33,400 Speaker 1: we're going to talk about is Tour, right, that was 9 00:00:33,440 --> 00:00:36,639 Speaker 1: originally an act from him for the Onion Router. Yeah, 10 00:00:36,720 --> 00:00:39,320 Speaker 1: now it's just Tour. They still have an onion that 11 00:00:39,560 --> 00:00:41,680 Speaker 1: is in their logo. It takes the place of the 12 00:00:41,760 --> 00:00:44,640 Speaker 1: O in Tour t o R. And that's not just 13 00:00:44,680 --> 00:00:46,920 Speaker 1: because they really like onions. There's a reason that we 14 00:00:46,920 --> 00:00:49,199 Speaker 1: will get into. Yeah, but so, but so, what is this? 15 00:00:49,320 --> 00:00:52,320 Speaker 1: So all the Mighty Tour is one of the Avengers. 16 00:00:52,720 --> 00:00:56,280 Speaker 1: He wields the hammer Jolner, and his brother is Loki. 17 00:00:57,760 --> 00:00:59,880 Speaker 1: She's not even rolling her eyes, she's just staring me 18 00:01:00,040 --> 00:01:02,960 Speaker 1: down this time. Okay. So seriously, though, what Tour is 19 00:01:03,360 --> 00:01:06,680 Speaker 1: free software. It's an open network and it helps you 20 00:01:06,800 --> 00:01:10,400 Speaker 1: defend against traffic analysis. In other words, people trying to 21 00:01:10,400 --> 00:01:13,440 Speaker 1: figure out what you are doing and who you're communicating with. 22 00:01:13,959 --> 00:01:17,440 Speaker 1: Traffic analysis is a form of network surveillance that threatens 23 00:01:17,480 --> 00:01:21,520 Speaker 1: personal freedom and privacy. UH, it threatens confidential business activities 24 00:01:21,560 --> 00:01:25,720 Speaker 1: and relationships, and it threatens state security. Therefore, some folks 25 00:01:25,959 --> 00:01:27,840 Speaker 1: got together and said, hey, you know what we should 26 00:01:27,840 --> 00:01:30,200 Speaker 1: do is we should come up with the means to 27 00:01:30,280 --> 00:01:33,640 Speaker 1: allow people to communicate over the Internet, but do so 28 00:01:34,040 --> 00:01:37,360 Speaker 1: in a private, anonymous fashion, so that you can set 29 00:01:37,400 --> 00:01:40,399 Speaker 1: up these anonymous channels. Perhaps the most popular way to 30 00:01:40,480 --> 00:01:43,640 Speaker 1: access this is through a customized built a Firefox called 31 00:01:43,680 --> 00:01:47,120 Speaker 1: the the Tour Browser Bundle. Right, yeah, because just using 32 00:01:47,160 --> 00:01:50,080 Speaker 1: Tour on its own is one thing to do to 33 00:01:50,080 --> 00:01:51,680 Speaker 1: to allow you to have a little more of an 34 00:01:51,680 --> 00:01:56,040 Speaker 1: anonymous presence, But it requires more than that, because if 35 00:01:56,040 --> 00:01:58,520 Speaker 1: you access Tour through some other means, if you don't 36 00:01:58,560 --> 00:02:02,880 Speaker 1: have say Flash disabled in your web browser, then you're 37 00:02:02,920 --> 00:02:06,200 Speaker 1: still kind of broadcasting where you are because Flash often 38 00:02:06,320 --> 00:02:10,960 Speaker 1: involves UH identification information in order for it to work. 39 00:02:11,240 --> 00:02:13,880 Speaker 1: So it is open source, so if you feel like 40 00:02:13,919 --> 00:02:15,840 Speaker 1: getting in there and and doing your own thing, you're 41 00:02:15,840 --> 00:02:19,320 Speaker 1: absolutely able to um and uh and and a lot 42 00:02:19,320 --> 00:02:21,840 Speaker 1: of people do use it in one form or another. 43 00:02:21,880 --> 00:02:24,720 Speaker 1: At its peak in more than half a million people 44 00:02:24,760 --> 00:02:27,959 Speaker 1: were using it every day. Yeah, oddly enough, I think 45 00:02:29,440 --> 00:02:30,880 Speaker 1: as I a call in that year, there was some 46 00:02:30,960 --> 00:02:37,440 Speaker 1: news that broke about government agencies. Yeah, Edward Snowden had 47 00:02:37,480 --> 00:02:40,360 Speaker 1: that leak about the n s A, and suddenly people 48 00:02:40,400 --> 00:02:43,800 Speaker 1: were thinking, you know, I was like it doubled. Yeah. Yeah, 49 00:02:43,880 --> 00:02:46,239 Speaker 1: it was one of those things where people began to 50 00:02:46,280 --> 00:02:49,440 Speaker 1: get very concerned. And it's not necessarily that these people 51 00:02:49,440 --> 00:02:52,000 Speaker 1: are doing anything wrong. In fact, that's not the point 52 00:02:52,040 --> 00:02:55,120 Speaker 1: at all. The point is that they have an expectation 53 00:02:55,280 --> 00:02:58,800 Speaker 1: to privacy and being able to hold this kind of 54 00:02:58,840 --> 00:03:04,760 Speaker 1: anonymous communication with other people. The communication itself isn't necessarily anonymous, 55 00:03:04,760 --> 00:03:08,480 Speaker 1: but the channels are. Uh, you know, that's just that's 56 00:03:08,520 --> 00:03:10,920 Speaker 1: just an expectation we have. It's not that, you know, 57 00:03:11,200 --> 00:03:14,000 Speaker 1: I'm planning something to various, it's just if I want 58 00:03:14,000 --> 00:03:17,520 Speaker 1: to send a message to Lauren and it's just for 59 00:03:17,639 --> 00:03:21,600 Speaker 1: Lauren's eyes, I don't think anyone else has the right 60 00:03:21,639 --> 00:03:24,280 Speaker 1: to look in on that. So yeah, and in normal 61 00:03:24,320 --> 00:03:28,600 Speaker 1: internet traffic, that's absolutely a possibility. Yes. Because we've talked 62 00:03:28,639 --> 00:03:31,720 Speaker 1: a lot about how information travels across the internet, you know, 63 00:03:31,800 --> 00:03:34,640 Speaker 1: it all gets divided up into these little packets. Then 64 00:03:34,680 --> 00:03:37,600 Speaker 1: the packets go across the network and then get put 65 00:03:37,640 --> 00:03:40,360 Speaker 1: together Willy Wonka style on the other side, so that 66 00:03:40,400 --> 00:03:42,200 Speaker 1: you get whatever it is you were trying to send, 67 00:03:42,360 --> 00:03:45,240 Speaker 1: which is unfortunately probably not a delicious chocolate bar no 68 00:03:45,600 --> 00:03:48,800 Speaker 1: or Mike TV either, it's not neither of those things. 69 00:03:48,800 --> 00:03:50,280 Speaker 1: What it might be like if I if I were 70 00:03:50,360 --> 00:03:53,160 Speaker 1: to send that email to Lauren and it's a sizeable email, 71 00:03:53,440 --> 00:03:56,680 Speaker 1: that email gets divided up into numerous packets. The packets 72 00:03:57,000 --> 00:03:59,840 Speaker 1: go across the Internet, not necessarily taking the same path, 73 00:04:00,440 --> 00:04:03,840 Speaker 1: and they eventually reassemble on the other side and Lauren 74 00:04:03,880 --> 00:04:06,000 Speaker 1: can read it. But in order for that to happen, 75 00:04:06,280 --> 00:04:08,920 Speaker 1: these packets have to have little bits of information so 76 00:04:08,960 --> 00:04:12,280 Speaker 1: the routers know where to send the information onto next. 77 00:04:12,720 --> 00:04:16,159 Speaker 1: So it's kind of like an address on a piece 78 00:04:16,160 --> 00:04:19,440 Speaker 1: of mail. So let's say that you've got a snoop 79 00:04:19,520 --> 00:04:24,680 Speaker 1: in your neighborhood and this person is getting into everybody's business. 80 00:04:24,760 --> 00:04:27,240 Speaker 1: And the way this person does it is they look 81 00:04:27,240 --> 00:04:30,480 Speaker 1: at all the mail that's going in and out of 82 00:04:30,520 --> 00:04:33,560 Speaker 1: a person's mailbox, and even if they're not opening that 83 00:04:33,680 --> 00:04:36,200 Speaker 1: mail and and reading all of it, just just the 84 00:04:36,200 --> 00:04:39,240 Speaker 1: fact that you're sending it to particular people at particular 85 00:04:39,279 --> 00:04:42,440 Speaker 1: times can tell that snoop a lot about what's going on. Right, 86 00:04:42,480 --> 00:04:45,800 Speaker 1: So if you're sending out uh, you know, envelopes to 87 00:04:46,160 --> 00:04:50,440 Speaker 1: say a medical facility, that could give a lot of 88 00:04:50,480 --> 00:04:53,479 Speaker 1: information to a snoop if they're seeing that stuff from 89 00:04:53,880 --> 00:04:56,839 Speaker 1: various insurance companies is coming into you, that could you know, 90 00:04:57,000 --> 00:04:59,359 Speaker 1: I'm going with a medical thing here. But really this 91 00:04:59,440 --> 00:05:03,440 Speaker 1: applies to any sort of communication. So so what we're 92 00:05:03,440 --> 00:05:06,159 Speaker 1: saying is that it's not enough for the content of 93 00:05:06,200 --> 00:05:09,440 Speaker 1: what you send over the internet, uh necessarily, I mean 94 00:05:09,480 --> 00:05:12,400 Speaker 1: you are hypothetical, you maybe you're fine. It's not enough 95 00:05:12,440 --> 00:05:15,960 Speaker 1: for you to encrypt the content, but the actual transfer 96 00:05:16,000 --> 00:05:19,560 Speaker 1: of the content in some cases needs to be encrypted exactly. 