WEBVTT - Our Heart Breaks From Heartbleed

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<v Speaker 1>Get in touch with technology with tech Stuff from how

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<v Speaker 1>stuff works dot com. Hey there, and welcome to tech Stuff.

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<v Speaker 1>I'm Jonathan Strickland and I'm Lauren and we're going to

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<v Speaker 1>talk about a really bad day on the internet and

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<v Speaker 1>the terrible, horrible, no good, very bad day and actually

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<v Speaker 1>it's a it's a very bad day that lasted for

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<v Speaker 1>a couple of years before we knew about it. Oops. Yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>we're talking about heart bleed, which if any of you,

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<v Speaker 1>I'm assuming a lot of our listeners keep up with

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<v Speaker 1>tech news in general, and normally on tech stuff, we

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<v Speaker 1>don't cover things that are of the immediate uh past,

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<v Speaker 1>because often we record ahead of time and it's over.

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<v Speaker 1>We we often, in fact kind of kind of almost

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<v Speaker 1>avoid very breaking news so that we have a chance

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<v Speaker 1>to discuss more in depth exactly what has happened. However,

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<v Speaker 1>this is such a huge story and it's one that

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<v Speaker 1>is a little difficult for someone to to understand if

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<v Speaker 1>they don't really have a working knowledge of of what

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<v Speaker 1>actually is going on behind the scenes, that we thought

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<v Speaker 1>it was important to address this and actually talk about

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<v Speaker 1>what you guys can do in order to protect yourselves

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<v Speaker 1>as best as possible. It's not all gonna be a

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<v Speaker 1>happy story, folks. This is actually a pretty serious problem.

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<v Speaker 1>In fact, pretty serious is an incredible understatement. Um So, really,

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<v Speaker 1>what it gets down to is this is a story

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<v Speaker 1>all about encryption. So encryption pretty simple. I mean you've

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<v Speaker 1>probably heard the term. It's not not too simple. I mean,

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<v Speaker 1>the concept is simple. Execution is somewhat more complicated. But

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<v Speaker 1>the concept is that you are you are changing something

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<v Speaker 1>so that the content is not easily readable from anyone

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<v Speaker 1>else unless they have the key to decrypt that information. Right.

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<v Speaker 1>And this is really important for many different web related

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<v Speaker 1>purposes because you know, any any time that you don't

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<v Speaker 1>want everyone on the internet who chooses to to read

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<v Speaker 1>your emails or get your get into your bank account

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<v Speaker 1>or etcetera, etcetera. Yeah, you want to you want to

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<v Speaker 1>make sure that stuff is encrypted. So you know, you

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<v Speaker 1>probably have heard that when you log into sites that

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<v Speaker 1>are going to have a lot of access to to

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<v Speaker 1>secure what should be secure information like things like your

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<v Speaker 1>bank account or just shopping history or your medical information

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<v Speaker 1>that's a great example. Then you know that you want

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<v Speaker 1>to look for that HTTPS which tells you it's a

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<v Speaker 1>secure or it's supposed to be a secure connection right,

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<v Speaker 1>or that little padlock that will show up in your

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<v Speaker 1>in your web browser right exactly, and that tells you, hey, uh,

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<v Speaker 1>there's a there's a handshake that's going on between your

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<v Speaker 1>browser and that website that indicates the connection is secure

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<v Speaker 1>and encrypted, and that anyone looking in from the outside

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<v Speaker 1>should just see gibberish. And furthermore that the website that

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<v Speaker 1>you're that you're on is what it says it is,

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<v Speaker 1>that it's not an imposter for possibly nefarious purposes exactly

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<v Speaker 1>because there's an attack called the man in the middle attack,

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<v Speaker 1>which is where you have a hacker insert him or

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<v Speaker 1>herself in the middle of communication between you and whatever

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<v Speaker 1>service you actually want to use, and that way they

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<v Speaker 1>are able to access all the information you're sending and

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<v Speaker 1>you think you're sending it to the service, but you're

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<v Speaker 1>really sending it to the hacker. This security is supposed

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<v Speaker 1>to allow you to make you know, to be sure

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<v Speaker 1>that it's going exactly where it needs to go and

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<v Speaker 1>that no one is snooping on you. So it turns

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<v Speaker 1>out that the most popular online encryption software used on

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<v Speaker 1>the web today had a fundamental flaw and its security

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<v Speaker 1>in several recent builds of that software that have been

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<v Speaker 1>in use for the past two years or so. Yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>and that is heart bleed. So, first of all, the

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<v Speaker 1>software we're talking about is called open s s L.

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<v Speaker 1>This is an open source version of SSL. Yeah, it

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<v Speaker 1>stands for Secure Sockets Layer. Now it's it's a protocol,

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<v Speaker 1>so it's a set of rules that tell UH sites

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<v Speaker 1>how to encrypt information. And there are lots of different

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<v Speaker 1>ways you can implement this. SSL is just that's kind

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<v Speaker 1>of like the the the the specific category, but then

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<v Speaker 1>you can implement it in different ways. Open SSL is

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<v Speaker 1>one of those ways. Yeah, I would say proprietary, but

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<v Speaker 1>since it's open source, that might be kind of the

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<v Speaker 1>wrong word. So it's a specific version exactly exactly. So

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<v Speaker 1>you know, it's all about securing your transmissions across the

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<v Speaker 1>Internet so that they remain opaque to anyone else. They're

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<v Speaker 1>not gonna be able to see them, and UH in general,

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<v Speaker 1>to communicating parties are given encryption keys which allow each

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<v Speaker 1>party to encrypt and decrypt messages so that they can

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<v Speaker 1>send it back and forth and only in theory the

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<v Speaker 1>other party can see what's going on, and only for

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<v Speaker 1>the length of this particular communication session, right, because once

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<v Speaker 1>that session ends, then the session keys that's what you're

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<v Speaker 1>using to encrypt and decrypt are magically dissolve. So there's

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<v Speaker 1>actually two different types of encryption keys we're talking about here.

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<v Speaker 1>There's one that's called an asymmetrical key, and that's sort

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<v Speaker 1>of a long term key that's like the the overall

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<v Speaker 1>rules that guide the any individual session. The session key

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<v Speaker 1>is dependent upon lots of stuff. It's dependent upon the client.

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<v Speaker 1>That's the that would be you using your computer to

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<v Speaker 1>access whatever it is you want to access. Let's, for

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<v Speaker 1>the argument's sake, say it's your email. So your client,

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<v Speaker 1>your your computer is the client. You send out a

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<v Speaker 1>request to log into your email. The email exists on

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<v Speaker 1>a server. That's that's the server on the client server side,

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<v Speaker 1>and so the the session keys are going to depend

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<v Speaker 1>upon that asymmetrical key. They're going to depend upon the

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<v Speaker 1>fact that you're the client. It's going to depend upon

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<v Speaker 1>whatever server hosts the email that you access. It's going

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<v Speaker 1>to depend upon the session time when you've actually started this.

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<v Speaker 1>There are a lot of different factors that all uh

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<v Speaker 1>come into play, and then that is what determines the

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<v Speaker 1>individual session keys that then allow you to send information

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<v Speaker 1>that's encrypted and receive information that's encrypted then decrypted so

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<v Speaker 1>that you can read it, because if you just received

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<v Speaker 1>encrypted information, it would not be terribly useful for a

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<v Speaker 1>human being. Interesting maybe, but not useful. Yeah, exactly, you

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<v Speaker 1>just be thinking that while somebody let their cat walk

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<v Speaker 1>around on their keyboard for like an hour or something,

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<v Speaker 1>because it's just it's there's nothing meaningful here. So this

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<v Speaker 1>is the basic idea here. Those the session keys are

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<v Speaker 1>symmetrical and they're used in that encryption and decryption and

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<v Speaker 1>symmetrical keys in general are not uh, by themselves incredibly

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<v Speaker 1>secure because you've got one, you know how it all works.

