Speaker 1: Hello, and welcome to What Goes Up, a weekly markets podcast.
Speaker 1: My name is Mike Reagan. I'm a senior editor at
Speaker 1: Bloomberg and Mboda across asset reporter with Bloomberg, and this
Speaker 1: week on the show, Well, it can feel awkward and
Speaker 1: a little heartless to talk about markets at times like this,
Speaker 1: when innocent lives are being lost, families are being torn apart,
Speaker 1: and young people's futures are being destroyed by the violence
Speaker 1: in Ukraine. And we get that. So let's just start
Speaker 1: off with a heartfelt wish for peace. As Albert Einstein
Speaker 1: once said, peace cannot be kept by force. It can
Speaker 1: only be achieved by understanding. So we want to first
Speaker 1: try to understand what caused this war and what might
Speaker 1: bring it to an end and when, and then we'll
Speaker 1: get into what it means for markets. After all, with
Speaker 1: crude oil surging and the ruble crashing, as the US
Speaker 1: and Europe leverage the financial system as their best weapon
Speaker 1: to confront Vladimir Putin, markets and finance actually are an
Speaker 1: important element of this situation and maybe even the best
Speaker 1: hope to bring about peace. This week's guest is an
Speaker 1: expert on both geo politics and markets, and he's gonna
Speaker 1: help us make sense of this tragedy unfolding before our eyes. Yeah,
Speaker 1: I want to welcome Marco. He's the chief strategist at
Speaker 1: the clock Tour Group and he's the author of the
Speaker 1: book Geopolitical Alpha, and Marco, I want to welcome you
Speaker 1: to the show. Thank you so much for Dona and Mike.
Speaker 1: It's it's such a pleasure to be back. Unfortunately under
Speaker 1: these circumstances, but you know it is the professional we chose. Yeah, yeah, Well,
Speaker 1: we appreciate your time. Marco. It's a good week to
Speaker 1: have you. Um And if anyone's curious about Marco's background
Speaker 1: and what his firm, clock Tower Group does, I would
Speaker 1: say you could go back to the podcast from February
Speaker 1: of last year. We got into exactly what clock Tower
Speaker 1: is all about out and Marco's background. So today we
Speaker 1: just want to get right into it. And uh, Mark,
Speaker 1: I wanted to ask you about your last note. Now,
Speaker 1: I've got respect for a strategist who admits they're wrong
Speaker 1: from time to time, and I noticed in your note,
Speaker 1: you know you would assigned a very low probability of
Speaker 1: a full blown invasion of Russia. And I bring this
Speaker 1: up not to heckle you, but because I think it's
Speaker 1: an important point because you're not You're not the only
Speaker 1: one though a lot of people, a lot of smart people,
Speaker 1: people that know this stuff the best, I think, would
Speaker 1: have agreed with you. You know, the sort of storyline
Speaker 1: for many experts was that Russia could be bluffing, or
Speaker 1: they could only be interested in those regions of the
Speaker 1: east of Ukraine that they have sort of already in
Speaker 1: control of. But I think it's important to sort of
Speaker 1: try to figure out what everyone got wrong right now,
Speaker 1: especially because you know, you hear all the pundits now
Speaker 1: talking about Vladimir Putin and wondering and saying, he's not
Speaker 1: the guy we thought he was. He's not the guy
Speaker 1: he used to be. There there's concerns about, you know,
Speaker 1: whether he's mentally fit or or even some kind of
Speaker 1: physical ailments that's affecting his decisions. But I'm curious what
Speaker 1: your perspective is. What did everyone get wrong about thinking
Speaker 1: this was most likely a bluff? So I'll tell you
Speaker 1: what I got wrong. You know, my framework is based
Speaker 1: on material constraints the policy makers, and I call it
Speaker 1: a framework on purpose, right, because not a theory it's
Speaker 1: not a method, it's a framework that allows investors to
Speaker 1: have some sort of a set of probabilities. Some center
Speaker 1: is parabous sense of where we are, what's the path
Speaker 1: of the least resistance you know, uh, to policy maker
Speaker 1: action and in the in this particular case. Um. Actually,
Speaker 1: what's what's interesting is that the set of constraints that
Speaker 1: I elucidated in my research is absolutely acting itself out.
Speaker 1: It's manifesting in reality as we speak, uh. And it's
Speaker 1: manifesting itself in a couple of ways. Ukrainians are fighting really,
Speaker 1: really hard. It is an absolute like fallacy that there
Speaker 1: are pro Russians and any spot of Ukraine left, they
Speaker 1: are in Donetskonsk, in Crimea, so Putin has already kind
Speaker 1: of you know, annexed him. The second is that Russian
Speaker 1: military has not had any experience fighting real wars. And
Speaker 1: third is that Ukraine is a very logistically difficult place
Speaker 1: to invade. So those those constraints are manifesting itself. And
Speaker 1: and so I guess what I'm saying is, you know,
Speaker 1: it's still very very valuable to be focused on the
Speaker 1: material reality, because if policymaker, you're trying to predict ignores
Speaker 1: the constraints you laid out. Then you were right in
Speaker 1: how you laid it out. Then you can chart a
Speaker 1: path forward once they have surprised you with their decision making. Now,
Speaker 1: why did we all get it wrong? I think, um,
Speaker 1: I think what we misunderstood as two things. One, Putin's
Speaker 1: r o I on geopolitical events has been very high.
Speaker 1: He's been very very cautious empirically. I can prove this
Speaker 1: with his previous actions. And the second I think is
Speaker 1: that it's not clear that we did get it wrong.
Speaker 1: And what I mean by that is that there is
Speaker 1: still an off ramp where this becomes a Georgia two
Speaker 1: thousand eight scenario, where in that initial stage of the attack,
Speaker 1: it looks like a wide occupation and an attack against
Speaker 1: the entire country, but it's actually going to end up
Speaker 1: being much more limited, where he withdraws from a lot
Speaker 1: of the areas and focuses on what he wants. That's
Speaker 1: what happening to thousand in Georgia. And so that's something
Speaker 1: that I would just add, like, let's see how this
Speaker 1: play out, especially as pain continues to be exerted in
Speaker 1: Russian military, Russian economy and politics. Marco can I actually
Speaker 1: ask you to start with a really basic question. And
Speaker 1: I've read a ton about this, and I'm really interested
Speaker 1: in this, and I'm struck by how many theories there are,
Speaker 1: But what is your theory for the why the invasion happened?