97 00:05:19,640 --> 00:05:22,600 Speaker 1: And there are a lot of legitimate cases where you 98 00:05:22,600 --> 00:05:25,640 Speaker 1: would want that to happen. I mean, let's talk about 99 00:05:25,920 --> 00:05:29,240 Speaker 1: journalists for example. So you might have a journalist who 100 00:05:29,400 --> 00:05:34,760 Speaker 1: is pursuing some major story, perhaps they're in unfriendly territory 101 00:05:34,839 --> 00:05:37,240 Speaker 1: to do so, and they want to be able to 102 00:05:37,720 --> 00:05:41,400 Speaker 1: contact sources that might be in danger otherwise if there 103 00:05:41,480 --> 00:05:45,279 Speaker 1: if if this communication were publicly known, or really anything 104 00:05:45,320 --> 00:05:49,200 Speaker 1: that could endanger the journalist, a source or the story itself, 105 00:05:49,680 --> 00:05:51,680 Speaker 1: then you would want to have a way of securely 106 00:05:51,680 --> 00:05:55,479 Speaker 1: communicating and making sure that no one's really snooping in 107 00:05:55,560 --> 00:05:59,240 Speaker 1: on you. Well, that's that's a perfectly legitimate source. Their 108 00:05:59,360 --> 00:06:02,200 Speaker 1: governments use this kind of thing in order so that 109 00:06:02,279 --> 00:06:06,760 Speaker 1: they can gather information and disseminate information. Uh, you've got 110 00:06:06,800 --> 00:06:09,159 Speaker 1: companies that use this kind of stuff in order to 111 00:06:10,040 --> 00:06:14,120 Speaker 1: have secure communications about upcoming products or services that are 112 00:06:14,160 --> 00:06:16,359 Speaker 1: not part of the public knowledge and don't need to 113 00:06:16,400 --> 00:06:18,520 Speaker 1: be Oh sure, I mean even if you're just doing 114 00:06:18,680 --> 00:06:20,880 Speaker 1: r and D about something, you know, like like let's 115 00:06:20,920 --> 00:06:23,600 Speaker 1: say that you're the example that you used and in 116 00:06:23,600 --> 00:06:25,320 Speaker 1: our notes here is Apple. Like if here, if you're 117 00:06:25,320 --> 00:06:29,800 Speaker 1: creating a new product and you start researching patents online, um, 118 00:06:30,320 --> 00:06:33,880 Speaker 1: the right person could could find your searches and figure 119 00:06:33,880 --> 00:06:37,840 Speaker 1: out what you were looking for. And that sucks for you. Yeah, yeah, 120 00:06:37,839 --> 00:06:41,719 Speaker 1: if you had the next big idea and you were waiting, 121 00:06:41,880 --> 00:06:44,480 Speaker 1: because you know, like the company of Apple, they get 122 00:06:44,520 --> 00:06:49,279 Speaker 1: a lot of you a boost from folks whenever they 123 00:06:49,320 --> 00:06:52,599 Speaker 1: announced something brand new that surprises everyone, which of course 124 00:06:52,680 --> 00:06:57,720 Speaker 1: is exactly why you have so many news agencies scrutinizing 125 00:06:57,960 --> 00:07:01,200 Speaker 1: everything Apple does in order to try and guess what's 126 00:07:01,240 --> 00:07:05,000 Speaker 1: coming next. So the more you're able to keep that secret, 127 00:07:05,080 --> 00:07:07,640 Speaker 1: the bigger the impact is when you unveil it. Because 128 00:07:08,360 --> 00:07:12,120 Speaker 1: the worst the worst feeling is when you tune into 129 00:07:12,160 --> 00:07:14,400 Speaker 1: an Apple event and it ends up being exactly what 130 00:07:14,480 --> 00:07:18,040 Speaker 1: you expected it was to be. Every everyone still tunes in, 131 00:07:18,080 --> 00:07:20,440 Speaker 1: but then they're like, oh, but that's exactly what they 132 00:07:20,480 --> 00:07:23,280 Speaker 1: were talking about last week. I know, and you read 133 00:07:23,440 --> 00:07:29,119 Speaker 1: what they wrote last week, so stop it me. Sure, 134 00:07:29,240 --> 00:07:32,480 Speaker 1: and and lots of other people who could generally be 135 00:07:32,680 --> 00:07:35,800 Speaker 1: considered to be working for for non nefarious purposes, but 136 00:07:36,120 --> 00:07:39,840 Speaker 1: nonetheless would like a little bit of secrecy, uh, for example, 137 00:07:39,880 --> 00:07:43,480 Speaker 1: activists or whistleblowers um or you know Chinese citizens who 138 00:07:43,480 --> 00:07:45,400 Speaker 1: really just want to use Facebook or read news from 139 00:07:45,440 --> 00:07:48,440 Speaker 1: other countries. Sure, and we've seen plenty of examples also, 140 00:07:48,520 --> 00:07:51,600 Speaker 1: things like the Arabs Spring. You know, places in the 141 00:07:51,600 --> 00:07:55,320 Speaker 1: world where you have people who are trying to enact 142 00:07:55,440 --> 00:07:59,760 Speaker 1: change in a very harsh environment where if their activities 143 00:07:59,800 --> 00:08:03,840 Speaker 1: were picked up on by official sources, government sources, state 144 00:08:03,960 --> 00:08:08,800 Speaker 1: sponsored sources, they could face some serious consequences. And it's 145 00:08:08,800 --> 00:08:11,160 Speaker 1: not necessarily the again, like you said, that they're doing 146 00:08:11,160 --> 00:08:13,920 Speaker 1: anything nefarious it's just they can't do it at all 147 00:08:14,000 --> 00:08:18,400 Speaker 1: without fear of some form of consequence unless that can 148 00:08:18,440 --> 00:08:20,680 Speaker 1: remain secure. So you've got to figure out how do 149 00:08:20,760 --> 00:08:24,360 Speaker 1: we make this secure. Also, we have to figure out 150 00:08:24,680 --> 00:08:26,920 Speaker 1: how do we frame this in such a way where 151 00:08:26,960 --> 00:08:31,600 Speaker 1: we also admit some people do use it for nefarious purposes. Oh, sure, 152 00:08:31,600 --> 00:08:34,520 Speaker 1: of course. I mean there are plenty of people out 153 00:08:34,520 --> 00:08:37,040 Speaker 1: there who are going to use this kind of anonymous 154 00:08:37,040 --> 00:08:41,520 Speaker 1: connection in order to conduct illegal or otherwise illicit activities. 155 00:08:41,640 --> 00:08:44,480 Speaker 1: We've talked about some of them in previous episodes, in fact, 156 00:08:44,800 --> 00:08:48,400 Speaker 1: and we'll mention some more as we go along. So again, 157 00:08:48,440 --> 00:08:50,520 Speaker 1: it's one of those things where you would probably argue 158 00:08:50,520 --> 00:08:54,720 Speaker 1: that it's a relatively small percentage of the population using 159 00:08:54,720 --> 00:08:57,000 Speaker 1: it for these purposes, but they're the ones who get 160 00:08:57,000 --> 00:09:00,800 Speaker 1: the most press, uh, and so therefore or it kind 161 00:09:00,840 --> 00:09:04,160 Speaker 1: of creates this public perception that people who use tour 162 00:09:04,280 --> 00:09:07,840 Speaker 1: are up to something. Also, you know, we mentioned the 163 00:09:07,880 --> 00:09:12,720 Speaker 1: fact that in a normal Internet communication, the you know what, 164 00:09:12,720 --> 00:09:16,360 Speaker 1: what amounts to the uh, the address on the label 165 00:09:16,480 --> 00:09:18,960 Speaker 1: is perfectly visible because it needs to be so that 166 00:09:19,040 --> 00:09:21,480 Speaker 1: it can route across gets to the place it's gone. 167 00:09:21,679 --> 00:09:24,120 Speaker 1: And Tour they had to figure out a way around 168 00:09:24,160 --> 00:09:27,120 Speaker 1: that so that you could have it be obuse skated 169 00:09:27,240 --> 00:09:30,720 Speaker 1: so that if someone were to snoop in on communication, 170 00:09:30,760 --> 00:09:33,120 Speaker 1: they would not be able to determine what the origin 171 00:09:33,200 --> 00:09:38,520 Speaker 1: nor destination were. And that it is pretty amazing stuff 172 00:09:38,520 --> 00:09:40,120 Speaker 1: because you've got you gotta figure out a way of 173 00:09:40,160 --> 00:09:42,960 Speaker 1: implementing that where it can still work, Like how do 174 00:09:43,000 --> 00:09:46,160 Speaker 1: you disguise the address and still hope that it gets 175 00:09:46,160 --> 00:09:49,160 Speaker 1: to where it's going? Because if we did that to 176 00:09:49,200 --> 00:09:52,559 Speaker 1: the to the US Postal Service, our stuff would never 177 00:09:52,600 --> 00:09:56,240 Speaker 1: get anywhere and it wouldn't be their fault either, because 178 00:09:56,559 --> 00:09:58,520 Speaker 1: you just wouldn't be following the rules. Oh sure, yeah, 179 00:09:58,520 --> 00:10:00,360 Speaker 1: I if you don't write your address on something, then 180 00:10:00,960 --> 00:10:03,920 Speaker 1: how does it get to that