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<v Speaker 1>But because it's based on the session and once the

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<v Speaker 1>sessions over it's no longer a factor, it's considered pretty

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<v Speaker 1>secure because it's not like it's something that lasts forever.

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<v Speaker 1>It's not that long term asymmetrical key that's the really

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<v Speaker 1>super important one. So yeah, this is used for um,

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<v Speaker 1>pretty much anything that involves sending information across the Internet,

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<v Speaker 1>which I don't know if you know this, that's what

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<v Speaker 1>the Internet's for. So everything really is what it boils

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<v Speaker 1>down to. We're talking web mail, we're talking we're talking

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<v Speaker 1>instant messages, web browsing voice over Internet protocol. So if

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<v Speaker 1>you happen to use a void phone, it involves that

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<v Speaker 1>as well. Uh. Even facts is for those of us

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<v Speaker 1>who still have to um, yeah, so and and on

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<v Speaker 1>and on every website, I mean, you know, and any

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<v Speaker 1>anything that you have to log into. So Netflix uses yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>oh yeah, exactly. Yeah. So here's the thing is that

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<v Speaker 1>open SSL is is one version of this implementation. Like

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<v Speaker 1>we said, right, it's not that uh it's the only one,

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<v Speaker 1>but it happens to be the most popular. And there's

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<v Speaker 1>part of that name is pretty interesting. Or we we've

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<v Speaker 1>talked about SSL, now it's time to talk about open right.

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<v Speaker 1>Like I said earlier, it's an open source version of

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<v Speaker 1>this right now. Open source, of course means that the

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<v Speaker 1>the source code is available for people to look at,

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<v Speaker 1>to modify, to update, to tweak. And it's important because

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<v Speaker 1>if there are two very different philosophies when it comes

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<v Speaker 1>to security, right, you have the one philosophy where the

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<v Speaker 1>idea is let's lock it all down, let's have a

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<v Speaker 1>let's have a secure room where we've got our own

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<v Speaker 1>experts developing this stuff. They are the one and only

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<v Speaker 1>group that can do it. And furthermore that if you know,

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<v Speaker 1>we only have these five people who know how this works,

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<v Speaker 1>then it's a very secure system because we trust those

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<v Speaker 1>five people and everything's going to be cool. Assuming that

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<v Speaker 1>none of those five people ever make a mistake, uh,

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<v Speaker 1>then we're awesome. The other approach is the open source approach,

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<v Speaker 1>where the idea is everyone who has the ability to

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<v Speaker 1>look at this and to improve it has the chance

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<v Speaker 1>to do so, and therefore you would in theory, end

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<v Speaker 1>up eventually with the strongest kind of security because you

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<v Speaker 1>would have some It wouldn't be limited to five people

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<v Speaker 1>that you've identified as being really good at it. It's

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<v Speaker 1>it's not limited at all. Anyone can start making tweaks

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<v Speaker 1>to it. It doesn't mean that the uh CO just

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<v Speaker 1>runs rampant and gets out of control. You do have

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<v Speaker 1>people in charge of making sure everything is still working,

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<v Speaker 1>everything is on the up and up right, But you

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<v Speaker 1>also have this entire network of checks and balances of

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<v Speaker 1>people who are who are looking for any problems and

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<v Speaker 1>trying to solve them and advancing them to that that

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<v Speaker 1>higher up system right exactly. So you know, again, two

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<v Speaker 1>different approaches to the same goal, and depending upon what

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<v Speaker 1>you're trying to accomplish. You might say one is better

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<v Speaker 1>than the other. Now, the web at large has said

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<v Speaker 1>the open SSL model was better. The reason I can

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<v Speaker 1>say that is because it's so popular. We'll talk more

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<v Speaker 1>about that a little later in the podcast. Right, but

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<v Speaker 1>so so versions of this are available for I mean

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<v Speaker 1>for for everything, for Unix Space systems, Linux Space Systems, uh,

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<v Speaker 1>Mac and also Windows. Yeah. And so you also have

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<v Speaker 1>server software using it. Yeah, yeah, some of the major

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<v Speaker 1>the two biggest types of our brands, I guess of

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<v Speaker 1>server software Apache and how do you say that other one?

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<v Speaker 1>Let's go with that, because here's the thing. A lot

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<v Speaker 1>of these are names that you see written out all

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<v Speaker 1>the time, but you don't ever have to say them

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<v Speaker 1>if you if you are communicating, it's basically by text. Yes,

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<v Speaker 1>uh so injinks, let's go with that one. Um uh

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<v Speaker 1>but but but right, But it's not totally universal, like,

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<v Speaker 1>for example, Microsoft has proprietary server software called Internet Information Services,

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<v Speaker 1>which does not use open SSL. Right. And in fact,

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<v Speaker 1>if you were to look at lists of sites that

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<v Speaker 1>have been affected by this heart bleed bug, you would

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<v Speaker 1>see that Microsoft Microsoft are not in Microsoft's are not

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<v Speaker 1>involved because are using a completely different security approach completely

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<v Speaker 1>different in the sense that it's it's a different implementation

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<v Speaker 1>of the same sort of uh security. It's again, like

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<v Speaker 1>I said, open SSL is a very specific one, so

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<v Speaker 1>heart bleed. The bug was announced on Monday, April seventh,

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<v Speaker 1>two thousand fourteen, and the day we're recording this is

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<v Speaker 1>April tenth, And of course this will be going live

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<v Speaker 1>the following week, so you guys are are hearing. Probably

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<v Speaker 1>I think this might be the most uh topical episode

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<v Speaker 1>I have recorded in recent memory. So is the open

0:11:35.760 --> 0:11:38.640
<v Speaker 1>SSL team, who said, all right, here's the news. Guys,

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<v Speaker 1>Uh it's bad, and prepare yourselves right. The bug was

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<v Speaker 1>actually discovered the previous week independently by UM by a

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<v Speaker 1>Google security employee named Neil Meta and researchers from a

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<v Speaker 1>finished security company called Kotonomicon, which best name. Ever, it's

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<v Speaker 1>pretty good. As soon as I saw Cotonomicon, I was like,

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<v Speaker 1>I'm gonna have to flip a coin to find out

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<v Speaker 1>which of us gets to say that first. I got

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<v Speaker 1>to it suck Lauren. Lauren took that one. Well done,

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<v Speaker 1>thank you. But so the notifications spread through a few

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<v Speaker 1>select organizations before the big announcement came out, so that

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<v Speaker 1>those organizations could begin working on updates and fixes kind

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<v Speaker 1>of quietly. This was because the disclosure would alert potential

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<v Speaker 1>attackers to the security flaw as much as it would

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<v Speaker 1>system administrators, so everyone was trying to be really careful.

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<v Speaker 1>The announcement might have even been delayed further if the

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<v Speaker 1>open SSL team thought that they could have gotten away

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<v Speaker 1>with it. Basically, they were afraid of leaks and so

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<v Speaker 1>they figured that they might as well go forward. Yeah.

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<v Speaker 1>I mean, if you're going to sit there and have

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<v Speaker 1>to alert presumably some of the really big names on

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<v Speaker 1>the Internet to this thing, then eventually you're going to say, well,

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<v Speaker 1>someone on one of those teams is going to say

0:12:48.559 --> 0:12:51.760
<v Speaker 1>something because this is such a huge issue, right Uh.

