1 00:00:03,480 --> 00:00:07,360 Speaker 1: On this episode of News World on Wednesday, August twenty fourth, 2 00:00:07,840 --> 00:00:10,480 Speaker 1: the world watched as a plane fell out of the 3 00:00:10,520 --> 00:00:14,520 Speaker 1: sky outside of Moscow. On board were ten people, including 4 00:00:14,560 --> 00:00:18,520 Speaker 1: the leader of Russia's Wagner Mercenary Group off Guinea, Progosian. 5 00:00:19,040 --> 00:00:22,680 Speaker 1: Speculation followed the Progosian was on another plane and had 6 00:00:22,680 --> 00:00:26,040 Speaker 1: outsmarted Putin, but it turned out not to be the case. 7 00:00:26,600 --> 00:00:31,400 Speaker 1: Progosian's death was confirmed by Russian authorities the following Sunday 8 00:00:31,840 --> 00:00:36,640 Speaker 1: after investigators used genetic testing to identify all the victims 9 00:00:36,760 --> 00:00:40,680 Speaker 1: of the plane crash. The action raised many questions about 10 00:00:40,680 --> 00:00:43,400 Speaker 1: how the plane had crashed. For those who follow Putin, 11 00:00:43,800 --> 00:00:47,199 Speaker 1: the answer seemed obvious. Here to talk about Putin and 12 00:00:47,280 --> 00:00:50,600 Speaker 1: the death of Progosion, I'm really pleased to welcome my guest, 13 00:00:50,920 --> 00:01:07,280 Speaker 1: George bb, the director of Grand Strategy at Quincy Institute. George, 14 00:01:07,680 --> 00:01:10,240 Speaker 1: welcome and thank you for joining me on news World. 15 00:01:11,080 --> 00:01:12,920 Speaker 2: My pleasure. Thank you. 16 00:01:12,920 --> 00:01:16,360 Speaker 1: Can you talk about who yevget Any Progosion was and 17 00:01:16,400 --> 00:01:18,360 Speaker 1: what his relationship with Putin was like? 18 00:01:19,160 --> 00:01:22,720 Speaker 2: Well, Progosion was somebody that was more or less a 19 00:01:22,760 --> 00:01:26,399 Speaker 2: street thug during the Soviet period. He grew up in 20 00:01:26,520 --> 00:01:29,600 Speaker 2: Leningrad as it was called back in the Soviet days, 21 00:01:30,360 --> 00:01:34,360 Speaker 2: and was actually convicted of theft and served many years 22 00:01:34,400 --> 00:01:39,840 Speaker 2: in Soviet prison. When the Soviet Union broke up progosion, 23 00:01:40,240 --> 00:01:44,280 Speaker 2: Like a lot of people of his social standing, took 24 00:01:44,360 --> 00:01:50,480 Speaker 2: advantage of the lack of governance that ensued as Russia 25 00:01:50,760 --> 00:01:54,800 Speaker 2: more or less imploded during the nineteen nineties, drew upon 26 00:01:55,080 --> 00:02:00,880 Speaker 2: his criminal world connections and managed to start businesses. He 27 00:02:01,000 --> 00:02:04,919 Speaker 2: became a street vendor and then part oflaid that into 28 00:02:05,000 --> 00:02:09,440 Speaker 2: a catering business, and drew upon his connections in the 29 00:02:09,480 --> 00:02:15,160 Speaker 2: Saint Petersburg world where Putin had also grown up, to 30 00:02:15,200 --> 00:02:18,880 Speaker 2: get some contracts with the government, and ultimately signed some 31 00:02:19,040 --> 00:02:24,320 Speaker 2: very large catering contacts with the Kremlin and found himself. 32 00:02:24,720 --> 00:02:28,120 Speaker 2: I won't use the word self made millionaire, because he 33 00:02:28,240 --> 00:02:33,360 Speaker 2: didn't succeed on his intellectual talents. He succeeded on his 34 00:02:33,720 --> 00:02:39,040 Speaker 2: unscrupulous willingness to do whatever was necessary to make money, 35 00:02:39,120 --> 00:02:41,720 Speaker 2: and in the nineteen nineties in Russia there were a 36 00:02:41,760 --> 00:02:45,640 Speaker 2: lot of opportunities for people like that. When the Ukraine 37 00:02:46,200 --> 00:02:52,000 Speaker 2: Civil War broke out in twenty fourteen and parts of 38 00:02:52,200 --> 00:02:57,359 Speaker 2: Ukraine's eastern regions declared independence, the so called d Nietsk 39 00:02:57,560 --> 00:03:03,399 Speaker 2: People's Republic in Lugansk People's Republic, the Russians provided all 40 00:03:03,520 --> 00:03:08,960 Speaker 2: but over support to those movements. The Russians never formally 41 00:03:09,000 --> 00:03:12,720 Speaker 2: acknowledged they were providing actual military aid there, but in 42 00:03:12,760 --> 00:03:18,960 Speaker 2: fact Russian military commanders were helping the militias in that 43 00:03:19,040 --> 00:03:23,520 Speaker 2: part of Ukraine fight back against the Ukrainian government. And 44 00:03:23,760 --> 00:03:28,040 Speaker 2: that's where Wagner really got its start. Progosian managed to 45 00:03:28,120 --> 00:03:32,640 Speaker 2: win a contract with the Russian government to take a 46 00:03:32,720 --> 00:03:36,920 Speaker 2: private militia, which became known as the Wagner Group, and 47 00:03:37,800 --> 00:03:42,040 Speaker 2: provide military support and fighters to those self declared people's 48 00:03:42,120 --> 00:03:48,280 Speaker 2: republics in Ukraine. And he then parlayed that into contracts 49 00:03:48,320 --> 00:03:52,000 Speaker 2: in Syria, where Wagner had a very prominent role once 50 00:03:52,080 --> 00:03:57,680 Speaker 2: Russia intervened there militarily, and in Africa as well. So 51 00:03:57,920 --> 00:04:03,800 Speaker 2: ultimately Progosian and his company had a contract which the 52 00:04:03,880 --> 00:04:06,960 Speaker 2: Kremlin has said in retrospect was worth about a billion 53 00:04:07,040 --> 00:04:11,520 Speaker 2: dollars for all these kinds of services. Now he was 54 00:04:11,560 --> 00:04:14,800 Speaker 2: regarded as a friend of Putin. In retrospect, I think 55 00:04:14,920 --> 00:04:19,080 Speaker 2: one has to wonder just how close that personal relationship was. 56 00:04:19,640 --> 00:04:22,800 Speaker 1: I mean, my sense is that they operated in an 57 00:04:22,839 --> 00:04:27,080 Speaker 1: amazing number of countries and were a significant un official 58 00:04:27,200 --> 00:04:28,760 Speaker 1: arm of the Russian government. 59 00:04:29,520 --> 00:04:31,560 Speaker 2: Yeah, I think that's right. They had a lot of 60 00:04:31,600 --> 00:04:34,360 Speaker 2: contracts in a lot of places in the world to 61 00:04:34,440 --> 00:04:39,479 Speaker 2: perform various military and security functions. So they were operating 62 00:04:39,520 --> 00:04:44,800 Speaker 2: as palace guards, they were operating as private intelligence gathering organizations. 63 00:04:45,360 --> 00:04:50,479 Speaker 2: They were providing actual military fighters in many of these cases, 64 00:04:51,240 --> 00:04:54,000 Speaker 2: and in doing so they were getting paid not only 65 00:04:54,040 --> 00:04:56,640 Speaker 2: by the Russian government but also by the host governments. 66 00:04:56,680 --> 00:05:01,000 Speaker 2: In many cases, for example, in Libya, they were operating 67 00:05:01,040 --> 00:05:05,000 Speaker 2: on behalf of a rebel warlord, their hof Tar, and 68 00:05:05,279 --> 00:05:08,680 Speaker 2: the situation was so messy that it becomes quite difficult 69 00:05:08,720 --> 00:05:12,760 Speaker 2: to figure out who is officially whom there. Parts of 70 00:05:12,800 --> 00:05:18,760 Speaker 2: these contracts included the right to sell and exploit oil 71 00:05:18,920 --> 00:05:23,520 Speaker 2: or other natural resources that they managed to liberate quote unquote. 72 00:05:24,040 --> 00:05:26,640 Speaker 2: That was the case in Syria. They had some contracts 73 00:05:26,680 --> 00:05:29,960 Speaker 2: whereby if they could take control of oil fields that 74 00:05:30,080 --> 00:05:33,600 Speaker 2: the Assad government there did not control, that rebels control, 75 00:05:34,200 --> 00:05:36,960 Speaker 2: that they would gain to share the proceeds from whatever 76 00:05:37,160 --> 00:05:37,799 Speaker 2: was recovered. 