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Speaker 1: Oh, it could happen here, and it's currently happening there

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Speaker 1: there being Ukraine, which is in the midst of an

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Speaker 1: invasion by the Russian government. I'm Robert Evans. This is

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Speaker 1: a podcast about bad things and how to make them better,

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Speaker 1: joined as often by Garrison and Chris my co hosts,

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Speaker 1: and we are talking about some of the advice, good

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Speaker 1: and bad, that's been going around on social media about

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Speaker 1: how to disable and destroy armored vehicles. This is something

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Speaker 1: we've kind of waited to do until the conflict was

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Speaker 1: a little bit more of a mature state. But in

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Speaker 1: brief if you have been following what's been happening in

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Speaker 1: Russia through the lens of social media or what's pepping

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Speaker 1: in Ukraine through the lens of social media, one thing

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Speaker 1: that has happened is in the early stages of the invasion,

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Speaker 1: a whole bunch of people flocked, particularly to Twitter, but

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Speaker 1: also not this did not just stay on Twitter. There

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Speaker 1: were large number of mainstreams news articles published on the

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Speaker 1: subject of the things people were saying to talk about

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Speaker 1: different ways civilians could disable Russian armored vehicles or otherwise

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Speaker 1: stymy and thwart the progress of Russian military units through

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Speaker 1: their cities. Um. And this has been accompanied by things

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Speaker 1: like the Ukrainian government giving out information on how to

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Speaker 1: make molotov cocktails. We talked about this in our Molotov

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Speaker 1: Cocktail episode and putting out really neat infographics on where

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Speaker 1: to throw molotov cocktails to disable armored vehicles. But it's

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Speaker 1: also come with a lot of bad advice that I

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Speaker 1: don't want people who are maybe looking at the potential

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Speaker 1: of urban combat happening in their future to take away

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Speaker 1: from this conflict, because there's also a lot of disinfos.

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Speaker 1: So that's what we're talking about today. Yes, And I

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Speaker 1: guess one of the first places to probably discuss this

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Speaker 1: urban combat idea is they probably the guy who's tried

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Speaker 1: to make kind of a career out of talking about

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Speaker 1: ourban combat, which would be who wrote a relatively viral

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Speaker 1: Twitter thread on this topic and has been writing about

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Speaker 1: this thing for the past few years. Um. He's a

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Speaker 1: he's the the chair of Urban Warfare Studies at West

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Speaker 1: Points Modern War Institute and served for like a quarter

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Speaker 1: of a century as an infantry soldier, including two deployments

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Speaker 1: into Iraq. And yeah, the past few years he's tried

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Speaker 1: to kind of make a name for himself as the

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Speaker 1: guy who writes about urban combat. And obviously since this

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Speaker 1: was happening largely when Russia started invading Kiev, John Spetzer

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Speaker 1: put put together some of his thoughts that went pretty

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Speaker 1: viral on this on this said topic, Yeah, and it's

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Speaker 1: it's frustrating. You've got a quote in here from one

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Speaker 1: of the articles about he was giving out that says

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Speaker 1: some of his advice such is preparing simple molotov cocktails,

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Speaker 1: it's already being seen on the streets of Kiev, which

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Speaker 1: is kind of framing it as if Spencer advised the Ukrainians.

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Speaker 1: Absolutely not true. Before he made that threat, the government

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Speaker 1: was urging people to rest. And also, like molotov cocktails

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Speaker 1: got their name from people in Finland, not super far

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Speaker 1: from Ukraine, resisting the Russian military in a very similar

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Speaker 1: way to add, they're being used by Ukrainian civilians. Now, Um,

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Speaker 1: what I I believe what John Spencer did. He's a

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Speaker 1: guy with some qualifications. Um, certainly like not a random person.

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Speaker 1: We'll talk about random people giving advice to on Twitter.

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Speaker 1: But he's also all None of his advice is new,

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Speaker 1: none of it is from him, None of it is

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Speaker 1: counter intuitive. A good deal of it is bad, and

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Speaker 1: most of what he said that is good is just

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Speaker 1: him pulling things from US military combat manuals and from

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Speaker 1: Ukrainian military combat manuals and then putting it up in

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Speaker 1: social media in order to go viral and try to

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Speaker 1: get another book deal by making it look as if

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Speaker 1: he is giving advice that is being adopted in real time,

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Speaker 1: which is not what is happening. Yeah, I mean, like

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Speaker 1: a good, good instance of this is yeah claiming that

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Speaker 1: they're making multiv cocktails due to his advice. I mean,

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Speaker 1: there's a picture in that very article that was taken

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Speaker 1: before he even posted that thread. So it's like, no,

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Speaker 1: they're they're few people know how to make all have cocktails.