place? So here's another 181 00:10:04,000 --> 00:10:08,520 Speaker 1: funny thing, Lauren, Um, who was it that came up 182 00:10:08,559 --> 00:10:11,720 Speaker 1: with this whole tour idea? I mean it must have 183 00:10:11,800 --> 00:10:16,360 Speaker 1: been like some like hackers you know at def con 184 00:10:16,840 --> 00:10:19,400 Speaker 1: convention who all got together and said, we don't want 185 00:10:19,400 --> 00:10:21,880 Speaker 1: the government looking in on our stuff, right, you know? 186 00:10:21,880 --> 00:10:24,840 Speaker 1: It was the government? It was it was it was 187 00:10:24,920 --> 00:10:28,360 Speaker 1: the U. S. Naval Research Laboratory UM back in back 188 00:10:28,360 --> 00:10:33,040 Speaker 1: in actually, which makes it extra hilarious that that the 189 00:10:33,240 --> 00:10:36,160 Speaker 1: n s A has kind of been trying to crack 190 00:10:36,400 --> 00:10:39,360 Speaker 1: trying to crack it because you've got a government agency 191 00:10:39,559 --> 00:10:43,359 Speaker 1: doing its best to figure out how to intercept information 192 00:10:43,400 --> 00:10:47,199 Speaker 1: that goes across a tour network, and another government US 193 00:10:47,280 --> 00:10:52,600 Speaker 1: government entity that's responsible in large part for the creation 194 00:10:52,720 --> 00:10:56,520 Speaker 1: for creation and furthermore, other governmental agencies that are responsible 195 00:10:56,559 --> 00:10:59,679 Speaker 1: for funding it. As of twelve, one point two four 196 00:10:59,720 --> 00:11:04,440 Speaker 1: million dollars half of tours revenue UH came from government grants, 197 00:11:04,480 --> 00:11:07,400 Speaker 1: including a large part from the Department of Defense. So 198 00:11:07,679 --> 00:11:10,199 Speaker 1: this is an example of two different parts of the 199 00:11:10,280 --> 00:11:13,880 Speaker 1: United States government working at odds against each other, one 200 00:11:13,920 --> 00:11:16,680 Speaker 1: part saying this is absolutely necessary for us to be 201 00:11:16,760 --> 00:11:20,240 Speaker 1: able to operate in a secure way, and the other 202 00:11:20,280 --> 00:11:22,760 Speaker 1: part saying, we want to be able to see what's 203 00:11:22,800 --> 00:11:25,280 Speaker 1: going on here. So so so yeah. But but but this 204 00:11:25,440 --> 00:11:28,839 Speaker 1: all got its start back with the U. S. Navy 205 00:11:28,920 --> 00:11:32,840 Speaker 1: and UM. It was part of an onion rooting project 206 00:11:33,480 --> 00:11:37,360 Speaker 1: routing project rooting. If you're in England, it's routing. Here 207 00:11:37,400 --> 00:11:40,800 Speaker 1: in the US, it's usually routing either way. Why would 208 00:11:40,840 --> 00:11:44,000 Speaker 1: you even call it an onion It's because it relies 209 00:11:44,120 --> 00:11:47,599 Speaker 1: upon quote a layered object to direct the construction of 210 00:11:47,640 --> 00:11:51,439 Speaker 1: an anonymous, bidirectional, real time virtual circuit between two communicating 211 00:11:51,480 --> 00:11:55,320 Speaker 1: parties and initiator and responder. And that's as clear as day. Yeah, 212 00:11:55,360 --> 00:11:57,679 Speaker 1: we can just end up podcast now. Guys, don't worry. 213 00:11:57,679 --> 00:12:00,480 Speaker 1: We're going to explain the whole layered thing a little 214 00:12:00,480 --> 00:12:04,400 Speaker 1: bit later on. So we will. We will make sure 215 00:12:04,480 --> 00:12:08,080 Speaker 1: that you understand why an onion it's actually a pretty 216 00:12:08,080 --> 00:12:12,160 Speaker 1: clever way to describe what's going on. But the project 217 00:12:12,240 --> 00:12:16,599 Speaker 1: had specific goals to research and develop and build anonymous 218 00:12:16,600 --> 00:12:21,560 Speaker 1: communication systems, to analyze other anonymous communications systems, and to 219 00:12:21,640 --> 00:12:26,960 Speaker 1: create low latency Internet based systems that resisted traffic analysis, eavesdropping, 220 00:12:26,960 --> 00:12:31,240 Speaker 1: and other attacks from outsiders as an Internet routers or 221 00:12:31,320 --> 00:12:36,880 Speaker 1: insiders as an Onion routing servers. So if the best 222 00:12:37,360 --> 00:12:40,960 Speaker 1: uh the ideal was to create some form of distributed 223 00:12:41,000 --> 00:12:44,160 Speaker 1: system where you could have two parties communicating with one 224 00:12:44,200 --> 00:12:46,719 Speaker 1: another and no one would be able to know that 225 00:12:46,760 --> 00:12:49,520 Speaker 1: those two parties were in communication. They would know the 226 00:12:49,520 --> 00:12:52,640 Speaker 1: communication is going on because traffic is moving across the network, 227 00:12:53,040 --> 00:12:55,600 Speaker 1: but because of the network's design, they would have no 228 00:12:55,640 --> 00:12:58,840 Speaker 1: way of knowing what to end parties were actually communicating 229 00:12:58,880 --> 00:13:00,760 Speaker 1: with one another. Because just as we were saying with 230 00:13:00,800 --> 00:13:04,160 Speaker 1: that snoop. Even if you can't see what the information 231 00:13:04,200 --> 00:13:07,480 Speaker 1: itself is, just knowing who is talking to whom gives 232 00:13:07,480 --> 00:13:11,719 Speaker 1: you a lot of info. Right. Because of this, And 233 00:13:11,720 --> 00:13:14,120 Speaker 1: funnily enough, the Navy actually had to step back from 234 00:13:14,120 --> 00:13:16,920 Speaker 1: the project in order to make it actually useful because 235 00:13:16,960 --> 00:13:20,280 Speaker 1: the network needs to be open, right. Um. So, I mean, 236 00:13:20,400 --> 00:13:22,480 Speaker 1: if if you know, if you can see that everything 237 00:13:22,559 --> 00:13:26,720 Speaker 1: is coming through, if on if only the Navy used it, 238 00:13:26,960 --> 00:13:30,160 Speaker 1: then you would know whenever communication was happening that the 239 00:13:30,240 --> 00:13:33,680 Speaker 1: Navy was communicating with people like you would you would 240 00:13:33,679 --> 00:13:36,520 Speaker 1: have limited the number of people that could possibly be 241 00:13:36,600 --> 00:13:40,040 Speaker 1: the ones communicating by making it open and say this 242 00:13:40,120 --> 00:13:43,080 Speaker 1: is a playground where everyone can come in. Suddenly you 243 00:13:43,120 --> 00:13:46,040 Speaker 1: can't tell who's communicating with whom because there's so many's 244 00:13:46,080 --> 00:13:48,720 Speaker 1: too much noise and not in the traffic, right. Um. So, 245 00:13:48,800 --> 00:13:51,880 Speaker 1: the project incorporated as a nonprofit in two thousand six, 246 00:13:51,960 --> 00:13:54,679 Speaker 1: and it currently depends a whole lot on crowdsourcing. Um. 247 00:13:54,679 --> 00:13:57,600 Speaker 1: There are only nine full time to our employees as 248 00:13:57,600 --> 00:14:02,440 Speaker 1: of this podcast, which we are recording on April, by 249 00:14:02,440 --> 00:14:05,600 Speaker 1: the way, um and uh, the rest of the development 250 00:14:05,640 --> 00:14:08,480 Speaker 1: is spread across dozens of part time assistants and hundreds 251 00:14:08,480 --> 00:14:12,560 Speaker 1: of volunteers. The code is open source, which actually makes 252 00:14:12,559 --> 00:14:15,200 Speaker 1: it harder to mess with. Um. You know, like if someone, say, 253 00:14:15,360 --> 00:14:19,320 Speaker 1: say the n s A, tried to create a vulnerability deliberately, 254 00:14:19,680 --> 00:14:23,160 Speaker 1: then anyone could catch it, right. Yeah, it's not like 255 00:14:23,320 --> 00:14:25,720 Speaker 1: it's hidden the way behind closed doors. In that way, 256 00:14:26,040 --> 00:14:28,600 Speaker 1: it gets overlooked and you suddenly have this back door 257 00:14:28,760 --> 00:14:31,760 Speaker 1: entrance into the Tour Network. No, it's it's it's much 258 00:14:31,760 --> 00:14:33,520 Speaker 1: more likely for someone to catch it if lots of 259 00:14:33,520 --> 00:14:36,000 Speaker 1: people are looking. Yeah exactly. Yeah, you've got lots of 260 00:14:36,000 --> 00:14:38,720 Speaker 1: people checking on it all the time. So it's actually 261 00:14:38,720 --> 00:14:41,280 Speaker 1: more secure by being in plain sight in that way. 262 00:14:41,360 --> 00:14:44,360 Speaker 1: So here's how it used to work. Because you know, 263 00:14:44,400 --> 00:14:48,120 Speaker 1: I mentioned that tour was had an onion in the oh, 264 00:14:48,280 --> 00:14:51,720 Speaker 1: but it doesn't really involve onions anymore. And then we've 265 00:14:51,720 --> 00:14:54,320 Speaker 1: mentioned onions. Yeah, so yeah, so