77 00:05:38,160 --> 00:05:43,720 Speaker 1: So, in your mind, were they an extension of Russian 78 00:05:43,760 --> 00:05:48,400 Speaker 1: power or are they sort of an private sector group 79 00:05:48,520 --> 00:05:51,240 Speaker 1: doing the most they can, but really driven by their 80 00:05:51,279 --> 00:05:54,640 Speaker 1: desire for profit rather than serving the Russian state. 81 00:05:55,160 --> 00:05:57,520 Speaker 2: Well, I think a little of both, and what's interesting 82 00:05:57,640 --> 00:06:00,840 Speaker 2: about the Wagner situation is that the line between those 83 00:06:00,880 --> 00:06:05,200 Speaker 2: two are very blurry. Clearly, I think the Russian government 84 00:06:05,600 --> 00:06:10,800 Speaker 2: saw that Wagner could perform some useful services for the state. 85 00:06:11,680 --> 00:06:16,080 Speaker 2: That was true in Ukraine, where last year in the war, 86 00:06:16,880 --> 00:06:20,200 Speaker 2: the Kremlin was actually quite dependent on Wagner and its 87 00:06:20,240 --> 00:06:25,040 Speaker 2: ability to bring tens of thousands of fighters to the 88 00:06:25,080 --> 00:06:31,400 Speaker 2: war and provide a lot of expertise in urban combat. 89 00:06:31,800 --> 00:06:36,240 Speaker 2: That essentially offloaded a good portion of the burden of 90 00:06:36,279 --> 00:06:40,600 Speaker 2: this war and the casualties that the war entailed onto 91 00:06:40,640 --> 00:06:44,800 Speaker 2: a private organization rather than on the regular Russian military 92 00:06:45,480 --> 00:06:51,000 Speaker 2: and on conscripts. I think Putin's hope was that by 93 00:06:51,200 --> 00:06:54,520 Speaker 2: outsourcing some of the burden of the war to Wagner, 94 00:06:54,560 --> 00:06:59,000 Speaker 2: he could avoid some of the political ramifications that might 95 00:06:59,040 --> 00:07:03,000 Speaker 2: have been more difficult for him with popular opinion in Russia. 96 00:07:03,120 --> 00:07:06,120 Speaker 1: Why were they more effective? What was there about the 97 00:07:06,200 --> 00:07:09,840 Speaker 1: Volguner group that made them more effective than most Russian units? 98 00:07:10,600 --> 00:07:13,600 Speaker 2: Well, I think there were a couple of reasons. Number one, 99 00:07:14,320 --> 00:07:18,080 Speaker 2: a lot of the people that Pregosian recruited early in 100 00:07:18,120 --> 00:07:23,360 Speaker 2: the war in Ukraine got their start in military intelligence 101 00:07:23,480 --> 00:07:27,800 Speaker 2: and in special operations. So these were guys that had 102 00:07:27,880 --> 00:07:32,360 Speaker 2: seen combat before. They were highly trained, they were very good, 103 00:07:33,200 --> 00:07:35,760 Speaker 2: and they fought a style of war that was a 104 00:07:35,760 --> 00:07:38,800 Speaker 2: little different than the regular Russian military. The regular Russian 105 00:07:38,840 --> 00:07:44,360 Speaker 2: military is very hierarchical and very top down and is 106 00:07:44,960 --> 00:07:47,600 Speaker 2: designed to fight a war of attrition, essentially to take 107 00:07:47,680 --> 00:07:53,520 Speaker 2: advantage of Russia's comparative advantages, which are size and mass, 108 00:07:54,080 --> 00:07:59,360 Speaker 2: great industrial manufacturing capability. That's what won the war for 109 00:07:59,560 --> 00:08:02,720 Speaker 2: the Soviet military over Nazi Germany in World War Two. 110 00:08:03,760 --> 00:08:06,800 Speaker 2: You don't innovate a lot. You don't see it a 111 00:08:06,800 --> 00:08:10,920 Speaker 2: lot of initiative to local commanders. You keep everybody in line, 112 00:08:11,000 --> 00:08:13,920 Speaker 2: and you just wear down the other side over time. 113 00:08:14,800 --> 00:08:18,800 Speaker 2: That's not the way Russian Special Operations fights. They do 114 00:08:19,080 --> 00:08:23,200 Speaker 2: tricky things, sneaky things, and when you're in urban combat, 115 00:08:23,280 --> 00:08:25,960 Speaker 2: that can be useful. Now, the other thing that they 116 00:08:25,960 --> 00:08:28,120 Speaker 2: brought to the table was they recruited a lot of 117 00:08:28,160 --> 00:08:33,280 Speaker 2: people who we might call undesirables. Putin gave Pregosian permission 118 00:08:33,320 --> 00:08:37,040 Speaker 2: to recruit from Russian prisons, and to offer them amnesty 119 00:08:37,120 --> 00:08:39,880 Speaker 2: in return for fighting in Ukraine, and a lot of 120 00:08:39,880 --> 00:08:42,400 Speaker 2: these prisoners took that deal. This was a good deal 121 00:08:42,400 --> 00:08:45,679 Speaker 2: from their point of view, a path to freedom ultimately. 122 00:08:46,240 --> 00:08:49,320 Speaker 2: But this also meant that Wagner was willing to take 123 00:08:49,600 --> 00:08:54,080 Speaker 2: very high casualties because they viewed a number of their 124 00:08:54,160 --> 00:08:57,880 Speaker 2: rank and file fighters as expendable. So this was an 125 00:08:57,920 --> 00:09:02,600 Speaker 2: advantage too. The regular Russian military did not want to 126 00:09:02,720 --> 00:09:06,320 Speaker 2: sacrifice tens of thousands of people on the battlefield in 127 00:09:06,360 --> 00:09:11,200 Speaker 2: this war. They were happy to outsource that. So this 128 00:09:11,440 --> 00:09:15,120 Speaker 2: was why Wagner was useful, I think, to putin in Ukraine. 129 00:09:15,200 --> 00:09:18,640 Speaker 2: But I think he made a fundamental error. He assumed 130 00:09:19,320 --> 00:09:24,280 Speaker 2: that he could empower Progosion and Wagner with little danger 131 00:09:24,520 --> 00:09:28,880 Speaker 2: that they would become political actors in Russia in their 132 00:09:28,920 --> 00:09:32,480 Speaker 2: own right, and that proved to be an unwise gamble. 133 00:09:32,840 --> 00:09:38,439 Speaker 2: Progosion became an increasingly active political player in his own right, 134 00:09:38,559 --> 00:09:43,080 Speaker 2: and as we saw a few weeks ago, eventually challenged 135 00:09:43,640 --> 00:09:46,080 Speaker 2: the Russian government in Russian military directly. 136 00:09:46,640 --> 00:09:50,400 Speaker 1: You know that to me was very strange, and that 137 00:09:50,800 --> 00:09:54,880 Speaker 1: you couldn't tell whether Progosion had sort of let all 138 00:09:54,880 --> 00:09:58,000 Speaker 1: this go to his head because He starts out by 139 00:09:58,000 --> 00:10:04,319 Speaker 1: publicly attacking Russian and Putin, saying that they weren't providing ammunition, 140 00:10:04,400 --> 00:10:08,240 Speaker 1: they were getting his guys killed, and then he mutinies 141 00:10:08,520 --> 00:10:12,120 Speaker 1: in effect, and then halfway through what looked like a 142 00:10:12,400 --> 00:10:18,640 Speaker 1: modernly successful mutiny, he caves in. Now shortly, given Putin's 143 00:10:18,720 --> 00:10:24,040 Speaker 1: general background, Pegoshian mostly realized that to give in after 144 00:10:24,160 --> 00:10:28,000 Speaker 1: you have risen in rebellion virtually guarantees you'll get killed. 