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Speaker 1: That's not hard to find out. In a lot of cases,

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Speaker 1: the Ukrainian Ukrainian government was giving out instructions on how

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Speaker 1: to do it. And I mean, and if you if

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Speaker 1: you look at this picture, um, it looks very similar

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Speaker 1: to a lot of a lot of like the the

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Speaker 1: almost like small defensive weapons factories that we saw across

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Speaker 1: the States. You would often see just collections of bottles, uh,

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Speaker 1: just ready to be thrown, all kind of laid out

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Speaker 1: in in in milk crates very similar to this photo.

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Speaker 1: Now there was there was less actual molotov cocktails, but

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Speaker 1: the way that this is whole, the way this all

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Speaker 1: set up looks, looks very similar to any kind of

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Speaker 1: insurgency tactics of being like, yeah, there's gonna be spontaneous

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Speaker 1: on the ground organizing because people are just kind of

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Speaker 1: naturally gifted at that. And on a on an objective level,

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Speaker 1: molotov cocktails have a place on an urban battlefield. They

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Speaker 1: can be useful weapons for disabling armored vehicles, for causing distractions,

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Speaker 1: for injuring and even sometimes killing soldiers. They are they

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Speaker 1: are capable of doing that, and they that's part of

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Speaker 1: why the Ukrainian government put out these guides showing like

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Speaker 1: where to huck the sons of bitches in order to

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Speaker 1: disable you know, transports and armored vehicles and whatnot. Now

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Speaker 1: that said, attempting to attack a military column with a

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Speaker 1: Molotov cocktail in most circumstances is very close to suicidal,

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Speaker 1: and I've watched a number of videos of Ukrainians do it.

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Speaker 1: In the times that seemed to be most successful is

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Speaker 1: when you have areas where the Russians are attempting to

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Speaker 1: establish control. You have small groups of vehicles that are

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Speaker 1: moving down residential streets. You have a significant amount of

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Speaker 1: traffic of civilian traffic occurring alongside those military convoys. And

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Speaker 1: as they passed the convoy, a civilian hucks a molotov,

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Speaker 1: or as they pass a building, a civilian hucksa molotov.

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Speaker 1: Um and those seem to be, broadly speaking, the situations

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Speaker 1: in which people have kind of gotten away with it.

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Speaker 1: We don't have any kind of I'm not aware of

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Speaker 1: any kind of solid, uh overarching analysis of all of

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Speaker 1: the use of molotovs in this but that is, broadly speaking,

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Speaker 1: a potentially effective way to use a molotov cocktail UH

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Speaker 1: in order to degrade military capacity of an occupier. What

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Speaker 1: doesn't work, and what Spencer and a number of other

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Speaker 1: people suggested is is huck and paint at tanks or

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Speaker 1: other armored vehicles. And that may be surprising to a

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Speaker 1: lot of people. I think there's a lot of folks

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Speaker 1: who want to believe this, UH want to believe that

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Speaker 1: that that could really work, because it's like you walk ship, right,

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Speaker 1: it feels like the kind of thing should be doing. Yes,

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Speaker 1: But here is the thing When you have police officers

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Speaker 1: who are tear gas in an area and you huck

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Speaker 1: a bunch of paint and you get it over their

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Speaker 1: face masks and they cannot see, it reduces their ability

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Speaker 1: to tear gas you for a while. It makes them uncomfortable,

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Speaker 1: it makes them have less fun, and it damages gear.

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Speaker 1: When you huck a bunch of paint at an armored vehicle,

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Speaker 1: the armored vehicle will return fire with a fifty caliber

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Speaker 1: mounted Dashka or some other similar gun which fires bullets

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Speaker 1: that are large enough to take chunks the size of

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Speaker 1: your head out of concrete, and you will be torn

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Speaker 1: apart in your organs, liquefied in a hail of metal um. Meanwhile,

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Speaker 1: the paint that you are attempting to throw at that

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Speaker 1: vehicle is almost certain to have no impact on it. Um.