we're we're gonna we're 266 00:14:54,320 --> 00:14:57,040 Speaker 1: gonna go back to how it worked originally because the 267 00:14:57,040 --> 00:14:58,960 Speaker 1: way it works now is not that much different, but 268 00:14:59,000 --> 00:15:03,520 Speaker 1: it doesn't involve the onion metaphor anymore. So, first of all, 269 00:15:03,520 --> 00:15:07,720 Speaker 1: to achieve anonymity, the Tour Network uses something called privoxy filters, 270 00:15:07,760 --> 00:15:12,240 Speaker 1: which prevent client information from reaching servers. So this means 271 00:15:12,280 --> 00:15:15,000 Speaker 1: that a client, you know, that's that's your computer when 272 00:15:15,040 --> 00:15:18,640 Speaker 1: you are trying to access anything. Let's say you're using 273 00:15:18,680 --> 00:15:21,760 Speaker 1: your your browser to access your email, because I love 274 00:15:21,800 --> 00:15:24,680 Speaker 1: that example. It's easy one. So your your computer is 275 00:15:24,720 --> 00:15:28,280 Speaker 1: the client. It's sending a request to another computer. It's 276 00:15:28,400 --> 00:15:33,080 Speaker 1: asking for data from this computer that hosts the the 277 00:15:33,120 --> 00:15:37,200 Speaker 1: email service that you use, and that is called the server. Now, 278 00:15:37,200 --> 00:15:40,560 Speaker 1: normally the server receives information that can identify the client, 279 00:15:40,920 --> 00:15:45,080 Speaker 1: so you have some sort of address that identifies this 280 00:15:45,160 --> 00:15:48,000 Speaker 1: is the machine that's asking for that information, So then 281 00:15:48,040 --> 00:15:51,640 Speaker 1: the server knows exactly who it's talking to. Well, privoxy 282 00:15:51,720 --> 00:15:54,840 Speaker 1: filters prevent that from happening, so it's possible for a 283 00:15:54,880 --> 00:15:59,200 Speaker 1: client's identity to remain unknown to the server and also 284 00:15:59,280 --> 00:16:01,960 Speaker 1: to the rest of the network as these requests go 285 00:16:02,000 --> 00:16:05,080 Speaker 1: across the network. Also, one of the other things that 286 00:16:05,120 --> 00:16:07,040 Speaker 1: has and we'll talk more about this in a bit, 287 00:16:07,600 --> 00:16:11,280 Speaker 1: is the ability to create hidden services. But you know, 288 00:16:11,320 --> 00:16:13,760 Speaker 1: I'm not going to spoil that because the discussion we 289 00:16:13,800 --> 00:16:16,000 Speaker 1: have later on will really kind of bring that to 290 00:16:16,160 --> 00:16:18,440 Speaker 1: light and it will make much more sense after we 291 00:16:18,520 --> 00:16:22,840 Speaker 1: talk about exactly how this communication occurs. Yes, so it's 292 00:16:23,160 --> 00:16:27,200 Speaker 1: possible to use onion routing software to send information completely anonymously. 293 00:16:27,240 --> 00:16:29,360 Speaker 1: In other words, you could use it so that you 294 00:16:29,400 --> 00:16:32,520 Speaker 1: could send an anonymous message to someone else. They would 295 00:16:32,560 --> 00:16:34,680 Speaker 1: not know the identity of that person. But that's not 296 00:16:34,760 --> 00:16:38,240 Speaker 1: the purpose of tour. The purpose, like I said before, 297 00:16:38,360 --> 00:16:42,880 Speaker 1: is to allow anonymous channels of communication. So you and 298 00:16:43,000 --> 00:16:45,840 Speaker 1: the person with whom you're communicating know each other's identity, 299 00:16:46,040 --> 00:16:48,960 Speaker 1: but nobody else does, right, So this allows you to 300 00:16:49,120 --> 00:16:53,160 Speaker 1: have that honest, open expression of information without fear of 301 00:16:53,200 --> 00:16:56,680 Speaker 1: someone else snooping in on you or any other consequences 302 00:16:56,720 --> 00:16:59,960 Speaker 1: apart from whatever consequences come from just that communication between 303 00:17:00,000 --> 00:17:03,560 Speaker 1: two parties. If you tell someone that they dressed like 304 00:17:03,560 --> 00:17:05,680 Speaker 1: a slab, there's going to be consequence, is what I'm saying. 305 00:17:05,840 --> 00:17:07,600 Speaker 1: It doesn't have to be someone snooping in on you. 306 00:17:08,800 --> 00:17:12,600 Speaker 1: Good point. I get that a lot. Uh. So it 307 00:17:12,800 --> 00:17:15,800 Speaker 1: uses proxy servers, and a proxy server acts as an 308 00:17:15,800 --> 00:17:19,960 Speaker 1: intermediary between a client and some other server. So you 309 00:17:20,000 --> 00:17:21,359 Speaker 1: can kind of think of it as this is the 310 00:17:21,400 --> 00:17:25,080 Speaker 1: go between. So if I were to send a request 311 00:17:25,119 --> 00:17:27,960 Speaker 1: to get my email, but I wanted to go through 312 00:17:27,960 --> 00:17:31,119 Speaker 1: a proxy server, I would log into the proxy server. 313 00:17:31,520 --> 00:17:34,920 Speaker 1: The proxy server would then send my request onto the 314 00:17:35,000 --> 00:17:39,400 Speaker 1: email server, and from the email servers perspective, it looked 315 00:17:39,400 --> 00:17:42,160 Speaker 1: like the proxy server was the origin of that request. 316 00:17:42,600 --> 00:17:46,960 Speaker 1: It isn't able to see back to exactly there's a 317 00:17:46,960 --> 00:17:51,879 Speaker 1: hop missing there. So that's really important in this. And uh, 318 00:17:52,040 --> 00:17:55,600 Speaker 1: the communication part is the tricky part. Like I said, 319 00:17:55,640 --> 00:17:59,000 Speaker 1: so you've got this information, it's passing between nodes or 320 00:17:59,280 --> 00:18:03,320 Speaker 1: little orders within the tour network. Okay, so think of 321 00:18:03,359 --> 00:18:07,040 Speaker 1: these nodes as rest stops between the client, the sender, 322 00:18:07,320 --> 00:18:10,440 Speaker 1: and the recipient the server. Right, Each node only knows 323 00:18:10,480 --> 00:18:13,720 Speaker 1: the identity of the node before it and the note 324 00:18:13,760 --> 00:18:16,399 Speaker 1: after it, right, So uh, and the note before it 325 00:18:16,440 --> 00:18:19,800 Speaker 1: and after it completely is dependent upon when you're sending 326 00:18:19,840 --> 00:18:22,960 Speaker 1: the message, because you're you're going to create new pathways 327 00:18:23,000 --> 00:18:25,320 Speaker 1: every time you create a connection, so it's not like 328 00:18:25,400 --> 00:18:28,800 Speaker 1: you have a set path each time. It's like the Internet. 329 00:18:28,960 --> 00:18:32,639 Speaker 1: It's very flexible. So when you send a message, and 330 00:18:32,720 --> 00:18:35,640 Speaker 1: let's say it's going through letters A through G, we're 331 00:18:35,680 --> 00:18:37,879 Speaker 1: just designating these nodes as A through G and for 332 00:18:37,920 --> 00:18:39,679 Speaker 1: some reason it's going into a B C, D, E 333 00:18:39,760 --> 00:18:43,520 Speaker 1: F G order. So node D only knows about nodes 334 00:18:43,680 --> 00:18:46,840 Speaker 1: C and E. The information came from C. It knows 335 00:18:46,880 --> 00:18:49,239 Speaker 1: it has to send the information onto E. It has 336 00:18:49,359 --> 00:18:52,320 Speaker 1: no awareness of a B or you know, effor G. 337 00:18:52,960 --> 00:18:56,760 Speaker 1: So that's it. And that means that if you were 338 00:18:56,840 --> 00:19:00,639 Speaker 1: to intercept information passing between two nodes, you would just 339 00:19:00,680 --> 00:19:02,480 Speaker 1: know which note it came from and which node it 340 00:19:02,520 --> 00:19:04,919 Speaker 1: went to. You wouldn't know the actual person who sent it, 341 00:19:05,000 --> 00:19:07,520 Speaker 1: nor would you know the person to whom it went. Ultimately, 342 00:19:07,720 --> 00:19:11,400 Speaker 1: on top of that, the nodes encrypt the communication as 343 00:19:11,440 --> 00:19:14,160 Speaker 1: it's passed along. Yes, and this is where you get 344 00:19:14,160 --> 00:19:17,840 Speaker 1: that layer and layer and layer of encryption. And because 345 00:19:17,880 --> 00:19:21,000 Speaker 1: there's so many layers of encryption, well, what else has 346 00:19:21,119 --> 00:19:24,240 Speaker 1: lots of layers? And Onion I was gonna think of 347 00:19:24,359 --> 00:19:26,840 Speaker 1: Game of Thrones, but yes, Onion is right. Onion is 348 00:19:26,880 --> 00:19:29,000 Speaker 1: exactly the thing that they went with because Game of 349 00:19:29,040 --> 00:19:32,160 Speaker 1: Thrones really wasn't that popular. Also, it's proprietary. I mean, 350 00:19:32,200 --> 00:19:34,920 Speaker 1: you know, yeah, that probably would have George R. Martin 351 00:19:35,280 --> 00:19:37,359 Speaker 