Speaker 1: Can you maybe lay out some of the factors, whether
Speaker 1: it's you know, we've heard a lot about thwarting NATO
Speaker 1: or putin sphere, of being so close to a democratically
Speaker 1: elected country or etcetera. What is top of mind for you?
Speaker 1: You know, I think all of those are very good theories.
Speaker 1: I mean, to me, the fundamental issue here is that
Speaker 1: Russian policy, over over hundreds of years has been colored
Speaker 1: by deep paranoia of vulnerability. And it's really born out
Speaker 1: of history which is bloody. Many many, many people and
Speaker 1: leaders have tried to conquer Russian and knock it out.
Speaker 1: And the second is a really vulnerable geographical position. And
Speaker 1: that's something that you know, I'm not the only one
Speaker 1: that has mentioned that, but this is this is imprinted
Speaker 1: on Russian psyche. Especially if you come to rule Russia,
Speaker 1: you come to learn the lessons of its history, which
Speaker 1: is that leaders who took geographical and security of Russia
Speaker 1: lightly are not remembered with glory, and so those that
Speaker 1: take it seriously, you know, they try to secure Russian
Speaker 1: and the biggest problem right now for Russia is that
Speaker 1: when you look at its western borders, the fact of
Speaker 1: the matter is that it's it's vulnerable, it's exposed, and
Speaker 1: so has tried to explain this to the West for
Speaker 1: a very long time. I do think the West didn't
Speaker 1: really listen to it seriously. And I think what you
Speaker 1: saw over the last twelve months especially is a ramping
Speaker 1: up in rhetoric, not so much from Paris in Berlin,
Speaker 1: but specifically from Washington, d C. On Ukrainian membership NATO.
Speaker 1: You know, and now now listen, like you know, I'm
Speaker 1: not here to tell you that this is like America's
Speaker 1: fault in Putin his crossing an international border. He didn't
Speaker 1: have to do that. But the rhetoric out of the
Speaker 1: US has been much more stringent. There was also, you know,
Speaker 1: the U s sent lethal weapon to Ukraine, and you know,
Speaker 1: there was things that US has said that we're really interesting.
Speaker 1: For example, territorial disputes between Ukraine and Russia do not
Speaker 1: preclude Ukraine's membership to Tornado. That's something the White House
Speaker 1: said recently. And the truth is, like, of course it does.
Speaker 1: In fact, Croatia and Slovenia like they had a dispute
Speaker 1: and Gratia wasn't allowed to get in too NATO until
Speaker 1: it resolved that territorial dispute. There was a silly one
Speaker 1: in the on the coast. But the point is that
Speaker 1: US was just kind of writing checks. It doesn't have
Speaker 1: any intention of cashion. I think Putin called, you know,
Speaker 1: kind of America's bluff and think what he What I
Speaker 1: think he's doing though, is I don't think that the
Speaker 1: Kremlin is trying to annex. We can talk about how
Speaker 1: ludicrous that would be. And this is where my point
Speaker 1: of material constraints really hits in. I think what he's
Speaker 1: trying to signal to Kiev in stark terms is how
Speaker 1: alone they really are and how no one's coming to
Speaker 1: save them. And that's something that Lensky President Jelenski said
Speaker 1: at the very onset of the war. He said, we
Speaker 1: will offer neutrality. We now know the truth. I'm fair rephrasing,
Speaker 1: but he basically said, look, no one's coming to save us.
Speaker 1: There is no NATO membership and offer we do need
Speaker 1: to offer Russian neutrality. I think that's an offer that
Speaker 1: Putin would take to actually declare victory, raise the mission
Speaker 1: accomplished banner and move on. Mark. Could you think the
Speaker 1: the sanctions, uh that have been imposed? You know, it's
Speaker 1: a long list. Obviously, the major banks, almost all the
Speaker 1: major banks kicked off the Swift international bank messaging system,
Speaker 1: basically isolating Russia's financial system from the rest of the world. Um,
Speaker 1: the assets seizures, the central bank assets being seized around
Speaker 1: the world, on and on and on, threats to the
Speaker 1: oligarch's yachts and property around the world. Are these enough
Speaker 1: to influence Prutent's behavior and to sort of piggyback on that.
Speaker 1: I think there's a lot of speculation in the West
Speaker 1: that they possibly could be enough to tugger some sort
Speaker 1: of coup or some sort of overthrow of Putin as leader.
Speaker 1: How do you see all that playing out? Are the
Speaker 1: sanctions gonna be enough to influence his behavior? Even topple him? Hey, listen,
Speaker 1: I don't shy for making calls. I I I couched
Speaker 1: him me probabilities, you know, And I always always offer
Speaker 1: hedges to my positions. I would say that I give
Speaker 1: Prutin twelve months, and I'm taking the under When policymakers
Speaker 1: make extraordinarily bad decisions that ignore their material constraints, they
Speaker 1: get punished. And listen, I'm just a guy, okay. I mean,
Speaker 1: you know, me and Ville Donna were from the same region.
Speaker 1: We grew up with this kind of stuff, unfortune. So
Speaker 1: I've been following this kind of stuff since I was
Speaker 1: sixty years old. So I have a lot of experience
Speaker 1: analyzing wars, not just professional and I will say this
Speaker 1: to you. I'm just a guy sitting on Santa Monica
Speaker 1: Beach doing my research for investors. And I called the
Speaker 1: material constraints to Russia perfectly, So how the heck that
Speaker 1: Vladimi Reprutin not do the same? That is an egregious,
Speaker 1: egregious mistake by a policy maker. And I mean that objectively.
Speaker 1: I'm not even mentioning the civilian that's and all that
Speaker 1: other stuff in the pariah status for Russia. Leave that aside.
Speaker 1: The forty mile convoy. The forty mile convoy, that's not
Speaker 1: a sign of Russian power, that's a sign of Russian weakness.