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Speaker 1: Not only are you unlikely to get close enough to

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Speaker 1: use the paint, because you have to be considerably closer

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Speaker 1: to do that than you have to with a molotov

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Speaker 1: in most situations, but also tanks are built with the

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Speaker 1: understanding that it is possible that one or more of

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Speaker 1: the ways in which they see will be obstructed. Tank

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Speaker 1: drivers are trained to drive blind. There are ways of

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Speaker 1: utilizing tanks when vision is obstructed, because in the kinds

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Speaker 1: of fights that tanks are built to get into, they

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Speaker 1: are often in situations where there is so much smoke

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Speaker 1: around the exactly that there is effectively zero visibility, which

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Speaker 1: is why when Spencer started talking about people throwing paint

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Speaker 1: at tanks, a number of tank drivers came out and said,

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Speaker 1: that's actually horrible advice, like they don't work that way,

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Speaker 1: and I was, I was chatting with a couple of people. Um,

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Speaker 1: there was one fellow former Green brand name Mike Nelson

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Speaker 1: who was posting about Spencer and very angry that he

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Speaker 1: was basically copying material directly from stuff published by the

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Speaker 1: Ukrainian government, and then like getting up anytime journalists or

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Speaker 1: media figures would comment about Ukraine, would like, there's a

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Speaker 1: nasty post here where Anne Cabrera, who I think is

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Speaker 1: some sort of reporter, was like, I feel heartsick upon

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Speaker 1: the latest news out of Mariopol. My god, just like

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Speaker 1: expressing horror and human terry and tragedy. And Spencer posts

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Speaker 1: a link to his personal website and says me too,

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Speaker 1: not sure if you saw my mini manual for the

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Speaker 1: Urban Defender, but it is available in English and UKRAINI. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: it's so like anyway grifty ship like that. But because

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Speaker 1: that it's all that's very different than also like throwing

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Speaker 1: paint at like a squad car or like a riot

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Speaker 1: like a riot truck that's coming through because if obscure

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Speaker 1: their vision, the worst that they can do is crash

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Speaker 1: into a wall. They're not going to start firing uh

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Speaker 1: massive explosion rounds from a central Uh. Yeah. So they

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Speaker 1: they do not like for one thing, the like the police,

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Speaker 1: as bad as they can be, their default when they

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Speaker 1: come under any kind of like attack is not to

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Speaker 1: start firing machine guns wildly in all directions, which Russian

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Speaker 1: not yet at least. Um. But you know, the other

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Speaker 1: thing I was chatting with Matthew Mora, who's a is

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Speaker 1: has been one of the guys who's biling ailing get

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Speaker 1: spencer on Twitter. Matthew was a Marine Corps tank commander

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Speaker 1: and was blown up in Afghanistan. So he was in

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Speaker 1: a tank that was attacked several times and eventually destroyed. UM.

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Speaker 1: So he's he has some firsthand knowledge about what works

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Speaker 1: and does not work against tanks. And one of the

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Speaker 1: things he pointed out is that the people who destroyed

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Speaker 1: his tank put together I don't know, hundred two hundred

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Speaker 1: dollars worth of various accelerants and random scrap metal and

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Speaker 1: made a bomb that destroyed an Abrams tank that works

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Speaker 1: a lot better than paint, and it's it's the kind

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Speaker 1: of thing where I think one of the things that's

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Speaker 1: frustrating here is you've got a lot of these like

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Speaker 1: American kind of military academic guys. And I know Spencer served,

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Speaker 1: but that doesn't necessarily mean much. That doesn't mean just

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Speaker 1: being deployed to Iraq doesn't mean you did anything. But

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Speaker 1: they were deployed, and maybe they did see urban combat.

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Speaker 1: But I have watched United States soldiers in an intense

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Speaker 1: urban combat environment, uh, and most of what they did

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Speaker 1: was be inside of m wraps because it's very hard

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Speaker 1: to blow those up. While the Iraqi military did a

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Speaker 1: great deal of the fighting, and when US soldiers did

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Speaker 1: engage in fighting, they did so with absolute air supremacy

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Speaker 1: and with artillery supremacy. Um. Which isn't to say that

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Speaker 1: it wasn't dangerous, but it is a profoundly different situation

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Speaker 1: than engaging in urban combat when the air space is

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Speaker 1: contested and when you do not have artillery supremacy. So

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Speaker 1: what does that mean in terms of like what can

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Speaker 1: people actually take away that's useful from this, UM. Well,