0:12:51.760 --> 0:12:54.000
<v Speaker 1>And you know this is this really reminds me a

0:12:54.000 --> 0:12:57.720
<v Speaker 1>lot about white hat hackers, the people who make it

0:12:57.800 --> 0:12:59.960
<v Speaker 1>there and sometimes you can call them gray hats too,

0:13:00.120 --> 0:13:03.720
<v Speaker 1>but these are people who will find security vulnerabilities, and

0:13:03.760 --> 0:13:08.280
<v Speaker 1>generally speaking there there m O tends to be alert.

0:13:08.400 --> 0:13:13.880
<v Speaker 1>Whatever organization is responsible for fixing that vulnerability, give them

0:13:13.880 --> 0:13:16.520
<v Speaker 1>a little time to do so, and if they haven't

0:13:16.520 --> 0:13:18.800
<v Speaker 1>done it, say listen. If you guys don't do it soon,

0:13:18.920 --> 0:13:21.720
<v Speaker 1>I'm gonna make this public because then you will have

0:13:21.840 --> 0:13:25.240
<v Speaker 1>to do it. You'll be obligated to because then everyone's

0:13:25.240 --> 0:13:27.320
<v Speaker 1>gonna know about and if you don't do anything, someone's

0:13:27.320 --> 0:13:29.720
<v Speaker 1>going to exploit it. And it's it's kind of this

0:13:29.920 --> 0:13:34.280
<v Speaker 1>crazy sort of almost like I guess blackmail is the

0:13:34.320 --> 0:13:36.400
<v Speaker 1>wrong word for it, but you're kind of holding a

0:13:36.840 --> 0:13:40.160
<v Speaker 1>virtual gun to the head of the responsible organization. But

0:13:40.200 --> 0:13:44.160
<v Speaker 1>you're doing so in order to keep security right forward,

0:13:44.320 --> 0:13:46.599
<v Speaker 1>right it's in the best interests of everyone involved, and

0:13:46.800 --> 0:13:49.439
<v Speaker 1>there's a really delicate balance involved there. There there is

0:13:49.440 --> 0:13:52.360
<v Speaker 1>a wee bit of controversy over who was notified when

0:13:52.720 --> 0:13:54.599
<v Speaker 1>you know, some of the big companies like Yahoo and

0:13:54.640 --> 0:13:58.320
<v Speaker 1>Amazon feel a little bit left out in the cold

0:13:58.400 --> 0:14:03.120
<v Speaker 1>because they were. To be fair, Amazon the store was

0:14:03.160 --> 0:14:07.640
<v Speaker 1>not affected, but Amazon as in the company that also, yeah,

0:14:07.679 --> 0:14:11.600
<v Speaker 1>the services that was affected. So it's it all depends

0:14:11.640 --> 0:14:14.440
<v Speaker 1>on how like chances are most of our listeners don't

0:14:14.440 --> 0:14:16.920
<v Speaker 1>have to worry about the Amazon side unless you happen

0:14:17.240 --> 0:14:20.600
<v Speaker 1>to use the Amazon services to host major apps or

0:14:20.760 --> 0:14:22.840
<v Speaker 1>or other sites or things of that nature, in which

0:14:22.840 --> 0:14:25.400
<v Speaker 1>case you need to look into it. Right So, so,

0:14:25.480 --> 0:14:28.120
<v Speaker 1>at any rate, I think that it's generally agreed upon

0:14:28.280 --> 0:14:31.560
<v Speaker 1>right now that the involved parties we're using responsible disclosure

0:14:31.600 --> 0:14:35.400
<v Speaker 1>to to mitigate damage as to the best of their abilities.

0:14:35.880 --> 0:14:39.040
<v Speaker 1>And the news then hit the public consciousness. I think

0:14:39.160 --> 0:14:41.960
<v Speaker 1>on Wednesday, April nine, that's the first time that I

0:14:42.080 --> 0:14:44.440
<v Speaker 1>heard stories about it. Of course I'm not assistant men,

0:14:44.600 --> 0:14:47.160
<v Speaker 1>so yeah, and that's the day before we record this.

0:14:47.240 --> 0:14:50.600
<v Speaker 1>So that's how how fast this stuff has really held Healy,

0:14:50.680 --> 0:14:53.960
<v Speaker 1>This news is broken. Yeah, So the bug is present

0:14:54.240 --> 0:14:58.880
<v Speaker 1>in only certain versions of open SSL. Like all great software,

0:14:59.640 --> 0:15:05.000
<v Speaker 1>open SSL has generations of versions, right, So if you

0:15:05.040 --> 0:15:09.720
<v Speaker 1>were to run open ss L one point zero point

0:15:09.840 --> 0:15:15.280
<v Speaker 1>to dash beta or any version that is uh involves

0:15:15.360 --> 0:15:19.200
<v Speaker 1>one point zero point one up to one point zero

0:15:19.280 --> 0:15:22.600
<v Speaker 1>point one F, those are all affected. One point zero

0:15:22.640 --> 0:15:26.720
<v Speaker 1>point one G and later perfectly fine because that's when

0:15:26.760 --> 0:15:29.960
<v Speaker 1>the vulnerability was patched. Or if you're running something that's

0:15:30.040 --> 0:15:33.360
<v Speaker 1>earlier than that, you're fine because the bug had not

0:15:33.440 --> 0:15:37.000
<v Speaker 1>been implemented into the code. So really we're looking at

0:15:37.040 --> 0:15:39.680
<v Speaker 1>one point zero point one through one point zero point

0:15:39.680 --> 0:15:43.360
<v Speaker 1>one F and that one point zero point to DASH beta.

0:15:43.600 --> 0:15:47.520
<v Speaker 1>Those are the ones that are um problematic. So some

0:15:48.280 --> 0:15:51.520
<v Speaker 1>companies that are using open SSL, they might not be

0:15:51.560 --> 0:15:55.920
<v Speaker 1>affected at all just because they never up updated the software,

0:15:56.360 --> 0:15:58.520
<v Speaker 1>which you know, a lot of people will say when

0:15:58.520 --> 0:16:00.120
<v Speaker 1>it comes to security, you want to keep yoursel up

0:16:00.120 --> 0:16:02.040
<v Speaker 1>whereas up to date as possible. This is not one

0:16:02.080 --> 0:16:04.680
<v Speaker 1>of those times. Yeah, could as could as to those

0:16:04.760 --> 0:16:09.040
<v Speaker 1>lazy ye maybe maybe they just felt something bad was coming.

0:16:09.600 --> 0:16:12.800
<v Speaker 1>But what exactly is going on? So this bug, we've

0:16:12.840 --> 0:16:15.720
<v Speaker 1>we've mentioned it a few times. This, this heart bleed bug,

0:16:16.240 --> 0:16:19.680
<v Speaker 1>is a severe memory handling bug in the implementation of

0:16:19.720 --> 0:16:23.640
<v Speaker 1>the tl S heartbeat extension. That's why it's called heartbleed

0:16:23.720 --> 0:16:29.160
<v Speaker 1>because it's involving this heartbeat. A heartbeat here we go, Um,

0:16:29.200 --> 0:16:33.080
<v Speaker 1>a heartbeat. I'm gonna try and avoid making any nineteen

0:16:33.120 --> 0:16:36.720
<v Speaker 1>eighties power ballad references here, but they're all going through

0:16:36.720 --> 0:16:39.400
<v Speaker 1>my mind, trust me. So a heartbeat in this case,

0:16:39.400 --> 0:16:45.000
<v Speaker 1>and the technology sense is a message sent from one

0:16:45.040 --> 0:16:47.760
<v Speaker 1>machine to another while they are connected in one of

0:16:47.800 --> 0:16:50.440
<v Speaker 1>these sessions. And the purpose of this message is really

0:16:50.480 --> 0:16:53.960
<v Speaker 1>just to say, hey, are you still there? Right? Yeah, exactly,

0:16:54.000 --> 0:16:57.320
<v Speaker 1>It's it's it's you know, saying I'm still here, are

0:16:57.320 --> 0:16:59.560
<v Speaker 1>you still there? And then the responses you still here,

0:16:59.600 --> 0:17:03.640
<v Speaker 1>let's keep fund trucking? So um, that's generally what it is.