Speaker 1: They can't move that thing. That thing is more backed
Speaker 1: up than I thirty five from Waco to Dallas, it
Speaker 1: might be less lethal, to be quite frank with you,
Speaker 1: I mean, I mean, if you are a country with
Speaker 1: a modicum of look down capability for your air force,
Speaker 1: like if you have fighter jets that can shoot down,
Speaker 1: which is rare, but if you have them right now,
Speaker 1: the message you're getting from this conflict is you can
Speaker 1: defeat two Russians in the war, like Belgium can defeat
Speaker 1: Russia in the war right now. And so that's where Mike,
Speaker 1: that's why I'm so um, you know, adamant that this
Speaker 1: this mistake will be punished not by like a coup,
Speaker 1: not by something, but it will be punished by the
Speaker 1: material reality. One thing that I would mention is, you know,
Speaker 1: speaking of the Balkan Wars, I mean Slobano Milosh very
Speaker 1: similar mistakes that he made throughout the crises, and he
Speaker 1: kept he kept coming to the negotiating table. The data
Speaker 1: and accords are a good example of how you know
Speaker 1: that happened, um, And obviously domestically in Serbia he had
Speaker 1: to declare victory, uh and say, oh, we got what
Speaker 1: we wanted. But the point is that don't confuse madness,
Speaker 1: temporary madness with permanent you know, um lunacy, and so
Speaker 1: I do think that the constraints are going to act
Speaker 1: over the next couple of weeks, and at some point
Speaker 1: I think there is an off ramp. Now, am I
Speaker 1: sanguine on the market, No, I do think that this
Speaker 1: conflict could be different than others, and I do think
Speaker 1: there's a considerable still downside risk. Mike mentioned the slew
Speaker 1: of sanctions that the West has already announced against Russia.
Speaker 1: One thing I really haven't heard much about is what
Speaker 1: other sanctions or what else the West and allies can
Speaker 1: deploy against Russia. What else is left to do? Well?
Speaker 1: The Swift sanctions have been applied very tepidally, you know,
Speaker 1: because basically the Germans, the Italians, a lot of the
Speaker 1: importers don't want to curtail their ability to transact with
Speaker 1: Russian financial entities due to the energy section. So I
Speaker 1: think that, you know, a permanent expulsion of all financial
Speaker 1: institutions of from Swift would be a game change. So
Speaker 1: that's the first. The second is just an actual embarko
Speaker 1: on Russian exports and energy. I don't see that happening,
Speaker 1: but I worry that if it takes longer for President
Speaker 1: putin to realize his constraints. If he takes longer, it
Speaker 1: might be Russia that self imposes. Actually, it's exports, you know.
Speaker 1: So you're talking palladium, global production, you're talking potash, Russian
Speaker 1: Bellarus together for masure. The Bello is put on its
Speaker 1: exports a couple of weeks ago because of sanctions. So
Speaker 1: that's a really significant hits to already climbing food prices.
Speaker 1: Uh and then obviously things like aluminum, nickel, and so on.
Speaker 1: So I think that that's what I fear Bill Donna,
Speaker 1: and I fear that that it mutates into the seventy
Speaker 1: three young people war scenario. So you know, if you
Speaker 1: look at my book, I have this fancy table of
Speaker 1: every every conflict is the Second World War, and like
Speaker 1: the message of the table is by on the side
Speaker 1: of the cannon's empirically proven, you know. And I've seen
Speaker 1: that table like star people are quoting me like, oh,
Speaker 1: you know, Marco Poppy, she loves this, you know, like buying,
Speaker 1: and I'm like, whoa, whoa, whoa. The one war in
Speaker 1: that table that didn't it wasn't an opportunity to buy
Speaker 1: was nineteen seventy three poor and if you think about
Speaker 1: the macro context we're in today, and then it's kind
Speaker 1: of similar. You know, these are events that are basically
Speaker 1: inflationary cherries on top of like a Sunday. You know,
Speaker 1: it's it's it's just we're in this very complicated mac environment.
Speaker 1: I was already barished on US assets and US equities
Speaker 1: in particulars is December. I'm not sure that I want
Speaker 1: to not buy because Russian you preinter going to war? Right? Well,
Speaker 1: I think about that, that notion of material and resource constraints, um,
Speaker 1: and it works both ways obviously too. If if prudent
Speaker 1: were to turn the whale and gas off to Europe,
Speaker 1: I mean, who knows what Brent Crude would do. I'm
Speaker 1: probably of barrel. I would guess we'd be looking at
Speaker 1: surgeon gasoline prices. So how do you do do view
Speaker 1: the constraints on the other side? Uh? If he were
Speaker 1: to do something like that, I mean, is that it
Speaker 1: would be enough to sort of cause the US and
Speaker 1: EU to back off a little bit? Do you think, Well,
Speaker 1: I think it's already causing them to back off a
Speaker 1: little bit and create his ofference. Uh. And I think
Speaker 1: that you know, it all depends on what it is
Speaker 1: that the intention of President putinist. Now the problem is that,
Speaker 1: you know, my suspicion, and maybe this is colored by
Speaker 1: my failure to predict a full invasion, but my suspicion
Speaker 1: is that he made this decision last minute, you know.
Speaker 1: And that's a worrying point because it's also suggests that,
Speaker 1: you know, there's like an element of irrationality. So if
Speaker 1: if he's just looking to have a punitive war campaign
Speaker 1: against you, Praine, like in Georgia in two thousand and eight,
Speaker 1: and I keep referring to Georgia just through like reminded
Speaker 1: listeners what happened in Georgia is that for five six
Speaker 1: days you didn't know if it was a full invasion
Speaker 1: or just the punitive campaign where Russians then retreated to
Speaker 1: self possession and a positive So my point about two
Speaker 1: eight peril is that we're still there, you know, Mike,
Speaker 1: like this could still be a Georgia type of scenario
Speaker 1: where it's a punitive campaign punished Kiev for alerting with
Speaker 1: the US, and that we're drawing into the regions of
Speaker 1: Ukraine that Russia basically ostensibly already controls the netic Premia.
Speaker 1: And so my point is that A lot of the
Speaker 1: decision making by the leadership in Russia suggested they had
Speaker 1: a last minute decision to flip this into some sort
Speaker 1: of a punitive campaign. If it just remains a punitive
Speaker 1: campaign they withdraw, then you have a number of off
Speaker 1: rams if it becomes a complete destruction of like Ukrainian
Speaker 1: civilian infrastructure with the intention to occupy. First of all,
Speaker 1: I think Russia will break itself against Ukraine as a state.
Speaker 1: I mean, this is the end of Russia in that case,
Speaker 1: ISSI as a power because it will be extremely expensive
Speaker 1: and costly to Moscow to to exert this. I mean
Speaker 1: US struggle with Iraq. Iraqi is smaller, less population in
Speaker 1: US had more troops. So that's the first issue. The
Speaker 1: second issue is that then I can see your scenario
Speaker 1: where we go all out and actually start embargoing energy,
Speaker 1: you know, if this becomes a war of occupation. But
Speaker 1: to me, the probability of that still is very low.
