1
00:00:00,240 --> 00:00:04,680
Speaker 1: From UFOs to psychic powers and government conspiracies. History is

2
00:00:04,760 --> 00:00:09,080
Speaker 1: riddled with unexplained events. You can turn back now or

3
00:00:09,200 --> 00:00:12,079
Speaker 1: learn the stuff they don't want you to know. A

4
00:00:12,240 --> 00:00:25,800
Speaker 1: production of I Heart Radio. Hello, welcome back to the show.

5
00:00:25,920 --> 00:00:29,639
Speaker 1: My name is Matt our colleague No will return very soon,

6
00:00:30,080 --> 00:00:32,599
Speaker 1: they called me Ben. We're joined as always with our

7
00:00:32,720 --> 00:00:38,159
Speaker 1: super producer Paul. Mission controlled deconds. Most importantly, you are you.

8
00:00:38,159 --> 00:00:41,520
Speaker 1: You are here, and that makes this the stuff they

9
00:00:41,720 --> 00:00:45,560
Speaker 1: don't want you to know. Matt. This is a two

10
00:00:45,600 --> 00:00:48,479
Speaker 1: parter for us. It's one that you and I are

11
00:00:48,560 --> 00:00:50,760
Speaker 1: very excited about. And I have to tell you, I'm

12
00:00:50,800 --> 00:00:54,360
Speaker 1: surprised man that we did not talk about this in

13
00:00:54,480 --> 00:00:58,880
Speaker 1: part one. Do you remember those spycraft or spy tech toys.

14
00:00:58,960 --> 00:01:02,720
Speaker 1: Did you ever mess with those? Oh? Yeah, spyecraft toys

15
00:01:02,760 --> 00:01:06,559
Speaker 1: were the stuff. I remember, the magnifying glasses, the mirrors

16
00:01:06,560 --> 00:01:11,720
Speaker 1: that I could look around a corner with, um trying

17
00:01:11,720 --> 00:01:16,360
Speaker 1: to think of other Oh, early walkie talkie, I remember

18
00:01:16,440 --> 00:01:19,400
Speaker 1: having a conversion of that. Yeah. There used to be

19
00:01:19,440 --> 00:01:23,520
Speaker 1: this red laser toy that was like it was supposed

20
00:01:23,560 --> 00:01:26,039
Speaker 1: to be a trap, but it was really just you know,

21
00:01:26,080 --> 00:01:28,440
Speaker 1: you would walk past the laser, I know would it

22
00:01:28,440 --> 00:01:31,679
Speaker 1: would in that case ping up? But but yes, so

23
00:01:32,360 --> 00:01:38,520
Speaker 1: we know that spying in society has been glamorized, right

24
00:01:38,600 --> 00:01:41,039
Speaker 1: and we know that unlike some other things that have

25
00:01:41,080 --> 00:01:46,960
Speaker 1: been glamorized, say dragons, spine is real. Spine. Spine is dangerous,

26
00:01:47,000 --> 00:01:52,560
Speaker 1: sometimes as dangerous in the long term effects as fictional dragons.

27
00:01:53,720 --> 00:01:56,840
Speaker 1: With our previous episode, folks, which we do hope you enjoyed,

28
00:01:57,240 --> 00:02:01,360
Speaker 1: we looked into the past of the of trade craft

29
00:02:01,640 --> 00:02:04,520
Speaker 1: that's the classy name for spycraft, and then we looked

30
00:02:04,520 --> 00:02:08,080
Speaker 1: a little bit into the present problems, the trends, and

31
00:02:08,120 --> 00:02:12,040
Speaker 1: the conspiracies of foot today. Matt, you and I and

32
00:02:12,080 --> 00:02:15,240
Speaker 1: our fellow conspiracy realist along of course with Paul Mission

33
00:02:15,280 --> 00:02:19,160
Speaker 1: Controled Decond are exploring the present in a little more detail,

34
00:02:19,560 --> 00:02:22,160
Speaker 1: and towards the end we're going to look into what

35
00:02:22,240 --> 00:02:25,919
Speaker 1: I think is the scary part the future of spying.

36
00:02:26,280 --> 00:02:30,079
Speaker 1: Oh yes, but right now we're gonna stick in more

37
00:02:30,080 --> 00:02:33,519
Speaker 1: of the present. Just we're gonna talk modern spycraft. What

38
00:02:33,639 --> 00:02:36,560
Speaker 1: is happening right now, because it is happening right now.

39
00:02:36,720 --> 00:02:39,760
Speaker 1: We assure you not to you, not to you, well

40
00:02:39,800 --> 00:02:46,040
Speaker 1: probably probably maybe Here are the facts. Yeah, it's changed.

41
00:02:46,200 --> 00:02:50,959
Speaker 1: Modern spycraft is around, but it's changed in step with technology.

42
00:02:51,040 --> 00:02:54,640
Speaker 1: And if you look at the history of human civilization,

43
00:02:54,919 --> 00:03:00,280
Speaker 1: one unfortunate truth you will always find is that war

44
00:03:00,680 --> 00:03:04,760
Speaker 1: is responsible for a lot of innovations. Like bad things

45
00:03:04,840 --> 00:03:09,200
Speaker 1: happening to people on a very large scale often produces

46
00:03:09,280 --> 00:03:13,320
Speaker 1: some of the most innovative periods in human history, which

47
00:03:13,360 --> 00:03:17,880
Speaker 1: stinks because there are billions of people who died as

48
00:03:17,919 --> 00:03:20,000
Speaker 1: a result of this, And would you want to go

49
00:03:20,080 --> 00:03:23,400
Speaker 1: to them and say, well, hey, you know, overall, nowadays

50
00:03:23,400 --> 00:03:25,840
Speaker 1: we think it was kind of worth it. Oh. Yeah.

51
00:03:25,960 --> 00:03:30,040
Speaker 1: The thing is when it comes to spying, I don't

52
00:03:30,040 --> 00:03:31,840
Speaker 1: know if I would characterizing in the same way been

53
00:03:32,240 --> 00:03:35,000
Speaker 1: exactly just when it with the messed up nature of

54
00:03:35,040 --> 00:03:37,960
Speaker 1: it with spying, because for me, I do see kind

55
00:03:38,000 --> 00:03:41,960
Speaker 1: of beauty here where you're marrying scientific innovation with pure

56
00:03:42,160 --> 00:03:45,040
Speaker 1: I think human creativity in a lot of ways with

57
00:03:45,200 --> 00:03:49,200
Speaker 1: some of the tech that is developed in uh over

58
00:03:49,240 --> 00:03:50,640
Speaker 1: the course of the years and it is being used

59
00:03:50,720 --> 00:03:55,200
Speaker 1: right now. Yeah, yeah, well said met And we talked

60
00:03:55,240 --> 00:03:57,680
Speaker 1: a little bit at the end of our first episode

61
00:03:57,800 --> 00:04:04,280
Speaker 1: about how the fictional world of spying doesn't always match

62
00:04:04,480 --> 00:04:10,080
Speaker 1: what people are actually doing and how technology might seem

63
00:04:11,360 --> 00:04:14,160
Speaker 1: like it might seem like it would mean the old

64
00:04:14,320 --> 00:04:17,640
Speaker 1: days of trade craft are gone, But that's kind of

65
00:04:17,680 --> 00:04:22,080
Speaker 1: misleading because the truth is, yes there are when you

66
00:04:22,120 --> 00:04:25,400
Speaker 1: talk about signs and humans, yes there are quote unquote

67
00:04:25,440 --> 00:04:28,719
Speaker 1: spies who kind of operate purely in the digital realm.

68
00:04:29,400 --> 00:04:34,120
Speaker 1: But the truth is that for most folks, if you

69
00:04:34,440 --> 00:04:37,400
Speaker 1: thought of them as like a field agent or a

70
00:04:37,440 --> 00:04:42,359
Speaker 1: field asset, they're taking a hybrid approach. They operate clandestinely

71
00:04:42,760 --> 00:04:47,080
Speaker 1: leveraging digital tradecraft. There was one example we found it's

72
00:04:47,080 --> 00:04:51,400
Speaker 1: pretty interesting. In two the FBI announced it had taken

73
00:04:51,440 --> 00:04:54,280
Speaker 1: out this Russian spy ring that was engaging in what

74
00:04:54,320 --> 00:04:59,360
Speaker 1: they called long term deep cover activity. This is like

75
00:04:59,440 --> 00:05:02,799
Speaker 1: when when hear those terms, this gets kind of close

76
00:05:02,839 --> 00:05:05,640
Speaker 1: to that show The Americans. Do you remember the Americans?

77
00:05:05,680 --> 00:05:07,400
Speaker 1: Did you watch it? Yeah, it's very close to that.

78
00:05:07,720 --> 00:05:10,800
Speaker 1: Perhaps exactly that maybe it was based on that. Now

79
00:05:10,839 --> 00:05:13,760
Speaker 1: I'm just joking it wasn't. But yeah, this is this

80
00:05:13,839 --> 00:05:17,040
Speaker 1: is very real. Somebody who has been around for a

81
00:05:17,080 --> 00:05:20,480
Speaker 1: decade or more, who has just been keeping tabs on

82
00:05:20,520 --> 00:05:24,480
Speaker 1: someone or some entity or multiple right in this case,

83
00:05:24,560 --> 00:05:27,680
Speaker 1: it was ten people who are doing this. The ones

84
00:05:27,720 --> 00:05:32,960
Speaker 1: that were caught up when when the FBI made that announcement. Um,

85
00:05:33,000 --> 00:05:36,839
Speaker 1: it's just it's incredible. According to what we found here,

86
00:05:37,320 --> 00:05:43,120
Speaker 1: they would exchange information over free wireless at their local Starbucks,

87
00:05:43,800 --> 00:05:48,159
Speaker 1: which was in Times Square. Yeah, and again they got

88
00:05:48,200 --> 00:05:50,960
Speaker 1: away with this for a long long time, right, they

89
00:05:50,960 --> 00:05:54,880
Speaker 1: were successful. It's it's interesting to me to take for

90
00:05:54,960 --> 00:05:56,760
Speaker 1: us to take a moment and think about that. We

91
00:05:56,960 --> 00:06:03,560
Speaker 1: talked in the past about how governments when controlling information,

92
00:06:03,720 --> 00:06:07,240
Speaker 1: whether they were keeping secrets or whether they were learning secrets.

93
00:06:08,000 --> 00:06:11,400
Speaker 1: They were they were taking an approach where you could

94
00:06:11,440 --> 00:06:15,560
Speaker 1: just shut down the avenues toward that information, right, Like

95
00:06:15,640 --> 00:06:18,840
Speaker 1: you can write a couple of letters to the newspapers

96
00:06:18,839 --> 00:06:21,640
Speaker 1: of note and they won't report on something. You can

97
00:06:21,720 --> 00:06:26,520
Speaker 1: suppress other stories, etcetera. But now, with a deluge of

98
00:06:26,600 --> 00:06:30,839
Speaker 1: information in which we exist, it is a valid strategy

99
00:06:31,160 --> 00:06:33,880
Speaker 1: to just sort of like blend in with the crowd

100
00:06:33,920 --> 00:06:37,240
Speaker 1: of endless bytes and bits. And that's what they were doing, right.

