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Speaker 1: From UFOs to psychic powers and government conspiracies. History is

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Speaker 1: riddled with unexplained events. You can turn back now or

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Speaker 1: learn the stuff they don't want you to know. A

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Speaker 1: production of iHeartRadio.

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Speaker 2: Hello, welcome back to the show. My name is Matt,

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Speaker 2: my name is Noel.

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Speaker 3: They call me Ben.

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Speaker 4: We are joined with our guest super producer, Dylan the

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Speaker 4: Tennessee pal Fagan. Most importantly, you are here. That makes

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Speaker 4: this the stuff they don't want you to know. It

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Speaker 4: is quite a week for strange news. We're going to

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Speaker 4: visit some folks across the Pacific. We're going to go

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Speaker 4: on air with some conversations we had had in the

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Speaker 4: past about different ambitious attempts at grass roots regime change.

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Speaker 4: We'll call it. We'll see some bribery. Well, we'll also

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Speaker 4: just for anybody listening right now, if you have a pager,

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Speaker 4: no judgment. If you have a pager, move it across

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Speaker 4: the room.

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Speaker 3: A pager? What is it? Nineteen ninety five, Oliver Bay

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Speaker 3: I had one. I had a bright green, translucent Motorola pager.

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Speaker 2: Yes, hopefully you don't need to be worried about your pager.

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Speaker 2: If you know, if you're.

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Speaker 3: A doctor or a drug dealer, a work production mine

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Speaker 3: never mine never injured me, you know, physically anyway.

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Speaker 4: The ones I had injured me emotionally exactly.

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Speaker 3: That's that's clear. All those mean spirited pager codes that

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Speaker 3: were flying around.

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Speaker 4: Is it really nine one one? Is it really nine

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Speaker 4: one one? Or do you just want me to tell

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Speaker 4: you what Jennifer said about you in middle school?

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Speaker 5: You know?

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Speaker 2: No, I mean, it's not nine one one, it's eight

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Speaker 2: zero zero eight five?

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Speaker 3: Is it really? Boobs? Guys? Is it really?

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Speaker 4: We're fans and we've returned. Listen, folks, fellow conspiracy realist.

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Speaker 4: We are recording this on the evening of September eighteenth,

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Speaker 4: twenty twenty four, and our breaking news story should be

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Speaker 4: considered just that we don't have all the facts. Very

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Speaker 4: few people do. But I was talking with the guys

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Speaker 4: earlier when I got the news and it quickly spread

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Speaker 4: around the world. There was a massive pager attack on

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Speaker 4: affiliates of his Belah.

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Speaker 3: But not like an interruption of service attack, like where

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Speaker 3: all of a sudden people's pages didn't work. It was

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Speaker 3: something quite different. Ben right, Yes, sir, that's correct.

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Speaker 2: This is.

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Speaker 4: In contrast to a denial of service. This was a

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Speaker 4: quote unquote service that the people affected certainly did not welcome,

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Speaker 4: nor did they expect it. And to intro into this,

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Speaker 4: I think it's important for us to note the events

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Speaker 4: were going to describe here occurred just a few days ago.

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Speaker 4: As a matter of fact, as we were gearing up

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Speaker 4: for things. In the past twenty four hours, another attack occurred,

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Speaker 4: another mass attack with exploding walkie talkies. This is going

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Speaker 4: to be an episode in the future. Right now, we

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Speaker 4: want to set the stage and answer some questions that

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Speaker 4: are on everybody's mind. To really understand what happened, you

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Speaker 4: need to go back to October of nineteen ninety five

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Speaker 4: and a guy a lot of people don't remember his name,

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Speaker 4: Kamil Hamad, met with operatives of shin Bet. Without getting

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Speaker 4: too into the weeds, that's Israel's counter terrorism outfit. And

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Speaker 4: when this guy met with shin Bet, he came to

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Speaker 4: him and he said, look, I need funding and I

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Speaker 4: need Israeli identity cards for myself and for my family.

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Speaker 4: And shin Bett, like a lot of good intel organizations

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Speaker 4: will do, said well, now we've got you by the

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Speaker 4: short and curls right now, you work for us. We

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Speaker 4: will inform on you and your bosses will murder you

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Speaker 4: as a result. So he agreed to cooperate. He went

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Speaker 4: in thinking that he was the deal maker, and he

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Speaker 4: came out at the wrong end.

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Speaker 3: Of a deal.

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Speaker 4: So what they did is they gave him a cell phone,

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Speaker 4: and they were upfront. They told him this was bugged

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Speaker 4: so that they could listen in on his conversations. What's

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Speaker 4: more important is what they did not tell Hamad. They

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Speaker 4: did not tell him that this bugged phone also contained

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Speaker 4: fifteen grams of explosives.

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Speaker 5: WHOA I mean, that was my initial question, because there's

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Speaker 5: part of me that almost wondered, is this some way

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Speaker 5: of hijacking a device and causing it to overheat to

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Speaker 5: the point.

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Speaker 3: Where it would injure somebody. But it's deeper than that.

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Speaker 3: It's it's potentially like someone got in on the supply

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Speaker 3: chain of the product or planted a tampered with product

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Speaker 3: that these individuals ended up using. That just seems so complicated.

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Speaker 4: Which we'll get to. That's the twenty twenty four event.

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Speaker 4: We're still like October nineteen ninety five.

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Speaker 2: But yeah, you're describing that it is possible, right to

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Speaker 2: do that, but with one person.

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Speaker 4: Right, Yeah, that's what I'm hoping to do. Yeah, like

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Speaker 4: the president here, which doesn't get as reported as widely

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Speaker 4: as it should. Takes us to not Kamil Hamad. Kamil

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Speaker 4: Hamad was not the target of this operation. Instead, the

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Speaker 4: Intel was targeting a guy named yahe Ayash that is

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Speaker 4: spelled yahya Ayyash. During his lifetime, this guy was known

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Speaker 4: as the prime or chief bomb maker of Hamas. And

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Speaker 4: so when the Chinbet gives Kamal Hamad this cell phone

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Speaker 4: that he knows is bugged, he knows is tapped. Essentially,

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Speaker 4: what they're doing is waiting for him to give it

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Speaker 4: to someone who will give it to Ayash. And so

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Speaker 4: Hamad gives the phone to one of his nephews, his nephew,

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Speaker 4: and he knows that this guy, the chief bombmaker of Hamas,

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Speaker 4: regularly uses this nephew's phones. And then fast forward It's

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Speaker 4: January fifth, nineteen ninety six. Ayash's father calls him on

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Speaker 4: this bugged phone. Aosh answers, and then and Israeli playing

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Speaker 4: flying overhead, picks up the conversation, relays it to command.

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Speaker 4: They confirm this is the guy they're looking for on

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Speaker 4: the phone, and they remotely detonate the device. They kill

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Speaker 4: him instantly.

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Speaker 2: Wow.

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Speaker 3: Effective, brutal effective.

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Speaker 4: And this is what leads us to the news that

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Speaker 4: everybody saw. On Tuesday, an attack in Lebanon across the

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Speaker 4: country of Lebanon caused pagers to explode. Thousands of people

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Speaker 4: were injured. At current count, twelve are dead as a

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Speaker 4: result of the pager attack because the day after this evening,

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Speaker 4: as we record, walkie talkies associated with Hesbola affiliates also exploded.

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Speaker 4: This is something that I would say is not unprecedented

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Speaker 4: therefore in terms of the principle or the concept, but

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Speaker 4: it is unprecedented, I would argue in terms.

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Speaker 3: Of the scale of the operation. To your earlier point,

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Speaker 3: it's it's wild. I mean, and you know, we don't

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Speaker 3: know much yet. I mean, we will hopefully by the

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Speaker 3: time we do this full episode, but like you know,

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Speaker 3: we certainly know there are things like defects and phones

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Speaker 3: that you have to get recalled because the lithium batteries

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Speaker 3: can heat up to the point of injuring people. I mean,

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Speaker 3: there have been like lawsuits filed but against cell phone

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Speaker 3: manufacturers for like people getting horribly burned, but this sounds

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Speaker 3: even worse than that, and like more immediate. We hear

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Speaker 3: we're hearing a lot about injuries to people's eyes and

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Speaker 3: faces because they're holding the thing up to look at

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Speaker 3: it when the call comes in.

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Speaker 4: Yeah, but they got a buzz notification, right, And you

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Speaker 4: can see you can see a lot of video of

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Speaker 4: the aftermath, which is horrified. You can also see a

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Speaker 4: couple of videos that just happen to be caught on

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Speaker 4: things like CCTV and what you'll what you'll see there

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Speaker 4: is somebody gets a buzz like soap, they into their pocket,

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Speaker 4: they hold up the thing and it explodes with much

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Speaker 4: more force than you know, an overheated lithium ion battery.

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Speaker 3: Yeah, and Asia probably doesn't even take one of those.