Speaker 1: I still am not ready to skew probabilities more towards
Speaker 1: a full occupation. UM I would say eight twenty in
Speaker 1: favor of the Georgia punitive campaign scenario. How about you know,
Speaker 1: there's obviously tons of speculation on the other weapons uh
Speaker 1: in Putin's holster, uh cyber warfare and god forbid nuclear weapons.
Speaker 1: Um any probabilities on on him unleashing either of those. Yeah,
Speaker 1: I mean, I've I've heard that some people are talking
Speaker 1: about this seriously. I don't see what tactical nuclear weapons
Speaker 1: and kine accomplish. I also cybersecurity, you know it's a
Speaker 1: big deal. I know that cybersecurity stocks are doing great
Speaker 1: blah blah blah, and everyone's in the cybersecurity train. But listen,
Speaker 1: cybersecurity doesn't control air space. Cybersecurity doesn't royal ground troops
Speaker 1: like what. This war is much more classical than people thought.
Speaker 1: This is a very, very much classical issue. So I
Speaker 1: think the cybersecurity issues just don't consider me too much.
Speaker 1: There might be might go back and forth. I'm not
Speaker 1: saying Russia doesn't attack the US and US attack to Russia,
Speaker 1: but this is about controlling ground with with men with
Speaker 1: guns and controlling airspace above them. It's a much more
Speaker 1: of a classic conflict that people thought would happen, So
Speaker 1: I think that's really important. I don't think Russia uses
Speaker 1: nuclear weapons. I don't see white Wood and and in fact,
Speaker 1: you know, I think that the logic of destroying Ukraine
Speaker 1: further is also kind of weak, and in fact, the
Speaker 1: more they destroy Ukraine, the more likely it is that
Speaker 1: this is a punitive pain, because what's the point of
Speaker 1: occupying and holding a country you destroyed. What about what's
Speaker 1: going on within Russia itself? We had a Bloomberg story
Speaker 1: that said there's a lot of resignation among the population
Speaker 1: about the economic hardships that they're going to be facing.
Speaker 1: So what sense can you give us about what the
Speaker 1: sentiment is like within Russia itself and how does that
Speaker 1: play a part in putents thinking? That's such a critical question,
Speaker 1: Bill Donna. I mean that is that is what we
Speaker 1: need to focus on. I think we have investors have
Speaker 1: to focus on the streets of Moscow and St. Petersburg.
Speaker 1: It's difficult to get good information though, But what I
Speaker 1: would say to you is is this, every authoritarian regime
Speaker 1: has a social contract. We don't live in medieval times,
Speaker 1: so you can just like kill scores of people, and
Speaker 1: a throitary regime like Russia does not do that. I'd
Speaker 1: be sure they repressed the public, but it's not like
Speaker 1: they have They're running Goulas, they're not. So what is
Speaker 1: the social contract that allows Vladimir Putin to retain power
Speaker 1: with the median Russian accepting that that rule? What's the
Speaker 1: trade off? It's not the same as Chinese communist parties
Speaker 1: see Chinese communist parties. Social contract which citizens is simple,
Speaker 1: we will deliver the Chinese dream to you. You don't
Speaker 1: ask us for a and that's worth And they've done it.
Speaker 1: They've delivered the Chinese street. In the case of Russia,
Speaker 1: it's not about economic progresses. Were a terrible time for Russia.
Speaker 1: I mean, you had mafia running the streets of major cities,
Speaker 1: You had PhDs in physics, you know, living in dumpsters.
Speaker 1: You had complete chaos, complete collapse of economy and currency.
Speaker 1: And so the social contract in Russia is very simple.
Speaker 1: Russian public expects its leaders to provide stability, not necessarily
Speaker 1: economic growth and potential, but stability, like you know, like
Speaker 1: get Russia off of its economic needs and its geopolitical
Speaker 1: needs that it was at especially NATO bomb one of
Speaker 1: its allies in serving Prutin has for the most part
Speaker 1: delivered on that stability. And the problem right now vill
Speaker 1: Dona is he's breaking a social contract, and he's breaking
Speaker 1: the social contract for unclear purposes. And this is why,
Speaker 1: by the way, a lot of Russian watchers didn't expect
Speaker 1: the full invasion. You know, we expected some sort of
Speaker 1: limited incursion because the mass stick lead. There was no
Speaker 1: prep There's no prep The media and Russia did not
Speaker 1: talk about like ethnic lensing of Russians or this, or
Speaker 1: that they were making fun of Biden for being hysterical, right,
Speaker 1: that was the narrative. They did not at all. Putin
Speaker 1: pulled the rug under his military, his propagandist, his his
Speaker 1: central bank that didn't prepare for this, his diplomats, who
Speaker 1: gave Chinese diplomats all sorts of stories that they didn't deliver.
Speaker 1: This was so sudden and surprising that the collapse of
Speaker 1: stability in Russia relative to the gains for the Russian
Speaker 1: state from doing this in Ukraine is such a skewed
Speaker 1: ratio that there will be serious consequences for the political
Speaker 1: hold of power of Lavenot. And again, I can't, I
Speaker 1: can't just stop comparing it. Maybe you know, I'm from Belgrade,
Speaker 1: but I can't stop comparing it. Too slow and milosh
Speaker 1: like a NATO bombing of of Belgrade. You know, for
Speaker 1: for like a minute it unified, serves against the West,
Speaker 1: and then six months later he was in trouble, I
Speaker 1: mean in the serious trouble, and finally the country revolted.
Speaker 1: And one thing I will say is like Russians will
Speaker 1: not be cowed. This is a country with a deep history,
Speaker 1: deep history of failing in military aggressive tactics. We all,
Speaker 1: as in the West, we think Russia is a has
Speaker 1: a has an incredible military history. It does if you
Speaker 1: attack it, But when they're on offense, they lose more
Speaker 1: than they win. And when they lose, there is a revolt,
Speaker 1: there is a revolution, there is a cud tough and
Speaker 1: it's shocking to me that someone has steeped in history.
Speaker 1: Is Vladimir just forgot that? I still think of Molossovitch,
Speaker 1: of of all that being not too long ago. But
Speaker 1: I guess as as I get older, it's it's it's
Speaker 1: longer than I realized. But um, you know, and you
Speaker 1: look at that Bosnia, Serbia recovered from that, maybe not
Speaker 1: thriving so much, but doing pretty well. You know, as
Speaker 1: nations these days, is there a chance for that in
Speaker 1: a sort of postputent Russia or is is Russia, uninvestable, unapproachable,
Speaker 1: untouchable for the rest of the world. Say for the
Speaker 1: rest of our lifetime, do you think well, I would
Speaker 1: say that it's difficult for us to like kind of
Speaker 1: make a call now something that hasn't happened, you know,
Speaker 1: so as a caveat. But I'm about to answer your question.