0:17:03.680 --> 0:17:09.040
<v Speaker 1>But the way that heartbeats work is a little problematic.

0:17:09.280 --> 0:17:13.760
<v Speaker 1>So normally what happens is you have machine A send

0:17:13.800 --> 0:17:16.080
<v Speaker 1>a little message over to machine B, and if they

0:17:16.119 --> 0:17:19.080
<v Speaker 1>don't hear anything back after a few seconds, machine A says, okay,

0:17:19.200 --> 0:17:23.160
<v Speaker 1>Machine B has ended the session or as otherwise inoperable.

0:17:23.520 --> 0:17:27.120
<v Speaker 1>We will cancel the session on this side, and everything

0:17:27.200 --> 0:17:29.040
<v Speaker 1>is over, and then if we want to start up again,

0:17:29.080 --> 0:17:31.600
<v Speaker 1>we have to initiate a new session, all right, where

0:17:31.640 --> 0:17:34.680
<v Speaker 1>we're throwing away those session keys. Yeah, yeah, but now

0:17:34.840 --> 0:17:37.280
<v Speaker 1>now we know that we need to you know, re

0:17:37.480 --> 0:17:42.120
<v Speaker 1>up security. But these heartbeat bugs are the heartbeat could

0:17:42.200 --> 0:17:47.280
<v Speaker 1>reveal up to sixty bytes of data, and a heartbeat

0:17:47.320 --> 0:17:50.560
<v Speaker 1>does not need to be sixty four kilobytes in size.

0:17:51.080 --> 0:17:53.480
<v Speaker 1>And they found out that if you were to send

0:17:53.520 --> 0:17:58.000
<v Speaker 1>a heartbeat message, uh, and the actual file size is

0:17:58.080 --> 0:18:00.639
<v Speaker 1>pretty small. Let's say it's just to kill bite. So

0:18:00.680 --> 0:18:04.400
<v Speaker 1>you're just sending a one kilobyte message saying, hey, I'm here.

0:18:04.400 --> 0:18:07.960
<v Speaker 1>Are you still there? Now? Technically what's supposed to happen

0:18:08.440 --> 0:18:11.760
<v Speaker 1>is machine BE gets the message and sends an identical

0:18:11.840 --> 0:18:14.880
<v Speaker 1>message back to machine A, Yes I'm still here, or

0:18:14.960 --> 0:18:17.320
<v Speaker 1>technically it's hey, are you still there? Because it's whatever

0:18:17.320 --> 0:18:20.960
<v Speaker 1>the message was in the first case. But let's say

0:18:21.000 --> 0:18:24.640
<v Speaker 1>that machine BE gets the message and the actual file

0:18:24.680 --> 0:18:28.720
<v Speaker 1>size is one kilobyte, but for some reason, the stated

0:18:28.960 --> 0:18:32.359
<v Speaker 1>file size is larger. Let's say it's sixty k by,

0:18:32.480 --> 0:18:35.760
<v Speaker 1>so it's the maximum that a heartbeat can be. Now,

0:18:35.880 --> 0:18:39.639
<v Speaker 1>Machine B has to reply back to Machine A, and

0:18:39.680 --> 0:18:43.120
<v Speaker 1>it's doing it based on that stated file size, right,

0:18:43.200 --> 0:18:46.800
<v Speaker 1>So it's going to take that that one kilobyte of

0:18:46.840 --> 0:18:49.800
<v Speaker 1>the correct information and fill the rest of that up

0:18:49.840 --> 0:18:52.359
<v Speaker 1>with junk. With a junk. Yeah, it's kind of like,

0:18:52.400 --> 0:18:54.840
<v Speaker 1>you know, if you've ever heard people say when you dream,

0:18:55.000 --> 0:18:57.159
<v Speaker 1>it's just your brain making up junk to try and

0:18:57.200 --> 0:18:59.160
<v Speaker 1>get rid of it, kind of the same thing. It's

0:18:59.200 --> 0:19:02.880
<v Speaker 1>really the machine be starts to panic and says, oh, uh,

0:19:02.960 --> 0:19:05.080
<v Speaker 1>this message needs to be way bigger than what I

0:19:05.119 --> 0:19:07.280
<v Speaker 1>thought it need to be. Uh, let's just ship them

0:19:07.320 --> 0:19:09.840
<v Speaker 1>everything here. Uh. And And the thing is that when

0:19:09.840 --> 0:19:11.800
<v Speaker 1>you when you dream, that junk is made up of

0:19:11.880 --> 0:19:15.399
<v Speaker 1>I don't know, your your worries about passing chemistry in

0:19:15.480 --> 0:19:18.119
<v Speaker 1>high school. In this case, the junk is made up

0:19:18.160 --> 0:19:20.879
<v Speaker 1>of stuff from your computer's random access memory. Now, random

0:19:20.880 --> 0:19:23.920
<v Speaker 1>access memory tends to be pretty awesome stuff because it

0:19:23.960 --> 0:19:27.639
<v Speaker 1>allows you to uh to have quick access to data

0:19:27.720 --> 0:19:30.680
<v Speaker 1>that you use over and over again, and that means

0:19:30.680 --> 0:19:33.000
<v Speaker 1>that you don't have to have your computer access the

0:19:33.080 --> 0:19:35.879
<v Speaker 1>deep memory banks like the hard drive to try and

0:19:35.920 --> 0:19:38.560
<v Speaker 1>find this information. It stays there in the random access

0:19:38.560 --> 0:19:42.960
<v Speaker 1>memory makes things much faster Without it, everything which slow down. Right,

0:19:43.560 --> 0:19:47.080
<v Speaker 1>So here's the issue. Uh, normally random access memory, if

0:19:47.080 --> 0:19:49.920
<v Speaker 1>you turn off a machine, it erases it's it overwrites

0:19:49.960 --> 0:19:53.720
<v Speaker 1>itself all the time, and so nothing that stays in

0:19:53.840 --> 0:19:57.919
<v Speaker 1>random access memory will stay there for very long comparatively speaking.

0:19:58.600 --> 0:20:02.480
<v Speaker 1>So because of that, in general, it's considered to be

0:20:02.520 --> 0:20:06.679
<v Speaker 1>pretty safe to have cryptograph keys stored in random access

0:20:06.720 --> 0:20:09.760
<v Speaker 1>memory because one, you're going to need them all the time, right,

0:20:09.760 --> 0:20:12.359
<v Speaker 1>You're gonna need it in order to make these communications.