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Speaker 3: I mean, they're so underpower they don't need much.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, No, that's a really good point. It was said,

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Speaker 2: it was known that the pager definitely got a signal.

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Speaker 2: There were some kind of strange code that was displayed,

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Speaker 2: you know, on the on the display there on the

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Speaker 2: pager right before it went off, and it was like

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Speaker 2: a like a couple of second delay.

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Speaker 3: I think I maybe heard on public radio today that

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Speaker 3: these were meant to be like proprietary communications from HESBELA.

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Speaker 4: Yes, yeah, this was meant to be what we would

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Speaker 4: call sequestered or discrete comms for Hesbelos. So if you

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Speaker 4: had your own pager already, your CIV pager or your

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Speaker 4: civy phone, that would not be connected. This is to

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Speaker 4: message people in this organization because there is, as you

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Speaker 4: can objectively understand, there is a great deal of concern

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Speaker 4: about security of communication because HESBLA, being a proxy of Iran,

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Speaker 4: has been at war with Israel for quite some time. Look,

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Speaker 4: we know that this is ideologically deep for people. We're

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Speaker 4: not here to talk about the ideology necessarily. We're here

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Speaker 4: to explore what appears to be an insidiously successful covert operation,

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Speaker 4: a genuine conspiracy.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, can we quickly just talk about what Heswela is.

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Speaker 2: I think sometimes people get confused about some of these

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Speaker 2: organizations and groups and just to get people to run

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Speaker 2: down on like because Hesbela is a vast and multifaceted thing. Sure.

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Speaker 3: Yeah.

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Speaker 4: HESBLA is a political party, Lebanese Shia Islamist political party

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Speaker 4: and also a paramilitary group. So if you talk to

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Speaker 4: some people in Lebanon, they're going to say this is

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Speaker 4: not a terrorist group, right, These are more akin to

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Speaker 4: freedom fighters However, it is an open secret that Hebela

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Speaker 4: receives a lot of funding from the nation of Iran,

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Speaker 4: which is currently a theocracy, and Iran has different statements

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Speaker 4: about this, you know what I mean, kind of like

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Speaker 4: Russia writes laws about any Russian president. One notable thing

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Speaker 4: that happened in the pager attack was that the Iranian

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Speaker 4: ambassador was also injured. So one of the first questions

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Speaker 4: that the international community is asking is why did you

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Speaker 4: have a direct plug in to hisbolo?

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Speaker 3: Holy crap, the plot dickens. I mean, now, that's wow,

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Speaker 3: that's very I didn't even think about that aspect of it.

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Speaker 2: It's a big deal. It's a good question.

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Speaker 3: It's a big deal and a good question.

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Speaker 4: This is where we get to something that was brought

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Speaker 4: up a little bit earlier, but let's get to it.

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Speaker 4: Initial conversation and speculation concerned the idea of how an

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Speaker 4: attack could happen. Is it theoretically possible that malicious code

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Speaker 4: could have been used to simply overheat a battery right,

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Speaker 4: resulting in all of these things going off at once.

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Speaker 4: That does not appear to be the case. Pagers again,

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Speaker 4: are you know, not super advanced technology. They're not all

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Speaker 4: cloud connected to.

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Speaker 3: The point, probably why they use these instead of cell

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Speaker 3: phones or instead of smart devices, because it's so siloed

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Speaker 3: and low tech.

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Speaker 4: And I keep thinking about I rewatched it too many times.

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Speaker 4: I keep thinking about the scene and Breaking Bad spoilers

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Speaker 4: three to one. I keep thinking about the scene and

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Speaker 4: Breaking bad. Wherein Walter White ordered hits on a ton

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Speaker 4: of people all in the same two minutes in the

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Speaker 4: US prison system. Do you guys remember that?

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Speaker 2: Uh?

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Speaker 3: Huh, I didn't. I don't remember what clever mcguy vermethod

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Speaker 3: he used to do that, but I do remember that

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Speaker 3: plot point he got a biker gang ye had inside

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Speaker 3: people in different prisons from this back. What was so

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Speaker 3: this you're saying, just the level of precision and comms

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Speaker 3: kind of reminded you of that.

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Speaker 4: Yeah, but in this case also innocent people were injured,

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Speaker 4: and perhaps more importantly, this is real life. Now, another

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Speaker 4: thing we have to think about here. When these explosions

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Speaker 4: occur again simultaneously or near simultaneously, it tells us some

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Speaker 4: very important things. The first thing it tells us is

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Speaker 4: that this came from the same signal, right. The second

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Speaker 4: thing it tells us is it's important mission critical to

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Speaker 4: figure out the provenance of this pager supply and speculation

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Speaker 4: is going for Hungry to Taiwan right now. And then

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Speaker 4: the third thing I think it tells us to be

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Speaker 4: quite clear, is that there was somebody waited. They put

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Speaker 4: explosives in these things. They put grams of explosives in pagers,

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Speaker 4: and they didn't immediately pull the trigger.

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Speaker 3: Yeah, they waited.

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Speaker 4: And the question then is why did they wait without

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Speaker 4: sounding to James Bondi about it. It was probably because

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Speaker 4: the plan was getting close to being exposed, so it

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Speaker 4: was time to maximize the leverage.

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Speaker 3: It's hella, James bond all of it. It's crazy. It's

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Speaker 3: like an exploding pen.

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Speaker 2: The big question I have, guys, is if they were

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Speaker 2: a if whoever did this right was able to gain

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Speaker 2: access to all those devices. These are just like a

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Speaker 2: pretty simple send receive signaled device right usually with radio signals.

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Speaker 2: If they took the time and were able to gain

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Speaker 2: access to all those things and put explosives in them,

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Speaker 2: what makes us think that they weren't also enabled with

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Speaker 2: some kind of listening device or tracking device.

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Speaker 3: Like original story Ben told was exactly.

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Speaker 2: Exactly like and you're doing it across an entire organization,

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Speaker 2: and it makes guys, it makes me think about the

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Speaker 2: stories we've heard in the past from listeners in read

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Speaker 2: online about let's say, a federal agent from any country

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Speaker 2: that intercepts an Amazon package or something that's ordered that

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Speaker 2: has a device in it, like a new computer or

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Speaker 2: a phone or something like that that gets it gets intercepted,

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Speaker 2: and then something gets meddled with just enough to where

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Speaker 2: it can be useful in the future. And it can

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Speaker 2: be that kind of thing you're talking about, Ben, where

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Speaker 2: it's a tool that now you have and you can

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Speaker 2: use it when you need.

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Speaker 4: It right and you don't want The main thing you

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Speaker 4: want to protect will be what we call methods, right,

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Speaker 4: and I know we're going a little over again. We

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Speaker 4: will have an episode on this pretty soon. Another question

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Speaker 4: I had was immediately, what's next. There's a lot of

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Speaker 4: scuttle but in the policy wonk field, in the war

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Speaker 4: maker field right now, over whether or not this is

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Speaker 4: the harbinger of a large scale ground invasion, which is

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Speaker 4: very dangerous for innocent people. Here's what I learned when

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Speaker 4: I thought what's next? The goal was not to instantly

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Speaker 4: kill everybody with these pages. I imagine again whomever did it

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Speaker 4: was hoping to fatally injure as many people as possible.

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Speaker 3: We know that message, we know at.

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Speaker 4: Least a dozen or dead. Worse than sending a message

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Speaker 4: more dangerous listening because now that you have that network identified,

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Speaker 4: you can look at things like hospital roots, which ambulances

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Speaker 4: are picking someone up?

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Speaker 3: Where are they going? Right?

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Speaker 4: How many of these people in these places? How many

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Speaker 4: folks have similar injuries?

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Speaker 3: Well?

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Speaker 2: Yeah, because we're talking about the network of individuals that

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Speaker 2: this opposition force is interested in. Right, So you're you're

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Speaker 2: absolutely right.

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Speaker 3: So are you saying that they don't already know who

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Speaker 3: these people are? Yes? How would they? So they cast

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Speaker 3: a wide net. Does that mean that maybe potentially civilians

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Speaker 3: got a hold of these devices too? Quite possibly. That's

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Speaker 3: why I use the phrase affiliates. Yes, And that's why

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Speaker 3: it's important to say that, you know, in Lebanon, Hasbola

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Speaker 3: is considered a political party, right, so there are people

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Speaker 3: who are not you know, out at the front lines

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Speaker 3: of the border trying to murder folks they ideologically identify

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Speaker 3: with certain tenets of that party. And then if you

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Speaker 3: just so this part up, if you assassinate a few people,

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Speaker 3: but then you have already hijacked the enemy's communication network.

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Speaker 3: They are identifying their forces to you, and then right

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Speaker 3: after that they followed up with the walkie talkies.

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Speaker 4: I wish we had time to talk about the providence,

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Speaker 4: but it's going to have to be an episode.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, it's definitely a full episode, just to think about it. Guys,

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Speaker 2: the CFR, the Council and Foreign Relations that you know them.