145 00:10:28,559 --> 00:10:30,240 Speaker 1: What do you think his reasoning was. 146 00:10:31,000 --> 00:10:36,280 Speaker 2: Well proguosion gambled in part because he was increasingly panicking 147 00:10:36,440 --> 00:10:39,920 Speaker 2: over the situation that he and Wagner were finding themselves in. 148 00:10:41,280 --> 00:10:45,160 Speaker 2: Once they had taken the Ukrainian city of Bahmut, which 149 00:10:45,240 --> 00:10:49,600 Speaker 2: was a very long, very bloody battle on which Wagner 150 00:10:49,640 --> 00:10:53,040 Speaker 2: lost a lot of men, Wagner was no longer as 151 00:10:53,160 --> 00:10:56,840 Speaker 2: important to Putin in the Russian military as it had 152 00:10:56,840 --> 00:11:00,560 Speaker 2: been back in twenty twenty two. Putin had not yet 153 00:11:01,000 --> 00:11:06,160 Speaker 2: mobilized much of the Russian population for war. The Kremlin 154 00:11:06,240 --> 00:11:09,640 Speaker 2: was far more dependent on Wagner for manpower and fighting. 155 00:11:10,280 --> 00:11:16,400 Speaker 2: But after the Ukrainians succeeded with some of their offensive 156 00:11:16,480 --> 00:11:21,600 Speaker 2: actions last summer and early last fall, Putin bit the 157 00:11:21,640 --> 00:11:25,679 Speaker 2: bullet and announced what he called a partial mobilization, and 158 00:11:25,720 --> 00:11:30,719 Speaker 2: that brought several hundred thousand more Russian fighters to Ukraine. 159 00:11:31,200 --> 00:11:35,760 Speaker 2: Once that happened, Wagner was no longer as important to 160 00:11:35,840 --> 00:11:38,320 Speaker 2: the Russian military effort as it had been in twenty 161 00:11:38,360 --> 00:11:42,840 Speaker 2: twenty two. And then once bach mout ended successfully, once 162 00:11:42,920 --> 00:11:46,920 Speaker 2: Wagner had captured Bachmut, the Russians really didn't need Wagner, 163 00:11:47,640 --> 00:11:52,960 Speaker 2: and that meant that, with Putin's permission, the Russian Military 164 00:11:53,000 --> 00:11:58,000 Speaker 2: Command announced that Wagner fighters would be required to sign 165 00:11:58,200 --> 00:12:02,680 Speaker 2: contracts with the regular Russian military as of this past July. 166 00:12:02,840 --> 00:12:09,360 Speaker 2: First Well, that announcement, I think caused Progosion to panic 167 00:12:09,760 --> 00:12:12,559 Speaker 2: because he saw the gravy train coming to an end 168 00:12:12,640 --> 00:12:17,760 Speaker 2: for Wagner. Once you see your forces, your fighters being 169 00:12:17,880 --> 00:12:23,360 Speaker 2: forced to sign contracts with the regular Russian military, he realized, Okay, 170 00:12:23,520 --> 00:12:27,080 Speaker 2: my income is going to go down fairly dramatically. The 171 00:12:27,120 --> 00:12:28,800 Speaker 2: other part of this was a little bit of a 172 00:12:28,840 --> 00:12:33,800 Speaker 2: culture clash. A lot of Wagner's senior military commanders, guys 173 00:12:33,800 --> 00:12:38,240 Speaker 2: that came out of military intelligence and special operations, don't 174 00:12:38,400 --> 00:12:41,920 Speaker 2: like the regular Russian military. And this is not actually 175 00:12:42,000 --> 00:12:45,439 Speaker 2: unusual in any militaries in the world. There's a cultural 176 00:12:45,600 --> 00:12:49,800 Speaker 2: difference between your special ops people and your regular military people. 177 00:12:49,920 --> 00:12:52,839 Speaker 2: The special ops people think they're elite, they think they're better, 178 00:12:53,440 --> 00:12:55,880 Speaker 2: they're more courageous, they're better fighters, etc. 179 00:12:56,160 --> 00:12:56,360 Speaker 1: Etc. 180 00:12:57,120 --> 00:13:00,520 Speaker 2: They fight a different style than the regular military, and 181 00:13:00,920 --> 00:13:04,640 Speaker 2: there's a lot of mutual disdain between those cultures. That 182 00:13:04,760 --> 00:13:07,800 Speaker 2: was certainly true in the Russian military as well. So 183 00:13:07,840 --> 00:13:11,760 Speaker 2: the prospect that the senior commanders in Wagner were looking 184 00:13:11,800 --> 00:13:15,120 Speaker 2: at was not only was their income going to take 185 00:13:15,160 --> 00:13:17,320 Speaker 2: a big hit, but suddenly they were going to have 186 00:13:17,400 --> 00:13:20,120 Speaker 2: to be put under the command of people that they 187 00:13:20,160 --> 00:13:23,320 Speaker 2: didn't respect and didn't want to fight for. So under 188 00:13:23,360 --> 00:13:27,800 Speaker 2: those circumstances, they faced an alternative. You either submit to 189 00:13:27,840 --> 00:13:33,920 Speaker 2: this directive or you say no. And a few thousand 190 00:13:34,040 --> 00:13:38,080 Speaker 2: of the Wagner group said no, and they decided they 191 00:13:38,120 --> 00:13:40,840 Speaker 2: were going to use the leverage that they had to 192 00:13:40,880 --> 00:13:45,439 Speaker 2: try to strike a better bargain to force the senior 193 00:13:45,640 --> 00:13:50,240 Speaker 2: military command and putin to change that order, and that 194 00:13:50,440 --> 00:13:56,000 Speaker 2: I think was ultimately the motivation for turning their forces 195 00:13:56,000 --> 00:14:00,360 Speaker 2: and marching on Moscow. Now they made a miscalculation. You 196 00:14:00,440 --> 00:14:03,840 Speaker 2: can't take four or five thousand fighters, which is I 197 00:14:03,840 --> 00:14:07,480 Speaker 2: think by most reports, what they had march up a 198 00:14:07,640 --> 00:14:12,720 Speaker 2: highway several hundred miles to Moscow with no air force 199 00:14:13,240 --> 00:14:17,000 Speaker 2: and no air cover, essentially and expect you're going to 200 00:14:17,000 --> 00:14:20,040 Speaker 2: take on the Russian military and win. The only way 201 00:14:20,080 --> 00:14:23,440 Speaker 2: that could have succeeded would have been if significant elements 202 00:14:23,440 --> 00:14:28,000 Speaker 2: of the Russian military itself defected and threw their weight 203 00:14:28,080 --> 00:14:32,600 Speaker 2: behind Progosion. Progosian must have believed that some of that 204 00:14:32,760 --> 00:14:36,240 Speaker 2: would have happened, but it turned out he was wrong. 205 00:14:36,840 --> 00:14:41,240 Speaker 2: No units defected, he got no support from anybody, and 206 00:14:41,440 --> 00:14:44,720 Speaker 2: he was left in a situation where he's got a 207 00:14:44,760 --> 00:14:49,320 Speaker 2: few thousand people on the outskirts of Moscow, much like 208 00:14:49,480 --> 00:14:53,360 Speaker 2: the proverbial dog that caught the car, right, what do 209 00:14:53,400 --> 00:14:56,200 Speaker 2: you do now? And he was left with a very 210 00:14:56,240 --> 00:15:00,440 Speaker 2: bad set of choices. He wasn't going to win now. 211 00:15:00,480 --> 00:15:02,720 Speaker 2: Putin also had an incentive to strike a deal too. 212 00:15:03,400 --> 00:15:05,680 Speaker 2: One of the worst outcomes of this for Putin would 213 00:15:05,680 --> 00:15:10,760 Speaker 2: have been some sort of prolonged urban clash between the 214 00:15:10,800 --> 00:15:15,000 Speaker 2: regular Russian military and Wagner. Urban fighting is difficult to do. 215 00:15:15,280 --> 00:15:17,560 Speaker 2: It's very bloody. You can't do it without a lot 216 00:15:17,560 --> 00:15:20,600 Speaker 2: of damage and a lot of civilian casualties, It would 217 00:15:20,600 --> 00:15:25,440 Speaker 2: have bogged the Russian military down internally and probably allowed 218 00:15:25,480 --> 00:15:31,400 Speaker 2: the Ukrainians to exploit that problem to make real gains 219 00:15:31,440 --> 00:15:34,520 Speaker 2: on the battlefield in Ukraine. So that was an outcome 220 00:15:34,560 --> 00:15:38,320 Speaker 2: that Putin really wanted to avoid, and so he had 221 00:15:38,440 --> 00:15:41,560 Speaker 2: a big incentive to strike a deal with Progosian as well, 222 00:15:41,720 --> 00:15:46,560 Speaker 2: which he did. Now in retrospect, whatever it was that 223 00:15:46,600 --> 00:15:51,680 Speaker 2: Putin agreed to and Progosian agreed to obviously didn't last 224 00:15:51,720 --> 00:15:55,040 Speaker 2: all that long. But I think Putin managed to avoid 225 00:15:55,080 --> 00:15:57,920 Speaker 2: the worst case outcomes in this uprising. 