0:20:12.400 --> 0:20:15.199
<v Speaker 1>And secondly, because if you turn off the power to

0:20:15.240 --> 0:20:17.600
<v Speaker 1>your computer, it goes away, so you don't have to

0:20:17.600 --> 0:20:19.640
<v Speaker 1>work right, right, and it could be overwritten at any

0:20:19.680 --> 0:20:24.200
<v Speaker 1>given moment exactly. So the issue here is that since

0:20:24.240 --> 0:20:27.480
<v Speaker 1>it can be in random access memory, if you were

0:20:27.560 --> 0:20:30.240
<v Speaker 1>to if you were a hacker and you wanted to

0:20:30.280 --> 0:20:33.800
<v Speaker 1>exploit the system, you can send a heartbeat that is

0:20:33.880 --> 0:20:36.240
<v Speaker 1>the mimimum amount of information that you need to send,

0:20:36.480 --> 0:20:40.080
<v Speaker 1>but looks like the maximum amount of information. The server

0:20:40.280 --> 0:20:43.080
<v Speaker 1>that you target is going to send you that maximum

0:20:43.080 --> 0:20:46.560
<v Speaker 1>amount of information back, which may or may not include

0:20:46.600 --> 0:20:50.080
<v Speaker 1>within it one of these cryptograph keys. Yeah, yeah, whatever

0:20:50.200 --> 0:20:53.879
<v Speaker 1>John happens to be in the RAM, including potentially Yeah,

0:20:54.040 --> 0:20:56.240
<v Speaker 1>so it's it's a grab bag. It doesn't mean that

0:20:56.280 --> 0:20:58.120
<v Speaker 1>you're every single time you hit it that you're going

0:20:58.160 --> 0:21:00.920
<v Speaker 1>to end up with the jackpot of Now I can

0:21:01.000 --> 0:21:04.640
<v Speaker 1>decrypt everything that goes across your network, right, but with

0:21:04.880 --> 0:21:08.280
<v Speaker 1>enough of these heartbeat attacks, you can you can absolutely

0:21:08.320 --> 0:21:13.280
<v Speaker 1>put together in piece together, uh a lot of scary information. Yeah. Yeah,

0:21:13.320 --> 0:21:16.320
<v Speaker 1>you can get completely decrypted information. Maybe you didn't get

0:21:16.359 --> 0:21:18.760
<v Speaker 1>the key, but you might get some information that was

0:21:18.760 --> 0:21:21.600
<v Speaker 1>going through the server that's really important. Or maybe you

0:21:21.640 --> 0:21:23.640
<v Speaker 1>get a session key so you can see everything that's

0:21:23.680 --> 0:21:26.000
<v Speaker 1>going on in that session, or maybe you get like

0:21:26.040 --> 0:21:28.960
<v Speaker 1>the private key that the that's the golden goose that

0:21:29.000 --> 0:21:32.440
<v Speaker 1>would allow you to not only be able to snoop

0:21:32.560 --> 0:21:35.280
<v Speaker 1>on everything that's going through that server that normally would

0:21:35.280 --> 0:21:38.879
<v Speaker 1>be encrypted, you could also potentially pose as that server

0:21:39.359 --> 0:21:43.000
<v Speaker 1>and suddenly people think they are having a secure connection

0:21:43.040 --> 0:21:47.200
<v Speaker 1>with the service that they trust because all indications show

0:21:47.320 --> 0:21:51.000
<v Speaker 1>that they are, but in reality, it's going to a hacker. Now,

0:21:51.040 --> 0:21:55.239
<v Speaker 1>this is a fundamental flaw in internet security. There is

0:21:55.280 --> 0:21:58.880
<v Speaker 1>no way to overstate how bad this is. Yeah, and

0:21:58.880 --> 0:22:03.720
<v Speaker 1>and it's exists and since December one. Um, I mean

0:22:03.720 --> 0:22:08.200
<v Speaker 1>it's technically only been in distribution since March of so

0:22:08.200 --> 0:22:10.920
<v Speaker 1>so so that's much better. So here's here's the thing.

0:22:10.960 --> 0:22:13.320
<v Speaker 1>We know how long it's been since the good guys

0:22:13.600 --> 0:22:15.600
<v Speaker 1>found out about it. The problem is we don't know

0:22:16.000 --> 0:22:19.520
<v Speaker 1>if bad guys knew about it before then, because the

0:22:19.600 --> 0:22:23.119
<v Speaker 1>other issue here is that you can't tell when someone's

0:22:23.200 --> 0:22:26.760
<v Speaker 1>using this. They're completely untraceable. This is not like some

0:22:26.840 --> 0:22:30.400
<v Speaker 1>sort of vulnerability where you have to have someone install

0:22:31.160 --> 0:22:34.760
<v Speaker 1>a trojan backdoor program onto their computer. There's no need

0:22:34.840 --> 0:22:37.720
<v Speaker 1>for that because it's it's a vulnerability, it's a bug

0:22:37.760 --> 0:22:44.080
<v Speaker 1>within the security software itself. So yeah, this is bad,

0:22:44.119 --> 0:22:47.960
<v Speaker 1>bad news. And um we're going to talk about more

0:22:48.760 --> 0:22:51.880
<v Speaker 1>why it's bad bad news. But wait, it gets worse. Yeah,

0:22:51.920 --> 0:22:55.400
<v Speaker 1>So before we really dive into all that, let's take

0:22:55.440 --> 0:23:00.199
<v Speaker 1>a quick break to thank our sponsor. Okay, law Ran

0:23:01.160 --> 0:23:03.760
<v Speaker 1>We've talked about that this is seriously bad news. I

0:23:03.760 --> 0:23:08.000
<v Speaker 1>think we we managed to communicate that the consequences are dire.

0:23:08.600 --> 0:23:13.840
<v Speaker 1>But do we have a rough percentage of how many

0:23:14.320 --> 0:23:17.680
<v Speaker 1>machines and services out there on the web actually use

0:23:17.800 --> 0:23:24.920
<v Speaker 1>open ssl? H Yeah about six? Okay, so you're telling

0:23:24.960 --> 0:23:31.160
<v Speaker 1>me that two out of every three sites, services, apps, etcetera.

0:23:31.320 --> 0:23:35.800
<v Speaker 1>Are working on a compromise security system. That that is

0:23:35.840 --> 0:23:38.679
<v Speaker 1>exactly what I'm saying. Wow, that I mean, you know

0:23:38.720 --> 0:23:40.600
<v Speaker 1>that's that's the estimate. That is that is what open

0:23:40.720 --> 0:23:44.800
<v Speaker 1>ssl themselves have have have guessed. Yeah, yeah, that is

0:23:47.560 --> 0:23:50.080
<v Speaker 1>m M. There are no words at this point. So

0:23:50.480 --> 0:23:53.879
<v Speaker 1>I ended up creating an analogy. And this is a

0:23:54.000 --> 0:23:59.080
<v Speaker 1>drastic oversimplification, as all my analogies are, but I was

0:23:59.119 --> 0:24:02.440
<v Speaker 1>an English lit major and I like them. So here

0:24:02.440 --> 0:24:05.720
<v Speaker 1>we go. All right, Now, imagine that you have just

0:24:05.800 --> 0:24:09.080
<v Speaker 1>purchased an old house. It's a gorgeous old house that

0:24:09.200 --> 0:24:12.240
<v Speaker 1>you you have managed to buy, but you have no

0:24:12.400 --> 0:24:15.760
<v Speaker 1>knowledge whatsoever of what the previous owners were like, or

0:24:15.960 --> 0:24:18.040
<v Speaker 1>the kind of people that they hung out with, who

0:24:18.080 --> 0:24:20.639
<v Speaker 1>they might have given keys to. So so you do

0:24:20.680 --> 0:24:23.080
<v Speaker 1>the logical thing when you move in and you you

0:24:23.119 --> 0:24:26.040
<v Speaker 1>have a locksmith come out and put new locks in

0:24:26.080 --> 0:24:28.560
<v Speaker 1>the house. Yeah, so you have the keys to the

0:24:28.560 --> 0:24:31.480
<v Speaker 1>new locks. You're feeling pretty confident. Why you don't know

0:24:32.200 --> 0:24:35.760
<v Speaker 1>is that that locksmith, uh not necessarily through any kind

0:24:35.800 --> 0:24:40.080
<v Speaker 1>of malicious behavior, is just not the not the sharpest

0:24:40.160 --> 0:24:43.560
<v Speaker 1>knife in the drawer. And so the locksmith keeps copies

0:24:43.960 --> 0:24:47.240
<v Speaker 1>of all the keys that he or she makes in

0:24:47.680 --> 0:24:51.959
<v Speaker 1>uh in in like a box that's easily found by

0:24:52.000 --> 0:24:54.959
<v Speaker 1>anyone who happens to know where to look, completely accessible

0:24:55.040 --> 0:24:58.160
<v Speaker 1>to the to the public. Yeah, And so that means

0:24:58.200 --> 0:25:01.199
<v Speaker 1>that while you feel that your box are completely secure

0:25:01.200 --> 0:25:04.840
<v Speaker 1>because you have changed them all, in reality people can

0:25:04.880 --> 0:25:07.879
<v Speaker 1>get access to copies of the sink keys that you

0:25:08.040 --> 0:25:10.760
<v Speaker 1>use and us just walk right on into your house.