1: gotten a little upset about that. But yeah, so so 352 00:19:37,440 --> 00:19:40,160 Speaker 1: Onion is in fact what they went with because there's 353 00:19:40,200 --> 00:19:43,640 Speaker 1: so many different layers of encryption. Now I've I know 354 00:19:43,720 --> 00:19:47,560 Speaker 1: that this discussion we've just had is really dense and 355 00:19:47,640 --> 00:19:51,080 Speaker 1: there's a lot of things about nodes and traffic and 356 00:19:51,200 --> 00:19:54,679 Speaker 1: encryption and layers here. So I created an example to 357 00:19:54,760 --> 00:19:57,359 Speaker 1: kind of illustrate this. And we're going to get to 358 00:19:57,400 --> 00:20:00,320 Speaker 1: that in just a moment, but before we do, let's 359 00:20:00,320 --> 00:20:03,920 Speaker 1: take a quick break to thank our sponsor. Okay, So 360 00:20:04,200 --> 00:20:07,080 Speaker 1: here's my example, and I think it's a doozy of 361 00:20:07,119 --> 00:20:11,360 Speaker 1: an example because it's completely believable. I decided to use 362 00:20:11,440 --> 00:20:14,560 Speaker 1: as an example two of our beloved co workers here 363 00:20:14,600 --> 00:20:17,359 Speaker 1: at how stuff works. Uh, and when you start thinking 364 00:20:17,400 --> 00:20:20,720 Speaker 1: to yourself, who would be so paranoid that they would 365 00:20:20,720 --> 00:20:25,480 Speaker 1: need an incredibly secure communication process? Two names leap to 366 00:20:25,600 --> 00:20:28,480 Speaker 1: mind from the shadows and then back into the shadows, 367 00:20:28,520 --> 00:20:30,720 Speaker 1: because that's where they belong. One of them wearing a 368 00:20:30,760 --> 00:20:33,600 Speaker 1: gremlin mask ye, and maybe a fedora on top of it. 369 00:20:33,600 --> 00:20:36,199 Speaker 1: It's not a fedora, I know, Ben Dora. No, it's 370 00:20:36,240 --> 00:20:38,520 Speaker 1: a trill Bey, I'm going to call it a fedor anyway, 371 00:20:38,560 --> 00:20:41,680 Speaker 1: So Ben Bolan and Matt Frederick so Stuff they don't 372 00:20:41,680 --> 00:20:44,200 Speaker 1: want you to know hosts. Yes, and if you've never 373 00:20:44,320 --> 00:20:48,760 Speaker 1: ever listened to that show, go check it out. Watched show. Yeah, 374 00:20:48,760 --> 00:20:51,520 Speaker 1: that's great. So So let's say that Ben wants to 375 00:20:51,600 --> 00:20:54,240 Speaker 1: contact Matt and he wants the communication to be secure, 376 00:20:54,320 --> 00:20:56,840 Speaker 1: so he sends it across the Tour network using this 377 00:20:56,920 --> 00:21:00,360 Speaker 1: freely available software. He's got the Tour bundle installed, and 378 00:21:00,440 --> 00:21:03,359 Speaker 1: he sends the message along. So here's what happens. Ben 379 00:21:03,359 --> 00:21:06,960 Speaker 1: would contact a proxy server on the Tour network. Now, 380 00:21:07,040 --> 00:21:10,920 Speaker 1: that proxy server would then determine the route of nodes 381 00:21:11,440 --> 00:21:13,399 Speaker 1: or the number of hops that it will take to 382 00:21:13,440 --> 00:21:17,320 Speaker 1: get from the proxy server to Matt's computer. So for 383 00:21:17,480 --> 00:21:21,840 Speaker 1: argument's sake, let's say again that it's just uh five nodes, 384 00:21:22,000 --> 00:21:24,840 Speaker 1: So it's a B, C, D E. Those are the 385 00:21:25,000 --> 00:21:28,280 Speaker 1: Those are the nodes that it's going to go through. Now, 386 00:21:29,160 --> 00:21:33,520 Speaker 1: each hop becomes an encryption layer on this onion, and 387 00:21:33,560 --> 00:21:36,920 Speaker 1: the core of the onion is Ben's original message to Matt, 388 00:21:37,000 --> 00:21:40,320 Speaker 1: so that's the very center. Now Ben's proxy server starts 389 00:21:40,320 --> 00:21:44,600 Speaker 1: to construct layers of encryption based upon the path that 390 00:21:44,760 --> 00:21:48,400 Speaker 1: this onion is going to take journeying from the proxy 391 00:21:48,480 --> 00:21:51,880 Speaker 1: server all the way to Matt's computer, and the intermost 392 00:21:51,960 --> 00:21:55,199 Speaker 1: layer will be the encryption for mats proxy. Yes, so 393 00:21:55,240 --> 00:21:58,320 Speaker 1: the next layer out would be the node just before 394 00:21:58,480 --> 00:22:01,760 Speaker 1: it gets to Matt's proxy. The next layer out would 395 00:22:01,760 --> 00:22:03,359 Speaker 1: be the node before that, and so on and so 396 00:22:03,480 --> 00:22:06,080 Speaker 1: forth until you got to the first node that the 397 00:22:06,080 --> 00:22:09,800 Speaker 1: proxy server sends this onion onto. Now, every time the 398 00:22:09,840 --> 00:22:13,879 Speaker 1: onion travels to a new node, it decrypts that layer, 399 00:22:14,040 --> 00:22:18,280 Speaker 1: the corresponding layer of encryption. Yeah, so that that layer 400 00:22:18,320 --> 00:22:20,679 Speaker 1: of the onion gets pulled away, and that's how the 401 00:22:20,720 --> 00:22:25,560 Speaker 1: node knows where to send it onto next. So proxy 402 00:22:25,600 --> 00:22:28,640 Speaker 1: service sends it on to node A. Note A strips 403 00:22:28,640 --> 00:22:30,919 Speaker 1: away that encryption and sees that needs to send it 404 00:22:30,960 --> 00:22:35,440 Speaker 1: on to node B. Node B gets this onion. Now 405 00:22:35,480 --> 00:22:38,200 Speaker 1: Node B only knows that Node A sent the onion, 406 00:22:38,240 --> 00:22:40,760 Speaker 1: doesn't know where the onion originally came from, and it 407 00:22:41,240 --> 00:22:44,600 Speaker 1: decrypts that next layer, strips it free, uh, finds the 408 00:22:44,600 --> 00:22:47,359 Speaker 1: identification of notes C and send it along. Yep, Node 409 00:22:47,400 --> 00:22:49,879 Speaker 1: C doesn't know about Note A, just Notes knows about 410 00:22:49,920 --> 00:22:51,919 Speaker 1: Node B, So so on and so forth till it 411 00:22:51,920 --> 00:22:53,840 Speaker 1: gets to Matt. By the time it gets to Matt, 412 00:22:53,880 --> 00:22:55,800 Speaker 1: all those layers of encryption have been stripped away and 413 00:22:55,840 --> 00:22:59,080 Speaker 1: that can actually read what the messages. Therefore, anyone who's 414 00:22:59,080 --> 00:23:01,399 Speaker 1: trying to analyze all of this traffic would would just 415 00:23:01,440 --> 00:23:05,440 Speaker 1: see a message passing between two seemingly random routers with 416 00:23:05,440 --> 00:23:08,800 Speaker 1: with no way of knowing either where that information came 417 00:23:08,840 --> 00:23:11,639 Speaker 1: from or what the ultimate destination is. Yep, And because 418 00:23:11,720 --> 00:23:14,480 Speaker 1: you've encrypted it so many times, they probably can't even 419 00:23:14,480 --> 00:23:17,240 Speaker 1: tell what the information. They can't read it, they don't 420 00:23:17,280 --> 00:23:20,240 Speaker 1: know where it's going there in the dark. So to them, 421 00:23:20,240 --> 00:23:22,600 Speaker 1: it's just all they know is that traffic is going 422 00:23:22,640 --> 00:23:24,800 Speaker 1: across this network, but they don't have any way of 423 00:23:25,119 --> 00:23:30,240 Speaker 1: deriving meaning from that. Now, once Matt's proxy receives that onion, 424 00:23:30,720 --> 00:23:33,800 Speaker 1: a virtual circuit forms along the nodes. Think of it 425 00:23:33,840 --> 00:23:40,119 Speaker 1: as like a temporary pathway that solidifies between uh Ben's 426 00:23:40,200 --> 00:23:45,560 Speaker 1: proxy and Matt's final computer, and it allows for encryption 427 00:23:45,600 --> 00:23:48,760 Speaker 1: to pass both ways. So you have two different kinds 428 00:23:48,760 --> 00:23:51,720 Speaker 1: of encryption. You've got one kind whenever Ben sends a 429 00:23:51,800 --> 00:23:55,240 Speaker 1: message to Matt, and essentially you have the inverse of 430 00:23:55,280 --> 00:23:58,639 Speaker 1: that when Matt sends it to Ben. So unless you 431 00:23:58,760 --> 00:24:01,280 Speaker 1: have the key to that in encryption, you can't figure 432 00:24:01,280 --> 00:24:06,200 Speaker 1: out what's going on either. So it's it's pretty secure. Now, 433 00:24:06,200 --> 00:24:11,520 Speaker 1: there are some mainly we're talking about vulnerabilities when you 434 00:24:11,560 --> 00:24:14,439 Speaker 1: send it from your computer to that proxy server and 435 00:24:14,600 --> 00:24:17,879 Speaker 1: when that last proxy sends it to the destination. Because 436 00:24:18,240 --> 00:24:21,040 Speaker 1: this is when you don't have the protection of the 437 00:24:21,080 --> 00:24:23,359 Speaker 1: network itself. It's when it's you can think of it 438 00:24:23,400 --> 00:24:25,919 Speaker 1: as the information is leaving the network to get to 439 00:24:26,040 --> 00:24:30,280 Speaker 1: wherever it's going, or entering the net. Yeah, and again, 440 00:24:30,440 --> 00:24:33,720 Speaker 1: if you're using a browser that still has certain things 441 00:24:33,840 --> 00:24:37,600 Speaker 1: enabled like Flash or Java, then you may end up 442 00:24:37,800 --> 00:24:41,439 Speaker 1: having sending along some information that people could identify you 443 00:24:41,520 --> 00:24:44,200 Speaker 1: on based on that. But within the network itself, it's 444 00:24:44,240 --> 00:24:48,400 Speaker 1: incredibly secure, right And and so this, the circuit that 445 00:24:48,400 --> 00:24:50,520 Speaker 1: that you've created, well will last as long as both 446 00:24:50,520 --> 00:24:52,240 Speaker 1: parties want it to. You can you can send a 447 00:24:52,240 --> 00:24:55,080 Speaker 1: command to collapse it at the end of your session, 448 00:24:55,160 --> 00:24:59,119 Speaker 1: you say destroy, and it collapses. This uh, this virtual circuit. 