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Speaker 2: They describe Hesbella as a terrorist organization because the United

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Speaker 2: States has designated hesbel as a terrorist organization. Does this

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Speaker 2: attack not feel like a terrorist attack or an act

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Speaker 2: of terrorism? Both of these where car you know, and

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Speaker 2: completely unexpected, and then just the fear that it generates.

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Speaker 2: I don't know.

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Speaker 4: I will say as we end this, before we go

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Speaker 4: to a break, there is what we could see as

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Speaker 4: public possible public like motivation, which is the attent at assassination.

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Speaker 4: Hezbola earlier failed to assassinate a guy named moshe Yah alone,

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Speaker 4: and this may have been a reaction to it, or

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Speaker 4: methods may have been exposed.

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Speaker 3: We do know, we do know that.

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Speaker 4: The question on everybody's mind, and a lot of you guys,

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Speaker 4: friends were asking you about this, friends of family. We

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Speaker 4: do know the question on a lot of people's minds

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Speaker 4: right now. Is my stuff safe? You know, like my

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Speaker 4: kid just got a phone? Is my kid safe? What

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Speaker 4: could happen next?

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Speaker 3: Gears? It could be other classes of devices that are

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Speaker 3: affected too, as we've already seen two. I mean, you

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Speaker 3: could easily argue that those are both kind of more

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Speaker 3: low tech radio wave based devices. And to my understanding,

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Speaker 3: it's usually radio waves that are used to trigger bombs

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Speaker 3: a lot of the time. But I guess surely there's

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Speaker 3: advancements in bomb making and triggering.

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Speaker 2: Well, your device would have to have explosives in it

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Speaker 2: to be triggered, right, of course.

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Speaker 3: I guess. I just mean like it creates this sense

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Speaker 3: of fear as to what's next, Like Ben was saying,

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Speaker 3: like could it be in an iPhone? Could it be

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Speaker 3: in you know, my razor or whatever?

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Speaker 2: You know?

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Speaker 4: And here's why, as we go to ad break, here's

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Speaker 4: why people are kind of other points I want to

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Speaker 4: get to. Yeah, yeah, we'll do an episode here. Here's

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Speaker 4: why people have been concerned candidly about the idea of

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Speaker 4: a large scale ground war. It's because you're removing command, right,

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Speaker 4: and a lot of hisbela command by the way, didn't

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Speaker 4: use these pagers. They were communicated to by people who

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Speaker 4: had these pages, so that the heads of the organization

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Speaker 4: are not entirely gone. You remove command, you create fear, right,

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Speaker 4: you break comms, and then by doing so, you remove

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Speaker 4: the ability for the enemy to respond, and that is

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Speaker 4: an arguable part of the calculus. This enigmatic what's next

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Speaker 4: question is still haunting the world right now. We don't

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Speaker 4: know what's going to happen. We know that as targeted

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Speaker 4: as these things may appear on paper, there are inevitably

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Speaker 4: civilians bystanders injured, and the question always becomes what happens next.

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Speaker 4: So we'll be back with a full episode. We know

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Speaker 4: this is heavy stuff. We're here with you. We got

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Speaker 4: your back, folks. Let's go to the app break.

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Speaker 2: And we've returned and we are going to travel over

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Speaker 2: to Venezuela for the first story here. Maybe we'll get

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Speaker 2: to the second one and we might just focus on Venezuela.

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Speaker 2: We'll see. But guys, Venezuela in July had an election

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Speaker 2: and somebody that we've talked about a lot on this show,

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Speaker 2: mister Maduro himself, won a third term as the leader

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Speaker 2: of Venezuela, much to the chagrin of pretty much the

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Speaker 2: world and the opposition that he faced there in Venezuela.

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Speaker 2: People are saying, uh, yeah, it really does seem like

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Speaker 2: they're just covering up that he lost the election and

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Speaker 2: just saying he won, and they being, you know, the

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Speaker 2: powers that he, mister Maduro as a leader currently has,

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Speaker 2: the levers that we just talked about with regards to

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Speaker 2: other countries on the show, where once you have that power,

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Speaker 2: you can do things like turn courts and legislatures and

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Speaker 2: other powers in your favor to do things like cover

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Speaker 2: up the results of an election.

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Speaker 3: You know, the US has done it for less I mean,

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Speaker 3: right in terms of being instrumental.

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Speaker 2: In coups, Oh yeah, carrying out a coup in another country.

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Speaker 2: There was a story from July. Ben I don't know

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Speaker 2: if we actually talked about it, but you had it

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Speaker 2: in the dock there to talk about at the end

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Speaker 2: of July that there was a failed coup in twenty

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Speaker 2: twenty in Venezuela something like that. I can't remember the specifics.

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Speaker 1: Yeah.

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Speaker 4: Yeah, it's been a fertile soil for attempted non consensual

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Speaker 4: regime change.

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Speaker 2: Oh yes, to just go back to that election, for

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Speaker 2: one more minute. The National Electoral Council of Venezuela also

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Speaker 2: known as the CNE, declared Maduro the winner on July

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Speaker 2: twenty eighth, and it was ratified by the Supreme Court

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Speaker 2: a couple of weeks later. But you know, the official

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Speaker 2: documentation of that election, the things like the what they

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Speaker 2: call the disaggregated data or data from the vote tally sheets,

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Speaker 2: has not been published in a bunch of other countries,

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Speaker 2: including the US, to saying this election is not right.

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Speaker 2: Something is sour here, at least with those with the

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Speaker 2: official reporting on that election. And you guys, I didn't

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Speaker 2: realize the opposition leader who was going up against Maduro

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Speaker 2: in that election had to get the heck out of there.

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Speaker 2: He had to leave because he was facing some pretty

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Speaker 2: serious charge, really freaky stuff. He flew to Spain because

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Speaker 2: there was an arrest warrant out for him, accusing him

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Speaker 2: of terrorism and conspiracy.

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Speaker 3: That's what I accuse.

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Speaker 4: Anybody disagrees with me about anything down, I'm like a

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Speaker 4: freaking terrorist and you're inspiring case a Dias are clearly

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Speaker 4: a superior sandwich. Someone arrests this.

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Speaker 3: Man and this all transpired like after the election was called,

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Speaker 3: then all of a sudden, these charges were filed.

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Speaker 2: Yes, and then he had to leave. The opposition leader

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Speaker 2: there who had to go to Spain and was charged

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Speaker 2: with that stuff was Edmundo Gonzalez, and he was you know,

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Speaker 2: he went out publicly and said, hey, this vote was stolen,

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Speaker 2: this isn't right, and he became an enemy really quickly.

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Speaker 2: So why are we talking about all this? Oh, because

404
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Speaker 2: it's context to this story that was written in CNN.

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Speaker 2: It is titled US says claims of CIA plot to

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Speaker 2: kill Maduro are categorically false. That's in quotations. Yes, after

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Speaker 2: Venezuela rest six foreigners. Okay, so let's just get in

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Speaker 2: this state department says no, no, no, there's nothing. There's

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Speaker 2: no base to these accusations that somebody was trying to kill.

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Speaker 2: His name is Nicholas Maduro. By the way, I think

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Speaker 2: we just lovingly calling him Maduro again mentioned before in

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Speaker 2: that episode. It is one of my favorite foods that

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Speaker 2: exists on this planet. A good Maduro or Maduro's usually.

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Speaker 3: What is that I don't think I know about this food, Matt.

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Speaker 2: That is a ripened plantain that has been somewhat fried

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Speaker 2: in that's sweet and.

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Speaker 3: Delicious I don't know that I've had a Maduro. N Oh,

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Speaker 3: it's so good. All right, we'll hang out later and

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Speaker 3: get sack, but not this Madru. I don't think we

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Speaker 3: care for this.

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Speaker 4: We're not hey, hey, we're not involved. We're giving you

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Speaker 4: the strange news. As a matter of fact, none of

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Speaker 4: us have officially visited Venezuela in Quba officially.

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Speaker 3: Yeah, this guy Maduro seems like a real pill. Matt Oh.

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Speaker 2: Yeah. Maduro, who was famously the number two for a

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Speaker 2: long time to Hugo Chavez, which we've done a whole

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Speaker 2: video series and talked about numerous times. He had some

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Speaker 2: weirdness going on, right.

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Speaker 4: Yeah, you can see. I hope YouTube hasn't pulled it down.

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Speaker 4: They're tricky with that kind of media. This guy, in

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Speaker 4: the midst of running Venezuela, also was known for having

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Speaker 4: his talk show that went on in excess of four

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Speaker 4: hours where you could just call him live yeah and

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Speaker 4: ask him stuff and then you know, off the cuff,

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Speaker 4: he would he would have this big at least in

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Speaker 4: the public facing persona. He would have big Uncle energy

437
00:26:34,400 --> 00:26:39,240
Speaker 4: where someone would say, hey, sir, we are hungry, retired,

438
00:26:39,440 --> 00:26:41,960
Speaker 4: crime is out of control, and he would just say

439
00:26:41,960 --> 00:26:45,120
Speaker 4: something like mothers are the most important part of this country.