226 00:16:08,640 --> 00:16:11,360 Speaker 1: Hi, this is newt In my new book March the Majority, 227 00:16:11,400 --> 00:16:14,880 Speaker 1: The Real Story of the Republican Revolution, I offer strategies 228 00:16:14,920 --> 00:16:18,600 Speaker 1: and insights for everyday citizens and for season politicians. 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Order it 238 00:16:51,280 --> 00:17:02,280 Speaker 1: today at gingrishtree sixty dot com slash book. What would 239 00:17:02,280 --> 00:17:06,720 Speaker 1: you say are the odds that Putin was in some 240 00:17:06,800 --> 00:17:10,240 Speaker 1: direct way responsible for the plane going down? 241 00:17:11,359 --> 00:17:14,920 Speaker 2: High. I don't think we're ever going to know definitively 242 00:17:15,000 --> 00:17:19,680 Speaker 2: what happened, but the circumstances are such that anybody would 243 00:17:19,680 --> 00:17:22,960 Speaker 2: have to be awfully suspicious that Putin was involved in 244 00:17:23,040 --> 00:17:28,280 Speaker 2: taking Progosion down in some way. This particular aircraft has 245 00:17:28,359 --> 00:17:32,359 Speaker 2: a sparkling safety record. These planes just don't go down, 246 00:17:32,480 --> 00:17:36,600 Speaker 2: particularly not in good weather conditions, which they were, and 247 00:17:36,640 --> 00:17:39,919 Speaker 2: it just so happened that not only Progosion but several 248 00:17:39,960 --> 00:17:42,680 Speaker 2: of his other senior commanders are on board this plane. 249 00:17:43,480 --> 00:17:46,120 Speaker 2: The chances that this was a coincidence or I think 250 00:17:46,160 --> 00:17:51,600 Speaker 2: infinitesimally low. Now I think we're probably going to wind 251 00:17:51,680 --> 00:17:55,440 Speaker 2: up with a situation where the Kremlin tries to blame 252 00:17:55,560 --> 00:17:59,240 Speaker 2: this crash on Ukraine or the United States or both. 253 00:18:00,200 --> 00:18:02,879 Speaker 2: Very few people are going to buy that there's absolutely 254 00:18:02,960 --> 00:18:06,600 Speaker 2: no benefit to Ukraine or the United States and taking 255 00:18:06,640 --> 00:18:10,520 Speaker 2: Progos out. Yes, he's somebody that had a lot of enemies. Absolutely, 256 00:18:10,600 --> 00:18:14,560 Speaker 2: that's correct, But I doubt anybody in Russia would act 257 00:18:14,600 --> 00:18:18,160 Speaker 2: against him without Putin's at least ascit blessing. 258 00:18:18,560 --> 00:18:20,760 Speaker 1: Well, and doesn't that sort of fit a Putent pattern 259 00:18:20,800 --> 00:18:23,159 Speaker 1: of cheerfully killing his opponents. 260 00:18:24,280 --> 00:18:26,920 Speaker 2: Well, certainly he has done that in a number of occasions. 261 00:18:27,040 --> 00:18:29,480 Speaker 1: Yes, it's a very tough dictatorship. 262 00:18:29,920 --> 00:18:32,359 Speaker 2: Well, it is. You know, Russian politics is a full 263 00:18:32,400 --> 00:18:34,720 Speaker 2: contact sport. It's not for the faint of heart. 264 00:18:34,760 --> 00:18:36,160 Speaker 1: And I guess I always has been. 265 00:18:36,920 --> 00:18:37,400 Speaker 2: That's right. 266 00:18:38,040 --> 00:18:44,080 Speaker 1: So maybe for three months in nineteen seventeen, Yes, now 267 00:18:44,160 --> 00:18:48,399 Speaker 1: turned out Kerensky was too Western to effectively govern Russia. 268 00:18:48,600 --> 00:18:51,920 Speaker 2: Yeah, well, it's a very difficult country to govern physically, 269 00:18:52,080 --> 00:18:57,600 Speaker 2: very large, and very difficult to enforce discipline. And anybody 270 00:18:57,640 --> 00:19:00,800 Speaker 2: that's read a lot of Russian literature realizes that Russian 271 00:19:00,840 --> 00:19:05,200 Speaker 2: bureaucrats are masters of the art of feigned compliance. So 272 00:19:05,280 --> 00:19:06,720 Speaker 2: it's not an easy place to run. 273 00:19:06,760 --> 00:19:09,919 Speaker 1: No question. Do you agree with those who suggested we 274 00:19:09,960 --> 00:19:14,359 Speaker 1: shouldn't assume that Putin would be replaced by somebody better, 275 00:19:15,160 --> 00:19:17,720 Speaker 1: but then in fact he might be replaced by somebody 276 00:19:17,760 --> 00:19:21,639 Speaker 1: even more authoritarian and more anti Western. 277 00:19:22,280 --> 00:19:25,200 Speaker 2: Yes, I think if Putin were replaced in some sort 278 00:19:25,240 --> 00:19:29,800 Speaker 2: of extra constitutional way. The chances that it would be 279 00:19:30,080 --> 00:19:35,000 Speaker 2: a liberal, Western loving Gorbachev type are very low. First 280 00:19:35,000 --> 00:19:38,680 Speaker 2: of all, many Russian still remember the nineteen nineties. They 281 00:19:38,680 --> 00:19:41,800 Speaker 2: have no fondness for what Russia went through during that time. 282 00:19:41,920 --> 00:19:45,280 Speaker 2: A lot of them blame Gorbachev for being naive, for 283 00:19:45,440 --> 00:19:50,760 Speaker 2: not understanding the West's bad intentions towards Russia as they 284 00:19:50,800 --> 00:19:54,359 Speaker 2: see them. So are there liberals in Russia? Are there 285 00:19:54,400 --> 00:19:55,760 Speaker 2: people that are pro Western? 286 00:19:55,880 --> 00:19:56,080 Speaker 1: Yes? 287 00:19:56,119 --> 00:20:00,080 Speaker 2: There are. Are they anywhere close to being a the 288 00:20:00,960 --> 00:20:04,480 Speaker 2: substantial political force in Russia right now? No, they're not. 289 00:20:05,400 --> 00:20:08,480 Speaker 2: Most of the dynamism on the Russian political spectrum is 290 00:20:08,520 --> 00:20:12,520 Speaker 2: on the right, nationalists and patriots who actually believe that 291 00:20:12,560 --> 00:20:15,359 Speaker 2: Putin has been too soft in dealing with the West, 292 00:20:16,720 --> 00:20:21,439 Speaker 2: too quick to want to strike compromises, naive in his 293 00:20:21,640 --> 00:20:28,000 Speaker 2: understanding of American, in German and French intentions. So it's 294 00:20:28,040 --> 00:20:31,280 Speaker 2: not impossible to imagine that we could get a more 295 00:20:31,359 --> 00:20:35,080 Speaker 2: moderate leader as a successor to Putin, But I don't 296 00:20:35,080 --> 00:20:37,840 Speaker 2: think that's the most likely scenario by a long shot 297 00:20:37,920 --> 00:20:38,359 Speaker 2: right now. 298 00:20:39,160 --> 00:20:42,439 Speaker 1: I mean, isn't there a significant faction that actually thinks 299 00:20:43,000 --> 00:20:47,119 Speaker 1: they should use nuclear weapons and they should exert real force. 