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Speaker 1: on an individual level, somethings have been extremely effective. Ukrainian

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Speaker 1: territorial defense militias have been very effective at doing things

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Speaker 1: like picking up small arms, going out in small patrols

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Speaker 1: into uh rural environments around the area where Russian troops

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Speaker 1: are moving in small convoys, and oftentimes, because of the

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Speaker 1: way the advance went, you would have a single or

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Speaker 1: a couple of Russian munition trucks essentially alone and unsupported,

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Speaker 1: trying to find their way around. UM. You had civilians

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Speaker 1: doing stuff like turning signs around, like removing signs, which

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Speaker 1: they were instructed to by the areas Kraatian officials as well. Yes, yes,

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Speaker 1: and which I'm sure some people just started doing because

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Speaker 1: it seemed like a good idea. UM. But that sort

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Speaker 1: of ship causes them to burn fuel, causes them to

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Speaker 1: abandon vehicles. You had these kind of independent groups of

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Speaker 1: farmers towing away abandoned vehicles. You had small raiding parties

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Speaker 1: attacking convoys and attacking isolated units. You had cases where

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Speaker 1: you know, Russian military units early in the fight would

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Speaker 1: get into Kiev uh kind of on accident and be

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Speaker 1: ambushed by territorial defense units and wiped out. And those

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Speaker 1: are all very effective examples of of decentralized kind of

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Speaker 1: ground up resistance against a major military force. Now, one

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Speaker 1: thing we don't know that is important if you think

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Speaker 1: about the potential that you might have to endure something

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Speaker 1: like this, is we have no idea what the casualties

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Speaker 1: were like among those kids. It is a total black box.

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Speaker 1: And it's it's probable that part of why Russian forces

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Speaker 1: did the war crime they did in Bucca Um was

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Speaker 1: because they had an attitude that all civilians were insurgents,

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Speaker 1: which is, you know what happens when you have kind

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Speaker 1: of a people's war, which doesn't justify an act of

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Speaker 1: genocide um, but it is something people should keep aware of.

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Speaker 1: When you start fucking with the signs and ambushing the

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Speaker 1: convoys and throwing Molotov's, one of the things that will

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Speaker 1: happen is it will accelerate the violence that is being done. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: and it makes to the civilian justified target in some

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Speaker 1: you know propaganda lens, Yeah exactly. And that doesn't mean

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Speaker 1: like it's you should resist if you are invaded. Um,

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Speaker 1: But these are things that also should be noted, is

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Speaker 1: this is what happens when you resist, right that this

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Speaker 1: is what a modern war of this type looks like.

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Speaker 1: Other things that I'm not sure if they've been effective,

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Speaker 1: but they're certainly not bad strategies. Is the construction of

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Speaker 1: a lot of vehicle barriers, tank traps. But next is

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Speaker 1: the barricade thing, both than what we've been kind of

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Speaker 1: seeing or speculated about in the East, and then how

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Speaker 1: we've seen you know, barricade set ups a lot in

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Speaker 1: the past few years in various resistance movements to you know,

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Speaker 1: a variety of success levels and non success levels. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: and and and these are like, you know, barriers tank

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Speaker 1: traps of a very long history in warfare. So they

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Speaker 1: absolutely can be and have been effective many many times

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Speaker 1: on the battlefield. So this is not an area of

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Speaker 1: does this thing work, but it is a question of

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Speaker 1: like and and this is something we just don't seem

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Speaker 1: to have perfect data on did it Did it particularly

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Speaker 1: play a role in what's happening here? And Um, that's

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Speaker 1: harder to tell. Um, And it's probably going to be different,

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Speaker 1: you know, depending on the tactical in an area you're

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Speaker 1: talking about, which kind of like theater you're talking about.

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Speaker 1: But um, you know one thing that's like the way

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Speaker 1: in which these kind of barriers hedgehoggs and like whatnot work.