440
00:26:45,440 --> 00:26:48,160
Speaker 4: Give that woman thousands of dollars, you know at buyer

441
00:26:48,200 --> 00:26:51,480
Speaker 4: a house, all right, next caller, Which is not the

442
00:26:51,480 --> 00:26:52,960
Speaker 4: way you're supposed to run a government.

443
00:26:53,400 --> 00:26:55,639
Speaker 2: Yeah, but he did have a team of people that

444
00:26:55,720 --> 00:26:57,800
Speaker 2: just went out and bought houses. No, I'm just joking.

445
00:26:57,800 --> 00:27:02,879
Speaker 2: I can't confirm that. So so there was allegedly some

446
00:27:03,000 --> 00:27:07,080
Speaker 2: kind of attempt on Nicholas Maduro's life, at least according

447
00:27:07,160 --> 00:27:12,800
Speaker 2: to Venezuela's official apparatus there and the State Department here

448
00:27:12,800 --> 00:27:15,320
Speaker 2: in the US says no, that's categorically false. That did

449
00:27:15,359 --> 00:27:19,720
Speaker 2: not occur. But they did. Venezuela did arrest six people,

450
00:27:19,800 --> 00:27:24,720
Speaker 2: that has been confirmed. Those six people include a US

451
00:27:24,840 --> 00:27:29,920
Speaker 2: Navy seal, which you know Navy seals. Guys, what separates

452
00:27:30,400 --> 00:27:34,240
Speaker 2: someone who I don't know is in the Navy versus

453
00:27:34,240 --> 00:27:35,560
Speaker 2: someone who is a Navy seal?

454
00:27:35,680 --> 00:27:40,879
Speaker 3: Badassory, I mean, Navy is like your a sailor or

455
00:27:40,880 --> 00:27:42,399
Speaker 3: you're on a ship. But I mean, I understanding, so

456
00:27:42,400 --> 00:27:43,920
Speaker 3: you can be a pilot too. But isn't a Navy

457
00:27:43,960 --> 00:27:46,280
Speaker 3: seals like a special ops kind of individual?

458
00:27:46,960 --> 00:27:48,760
Speaker 2: That is my understanding. I just didn't know, if you

459
00:27:48,760 --> 00:27:52,440
Speaker 2: guys had anything further on that. I know, Navy seal

460
00:27:52,520 --> 00:27:56,680
Speaker 2: training is historically some of the most intensive stuff you

461
00:27:56,720 --> 00:27:57,359
Speaker 2: can go through.

462
00:27:57,600 --> 00:27:58,040
Speaker 3: Brutal.

463
00:27:58,280 --> 00:28:01,359
Speaker 4: Yeah, if you ever, if you want to ever feel

464
00:28:01,440 --> 00:28:05,399
Speaker 4: palpable tension in a room, hang out with some Army

465
00:28:05,480 --> 00:28:09,199
Speaker 4: rangers and Navy seals and just you know, ask them

466
00:28:09,240 --> 00:28:11,960
Speaker 4: if they want to arm wrestle and stand back.

467
00:28:12,320 --> 00:28:13,960
Speaker 2: Don't ask them if they want to arm wrestle.

468
00:28:14,119 --> 00:28:15,520
Speaker 3: But yeah, you're right.

469
00:28:15,640 --> 00:28:20,800
Speaker 4: Special ops we call it small unit specialization as well,

470
00:28:20,920 --> 00:28:28,600
Speaker 4: often ordered or tasked with identifying, capturing, and or terminating

471
00:28:28,880 --> 00:28:33,840
Speaker 4: high level targets or sometimes reconnaissance, just getting behind very

472
00:28:33,840 --> 00:28:37,280
Speaker 4: difficult enemy lines, getting the lay of the land. And

473
00:28:37,359 --> 00:28:41,840
Speaker 4: I think we talked about this in maybe July twenty

474
00:28:41,880 --> 00:28:46,200
Speaker 4: twenty four on Strange News that maybe that's a different one.

475
00:28:46,280 --> 00:28:48,160
Speaker 4: Oh yeah, because that's the twenty twenty.

476
00:28:48,680 --> 00:28:50,880
Speaker 2: Yeah, this was a whole separate thing in twenty twenty

477
00:28:50,880 --> 00:28:53,720
Speaker 2: where there were two green berets that were arrested.

478
00:28:53,440 --> 00:28:58,960
Speaker 4: Exactly, and again the government, the US government, we should say,

479
00:28:59,040 --> 00:29:04,040
Speaker 4: did make statements disavowing any kind of green lighting of

480
00:29:04,080 --> 00:29:08,760
Speaker 4: this activity. Right, So, yeah, it is possible just to

481
00:29:08,800 --> 00:29:12,920
Speaker 4: be objective, it is possible that these folks simply had

482
00:29:13,000 --> 00:29:17,640
Speaker 4: their own experience and their own expertise and leveraged that

483
00:29:17,960 --> 00:29:23,000
Speaker 4: of their own agency and volition to push for something

484
00:29:23,080 --> 00:29:26,960
Speaker 4: they wanted to happen without checking in with chain and command.

485
00:29:27,040 --> 00:29:28,080
Speaker 3: Completely possible.

486
00:29:29,000 --> 00:29:31,880
Speaker 2: And guys, this Navy seal has been named a bunch

487
00:29:31,920 --> 00:29:33,160
Speaker 2: of times. We're not going to say his name on

488
00:29:33,240 --> 00:29:36,320
Speaker 2: here just because it doesn't well, maybe it does matter.

489
00:29:38,120 --> 00:29:39,720
Speaker 2: We don't have to say his name. There are two

490
00:29:39,760 --> 00:29:43,160
Speaker 2: other Americans that were also arrested, and then three other people,

491
00:29:43,520 --> 00:29:46,320
Speaker 2: and Venezuela is alleging that this was a full on,

492
00:29:47,120 --> 00:29:50,760
Speaker 2: like an action, a destabilizing action that was supposed to

493
00:29:50,840 --> 00:29:55,040
Speaker 2: take place. They say that they seized four hundred US

494
00:29:55,240 --> 00:29:58,920
Speaker 2: rifles that were linked directly to this plot, which implies,

495
00:29:59,200 --> 00:30:02,040
Speaker 2: if true, that these were guys who were going to

496
00:30:02,080 --> 00:30:05,160
Speaker 2: recruit a bunch of other people in country in Venezuela

497
00:30:05,480 --> 00:30:08,840
Speaker 2: to take some kind of action that is much larger

498
00:30:08,880 --> 00:30:14,600
Speaker 2: than just six human individuals. Right, four hundred guns, That's

499
00:30:14,800 --> 00:30:16,760
Speaker 2: that's a lot of people. But that could also mean

500
00:30:16,760 --> 00:30:19,360
Speaker 2: that it's some kind of weapons trade or you know,

501
00:30:19,520 --> 00:30:24,920
Speaker 2: black market weapons deal thing going on, which I don't know. Weirdly,

502
00:30:24,920 --> 00:30:27,960
Speaker 2: feels more likely to me, but maybe maybe I'm out

503
00:30:27,960 --> 00:30:30,240
Speaker 2: of my depth here when it comes to, you know,

504
00:30:30,320 --> 00:30:32,840
Speaker 2: some kind of attempted coup versus making some money on

505
00:30:32,920 --> 00:30:35,239
Speaker 2: some rifles, and I don't know.

506
00:30:37,200 --> 00:30:42,680
Speaker 4: Ay you raise a you raise really interesting point there too,

507
00:30:42,760 --> 00:30:46,800
Speaker 4: because I think it was not just the CIA that

508
00:30:46,960 --> 00:30:50,320
Speaker 4: was accused of involvement, but the Interior Minister was saying

509
00:30:50,840 --> 00:30:56,600
Speaker 4: Spain's intel agency was there, Yeah, like named a rogues

510
00:30:56,680 --> 00:30:58,240
Speaker 4: gallery of possible actors.

511
00:30:58,600 --> 00:31:03,320
Speaker 2: Well, yeah, there was a citizen and two Spanish citizens

512
00:31:03,320 --> 00:31:09,080
Speaker 2: who were arrested. So I don't know, three Americans, two

513
00:31:09,080 --> 00:31:11,200
Speaker 2: Spanish citizens, and one Czech citizen.

514
00:31:11,560 --> 00:31:15,240
Speaker 4: Do you think do you think it's possible that there

515
00:31:15,400 --> 00:31:21,440
Speaker 4: was some kind of internal dissent in like, let's say,

516
00:31:21,600 --> 00:31:24,240
Speaker 4: so the CIA, as you as you point out, has

517
00:31:25,320 --> 00:31:29,640
Speaker 4: publicly responded, which they don't always do, but has publicly

518
00:31:29,680 --> 00:31:33,560
Speaker 4: responded and said, hey, nope, hashtag not it, not us.