300 00:20:47,840 --> 00:20:51,040 Speaker 2: Well, certainly there is a large faction that believes that 301 00:20:51,119 --> 00:20:54,680 Speaker 2: Russia has not been decisive enough, has been too timid 302 00:20:54,960 --> 00:21:00,160 Speaker 2: in using the military capabilities that Russia has against Ukraine, 303 00:21:00,760 --> 00:21:07,040 Speaker 2: too wary of potential Western reactions. In fact, Sergei Karaganov 304 00:21:07,440 --> 00:21:12,560 Speaker 2: has been a long time, very prominent foreign policy intellectual 305 00:21:12,640 --> 00:21:16,960 Speaker 2: in Russia, published an article a couple of months ago 306 00:21:17,160 --> 00:21:21,280 Speaker 2: saying that Russia ought to use a tactical nuclear weapon 307 00:21:21,880 --> 00:21:26,120 Speaker 2: because the West has lost its fear of nuclear war, 308 00:21:26,680 --> 00:21:30,800 Speaker 2: and that loss of fear is actually a destabilizing factor 309 00:21:30,840 --> 00:21:35,440 Speaker 2: in the world. That the shared fear of nuclear war 310 00:21:36,280 --> 00:21:40,560 Speaker 2: actually was one of the primary stabilizing elements during the 311 00:21:40,560 --> 00:21:43,320 Speaker 2: Cold War, according to his argument, and I do have 312 00:21:43,359 --> 00:21:48,480 Speaker 2: some sympathy for that perspective. But today nobody believes that 313 00:21:48,600 --> 00:21:53,040 Speaker 2: nuclear war is possible anymore. Nobody fears it, and hence 314 00:21:53,080 --> 00:21:57,240 Speaker 2: they're willing to take risks and do things that nobody 315 00:21:57,280 --> 00:22:00,359 Speaker 2: would have done back in the Cold War days, like 316 00:22:00,480 --> 00:22:04,080 Speaker 2: trying to put NATO forces on Russia's border, as we 317 00:22:04,480 --> 00:22:07,560 Speaker 2: have been doing and from Russia's perspective, are continuing to 318 00:22:07,600 --> 00:22:10,639 Speaker 2: try to do in Ukraine. So the solution to this 319 00:22:10,880 --> 00:22:14,080 Speaker 2: is let's use a nukar restore the fear of nuclear war, 320 00:22:14,560 --> 00:22:17,960 Speaker 2: and that will ultimately not only in the war in Ukraine, 321 00:22:18,520 --> 00:22:23,480 Speaker 2: but usher back in an extended period of stability in 322 00:22:23,520 --> 00:22:29,080 Speaker 2: the world. Now, Karaganov's argument was refuted by a number 323 00:22:29,080 --> 00:22:32,720 Speaker 2: of other Russian foreign policy commentators in the aftermath of 324 00:22:32,800 --> 00:22:35,960 Speaker 2: this article, But the fact that he would write something 325 00:22:36,080 --> 00:22:38,880 Speaker 2: like this, I think is an indication that there are 326 00:22:39,480 --> 00:22:43,359 Speaker 2: substantial numbers of people in Russia that are arguing for 327 00:22:43,440 --> 00:22:44,800 Speaker 2: a much harder line approach. 328 00:23:01,800 --> 00:23:05,119 Speaker 1: You're a real expert in this area. Are you surprised 329 00:23:05,160 --> 00:23:07,840 Speaker 1: at the course of the campaign in Ukraine? 330 00:23:08,720 --> 00:23:12,919 Speaker 2: I would say I have been surprised tactically by some 331 00:23:13,000 --> 00:23:15,719 Speaker 2: of the twists and turns that the war has taken 332 00:23:15,960 --> 00:23:20,320 Speaker 2: over the last eighteen months, but not strategically. By that, 333 00:23:20,480 --> 00:23:23,520 Speaker 2: I mean I was not surprised that the Russians invaded. 334 00:23:23,600 --> 00:23:25,879 Speaker 2: In fact, I had been warning for quite some time 335 00:23:26,000 --> 00:23:30,480 Speaker 2: that something like this was coming. I've not been surprised 336 00:23:30,920 --> 00:23:36,240 Speaker 2: that the Russians have been unable to seize Ukraine as 337 00:23:36,280 --> 00:23:40,160 Speaker 2: a whole, to capture Kiev, to put in place a 338 00:23:40,240 --> 00:23:44,440 Speaker 2: pro Russian puppet government. Those were things that I thought 339 00:23:44,480 --> 00:23:50,240 Speaker 2: were beyond Russia's capabilities. But I have been surprised at 340 00:23:50,480 --> 00:23:53,560 Speaker 2: some of the ineptitude that the Russian military has shown, 341 00:23:54,440 --> 00:23:58,200 Speaker 2: some of the failures of intelligence that were glaringly obvious 342 00:23:58,280 --> 00:24:01,040 Speaker 2: early in the war. I had thought that the Russians 343 00:24:01,040 --> 00:24:04,480 Speaker 2: had a better intelligence handle on what was going on 344 00:24:04,600 --> 00:24:07,760 Speaker 2: in Ukraine and how the Ukrainians might respond to things 345 00:24:07,840 --> 00:24:12,240 Speaker 2: than they demonstrated early in the war. Some of the 346 00:24:12,280 --> 00:24:16,480 Speaker 2: tactical twists. The Russians made some glaring military errors. They 347 00:24:16,600 --> 00:24:20,879 Speaker 2: left large stretches of their front lines in twenty twenty 348 00:24:20,880 --> 00:24:25,679 Speaker 2: two pretty lightly defended, and the Ukrainians took advantage of 349 00:24:25,720 --> 00:24:29,440 Speaker 2: that quite impressively. Now I think the Russians have engaged 350 00:24:29,480 --> 00:24:32,680 Speaker 2: in some learning behavior. They've corrected some of these problems. 351 00:24:32,720 --> 00:24:36,399 Speaker 2: They've gotten their act together militarily to a much greater 352 00:24:36,480 --> 00:24:39,439 Speaker 2: degree than they had last year. But it's been a 353 00:24:39,440 --> 00:24:43,359 Speaker 2: painful process, and the degree of Russian ineptitude has surprised me. 354 00:24:43,880 --> 00:24:47,200 Speaker 1: Why do you think General Milly said publicly that they'd 355 00:24:47,240 --> 00:24:50,359 Speaker 1: be in Kiev in three days? I mean, was there 356 00:24:50,400 --> 00:24:53,520 Speaker 1: a serious American estimate of that? Oh? 357 00:24:53,600 --> 00:24:56,360 Speaker 2: I doubt there was a serious American estimate of three days, 358 00:24:56,359 --> 00:25:01,120 Speaker 2: But I do think that most people looked at the 359 00:25:01,119 --> 00:25:05,600 Speaker 2: correlation of forces between Ukraine and Russia on paper and 360 00:25:05,720 --> 00:25:07,880 Speaker 2: thought that this was not going to be a close war. 361 00:25:08,200 --> 00:25:09,960 Speaker 2: I thought the Russians were going to be at the 362 00:25:10,080 --> 00:25:14,920 Speaker 2: Dannepper River, you know, within weeks or months, and you 363 00:25:14,960 --> 00:25:17,960 Speaker 2: know that obviously didn't happen, and they've got their hands 364 00:25:17,960 --> 00:25:18,720 Speaker 2: full right now. 365 00:25:19,000 --> 00:25:21,400 Speaker 1: Is that a function of their logistics system just being 366 00:25:21,440 --> 00:25:22,240 Speaker 1: so bad. 367 00:25:22,520 --> 00:25:24,520 Speaker 2: Well, that's part of it, Yeah, that's part of it. 368 00:25:24,640 --> 00:25:27,960 Speaker 2: Part of it is, though, that they found themselves facing 369 00:25:28,160 --> 00:25:31,639 Speaker 2: an opponent that had twenty four to seven real time 370 00:25:31,760 --> 00:25:38,600 Speaker 2: intelligence capabilities in battlefield awareness, which meant that the Ukrainians 371 00:25:38,640 --> 00:25:43,439 Speaker 2: were able to play defense against the Russians quite well. 372 00:25:43,520 --> 00:25:45,320 Speaker 2: They knew where they were, they knew what they were doing, 373 00:25:45,320 --> 00:25:47,840 Speaker 2: They were able to identify them and target them in 374 00:25:47,920 --> 00:25:54,520 Speaker 2: real time quite effectively. We've had a combination of traditional 375 00:25:55,080 --> 00:25:59,080 Speaker 2: satellite intelligence collection, which is more advanced than it used 376 00:25:59,080 --> 00:26:02,439 Speaker 2: to be back in the old days. The United States 377 00:26:02,440 --> 00:26:08,520 Speaker 2: began flying a Wax aircraft outside Ukrainian airspace, but close 378 00:26:08,600 --> 00:26:13,000 Speaker 2: enough that we had pretty full awareness of what the 379 00:26:13,080 --> 00:26:17,080 Speaker 2: Russian air assets were doing, and that really helped the 380 00:26:17,160 --> 00:26:22,520 Speaker 2: Ukrainians blunt what would otherwise have been quite significant Russian 381 00:26:22,600 --> 00:26:25,520 Speaker 2: air dominance, and I think one of the assumptions a 382 