101
00:06:38,120 --> 00:06:42,880
Speaker 1: They're not some exception to some ironclad rule. Physical tradecraft

102
00:06:43,160 --> 00:06:47,600
Speaker 1: has embraced I don't like this term, but it has

103
00:06:47,600 --> 00:06:51,800
Speaker 1: embraced the cyber operations and they move in tandem this

104
00:06:51,880 --> 00:06:53,560
Speaker 1: day I I don't know, how do you feel about

105
00:06:53,600 --> 00:06:56,120
Speaker 1: that term? When you hear when you hear some like

106
00:06:56,279 --> 00:07:01,679
Speaker 1: high level government so and so saying, well, we gotta,

107
00:07:01,920 --> 00:07:04,680
Speaker 1: you know, we gotta concentrate on the cyber Yeah. I

108
00:07:04,800 --> 00:07:08,360
Speaker 1: just imagine them in their computer room, which they have

109
00:07:08,600 --> 00:07:11,520
Speaker 1: they by the way, every congress person has a computer

110
00:07:11,640 --> 00:07:14,760
Speaker 1: room in their house. And they're doing naughty things on

111
00:07:14,800 --> 00:07:17,320
Speaker 1: a chat room. That's all I imagine. And I don't

112
00:07:17,320 --> 00:07:22,520
Speaker 1: like imagining it, and I don't appreciate it, well, at least, yeah,

113
00:07:22,560 --> 00:07:25,680
Speaker 1: the middle school version of me. So they click on,

114
00:07:25,840 --> 00:07:29,280
Speaker 1: they click on like find local singles in your area,

115
00:07:29,600 --> 00:07:32,760
Speaker 1: and they get some ransomware or something, and then they

116
00:07:33,200 --> 00:07:36,360
Speaker 1: all of a sudden being worried about cyber is a

117
00:07:36,440 --> 00:07:39,400
Speaker 1: huge part of their platform. Oh no, dude, they're not.

118
00:07:39,440 --> 00:07:41,000
Speaker 1: They're not even going that far. They're just on an

119
00:07:41,000 --> 00:07:45,720
Speaker 1: A O L chat room. Oh okay, okay, they're not.

120
00:07:46,480 --> 00:07:48,880
Speaker 1: They're not. They're not to the land of pop up

121
00:07:48,880 --> 00:07:52,200
Speaker 1: ads yet. No, no, no, no, okay. Well, I wish

122
00:07:52,240 --> 00:07:57,200
Speaker 1: them luck in their war against cyber. Uh. Also, the

123
00:07:57,280 --> 00:08:01,920
Speaker 1: aims of spying, the aims of tradecraft have increased. Industrial

124
00:08:02,080 --> 00:08:05,920
Speaker 1: espionage is a huge, huge industry there's a lot of

125
00:08:05,920 --> 00:08:10,440
Speaker 1: money in it. Agents or assets can also focus on

126
00:08:10,480 --> 00:08:16,040
Speaker 1: monitoring and disrupting terrorist activities. Of course, as you know

127
00:08:16,720 --> 00:08:19,720
Speaker 1: if you are if you were alive during two thousand

128
00:08:19,800 --> 00:08:24,120
Speaker 1: and one and the aftermath, you've seen the global community,

129
00:08:24,240 --> 00:08:29,400
Speaker 1: especially in the West, increasingly focus on what are called

130
00:08:29,480 --> 00:08:36,280
Speaker 1: terrorist activities and sometimes well, unfortunately it's it's not uncommon

131
00:08:36,440 --> 00:08:39,440
Speaker 1: for not just the US but other countries to kind

132
00:08:39,480 --> 00:08:44,840
Speaker 1: of overtime expand the definition of what qualifies as terrorism.

133
00:08:44,920 --> 00:08:48,800
Speaker 1: And also, you know, they're after drug smugglers and cartels,

134
00:08:48,840 --> 00:08:52,960
Speaker 1: always after those guys, and they have been forever, always

135
00:08:54,080 --> 00:09:00,400
Speaker 1: while they sell the drugs on the side. Uh yeah.

136
00:09:00,640 --> 00:09:02,680
Speaker 1: And then just before we continue here, I want to

137
00:09:02,679 --> 00:09:08,920
Speaker 1: reiterate the importance of having a mini cassette tape recorder,

138
00:09:09,160 --> 00:09:12,199
Speaker 1: a physical one that's not connected digitally to anything else.

139
00:09:12,679 --> 00:09:15,319
Speaker 1: Everybody should have one of those, just in case you

140
00:09:15,320 --> 00:09:18,080
Speaker 1: should do. You should go out and get one because

141
00:09:18,120 --> 00:09:20,880
Speaker 1: you can't detect it on a network, which yeah, I

142
00:09:20,960 --> 00:09:24,000
Speaker 1: have best. Good there you go, you have one. But

143
00:09:24,040 --> 00:09:27,960
Speaker 1: I thought it's for your music. Oh no, no, it's

144
00:09:28,000 --> 00:09:32,400
Speaker 1: for the craft, all right, Okay, I respected, I respect

145
00:09:32,440 --> 00:09:35,920
Speaker 1: the craft, so you should. Yeah, it is good by

146
00:09:35,920 --> 00:09:40,840
Speaker 1: the way to not normalize everything being connected online or

147
00:09:40,880 --> 00:09:45,480
Speaker 1: everything being connected on a cloud. Just we're just saying,

148
00:09:45,520 --> 00:09:47,480
Speaker 1: I think Matt and Iron just putting that out there,

149
00:09:47,960 --> 00:09:53,199
Speaker 1: just something to think about. But whether we're talking terrorism,

150
00:09:53,400 --> 00:09:59,640
Speaker 1: industrial espionage, drugs and firearms smuggling, or whatever, the motivations

151
00:09:59,679 --> 00:10:04,960
Speaker 1: remain in the same. A typical non employee spy or

152
00:10:05,320 --> 00:10:09,960
Speaker 1: excuse us, asset will be motivated by one of three things.

153
00:10:10,000 --> 00:10:13,200
Speaker 1: And when we say non employee, what we mean is

154
00:10:13,240 --> 00:10:19,320
Speaker 1: someone who wasn't specifically hired and trained to engage in tradecraft,

155
00:10:19,400 --> 00:10:24,600
Speaker 1: which could mean either being a spy or stopping a spy.

156
00:10:24,640 --> 00:10:28,640
Speaker 1: So let's maybe talk a little bit about what what

157
00:10:28,720 --> 00:10:32,760
Speaker 1: gets people in the game. You have to be they

158
00:10:32,840 --> 00:10:36,280
Speaker 1: listen to this these parts closely. They're they're about three

159
00:10:36,600 --> 00:10:40,120
Speaker 1: rough categories and they are not created equally. Yeah. The

160
00:10:40,200 --> 00:10:43,240
Speaker 1: first it would be if you were seeking some kind

161
00:10:43,400 --> 00:10:48,040
Speaker 1: of gain, whether a financial social gain. Let's say an

162
00:10:48,040 --> 00:10:52,079
Speaker 1: employee with top secret clearance at a nuclear facility. M hmm,

163
00:10:52,679 --> 00:10:55,920
Speaker 1: this person is running to you know, an issue. They

164
00:10:55,960 --> 00:10:58,720
Speaker 1: can't quite make their mortgage the way they used to

165
00:10:58,760 --> 00:11:03,640
Speaker 1: be able to because what of whatever situation. And maybe

166
00:11:03,679 --> 00:11:06,800
Speaker 1: there's also a gambling problem going on. They got held

167
00:11:06,920 --> 00:11:11,720
Speaker 1: it by the one arm bandit right, yeah exactly. Um,

168
00:11:11,760 --> 00:11:14,240
Speaker 1: you know that could be that could be real issue.

169
00:11:14,400 --> 00:11:16,320
Speaker 1: Now they need to find a way to make some

170
00:11:16,360 --> 00:11:19,480
Speaker 1: more money on the side. They decide to get that

171
00:11:19,520 --> 00:11:26,319
Speaker 1: money by selling secrets, which is a real currency. Yes, yes, exactly.

172
00:11:27,280 --> 00:11:30,599
Speaker 1: Or they could even just be not not just the

173
00:11:30,880 --> 00:11:33,080
Speaker 1: idea of financial gain, it could be some kind of

174
00:11:33,240 --> 00:11:36,480
Speaker 1: social gain. They could be bored with life, right, they

175
00:11:36,480 --> 00:11:38,960
Speaker 1: could be tired of the two point five kids, the

176
00:11:39,040 --> 00:11:42,760
Speaker 1: ranch level home, the breakfast and the dinner at the

177
00:11:42,800 --> 00:11:46,199
Speaker 1: same time, and some endless march towards death on we

178
00:11:46,440 --> 00:11:49,880
Speaker 1: as real. Uh, And then you're just describing my life. Man,

179
00:11:49,920 --> 00:11:52,679
Speaker 1: I appreciate not you don't have two point five kids.

180
00:11:55,240 --> 00:11:57,960
Speaker 1: I was. I bring that statistic up because I love it.

181
00:11:57,960 --> 00:12:01,160
Speaker 1: It's where is that point five five kid? You know,

182
00:12:01,320 --> 00:12:03,600
Speaker 1: for a while that was a national average that was

183
00:12:03,640 --> 00:12:08,640
Speaker 1: oft quoted, and I wonder who had point five kids? Anyhow,

184
00:12:09,120 --> 00:12:14,360
Speaker 1: the let's say you are someone general you as someone

185
00:12:14,400 --> 00:12:17,960
Speaker 1: who's kind of bored with life and they're suffering from

186
00:12:17,960 --> 00:12:22,600
Speaker 1: the nihilism and the gray days. But they love spy films,

187
00:12:22,640 --> 00:12:24,959
Speaker 1: the Bond films. They want to shake things up. They

188
00:12:24,960 --> 00:12:28,440
Speaker 1: want to be the kind of person movies taught them

189
00:12:28,640 --> 00:12:32,520
Speaker 1: would be cool. You know. Uh, this last idea, by

190
00:12:32,520 --> 00:12:36,680
Speaker 1: the way, it happens, but it's incredibly dangerous, and a

191
00:12:36,720 --> 00:12:39,800
Speaker 1: lot of folks are not going to get the results

192
00:12:39,920 --> 00:12:43,559
Speaker 1: they want on either side of that relationship, because what

193
00:12:43,600 --> 00:12:47,240
Speaker 1: will people do if they crave social approval, they will

194
00:12:47,320 --> 00:12:52,120
Speaker 1: end up giving themselves away because social approval inherently depends

195
00:12:52,200 --> 00:12:55,679
Speaker 1: on other people knowing what you're doing, which is kind

196
00:12:55,679 --> 00:13:00,360
Speaker 1: of antithetical to spy work any case. Uh, if we're

197
00:13:00,360 --> 00:13:06,480
Speaker 1: talking like financial problems, we're talking social desires, the ideology

198
00:13:06,559 --> 00:13:10,400
Speaker 1: may not really matter here, and a relatively small some

199
00:13:10,600 --> 00:13:13,680
Speaker 1: of cash can prime a pump, and that leads to

200
00:13:13,760 --> 00:13:19,920
Speaker 1: a deeper, increasingly dangerous revelation as they exchange more and

201
00:13:20,040 --> 00:13:23,960
Speaker 1: more info for more and more money, like the like

202
00:13:24,040 --> 00:13:26,760
Speaker 1: the thing we talked about recently in Strange News, where

203
00:13:26,800 --> 00:13:32,000
Speaker 1: that nuclear engineer and his spouse ended up for relatively

204
00:13:32,080 --> 00:13:36,000
Speaker 1: small something like a hundred thousand in cryptocurrency. They ended

205
00:13:36,080 --> 00:13:40,360
Speaker 1: up thinking they were giving away quite a bit. But

206
00:13:40,440 --> 00:13:43,480
Speaker 1: of course, spoiler, that was not a foreign government they

207
00:13:43,480 --> 00:13:47,240
Speaker 1: were talking to. That was the FBI, playing alphabet and disguise.

208
00:13:47,280 --> 00:13:52,640
Speaker 1: I guess yeah, just switching the letters around f K

209
00:13:53,920 --> 00:14:00,240
Speaker 1: b G. They were doing a big literally huh. But

210
00:14:00,240 --> 00:14:03,600
Speaker 1: but okay, in this situation, I think it's important for

211
00:14:03,679 --> 00:14:07,760
Speaker 1: us to talk about why most of those would be

212
00:14:07,960 --> 00:14:13,200
Speaker 1: spies who are motivated that way are doomed from the jump. First,

213
00:14:13,200 --> 00:14:16,480
Speaker 1: they make a really really, really big mistake. It's easy

214
00:14:16,559 --> 00:14:20,440
Speaker 1: mistake to make. They make a very egregious mistake, which

215
00:14:20,520 --> 00:14:25,480
Speaker 1: is assuming that their access to knowledge is powerful leverage.