519
00:31:34,760 --> 00:31:39,280
Speaker 4: Is it possible that there would be factions in that

520
00:31:39,520 --> 00:31:44,160
Speaker 4: organization who decided to you know, yeah, pony up their

521
00:31:44,200 --> 00:31:45,120
Speaker 4: own bones.

522
00:31:44,800 --> 00:31:47,200
Speaker 3: Aren't there? Like? I mean, we know that there's wheels

523
00:31:47,240 --> 00:31:49,880
Speaker 3: within wheels and a lot of these massive branches of

524
00:31:49,920 --> 00:31:53,360
Speaker 3: governments and military branches, you know, so maybe if this

525
00:31:53,560 --> 00:31:57,360
Speaker 3: was some kind of siloed operation, like a black op

526
00:31:57,400 --> 00:31:58,640
Speaker 3: of some kind, is that what you mean then?

527
00:31:59,120 --> 00:32:02,400
Speaker 2: Yeah? I think right. I mean that's what you're saying.

528
00:32:02,400 --> 00:32:07,880
Speaker 2: It's an unknown, it's an unknownn wait no.

529
00:32:07,000 --> 00:32:09,040
Speaker 3: No no, it's a no no, it's a.

530
00:32:09,120 --> 00:32:10,560
Speaker 1: No no, it's a new unknown.

531
00:32:10,600 --> 00:32:10,680
Speaker 2: No.

532
00:32:11,360 --> 00:32:16,959
Speaker 4: Also yeah, again, to be clear for anybody in general

533
00:32:16,960 --> 00:32:23,280
Speaker 4: who's listening, we are not saying anything. We are asking questions,

534
00:32:23,680 --> 00:32:25,360
Speaker 4: and I think that's totally fine.

535
00:32:25,800 --> 00:32:27,200
Speaker 3: Yea, wildly.

536
00:32:29,320 --> 00:32:32,080
Speaker 2: I do love the point you made, Ben, I don't

537
00:32:32,080 --> 00:32:35,200
Speaker 2: know exactly how you put it, something about the CIA

538
00:32:35,440 --> 00:32:38,440
Speaker 2: just saying hey, not us. I'd love the idea of

539
00:32:38,440 --> 00:32:42,480
Speaker 2: the CIA being known for having a reputation for just

540
00:32:42,480 --> 00:32:46,080
Speaker 2: coming out and saying, oh are bad guys? That was us? Yeah, sorry,

541
00:32:46,520 --> 00:32:49,200
Speaker 2: anytime they get accused of something, Ah, shucks, you.

542
00:32:49,240 --> 00:32:53,680
Speaker 4: Gotta the CIA's new motto transparency.

543
00:32:53,160 --> 00:32:56,520
Speaker 3: Or aucks you got shuts od jeepers.

544
00:32:57,080 --> 00:32:59,880
Speaker 4: We're the real Apple Dumpling Gang, the twenty first cent.

545
00:33:00,440 --> 00:33:04,440
Speaker 4: But yeah, I mean you're you're bringing up, though, something

546
00:33:04,520 --> 00:33:07,840
Speaker 4: that's that's incredibly important because we know that there were

547
00:33:08,520 --> 00:33:14,040
Speaker 4: multiple things that have been framed as coup attempts or

548
00:33:14,080 --> 00:33:17,960
Speaker 4: even described as coup attempts by the people involved. What

549
00:33:18,800 --> 00:33:22,280
Speaker 4: makes the CIA come out and say not it right?

550
00:33:22,600 --> 00:33:24,760
Speaker 3: Like you know, typically you think they would just not

551
00:33:25,560 --> 00:33:27,160
Speaker 3: dignify it with a response.

552
00:33:28,920 --> 00:33:31,960
Speaker 2: I I don't know, what do you think? Seriously, do

553
00:33:31,960 --> 00:33:34,320
Speaker 2: you guys have any ideas of why this idea would

554
00:33:34,320 --> 00:33:35,200
Speaker 2: be auspicious?

555
00:33:35,520 --> 00:33:39,240
Speaker 3: It's weird. Maybe the denial is part of the op

556
00:33:39,920 --> 00:33:40,720
Speaker 3: in a way.

557
00:33:41,200 --> 00:33:45,320
Speaker 4: Possible, Yeah, it's I mean, if we had to guess,

558
00:33:45,360 --> 00:33:49,080
Speaker 4: and again just guessing, then one of the reasons you

559
00:33:49,120 --> 00:33:53,800
Speaker 4: would do this is to kind of maintain the boundaries

560
00:33:53,920 --> 00:33:58,560
Speaker 4: and parameters of your current geopolitical rivalry. Honestly, and this

561
00:33:58,600 --> 00:34:01,640
Speaker 4: is a terrible comparison kind of like how when somebody

562
00:34:01,680 --> 00:34:04,880
Speaker 4: stole the secret recipe for Coca Cola and tried to

563
00:34:04,920 --> 00:34:08,480
Speaker 4: sell it to Pepsi and then PEPSI said, oh no, no, no, no, no, no,

564
00:34:08,560 --> 00:34:11,239
Speaker 4: not us. We're going to turn this to the authorities.

565
00:34:11,480 --> 00:34:14,440
Speaker 3: Guys, Sorry, quick off, quick aside. Did you see that

566
00:34:14,560 --> 00:34:20,160
Speaker 3: the Kentucky Fried Chicken original recipe secret spice blend was

567
00:34:20,239 --> 00:34:22,840
Speaker 3: leaked by a relative of Colonel Sanders.

568
00:34:23,600 --> 00:34:24,920
Speaker 1: It's the ones closest to you.

569
00:34:24,920 --> 00:34:26,560
Speaker 3: And then I always hurt the ones we.

570
00:34:26,520 --> 00:34:29,560
Speaker 2: Love, my God, we need to impose sanctions on.

571
00:34:29,520 --> 00:34:32,799
Speaker 3: That person, and the internet collectively shrugged because no one

572
00:34:32,920 --> 00:34:34,200
Speaker 3: likes KFC anymore.

573
00:34:34,520 --> 00:34:37,520
Speaker 4: Wait, wait, Ben, has the CIA issued a statement?

574
00:34:37,600 --> 00:34:40,319
Speaker 3: Where is job rule? It's a good question, then it's

575
00:34:40,320 --> 00:34:40,960
Speaker 3: a good question.

576
00:34:41,920 --> 00:34:44,600
Speaker 2: Hey, guys, just quickly we can end this out here.

577
00:34:44,840 --> 00:34:47,480
Speaker 2: There's a lot going on between the US and Venezuela

578
00:34:47,560 --> 00:34:51,000
Speaker 2: right now. Sanctions were just imposed on them by the

579
00:34:51,080 --> 00:34:54,719
Speaker 2: United States. Sanctions on officials who are you know, they're

580
00:34:54,719 --> 00:34:57,719
Speaker 2: in that close relationship with Nicholas Maduro, who may have

581
00:34:57,800 --> 00:35:02,319
Speaker 2: actually helped change and cup up the election, right, make

582
00:35:02,360 --> 00:35:05,480
Speaker 2: it so that Moduro won. So, yeah, the US and

583
00:35:05,560 --> 00:35:08,720
Speaker 2: post sanctions on several of those people. That was on Thursday, y'all,

584
00:35:09,200 --> 00:35:13,440
Speaker 2: September twelfth, as we record this. Then just before that,

585
00:35:14,080 --> 00:35:18,120
Speaker 2: the US, I think, yeah, the US seized I think

586
00:35:18,120 --> 00:35:21,399
Speaker 2: it was like the private plane or basically the air

587
00:35:21,440 --> 00:35:24,760
Speaker 2: force one of Venezuela when it was in the Dominican Republic.

588
00:35:24,800 --> 00:35:29,120
Speaker 2: They just said hours now, but.

589
00:35:29,120 --> 00:35:33,120
Speaker 3: Also not it. Yeah, they called dibbs and then not it.

590
00:35:34,160 --> 00:35:37,479
Speaker 2: Yeah. Yeah, I don't know. It's very very weird, y'all.

591
00:35:37,600 --> 00:35:42,160
Speaker 2: So there's more to come here. Look up this. We're

592
00:35:42,160 --> 00:35:44,040
Speaker 2: not gonna talk about this story. Just look it up.

593
00:35:44,160 --> 00:35:45,960
Speaker 2: And I want to make sure you're aware of this.

594
00:35:46,280 --> 00:35:50,759
Speaker 2: Look up New York fire chief bribery scheme. Just look

595
00:35:50,800 --> 00:35:52,800
Speaker 2: it up, read about it. I'm sure we're going to

596
00:35:52,840 --> 00:35:54,719
Speaker 2: talk about it at some point in the future. Yeah.