449 00:24:59,359 --> 00:25:00,880 Speaker 1: And then if you going to create a new one, 450 00:25:00,920 --> 00:25:03,479 Speaker 1: you could and it would be a new virtual circuit, 451 00:25:04,119 --> 00:25:07,399 Speaker 1: probably taking a totally different pathway through the nodes. And 452 00:25:07,400 --> 00:25:09,800 Speaker 1: you know, I made the example of ABC D E 453 00:25:10,400 --> 00:25:13,640 Speaker 1: that kind of stuff, but really, you know, it could 454 00:25:13,640 --> 00:25:16,560 Speaker 1: be any order. You know, it's it's and it will 455 00:25:16,640 --> 00:25:19,080 Speaker 1: be an order. That's all. That's one of the who 456 00:25:19,119 --> 00:25:21,120 Speaker 1: points because if it were the same pathway each time, 457 00:25:21,160 --> 00:25:23,280 Speaker 1: then you would ultimately be able to determine who sent 458 00:25:23,359 --> 00:25:25,320 Speaker 1: it and who it went to. So it has to 459 00:25:25,359 --> 00:25:27,679 Speaker 1: be uh, you know. And of course the more the 460 00:25:27,720 --> 00:25:30,760 Speaker 1: more routers you have available, the more of these relay 461 00:25:30,800 --> 00:25:34,480 Speaker 1: nodes you have, the more secure the communication becomes, so 462 00:25:34,720 --> 00:25:37,720 Speaker 1: that's also really important. Then there's also a concept called 463 00:25:37,760 --> 00:25:40,800 Speaker 1: loose routing, which adds another layer of security on this 464 00:25:40,840 --> 00:25:43,760 Speaker 1: because like I said, you know, you ultimately you have 465 00:25:43,840 --> 00:25:47,520 Speaker 1: these proxies that no way more information than all the 466 00:25:47,600 --> 00:25:49,800 Speaker 1: nodes do. They have to in order to be able 467 00:25:49,800 --> 00:25:52,639 Speaker 1: to make that layer of encryption and have this onion 468 00:25:52,720 --> 00:25:55,720 Speaker 1: pass from one spot to the next. So one thing 469 00:25:55,800 --> 00:25:59,640 Speaker 1: you could do with loose routing is that the proxy 470 00:25:59,760 --> 00:26:04,119 Speaker 1: and up sending the onion on to the first node. 471 00:26:04,280 --> 00:26:06,480 Speaker 1: But that's all the proxy knows about the probably and 472 00:26:06,520 --> 00:26:09,560 Speaker 1: then the first nodes responsibility is to create the rest 473 00:26:09,640 --> 00:26:13,439 Speaker 1: of that pathway. So even that first stop isn't aware 474 00:26:13,480 --> 00:26:16,280 Speaker 1: of where, how, what path it's gonna take to get 475 00:26:16,280 --> 00:26:18,960 Speaker 1: to its destination. It just knows this is the first 476 00:26:18,960 --> 00:26:21,200 Speaker 1: step of that path, but beyond that I don't know, 477 00:26:21,520 --> 00:26:24,440 Speaker 1: So it adds another layer of security to it that way. Now, again, 478 00:26:24,440 --> 00:26:26,919 Speaker 1: if you were able to target that first node, you 479 00:26:27,000 --> 00:26:28,880 Speaker 1: might be able to figure some stuff out, but really 480 00:26:28,880 --> 00:26:30,560 Speaker 1: you just know that it came from a proxy. You 481 00:26:30,560 --> 00:26:33,560 Speaker 1: wouldn't know who sent the information to the proxy in 482 00:26:33,560 --> 00:26:37,160 Speaker 1: the first place. But yeah, so we've got these these 483 00:26:37,280 --> 00:26:40,080 Speaker 1: endpoints that have some vulnerabilities, but other than that, it's 484 00:26:40,119 --> 00:26:43,000 Speaker 1: it's pretty secure. Uh, I've got to We've got a 485 00:26:43,000 --> 00:26:44,720 Speaker 1: great little bit about how secure it is, and a 486 00:26:44,760 --> 00:26:48,439 Speaker 1: little in just a little while. But today nodes or 487 00:26:48,480 --> 00:26:51,159 Speaker 1: relays within the system still don't know the origin or 488 00:26:51,280 --> 00:26:55,120 Speaker 1: ultimate destination of information. And you still create virtual circuits 489 00:26:55,240 --> 00:26:59,320 Speaker 1: between the initiator and the recipient for encrypted anonymous channels. 490 00:26:59,320 --> 00:27:03,280 Speaker 1: But there's no our use of this onion metaphor. I mean, 491 00:27:03,280 --> 00:27:06,480 Speaker 1: it's not it's not the same implementation. You get the 492 00:27:06,520 --> 00:27:09,560 Speaker 1: same result, but it's a different implementation that does it. 493 00:27:10,040 --> 00:27:12,200 Speaker 1: But it's this, you know, it's following a lot of 494 00:27:12,240 --> 00:27:15,199 Speaker 1: the same philosophies. And you've got a tour directory that 495 00:27:15,280 --> 00:27:17,919 Speaker 1: keeps track of all the available nodes that are on 496 00:27:17,960 --> 00:27:21,719 Speaker 1: the system at any given moment. As of January, there 497 00:27:21,720 --> 00:27:25,119 Speaker 1: are about five thousand computers around the world operated by 498 00:27:25,119 --> 00:27:27,840 Speaker 1: those volunteers that I mentioned serving as potential nodes in 499 00:27:27,840 --> 00:27:30,199 Speaker 1: this system. Right, And when you send a message to 500 00:27:30,280 --> 00:27:34,240 Speaker 1: recipient across the Tour network, your Tour browser or whatever 501 00:27:34,600 --> 00:27:39,159 Speaker 1: consults this directory, which then uh gives it a route 502 00:27:39,280 --> 00:27:41,920 Speaker 1: of nodes, and then you can send the encrypted information 503 00:27:41,960 --> 00:27:45,240 Speaker 1: across and each node further encrypts the message again and 504 00:27:45,440 --> 00:27:47,600 Speaker 1: only knows the note immediately before and after, kind of 505 00:27:47,640 --> 00:27:51,080 Speaker 1: like the previous version we just talked about. So it's 506 00:27:51,200 --> 00:27:54,480 Speaker 1: not that different, it's just this whole layer metaphor is 507 00:27:54,560 --> 00:27:58,560 Speaker 1: kind of no longer as accurate. But um, yeah, one 508 00:27:58,600 --> 00:28:00,199 Speaker 1: thing you've got to remember is that because as you've 509 00:28:00,240 --> 00:28:03,880 Speaker 1: got this extra layer of encryption going on, and it's 510 00:28:04,119 --> 00:28:08,480 Speaker 1: purposefully obvious, skating the the origin by hopping around a lot, 511 00:28:08,840 --> 00:28:12,159 Speaker 1: communication is not as quick, right, It's going to take 512 00:28:12,200 --> 00:28:14,800 Speaker 1: a longer necessarily. So if you're using Tour in order 513 00:28:14,840 --> 00:28:18,159 Speaker 1: to send instant messages, your definition of instant maybe a 514 00:28:18,160 --> 00:28:20,760 Speaker 1: little different than what it normally would be. It may 515 00:28:20,800 --> 00:28:23,480 Speaker 1: just be pretty darn quick, but not as instant as 516 00:28:23,520 --> 00:28:27,560 Speaker 1: this other method. Yeah. Um. Furthermore, it is not the 517 00:28:27,600 --> 00:28:30,800 Speaker 1: most secure thing that you can do. No. I actually 518 00:28:30,880 --> 00:28:33,879 Speaker 1: read a great article on the best way of using 519 00:28:33,960 --> 00:28:38,240 Speaker 1: Tour as as part of an approach to securely using 520 00:28:38,280 --> 00:28:41,640 Speaker 1: the Internet and maintaining your anonymity, and I thought about 521 00:28:41,680 --> 00:28:44,280 Speaker 1: including it in this podcast. I really did, Guys. I 522 00:28:44,360 --> 00:28:47,360 Speaker 1: was gonna go all into the tips this guy had, 523 00:28:47,360 --> 00:28:50,080 Speaker 1: and then I realized that it was so in depth 524 00:28:50,120 --> 00:28:52,400 Speaker 1: and there was so much to keep tak into consideration 525 00:28:52,920 --> 00:28:55,400 Speaker 1: that really we could just do a full podcast just 526 00:28:55,520 --> 00:28:57,560 Speaker 1: on that, and perhaps in the future we will. If you, 527 00:28:57,600 --> 00:29:01,000 Speaker 1: guys in particular, want to know so I want to 528 00:29:01,000 --> 00:29:04,040 Speaker 1: be as anonymous and secure as possible, Tell me what 529 00:29:04,080 --> 00:29:06,640 Speaker 1: I need to do, and we'll we'll give you the podcast. 