216
00:14:26,480 --> 00:14:30,480
Speaker 1: It is a little bit of leverage, right, but that

217
00:14:30,600 --> 00:14:36,160
Speaker 1: leverage is dwarfed by the leverage actual intelligence agencies will

218
00:14:36,200 --> 00:14:40,240
Speaker 1: have over them the moment they come forward. Yeah, I

219
00:14:40,280 --> 00:14:42,880
Speaker 1: guess so, because well, if they're on a list or

220
00:14:43,040 --> 00:14:45,920
Speaker 1: or they're being monitored already, right, I mean, I know

221
00:14:45,960 --> 00:14:49,000
Speaker 1: there's active monitoring happening through Solar Wind and some of

222
00:14:49,040 --> 00:14:51,560
Speaker 1: these other programs at all times on anyone within the

223
00:14:51,640 --> 00:14:55,560
Speaker 1: United States. But I wonder, I wonder how deep that

224
00:14:55,720 --> 00:14:58,760
Speaker 1: goes for an individual. I don't need to disagree with you, Ben,

225
00:14:58,760 --> 00:15:01,960
Speaker 1: I just mean I say, yeah, I guess it, just yeah,

226
00:15:02,000 --> 00:15:06,320
Speaker 1: I don't know. Oh yeah, yeah, I see what you're saying. Like,

227
00:15:06,840 --> 00:15:11,480
Speaker 1: not everybody, not everybody is a high value target. Yeah,

228
00:15:11,600 --> 00:15:14,600
Speaker 1: they'd have to paying the radar one time, right that

229
00:15:14,760 --> 00:15:16,800
Speaker 1: first time, I think I agree with you. The moment

230
00:15:16,800 --> 00:15:21,000
Speaker 1: they come forward, that's when oh collection is occurring. Now

231
00:15:21,280 --> 00:15:23,440
Speaker 1: that's what I mean. Yeah, you're so. What I mean

232
00:15:23,480 --> 00:15:25,560
Speaker 1: when when I say like you're doomed from the start

233
00:15:25,720 --> 00:15:28,880
Speaker 1: is think of it this way. Let's say who are

234
00:15:28,880 --> 00:15:31,760
Speaker 1: you going to pick on. Let's pick on Paul. So

235
00:15:31,920 --> 00:15:35,200
Speaker 1: let's say Paul, in addition to being one of the

236
00:15:35,200 --> 00:15:38,800
Speaker 1: best superproducers, if not the best, in the world, is

237
00:15:39,000 --> 00:15:43,479
Speaker 1: also somehow working at an embassy in a foreign country

238
00:15:43,640 --> 00:15:49,600
Speaker 1: and a foreign national approaches him and says, hey, look,

239
00:15:50,680 --> 00:15:53,560
Speaker 1: I will make a deal with you if you give

240
00:15:53,600 --> 00:15:56,440
Speaker 1: me you know, X amount of cash. Paul doesn't have

241
00:15:56,480 --> 00:15:58,960
Speaker 1: to give him that money. He can pay him less

242
00:15:59,320 --> 00:16:03,480
Speaker 1: and he can say, hey, take the deal, or I'll

243
00:16:03,480 --> 00:16:06,880
Speaker 1: go tell the government of this country that you were

244
00:16:06,880 --> 00:16:09,480
Speaker 1: trying to be a spy? Is that what you want

245
00:16:09,520 --> 00:16:14,560
Speaker 1: to do? Like, I have a crumpled twenty I know

246
00:16:14,640 --> 00:16:17,840
Speaker 1: it's not ten tho dollars, but it's also not torture

247
00:16:17,880 --> 00:16:20,240
Speaker 1: and death. So why don't you tell me what's on

248
00:16:20,280 --> 00:16:23,359
Speaker 1: your mind? Bro? Like that can happen because you sacrifice

249
00:16:23,360 --> 00:16:26,080
Speaker 1: that leverage, and if you're the intelligence operator or your

250
00:16:26,120 --> 00:16:29,680
Speaker 1: potential case agent, then you dictate the rules of the

251
00:16:29,720 --> 00:16:33,240
Speaker 1: game going forward. So there could be you know, and

252
00:16:33,600 --> 00:16:37,480
Speaker 1: it's happened before the would be James Bond walks into

253
00:16:37,480 --> 00:16:40,480
Speaker 1: a conversation thinking they're gonna walk out a millionaire, and

254
00:16:40,520 --> 00:16:43,120
Speaker 1: then they walk away realizing that their life and maybe

255
00:16:43,160 --> 00:16:47,160
Speaker 1: the life of their loved ones is now in Paul

256
00:16:47,200 --> 00:16:52,560
Speaker 1: Decan's hands. I think in that scenario that you've just described, Ben,

257
00:16:52,760 --> 00:16:57,200
Speaker 1: the only thing you can do is throw your hands

258
00:16:57,240 --> 00:16:59,880
Speaker 1: up in the air like this and start yelling about

259
00:16:59,880 --> 00:17:04,040
Speaker 1: the widow's son. That's all you could do, and say,

260
00:17:04,080 --> 00:17:08,160
Speaker 1: this man is accusing me of spycraft, really loudly. Think

261
00:17:08,200 --> 00:17:11,640
Speaker 1: it depends on what country you're in, it's true, because

262
00:17:11,720 --> 00:17:15,040
Speaker 1: that's gonna whoosh for some people. Yeah, and that's a

263
00:17:15,040 --> 00:17:17,199
Speaker 1: good point. Well, this and this is all just the

264
00:17:17,280 --> 00:17:21,080
Speaker 1: first category. So what about this. Let's let's pause. We

265
00:17:21,200 --> 00:17:24,640
Speaker 1: got some redactions to do. Will come back and we'll

266
00:17:24,640 --> 00:17:29,320
Speaker 1: tell you about the second categories that most non professional

267
00:17:29,400 --> 00:17:38,800
Speaker 1: spies fall into. And we are back. Let us jump

268
00:17:38,840 --> 00:17:42,879
Speaker 1: into the next version of a would be spy, someone

269
00:17:42,960 --> 00:17:46,880
Speaker 1: motivated by their own ideology or the ideology that has

270
00:17:46,920 --> 00:17:51,160
Speaker 1: been given to them that they've adopted. Uh. Let's say

271
00:17:51,680 --> 00:17:54,879
Speaker 1: someone living within the United States says, you know, I

272
00:17:54,960 --> 00:18:00,359
Speaker 1: don't like what capitalism is doing over here. I think

273
00:18:00,480 --> 00:18:05,240
Speaker 1: I'm I think I can see myself supporting the communist platform. Well,

274
00:18:05,280 --> 00:18:09,399
Speaker 1: I am a spy already, I mean, an asset for

275
00:18:09,600 --> 00:18:14,520
Speaker 1: the n S A. Uh, you know what, I'm gonna

276
00:18:14,600 --> 00:18:17,880
Speaker 1: do whatever I can to help out the movement. Yeah,

277
00:18:18,359 --> 00:18:22,080
Speaker 1: I agree with the communist platforms says our would be spy,

278
00:18:22,119 --> 00:18:25,240
Speaker 1: and I am a high level in essay employee. I'm

279
00:18:25,280 --> 00:18:28,919
Speaker 1: here to assist you any way I can. That's just

280
00:18:28,960 --> 00:18:33,200
Speaker 1: an email, by the way, to KGB dot gov. Yeah,

281
00:18:33,520 --> 00:18:38,480
Speaker 1: KGB dot gov or posted on Twitter, uh, tagging at KGB.

282
00:18:38,960 --> 00:18:42,600
Speaker 1: So this is less likely. I mean we're joking a

283
00:18:42,600 --> 00:18:45,160
Speaker 1: little bit. This is less likely to happen today because

284
00:18:45,200 --> 00:18:48,919
Speaker 1: these types of employees are likely to be monitored by

285
00:18:48,960 --> 00:18:52,560
Speaker 1: their own governments. It just makes sense. And then this

286
00:18:52,680 --> 00:18:57,920
Speaker 1: weird shadow game unfolds. It's tougher actually for the would

287
00:18:57,920 --> 00:19:03,679
Speaker 1: be spy master here, because the employee who's trying to

288
00:19:03,800 --> 00:19:07,760
Speaker 1: turn for ideology has to figure out whether they're talking

289
00:19:07,800 --> 00:19:11,240
Speaker 1: with an actual operative or one of the alphabet boys

290
00:19:11,240 --> 00:19:14,480
Speaker 1: spinning out a trap. And then on the flip side,

291
00:19:14,520 --> 00:19:17,399
Speaker 1: the foreign intelligence crew has to figure out whether this

292
00:19:17,520 --> 00:19:21,080
Speaker 1: source is credible, trustworthy, or at the very least easy

293
00:19:21,160 --> 00:19:25,240
Speaker 1: to control and actually who who they say they are

294
00:19:25,680 --> 00:19:29,320
Speaker 1: instead of a double agent. And this is like, this

295
00:19:29,400 --> 00:19:32,840
Speaker 1: becomes this weird cat and mouse game and it gets

296
00:19:33,000 --> 00:19:37,080
Speaker 1: it gets really really confusing. And that's not even adding

297
00:19:37,119 --> 00:19:42,240
Speaker 1: to the fact that sometimes sometimes intelligence agencies or operations

298
00:19:42,480 --> 00:19:45,520
Speaker 1: have kind of scored an own goal or shot themselves

299
00:19:45,520 --> 00:19:49,560
Speaker 1: in the foot like that, Like that guy who got

300
00:19:49,600 --> 00:19:55,360
Speaker 1: reported for attempting to radicalize members of a mosque here

301
00:19:55,400 --> 00:19:58,000
Speaker 1: in the US, and then it turned out like he

302
00:19:58,119 --> 00:20:01,200
Speaker 1: was supposed to be finding terrorist but he was trying

303
00:20:01,240 --> 00:20:04,240
Speaker 1: to invent them, and then he got reported as a

304
00:20:04,240 --> 00:20:10,560
Speaker 1: freaking terrorist. That's it's tough, but that's still like I

305
00:20:10,600 --> 00:20:14,440
Speaker 1: would rank that the ideological aspect, if you can get

306
00:20:14,480 --> 00:20:17,000
Speaker 1: past the burden figure out who people are, I would

307
00:20:17,040 --> 00:20:21,080
Speaker 1: rank that as a little bit better than financial control.

308
00:20:21,520 --> 00:20:24,200
Speaker 1: But both of those pale in comparison to the old,

309
00:20:24,320 --> 00:20:29,280
Speaker 1: tried and true best way to turn someone reliably for

310
00:20:29,400 --> 00:20:33,320
Speaker 1: a long time, and that is beat me here, Paul.

311
00:20:33,600 --> 00:20:37,359
Speaker 1: That is the blackmail, the shift out of him. That's right,

312
00:20:38,880 --> 00:20:42,359
Speaker 1: that's right. Compromat that's the best thing you can do

313
00:20:43,080 --> 00:20:46,280
Speaker 1: if you want to make a spy someone to work

314
00:20:46,480 --> 00:20:52,080
Speaker 1: for you. Uh so yeah, I mean you really just

315
00:20:53,720 --> 00:20:57,080
Speaker 1: you pick a target, somebody who seems vulnerable, somebody who

316
00:20:57,119 --> 00:21:01,359
Speaker 1: has some problems maybe in their life, and then uh

317
00:21:01,480 --> 00:21:03,560
Speaker 1: monitor them for a little while, and then you've got

318
00:21:03,600 --> 00:21:06,240
Speaker 1: your own little monitor that you create. It's kind of

319
00:21:06,280 --> 00:21:09,000
Speaker 1: messed up. It's really messed up. This is the direct

320
00:21:09,119 --> 00:21:12,639
Speaker 1: route to non consensual spy. This is what this is

321
00:21:12,680 --> 00:21:14,959
Speaker 1: what we're talking about when we talk about turning someone,

322
00:21:15,880 --> 00:21:20,720
Speaker 1: for instance, is unfortunately common. Back in the days when

323
00:21:21,520 --> 00:21:27,080
Speaker 1: homosexuality was largely considered a crime in in different parts

324
00:21:27,119 --> 00:21:28,800
Speaker 1: of the world, and still is considered a crime in

325
00:21:28,840 --> 00:21:33,000
Speaker 1: different parts of the world, intelligence agencies loved being able

326
00:21:33,040 --> 00:21:36,600
Speaker 1: to hang exposure over the head of a potential asset.