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Speaker 1: Is there there an area denial tool. It's like an

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Speaker 1: area denial tool four vehicles, um. And it makes military

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Speaker 1: units slow down, it makes them take more time in

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Speaker 1: clearing area. Um. They have to tow things away or

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Speaker 1: blow them up. Um. And they also can provide, depending

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Speaker 1: on the type of thing, cover for infantry and in

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Speaker 1: urban combat situations, which obviously can cut both ways a

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Speaker 1: little bit. But there's a reason why you see these

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Speaker 1: kinds of things in every conflict and also a reason

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Speaker 1: why people put them up in protests. It can be

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Speaker 1: very useful to deny the vehicles of the enemy access

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Speaker 1: to an area temporarily, and a big pile of metal

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Speaker 1: always does that of the time. It requires something to

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Speaker 1: deal with it. Yeah, that was something that was very

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Speaker 1: kind of considered when there was an increase in like

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Speaker 1: vehicular attacks, UH, during like a lot of vehicles running

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Speaker 1: into a massive, massive marches, there was definitely a concerted

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Speaker 1: effort to try to block off streets where stuff is happening,

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Speaker 1: whether that be like you know, corkers for marches of

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Speaker 1: people who specifically block off the sides of streets with

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Speaker 1: their own cars to follow the march around, or you know,

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Speaker 1: less less effective arricades like throwing a chain lenk fence

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Speaker 1: in the middle of the street, which is I guess

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Speaker 1: better than nothing sometimes but also maybe not the most

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Speaker 1: effective thing. Yeah, in terms of trying to like build

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Speaker 1: layered barricades, that's not just you know, one flimsy wall,

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Speaker 1: but it's a series of things that can compress down.

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Speaker 1: And when you're talking about barricades in a kind of

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Speaker 1: militant situation, there's there's broadly speaking, got to be two purposes.

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Speaker 1: One of those purposes is to create a to add

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Speaker 1: to the friction that you are attempting to create for

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Speaker 1: the enemy. And that's that's all insurge. All insurgeon warfare

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Speaker 1: is about creating friction, right, because friction degrades assets. It's

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Speaker 1: over time. It it called basically like, Okay, so say

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Speaker 1: you've blocked off a bunch of roads and you've added

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Speaker 1: fifteen twenty miles to the transport distance that this convoy

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Speaker 1: has to go. Well, generally speaking, in the case of war.

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Speaker 1: When we're talking about war, it's assumed that about one

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Speaker 1: mile is in terms of wear and tear like tins

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Speaker 1: plus miles um. Because of how much more difficult the

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Speaker 1: strain on vehicles is in those situations. So you've added

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Speaker 1: a great deal more strain on the vehicles. That increases

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Speaker 1: the chance that one of them is gonna blow a tire,

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Speaker 1: one of them gonna crack an axle, one of them

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Speaker 1: is going to have an engine block go like blow

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Speaker 1: or whatever, um. Which means over time, if you're doing

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Speaker 1: this a bunch, if you're setting up de ricades and

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Speaker 1: you're effectively increasing or all the amount of travel time

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Speaker 1: or at least the amount of idoling time that forces

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Speaker 1: have to go in by a significant amount, you're guaranteeing

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Speaker 1: a certain number of those vehicles are going to break

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Speaker 1: or be rendered inoperable in that time. And you're also

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Speaker 1: the other thing that they do is they allow you

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Speaker 1: to deny area and funnel the enemy into a specific

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Speaker 1: into a place more advantageous for you, right, And this

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Speaker 1: can be advantageous if you're trying to set up an ambush,

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Speaker 1: if you're just trying to buy time for forces to

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Speaker 1: move back to a better position. UM it can you know,

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Speaker 1: there's a number of uses for it. But if you

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Speaker 1: set up a series of obstacles like this and guarantee

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Speaker 1: that they're going to have to find an alternate route,

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Speaker 1: and you know, broadly speaking, because it's your terrain, what

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Speaker 1: kind of route they're going to take, UM, then you

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Speaker 1: could do stuff like drop throw a drone at them,

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Speaker 1: or if because of the damage you've done to the

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Speaker 1: roads and the difficulty of how difficult you made it

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Speaker 1: to advance, they wind up just parked for a long time.

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Speaker 1: That's also a great situation to bomb people with a drone,

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Speaker 1: which is by far the most effective weapons unit that

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Speaker 1: we have seen built by civilians in this war. By

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Speaker 1: the way, UH, it's not molotovs, it's certainly not paint.