00:26:25,560 --> 00:26:28,640 Speaker 2: lot of people made was that the Russians would establish 383 00:26:28,720 --> 00:26:32,200 Speaker 2: air superiority pretty quickly and that would make it very 384 00:26:32,240 --> 00:26:36,360 Speaker 2: hard for the Ukrainians to defend against what the Russians 385 00:26:36,400 --> 00:26:38,560 Speaker 2: were doing, and that proved not to be the case. 386 00:26:38,600 --> 00:26:43,360 Speaker 2: The Russians did not establish air superiority, and even now, 387 00:26:44,000 --> 00:26:46,639 Speaker 2: although they think they've got much greater dominance of the 388 00:26:46,720 --> 00:26:49,600 Speaker 2: year than they did a year ago, they're still not 389 00:26:49,720 --> 00:26:52,960 Speaker 2: at the point where they can fly without real fear 390 00:26:53,359 --> 00:26:57,800 Speaker 2: of Ukrainian targeting, and that's a big factor in the war. 391 00:26:58,280 --> 00:27:01,719 Speaker 1: If we had moved all of our assistance up by 392 00:27:01,760 --> 00:27:04,680 Speaker 1: a year and had done a year ago what we're 393 00:27:04,720 --> 00:27:07,200 Speaker 1: now doing, would that have made much of a difference. 394 00:27:08,200 --> 00:27:08,399 Speaker 1: You know. 395 00:27:08,440 --> 00:27:10,320 Speaker 2: One of the things that we have tried to do 396 00:27:10,400 --> 00:27:13,159 Speaker 2: from the start is strike a balance between giving the 397 00:27:13,240 --> 00:27:17,560 Speaker 2: Ukrainians what they need to defend themselves and not going 398 00:27:17,640 --> 00:27:21,879 Speaker 2: so far as to find ourselves in a direct military 399 00:27:21,920 --> 00:27:26,760 Speaker 2: conflict with the Russians, which I think nobody wants. Over time, 400 00:27:27,000 --> 00:27:32,080 Speaker 2: I think we have grown more confident that things that 401 00:27:32,119 --> 00:27:35,120 Speaker 2: we thought were Russian redlines, and by that I mean, 402 00:27:35,440 --> 00:27:38,919 Speaker 2: things that would cause the Russians to retaliate directly against 403 00:27:39,000 --> 00:27:43,600 Speaker 2: the United States or NATO were not as firm as 404 00:27:43,720 --> 00:27:46,160 Speaker 2: we had feared that they would be. So we've grown 405 00:27:46,240 --> 00:27:50,760 Speaker 2: more confident that we can provide more than we thought 406 00:27:50,800 --> 00:27:54,639 Speaker 2: we could without danger of crossing whatever that invisible line 407 00:27:54,760 --> 00:27:59,560 Speaker 2: is into conflict with Russia directly. The problem though, was, say, hey, 408 00:27:59,560 --> 00:28:03,320 Speaker 2: if giving them everything right away, really quickly, with automated difference, 409 00:28:03,400 --> 00:28:07,160 Speaker 2: well you don't know where that red line really would be. 410 00:28:07,160 --> 00:28:09,360 Speaker 2: Because I think it's a mistake to assume that these 411 00:28:09,400 --> 00:28:12,200 Speaker 2: red lines are permanent and fixed and that the Russians 412 00:28:12,200 --> 00:28:15,840 Speaker 2: themselves know where they are. I think they're highly circumstantial. 413 00:28:16,400 --> 00:28:19,040 Speaker 2: Things that the Russians might be willing to tolerate under 414 00:28:19,040 --> 00:28:22,800 Speaker 2: one set of circumstances might be very different than what 415 00:28:22,840 --> 00:28:25,680 Speaker 2: they'd be willing to tolerate under a different set of circumstances. 416 00:28:25,760 --> 00:28:29,159 Speaker 2: And for me, one of the variables that affects the 417 00:28:29,200 --> 00:28:32,399 Speaker 2: movement of that red line is are the Russians in 418 00:28:32,480 --> 00:28:35,600 Speaker 2: danger of really losing the war. If they're in danger 419 00:28:35,680 --> 00:28:38,680 Speaker 2: really losing the war, I think suddenly they start doing 420 00:28:38,720 --> 00:28:42,040 Speaker 2: things that are a lot riskier and a lot more 421 00:28:42,240 --> 00:28:45,120 Speaker 2: likely to lead to a direct conflict with the United 422 00:28:45,120 --> 00:28:49,000 Speaker 2: States and NATO than they would under conditions where they think, Okay, 423 00:28:49,040 --> 00:28:52,160 Speaker 2: you know, we don't like this, but can we win 424 00:28:52,240 --> 00:28:55,800 Speaker 2: the war despite this? And that's where I think the 425 00:28:55,880 --> 00:29:02,680 Speaker 2: Russians have been. They have settled on attrition strategy that 426 00:29:02,840 --> 00:29:07,520 Speaker 2: does not try to have sudden breakthroughs against the Ukrainians. 427 00:29:07,560 --> 00:29:10,400 Speaker 2: They're not trying to outflank them out and maneuver them. 428 00:29:10,720 --> 00:29:14,480 Speaker 2: They're trying to wear them down over time, to exhaust 429 00:29:14,720 --> 00:29:21,680 Speaker 2: their reserves of manpower, to undermine Ukraine's ability to supply 430 00:29:21,800 --> 00:29:26,920 Speaker 2: its forces, to generate new forces over time, wear down 431 00:29:27,480 --> 00:29:33,040 Speaker 2: Ukraine's resilience politically and economically, and exhaust the West patients. 432 00:29:33,400 --> 00:29:35,800 Speaker 2: That is, as far as I can tell, is Putin's 433 00:29:35,840 --> 00:29:39,479 Speaker 2: strategy for winning this war, and he thinks, I believe 434 00:29:39,840 --> 00:29:43,200 Speaker 2: that that's going fairly well right now, that there's no 435 00:29:43,400 --> 00:29:49,120 Speaker 2: reason to do anything that would risk a direct conflict 436 00:29:49,200 --> 00:29:53,160 Speaker 2: with NATO because that would itself change the contours of 437 00:29:53,240 --> 00:29:58,320 Speaker 2: this war and might wind up threatening Russia profoundly. So 438 00:29:58,600 --> 00:30:02,200 Speaker 2: why risk that now? The other factor in providing a 439 00:30:02,240 --> 00:30:05,000 Speaker 2: lot of stuff really quickly to the Ukrainians is they've 440 00:30:05,040 --> 00:30:06,760 Speaker 2: got to be able to absorb it. They've got to 441 00:30:06,760 --> 00:30:08,720 Speaker 2: be able to use it. They've got to be able 442 00:30:08,760 --> 00:30:11,160 Speaker 2: to be trained on it, they've got to maintain it. 443 00:30:11,920 --> 00:30:15,480 Speaker 2: And a lot of this weaponry is pretty complex. It 444 00:30:15,560 --> 00:30:21,120 Speaker 2: takes American forces a long time to master it. The 445 00:30:21,240 --> 00:30:26,400 Speaker 2: F sixteen, which has discussed a lot about it right now, 446 00:30:26,520 --> 00:30:29,320 Speaker 2: you know, let's provide them with F sixteen's and this 447 00:30:29,360 --> 00:30:32,600 Speaker 2: will give Ukraine a big advantage in the skyes blunt 448 00:30:32,920 --> 00:30:36,320 Speaker 2: the advantages that the Russians have had. That's an aircraft 449 00:30:36,400 --> 00:30:41,040 Speaker 2: that requires many, many, many hours of maintenance for every 450 00:30:41,080 --> 00:30:44,680 Speaker 2: hour of flight. It's a single engine fighter. It has 451 00:30:44,760 --> 00:30:48,520 Speaker 2: to take off from pristine airstrips, you know, in more 452 00:30:48,640 --> 00:30:53,320 Speaker 2: or less perfect conditions. They actually vacuum these airstrips that 453 00:30:53,360 --> 00:30:56,120 Speaker 2: the F sixteens take off from so that it doesn't 454 00:30:56,240 --> 00:30:59,840 Speaker 2: suck up debris and blow out an engine and you know, 455 00:31:00,600 --> 00:31:03,560 Speaker 2: wind up in the shop for repairs for many months. 