327
00:21:37,320 --> 00:21:40,159
Speaker 1: Do what we say, and when we say it, they

328
00:21:40,160 --> 00:21:43,600
Speaker 1: would argue, or will release these pictures or will release

329
00:21:43,680 --> 00:21:48,480
Speaker 1: this evidence, and you will be outed. This would absolutely

330
00:21:48,560 --> 00:21:52,640
Speaker 1: ruin someone's personal and professional life, could lead to suicide,

331
00:21:52,640 --> 00:21:56,400
Speaker 1: coal lead to homicide. Very ugly things or for example,

332
00:21:57,040 --> 00:21:59,800
Speaker 1: let's see you're you're apprehending someone for a crime. You

333
00:22:00,000 --> 00:22:02,119
Speaker 1: see this in cops shows all the time, and this

334
00:22:02,240 --> 00:22:07,600
Speaker 1: really happens. Say you've caught someone who's like the the

335
00:22:07,680 --> 00:22:13,080
Speaker 1: little male angler fish that's attached fused to the big

336
00:22:13,400 --> 00:22:17,199
Speaker 1: female anglerfish. That's how they reproduce the sea as a

337
00:22:17,200 --> 00:22:20,120
Speaker 1: weird place. You caught a smuggler who's one of those

338
00:22:20,119 --> 00:22:22,720
Speaker 1: little angler fish, and you know that they've got cartel

339
00:22:22,800 --> 00:22:25,120
Speaker 1: ties that attached them to the big fish or after

340
00:22:25,880 --> 00:22:29,520
Speaker 1: you know, you can use this little fish to travel

341
00:22:29,600 --> 00:22:32,000
Speaker 1: up the chain of command all the way to the boss,

342
00:22:32,240 --> 00:22:33,840
Speaker 1: and so you can make a deal with them and

343
00:22:33,880 --> 00:22:37,000
Speaker 1: you can say, hey, we'll go lenient. You know, depending

344
00:22:37,000 --> 00:22:40,280
Speaker 1: on how you perform, you might even get immunity, right,

345
00:22:41,200 --> 00:22:46,360
Speaker 1: and maybe that's a big maybe. That's why it's that's

346
00:22:46,359 --> 00:22:48,400
Speaker 1: why it's always phrased with you know, I can put

347
00:22:48,440 --> 00:22:51,240
Speaker 1: in a good word for you, which if you are

348
00:22:51,320 --> 00:22:55,439
Speaker 1: listening and this conversation is relevant to your life, putting

349
00:22:55,480 --> 00:22:58,000
Speaker 1: in a good word for you quote unquote is not

350
00:22:58,119 --> 00:23:01,000
Speaker 1: the same thing as what they or what it is

351
00:23:01,080 --> 00:23:03,600
Speaker 1: implied to be. And you need a lawyer. I don't

352
00:23:03,600 --> 00:23:05,600
Speaker 1: know how you're listening to a podcast if you're in

353
00:23:05,640 --> 00:23:08,680
Speaker 1: this situation right now. But get a lawyer. Maybe you're

354
00:23:08,720 --> 00:23:10,760
Speaker 1: the lawyer and you need to reach out to some

355
00:23:10,840 --> 00:23:15,520
Speaker 1: new clients who are in this situation. Yeah, spread the

356
00:23:15,560 --> 00:23:20,280
Speaker 1: good word, I guess. But but this is like, this

357
00:23:20,320 --> 00:23:25,000
Speaker 1: is where you get to the situations like um dangling,

358
00:23:25,040 --> 00:23:28,280
Speaker 1: the carot of of safety and wit SEC a witness

359
00:23:28,320 --> 00:23:33,720
Speaker 1: protection program. And I always love you know, I think

360
00:23:33,760 --> 00:23:35,919
Speaker 1: you and I have talked about the soft air. But

361
00:23:36,280 --> 00:23:39,760
Speaker 1: knowing how cash strapped so many places are so many

362
00:23:39,800 --> 00:23:43,359
Speaker 1: law enforcement places. I always in my head, I know

363
00:23:43,440 --> 00:23:46,360
Speaker 1: this isn't true, but I always love to picture witness

364
00:23:46,400 --> 00:23:49,680
Speaker 1: Protection is being like so cash strapped that they can

365
00:23:49,720 --> 00:23:55,640
Speaker 1: only produce, you know, like let's say ten fake identities

366
00:23:56,040 --> 00:23:59,240
Speaker 1: a year, and then you have to audition for them,

367
00:23:59,280 --> 00:24:02,040
Speaker 1: you know, like you like when they say they'll get

368
00:24:02,040 --> 00:24:04,240
Speaker 1: you into talk with wit SEC. It's really your chance

369
00:24:04,280 --> 00:24:10,159
Speaker 1: to audition to try to beat these people. That's pretty great.

370
00:24:10,720 --> 00:24:16,920
Speaker 1: Somebody has to audition to become clear downing he was

371
00:24:17,000 --> 00:24:19,880
Speaker 1: just a person out in Mount Montana somewhere, yes, out

372
00:24:19,920 --> 00:24:22,520
Speaker 1: in big Sky country, and so they have to nail

373
00:24:22,560 --> 00:24:25,919
Speaker 1: the accent, and they're like, you know, thank you for

374
00:24:25,920 --> 00:24:31,600
Speaker 1: your time coming in. We're we're gonna go with someone else. Um,

375
00:24:31,680 --> 00:24:34,800
Speaker 1: but that's messed up. But if you could survive, if

376
00:24:34,800 --> 00:24:38,600
Speaker 1: you survived the cartel, then uh, in two, we think

377
00:24:38,640 --> 00:24:45,120
Speaker 1: we have another we having some more opportunities. Wow, dude, anyway,

378
00:24:45,200 --> 00:24:48,760
Speaker 1: that probably doesn't happen. But here's the thing, the other,

379
00:24:48,960 --> 00:24:52,960
Speaker 1: the other thing. If you want to turn this coercion

380
00:24:53,040 --> 00:24:55,800
Speaker 1: up to eleven, if somebody, let's say, somebody's clean, do

381
00:24:55,800 --> 00:24:58,960
Speaker 1: you don't have any skeletons their personal closet, they haven't

382
00:24:58,960 --> 00:25:02,680
Speaker 1: committed a cry, and they are okay with any part

383
00:25:02,720 --> 00:25:07,240
Speaker 1: of their personal life being exposed, then you would be

384
00:25:07,240 --> 00:25:10,440
Speaker 1: out of luck, right, not, So why not just create

385
00:25:10,480 --> 00:25:13,719
Speaker 1: a scandal or a crime and hook them that way?

386
00:25:13,800 --> 00:25:18,240
Speaker 1: This is like, this is where the real objectively kick

387
00:25:18,280 --> 00:25:20,920
Speaker 1: ass compromat comes in. That's where you put in those

388
00:25:20,960 --> 00:25:23,359
Speaker 1: honey traps, right, that's where you do the two to

389
00:25:23,480 --> 00:25:27,960
Speaker 1: ten rule. These things don't always work the two to

390
00:25:28,040 --> 00:25:30,800
Speaker 1: ten rule. Yes, I'm so glad, you asked. Okay, have

391
00:25:30,920 --> 00:25:34,920
Speaker 1: you ever heard of this before? Okay, So this happens

392
00:25:35,000 --> 00:25:39,399
Speaker 1: with government folks and with like high level business types.

393
00:25:39,960 --> 00:25:43,120
Speaker 1: You're familiar with the idea of people reading attractiveness on

394
00:25:43,119 --> 00:25:47,640
Speaker 1: one to ten tend being best, one being the worst, right, Okay, alright,

395
00:25:47,720 --> 00:25:51,320
Speaker 1: So the two to ten rule is this informal thing

396
00:25:51,640 --> 00:25:57,240
Speaker 1: where people will say, Okay, buddy, I know you think

397
00:25:57,280 --> 00:25:59,880
Speaker 1: you're cool. You know you think you're attractive. No matter

398
00:26:00,040 --> 00:26:02,920
Speaker 1: how cool or attractive you are. When you're traveling out

399
00:26:02,960 --> 00:26:06,200
Speaker 1: in this situation, you need to think of yourself as

400
00:26:06,240 --> 00:26:09,480
Speaker 1: a two on a one to ten level of attractiveness.

401
00:26:10,000 --> 00:26:13,160
Speaker 1: And if some stranger comes up to you at a party,

402
00:26:13,240 --> 00:26:16,040
Speaker 1: at a conference, at a hotel bar and they look

403
00:26:16,119 --> 00:26:19,760
Speaker 1: anywhere near a ten, you need to assume they're after

404
00:26:19,920 --> 00:26:22,960
Speaker 1: something and you need to remove yourself from the situation.

405
00:26:23,400 --> 00:26:25,879
Speaker 1: So it's a way for people to like manage egos

406
00:26:26,000 --> 00:26:29,520
Speaker 1: and their love of attention to two ten rule. It's

407
00:26:29,560 --> 00:26:32,440
Speaker 1: called all right there you go. Well I think I

408
00:26:32,440 --> 00:26:39,040
Speaker 1: would fail with that. Yeah, I'm glad. It's not saying

409
00:26:39,160 --> 00:26:42,320
Speaker 1: think of yourself as it's not saying call yourself a two.

410
00:26:42,440 --> 00:26:47,479
Speaker 1: It's just assume that for the purpose that's smart. So

411
00:26:47,560 --> 00:26:50,679
Speaker 1: let's say let's say you become a spy in the

412
00:26:50,720 --> 00:26:52,800
Speaker 1: modern day, and you don't want to be some over

413
00:26:52,920 --> 00:26:56,320
Speaker 1: zealous ideologue, and it's not to quote the joker about

414
00:26:56,359 --> 00:26:58,639
Speaker 1: the money and you're not trying to save your own skin.

415
00:26:59,359 --> 00:27:04,240
Speaker 1: Let's say you you've grown up in the US and

416
00:27:04,440 --> 00:27:07,960
Speaker 1: you want to be a professional, full time employee working

417
00:27:08,119 --> 00:27:13,240
Speaker 1: for your government. If you want to work as a

418
00:27:13,320 --> 00:27:17,320
Speaker 1: spy or spy catcher in the FBI, you're looking at

419
00:27:17,359 --> 00:27:22,800
Speaker 1: something called a special agent. And like all intelligence agencies are,

420
00:27:22,840 --> 00:27:27,920
Speaker 1: Like all intelligence agencies operating at this level, it's kind

421
00:27:27,920 --> 00:27:29,720
Speaker 1: of tough to get in, you know what I mean.

422
00:27:29,880 --> 00:27:33,480
Speaker 1: You can't just shoot him a text. No. No. I

423
00:27:33,520 --> 00:27:36,520
Speaker 1: had a friend one time that was let's say, auditioning

424
00:27:36,800 --> 00:27:41,200
Speaker 1: to become a Secret Service member, and just learning about

425
00:27:41,200 --> 00:27:44,239
Speaker 1: how rigorous some of that was, and it all had

426
00:27:44,280 --> 00:27:47,159
Speaker 1: to do with your background, with what you've done in

427
00:27:47,200 --> 00:27:50,760
Speaker 1: your life, and then sufficiently being able to pass a

428
00:27:50,840 --> 00:27:55,600
Speaker 1: polygraph test attesting to those facts that you have never

429
00:27:55,640 --> 00:28:00,560
Speaker 1: done any certain psychedelic or you've never tried a marijuana before. WHOA.