Speaker 1: Don't worry, Mike, I haven't heard a question. I don't answer.
Speaker 1: That's why we love you on this show. Listen. Of
Speaker 1: course it's is investing. Of course, of course Russia is investable.
Speaker 1: And I'll tell you why. If you look at the
Speaker 1: performance of Russian equities relative to end it really hit
Speaker 1: bought him in two thousand and eleven, and that was
Speaker 1: pre pre elections, when Medvedev and Putin had this very callous,
Speaker 1: very arrogant press conference where they basically said they were
Speaker 1: going to switch roles and everyone was like, you know,
Speaker 1: a lot of like internationalist investor davos Man type of
Speaker 1: people were hoping that Medvedev and Kudrain, you know, Coudrain
Speaker 1: is like the poster child of everyone who wants to invest,
Speaker 1: that they would take over, that Putin would just kind
Speaker 1: of like be there. And in two thousand and eleven
Speaker 1: everybody realized that wasn't the case, and Russian assets have
Speaker 1: never actually recovered since then, since that press conference actually
Speaker 1: that they had together on this weird stage. Well, I
Speaker 1: guess what I'm saying is that, yeah, I mean, if
Speaker 1: you have some sort of a change intact and in
Speaker 1: relationship with the West, of course, I do think that
Speaker 1: there will be a potential to invest in Russia. The
Speaker 1: problem is that from here to there, you know, we
Speaker 1: could have appropriation. So should you buy Russian equities now?
Speaker 1: Given this kind of hope that there is some sort
Speaker 1: of a you know, change in in leadership or Putin's
Speaker 1: retirement like cruise Ship got retired after he messed up
Speaker 1: the Cuban missile crisis. Like, I don't think so. I mean,
Speaker 1: it's this is a very volatile situation. I would actually
Speaker 1: propose a different view. I actually think that what's happening
Speaker 1: in Ukraine is extremely obviously terrifying, but also heartening. We're
Speaker 1: doing we're watching something we haven't seen in a long time.
Speaker 1: We're watching a birth of a new national identity, you know.
Speaker 1: And Ukraine's biggest challenge has been the post Soviet Union collapse.
Speaker 1: Its leaders have been corrupt, they've been incompetent, and not
Speaker 1: just pro Russian. Let's just be very clear here, like
Speaker 1: the pro West ones were sometimes most corrupt, most incompon
Speaker 1: the origins revolution gave us some really, really nasty characters
Speaker 1: that didn't go anywhere. So the point is that what
Speaker 1: we're seeing now in Ukraine though, is a birth of
Speaker 1: a truly like self aware nation, and I think that
Speaker 1: that might be actually a very interesting investment opportunity over
Speaker 1: the next um, over the next decade, you know, provided
Speaker 1: that you know, they fight off this attack and have
Speaker 1: some independence going forward. It's a large country, it is
Speaker 1: in Europe um, and a lot of potential exists in
Speaker 1: that country. We've heard from Biden and also from EU
Speaker 1: officials about how we're all going to have to face
Speaker 1: the some of the burdens that come with higher gas
Speaker 1: prices and some of the other reverberations that we're going
Speaker 1: to be seeing in the weeks and months to come.
Speaker 1: So what can you tell us about how this might
Speaker 1: impact growth here in the US and and and abroad
Speaker 1: as well in Europe as well, you know, Alana, that's
Speaker 1: that's the number one question with the folks that I
Speaker 1: talked on the daily basis, whether they are institutional investors
Speaker 1: like large pension funds and pools, the capital or hedge funds.
Speaker 1: And there's a range of outlooks out there. I mean,
Speaker 1: I'll give you mine. My view is that I worry
Speaker 1: about the young por scenario. As I said again, you
Speaker 1: know that's that's a nightmare scenario. We get into a
Speaker 1: staculation review. And by the way, think about why this
Speaker 1: is so difficult. Like if the fet just says, look,
Speaker 1: we're gonna deal with inflation, we get a reception. Okay.
Speaker 1: If the feed says, like it's caused by Putin, so
Speaker 1: we're not gonna We're gonna step back, like okay, what
Speaker 1: does that do to asset prices? I don't know, Like,
Speaker 1: I'm not sure that's positive for asset prices. Either inflation
Speaker 1: is basically un anchored and central banks lose credibility. The
Speaker 1: Epean Central Bank really has only one mandate and they
Speaker 1: are now backing off from them mandate. What does that
Speaker 1: do to the bond market? What does that do to acquities?
Speaker 1: I I don't know. I just know that I like
Speaker 1: commodities in that world. But in terms of the actual impact,
Speaker 1: there are differentiated impacts. I mean, obviously Europe is going
Speaker 1: to be far more affected by what's going on in Ukraine.
Speaker 1: In the US, US has a couple of things going
Speaker 1: for it. So my dear friend Georgie Vissor, he has
Speaker 1: great webinars. I don't know if you guys watching, really
Speaker 1: worth watching. He has made a point that net worth
Speaker 1: in the US is so high right now because of
Speaker 1: the Stimulu checks. If you plot oil prices relative to networth,
Speaker 1: it's they're like the lowest they've ever been. So Americans
Speaker 1: do have the ability to imper higher costs. And then
Speaker 1: on top of that, you have something else that's interesting.
Speaker 1: And that's something else is that we just went through
Speaker 1: two years of working from home. Our ways of life
Speaker 1: and work have altered, and it's not clear to me
Speaker 1: that an increase in all prices would necessarily impact the
Speaker 1: American economy as in the past. So the whole like
Speaker 1: idea that like a ten percent increase in all prices
Speaker 1: impacts the GDP as a certain percent, like we should
Speaker 1: throw all of that out the window. We don't know.
Speaker 1: In the US the impact will be much much lower,
Speaker 1: which also explains geopolitical position of US. That's why mccron
Speaker 1: is going to to Moscow. That's why Germany is hold
Speaker 1: holding back swift sanctions because the impact to Europe is
Speaker 1: much higher. US has much much lower risk tolerance, whereas
Speaker 1: the US doesn't care effectively. US can be much more
Speaker 1: macare valiant, much more meaner to Russia, as supportive of
Speaker 1: Ukraine because the macroeconomic implications are lower. Plus you know, hey,
Speaker 1: if inflation goes up and the FED can't fight it,
Speaker 1: Biden has an excuse. Now, it's not Automa bill prices
Speaker 1: that are driving CPI hied, it's a lot of reputin.