530 00:29:06,720 --> 00:29:08,760 Speaker 1: We should we should do that episode. Um I'll tell 531 00:29:08,800 --> 00:29:11,720 Speaker 1: you right now. It's crazy, but but right because because 532 00:29:11,720 --> 00:29:13,840 Speaker 1: even if you're using the most recent version of tour 533 00:29:14,040 --> 00:29:16,959 Speaker 1: I mean, which, as we have just detailed, is an 534 00:29:17,000 --> 00:29:22,720 Speaker 1: incredibly uh complex and encrypted process, a determined party could 535 00:29:22,800 --> 00:29:26,560 Speaker 1: exploit vulnerabilities and Firefox itself, which which Tour is based in. 536 00:29:27,000 --> 00:29:29,720 Speaker 1: Um it could attempt to set up monitoring nodes in 537 00:29:29,720 --> 00:29:33,040 Speaker 1: the network. UM or it could just methodically work on 538 00:29:33,160 --> 00:29:35,720 Speaker 1: key decryption in order to spy on your activities, so 539 00:29:37,000 --> 00:29:40,120 Speaker 1: uh stuff can still happen. Yeah, we'll think about doing 540 00:29:40,160 --> 00:29:42,960 Speaker 1: a full security episode. I mean, I kind of think 541 00:29:42,960 --> 00:29:44,959 Speaker 1: we'll have to pull Ben in for that one. Oh, 542 00:29:45,040 --> 00:29:47,040 Speaker 1: that would be great. We should totally do more classovers. 543 00:29:47,080 --> 00:29:49,360 Speaker 1: We'll we'll see if we can get Ben to be 544 00:29:49,400 --> 00:29:53,120 Speaker 1: available for an episode where we really talk about and 545 00:29:53,160 --> 00:29:55,240 Speaker 1: you know it's going to sound paranoid and crazy, but 546 00:29:55,360 --> 00:29:57,680 Speaker 1: the thing is technology, in order for it to work, 547 00:29:58,320 --> 00:30:01,440 Speaker 1: UH needs to have certain in nation so it can 548 00:30:01,720 --> 00:30:04,360 Speaker 1: allow you to have this communication. But because it needs 549 00:30:04,360 --> 00:30:07,880 Speaker 1: that certain information, it means that your anonymity is at risk. 550 00:30:08,000 --> 00:30:10,120 Speaker 1: So you've got to do these kind of crazy things. Also, 551 00:30:10,160 --> 00:30:15,480 Speaker 1: they're wacky bugs like heart bleed. Yeah actually, um okay, 552 00:30:15,640 --> 00:30:17,800 Speaker 1: go ahead and mention this so heart bleed. If you 553 00:30:17,840 --> 00:30:20,640 Speaker 1: listen to our previous episode, we talked all about this 554 00:30:20,760 --> 00:30:24,640 Speaker 1: vulnerability that was an open SSL versions one point zero 555 00:30:24,680 --> 00:30:28,720 Speaker 1: point one through one point zero point one F and 556 00:30:28,840 --> 00:30:32,040 Speaker 1: UH and how that ended up meaning that people who 557 00:30:32,360 --> 00:30:36,400 Speaker 1: use the heartbeat method could get access to encryption keys 558 00:30:36,720 --> 00:30:39,280 Speaker 1: and thus see everything that's going across the server. So 559 00:30:39,360 --> 00:30:42,360 Speaker 1: you might wonder does this work on the tour network, 560 00:30:42,600 --> 00:30:46,120 Speaker 1: this crazy relay node network, And the short answer is, 561 00:30:46,200 --> 00:30:50,400 Speaker 1: technically it works, but it doesn't help anybody out because 562 00:30:51,200 --> 00:30:54,719 Speaker 1: even if you were to see the information moving across 563 00:30:54,720 --> 00:30:58,720 Speaker 1: a node, it still has multiple layers of encryption, so 564 00:30:59,120 --> 00:31:03,080 Speaker 1: it's not as vulnerable. Yeah, although I mean toward towards 565 00:31:03,200 --> 00:31:05,640 Speaker 1: being tour did say that, you know, if you if 566 00:31:05,640 --> 00:31:07,160 Speaker 1: you really want to be secure, you might just want 567 00:31:07,160 --> 00:31:08,960 Speaker 1: to stay off the internet for a few days, right, 568 00:31:09,040 --> 00:31:11,640 Speaker 1: And they did say that they had planned on rolling 569 00:31:11,640 --> 00:31:16,680 Speaker 1: out patches of the open SSL uh software because the upgrade, 570 00:31:17,160 --> 00:31:21,640 Speaker 1: the newest patch does patch that vulnerability. So uh, they 571 00:31:21,640 --> 00:31:25,200 Speaker 1: are going to be fixing up those nodes over time anyway. 572 00:31:25,200 --> 00:31:27,080 Speaker 1: In fact, by the time this podcast comes out, most 573 00:31:27,080 --> 00:31:31,080 Speaker 1: of them may already be addressed. But yeah, they said that, Um, 574 00:31:31,440 --> 00:31:36,920 Speaker 1: that worst case scenario, you're probably still pretty okay. You know, 575 00:31:37,240 --> 00:31:41,360 Speaker 1: in the grand scheme of things, that heart bleed story 576 00:31:41,480 --> 00:31:44,880 Speaker 1: was a real eye opener. YEA. Then we have the 577 00:31:44,880 --> 00:31:47,800 Speaker 1: other thing we alluded to earlier, oh right, hidden services, 578 00:31:47,880 --> 00:31:50,360 Speaker 1: and that's where that dark net or deep web kind 579 00:31:50,400 --> 00:31:53,920 Speaker 1: of thing comes in. Um okay. So, so tour also 580 00:31:54,000 --> 00:31:56,160 Speaker 1: provides a way to to offer up access to a 581 00:31:56,200 --> 00:31:59,560 Speaker 1: server or to run an entire service without revealing your 582 00:31:59,560 --> 00:32:03,600 Speaker 1: IP addressed to your users and from behind a firewall. Um. 583 00:32:03,800 --> 00:32:06,080 Speaker 1: Sites and services set up like this are are off 584 00:32:06,160 --> 00:32:08,480 Speaker 1: the beaten Internet path. You can't even find them using 585 00:32:08,760 --> 00:32:11,280 Speaker 1: Google or other web searches. You have to be using 586 00:32:11,320 --> 00:32:13,960 Speaker 1: Tour in order to find them. And um, they're they're 587 00:32:14,000 --> 00:32:19,040 Speaker 1: all using what's called the dot Onion extension because onions. Um. Okay. So, 588 00:32:19,040 --> 00:32:22,080 Speaker 1: so basically how this works. The hidden service has a 589 00:32:22,200 --> 00:32:25,640 Speaker 1: public to tour listing, and so when a client wants 590 00:32:25,680 --> 00:32:28,719 Speaker 1: to access that service, the client sets up a rendezvous 591 00:32:28,800 --> 00:32:32,120 Speaker 1: node and sends along an access request via the usual 592 00:32:32,160 --> 00:32:37,840 Speaker 1: Tour encryption routing process UM through a random introduction node 593 00:32:37,920 --> 00:32:41,320 Speaker 1: that the service has set up UM, and then the 594 00:32:41,560 --> 00:32:44,760 Speaker 1: client and service can contact each other through that rendezvous 595 00:32:44,760 --> 00:32:48,400 Speaker 1: node again using the usual Tour circuits. UM. It's it's 596 00:32:48,400 --> 00:32:51,560 Speaker 1: like the the introduction and the rendezvous nodes are translators, right. 597 00:32:51,960 --> 00:32:55,200 Speaker 1: It protects the service and the client because neither knows 598 00:32:55,560 --> 00:32:58,320 Speaker 1: where the other is. That the translators are the recipients 599 00:32:58,360 --> 00:33:03,120 Speaker 1: for each party's communications. And so this this deep web 600 00:33:03,280 --> 00:33:07,480 Speaker 1: or dark net hosts lots of different stuff, some things 601 00:33:07,520 --> 00:33:11,520 Speaker 1: that are definitely in the nefarious category, like the Silk Road, 602 00:33:11,640 --> 00:33:17,080 Speaker 1: although Silk Road still has some legit. Sure of the 603 00:33:17,080 --> 00:33:20,360 Speaker 1: stuff that was on Silk Road was completely legal, the 604 00:33:20,400 --> 00:33:24,200 Speaker 1: other not so much. Yeah, So Silk Road, of course 605 00:33:24,240 --> 00:33:28,160 Speaker 1: that got shut down, but it existed on tour and 606 00:33:28,240 --> 00:33:30,800 Speaker 1: this kind of hidden web because you know, you wouldn't 607 00:33:31,400 --> 00:33:36,120 Speaker 1: want it to be easily accessible, uh, and then everything 608 00:33:36,120 --> 00:33:39,400 Speaker 1: would come crashing down, you know, ultimately came crashing down anyway, 609 00:33:39,480 --> 00:33:41,840 Speaker 1: but it was hidden better than just sitting there and 610 00:33:41,920 --> 00:33:45,720 Speaker 1: on the web. So yeah, that's that's definitely one of 611 00:33:45,760 --> 