456 00:31:04,040 --> 00:31:06,800 Speaker 2: That's not a description of Ukrainian airfields. You know, the 457 00:31:06,960 --> 00:31:10,600 Speaker 2: Ukraine flies off of, you know, Soviet era airstrips that 458 00:31:10,640 --> 00:31:14,960 Speaker 2: are in bad condition, and the Soviet planes that they've 459 00:31:15,000 --> 00:31:19,560 Speaker 2: been flying are adapted to those conditions pretty well. The 460 00:31:19,680 --> 00:31:24,080 Speaker 2: F sixteens aren't. So these are all complicating factors that 461 00:31:24,200 --> 00:31:27,880 Speaker 2: I think you have to take into account when you 462 00:31:28,000 --> 00:31:31,040 Speaker 2: try to answer that question. Couldn't we have just given 463 00:31:31,040 --> 00:31:33,000 Speaker 2: them a lot more, a lot sooner. It would have 464 00:31:33,000 --> 00:31:35,320 Speaker 2: that made a difference, I wonder. I don't think so. 465 00:31:35,760 --> 00:31:41,960 Speaker 1: I've been surprised at the Ukrainian ingenuity with drones, and 466 00:31:42,080 --> 00:31:45,480 Speaker 1: I was just reading this morning about this Australian made 467 00:31:45,800 --> 00:31:50,200 Speaker 1: cardboard drone which has apparently taken up for Russian airplanes. 468 00:31:50,480 --> 00:31:54,280 Speaker 1: The idea you're buying these like cardboard drones and they 469 00:31:54,280 --> 00:31:57,880 Speaker 1: can fly several thousand miles. This is a different world. 470 00:31:58,400 --> 00:32:04,680 Speaker 2: Well, it is warfare, drone technology, drone tactics. This war 471 00:32:04,800 --> 00:32:08,840 Speaker 2: is going to end up revolutionizing the way these things 472 00:32:08,880 --> 00:32:12,880 Speaker 2: are employed moving forward, and that's a fascinating part of 473 00:32:12,880 --> 00:32:13,360 Speaker 2: all of this. 474 00:32:14,160 --> 00:32:16,880 Speaker 1: I don't know that they have any media except psychological, 475 00:32:17,240 --> 00:32:20,320 Speaker 1: but when you see them hit Moscow or an airfield 476 00:32:20,400 --> 00:32:24,400 Speaker 1: just outside of Petersburg, that's a penetration I suspect Putin 477 00:32:24,440 --> 00:32:26,920 Speaker 1: would have thought two years ago was impossible. 478 00:32:28,080 --> 00:32:31,000 Speaker 2: No, Yeah, I think that's right. What impact that're we 479 00:32:31,280 --> 00:32:34,800 Speaker 2: have on the war itself is hard to say exactly. 480 00:32:35,680 --> 00:32:40,960 Speaker 2: These are I believe more psychologically damaging than militarily or 481 00:32:40,960 --> 00:32:44,440 Speaker 2: physically damaging. Part of the reason why the Ukrainians are 482 00:32:44,520 --> 00:32:47,480 Speaker 2: doing this, I think is as an element in the 483 00:32:47,520 --> 00:32:51,200 Speaker 2: information war, trying to show their backers in the West 484 00:32:51,600 --> 00:32:54,680 Speaker 2: that they're not losing. These still prospects they can reach 485 00:32:54,720 --> 00:32:58,560 Speaker 2: out and touch Putin and his cohort in Russia. The 486 00:32:58,600 --> 00:33:02,440 Speaker 2: effect that they're having on russia popular opinion also not 487 00:33:02,640 --> 00:33:08,880 Speaker 2: easy to gauge, but my suspicion, extrapolating from broader polling 488 00:33:08,960 --> 00:33:12,720 Speaker 2: data in Russia's that they're having an effect similar to 489 00:33:12,760 --> 00:33:18,240 Speaker 2: that of Russian airstrikes in Ukraine on Ukrainian opinion. Russian 490 00:33:18,280 --> 00:33:22,240 Speaker 2: strikes in Ukraine are not causing Ukrainians to say, oh, well, 491 00:33:22,280 --> 00:33:24,760 Speaker 2: this is just too hard, let's find a way out 492 00:33:24,800 --> 00:33:27,720 Speaker 2: of the war. It's in fact creating a rally around 493 00:33:27,720 --> 00:33:33,960 Speaker 2: the flag effect, stoking hatred against Russia, stoking Ukrainian resolve 494 00:33:34,400 --> 00:33:37,400 Speaker 2: in the broader public. And I think that's happening in Russia. 495 00:33:37,520 --> 00:33:40,680 Speaker 2: I think Russians are looking at this saying, hey, you know, 496 00:33:41,000 --> 00:33:44,720 Speaker 2: we're actually fighting the US and NATO, not just Ukraine. 497 00:33:45,040 --> 00:33:49,640 Speaker 2: Ukraine is the catspaw for Washington and Brussels. And all 498 00:33:49,680 --> 00:33:52,560 Speaker 2: of this, and they really do hate us. We really 499 00:33:52,560 --> 00:33:53,240 Speaker 2: do need to fight. 500 00:33:53,760 --> 00:33:57,160 Speaker 1: Do you think when Putin made the decision to go 501 00:33:57,200 --> 00:34:01,040 Speaker 1: into Ukraine in any notion that it would end up 502 00:34:01,120 --> 00:34:05,040 Speaker 1: leading Sweden and Finland to join NATO, which strikes me 503 00:34:05,080 --> 00:34:06,800 Speaker 1: as strategically a pretty big defeat. 504 00:34:08,000 --> 00:34:11,040 Speaker 2: Well, no, I don't think he expected that. I think 505 00:34:11,080 --> 00:34:16,799 Speaker 2: he was looking more narrowly at Ukraine. That said, I 506 00:34:16,920 --> 00:34:20,480 Speaker 2: think it's still early to draw conclusions about the strategic 507 00:34:20,520 --> 00:34:24,960 Speaker 2: impact of all of this. One of Pudin's big bets 508 00:34:25,520 --> 00:34:31,040 Speaker 2: in this war has been that the momentum in the 509 00:34:31,080 --> 00:34:35,400 Speaker 2: broader world has been shifting from the United States and 510 00:34:35,480 --> 00:34:40,960 Speaker 2: Europe to Asia and the Global South. He's making a 511 00:34:41,000 --> 00:34:45,920 Speaker 2: bet in this that the peak of American power, that 512 00:34:46,120 --> 00:34:49,080 Speaker 2: unipolar moment is someone once called it here in the 513 00:34:49,160 --> 00:34:52,640 Speaker 2: United States, is over. That the United States has become 514 00:34:53,760 --> 00:34:59,640 Speaker 2: a decadent power with big challenges internally, that Europe is stagnating, 515 00:35:00,160 --> 00:35:06,560 Speaker 2: and geostrategically, Russia is better off aligning itself with China 516 00:35:06,600 --> 00:35:11,359 Speaker 2: and Asia and the Global South. In that context, does 517 00:35:11,440 --> 00:35:16,440 Speaker 2: adding to countries to the NATO alliance really change the 518 00:35:16,480 --> 00:35:19,600 Speaker 2: big strategic picture for Putin? My guess is that it's 519 00:35:19,640 --> 00:35:22,880 Speaker 2: too soon to say now. What it does do, though, 520 00:35:23,200 --> 00:35:28,800 Speaker 2: for the Russian military is it complicates their threat planning. 521 00:35:29,560 --> 00:35:31,840 Speaker 2: They've got a lot more territory they've got to consider 522 00:35:32,239 --> 00:35:36,240 Speaker 2: in all of this, and it tilts the conventional balance 523 00:35:36,239 --> 00:35:41,120 Speaker 2: of power between Russia and NATO even further toward NATO. Now, 524 00:35:41,680 --> 00:35:46,880 Speaker 2: Russia can't hope to build a conventional military strong enough 525 00:35:47,160 --> 00:35:50,520 Speaker 2: to challenge the NATO Alliance. What it can do, and 526 00:35:50,520 --> 00:35:53,440 Speaker 2: what I expect that it will do, is increase its 527 00:35:53,440 --> 00:35:56,880 Speaker 2: reliance on its nuclear force. We're already seeing the first 528 00:35:56,880 --> 00:36:00,799 Speaker 2: steps toward that in Belarus. Both the Russians the Belarussians 529 00:36:00,840 --> 00:36:04,560 Speaker 2: have announced that the Russians have moved tactical nuclear forces 530 00:36:05,000 --> 00:36:09,040 Speaker 2: onto Belarussian territory. That to me is not surprising. They've 531 00:36:09,040 --> 00:36:12,600 Speaker 2: got to do something to compensate for their inability to 532 00:36:12,680 --> 00:36:16,640 Speaker 2: fight and win a conventional war against an enlarge NATO alliance. 