Speaker 1: Bloomberg Audio Studios, Podcasts, radio News.
Speaker 2: The risk of a war in the Horn of Africa
Speaker 2: appears to be growing as Ethiopian troops mobilize on the
Speaker 2: Eritrean border.
Speaker 3: Ethiopia's quest the sea access is irreversible.
Speaker 2: Tensions between the two countries have been building for weeks,
Speaker 2: with the Ethiopian Prime Minister making clear the country wants
Speaker 2: to regain access to the sea.
Speaker 3: I am a million percent sure that Ethiopia will not
Speaker 3: remain a landlocked country.
Speaker 1: Really.
Speaker 2: On this episode of The Next Africa Podcast, we'll look
Speaker 2: at what's behind these latest tensions and if they really
Speaker 2: will spill into a new regional war. I'm Jennifer's Abasajob
Speaker 2: and this is the Next Africa Podcast, bringing you one
Speaker 2: story each week from the continent driving the future of
Speaker 2: global growth with the context only Bloomberg can provide. Joining
Speaker 2: us this week is our reporter Simon Marx, who is
Speaker 2: based in East Africa, and also Shattil Tronvoll, a professor
Speaker 2: at Oslo New University College and also an expert on
Speaker 2: the region. Thank you both so much for joining us
Speaker 2: this week. Simon, Let's just start with you. Your latest
Speaker 2: report is now available on Bloomberg platforms.
Speaker 3: Get us up to speed.
Speaker 2: What do we know about what's happening on the border
Speaker 2: between Ethiopia and Eritrea.
Speaker 1: Well, what we know for a fact is that in
Speaker 1: recent days and weeks there has been a considerable amount
Speaker 1: of trout mobilization inside Ethiopia by the governments of Abiyamas,
Speaker 1: and these troops, reportedly in their thousands, have made their
Speaker 1: way northward towards there atrea yes, but more importantly perhaps
Speaker 1: towards the border with the northern Tigrai region in Ethiopia,
Speaker 1: where there is a regional government currently hostile to Abyama.
Speaker 1: It's in some ways a repeat of what we.
Speaker 4: Saw five years ago when there was a war between
Speaker 4: the Pigrian governments in that northern region and the government
Speaker 4: of Abyamas, who at that point was more recently in
Speaker 4: power in Ethiopia.
Speaker 2: Chattiel, let me bring you in here, because Assignment was
Speaker 2: just walking us through this. How are we now at
Speaker 2: a situation where war potentially looks likely again? After we
Speaker 2: had thought there there was a piece deal and the
Speaker 2: conflict seemed to be in the rear view.
Speaker 3: This has been a conflict long in the making, and
Speaker 3: we have to go back to the former War on
Speaker 3: Tigrind twenty twenty to twenty twenty two, where Ethiopian federal
Speaker 3: government where allied with Atitria in the war on the
Speaker 3: Tigrean regional authorities. It's to togrive People's liberation front. But
Speaker 3: when that war was settled with the secession of hostility
Speaker 3: agreement called the Praetoria Agreement in November twenty twenty two,
Speaker 3: that was only an agreement between the TPA lef regional
Speaker 3: administration in Tigray and the federal authorities in Ethiopia. Eritrea,
Speaker 3: as a key actor to that war, was not included
Speaker 3: in the discussions or in the agreement, and we know
Speaker 3: that soon after that agreement was announced that President Decizequerki
Speaker 3: of Editrea was very skeptical to the secession of hostilities
Speaker 3: because his objective of entering that war was to crush
Speaker 3: the TPA Left Party one time and for all, to
Speaker 3: anhiliate the party and its structure, and the Pretoria agreement
Speaker 3: saved the party and restored the party into gray as
Speaker 3: the dominant political force and the regional authority. So already
Speaker 3: from that time we saw that the relationship between Osmarra
Speaker 3: and Adis started toctoriate and since then that has escalated,
Speaker 3: so to say, the hostilities also because that Albi Ahmed
Speaker 3: a year and a half ago started to argue quite
Speaker 3: insistently that Ethiopia needed an outlet to see that it
Speaker 3: was an existential threat to Ethiopia that they didn't control
Speaker 3: Red Sea access, meaning the subport of Editrea. The Federal
Speaker 3: government of Ethiopia has insisted over and over again that
Speaker 3: it is a necessity for Ethiopia to have a sustainable
Speaker 3: access to Red Sea, also to build a naval base,
Speaker 3: and that has then, of course been a worrying sign
Speaker 3: from Osmara, from Eritrea that it looked upon that as
Speaker 3: a threat, although that Europian government has been very skillful
Speaker 3: in playing what is called constructive ambiguity, saying that they
Speaker 3: want an act to Red Sea through negotiations, but if
Speaker 3: that doesn't happen, well something else might come into play.