Speaker 1: You know, bark I wanted to you mentioned commodities. I
Speaker 1: wanted to roll in a little bit on wheat in particular. Um.
Speaker 1: You know, you made a interesting point in one of
Speaker 1: your recent notes that wheat is actually outperformed crude oil
Speaker 1: during all of this. And you know, I'm an older guy.
Speaker 1: I remember living through the gas shortages in the US
Speaker 1: UH when you had to wait two hours to get
Speaker 1: uh fill your your tank with gas and and maybe
Speaker 1: you couldn't get it and you canceled a trip or something.
Speaker 1: But a shortage of wheat is a is a much
Speaker 1: more serious scenario. I think, how are you thinking about week?
Speaker 1: I mean wheat the you know, obviously springs coming up.
Speaker 1: Ukraine is a big producer of wheat, exports to both
Speaker 1: Europe and Russia. And I'm curious how you're thinking of
Speaker 1: it a from a sort of a shortage standpoint, you know, uh,
Speaker 1: is there a risk of a shortage in Europe or
Speaker 1: is there enough producers worldwide to sort of, you know,
Speaker 1: plant some extra acres and pick up the slack. But
Speaker 1: also as an investment, you know, I think you sort
Speaker 1: of advised it as a hedge in this situation. It
Speaker 1: seems to me like possibly a risky investment if there
Speaker 1: are shortages, if there is a sort of government backlash
Speaker 1: to that and potential price caps that that sort of
Speaker 1: thing is. Is that a possibility do you think? I know,
Speaker 1: I asked you about ten questions there, but yeah, no,
Speaker 1: for sure, it is risky if it goes too high
Speaker 1: there there could be all sorts of things. I mean,
Speaker 1: I think there's other ways to play this, bulk carriers,
Speaker 1: there's like shipping implications for anytime there's a dislocation that
Speaker 1: we could play as well. I think we were headed
Speaker 1: towards of food crisis Anyways, this is a really big
Speaker 1: jubilical issue. I've been talking about this for twelve months
Speaker 1: before Ukraine Russia became an issue. And that's because you know,
Speaker 1: natural guess prices went up, cost of nitrates and fertilizer
Speaker 1: went up. On top of that, you have this PoTA
Speaker 1: situation in Belarus, which happened because of U S sanctions.
Speaker 1: Now you've got what's going on here. So fertilizer costs
Speaker 1: going through the roof, and you have actual potential curtailment
Speaker 1: of shipping it and supplying because Ukrainians its continues, they
Speaker 1: might not be able to harvest the week. You know,
Speaker 1: who knows what happened and and so you know, if
Speaker 1: you look around the world, you see Brazil or India
Speaker 1: and there kind of being very careful in how they
Speaker 1: react to this crisis. I think one of the reasons
Speaker 1: is because of this, they want to make sure that
Speaker 1: Russia prioritizes, especially India, fertilizer exports to India. UM. So
Speaker 1: you know, Motives is playing a very important to you
Speaker 1: a political game here. He can't just you know, do
Speaker 1: what America wants. And and that's because countries like India,
Speaker 1: North Africa obviously all of Africa, also some in Latin America.
Speaker 1: Their food share of the CPI is much higher than
Speaker 1: it is in the US Europe. And those are going
Speaker 1: to be the countries that suffered this. US Europe. They're
Speaker 1: gonna be fine. They're produced enough food. They don't really
Speaker 1: need exports from Russia and Ukraine. It's really other countries.
Speaker 1: And another one that I didn't mention is China. I'm speculating,
Speaker 1: but you know again, I'm just gonna give you my
Speaker 1: irrationally confident, hyperbolic view, and it's that. Look, I guarantee
Speaker 1: Putin didn't tell sheet what's going on? That that that
Speaker 1: beatings at the Olympics when set on the table, Well, look,
Speaker 1: I mean like the endless friendship or whatever, it was,
Speaker 1: the bottomless pit of love that they kind of. First
Speaker 1: of all, I get so many emails from investors like Marco.
Speaker 1: This is a sign I'm like of what, like, give
Speaker 1: me a clause in this deal, in this treaty, unless
Speaker 1: there's some secret annex I don't know about, like in
Speaker 1: the first of al War, Like this was just like
Speaker 1: a love fest, got it? We love each other, we
Speaker 1: hate NATO? Got it? Okay? God bless you. That's the world.
Speaker 1: But here's the problem with that. China does import food.
Speaker 1: Food prices are gonna matter one. Two, China's pushing on
Speaker 1: a string domestically. Look at the January TSF numbers, you know,
Speaker 1: total social financing. They barely got it up. And they
Speaker 1: only got it up because in the last week of
Speaker 1: January they went all old school stimulus with S and lgfps,
Speaker 1: Like the private sector in China can no longer be
Speaker 1: leveraged off. Household debt is percent of disposable income in
Speaker 1: China's hired in the US. So China staring at like
Speaker 1: another global recession, and we've got political risks at home,
Speaker 1: higher food prices, higher energy prices, and on top of that,
Speaker 1: you didn't tell us ahead of time so that we
Speaker 1: can extract our citizens from Ukraine, you know, I mean,
Speaker 1: you remember at the beginning of this crisis when the
Speaker 1: Chinese were saying, put a little Chinese flags on cars
Speaker 1: so people can identify you as Chinese, which, by the way,
Speaker 1: I'm not sure that's a good thing if Ukrainians think
Speaker 1: that you were on the Russian side. But like, let's
Speaker 1: leave that aside. The point here is that I think
Speaker 1: that the Putain did not tell Chinese what's going on,
Speaker 1: and I think that they are the Chinese economy, other
Speaker 1: than Russia, might be I might have the most to
Speaker 1: lose in this situation. I wonder what you make of
Speaker 1: the argument that we're in a stag relationary environment or
Speaker 1: headed towards one because of all of the rising prices.
Speaker 1: And I've I've seen a ton of notes come into
Speaker 1: my inbox over the past week arguing that potentially we
Speaker 1: could be headed for a stag flationary environment, and some
Speaker 1: people saying we're already and what it's already here? Yeah,
Speaker 1: I was gonna write one of those notes to probably.
Speaker 1: I mean, that's the kipor example, right, I mean that's
Speaker 1: the view of some of the very large asset managers
Speaker 1: out there in the world. Oil presses go up two
Speaker 1: D fifty and we have a recession. Every recession has
Speaker 1: been preceded by doubling in oil prices. Um, you know,
Speaker 1: something that we kind of forget, not just the yellow
Speaker 1: curb in version, but also doubling the oil presses. I
Speaker 1: think the risk is there, but the risk of positioning
Speaker 1: yourself for a recession is also enormous, you know, because
Speaker 1: what do you do then you buy ten your yields?