533 00:36:17,080 --> 00:36:19,000 Speaker 2: But I think that's a very bad thing for Europe 534 00:36:19,120 --> 00:36:21,600 Speaker 2: and probably a very bad thing for the United States too, 535 00:36:22,239 --> 00:36:26,719 Speaker 2: to see Europe renuclearized, because we're probably going to be 536 00:36:26,719 --> 00:36:30,319 Speaker 2: in a situation like the early nineteen eighties when the 537 00:36:30,360 --> 00:36:36,440 Speaker 2: Soviet Union deployed SS twenty intermediate range missiles pointed at Europe. 538 00:36:36,960 --> 00:36:40,080 Speaker 2: The United States and NATO countered by bringing Pershing two 539 00:36:40,160 --> 00:36:44,000 Speaker 2: missiles into Germany and other parts of Europe, and we 540 00:36:44,080 --> 00:36:46,719 Speaker 2: found ourselves on a nuclear hair trigger in Europe. We 541 00:36:46,800 --> 00:36:51,680 Speaker 2: had warning times measured in a handful of minutes, highly unstable, 542 00:36:51,800 --> 00:36:54,040 Speaker 2: and I think that's where we're heading. We're heading toward 543 00:36:54,040 --> 00:37:00,279 Speaker 2: a renuclearized Europe with very very short warning times, but 544 00:37:00,520 --> 00:37:03,279 Speaker 2: one that unlike in the nineteen eighties, we have no 545 00:37:03,840 --> 00:37:06,719 Speaker 2: structure of arms control or any kind of dialogue to 546 00:37:06,760 --> 00:37:09,879 Speaker 2: try to mitigate the risks of all of this. So 547 00:37:10,200 --> 00:37:13,120 Speaker 2: I think we're headed toward a very dangerous outcome in 548 00:37:13,200 --> 00:37:16,359 Speaker 2: all of this. So, yeah, Putin got something he didn't 549 00:37:16,440 --> 00:37:20,880 Speaker 2: want in NATO enlargement, but I think the end result 550 00:37:21,000 --> 00:37:23,279 Speaker 2: is going to be bad for everybody, not just bad 551 00:37:23,280 --> 00:37:24,160 Speaker 2: for Russia. 552 00:37:24,280 --> 00:37:27,520 Speaker 1: So in that context, don't you think they've already moved 553 00:37:28,080 --> 00:37:34,440 Speaker 1: tacto nukes into their enclave between Poland and Germany glenn Ingrid. 554 00:37:35,080 --> 00:37:39,759 Speaker 2: Yes, well, they've had tactical nukes stored there for several decades. 555 00:37:39,800 --> 00:37:43,839 Speaker 2: It's a mile a mile probably the most nuclearized part 556 00:37:43,840 --> 00:37:47,160 Speaker 2: of the planet, which makes it fully dangerous. 557 00:37:47,200 --> 00:37:51,200 Speaker 1: In my view, we're always in this sort of zero 558 00:37:51,360 --> 00:37:56,360 Speaker 1: one situation where if you cross over, you're in a 559 00:37:56,400 --> 00:37:59,880 Speaker 1: world so much more frightening and so much more violent 560 00:38:00,440 --> 00:38:04,400 Speaker 1: that even as violent as things look right now, they 561 00:38:04,440 --> 00:38:09,640 Speaker 1: would pale and insignificance compared to a real nuclear exchange. 562 00:38:10,400 --> 00:38:13,439 Speaker 2: Oh yeah, no, I think that's right. Unfortunately, I don't 563 00:38:13,440 --> 00:38:15,239 Speaker 2: think it's just going to be tactical nukes that the 564 00:38:15,320 --> 00:38:17,880 Speaker 2: Russians are going to be moving into the European theater. 565 00:38:17,920 --> 00:38:21,680 Speaker 2: I think they're going to be moving theater level nuclear 566 00:38:21,719 --> 00:38:26,279 Speaker 2: weapons like the SS twenties that can cover a lot 567 00:38:26,280 --> 00:38:29,040 Speaker 2: of distance in a big hurry and are very difficult 568 00:38:29,080 --> 00:38:29,759 Speaker 2: to contend with. 569 00:38:30,600 --> 00:38:33,040 Speaker 1: I mean, it does become a balance of terror again. 570 00:38:33,800 --> 00:38:37,520 Speaker 2: That's right, But the balance of was always mitigated by 571 00:38:37,840 --> 00:38:41,200 Speaker 2: an arms control component in which we were talking to 572 00:38:41,280 --> 00:38:43,399 Speaker 2: each other. And one of the most valuable things about 573 00:38:43,520 --> 00:38:47,719 Speaker 2: arms control in my view, was not the limits themselves, 574 00:38:48,560 --> 00:38:53,839 Speaker 2: but the dialogue that these arrangements required. We had to 575 00:38:53,880 --> 00:38:57,240 Speaker 2: meet with each other and talk to each other about implementation. 576 00:38:58,120 --> 00:39:02,320 Speaker 2: A lot of those discussions were quite contentious, you know, accusations, 577 00:39:02,360 --> 00:39:03,560 Speaker 2: counter accusations, etc. 578 00:39:03,800 --> 00:39:03,960 Speaker 1: Etc. 579 00:39:04,560 --> 00:39:07,480 Speaker 2: But we were talking, and that I think was a 580 00:39:07,560 --> 00:39:09,600 Speaker 2: critical part of this. Right now we're not talking. 581 00:39:10,040 --> 00:39:14,279 Speaker 1: We probably have less understanding of the decision process in 582 00:39:14,320 --> 00:39:17,239 Speaker 1: the Kremlin today than we did at any point during 583 00:39:17,239 --> 00:39:17,839 Speaker 1: the Cold War. 584 00:39:18,160 --> 00:39:22,439 Speaker 2: No, that's right. Our dialogue with Moscow today is far 585 00:39:22,640 --> 00:39:25,439 Speaker 2: less than it was at any point in the Cold War. 586 00:39:25,760 --> 00:39:28,040 Speaker 1: Now it's very sober and listen. I want to thank you. 587 00:39:28,120 --> 00:39:32,480 Speaker 1: I think as a citizen, taking your lifetime commitment to 588 00:39:32,680 --> 00:39:37,960 Speaker 1: understanding Russia, understanding the American security needs, and continuing to 589 00:39:38,000 --> 00:39:41,520 Speaker 1: work at it, you're an invaluable asset for those of 590 00:39:41,560 --> 00:39:45,279 Speaker 1: us who would like to have an intelligent, effective and 591 00:39:45,440 --> 00:39:49,400 Speaker 1: safe national security approach. So I really appreciate this has 592 00:39:49,440 --> 00:39:52,239 Speaker 1: been fascinating. It's great to talk to somebody with the 593 00:39:52,320 --> 00:39:54,839 Speaker 1: depth of knowledge you have. I really appreciate it. 594 00:39:55,239 --> 00:39:56,800 Speaker 2: Well, thank you, it's been my pleasure. 595 00:40:02,480 --> 00:40:05,040 Speaker 1: Thank you to my guest, George BB. You can learn 596 00:40:05,040 --> 00:40:07,920 Speaker 1: more about the Death of Progotion on our show page 597 00:40:08,080 --> 00:40:11,200 Speaker 1: at Newtsworld dot com. News World is produced by Ganwish, 598 00:40:11,200 --> 00:40:15,839 Speaker 1: three sixty and iHeartMedia. Our executive producer is Guarnsey Slum. 599 00:40:16,280 --> 00:40:20,160 Speaker 1: Our researcher is Rachel Peterson. The artwork for the show 600 00:40:20,560 --> 00:40:24,040 Speaker 1: was created by Steve Penley. Special thanks to the team 601 00:40:24,080 --> 00:40:27,440 Speaker 1: at Gingridge three sixty. If you've been enjoying Newtsworld, I 602 00:40:27,520 --> 00:40:30,239 Speaker 1: hope you'll go to Apple Podcast and both rate us 603 00:40:30,239 --> 00:40:33,600 Speaker 1: with five stars and give us a review so others 604 00:40:33,640 --> 00:40:37,000 Speaker 1: can learn what it's all about. Right now, listeners of 605 00:40:37,040 --> 00:40:40,920 Speaker 1: Newtworld can sign up for my three freeweekly columns at 606 00:40:40,920 --> 00:40:46,279 Speaker 1: ganwidsree sixty dot com slash newsletter. I'm Newt Gingrich. This 607 00:40:46,560 --> 00:40:47,279 Speaker 1: is news World.