597
00:35:54,760 --> 00:35:57,359
Speaker 2: If you ever thought, man, the firearm department doesn't get

598
00:35:57,400 --> 00:35:59,239
Speaker 2: to my house as quickly as it seems to to

599
00:35:59,280 --> 00:36:01,880
Speaker 2: a lot of these other houses, well, if you're in

600
00:36:01,920 --> 00:36:04,759
Speaker 2: New York City, there's probably a reason for that.

601
00:36:04,880 --> 00:36:08,640
Speaker 3: Gotta pay to play baby, a lot of money, apparently,

602
00:36:09,320 --> 00:36:10,120
Speaker 3: pay to blaze.

603
00:36:11,080 --> 00:36:14,120
Speaker 2: All right, be right back after a word from our.

604
00:36:14,040 --> 00:36:24,480
Speaker 3: Sponsor, and we're back with one more piece of strange news. Matt.

605
00:36:24,480 --> 00:36:26,560
Speaker 3: I just wanted to do a quick micro story. Mentioned

606
00:36:26,600 --> 00:36:30,160
Speaker 3: that your second story tease made me think of there

607
00:36:30,239 --> 00:36:32,080
Speaker 3: was a story that I read about a woman in

608
00:36:32,120 --> 00:36:36,400
Speaker 3: Greece I believe, who was setting fires in order to

609
00:36:36,600 --> 00:36:40,840
Speaker 3: flirt with firemen. That's a true story. It's a true story.

610
00:36:41,600 --> 00:36:45,040
Speaker 3: To the scene, a real firebug. Oh my god, it's

611
00:36:45,080 --> 00:36:48,560
Speaker 3: crazy we keep meeting like this. I know, it's bizarre. Yeah,

612
00:36:48,640 --> 00:36:50,520
Speaker 3: I just wanted to had to get a gander at

613
00:36:50,520 --> 00:36:55,440
Speaker 3: those beefcake firemen rushing to the scene and their sexy uniforms.

614
00:36:55,600 --> 00:36:59,520
Speaker 3: But anyway, that's not all my story's about today. My

615
00:36:59,560 --> 00:37:03,360
Speaker 3: story is about the work day, the workplace. It's a

616
00:37:03,360 --> 00:37:08,200
Speaker 3: workplace story specifically centered around the work culture in Japan,

617
00:37:08,600 --> 00:37:12,120
Speaker 3: which I know we've talked about numerous times as being

618
00:37:12,239 --> 00:37:18,040
Speaker 3: particularly hard and harsh. A regular, you know, work day

619
00:37:18,239 --> 00:37:22,600
Speaker 3: in Japan is nine to nine, it's my understanding, with

620
00:37:22,719 --> 00:37:26,040
Speaker 3: people typically staying as late as eleven and sometimes twelve.

621
00:37:26,520 --> 00:37:30,000
Speaker 3: A lot of folks have probably seen viral images of

622
00:37:30,880 --> 00:37:34,720
Speaker 3: Tokyo salarymen passed out on park benches and in train

623
00:37:34,800 --> 00:37:38,319
Speaker 3: stations because they have to go out drinking with their

624
00:37:38,360 --> 00:37:41,880
Speaker 3: bosses and they get hammered and the train stop running,

625
00:37:41,960 --> 00:37:45,200
Speaker 3: so they just kind of fall where they lay, and

626
00:37:45,239 --> 00:37:48,279
Speaker 3: that's part of the culture as well. Well. Another part

627
00:37:48,320 --> 00:37:52,560
Speaker 3: of the culture is apparently it's quite difficult in Japan

628
00:37:53,000 --> 00:37:56,120
Speaker 3: to quit your job. It's something we take for granted.

629
00:37:56,200 --> 00:37:58,960
Speaker 3: I think maybe here in America, in addition to all

630
00:37:58,960 --> 00:38:01,360
Speaker 3: that other stuff, we have a lot more protections in

631
00:38:01,400 --> 00:38:04,880
Speaker 3: this country, minimal though they may seem to the average

632
00:38:05,120 --> 00:38:08,040
Speaker 3: blue collar or hell even white collar worker here in America,

633
00:38:08,120 --> 00:38:10,040
Speaker 3: But in Japan, ad just don't have this to the

634
00:38:10,080 --> 00:38:12,600
Speaker 3: point where many folks report the when they try to

635
00:38:12,680 --> 00:38:19,800
Speaker 3: quit their jobs, they are relentlessly shamed, hounded, harassed, borderlines

636
00:38:19,920 --> 00:38:24,359
Speaker 3: stalked by their superiors. There's a really great article in

637
00:38:24,480 --> 00:38:29,200
Speaker 3: the Wall Street Journal that outlines a situation where somebody

638
00:38:29,320 --> 00:38:33,080
Speaker 3: who attempted to quit their job, an employer literally came

639
00:38:33,120 --> 00:38:35,560
Speaker 3: to their house knocking on their door, came to their

640
00:38:35,600 --> 00:38:38,560
Speaker 3: apartment knocking on their door. There are stories of folks

641
00:38:38,640 --> 00:38:41,319
Speaker 3: trying to quit their job only to be held up

642
00:38:41,400 --> 00:38:44,719
Speaker 3: in weeks of meetings, told that this is going to

643
00:38:44,800 --> 00:38:47,799
Speaker 3: ruin their life, is going to ruin their future. All

644
00:38:47,800 --> 00:38:50,680
Speaker 3: of this stuff just absolutely browbeating type behavior. And you know,

645
00:38:50,719 --> 00:38:53,040
Speaker 3: in Japan there's also kind of a culture of non

646
00:38:53,120 --> 00:38:58,520
Speaker 3: confrontation that is possibly, i think likely what these employers

647
00:38:58,520 --> 00:39:03,560
Speaker 3: and companies are taking advantage of. That despite being an

648
00:39:03,640 --> 00:39:07,000
Speaker 3: untenable situation workplace situation where you know that people feel

649
00:39:07,000 --> 00:39:11,719
Speaker 3: like their mental health suffering toxic environments, they find it

650
00:39:11,760 --> 00:39:16,240
Speaker 3: really difficult to quit, to the point where in recent

651
00:39:16,360 --> 00:39:21,040
Speaker 3: years a handful of companies offering a service have sprung

652
00:39:21,120 --> 00:39:24,640
Speaker 3: up wherein you can hire someone to quit your job

653
00:39:24,680 --> 00:39:28,920
Speaker 3: for you, and they basically cover all of the bases

654
00:39:28,960 --> 00:39:33,319
Speaker 3: in terms of giving notice, setting parameters for kind of

655
00:39:33,320 --> 00:39:38,320
Speaker 3: no contact, even making sure that equipment or uniforms or

656
00:39:38,360 --> 00:39:42,760
Speaker 3: any company property are returned. But it's just this buffer

657
00:39:43,520 --> 00:39:45,680
Speaker 3: that for the price of like you know, a night

658
00:39:45,760 --> 00:39:49,640
Speaker 3: out maybe with friends, like a date night, two hundred

659
00:39:49,719 --> 00:39:55,000
Speaker 3: bucks roughly American, you can hire these agencies to phone

660
00:39:55,160 --> 00:39:59,600
Speaker 3: your employer and quit on your behalf and you don't

661
00:39:59,600 --> 00:40:01,760
Speaker 3: ever have to see or talk to these people again.

662
00:40:02,680 --> 00:40:05,360
Speaker 3: There are sort of more bespoke versions of this that

663
00:40:05,440 --> 00:40:08,319
Speaker 3: are a little more expensive, about four hundred dollars. In

664
00:40:08,360 --> 00:40:12,120
Speaker 3: the case of hiring a firm to quit a military job,

665
00:40:13,040 --> 00:40:15,920
Speaker 3: because of the nature of that and the government ties

666
00:40:15,960 --> 00:40:20,680
Speaker 3: of that kind of employment, they offer a lawyer to

667
00:40:20,719 --> 00:40:24,319
Speaker 3: do the quitting for you, a company cited in this

668
00:40:24,400 --> 00:40:27,080
Speaker 3: Wall Street Journal article too timid to tell the boss

669
00:40:27,080 --> 00:40:31,680
Speaker 3: you're quitting, there's a service for that by Miho Inada.

670
00:40:32,239 --> 00:40:36,560
Speaker 3: The name of this company is Momori, which I think

671
00:40:36,760 --> 00:40:41,000
Speaker 3: literally translates in English to I can't take it anymore.