Speaker 1: I mean you do you buy ten your bonds? You
Speaker 1: buy you're going to cash. What happens if this is
Speaker 1: a Georgia scenario. What happens if this is a very
Speaker 1: short term like and by the way, in short terms
Speaker 1: like a month long conflict, terrifying, lots of human destruction,
Speaker 1: lots of pain. But then and offer him. And in
Speaker 1: that situation, with the amount of household network that is
Speaker 1: built up in the US, I'm not sure that you
Speaker 1: necessarily want to be positioned as if you're asset the
Speaker 1: location is expecting in a recession, you know. So that's
Speaker 1: why I would be I would stay very light on
Speaker 1: my feet right now. I would like commodities. I think
Speaker 1: they're the new risk verity. I like to play both
Speaker 1: inflation or just more inflation through a commodity paradigm. But
Speaker 1: I don't want to make any other decisions in terms
Speaker 1: of ascid location right now. I just want to see
Speaker 1: whether we are in that two thousand a Georgia scenario
Speaker 1: or if we're in some new world where you know,
Speaker 1: this last a very long time and then you have
Speaker 1: all these other consequences. They are negative Marco. Uh. You know,
Speaker 1: clock Tower has a lot of interactions with hedge funds obviously, Uh,
Speaker 1: sort of the whole purpose of the firm. I'm curious
Speaker 1: if you're have a sense of what sort of the
Speaker 1: hedge fund community is doing. I mean, someone's buying this
Speaker 1: dip inequities this week. But to me, I almost feel
Speaker 1: like hedge funds can kind of turn into day traders
Speaker 1: in a situation like this, sort of which is good.
Speaker 1: But Mike, that's that's what you have to do. And
Speaker 1: that's my point. You cannot make global asci location decisions
Speaker 1: right now. You've got to be a trader, you know.
Speaker 1: And I've seen this. I've seen real talent in the
Speaker 1: mac community emerge out of the COVID christ this same
Speaker 1: and we truly believe we've seated some of those guys.
Speaker 1: We think they're awesome, and we think that this environment
Speaker 1: is very volatile multipole of world where we will have
Speaker 1: events like this require active hedge fund macro guys to
Speaker 1: do the day trading when this stuff starts happening. But
Speaker 1: what I will say is that I do think that overall, overall,
Speaker 1: the macro community was basically buying tech shorting energy still
Speaker 1: like I don't think like I don't think enough investors
Speaker 1: in the macro sense, Uh, we're ready to give up
Speaker 1: like US tech story. Uh. And I think that's a
Speaker 1: mistake because listen, January selloff had zero to do with Russia. Zero.
Speaker 1: You know, when you see like Latin American effects I performed,
Speaker 1: it's not because people are worried about like emergent market war.
Speaker 1: What January was about was a serious rotation. Now Ukraine
Speaker 1: Russia could be the delta, the delta strain, and what
Speaker 1: I mean by that in March, from November to March one,
Speaker 1: we had this beautiful rotation into basically the reflations trade,
Speaker 1: and then what happens. Delta shows up, China starts doing austerity,
Speaker 1: the ten year yields starts going down, check Out performs
Speaker 1: rest for another like six to eight months. Ukraine Russia
Speaker 1: could play the same role if we settle into some
Speaker 1: sort of a low intensity conflict where that still keeps
Speaker 1: safety having bids up there, the tenure could like rally
Speaker 1: significantly enough to give Tech another six months of use.
Speaker 1: But I fear that this is much more of a
Speaker 1: binary outcome. Either we have an off ramp and put
Speaker 1: in realizes constraints and then the tenure resumes itself off
Speaker 1: and tech gets killed or this is like near World
Speaker 1: War three, and then why the heck are you inequities? Anyways?
Speaker 1: So I don't really see a way in which like
Speaker 1: Nasadack continues throughout perform. I think that's a head fake
Speaker 1: and I wouldn't be following that that kind of an
Speaker 1: investment recommendation. Tien up your st eight jackets. It's time
Speaker 1: for the craziest things we saw in markets this week? Well,
Speaker 1: vol donna um, even in these trying, uncertain times, I
Speaker 1: think we need to stick with our tradition of the
Speaker 1: craziest thing we saw in markets this week? I want
Speaker 1: you to kick it off. What's the craziest thing you saw?
Speaker 1: One of the wildest things was a story from our
Speaker 1: friend Katie Greif felt actually, and as you know, the
Speaker 1: Russian stock market has been closed this week, but there
Speaker 1: was one way for investors to see how Russia centric
Speaker 1: stocks were faring and how they might trade when things
Speaker 1: open back up, and that's through ETFs. So on Monday
Speaker 1: there was a Vanic fund that fell and an i
Speaker 1: SES fund that felt, and those losses have just been
Speaker 1: staggering obviously, but it is just one way to see
Speaker 1: how things might play out once the Russian stock market reopens.
Speaker 1: But to me, the craziest part is they both saw
Speaker 1: a lot of inflows. I believe didn't they They did,
Speaker 1: but I think it was for the creation redemption process
Speaker 1: so people can short it. I don't know. It could
Speaker 1: be yeah, I think, but not not because people were bullish.
Speaker 1: I mean potentially, I think there there have been some
Speaker 1: stories where retail traders are really interested in some of these.
Speaker 1: I saw Eric Beltuna's tweeting about r s UX, one
Speaker 1: of the funds, seeing a lot of interest on the
Speaker 1: tdamer trade website and seeing many more by orders than
Speaker 1: sell orders. But the Reddit crowd is all in on
Speaker 1: they want to buy these Ukrainian war bonds. They I
Speaker 1: saw that story too. I guess how about you, Marker,
Speaker 1: Do you see anything crazy this week? I mean there's
Speaker 1: so many things. I mean, yesterday's ECB burbage and the
Speaker 1: carnage did in the bondo markets in Europe. The crazy
Speaker 1: moves in the bond market to me, has been the
Speaker 1: sort of most like just not you know, it's such
Speaker 1: a macro variable. It's moving to alt it with such
Speaker 1: a vutility. But I'm actually gonna give you something that's
Speaker 1: a little less market. It's more like geopolitical. I think
Speaker 1: the craziest thing that I've seen were those lineups in
Speaker 1: Russian McDonald's to access the A T M S A
Speaker 1: T M machines, because you know, twenty years ago, like
Speaker 1: well no more, when I was like eight years old.