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Speaker 1: It is UH civilian volunteers who put together combat drones

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Speaker 1: using generally d j I drones that they have upgraded

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Speaker 1: with thermal imaging cameras in order to see at night,

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Speaker 1: and they have used three D printed parts in order

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Speaker 1: to drop bombs from UM and they have done carried

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Speaker 1: out for weeks now hundreds of extremely successful nighttime raids

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Speaker 1: on Russian positions. This has been effective for a couple

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Speaker 1: of reasons. One of them is that the Russian military

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Speaker 1: does not widespread half effective night vision. Um. We don't

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Speaker 1: need to get The reasons for this are complicated, based

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Speaker 1: in a mix of like appropriations, corruption, issues with the

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Speaker 1: technologies they do have, YadA, YadA, YadA, but they do

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Speaker 1: not have the capacity in large scale to carry out

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Speaker 1: operations at night to the extent that the Ukrainians do. UM.

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Speaker 1: And so you get when nighttime comes, these forces that

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Speaker 1: were advancing in places like Kiev clustering up and huddling

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Speaker 1: for the night, and then these hunter killer drones would

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Speaker 1: sneak in at night and they are impossible to fucking

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Speaker 1: see in data them. I can tell you from experience

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Speaker 1: at night, their ghosts just dropping bombs on on armored

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Speaker 1: vehicles and on groups of soldiers. UM. And these you

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Speaker 1: know what you have seen with these units which have

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Speaker 1: been integrated. They are like started out as civilian volunteer groups.

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Speaker 1: They have been integrated into the military to a significant extent.

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Speaker 1: And I think what you do have some of this

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Speaker 1: is conjecture on my part, but you've had a lot

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Speaker 1: of Russian officers in generals killed generally because they have

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Speaker 1: been communicating over open phone lines, and I suspect some

363
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Speaker 1: of what's been going on is when they figure out

364
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Speaker 1: where one of these guys is, they send some of

365
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Speaker 1: these fucking drone units and to blow them up, because

366
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Speaker 1: it's not hard if you know where someone is to

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Speaker 1: kill them with a drone in this way, I think

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Speaker 1: the other thing to talk about in terms of, you know,

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Speaker 1: building obstacles building barricades is the whole cover versus concealment

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Speaker 1: thing where a lot of people think that if they

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Speaker 1: hide behind a barricade, there now impervious, which obviously isn't

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Speaker 1: true if a drone is gonna get you, and obviously

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Speaker 1: isn't true for a large a large number of the

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Speaker 1: ammunitions that get fired, whether they be blitz or tank grounds. Yeah, yeah,

375
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Speaker 1: I mean it's and I think that's something in videos

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Speaker 1: I have watched of Russian soldiers responding to contact, you

377
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Speaker 1: have seen a lot of people in ambushes that they

378
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Speaker 1: lost hiding behind vehicles, um which if it's an armored

379
00:20:16,920 --> 00:20:19,879
Speaker 1: vehicle definitely can protect you from small arm fire, but

380
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Speaker 1: if somebody shoots that vehicle with a with a javelin,

381
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Speaker 1: you may find yourself next to a cooking off tank UM.

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Speaker 1: And I've seen like people hiding behind fucking fences, which

383
00:20:31,440 --> 00:20:35,480
Speaker 1: is terrible to hide behind, UM, failing to go to ground,

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Speaker 1: which is always your best bet is to kind of

385
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Speaker 1: get behind a burm or something, get load of the

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Speaker 1: fucking ground. And it's It's interesting to me a lot

387
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Speaker 1: of the worst videos of responding to contact that I've

388
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Speaker 1: seen on the Russian side have been there the Ross

389
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Speaker 1: Guardia units. I'm not great at pronouncing Russian, but they

390
00:20:51,720 --> 00:20:56,000
Speaker 1: are essentially police special forces units. That actually makes sense.

391
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Speaker 1: They have every video I've seen of these guys hand

392
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Speaker 1: being ambushed very poorly because they're not trained for that.

393
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Speaker 1: They're trained to go bust into a house and arrest somebody,

394
00:21:06,160 --> 00:21:09,240
Speaker 1: you know, like this is not where they're what they're

395
00:21:09,240 --> 00:21:13,000
Speaker 1: supposed to be doing. The other thing that Spencer really

396
00:21:13,000 --> 00:21:17,600
Speaker 1: focuses on is this whole like um sniper idea of

397
00:21:17,600 --> 00:21:21,159
Speaker 1: of being afraid of someone, of someone just cutting you

398
00:21:21,200 --> 00:21:24,359
Speaker 1: down from above, which obviously kind of is you know,

399
00:21:24,520 --> 00:21:26,760
Speaker 1: more of a thing with the drone stuff as well,

400
00:21:27,040 --> 00:21:29,919
Speaker 1: but this idea of not even being good at firearms,