672
00:40:41,600 --> 00:40:44,120
Speaker 3: And so this is one of the companies that does

673
00:40:44,280 --> 00:40:47,680
Speaker 3: all of this legwork for you when you want to

674
00:40:47,760 --> 00:40:52,600
Speaker 3: quit a job. It's pretty wild that it requires that

675
00:40:52,680 --> 00:40:55,200
Speaker 3: because I mean, it's certainly not illegal in Japan to

676
00:40:55,280 --> 00:40:57,440
Speaker 3: quit your job, but there is such a kind of

677
00:40:57,520 --> 00:41:02,520
Speaker 3: deference to authority figures and a sort of power dynamic

678
00:41:03,320 --> 00:41:09,920
Speaker 3: in inequality that employers are bullying people into staying in

679
00:41:10,000 --> 00:41:13,320
Speaker 3: jobs they hate. And the kicker is this, Japan actually

680
00:41:13,400 --> 00:41:19,000
Speaker 3: has a worker shortage, so you don't have to be

681
00:41:19,000 --> 00:41:22,280
Speaker 3: beholden to your current employer because there's probably something else

682
00:41:22,360 --> 00:41:25,440
Speaker 3: out there that you can snap up pretty quickly. And

683
00:41:25,520 --> 00:41:27,600
Speaker 3: this is partially why there's been such a spread of

684
00:41:27,640 --> 00:41:31,560
Speaker 3: these companies who are now also consulting with employers who

685
00:41:31,560 --> 00:41:34,359
Speaker 3: are looking for people who have recently quit jobs. So

686
00:41:34,400 --> 00:41:36,839
Speaker 3: they'll call Memory and say, hey, do you have any

687
00:41:36,880 --> 00:41:38,680
Speaker 3: candidates that I might be able to ring up for

688
00:41:38,719 --> 00:41:41,560
Speaker 3: these open positions. So with that, i'd really love to

689
00:41:41,600 --> 00:41:43,319
Speaker 3: hear what you guys think, especially you've been with your

690
00:41:43,360 --> 00:41:47,120
Speaker 3: experience abroad, if you've witnessed any of this toxic workplace culture,

691
00:41:47,200 --> 00:41:50,120
Speaker 3: and what you guys think of this kind of service

692
00:41:50,160 --> 00:41:51,400
Speaker 3: and how popular it's becoming.

693
00:41:51,719 --> 00:41:55,040
Speaker 2: Well, I'm trying to imagine a situation where I felt

694
00:41:55,080 --> 00:41:59,720
Speaker 2: like my boss was too legit for me to quite well, sorry,

695
00:41:59,760 --> 00:42:03,239
Speaker 2: I'm so sorry. No, but where I be afraid to

696
00:42:03,440 --> 00:42:07,520
Speaker 2: resign and I did not understand it. I didn't have

697
00:42:07,560 --> 00:42:10,759
Speaker 2: the personal perspective on it because I've I don't know

698
00:42:10,800 --> 00:42:12,719
Speaker 2: about you, guys, I've known a lot of people who

699
00:42:12,760 --> 00:42:15,960
Speaker 2: have resigned from positions over the years, or have left

700
00:42:15,960 --> 00:42:20,520
Speaker 2: a position to go to another job, or that specific

701
00:42:20,600 --> 00:42:23,120
Speaker 2: instance where you're like, I'm not going to work here anymore.

702
00:42:23,160 --> 00:42:24,800
Speaker 2: I just need to put in my two weeks notice.

703
00:42:25,440 --> 00:42:28,120
Speaker 2: Until I started reading this article that you shared with us,

704
00:42:28,160 --> 00:42:30,200
Speaker 2: and there's another CNN article. There are a couple of the

705
00:42:30,200 --> 00:42:34,120
Speaker 2: places that have articles on this, and they're describing I

706
00:42:34,120 --> 00:42:37,399
Speaker 2: couldn't fathom the number of overtime hours that people were

707
00:42:37,400 --> 00:42:39,799
Speaker 2: putting in. There's a story, there's a story in there

708
00:42:39,880 --> 00:42:42,120
Speaker 2: of somebody who put in one hundred and fifty nine

709
00:42:42,239 --> 00:42:46,960
Speaker 2: overtime hours in a single month before dying, literally experiencing

710
00:42:47,000 --> 00:42:50,400
Speaker 2: heart failure. Now it's nuts for me, because you have

711
00:42:50,440 --> 00:42:53,160
Speaker 2: to imagine that the stress levels in somebody who's going

712
00:42:53,200 --> 00:42:57,880
Speaker 2: through that must be incredibly high. Is that stress directly

713
00:42:57,920 --> 00:43:01,600
Speaker 2: related to the heart failure that that person experienced. It

714
00:43:01,680 --> 00:43:03,960
Speaker 2: seems to be so, at least it's written about it

715
00:43:04,080 --> 00:43:06,640
Speaker 2: that way. I don't know the science behind all of that,

716
00:43:07,080 --> 00:43:10,719
Speaker 2: but if you've got a huge number of people that

717
00:43:10,760 --> 00:43:13,279
Speaker 2: are going through that kind of stress, then yeah, this

718
00:43:13,360 --> 00:43:16,560
Speaker 2: kind of service makes a ton of sense and being

719
00:43:16,600 --> 00:43:20,000
Speaker 2: able to be that cold third party that says, here's

720
00:43:20,000 --> 00:43:23,880
Speaker 2: what my client is going to do, and it takes

721
00:43:24,040 --> 00:43:29,240
Speaker 2: the potential emotional encounter out of it, which is kind

722
00:43:29,239 --> 00:43:29,600
Speaker 2: of good.

723
00:43:29,960 --> 00:43:32,440
Speaker 3: Probably worth your money at that point, because it sounds

724
00:43:32,480 --> 00:43:34,759
Speaker 3: like some of these folks just can't muster up the

725
00:43:34,840 --> 00:43:38,600
Speaker 3: courage or the kind of grit. I guess to face

726
00:43:38,880 --> 00:43:43,080
Speaker 3: that because it is so off the charts, toxic and

727
00:43:43,640 --> 00:43:49,080
Speaker 3: meat spirited and manipulative. Understandable. Ben you have any experience

728
00:43:49,120 --> 00:43:51,000
Speaker 3: with this kind of thing that is from your travels

729
00:43:51,080 --> 00:43:54,040
Speaker 3: or just any perspective on why this would be so

730
00:43:54,160 --> 00:43:56,160
Speaker 3: necessary from a cultural.

731
00:43:55,800 --> 00:44:02,560
Speaker 4: Standpoint, Yeah, it's definitely tough. The overtime is crazy. Overtime

732
00:44:02,640 --> 00:44:05,200
Speaker 4: here in the United States is pretty crazy as well.

733
00:44:05,239 --> 00:44:12,319
Speaker 4: But Japan's work culture has some serious objective obstacles that

734
00:44:12,400 --> 00:44:15,279
Speaker 4: will have to be tackled at some point. A lot

735
00:44:15,280 --> 00:44:18,920
Speaker 4: of it is the idea of face of preserving decorum

736
00:44:19,239 --> 00:44:23,879
Speaker 4: in conversation. Another thing that happens on the flip side

737
00:44:23,920 --> 00:44:29,359
Speaker 4: of this, which may help explain the emergence of these

738
00:44:29,400 --> 00:44:36,640
Speaker 4: sorts of agencies is that sometimes Japanese companies won't fire people. Instead,

739
00:44:36,640 --> 00:44:40,680
Speaker 4: they'll kind of quiet fire them, they'll sideline them from projects,

740
00:44:42,400 --> 00:44:45,160
Speaker 4: they'll just not give them work. You show up, you

741
00:44:45,239 --> 00:44:48,160
Speaker 4: have eight hours, nine hours in the day, and you

742
00:44:48,239 --> 00:44:53,120
Speaker 4: don't have anything to do. Right, you're literally rearranging paper clips.

743
00:44:53,280 --> 00:44:56,040
Speaker 4: You're just checking on the printer, making sure the coffee

744
00:44:56,080 --> 00:45:00,799
Speaker 4: is working. This is something that, unfortun only a lot

745
00:45:00,840 --> 00:45:05,840
Speaker 4: of people have experienced. And another thing that maybe missing,

746
00:45:06,880 --> 00:45:11,080
Speaker 4: I think from what we would call the salary man philosophy,

747
00:45:11,719 --> 00:45:16,920
Speaker 4: is that in places like the United States, which doesn't

748
00:45:16,960 --> 00:45:21,000
Speaker 4: have the same worker protections as maybe your EU countries.

749
00:45:21,200 --> 00:45:24,120
Speaker 4: But in places like the United States, it is not

750
00:45:24,320 --> 00:45:28,640
Speaker 4: abnormal to fire or to be fired, to resign, or

751
00:45:28,680 --> 00:45:31,160
Speaker 4: to somehow quit a job and then go to another

752
00:45:31,200 --> 00:45:35,279
Speaker 4: place in the same industry without your character or your

753
00:45:35,280 --> 00:45:39,920
Speaker 4: reputation being smirched. It's not necessarily a demerits people know

754
00:45:40,000 --> 00:45:43,399
Speaker 4: you get in situations. However, depending on the industry we're

755
00:45:43,400 --> 00:45:47,600
Speaker 4: talking about. In Japan, in corporate life, it can be

756
00:45:47,640 --> 00:45:51,240
Speaker 4: seen as a vast demerit, as a loss of face.