430
00:28:01,080 --> 00:28:02,960
Speaker 1: And then I'm trying to imagine how you actually apply

431
00:28:03,080 --> 00:28:05,639
Speaker 1: that in the trade. For somebody who is going to

432
00:28:05,760 --> 00:28:08,520
Speaker 1: need to have some of that in their background, I

433
00:28:08,560 --> 00:28:10,399
Speaker 1: think I think you're gonna want to be able to

434
00:28:10,440 --> 00:28:13,040
Speaker 1: have some of that just for some of the situations

435
00:28:13,040 --> 00:28:15,159
Speaker 1: a person might have to be in when they're applying

436
00:28:15,280 --> 00:28:20,320
Speaker 1: that craft anyway. So it's an interesting thing. Yeah, and

437
00:28:20,359 --> 00:28:23,879
Speaker 1: there are you know, you have to balance, you have

438
00:28:23,960 --> 00:28:28,240
Speaker 1: to balance the likelihood of blowing your cover versus your

439
00:28:28,359 --> 00:28:33,439
Speaker 1: own your own personal ethical boundaries. You know. But if

440
00:28:33,440 --> 00:28:35,680
Speaker 1: you want to work as this kind of special agent

441
00:28:35,720 --> 00:28:39,400
Speaker 1: for the FBI, you need to be between twenty three

442
00:28:39,440 --> 00:28:42,720
Speaker 1: and thirty seven years old. If you are a veteran

443
00:28:42,760 --> 00:28:44,640
Speaker 1: and you meet a couple of different criteria, you can

444
00:28:44,680 --> 00:28:48,360
Speaker 1: get a waiver that will allow a little more latitude

445
00:28:48,360 --> 00:28:50,960
Speaker 1: on that. You have to be a citizen of the US.

446
00:28:51,120 --> 00:28:55,560
Speaker 1: No convictions for felonies, sex crimes, domestic violence. In practice,

447
00:28:55,800 --> 00:28:59,920
Speaker 1: often if you're coming in green than any criminal right

448
00:29:00,240 --> 00:29:03,800
Speaker 1: d is a big no no. Uh. Even stamp fraud,

449
00:29:04,120 --> 00:29:07,640
Speaker 1: which is still what a hilarious crime. Uh. You have

450
00:29:07,720 --> 00:29:09,880
Speaker 1: to pass the drug test. You've got to be in

451
00:29:09,960 --> 00:29:12,360
Speaker 1: at least good standing with your student loans. You don't

452
00:29:12,400 --> 00:29:14,040
Speaker 1: have to have them paid off. But you can't be

453
00:29:14,200 --> 00:29:18,240
Speaker 1: you know, super delinquent. You can never have had any

454
00:29:18,320 --> 00:29:22,320
Speaker 1: kind of security clearance provoked in the past. You can

455
00:29:22,440 --> 00:29:25,640
Speaker 1: never have worked towards the overthrow of the US government.

456
00:29:25,840 --> 00:29:31,160
Speaker 1: That's Aquila. It was a super villain. I've changed my mind.

457
00:29:31,200 --> 00:29:35,560
Speaker 1: You guys are pretty cool. Uh, that's the thing. Though.

458
00:29:35,840 --> 00:29:41,160
Speaker 1: In practice, this means membership in anything. However, passing your transient,

459
00:29:41,160 --> 00:29:44,360
Speaker 1: your membership could be anything that would be deemed a

460
00:29:44,480 --> 00:29:48,080
Speaker 1: terrorist group. And Uncle Sam is very very loose in

461
00:29:48,120 --> 00:29:52,800
Speaker 1: their determination of what qualifies as something working to overthrow

462
00:29:52,840 --> 00:29:58,120
Speaker 1: the US government. Looking at you vegans, look, it's true.

463
00:29:58,440 --> 00:30:03,040
Speaker 1: It is true, co and tells all right, yes it is.

464
00:30:03,440 --> 00:30:06,320
Speaker 1: Matt is not joking, folks. Uh. You also have to

465
00:30:06,320 --> 00:30:10,320
Speaker 1: go to college, have some kind of bachelor's degree. I'd

466
00:30:10,360 --> 00:30:13,160
Speaker 1: be great to have some sort of work experience, driver's license.

467
00:30:13,240 --> 00:30:15,800
Speaker 1: All this, except for that weird overthrow over the US

468
00:30:15,880 --> 00:30:20,680
Speaker 1: government things, sounds pretty normal. Also, the application process is

469
00:30:20,680 --> 00:30:23,840
Speaker 1: pretty intense. You start with an online application that you've

470
00:30:23,880 --> 00:30:26,680
Speaker 1: got some written tests, You've got test focus on your

471
00:30:26,880 --> 00:30:31,600
Speaker 1: set your your Liam Neeson esque set of skills. If

472
00:30:31,640 --> 00:30:34,320
Speaker 1: you pass these tests and you're still not done, of course,

473
00:30:34,360 --> 00:30:37,480
Speaker 1: you get an in person interview a writing test, and

474
00:30:37,640 --> 00:30:40,960
Speaker 1: if you pass this you can still fail the process

475
00:30:41,160 --> 00:30:43,560
Speaker 1: because it's not enough to pass. You have to be

476
00:30:43,640 --> 00:30:46,280
Speaker 1: one of the best of the people who did pass.

477
00:30:46,680 --> 00:30:49,640
Speaker 1: A minus is not good enough. It's still not over,

478
00:30:50,160 --> 00:30:54,160
Speaker 1: you get what's called a conditional letter of appointment. Don't

479
00:30:54,160 --> 00:30:56,640
Speaker 1: be fooled because the conditions you have to meet are tough.

480
00:30:57,120 --> 00:30:59,320
Speaker 1: Physical fitness. How many push ups can you do in

481
00:30:59,360 --> 00:31:02,640
Speaker 1: a minute, how fasking run a mile and a half, etcetera.

482
00:31:03,200 --> 00:31:05,520
Speaker 1: After you passed all this, now it's time for the

483
00:31:05,560 --> 00:31:10,160
Speaker 1: medical exam. And like you said, Matt, the background check.

484
00:31:11,000 --> 00:31:13,840
Speaker 1: The background check sinks a lot of people. I was

485
00:31:13,880 --> 00:31:17,520
Speaker 1: gonna I want to ask, when your friend was applying

486
00:31:17,600 --> 00:31:20,560
Speaker 1: to the Secret Service, did you get a call? I

487
00:31:20,600 --> 00:31:23,280
Speaker 1: did not? He I maybe i'm his character as he's

488
00:31:23,280 --> 00:31:26,400
Speaker 1: more of an acquaintance friend of a good friend. So

489
00:31:26,640 --> 00:31:30,280
Speaker 1: I did not get hit through that series of raise

490
00:31:30,920 --> 00:31:35,040
Speaker 1: that went out. But no, thankfully, I don't think I've

491
00:31:35,040 --> 00:31:39,360
Speaker 1: ever been asked to, you know, say anything about one

492
00:31:39,400 --> 00:31:41,800
Speaker 1: of my acquaintances to get them a job as a

493
00:31:41,840 --> 00:31:49,160
Speaker 1: spy yet yeah, or maybe he didn't know. Uh, maybe

494
00:31:49,200 --> 00:31:53,560
Speaker 1: he didn't know. But after all that stuff, if you're

495
00:31:53,600 --> 00:31:55,560
Speaker 1: one of these, if after all this stuff, if you're

496
00:31:55,560 --> 00:31:57,480
Speaker 1: one of the few people who make it pass that process,

497
00:31:57,520 --> 00:32:00,520
Speaker 1: you're not done. You need new agent training. That twenty

498
00:32:00,520 --> 00:32:07,160
Speaker 1: weeks eight fifty class our classes on stuff like firearms cases,

499
00:32:07,440 --> 00:32:12,000
Speaker 1: operational skills, an even tougher physical exam, and then when

500
00:32:12,040 --> 00:32:15,040
Speaker 1: you graduate from new agent training, you officially become a

501
00:32:15,080 --> 00:32:18,680
Speaker 1: special agent for the FBI. I think in general it's

502
00:32:18,680 --> 00:32:24,000
Speaker 1: more fair to describe these professionals as maybe spy catchers

503
00:32:24,280 --> 00:32:27,280
Speaker 1: when it comes up, uh, and you know, a spy,

504
00:32:27,320 --> 00:32:30,080
Speaker 1: a CIA spy or c I a case agent is

505
00:32:30,120 --> 00:32:33,080
Speaker 1: a different ball of wax. Still a lot of the

506
00:32:33,160 --> 00:32:37,520
Speaker 1: same test apply. Uh. In addition, we should mention that

507
00:32:37,760 --> 00:32:40,760
Speaker 1: because of what we just described about how people can

508
00:32:40,800 --> 00:32:44,960
Speaker 1: get turned, addiction issues, gambling problems, anything that could be

509
00:32:45,040 --> 00:32:48,160
Speaker 1: used against you by adversaries in the field is also

510
00:32:48,240 --> 00:32:52,360
Speaker 1: something they try to detect. I had a I'll call

511
00:32:52,440 --> 00:32:57,680
Speaker 1: them an acquaintance as well, who found themselves they had

512
00:32:57,720 --> 00:33:03,280
Speaker 1: security clearance and they were active in counterintelligence, and they

513
00:33:03,320 --> 00:33:08,680
Speaker 1: found themselves being targeted by a foreign power in what

514
00:33:08,800 --> 00:33:16,000
Speaker 1: seemed like an alarmingly casual way. Someone originally would call

515
00:33:16,000 --> 00:33:20,040
Speaker 1: this these places whose numbers are not published, of course,

516
00:33:20,520 --> 00:33:25,960
Speaker 1: and they started off pretty low level, like clear, clearly

517
00:33:26,080 --> 00:33:32,240
Speaker 1: discernible accent, claiming there's a wrong number and saying they're

518
00:33:32,240 --> 00:33:35,960
Speaker 1: trying to reach another specific person, which is a little

519
00:33:36,000 --> 00:33:39,280
Speaker 1: bit of social engineering, right to try to get Hey,

520
00:33:39,320 --> 00:33:41,720
Speaker 1: can you just give me the right extension? So they

521
00:33:41,720 --> 00:33:44,960
Speaker 1: shut that stuff down quick, and then they kept getting

522
00:33:45,000 --> 00:33:48,360
Speaker 1: more requests for these people, and there's always always a

523
00:33:48,400 --> 00:33:51,600
Speaker 1: different person, you know, which means that it's a little

524
00:33:51,640 --> 00:33:55,240
Speaker 1: bit of a fishing expedition, probably on their part. And

525
00:33:55,480 --> 00:34:01,320
Speaker 1: eventually someone with no discernible accent calls on the phone

526
00:34:01,320 --> 00:34:04,480
Speaker 1: and they call for this person, this acquaintance and uh,

527
00:34:04,680 --> 00:34:08,279
Speaker 1: and they say, look, I think some of some of

528
00:34:08,320 --> 00:34:12,840
Speaker 1: our friends have been calling a lot um, so I

529
00:34:12,920 --> 00:34:15,760
Speaker 1: figured it be best if you and I just talked directly.

530
00:34:16,080 --> 00:34:18,680
Speaker 1: And I'm not gonna tell you what it was. It

531
00:34:18,800 --> 00:34:22,160
Speaker 1: was Lyndon B. Johnson. It was Old Jumbo himself. But

532
00:34:23,320 --> 00:34:26,920
Speaker 1: but but that kind of stuff happens like these slow escalations.

533
00:34:27,160 --> 00:34:31,760
Speaker 1: And this person called knew some things about this acquaintances past,

534
00:34:32,800 --> 00:34:34,520
Speaker 1: so it's kind of like that scene where the men

535
00:34:34,560 --> 00:34:38,320
Speaker 1: in Black show up and know everything about your UFO sighting. Anyway,

536
00:34:38,520 --> 00:34:41,319
Speaker 1: it's the real thing. Um. This is just a brief

537
00:34:41,400 --> 00:34:45,200
Speaker 1: look at how people can end up becoming spies, sometimes

538
00:34:45,239 --> 00:34:48,840
Speaker 1: against their will. But for most folks, including the world's

539
00:34:48,880 --> 00:34:52,400
Speaker 1: intelligence communities, the biggest concern about the world of tradecraft

540
00:34:52,440 --> 00:34:57,680
Speaker 1: today is is how we predict the future of espionage.

541
00:34:58,520 --> 00:35:02,279
Speaker 1: So it's time for us to redact just a little more.

542
00:35:02,800 --> 00:35:06,920
Speaker 1: I am getting some phone calls from an unlisted number,

543
00:35:07,040 --> 00:35:12,200
Speaker 1: so I think that we should pause. That was you, alright,

544
00:35:12,320 --> 00:35:15,440
Speaker 1: So pause for a word from our sponsors and we'll return.