Speaker 2: Let's just get into more of this new alliance, because
Speaker 2: you outline there really how this has shifted, the alliances
Speaker 2: have shifted over the past few years. Can you unpack
Speaker 2: more of what we are seeing between Eritrea and the
Speaker 2: breakaway to Gray region.
Speaker 3: This is nothing new because this is how politics have
Speaker 3: been played in this region for centuries, that various regional
Speaker 3: powerholders are negotiating alliances and allegiances versus the center, so
Speaker 3: to say, to try to capture the political center. Because
Speaker 3: many people think it is quite strange that Editrea, which
Speaker 3: was probably the main perpetrator of the gross war crimes
Speaker 3: committed on the Tagrain people just five years back, that
Speaker 3: the Tigrain authorities now enter into an alliance with the perpetrators,
Speaker 3: so to say. I think, as interpreted locally, it is
Speaker 3: because they feel that they are dying standing up, as
Speaker 3: they say, because it has been a kind of a
Speaker 3: containment strategy from the federal authorities versus degrai. They haven't
Speaker 3: been able to rebuild after the war. They haven't restored
Speaker 3: their territories, they haven't restored the full administrative powers, they
Speaker 3: have not been represented politically at the federal level. So
Speaker 3: there are many grievances and they have barely survived. And
Speaker 3: the humanitarian situation in Tigray has also been deterror rating
Speaker 3: over the last two years. So from the local point
Speaker 3: of view of the powerholders in Mechle, they say that
Speaker 3: you know, we are dying as we are by starvation,
Speaker 3: so let's try to rock the boat to see if
Speaker 3: we can get a new momentum, and who can help
Speaker 3: us to create that momentum They need some new alliances.
Speaker 3: And then it seems to be that Editrea was ready
Speaker 3: then to enter into a dialogue with the political leadership
Speaker 3: integral to safeguard their own interest versus our Disaba. And
Speaker 3: the federal government of Ethiopia has been accusing Editrea repeatedly
Speaker 3: for the last two years to fund insurgencies in Ethiopia,
Speaker 3: the Amhara Pharmo insurgency, but possibly also the Rumo La insurgency.
Speaker 3: So this falls into a pattern that editrea strategy versus
Speaker 3: Ethiopia is destabilizing strategy to weaken the security control of
Speaker 3: the federal government in order to deter them to attack Editria.
Speaker 2: And we'll just pause right there. Stick with me, both guys.
Speaker 2: When we come back, we'll look more at how serious
Speaker 2: the chances are a major malitary confrontation.
Speaker 3: After the break, we'll be right back.
Speaker 2: Welcome back today on the podcast, we're discussing the growing
Speaker 2: fears of a war between Eritrea and Ethiopia in East Africa.
Speaker 2: Simon Marx is still with me, Simon, how dangerous could
Speaker 2: a war in this region be, especially considering what we've
Speaker 2: seen over the past few years and what Shatil was
Speaker 2: just explaining to us about what some other population has
Speaker 2: still been experiencing.
Speaker 1: Well, the last thing the whole of Africa needs, goes
Speaker 1: without saying, is another war. You already have a lot
Speaker 1: of conflict in this region. Obviously in neighboring Sudan. For
Speaker 1: the last three years there's been an absolutely gruesome civil
Speaker 1: war going on between the Army and the Rapid Support Forces,
Speaker 1: and that has attracted a whole host of proxies regionally,
Speaker 1: with the United Arab Emirates backing their Rapid Support Force
Speaker 1: and other countries like Saudi Arabia Egypt for example, being
Speaker 1: more closely aligned with the army, and you're seeing these
Speaker 1: proxies play out also to some extent inside Ethiopia. So
Speaker 1: any ignition of war could very likely see a repeat
Speaker 1: effect inside Ethiopia and Eritrea, where you have the Saudis
Speaker 1: and Egypt reportedly being quite close with the government of
Speaker 1: Isaias and the Emiratis having substantially backed Abby financing and
Speaker 1: political support as well there. So there is a huge
Speaker 1: risk for escalation, and recently you've seen these proxies play
Speaker 1: out to some extent on the issue of access to
Speaker 1: the Red Sea, where you have Saudi Arabia closely aligning
Speaker 1: with the government in Somalia and the United alb Emirates
Speaker 1: aligning very closely with the breakaway region off Somali land.