757
00:45:51,719 --> 00:45:56,160
Speaker 4: If you are God forbid fired, right, because that means

758
00:45:56,160 --> 00:45:59,720
Speaker 4: that you did something, or if you quit, that also

759
00:45:59,840 --> 00:46:03,200
Speaker 4: means that you did something. And so now the onus

760
00:46:03,280 --> 00:46:06,520
Speaker 4: is on you and you have this sort of scarlet

761
00:46:06,600 --> 00:46:11,719
Speaker 4: letter employment wise upon your characters. So there are reasonable,

762
00:46:11,840 --> 00:46:17,840
Speaker 4: valid and actionable needs that explain why this industry would

763
00:46:18,160 --> 00:46:20,839
Speaker 4: take off, because a big part of it too is

764
00:46:20,920 --> 00:46:26,760
Speaker 4: being able to not burn bridges to retain good relations

765
00:46:26,880 --> 00:46:30,560
Speaker 4: even after you were maybe no longer a colleague of

766
00:46:30,600 --> 00:46:31,840
Speaker 4: someone for sure.

767
00:46:32,719 --> 00:46:36,839
Speaker 3: The article on CNN that Matt mentioned interview is somebody

768
00:46:36,920 --> 00:46:40,680
Speaker 3: named Shiori Kalamazo is the operations manager at the Monmuri

769
00:46:41,080 --> 00:46:43,880
Speaker 3: agency that does this and said that in the past

770
00:46:43,960 --> 00:46:46,839
Speaker 3: year alone this articles came out, like last month, they've

771
00:46:46,840 --> 00:46:50,640
Speaker 3: gotten more than eleven thousand inquiries. And the agency's located

772
00:46:50,680 --> 00:46:55,080
Speaker 3: in Manato, which is a very busy business district in Tokyo.

773
00:46:55,480 --> 00:46:57,920
Speaker 3: It's been around since twenty twenty two. And there's a

774
00:46:57,960 --> 00:47:01,440
Speaker 3: really telling quote from Kalamada that I think and on saying,

775
00:47:01,640 --> 00:47:04,359
Speaker 3: we sometimes get calls from people crying asking if they

776
00:47:04,400 --> 00:47:07,520
Speaker 3: can quit their job based on X y Z. We

777
00:47:07,640 --> 00:47:10,359
Speaker 3: tell them that it's okay and that quitting their job

778
00:47:10,600 --> 00:47:13,759
Speaker 3: is a labor right, and the thing it was something

779
00:47:13,800 --> 00:47:15,879
Speaker 3: I was trying to remember earlier. It just one last

780
00:47:15,880 --> 00:47:19,839
Speaker 3: point that I wanted to mention. Another thing that Kalamata

781
00:47:19,920 --> 00:47:23,160
Speaker 3: says is that most of the time the employers go

782
00:47:23,280 --> 00:47:26,160
Speaker 3: along with them and they're you know, quitting on behalf

783
00:47:26,200 --> 00:47:28,799
Speaker 3: of these other individuals, but about ten percent of them

784
00:47:29,160 --> 00:47:34,840
Speaker 3: insist on further negotiations involving lawyers. So there is just

785
00:47:34,960 --> 00:47:38,520
Speaker 3: this really entrenched culture of just not taking no for

786
00:47:38,560 --> 00:47:40,800
Speaker 3: an answer when it comes to, you know, the bosses

787
00:47:40,800 --> 00:47:45,200
Speaker 3: there in Japan. It's very very interesting. It does kind

788
00:47:45,200 --> 00:47:47,200
Speaker 3: of reading stuff like this does make me feel lucky

789
00:47:47,200 --> 00:47:51,200
Speaker 3: that we have the minimal labor protections that we do

790
00:47:51,280 --> 00:47:56,319
Speaker 3: have here in the good old United States. So that's

791
00:47:56,400 --> 00:47:57,520
Speaker 3: that one, guys.

792
00:47:58,800 --> 00:48:01,680
Speaker 4: We have We have learned a lot, and thank you

793
00:48:01,719 --> 00:48:04,279
Speaker 4: for bringing that story, Noel. You know, we've got a

794
00:48:04,320 --> 00:48:07,640
Speaker 4: lot of listeners in Japan. We've got a lot of

795
00:48:07,680 --> 00:48:12,759
Speaker 4: people listening who are of Venezuelan extraction or providence or

796
00:48:12,840 --> 00:48:16,840
Speaker 4: may live in Venezuela now. And you know, we have

797
00:48:16,920 --> 00:48:22,000
Speaker 4: family members in Lebanon or of Lebanese origin, and there

798
00:48:22,120 --> 00:48:25,640
Speaker 4: is so much more to all of these stories. We

799
00:48:25,840 --> 00:48:28,759
Speaker 4: can't do this show without your help. So thank you

800
00:48:28,880 --> 00:48:33,160
Speaker 4: very much, fellow conspiracy realist, for tuning in. We would

801
00:48:33,200 --> 00:48:36,120
Speaker 4: love to hear from you. We want to hear your takes.

802
00:48:36,640 --> 00:48:40,600
Speaker 4: You know we've talked or otherwise. Right, We've got more

803
00:48:40,680 --> 00:48:44,200
Speaker 4: stuff on the way, and your our favorite part of it,

804
00:48:44,320 --> 00:48:47,360
Speaker 4: So please do reach out join us here in the dark.

805
00:48:47,560 --> 00:48:50,040
Speaker 4: We try to be easy to find through any number

806
00:48:50,120 --> 00:48:50,760
Speaker 4: of means.

807
00:48:51,000 --> 00:48:52,480
Speaker 3: Oh, do reach out. You can find us in the

808
00:48:52,520 --> 00:48:55,120
Speaker 3: Hamil Conspiracy Stuff where we exist, on Facebook with our

809
00:48:55,120 --> 00:48:58,879
Speaker 3: Facebook group Here's where it gets crazy, on YouTube where

810
00:48:58,880 --> 00:49:01,880
Speaker 3: we have video contents galore for you to enjoy, and

811
00:49:02,160 --> 00:49:07,080
Speaker 3: on x FKA, Twitter, on Instagram and TikTok. However, we

812
00:49:07,160 --> 00:49:09,040
Speaker 3: are Conspiracy Stuff Show.

813
00:49:10,000 --> 00:49:12,080
Speaker 2: Hey, do you want to call us? Our number is

814
00:49:12,120 --> 00:49:17,440
Speaker 2: one eight three three STDWYTK. It's a voicemail system. It

815
00:49:17,480 --> 00:49:20,000
Speaker 2: gives you three minutes. That's all you got. Gotta make

816
00:49:20,040 --> 00:49:22,400
Speaker 2: it quick. Give yourself a cool nickname and let us

817
00:49:22,440 --> 00:49:24,000
Speaker 2: know if we can use your name and message on

818
00:49:24,040 --> 00:49:25,960
Speaker 2: the air. If you've got more to say than can

819
00:49:26,000 --> 00:49:28,520
Speaker 2: fit in that three minutes, why not instead send us

820
00:49:28,520 --> 00:49:29,800
Speaker 2: a good old fashioned email.

821
00:49:30,000 --> 00:49:34,920
Speaker 4: We are the entities that read every piece of correspondence.

822
00:49:35,000 --> 00:49:35,800
Speaker 3: We receive.

823
00:49:36,400 --> 00:49:38,800
Speaker 4: We can't wait to hear from you. We're running behind

824
00:49:38,920 --> 00:49:42,759
Speaker 4: on some of these responses, but it's only because you

825
00:49:42,920 --> 00:49:47,200
Speaker 4: give us so much amazing and disturbing things.

826
00:49:46,840 --> 00:49:47,560
Speaker 3: To think about.

827
00:49:47,600 --> 00:49:50,279
Speaker 4: Shout out, by the way to Dan a, who has

828
00:49:50,440 --> 00:49:54,440
Speaker 4: recently persuaded us that Manchurian candidates can.

829
00:49:54,440 --> 00:49:56,799
Speaker 1: Now exist thanks to technology.

830
00:49:57,200 --> 00:49:59,239
Speaker 4: So thank you, slash Man.

831
00:49:59,480 --> 00:49:59,920
Speaker 1: Dang it, Dan.

832
00:50:00,800 --> 00:50:02,960
Speaker 4: If you want to be part of this, we'd love

833
00:50:02,960 --> 00:50:04,640
Speaker 4: for you to join us just off the edge of

834
00:50:04,680 --> 00:50:27,680
Speaker 4: the map here in the dark conspiracy at iHeartRadio dot com.

835
00:50:27,800 --> 00:50:29,880
Speaker 2: Stuff they Don't Want You to Know is a production

836
00:50:29,960 --> 00:50:34,520
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837
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