545
00:35:22,040 --> 00:35:25,000
Speaker 1: Here's where it gets crazy. Yes, we are now in

546
00:35:25,040 --> 00:35:28,520
Speaker 1: the future. Don't be fooled. Time is not passing as

547
00:35:28,560 --> 00:35:31,800
Speaker 1: it once was. Now we are here in the future.

548
00:35:31,880 --> 00:35:37,520
Speaker 1: Oh wait, no, it's there and that future uh is?

549
00:35:37,920 --> 00:35:42,360
Speaker 1: Oh man, it's weird when it comes to how you

550
00:35:42,480 --> 00:35:44,839
Speaker 1: and me and Ben and Paul and everyone else will

551
00:35:44,840 --> 00:35:49,359
Speaker 1: be surveiled just because we already are. We know this,

552
00:35:49,600 --> 00:35:52,280
Speaker 1: We talked about this. Look at all the other episodes

553
00:35:52,320 --> 00:35:55,960
Speaker 1: in this feed. Uh. We are being surveiled, all of us.

554
00:35:56,000 --> 00:36:00,640
Speaker 1: But when there is targeted surveillance on an individual, my goodness,

555
00:36:02,120 --> 00:36:08,719
Speaker 1: there is so much to unfold before us. Yes, the

556
00:36:08,800 --> 00:36:13,120
Speaker 1: world will still need human operatives. You will still need analysts,

557
00:36:13,120 --> 00:36:15,919
Speaker 1: you'll still need computer scientists. And yeah, you'll still need

558
00:36:16,080 --> 00:36:19,480
Speaker 1: field agents. I mean shout out to stuck snet. It

559
00:36:19,640 --> 00:36:25,680
Speaker 1: needs it needed a human to get in there. God.

560
00:36:25,920 --> 00:36:28,399
Speaker 1: But there there's a bad side to this too. I mean,

561
00:36:28,440 --> 00:36:33,040
Speaker 1: political volatility is spiking. Things are becoming inherently less predictable,

562
00:36:33,440 --> 00:36:38,560
Speaker 1: and everybody kind of wants predictability, at least for their perspective.

563
00:36:38,600 --> 00:36:42,279
Speaker 1: They want predictability that is unpredictable to other people. It's

564
00:36:42,280 --> 00:36:45,920
Speaker 1: a whole thing. But there are serious fears that when

565
00:36:45,960 --> 00:36:49,800
Speaker 1: it comes to the espionage game, especially the new DLC,

566
00:36:50,040 --> 00:36:54,080
Speaker 1: the digital version. Uh, the US is falling far behind,

567
00:36:54,280 --> 00:36:57,759
Speaker 1: just earlier this year. Uh. And there's a report met

568
00:36:57,800 --> 00:37:00,640
Speaker 1: you and I both read the Intelligence can. He issued

569
00:37:00,680 --> 00:37:05,040
Speaker 1: a survey of where the world might be in It

570
00:37:05,120 --> 00:37:09,839
Speaker 1: does not look good. Just a slight spoiler here. The

571
00:37:09,920 --> 00:37:13,959
Speaker 1: title of that report is a more contested World, which

572
00:37:14,040 --> 00:37:22,000
Speaker 1: is really, um, really strange prose for a government report. Yeah,

573
00:37:22,719 --> 00:37:32,360
Speaker 1: rather than unifying human hood. Right, yeah, it's really um,

574
00:37:32,400 --> 00:37:34,799
Speaker 1: it's messed up. I I got lost in one of

575
00:37:34,800 --> 00:37:37,759
Speaker 1: the sections around page sixty eight. If you're looking at

576
00:37:37,760 --> 00:37:40,640
Speaker 1: the PDF, because you can find it for a lay

577
00:37:40,640 --> 00:37:43,920
Speaker 1: person just interested in it. It makes you feel uncomfortable

578
00:37:44,200 --> 00:37:47,800
Speaker 1: for someone who was in charge, maybe a diplomat, political leader,

579
00:37:48,080 --> 00:37:53,759
Speaker 1: someone who is reading these predictions, these forecasts. Um, you

580
00:37:53,800 --> 00:37:58,920
Speaker 1: can just see where conflict on a state level of

581
00:37:59,000 --> 00:38:02,360
Speaker 1: you know, between states and within states, it seems to

582
00:38:02,440 --> 00:38:07,400
Speaker 1: be all of it coming to a head. Oh yeah, yeah,

583
00:38:07,480 --> 00:38:11,520
Speaker 1: because a lot of a lot of powerful forces now

584
00:38:11,680 --> 00:38:17,160
Speaker 1: are not not old school military. It's not old school

585
00:38:17,280 --> 00:38:22,560
Speaker 1: state craft. You know, if we're talking separatist forces, secessionist forces,

586
00:38:22,640 --> 00:38:25,480
Speaker 1: people who got together and said, let's make our own militia.

587
00:38:25,800 --> 00:38:27,960
Speaker 1: You know what I mean, right, you guys would do that,

588
00:38:28,040 --> 00:38:32,520
Speaker 1: Let's make our own militia. Or maybe falsely thinking about this, Ben,

589
00:38:32,600 --> 00:38:35,640
Speaker 1: but I imagine the old Guard that you're describing there

590
00:38:35,680 --> 00:38:39,000
Speaker 1: before some of the militias and more militant groups. I'm

591
00:38:39,000 --> 00:38:42,319
Speaker 1: imagining them the heads of those groups being able to

592
00:38:42,400 --> 00:38:45,560
Speaker 1: hang out and share a brandy together, you know, or

593
00:38:45,680 --> 00:38:48,759
Speaker 1: like in a in a study and a joke a

594
00:38:48,760 --> 00:38:51,840
Speaker 1: bit about the games that are being played, and like

595
00:38:51,920 --> 00:38:57,319
Speaker 1: have this back and forth kind of relationship, even though

596
00:38:57,360 --> 00:39:00,759
Speaker 1: they are both aware that there are armies that they

597
00:39:00,800 --> 00:39:03,479
Speaker 1: control spying on the other one. I think, I feel

598
00:39:03,520 --> 00:39:06,319
Speaker 1: I feel like there's it's maybe I'm equating it too

599
00:39:06,440 --> 00:39:09,080
Speaker 1: much with like the rules of engagement in war back

600
00:39:09,480 --> 00:39:12,879
Speaker 1: during maybe the US Civil War or even World War One,

601
00:39:13,280 --> 00:39:17,359
Speaker 1: where there there's so many um norms that are just

602
00:39:17,400 --> 00:39:23,239
Speaker 1: followed by everyone engaging in combat. Yeah, and this I

603
00:39:23,560 --> 00:39:27,160
Speaker 1: don't think you're far off on. You know, we also

604
00:39:27,280 --> 00:39:32,439
Speaker 1: see this kind of paramilitary force of hackers who have

605
00:39:32,680 --> 00:39:35,960
Speaker 1: plausible denied. The governments who are running them have plausible

606
00:39:35,960 --> 00:39:38,359
Speaker 1: deniability in a lot of cases, and can say, hey,

607
00:39:38,360 --> 00:39:41,400
Speaker 1: these are just private citizens, patriots acting on their own

608
00:39:41,680 --> 00:39:46,520
Speaker 1: you know, well can you do uh? That's like that.

609
00:39:47,400 --> 00:39:51,800
Speaker 1: There's a power to that, and it's also it's something

610
00:39:51,840 --> 00:39:55,840
Speaker 1: that you can see in the wind already. Earlier this month,

611
00:39:56,360 --> 00:39:59,920
Speaker 1: one of the senior there's that word against cyber secure

612
00:40:00,160 --> 00:40:05,200
Speaker 1: the officials at the Pentagon came forward and explained why

613
00:40:05,280 --> 00:40:09,799
Speaker 1: he quit. He quit the gig abruptly in September of

614
00:40:09,840 --> 00:40:15,520
Speaker 1: this year, and just recently he said that he thought

615
00:40:15,600 --> 00:40:18,200
Speaker 1: it was going to be impossible for the US specifically

616
00:40:18,280 --> 00:40:21,800
Speaker 1: to compete with China in the realm of cybersecurity, especially

617
00:40:21,880 --> 00:40:26,839
Speaker 1: given the development of machine consciousness or AI artificial intelligence.

618
00:40:27,440 --> 00:40:32,279
Speaker 1: His name Nicholas Chian. He joined the USA F the

619
00:40:32,360 --> 00:40:37,080
Speaker 1: Air Force as its first software Officer Chief Software Officer

620
00:40:37,200 --> 00:40:42,600
Speaker 1: in August, and his job was to equipped the Air

621
00:40:42,680 --> 00:40:47,440
Speaker 1: Force and the Pentagon with the most secure advanced software available.

622
00:40:48,200 --> 00:40:52,920
Speaker 1: Son work he tried for a few years, and then

623
00:40:52,960 --> 00:40:56,080
Speaker 1: he said, the Pentagon doesn't get it. This is like

624
00:40:56,360 --> 00:41:00,279
Speaker 1: dangerously behind. We have specific quotes from him that view

625
00:41:00,320 --> 00:41:03,600
Speaker 1: a sense of how dep he thinks the problem goes.

626
00:41:03,880 --> 00:41:08,280
Speaker 1: He says, we have no competing fighting chants against China

627
00:41:08,400 --> 00:41:11,960
Speaker 1: in fifteen to twenty years. Right now, it's already a

628
00:41:12,000 --> 00:41:15,759
Speaker 1: done deal. It is already over, in my opinion. And

629
00:41:15,800 --> 00:41:19,040
Speaker 1: then he went on to describe the level at which

630
00:41:19,080 --> 00:41:26,520
Speaker 1: the US is playing cyber as a kindergarten level. No,

631
00:41:27,120 --> 00:41:30,240
Speaker 1: some not everybody makes it past kindergarten on the first try,

632
00:41:30,320 --> 00:41:33,000
Speaker 1: so it can't be a little tough. But it's clear

633
00:41:33,080 --> 00:41:36,719
Speaker 1: what he's saying there. He's not coming to these conclusions

634
00:41:36,760 --> 00:41:41,799
Speaker 1: based on nothing. He he is very well aware that

635
00:41:41,840 --> 00:41:44,520
Speaker 1: in April of last year, like you said earlier, Matt,

636
00:41:45,080 --> 00:41:49,480
Speaker 1: multiple US departments were hit with something called solar winds.

637
00:41:50,080 --> 00:41:53,600
Speaker 1: Hackers were able to spy on digital activities of staff

638
00:41:53,719 --> 00:41:57,640
Speaker 1: and access some of their emails, including probably folks related

639
00:41:57,680 --> 00:42:02,760
Speaker 1: to intelligence operations abroad. Google stopped working with the Pentagon

640
00:42:03,440 --> 00:42:07,360
Speaker 1: eighteen because twelve employees quit over a project that we

641
00:42:07,440 --> 00:42:11,480
Speaker 1: talked about where Google helped the Pentagon make software that

642
00:42:11,560 --> 00:42:15,040
Speaker 1: could improve the accuracy of drone strikes and drones already

643
00:42:15,040 --> 00:42:18,240
Speaker 1: play a huge part in spying. For those who agree

644
00:42:18,280 --> 00:42:22,080
Speaker 1: with this, this guy resigned. The future of usspionage is

645
00:42:22,160 --> 00:42:27,200
Speaker 1: looking pretty ugly. It may by necessity moved from an

646
00:42:27,280 --> 00:42:31,960
Speaker 1: offensive or proactive stance to a defensive or reactionary position,

647
00:42:32,400 --> 00:42:35,359
Speaker 1: putting putting it on its back foot. This is never,

648
00:42:35,719 --> 00:42:38,600
Speaker 1: by the way, where you want to be. Nope. And

649
00:42:38,680 --> 00:42:41,560
Speaker 1: you can read a lot about this larger situation, especially

650
00:42:41,560 --> 00:42:43,960
Speaker 1: if you go head over to Foreign Policy, which is

651
00:42:44,040 --> 00:42:46,360
Speaker 1: one of our favorite places to read about any of

652
00:42:46,360 --> 00:42:47,920
Speaker 1: this kind of stuff. A little ill it's mind. Ben.