00:33:48,360 Speaker 1: the other issues. And again there are other things that 612 00:33:48,400 --> 00:33:51,040 Speaker 1: are on this deep net, this this dark net or 613 00:33:51,080 --> 00:33:55,120 Speaker 1: rather or deep web that again not nefarious at all. 614 00:33:55,440 --> 00:33:59,040 Speaker 1: They have very legitimate purposes for existing. It's completely legal, 615 00:33:59,120 --> 00:34:01,600 Speaker 1: but it's also designed in such a way as to 616 00:34:01,640 --> 00:34:03,760 Speaker 1: protect the identity of the people who need to use 617 00:34:03,760 --> 00:34:08,319 Speaker 1: the services. So again, just because we have some really 618 00:34:08,400 --> 00:34:13,920 Speaker 1: high profile examples of naughtiness doesn't mean that the entire 619 00:34:14,000 --> 00:34:17,000 Speaker 1: network is naughty. Just like there are other services that 620 00:34:17,040 --> 00:34:19,440 Speaker 1: people have used where some people are using it in 621 00:34:19,600 --> 00:34:24,040 Speaker 1: order to get like illegal downloads of whatever content they want, 622 00:34:24,560 --> 00:34:27,080 Speaker 1: but most people aren't. A lot of the focuses on 623 00:34:27,120 --> 00:34:29,439 Speaker 1: the people who are the pirates, and thus the entire 624 00:34:29,520 --> 00:34:33,520 Speaker 1: service gets painted as yeah, yeah, it's I I read 625 00:34:33,560 --> 00:34:35,200 Speaker 1: a really great quote and I don't have it open 626 00:34:35,280 --> 00:34:38,160 Speaker 1: right now, and um. Bloomberg Business Week did a really 627 00:34:38,239 --> 00:34:43,120 Speaker 1: great article in January about about tour in general and 628 00:34:43,480 --> 00:34:45,120 Speaker 1: the kids who are running it and all that kind 629 00:34:45,120 --> 00:34:47,640 Speaker 1: of stuff, and uh, the the example that I think 630 00:34:47,680 --> 00:34:50,200 Speaker 1: they used was that, you know, you don't hear about 631 00:34:50,800 --> 00:34:54,439 Speaker 1: someone who's stalker couldn't find them. You you hear about 632 00:34:54,520 --> 00:34:58,200 Speaker 1: the kid who got drugs or the child porn rang 633 00:34:58,320 --> 00:35:01,279 Speaker 1: or something right, right, So you know there are some 634 00:35:01,520 --> 00:35:06,640 Speaker 1: very very The Navy wouldn't have been interested in making this, uh, 635 00:35:06,680 --> 00:35:09,919 Speaker 1: in order just to have crime happened, because as low 636 00:35:09,960 --> 00:35:12,560 Speaker 1: as your opinion of the Navy, maybe depending on if 637 00:35:12,560 --> 00:35:15,480 Speaker 1: you're a Marine or not, it's it's really not in 638 00:35:15,560 --> 00:35:18,920 Speaker 1: that business. No, but but certainly the fact that this 639 00:35:19,000 --> 00:35:21,680 Speaker 1: kind of illegal activity can go on means that it 640 00:35:21,719 --> 00:35:26,600 Speaker 1: attracts attention from, for example, the n s A. Yes, Uh, 641 00:35:26,719 --> 00:35:29,000 Speaker 1: I love the stories about the n s A and 642 00:35:29,120 --> 00:35:33,600 Speaker 1: tour because they're both infuriating and funny at the same time. 643 00:35:33,680 --> 00:35:37,160 Speaker 1: So infuriating in that, uh, the n s A has attempted. 644 00:35:37,560 --> 00:35:39,640 Speaker 1: We know the n s A has attempted to try 645 00:35:39,640 --> 00:35:43,680 Speaker 1: and crack because some of those slides that have come 646 00:35:43,719 --> 00:35:48,160 Speaker 1: out from Standon's League A specifically mentioned tour yep, and uh, 647 00:35:48,920 --> 00:35:51,880 Speaker 1: one of the documents within the n s A is 648 00:35:51,920 --> 00:35:56,280 Speaker 1: titled Tour Stinks. And the reason they say Tour stinks 649 00:35:56,320 --> 00:35:59,040 Speaker 1: is because it's so gosh darn hard to figure out 650 00:35:59,360 --> 00:36:03,719 Speaker 1: what formation is within the Tour network. Now, they do 651 00:36:03,920 --> 00:36:07,200 Speaker 1: note that if you are able to target those points 652 00:36:07,320 --> 00:36:10,239 Speaker 1: where information is coming into the network are coming out 653 00:36:10,239 --> 00:36:12,520 Speaker 1: of the network, then you are more likely to be 654 00:36:12,600 --> 00:36:15,480 Speaker 1: able to determine what is going on and who is 655 00:36:15,520 --> 00:36:19,160 Speaker 1: talking to whom. But if it's within the network itself, 656 00:36:19,600 --> 00:36:22,520 Speaker 1: there's no report that has leaked so far that has 657 00:36:22,560 --> 00:36:25,120 Speaker 1: indicated the NSA has been able to crack that, which 658 00:36:25,160 --> 00:36:28,760 Speaker 1: has not stopped a whole lot of theorists from saying 659 00:36:29,040 --> 00:36:32,360 Speaker 1: that they have totally cracked it, and that the reports 660 00:36:32,360 --> 00:36:34,480 Speaker 1: saying that they haven't cracked it are just so that 661 00:36:34,520 --> 00:36:37,920 Speaker 1: people feel, yeah, that they people will feel a false 662 00:36:37,920 --> 00:36:41,600 Speaker 1: sense of security using tour. Here's the thing about conspiracy theories, 663 00:36:41,600 --> 00:36:44,000 Speaker 1: and again, I wish we had been on here right now. Uh. 664 00:36:44,080 --> 00:36:45,920 Speaker 1: You know, you can you can have a lack of 665 00:36:45,960 --> 00:36:48,520 Speaker 1: evidence and that becomes evidence, or if you have a 666 00:36:48,560 --> 00:36:53,360 Speaker 1: denial then that becomes hard evidence, you know. So I 667 00:36:53,360 --> 00:36:56,080 Speaker 1: I think, I really do think because I don't think 668 00:36:56,080 --> 00:36:58,960 Speaker 1: the n s A ever intended for all the information 669 00:36:58,960 --> 00:37:01,320 Speaker 1: to leak out based up on I don't know everything 670 00:37:01,320 --> 00:37:05,239 Speaker 1: that's happened since then. Uh So I'm pretty willing to 671 00:37:05,280 --> 00:37:09,799 Speaker 1: believe that they have not yet cracked how to get 672 00:37:09,960 --> 00:37:12,279 Speaker 1: look at information in a meaningful way on the Tour 673 00:37:12,320 --> 00:37:15,240 Speaker 1: network itself. In general, I would say that tours seems 674 00:37:15,800 --> 00:37:19,600 Speaker 1: for many purposes pretty secure. Now, keep in mind, you 675 00:37:19,640 --> 00:37:23,920 Speaker 1: still have to uh practice good internet security on your 676 00:37:23,960 --> 00:37:27,799 Speaker 1: own even if you're using tour. Uh And like I said, well, 677 00:37:27,840 --> 00:37:29,600 Speaker 1: maybe we'll do a full episode on that if you're 678 00:37:29,640 --> 00:37:31,799 Speaker 1: interested in that, let's know, because you know, maybe that 679 00:37:31,800 --> 00:37:34,600 Speaker 1: our listeners are thinking, wow, they did a heart bleed 680 00:37:34,640 --> 00:37:37,359 Speaker 1: episode in a tour episode, go back to talking about 681 00:37:37,480 --> 00:37:39,920 Speaker 1: Nintendo or something that we don't know. We have to 682 00:37:39,960 --> 00:37:41,400 Speaker 1: hear from you in order to know. So if you 683 00:37:41,440 --> 00:37:45,400 Speaker 1: want to know really how to securely navigate the web 684 00:37:45,960 --> 00:37:48,400 Speaker 1: like a superspy, let us know, and we'll give you 685 00:37:48,440 --> 00:37:51,319 Speaker 1: all the inside skinny and uh maybe we'll be able 686 00:37:51,320 --> 00:37:53,080 Speaker 1: to grab Ben on here and have them do his 687 00:37:53,160 --> 00:37:56,359 Speaker 1: creepy voice and be awesome. So I do not want 688 00:37:56,360 --> 00:37:58,480 Speaker 1: an entire episode of Ben's creepy I don't know they 689 00:37:58,640 --> 00:38:02,000 Speaker 1: could do a full episode each. I want at least 690 00:38:02,200 --> 00:38:04,200 Speaker 1: for him to introduce himself trap now. I want to 691 00:38:04,239 --> 00:38:07,440 Speaker 1: see him trying. Yeah, all right, well anyway, let us know. 692 00:38:07,880 --> 00:38:10,480 Speaker 1: You can send us email, all right addresses, text stuff 693 00:38:11,200 --> 00:38:14,799 Speaker 1: discovery dot com, or drop us a line on one 694 00:38:14,840 --> 00:38:18,279 Speaker 1: of the many social networks that we are on in 695 00:38:18,480 --> 00:38:22,839 Speaker 1: full view that includes Facebook, Tumbler, and Twitter. We use 696 00:38:22,880 --> 00:38:25,560 Speaker 1: the handle tech stuff H. S W and Lauren and 697 00:38:25,640 --> 00:38:32,200 Speaker 1: I will talk to you again really soon for more 698 00:38:32,239 --> 00:38:35,279 Speaker 1: on this and thousands of other topics. Staff works dot 699 00:38:35,360 --> 00:38:45,080 Speaker 1: com