0:25:11.680 --> 0:25:15.760
<v Speaker 1>That's not good. So now I think that two thirds

0:25:15.760 --> 0:25:21.359
<v Speaker 1>of the internet has that same problem. That's not great either.

0:25:21.720 --> 0:25:25.960
<v Speaker 1>So including I'm talking like your email, your instant messaging, banking,

0:25:26.520 --> 0:25:29.360
<v Speaker 1>all your user names and passwords, which are the kind

0:25:29.359 --> 0:25:32.800
<v Speaker 1>of the clients side of this handshake we keep talking about,

0:25:33.520 --> 0:25:35.560
<v Speaker 1>all of this can be read in plain text by

0:25:35.600 --> 0:25:38.359
<v Speaker 1>someone who can exploit this bug. So and and it

0:25:38.440 --> 0:25:42.440
<v Speaker 1>really only takes like like basic programming skills and a

0:25:42.520 --> 0:25:45.199
<v Speaker 1>desire to do mischief or harm or to you know,

0:25:45.240 --> 0:25:49.159
<v Speaker 1>impress your bosses at the n s A. But Lauren,

0:25:49.520 --> 0:25:52.119
<v Speaker 1>come on, let's let's get some bright bright spots and

0:25:52.320 --> 0:25:56.560
<v Speaker 1>bright sunshine shining through the dark clouds. What can the

0:25:56.680 --> 0:25:59.840
<v Speaker 1>average person do to protect him or herself more bad?

0:26:00.119 --> 0:26:04.480
<v Speaker 1>Is not much? Oh those dark clouds. Yeah. Basically, the

0:26:04.560 --> 0:26:10.000
<v Speaker 1>responsibility here lies not on you probably, but on the web. Yeah.

0:26:10.080 --> 0:26:15.080
<v Speaker 1>So the administrators of the various sites, services, apps, people

0:26:15.080 --> 0:26:19.280
<v Speaker 1>who develop operating systems, you know, everything that you encounter

0:26:19.320 --> 0:26:21.919
<v Speaker 1>on the web that requires this kind of security. That

0:26:22.000 --> 0:26:24.600
<v Speaker 1>stuff has to be rolled out in the background on

0:26:24.720 --> 0:26:27.359
<v Speaker 1>that back end, the stuff behind the scenes of the

0:26:27.359 --> 0:26:30.359
<v Speaker 1>websites and apps that you use. That's where this needs

0:26:30.400 --> 0:26:34.479
<v Speaker 1>to happen. So it's the The nice news is that

0:26:34.520 --> 0:26:39.080
<v Speaker 1>this vulnerability has been patched. There is a solution out there, right,

0:26:39.200 --> 0:26:41.280
<v Speaker 1>and it's right. It's it's just up to those system

0:26:41.320 --> 0:26:44.200
<v Speaker 1>means to take that patch and implement it on their systems, right.

0:26:44.320 --> 0:26:46.360
<v Speaker 1>They have to be the ones to distribute it. And

0:26:46.840 --> 0:26:48.879
<v Speaker 1>as of the recording of this podcast, some of them

0:26:48.920 --> 0:26:51.320
<v Speaker 1>have done it. Some of them, of course, knew ahead

0:26:51.359 --> 0:26:54.800
<v Speaker 1>of time by however many days, and they implemented the change.

0:26:54.840 --> 0:26:59.480
<v Speaker 1>Then others are implementing it now. Others we hope will

0:26:59.520 --> 0:27:03.119
<v Speaker 1>implement it soon. Right. So, so the responsibility of the

0:27:03.240 --> 0:27:06.520
<v Speaker 1>of the user of you guys here is really too. Um.

0:27:07.240 --> 0:27:10.160
<v Speaker 1>Just just watch out for getting messages from any kind

0:27:10.200 --> 0:27:12.880
<v Speaker 1>of services that you use online about when to change

0:27:12.880 --> 0:27:15.200
<v Speaker 1>your password, right, because it doesn't do you any good

0:27:15.200 --> 0:27:17.919
<v Speaker 1>to change your password right now. Yes, don't just go

0:27:18.200 --> 0:27:20.359
<v Speaker 1>run out and change all of your passwords. Really niling

0:27:20.520 --> 0:27:23.280
<v Speaker 1>right if you know for a fact that one of

0:27:23.320 --> 0:27:26.160
<v Speaker 1>the services like Gmail, for example, Google is a great example.

0:27:26.240 --> 0:27:29.320
<v Speaker 1>Google has addressed this now. They've said that you don't

0:27:29.359 --> 0:27:31.600
<v Speaker 1>necessarily have to change your password. I'm telling you change

0:27:31.600 --> 0:27:35.320
<v Speaker 1>your password. This is coming from me, guys, change your password. Uh,

0:27:35.400 --> 0:27:37.399
<v Speaker 1>it's better to be safe than sorry. And Google has

0:27:37.440 --> 0:27:41.000
<v Speaker 1>already addressed the vulnerability so that it's safe for you

0:27:41.040 --> 0:27:43.080
<v Speaker 1>to change your password there, but in other places it

0:27:43.119 --> 0:27:45.960
<v Speaker 1>may not be. And to go back to my locksmith analogy,

0:27:46.440 --> 0:27:49.159
<v Speaker 1>Let's say that you have figured out that people have

0:27:49.280 --> 0:27:51.000
<v Speaker 1>copies of your keys, so you go back to that

0:27:51.080 --> 0:27:53.760
<v Speaker 1>same locksmith and have brand new locks put in and

0:27:53.800 --> 0:27:56.760
<v Speaker 1>the old ones, the ones you had, the replacement ones

0:27:56.800 --> 0:27:59.520
<v Speaker 1>you have thrown away new new locks are put in,

0:27:59.800 --> 0:28:02.680
<v Speaker 1>the locksmith is still following that same protocol of keeping

0:28:02.720 --> 0:28:05.600
<v Speaker 1>everything out in plain site. Then you haven't really solved

0:28:05.600 --> 0:28:07.680
<v Speaker 1>the problem. All you've done is just changed your locks

0:28:07.720 --> 0:28:10.080
<v Speaker 1>one more time. So that's the same sort of thing.