Speaker 1: You know, I stood in those lineups and Communist Yugoslavia
Speaker 1: to get my taste of American originality, of American fool
Speaker 1: And it wasn't for the quality of the food. Like you,
Speaker 1: Phil Dona knows what's up. Like, we got better food
Speaker 1: in the Balkans than a big Mac. But you you
Speaker 1: wanted that big mac for a different reason. And again
Speaker 1: I go back to the point of white Vladimir Putin
Speaker 1: has been popular in Russia. You know, it's not because
Speaker 1: he beats people over the head with the police. It's
Speaker 1: because he's delivered stability. And the fact that now twenty
Speaker 1: years later, you go from waiting in a line to
Speaker 1: to get a taste of a big mac, waiting in
Speaker 1: a line to withdraw cash, that is going to imprint
Speaker 1: on the Russian Psychekee particular set of memories that are
Speaker 1: going to piss people off. Absolutely. I think Vobano only
Speaker 1: eats the impossible burger whopper these days. Is there it?
Speaker 1: I wouldn't even need that one, even I would like,
Speaker 1: is there a cauliflower? But you need it's coming, It's coming. Listen, listen.
Speaker 1: All that stuff is nothing. All right, great stuff. I'll
Speaker 1: give you mine quickly here because we're going on a
Speaker 1: long time. But the fact that Ukraine is soliciting donations
Speaker 1: to its cause via the cryptocurrency market kind of blows
Speaker 1: my mind. They're accepting bitcoin and ethereum. Someone sent them
Speaker 1: on Twitter, at least they claim to send them. I
Speaker 1: think a few million dollars worth of Polka dot the crypto,
Speaker 1: and uh, there are people saying can't you send us
Speaker 1: mint some n f T s and response as if
Speaker 1: like n f T s or the New War bonds.
Speaker 1: I find it crazy. But also Marco, you know, this
Speaker 1: whole week has brought up a lot of discussions about
Speaker 1: the role of the dollar internationally, the potential role of
Speaker 1: crypto in either you know, Russians dodging sanctions or donating
Speaker 1: to Ukraine. And you know, a lot of people believe
Speaker 1: that this was a water shed event as far as
Speaker 1: the financial world order, and that perhaps this is something
Speaker 1: that knocks the dollar off its its pedestal as as
Speaker 1: sort of the the global reserve currency, and you know,
Speaker 1: the the only currency we transact commodity commodities in most commodities. Anyway,
Speaker 1: I'm curious what do you think about that? Is there
Speaker 1: a risk to the dollar from all these sanctions? I
Speaker 1: think philosophically, I'm totally with you. Is crypto going to
Speaker 1: replace it? I don't think so, but I definitely think
Speaker 1: in emerging markets. You know, one of the reasons I
Speaker 1: took crypto seriously is because of emerging markets. When I saw,
Speaker 1: like the Brazilian we're starting to use bitcoin. You know,
Speaker 1: this is when I realized, like, wait, this is serious stuff.
Speaker 1: So I agree with you, but I would actually take
Speaker 1: your question a different direction if I made just really
Speaker 1: quickly I think. I think what's interesting also about this
Speaker 1: war is that there is a generational component to it.
Speaker 1: And what I mean by that is that fundamentally, like
Speaker 1: a lot of reprutin is basically pursuing like boomer foreign pulse.
Speaker 1: The interesting issue is that the metaverse, broadly defined, is
Speaker 1: making it very difficult for a nation state to promote
Speaker 1: a nation state propaganda because people have access to all
Speaker 1: sorts of channels. Now people are kind of riding on
Speaker 1: TikTok because there's a lot of like fake stuff going
Speaker 1: on in TikTok right now, and that's fine, But the
Speaker 1: point is that you can access different viewpoints and a
Speaker 1: lot of people in Russia are same with Ukraine, and
Speaker 1: that's I think creating a really interesting dynamic that none
Speaker 1: of us are really talking about right now. But I
Speaker 1: think it's going to be increasingly more and more difficult
Speaker 1: to create a narrative of irridentism, of nationalism, of revounctionism,
Speaker 1: just like purely from top down, like what happened in
Speaker 1: my country, for example, with Slobano. Milust is controlling the
Speaker 1: media and basically telling everyone like, oh, we need to
Speaker 1: go and defend you know this, us in that, and
Speaker 1: then everyone's like, yeah, let's do that, and then it
Speaker 1: takes a decade of destruction of the economy and politics
Speaker 1: of the country for people to finally revolve. Now it's
Speaker 1: kind of more it's easier. It's easier to just show
Speaker 1: your grandma, like, hey, grandma, maybe you should look at
Speaker 1: this TikTok video to see what's going on, like look
Speaker 1: at his child in Ukraine dying. And that's that's where
Speaker 1: I think that crypto matavers, Web three, starlink, all this
Speaker 1: stuff is having a really interesting and I think potentially
Speaker 1: extremely positive and humane evolution in today's world. I wish
Speaker 1: this stuff existed in the nineties when my country. Well,
Speaker 1: it's the simple fact that everyone has a high definition
Speaker 1: video camera in their pocket right now. You know, I
Speaker 1: always stick back into the nightmares when I was a
Speaker 1: kid that we're well in you know nine four scenario
Speaker 1: where we thought the state would be spying on us constantly,
Speaker 1: and it seems like the reverses being true. That you know,
Speaker 1: the people are holding the the powers to be accountable
Speaker 1: with the uh smartphone. Yeah, and I think the Internet
Speaker 1: in space is a big deal. It's a very very
Speaker 1: big deal because if you can continue to project information
Speaker 1: through pipelines that exists in the air, like that's came
Speaker 1: over for many countries in the world that repress information
Speaker 1: from there from their public I do wonder if Putin
Speaker 1: is going to have something to say to Elon Musk
Speaker 1: someday for sending his his startling satellites over you and listen.
Speaker 1: Those things are the size of a grapefruit, so good
Speaker 1: luck trying to knock them out. So fair enough, fair enough, Marco. UH,
Speaker 1: really fascinating conversation. We appreciate your time so much, UH,
Speaker 1: and I hope we can bring you back again to
Speaker 1: UH to get your download in the future anytime. Guys.
Speaker 1: I really enjoyed it. Build on and Mike, it's an
Speaker 1: honor to be on. Thank you What Comes Up. We'll
Speaker 1: be back now sweet. Until then, you can find us
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