653
00:42:47,960 --> 00:42:52,319
Speaker 1: I don't speak for you, but FP FP kind of rocks. Um.

654
00:42:52,360 --> 00:42:56,560
Speaker 1: There's a there's a writer there, Edward Lucas. He says, uh,

655
00:42:57,080 --> 00:43:00,439
Speaker 1: closed societies, because there is a trend that we're heading

656
00:43:00,480 --> 00:43:04,680
Speaker 1: towards having more closed nations, as we saw with Brexit,

657
00:43:04,800 --> 00:43:07,000
Speaker 1: with you know, the actions of the US over the

658
00:43:07,000 --> 00:43:11,600
Speaker 1: course of the past five six years. Um, these closed

659
00:43:11,600 --> 00:43:17,400
Speaker 1: societies will increasingly have advantages over open societies. And Edward

660
00:43:17,440 --> 00:43:20,719
Speaker 1: is saying that technology is going to become more it's

661
00:43:20,760 --> 00:43:26,959
Speaker 1: just a a very disruptive, powerful force and asymmetrical force

662
00:43:27,000 --> 00:43:30,000
Speaker 1: that can come from anywhere. Yeah, and think about it

663
00:43:30,040 --> 00:43:34,239
Speaker 1: this way. He his article, I highly recommend reading. But

664
00:43:34,760 --> 00:43:39,919
Speaker 1: he notes that if you were just a few years back,

665
00:43:39,960 --> 00:43:42,799
Speaker 1: if you were maybe a Canadian asset, and you were

666
00:43:42,840 --> 00:43:46,400
Speaker 1: in Moscow and you said you were a graduate student

667
00:43:46,520 --> 00:43:49,920
Speaker 1: in architecture, that's the example he uses, then it could

668
00:43:49,920 --> 00:43:54,400
Speaker 1: be difficult for Russian intelligence to figure out the true story.

669
00:43:54,600 --> 00:43:57,479
Speaker 1: You could ask this person about their background, you could

670
00:43:57,480 --> 00:44:01,560
Speaker 1: search their belongings, you could have them physically tailed, you

671
00:44:01,600 --> 00:44:07,640
Speaker 1: could check out their paperwork, and if that, if you

672
00:44:07,680 --> 00:44:10,080
Speaker 1: didn't come up with anything from there, then all you

673
00:44:10,120 --> 00:44:12,080
Speaker 1: would have to all you would be able to do

674
00:44:12,480 --> 00:44:15,319
Speaker 1: if you thought this operative, this was an operative, is

675
00:44:15,360 --> 00:44:19,080
Speaker 1: to sit around and carefully watch them, continue to monitor them,

676
00:44:19,239 --> 00:44:22,160
Speaker 1: and hope that at some point they made a mistake.

677
00:44:22,760 --> 00:44:26,360
Speaker 1: But now a cover that could have been full proof

678
00:44:27,080 --> 00:44:30,680
Speaker 1: as recently as two decades ago can be burned to

679
00:44:30,760 --> 00:44:34,640
Speaker 1: the ground in a couple of minutes. Facial recognition and

680
00:44:34,800 --> 00:44:38,520
Speaker 1: big data are the are the main reason, they're the

681
00:44:38,560 --> 00:44:43,880
Speaker 1: main matches leading to this arson. Like you're let's see, um,

682
00:44:44,040 --> 00:44:48,760
Speaker 1: let's say I'm a spy and Matt is a counterintelligence agent. Matt,

683
00:44:48,800 --> 00:44:52,319
Speaker 1: the first place you're gonna check to see what's going

684
00:44:52,320 --> 00:44:55,239
Speaker 1: out with my cover story? Is the Internet? Am I

685
00:44:55,320 --> 00:44:58,839
Speaker 1: in a photo anywhere as the real me? Well, here

686
00:44:58,880 --> 00:45:03,759
Speaker 1: comes the handcuffs. What about closed circuit television, especially in

687
00:45:03,840 --> 00:45:07,080
Speaker 1: countries where that can be easily pulled without needing a warrant?

688
00:45:07,640 --> 00:45:12,320
Speaker 1: What about social media? What about any phone I've touched?

689
00:45:12,440 --> 00:45:15,640
Speaker 1: You know? Um, dude, just jump on Instagram, grab some

690
00:45:15,680 --> 00:45:19,160
Speaker 1: of those photos and then use recognition on a handful

691
00:45:19,200 --> 00:45:24,120
Speaker 1: of them and if if anything exists, you can find it.

692
00:45:24,480 --> 00:45:30,239
Speaker 1: And does any part of this digital web, this digital fingerprint,

693
00:45:30,800 --> 00:45:35,200
Speaker 1: even like maybe just a long, long neglected LinkedIn page

694
00:45:35,280 --> 00:45:40,000
Speaker 1: or an old fossilized MySpace page, do they touch any

695
00:45:40,120 --> 00:45:44,479
Speaker 1: former or current US government official? Tut tut tut, day

696
00:45:44,480 --> 00:45:49,040
Speaker 1: one stuff. Let's go back to facial recognition. I mean

697
00:45:49,040 --> 00:45:52,040
Speaker 1: this can be automated. You can mobilize it on a

698
00:45:52,120 --> 00:45:56,960
Speaker 1: traveling drone. That means passing a single check at customs

699
00:45:57,239 --> 00:46:00,680
Speaker 1: is not enough anymore. You gotta be to be buttoned

700
00:46:00,760 --> 00:46:04,840
Speaker 1: up every single day afterwards. And if you're an asset

701
00:46:04,880 --> 00:46:09,760
Speaker 1: and unfriendly country, this is a tall milk shake for anyone,

702
00:46:09,920 --> 00:46:12,600
Speaker 1: even the best. At this point, you would have to

703
00:46:12,760 --> 00:46:17,759
Speaker 1: seriously consider things like the possibility of plastic surgery, and

704
00:46:17,800 --> 00:46:20,920
Speaker 1: there's no way to return to one's original appearance after

705
00:46:20,960 --> 00:46:25,920
Speaker 1: that with how technology is today. So okay, what's the

706
00:46:26,040 --> 00:46:30,960
Speaker 1: what's the solution, Matt, What's what's the solution here? If like, like, hey,

707
00:46:31,040 --> 00:46:34,399
Speaker 1: let's say you catch me and you say, you know,

708
00:46:34,880 --> 00:46:40,600
Speaker 1: excellent the work the agent and they say, multi lucky

709
00:46:40,680 --> 00:46:47,959
Speaker 1: did for you. I am double agent. I have the advice. Yeah,

710
00:46:48,000 --> 00:46:52,320
Speaker 1: advice is, uh, don't do anything on the internet, become

711
00:46:52,400 --> 00:47:00,760
Speaker 1: a ghost, don't do anything operating cash. I mean, I'm

712
00:47:00,800 --> 00:47:03,960
Speaker 1: I'm imagining. Uh, that's one of the only things you

713
00:47:03,960 --> 00:47:08,520
Speaker 1: could really do. Um. Because any kind of digital fingerprint,

714
00:47:08,840 --> 00:47:13,239
Speaker 1: any social media anything where someone is taking pictures of you, right,

715
00:47:13,400 --> 00:47:16,440
Speaker 1: it doesn't have to be you taking pictures of you. Uh,

716
00:47:16,520 --> 00:47:20,280
Speaker 1: you just have to watch where you are at all times.

717
00:47:20,680 --> 00:47:24,640
Speaker 1: Oh my god. But here's the problem. If you are

718
00:47:24,840 --> 00:47:27,960
Speaker 1: really good at this and you kind of just don't exist,

719
00:47:28,800 --> 00:47:30,800
Speaker 1: that could be even worse for you when it comes

720
00:47:30,840 --> 00:47:34,760
Speaker 1: to someone trying to discover you as a spy, because

721
00:47:34,800 --> 00:47:39,439
Speaker 1: that how suspicious is that? Right now? One or four

722
00:47:39,520 --> 00:47:43,040
Speaker 1: whenever you're hearing this. Uh, yeah, if there's no digital

723
00:47:43,120 --> 00:47:46,120
Speaker 1: fingerprint on you, you are the most likely suspect. Right,

724
00:47:46,640 --> 00:47:48,720
Speaker 1: it's it's kind of a damned if you do, damned

725
00:47:48,719 --> 00:47:53,719
Speaker 1: if you don't. UH. Agencies still always know all the

726
00:47:53,760 --> 00:47:56,880
Speaker 1: old school tricks. So even if you're trying to protect

727
00:47:56,920 --> 00:48:00,160
Speaker 1: yourself by not having a GPS surveillance that I it's

728
00:48:00,160 --> 00:48:03,240
Speaker 1: like a smartphone on you. They somebody can just shadow

729
00:48:03,280 --> 00:48:07,640
Speaker 1: you and you probably won't notice them unless you're you're

730
00:48:07,680 --> 00:48:10,680
Speaker 1: also pretty aware of your surroundings in a way that

731
00:48:10,760 --> 00:48:15,440
Speaker 1: sadly a lot of people are not. Intelligence agencies try

732
00:48:15,600 --> 00:48:18,640
Speaker 1: to address some of these tech problems. One way they

733
00:48:18,680 --> 00:48:21,880
Speaker 1: do it, it's just throw a ton of money at it,

734
00:48:22,280 --> 00:48:26,680
Speaker 1: making these uh these cover identities, which is sometimes called legends,

735
00:48:27,400 --> 00:48:33,279
Speaker 1: these covers for their officers, starting from scratch, false names, documents, addresses,

736
00:48:33,920 --> 00:48:38,600
Speaker 1: but with a digital twist, putting up a old fake

737
00:48:39,719 --> 00:48:45,480
Speaker 1: Facebook account. Someone just started Facebook. It didn't UM manipulate

738
00:48:45,560 --> 00:48:49,399
Speaker 1: their psychology the way Mark hoped at would, so they

739
00:48:49,440 --> 00:48:54,520
Speaker 1: stopped going on Facebook. And yes you can find um.

740
00:48:54,840 --> 00:48:59,319
Speaker 1: Yes you can find Janine Jansen, but she has not

741
00:48:59,560 --> 00:49:03,640
Speaker 1: logged in since two thousand and seven something like that,

742
00:49:03,960 --> 00:49:07,120
Speaker 1: so it looks real and it looks like she just

743
00:49:07,320 --> 00:49:10,840
Speaker 1: lost interest. UM make a credit rating that is somewhere

744
00:49:10,840 --> 00:49:13,759
Speaker 1: around the national average, maybe a little lower, just to

745
00:49:13,800 --> 00:49:20,200
Speaker 1: be like realistic, and then you can use The other

746
00:49:20,280 --> 00:49:25,480
Speaker 1: strategy is to just not use agents as often get

747
00:49:25,560 --> 00:49:29,560
Speaker 1: people who are kind of clean skinned. It's called freshly

748
00:49:29,600 --> 00:49:35,680
Speaker 1: recruited intelligence officers, recently showered, recently showered, the smell of

749
00:49:35,800 --> 00:49:41,600
Speaker 1: lavender and zest, and the only thing you see in

750
00:49:41,680 --> 00:49:46,360
Speaker 1: their online history or whatever is their previous civilian lives.

751
00:49:46,400 --> 00:49:48,799
Speaker 1: And since they've already never had a criminal record, nor

752
00:49:48,920 --> 00:49:52,879
Speaker 1: serious offense, nor serious family problems, etcetera, etcetera, then they

753
00:49:52,920 --> 00:49:55,880
Speaker 1: just look kind of vanilla, likely boring people, which is

754
00:49:55,920 --> 00:49:59,040
Speaker 1: what you want. And then the third is to just

755
00:49:59,200 --> 00:50:05,120
Speaker 1: send any intelligence officer on a one off mission, just say, look,

756
00:50:05,120 --> 00:50:09,239
Speaker 1: you got one shot, make it count. You are going

757
00:50:09,280 --> 00:50:11,160
Speaker 1: to be on a desk for the rest of your

758
00:50:11,160 --> 00:50:13,480
Speaker 1: career after this, because we can't play around with it.