0:28:10.080 --> 0:28:12.480
<v Speaker 1>If you were to change your password before one of

0:28:12.520 --> 0:28:16.920
<v Speaker 1>those sites, services, apps, etcetera. Was to implement this this

0:28:16.960 --> 0:28:20.439
<v Speaker 1>this patch, you're still vulnerable. So it doesn't matter how

0:28:20.520 --> 0:28:23.200
<v Speaker 1>much times you change your password, that password is still

0:28:23.280 --> 0:28:25.359
<v Speaker 1>vulnerable to one of these attacks. Yeah, and and it

0:28:25.400 --> 0:28:28.040
<v Speaker 1>could be it could be days or potentially even longer

0:28:28.160 --> 0:28:30.720
<v Speaker 1>for some sites that you use to to get with

0:28:30.720 --> 0:28:33.239
<v Speaker 1>the program. Yeah, So the best thing to do is

0:28:33.320 --> 0:28:37.040
<v Speaker 1>to use there are lots of different utilities online to

0:28:37.320 --> 0:28:42.200
<v Speaker 1>check and see what which sites have addressed this already.

0:28:42.480 --> 0:28:44.800
<v Speaker 1>In fact, I think the heart bleed dot org has

0:28:44.840 --> 0:28:47.480
<v Speaker 1>a link to a tool where all you do is

0:28:47.480 --> 0:28:49.760
<v Speaker 1>you put in the u r L for the website

0:28:49.760 --> 0:28:52.720
<v Speaker 1>that you're concerned about, and it'll do a little ping

0:28:52.920 --> 0:28:56.280
<v Speaker 1>of that website and determine which version of open SSL,

0:28:56.400 --> 0:28:59.560
<v Speaker 1>if any, is running on that site, and then it

0:28:59.600 --> 0:29:01.880
<v Speaker 1>will give you a message saying whether or not it's

0:29:01.880 --> 0:29:03.560
<v Speaker 1>okay for you to change your password, or if you

0:29:03.600 --> 0:29:07.800
<v Speaker 1>need to or if you can't, then it may tell you, hey,

0:29:07.880 --> 0:29:10.600
<v Speaker 1>you might need to send an email and say hey,

0:29:10.600 --> 0:29:13.080
<v Speaker 1>could you could you guys get on this because it's

0:29:13.080 --> 0:29:17.520
<v Speaker 1>really important. So you can be a little proactive in

0:29:17.560 --> 0:29:21.760
<v Speaker 1>that sense, but honestly you are dependent upon those those

0:29:21.800 --> 0:29:25.360
<v Speaker 1>administrators doing their job to make sure that they're running

0:29:25.400 --> 0:29:30.240
<v Speaker 1>the latest of the open SSL protocols right there. There

0:29:30.280 --> 0:29:33.240
<v Speaker 1>are some sites that have said that they were never vulnerable,

0:29:33.240 --> 0:29:36.600
<v Speaker 1>and those include uh, Microsoft sites, as we stated earlier,

0:29:36.800 --> 0:29:40.360
<v Speaker 1>a O L and LinkedIn, So they're safe unless, of course,

0:29:40.480 --> 0:29:43.720
<v Speaker 1>you use the same password across multiple sites, which you

0:29:43.760 --> 0:29:46.720
<v Speaker 1>should not be doing. No, don't do that. Um really,

0:29:47.480 --> 0:29:52.719
<v Speaker 1>and I've recommended these before. Get yourself a password vault program,

0:29:52.880 --> 0:29:55.960
<v Speaker 1>something like last pass or dash lane is what I use.

0:29:56.640 --> 0:30:00.200
<v Speaker 1>UM dash Lane, uh does use open s sl old,

0:30:00.280 --> 0:30:03.520
<v Speaker 1>but it doesn't at all involve the passwords in your

0:30:03.600 --> 0:30:07.400
<v Speaker 1>vault or your even your master passwords. So according to

0:30:07.480 --> 0:30:10.120
<v Speaker 1>dash Lane, it's still safe, which was a big relief

0:30:10.160 --> 0:30:12.560
<v Speaker 1>to me. Yeah. Yeah, last Pass has come out and

0:30:12.560 --> 0:30:15.320
<v Speaker 1>said the same thing. And last Pass also has the

0:30:15.320 --> 0:30:19.200
<v Speaker 1>benefit of it's telling users when to go in and

0:30:19.280 --> 0:30:23.720
<v Speaker 1>change passwords. As we get updates about this security implementation

0:30:24.080 --> 0:30:26.520
<v Speaker 1>right as as of the recording of this podcast, which

0:30:26.600 --> 0:30:30.120
<v Speaker 1>which again is Thursday, April tenth. Sites that were vulnerable

0:30:30.200 --> 0:30:32.680
<v Speaker 1>at some point but are currently safe to change your

0:30:32.680 --> 0:30:37.480
<v Speaker 1>passwords for now include Google, Facebook, Tumbler, Dropbox, and Yahoo,

0:30:37.600 --> 0:30:40.080
<v Speaker 1>among the really big ones that are probably going to

0:30:40.080 --> 0:30:43.000
<v Speaker 1>affect lots of people um and and Again as of

0:30:43.120 --> 0:30:46.000
<v Speaker 1>right now, other sites are still working on fixes. Um

0:30:46.160 --> 0:30:48.880
<v Speaker 1>and And probably will send you a message when it's

0:30:48.880 --> 0:30:51.800
<v Speaker 1>safe to get back in the digital water. But um,

0:30:51.840 --> 0:30:53.600
<v Speaker 1>you know, yeah, if you if you want to check

0:30:53.600 --> 0:30:56.320
<v Speaker 1>the status Jonathan talked about that, yeah, using last pass

0:30:56.440 --> 0:30:58.400
<v Speaker 1>or using They're also blog posts out there that are

0:30:58.480 --> 0:31:01.920
<v Speaker 1>kind of keeping a running alley of which sites have

0:31:02.400 --> 0:31:05.480
<v Speaker 1>addressed it, because in some cases, you know, I would

0:31:05.480 --> 0:31:08.040
<v Speaker 1>hope that any service at least at least has your

0:31:08.080 --> 0:31:10.360
<v Speaker 1>email address is going to send you a message saying, hey,

0:31:10.560 --> 0:31:14.120
<v Speaker 1>change your password. But in in other cases you may

0:31:14.200 --> 0:31:17.480
<v Speaker 1>have companies that do this through a blog post, which

0:31:17.920 --> 0:31:20.200
<v Speaker 1>you know, maybe you see it, maybe you don't. I

0:31:20.280 --> 0:31:23.720
<v Speaker 1>don't visit the blogs of most of the services I use.

0:31:24.040 --> 0:31:25.920
<v Speaker 1>I know that a lot of them have blogs, but

0:31:26.000 --> 0:31:28.120
<v Speaker 1>you know, I've only got so many hours in a day.

0:31:28.200 --> 0:31:31.240
<v Speaker 1>So there are blog posts run by other people who

0:31:31.280 --> 0:31:34.160
<v Speaker 1>are just kind of keeping a list as these different

0:31:34.240 --> 0:31:37.560
<v Speaker 1>companies are upgrading and announcing it, so that you can

0:31:37.640 --> 0:31:39.720
<v Speaker 1>just go to a master list and take a look

0:31:39.720 --> 0:31:42.080
<v Speaker 1>at all of them. Uh, it is important for you

0:31:42.080 --> 0:31:44.200
<v Speaker 1>to actually change your passwords at that point when it

0:31:44.200 --> 0:31:47.280
<v Speaker 1>tells you it's time to do so. Other bad news.

0:31:48.320 --> 0:31:52.320
<v Speaker 1>I hate to do this, but anything that was done

0:31:52.440 --> 0:31:56.120
<v Speaker 1>on those old open SSL channels that still out there

0:31:56.160 --> 0:32:00.000
<v Speaker 1>is still going to be vulnerable. So for two years

0:32:00.200 --> 0:32:03.320
<v Speaker 1>this was going on, so anyone who can access any

0:32:03.360 --> 0:32:07.160
<v Speaker 1>of that older information will be able to do so.