401
00:21:30,000 --> 00:21:32,359
Speaker 1: but just having the threat of taking fire from somewhere

402
00:21:32,400 --> 00:21:35,400
Speaker 1: as you can't see in terms of like knowing your

403
00:21:35,520 --> 00:21:39,119
Speaker 1: terrain better than whatever invading force does and knowing how

404
00:21:39,160 --> 00:21:42,400
Speaker 1: to set up spots where it's it's less you're less

405
00:21:42,400 --> 00:21:47,440
Speaker 1: likely to get shelled. Um, I mean yeah, and that's

406
00:21:47,520 --> 00:21:49,960
Speaker 1: that's very I mean, this is very basic and old

407
00:21:50,560 --> 00:21:55,720
Speaker 1: military doctrine. But this is like, you know, the way

408
00:21:55,840 --> 00:21:58,240
Speaker 1: a sniper can work in a deserve and environment is

409
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Speaker 1: you have a large number of guys and are trying

410
00:22:00,560 --> 00:22:05,159
Speaker 1: to move to a specific area and if they take fire, Um,

411
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Speaker 1: that limits their options from forward movement unless they're willing

412
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Speaker 1: to just risk getting hit, and generally they're not, And

413
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Speaker 1: then you find yourself kind of holding up for time

414
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Speaker 1: to take out the sniper, which can be uninvolved in

415
00:22:17,160 --> 00:22:20,400
Speaker 1: difficult process for just a single sniper. And yeah, that's

416
00:22:20,400 --> 00:22:22,320
Speaker 1: definitely a thing like that. You don't have to be

417
00:22:22,600 --> 00:22:27,080
Speaker 1: the fucking of Chris Kyle in order to effectively work

418
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Speaker 1: in that kind of situation. Now, what makes that effective

419
00:22:29,720 --> 00:22:33,320
Speaker 1: Because if you just have a sniper attacking police officers

420
00:22:33,400 --> 00:22:37,639
Speaker 1: or soldiers in an urban environment, generally speaking, there exists

421
00:22:37,680 --> 00:22:40,359
Speaker 1: the ability to deal with that pretty fucking quickly. But

422
00:22:40,480 --> 00:22:44,320
Speaker 1: if you have small units of snipers kind of oftentimes

423
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Speaker 1: just like civilians with hunting rifles who are doing that

424
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Speaker 1: within the context of soldiers also being resisted by other

425
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Speaker 1: soldiers and dealing with like an active combat environment, then yeah,

426
00:22:55,200 --> 00:22:58,040
Speaker 1: a handful of people with rifles can be a significant

427
00:22:58,040 --> 00:23:00,800
Speaker 1: force multiplier. It's a lot extra to deal with. And

428
00:23:00,840 --> 00:23:03,520
Speaker 1: I suspect ship like that has been part of why

429
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Speaker 1: you have seen cities like Mariopold resists so long under

430
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Speaker 1: overwhelming forces that there's a pretty wide comprehensive amount of

431
00:23:13,880 --> 00:23:17,840
Speaker 1: resistance going on in those areas. UM. And yeah, a

432
00:23:17,880 --> 00:23:21,639
Speaker 1: single person, if they're not like the only person engaging

433
00:23:21,880 --> 00:23:24,840
Speaker 1: with the enemy in that in that area, UM can

434
00:23:24,880 --> 00:23:27,000
Speaker 1: make it a lot harder for them to effectively respond

435
00:23:27,040 --> 00:23:38,680
Speaker 1: to contact. I think the last thing I wanted to

436
00:23:38,720 --> 00:23:42,120
Speaker 1: kind of get into today is the whole I mean,

437
00:23:42,560 --> 00:23:44,480
Speaker 1: this kind of ties them too, the weaponize on reality

438
00:23:44,520 --> 00:23:48,120
Speaker 1: aspect of being like all of these people who are

439
00:23:48,160 --> 00:23:50,800
Speaker 1: giving you know, I'll just listen to advice on Twitter

440
00:23:50,840 --> 00:23:53,639
Speaker 1: dot com, whether they be John Spencer, whether they be

441
00:23:53,800 --> 00:23:56,520
Speaker 1: you know, the wife of a former marine, whether they

442
00:23:56,520 --> 00:24:00,479
Speaker 1: be tank mechanics, whatever, Like everyone's every is doing this