Speaker 1: So you're seeing these these proxies pop up all over
Speaker 1: the region, and that will only fuel any war that
Speaker 1: breaks out. And as for the humanitarian situation, obviously, globally,
Speaker 1: right we've seen a huge cut in funding for food
Speaker 1: and humanitarian aid, largely from the US but also from
Speaker 1: other countries in Europe, and there hasn't really been much
Speaker 1: in the way of other regions stepping in to fill
Speaker 1: that gap. So it's a very precarious situation inside Ethiopia. Economically,
Speaker 1: it took a long time to recover from the last
Speaker 1: war as well as the COVID pandemic, you know, which
Speaker 1: really cripple the economy and send Ethiopia on a pathway
Speaker 1: to defaulting on its debt. It's only just beginning to
Speaker 1: sort of address that now with creditors, so really it's
Speaker 1: not worth contemplating how disasters it could potentially be.
Speaker 2: And we should just add that the UAE does officially
Speaker 2: deny providing support to the RSS. It's also interesting when
Speaker 2: you think about Turkey's Urduan was in the region over
Speaker 2: the past few days, and when you think about the
Speaker 2: proxies and the different relationships that these countries have, two
Speaker 2: countries that are outside of the region. Chetio, I wanted
Speaker 2: to get your opinion on that as well. I mean,
Speaker 2: I see you quoted as saying you could you potentially
Speaker 2: foresee a bigger conflict. What's your take on whether other
Speaker 2: countries could be drawn into this if in fact we
Speaker 2: do see that playing out.
Speaker 3: So both Editrea and Ethiopia are already engaging in the
Speaker 3: Sudanese War theater on each other's side. And then you
Speaker 3: have as indicated that Egypt is a very strong back
Speaker 3: of Eritrea because of its own interest to destabilize and
Speaker 3: weak in Ethiopia. So Ethiopia will not exploit the Blue
Speaker 3: Nile and the Good Dam, potentially weakening egypt control of
Speaker 3: the line. And the Saudi is linked into that alliance,
Speaker 3: directly assisting Editrea politically but possibly also financially. In the
Speaker 3: run up two air confrontation, the Somaliland and Emeratis are
Speaker 3: linked on them Ethiopian side, and where Somalia Mogadishu is
Speaker 3: on the Eritrean side, and in the tripatriot agreement between Egypt,
Speaker 3: Editrea and Mogadishu, this has the potential to really escalate.
Speaker 3: And I was just talking on the Norwegian podcast earlier
Speaker 3: today and we started to characterize this as a potential
Speaker 3: Africa's second World War. When you remember we call the
Speaker 3: Congo War the Africa's First World War some years back,
Speaker 3: indicating that you can actually have states from three continents Europe,
Speaker 3: Middle East, Asia and Africa involved in the Editrea Ethiopian
Speaker 3: conflict as proxies. It's very very serious.
Speaker 2: And so how imminent could a potential conflict be Chete.
Speaker 3: I think what we see now with the huge military
Speaker 3: mobilization and redeployment of troops and heavy material up north,
Speaker 3: is not by coincidence though to say the timing of it,
Speaker 3: both the clear warning letters sent by Ethiopian government to
Speaker 3: the UN and directly to Editrean government. But also we
Speaker 3: have to keep in mind that with this we are
Speaker 3: entering now the seasons of warring in Ethiopia. Traditionally it
Speaker 3: is also a date coming up which is very symbolic
Speaker 3: in Ethiopia. It's the second of March, which is the
Speaker 3: Adva Day, when in eighteen ninety six the Ethiopian Imperial
Speaker 3: Peasant Army managed to crush the invading Italian colonial army
Speaker 3: up north in Adwa Intigrai in the heartland Ltigrai. And
Speaker 3: we have seen earlier, for instance, during the nineteen ninety
Speaker 3: eight two thousand war between Eritrea and Ethiopia, that the
Speaker 3: major offensives from Ethiopia to reclaim what they said it
Speaker 3: was the Etu Open territory started in the end of
Speaker 3: February nineteen ninety nine, the operations Sunset, as it was called,
Speaker 3: and then later the final offensive started then in March
Speaker 3: two thousand to push back at a train and troops.