0:32:08.400 --> 0:32:12.960
<v Speaker 1>From this point forward, things will be fine. But yeah,

0:32:13.120 --> 0:32:16.400
<v Speaker 1>I mean, this is this is why when when security

0:32:16.400 --> 0:32:22.640
<v Speaker 1>experts who were not prone to being um, hyperbolic, say

0:32:22.680 --> 0:32:24.479
<v Speaker 1>to go to the hyper Bowl every year like we

0:32:24.560 --> 0:32:29.080
<v Speaker 1>like to, they said, when you make this, uh you know,

0:32:29.120 --> 0:32:30.680
<v Speaker 1>if you were to say, is this on the scale

0:32:30.720 --> 0:32:34.000
<v Speaker 1>one of ten, how bad is secure? Yeah, this was

0:32:34.120 --> 0:32:37.760
<v Speaker 1>all spinal tap on our butts here people. This was

0:32:37.880 --> 0:32:41.800
<v Speaker 1>not a good thing. So one other thing I recommend

0:32:41.840 --> 0:32:48.000
<v Speaker 1>doing is if the service you use offers to factor authentication,

0:32:49.280 --> 0:32:52.720
<v Speaker 1>do it. You know, usually it's a an option you

0:32:52.760 --> 0:32:55.880
<v Speaker 1>don't have to use to factor authentication, and a lot

0:32:55.920 --> 0:32:57.719
<v Speaker 1>of these services, some of them require it, but not

0:32:57.760 --> 0:33:02.560
<v Speaker 1>all of them. Google has this, Facebook has it as well. Uh.

0:33:02.600 --> 0:33:05.320
<v Speaker 1>And by the way, both Google and Facebook have addressed

0:33:05.320 --> 0:33:07.480
<v Speaker 1>this issue. And you could go in and change your passwords,

0:33:07.480 --> 0:33:10.680
<v Speaker 1>which I did just before I came in here. Um,

0:33:10.720 --> 0:33:13.840
<v Speaker 1>but yeah, you can. You can activate two factor authentication,

0:33:13.840 --> 0:33:19.800
<v Speaker 1>which requires a secondary uh piece of log in information

0:33:19.840 --> 0:33:23.000
<v Speaker 1>beyond just your user name and password that's generated specifically

0:33:23.040 --> 0:33:25.480
<v Speaker 1>when you try to log in. So usually you get

0:33:25.480 --> 0:33:27.560
<v Speaker 1>like a text message or an email that has a

0:33:27.680 --> 0:33:30.120
<v Speaker 1>numeric code that you have to also enter in ord

0:33:30.200 --> 0:33:33.280
<v Speaker 1>to log in. Once you've cleared a machine, usually it

0:33:33.520 --> 0:33:38.000
<v Speaker 1>stays clear. Sometimes it will expire, which means that eventually

0:33:38.000 --> 0:33:40.800
<v Speaker 1>you'll have to do it again. But as irritating as

0:33:40.840 --> 0:33:43.520
<v Speaker 1>you may find that, it's so much better than knowing

0:33:43.560 --> 0:33:46.000
<v Speaker 1>that your stuff could be open for anyone to see

0:33:46.000 --> 0:33:50.160
<v Speaker 1>at any time. So yeah, this, UM, this was definitely

0:33:50.200 --> 0:33:53.760
<v Speaker 1>a topic that we felt we had to address um

0:33:53.880 --> 0:33:58.040
<v Speaker 1>right away, because it's it's such a fundamental part of

0:33:58.080 --> 0:34:00.400
<v Speaker 1>how the Internet works. I mean, really, the only thing

0:34:00.440 --> 0:34:03.080
<v Speaker 1>that I can think of that would be more monumental

0:34:03.280 --> 0:34:06.160
<v Speaker 1>is if, for some reason uh t c P i

0:34:06.240 --> 0:34:09.040
<v Speaker 1>P protocol stopped working, in which case we wouldn't have

0:34:09.040 --> 0:34:11.080
<v Speaker 1>a job. I just I just had like a like

0:34:11.120 --> 0:34:16.600
<v Speaker 1>a shiver. Um. Yeah, and I mean it's affecting everyone. Yeah,

0:34:16.680 --> 0:34:20.880
<v Speaker 1>I mean everyone. This is across the globe. Um and

0:34:20.880 --> 0:34:23.279
<v Speaker 1>and and it's complicated enough that yeah, yeah, we you know,

0:34:23.320 --> 0:34:26.359
<v Speaker 1>we we really wanted to talk about what SSL does

0:34:26.360 --> 0:34:30.440
<v Speaker 1>and what open ssl particularly does and yeah, so so

0:34:30.520 --> 0:34:33.200
<v Speaker 1>we we We hope that you are at least um

0:34:33.640 --> 0:34:37.160
<v Speaker 1>more comfortable in your knowledge of the doom. It's definitely

0:34:37.200 --> 0:34:39.400
<v Speaker 1>better to know than not know. I mean, it is

0:34:39.960 --> 0:34:42.680
<v Speaker 1>not a happy story by any means. We have top

0:34:42.719 --> 0:34:45.200
<v Speaker 1>men working on it, and women as well, of course,

0:34:46.040 --> 0:34:48.920
<v Speaker 1>But you know, in Indiana Jones's day, they only they

0:34:48.920 --> 0:34:52.799
<v Speaker 1>only acknowledge the men. Well that's yep. Hey, at least

0:34:52.840 --> 0:34:55.640
<v Speaker 1>we don't live in Indiana Jones time. That's that's true.

0:34:55.920 --> 0:34:58.680
<v Speaker 1>I have not had to outrun any boulders in days,

0:34:59.360 --> 0:35:01.960
<v Speaker 1>so that's good. But yeah, this is a This was

0:35:02.000 --> 0:35:05.440
<v Speaker 1>a topic. We thought it was interesting enough and important

0:35:05.520 --> 0:35:07.080
<v Speaker 1>enough that we had to cover it right away. But

0:35:07.160 --> 0:35:09.640
<v Speaker 1>if you guys have suggestions for topics that we should

0:35:09.640 --> 0:35:12.720
<v Speaker 1>cover next, whether it's something that's happened in the news recently,

0:35:12.800 --> 0:35:15.680
<v Speaker 1>or maybe there's that one piece of technology dating back

0:35:15.719 --> 0:35:18.640
<v Speaker 1>to twelve fifty a d that you've always wanted to

0:35:18.680 --> 0:35:21.799
<v Speaker 1>know more about and we're afraid to ask. I'd say

0:35:21.800 --> 0:35:25.240
<v Speaker 1>to you, do not be afraid ask us your silly question,

0:35:25.480 --> 0:35:28.120
<v Speaker 1>because we will give you a silly answer, probably in

0:35:28.200 --> 0:35:30.800
<v Speaker 1>podcast form. But in order to ask that question, you

0:35:30.840 --> 0:35:33.960
<v Speaker 1>need to send us email. It address is tech stuff

0:35:34.239 --> 0:35:37.719
<v Speaker 1>at Discovery dot com. You can also get in touch

0:35:37.719 --> 0:35:41.840
<v Speaker 1>with us via various social media networks. Those are Twitter, Tumbler,

0:35:41.920 --> 0:35:45.120
<v Speaker 1>and Facebook. In all three places, our handle is tech

0:35:45.160 --> 0:35:49.160
<v Speaker 1>Stuff HSW and we will talk to you again. True

0:35:49.280 --> 0:35:55.719
<v Speaker 1>encryption really soon. For more on this and thousands of

0:35:55.760 --> 0:36:00.919
<v Speaker 1>other topics. Does it has stuff works dot com check

0:36:02.680 --> 0:36:03.440
<v Speaker 1>checks