759
00:50:14,239 --> 00:50:16,160
Speaker 1: The fourth, of course, is to play on the shallow

760
00:50:16,280 --> 00:50:19,399
Speaker 1: end of the pool, which is we're only doing this

761
00:50:19,480 --> 00:50:24,160
Speaker 1: kind of espionage in neutral or friendly countries. So that

762
00:50:24,200 --> 00:50:28,360
Speaker 1: means like, okay, for instance, that means, and this is

763
00:50:28,440 --> 00:50:34,200
Speaker 1: just an example hypothetical, folks, that means, let's we want

764
00:50:34,239 --> 00:50:38,200
Speaker 1: someone to learn more about what insert operation here that

765
00:50:38,280 --> 00:50:41,200
Speaker 1: the Chinese government is running, but we're not going to

766
00:50:41,360 --> 00:50:44,960
Speaker 1: go to China to do it. Instead, we're going to

767
00:50:45,000 --> 00:50:49,040
Speaker 1: go to Paris where they have an embassy, or you know,

768
00:50:49,160 --> 00:50:53,920
Speaker 1: London or wherever. And so the backdrop of our spine

769
00:50:53,960 --> 00:50:59,799
Speaker 1: operation becomes much less antagonistic, right because these are at

770
00:50:59,840 --> 00:51:04,000
Speaker 1: lea distensibly friendly countries. And now we have to ask

771
00:51:04,040 --> 00:51:08,600
Speaker 1: how how long will human intelligence remain relevant in an

772
00:51:08,640 --> 00:51:14,480
Speaker 1: online world? How long is it, for example, before not

773
00:51:14,680 --> 00:51:18,960
Speaker 1: rocking a neural implant becomes suspicious, how long before like

774
00:51:19,080 --> 00:51:23,440
Speaker 1: not having something plugged into your brain becomes as weird

775
00:51:23,600 --> 00:51:29,719
Speaker 1: as not having any online presence. And if everybody has

776
00:51:29,719 --> 00:51:31,920
Speaker 1: it like the old right now, the way to get

777
00:51:31,960 --> 00:51:35,160
Speaker 1: away with a good dead drop is just obviously don't

778
00:51:35,200 --> 00:51:38,240
Speaker 1: take a cell phone with you. But now not carrying

779
00:51:38,239 --> 00:51:42,360
Speaker 1: a cell phone make some people suspicious. And if you

780
00:51:42,400 --> 00:51:46,200
Speaker 1: get into a car accident or emergency situation, you don't

781
00:51:46,200 --> 00:51:52,640
Speaker 1: have a cell phone, right, And also mobile networks are

782
00:51:52,680 --> 00:51:58,919
Speaker 1: all extremely vulnerable if if someone with state level resources

783
00:51:59,000 --> 00:52:01,040
Speaker 1: is after you, so it's much harder to dodge a

784
00:52:01,120 --> 00:52:06,600
Speaker 1: tail to change your patterns. And now the new algorithmic

785
00:52:06,640 --> 00:52:10,719
Speaker 1: analysts can catch things human counter intelligence will miss and

786
00:52:10,800 --> 00:52:15,239
Speaker 1: they can also exercise some pretty spooky powers of prediction.

787
00:52:15,840 --> 00:52:19,200
Speaker 1: So this leads some longtime veterans of the Great Game

788
00:52:19,280 --> 00:52:22,800
Speaker 1: to say the West needs to change the rules. Says

789
00:52:22,840 --> 00:52:26,800
Speaker 1: the West is unduly constrained by laws that don't apply

790
00:52:27,800 --> 00:52:30,720
Speaker 1: to their counterparts, to their people on the other side

791
00:52:30,719 --> 00:52:33,320
Speaker 1: of the chessboard. Like you don't need a warrant to

792
00:52:33,440 --> 00:52:36,680
Speaker 1: pull somebody's personal cards in China, you just need to

793
00:52:36,760 --> 00:52:39,759
Speaker 1: run them through the system, like the power just has

794
00:52:39,800 --> 00:52:44,160
Speaker 1: to be on for that machine. And spies today increasingly

795
00:52:44,200 --> 00:52:48,480
Speaker 1: have to work with lawyers to test the legality of

796
00:52:48,480 --> 00:52:51,080
Speaker 1: their own operations. The idea is, even if they know

797
00:52:51,160 --> 00:52:53,880
Speaker 1: they've got someone dead to rights, they still have to

798
00:52:53,920 --> 00:52:56,600
Speaker 1: get a warrant. They still have to justify a thousand

799
00:52:56,719 --> 00:53:00,080
Speaker 1: things that the from their perspective, the bad guy I

800
00:53:00,120 --> 00:53:03,680
Speaker 1: simply don't have to do. That is an argument not

801
00:53:03,760 --> 00:53:07,120
Speaker 1: everybody agrees with. Like it's pretty obvious that the FISA

802
00:53:07,239 --> 00:53:10,480
Speaker 1: courts themselves are a rubber stamp. They don't turn down

803
00:53:10,520 --> 00:53:13,279
Speaker 1: a lot of warrant requests. But that's where we are.

804
00:53:13,640 --> 00:53:15,960
Speaker 1: That's a future of spy. It is evolving at a

805
00:53:16,040 --> 00:53:19,400
Speaker 1: pace unparalleled since the rise of mass media, and in

806
00:53:19,440 --> 00:53:22,319
Speaker 1: a very very short amount of time, the US may

807
00:53:22,360 --> 00:53:24,799
Speaker 1: no longer be in the lead. It may not be

808
00:53:24,880 --> 00:53:26,640
Speaker 1: in the lead now. To be honest with you, it

809
00:53:26,640 --> 00:53:29,279
Speaker 1: seems like it might not be. But maybe they're just

810
00:53:29,320 --> 00:53:31,880
Speaker 1: so good at what they do that nobody even knows

811
00:53:32,080 --> 00:53:35,160
Speaker 1: how good they are. They don't need any of that

812
00:53:35,239 --> 00:53:40,240
Speaker 1: societal recognition. Huh. Yeah, maybe that's what's up. I hope,

813
00:53:40,440 --> 00:53:44,279
Speaker 1: maybe not, Maybe I do hope. I don't know. I

814
00:53:44,320 --> 00:53:47,080
Speaker 1: don't know. The alternative is scary, but that's so it

815
00:53:47,080 --> 00:53:50,240
Speaker 1: goes deeper. It goes deeper than the spy tech toys, which,

816
00:53:50,760 --> 00:53:53,759
Speaker 1: by the way, I think you can still buy online

817
00:53:54,040 --> 00:53:58,520
Speaker 1: that oh snap objects, you're interested. I don't. I don't

818
00:53:58,560 --> 00:54:01,720
Speaker 1: know what kids play with these days. I'm totally interested.

819
00:54:01,800 --> 00:54:04,359
Speaker 1: But some would would love something like that. Actually got

820
00:54:04,440 --> 00:54:11,640
Speaker 1: him a couple of things like that already. Yeah. But anyway, um,

821
00:54:11,680 --> 00:54:15,799
Speaker 1: because like father, like son, Um, we didn't even talk

822
00:54:15,840 --> 00:54:17,839
Speaker 1: about this thing that I wanted to bring up, Ben

823
00:54:17,920 --> 00:54:20,880
Speaker 1: that I think we can save for an entire episode

824
00:54:20,880 --> 00:54:29,480
Speaker 1: on its own. Honestly, I think so CenTra Technology Incorporated. Yes, yes,

825
00:54:30,120 --> 00:54:33,320
Speaker 1: we uh we briefly interacted about this off air, didn't

826
00:54:33,360 --> 00:54:39,320
Speaker 1: we yeah, this is this is right up my alley

827
00:54:39,360 --> 00:54:42,440
Speaker 1: as far as just my interests, so I'm thinking that

828
00:54:42,520 --> 00:54:45,640
Speaker 1: it might be the same for others out there. No promises,

829
00:54:45,960 --> 00:54:51,120
Speaker 1: but look up CenTra Technology Incorporated. If you're just hanging

830
00:54:51,160 --> 00:54:54,759
Speaker 1: out right now and be careful, maybe maybe do it

831
00:54:54,800 --> 00:54:59,560
Speaker 1: with a tour browser. Well then also, uh, maybe continue

832
00:55:01,200 --> 00:55:06,080
Speaker 1: looking into the private sector of intelligence, which is it's

833
00:55:06,200 --> 00:55:10,600
Speaker 1: its own field. And to what degree do consulting groups

834
00:55:10,760 --> 00:55:16,280
Speaker 1: for those that call themselves consulting groups qualify as spying

835
00:55:16,600 --> 00:55:23,839
Speaker 1: espionage adjacent? Shout out Mackenzie. Right, uh, and let's let

836
00:55:23,960 --> 00:55:26,279
Speaker 1: us know, let us know what your take is. H

837
00:55:26,440 --> 00:55:28,959
Speaker 1: let us know if you believe that humans will still

838
00:55:29,000 --> 00:55:32,120
Speaker 1: participate in the future of spying. We'd love to hear

839
00:55:32,160 --> 00:55:35,480
Speaker 1: from you. We hope you enjoyed this. You can contact

840
00:55:35,560 --> 00:55:38,120
Speaker 1: us directly so many ways. We try to be easy

841
00:55:38,200 --> 00:55:42,000
Speaker 1: to find online. Yes, so take that giant digital footprint

842
00:55:42,040 --> 00:55:45,320
Speaker 1: that you've already got and aim it towards conspiracy stuff

843
00:55:45,360 --> 00:55:48,759
Speaker 1: on Twitter or Facebook or YouTube and if you don't

844
00:55:48,800 --> 00:55:53,440
Speaker 1: like those were also on Instagram conspiracy stuff show. If

845
00:55:53,520 --> 00:55:55,359
Speaker 1: you would like to reach out to us and tell

846
00:55:55,440 --> 00:55:58,000
Speaker 1: us your story with your mouth, you can do that

847
00:55:58,400 --> 00:56:02,279
Speaker 1: our number is one eight three three st d w

848
00:56:02,640 --> 00:56:06,000
Speaker 1: y t K. You'll have three minutes. Those three minutes

849
00:56:06,080 --> 00:56:09,440
Speaker 1: belong to you. Do with them what you will only

850
00:56:09,480 --> 00:56:13,480
Speaker 1: ask the following. Please give yourself a cool nickname. That

851
00:56:13,560 --> 00:56:16,200
Speaker 1: kind of stuff always makes our day. Uh, tell us

852
00:56:16,239 --> 00:56:19,319
Speaker 1: what's on your mind. The second most important thing, let

853
00:56:19,440 --> 00:56:21,279
Speaker 1: us know if we can use your voice, hand or

854
00:56:21,360 --> 00:56:25,560
Speaker 1: your message on the air. Again, there's one more important thing,

855
00:56:25,800 --> 00:56:28,040
Speaker 1: is the most important thing. Don't feel like you have

856
00:56:28,080 --> 00:56:31,399
Speaker 1: to censor yourself. If you call one eight three three

857
00:56:31,680 --> 00:56:35,160
Speaker 1: st d w y t K and you realize that

858
00:56:35,360 --> 00:56:39,439
Speaker 1: three minutes isn't enough to cover your story, then send

859
00:56:39,520 --> 00:56:42,480
Speaker 1: us a good old fashioned email. You shouldn't slide any

860
00:56:42,480 --> 00:56:45,880
Speaker 1: time of day, anytime and night, anywhere in this world

861
00:56:46,120 --> 00:56:49,680
Speaker 1: or off of it. We are conspiracy at i heart

862
00:56:49,760 --> 00:57:10,640
Speaker 1: radio dot com. M HM. Stuff they don't want you

863
00:57:10,680 --> 00:57:13,319
Speaker 1: to know is a production of I Heart Radio. For

864
00:57:13,360 --> 00:57:15,759
Speaker 1: more podcasts from my heart Radio, visit the i heart

865
00:57:15,800 --> 00:57:18,600
Speaker 1: Radio app, Apple Podcasts, or wherever you listen to your

866
00:57:18,600 --> 00:57:19,280
Speaker 1: favorite shows.