Speaker 3: This is because of the historical significance of this time,
Speaker 3: but also because of the seasonal changes. They have to
Speaker 3: win the war before the rains start in early June,
Speaker 3: so February, March April May is the key warring season
Speaker 3: in the region.
Speaker 2: Maybe finally, Simon, we've seen peace deals in the past,
Speaker 2: as you know we started the podcast talking about them.
Speaker 2: Is there any scope for a return to the negotiating
Speaker 2: table or is it too far gone.
Speaker 1: Well, as it stands, it doesn't look too likely. The
Speaker 1: regional government in t gray at the moment, after the
Speaker 1: last war, it's factionalized, and there was a camp of
Speaker 1: senior TPLF officials which aligned themselves more closely with the
Speaker 1: federal Government of Ethiopia. And then there were more so
Speaker 1: called hardline members of the TPLF which separated and did
Speaker 1: not join that political force. And at the moment, the
Speaker 1: pro government faction has seemingly lost power in Tigrai, many
Speaker 1: of whom have left the Tigrai region gone to the
Speaker 1: capital in Addis Ababa to take refuge, and it's the
Speaker 1: hardliners who are in charge of there. It doesn't really
Speaker 1: seem that the Vittoria agreement is something that's alive in kicking.
Speaker 1: If anything, Ethiopia, through its foreign minister, has hinted that
Speaker 1: the terms of it are no longer valid.
Speaker 3: You know, we have seen over the last couple of
Speaker 3: weeks on a much more intense diplomatic activity Saudi Arabia.
Speaker 3: For instance, both Foreign Minister Saudi Arabia recently visited ODIs
Speaker 3: and his deputy visited Asmara, in talks to Tye to
Speaker 3: meeting a conflict. Rugan, as you mentioned, was just there
Speaker 3: in this a few days ago, also addressing the issue.
Speaker 3: As far as I hear, he was not given any
Speaker 3: guarantees by Abbi that a conflict would not break out.
Speaker 3: AU had offered itself to mediate between Tigray and all this.
Speaker 3: But the sources say that that Youpen government clearly told
Speaker 3: a you to back off. This is an internal affair.
Speaker 3: You shouldn't meddle into that one. The party which have
Speaker 3: a potentially could have a leverages of course USA, but
Speaker 3: it seems to be that the US engagement is just
Speaker 3: anchored in the State Department. The White House is not
Speaker 3: on board, and as long as Trump himself or his
Speaker 3: special envoys are not tasked to address the issue, it
Speaker 3: doesn't have the political clout to make an impact on
Speaker 3: either of this. Mechila or Asmaro.
Speaker 2: Thanks so much, Simon, and thanks again to Settil Tranvel
Speaker 2: from Oslo New Universe Today College for walking us through
Speaker 2: what is increasingly a growing concern in the Horn of Africa.
Speaker 2: You can read Simon's report on Bloomberg platforms. Now we'll
Speaker 2: put a link to that in the show. Notes. Here's
Speaker 2: some of the other stories we are following across the
Speaker 2: region this week. The Democratic Republic of Congo struck a
Speaker 2: deal to tender copper from a major Glencore operation in
Speaker 2: the country, expanding the state miners trading of a medal
Speaker 2: that's key to the energy transition. And Nigeria's government will
Speaker 2: channel more of the proceeds from its oil and gas
Speaker 2: production directly into a central account, a move aimed at
Speaker 2: boosting state finances. You can follow these stories across Bloomberg,
Speaker 2: including the Next African Newsletter. Of course, we'll put a
Speaker 2: link to that in the show notes. This program was
Speaker 2: produced by Adrian Bradley and Tiba Adebaio. Don't forget to
Speaker 2: follow and review the show wherever you usually get your podcasts.
Speaker 2: But for now I'm Jennifer's Abistoga. Thanks as always for listening.