443
00:24:00,520 --> 00:24:02,600
Speaker 1: now and it's all seen as like completely valid. Right,

444
00:24:02,640 --> 00:24:05,960
Speaker 1: We're giving instructions on how to do urban insurgency online. Um,

445
00:24:06,000 --> 00:24:09,560
Speaker 1: and this is totally fine. Yet when you know, when

446
00:24:09,640 --> 00:24:13,120
Speaker 1: information from Hong Kong gets used in protest kind of

447
00:24:13,720 --> 00:24:18,600
Speaker 1: uh propaganda for urban insurgency instructions, then it's like international

448
00:24:19,280 --> 00:24:23,000
Speaker 1: like organized like terrorism. Yeah. Yeah, if you're telling people

449
00:24:23,000 --> 00:24:25,680
Speaker 1: had to use fucking laser pointers, yeah, it's like the

450
00:24:26,040 --> 00:24:28,760
Speaker 1: selective thing. How but you're like, Okay, we're allowed to

451
00:24:28,760 --> 00:24:31,920
Speaker 1: tell people how to do urban insurgency right now, but

452
00:24:32,280 --> 00:24:34,239
Speaker 1: when this is over or in the past, it's it's

453
00:24:34,320 --> 00:24:36,280
Speaker 1: it's not allowed, right. You have John Spencer, who I

454
00:24:36,359 --> 00:24:39,040
Speaker 1: doubt would be giving I doubt was a big fan

455
00:24:39,520 --> 00:24:44,600
Speaker 1: of any Black Lives Matter demonstration justly, but but I

456
00:24:44,600 --> 00:24:47,800
Speaker 1: mean I certainly doubt was giving people instructions and how

457
00:24:47,800 --> 00:24:50,480
Speaker 1: to disable bearcats. Yeah, I don't think he was giving

458
00:24:50,480 --> 00:24:54,280
Speaker 1: instructions on how to ambush police officers or anything like that.

459
00:24:54,800 --> 00:24:57,480
Speaker 1: So you have this whole coalition of people on Twitter

460
00:24:57,560 --> 00:24:59,879
Speaker 1: dot com giving all this advice out how to do

461
00:25:00,080 --> 00:25:03,800
Speaker 1: urban insurgency and whatever. Well, also, you know, whenever something

462
00:25:04,160 --> 00:25:07,080
Speaker 1: is happening like that where they live, it is that

463
00:25:07,080 --> 00:25:09,480
Speaker 1: that is obviously bad and obviously not a good thing.

464
00:25:10,080 --> 00:25:12,120
Speaker 1: Whether you know, for you know, you could talk about

465
00:25:12,160 --> 00:25:15,320
Speaker 1: whatever like ideological drive people have, but I think this

466
00:25:15,400 --> 00:25:17,440
Speaker 1: is just an interesting thing worth talking about in terms

467
00:25:17,480 --> 00:25:19,720
Speaker 1: of how we will offer, we will view. You know,

468
00:25:19,840 --> 00:25:22,520
Speaker 1: this type of discussion of urban insurgency is always like

469
00:25:22,560 --> 00:25:23,920
Speaker 1: a bad thing, all right. It's always this thing that

470
00:25:24,000 --> 00:25:26,439
Speaker 1: like terrorists do, you're helping, you know, you're you're always

471
00:25:26,840 --> 00:25:29,800
Speaker 1: you're rooting for the destruction of civilization or whatever. Um.

472
00:25:30,000 --> 00:25:31,760
Speaker 1: And then it just takes a few things for you

473
00:25:31,840 --> 00:25:34,639
Speaker 1: get you know, an instructor at West Point to start,

474
00:25:34,720 --> 00:25:37,160
Speaker 1: you know, posting threads to help sell his new book

475
00:25:37,160 --> 00:25:40,720
Speaker 1: on these very same topics. Yeah, I mean there's I

476
00:25:40,720 --> 00:25:42,840
Speaker 1: think a little degree to which I might push back

477
00:25:42,880 --> 00:25:44,760
Speaker 1: on some of that, not necessarily with Spencer, but I

478
00:25:44,800 --> 00:25:47,200
Speaker 1: can't remember during like the Fed War in Portland, which

479
00:25:47,280 --> 00:25:49,440
Speaker 1: was the probably the part of Portland that like most

480
00:25:49,480 --> 00:25:51,040
Speaker 1: people are aware of, when you had a bunch of

481
00:25:51,040 --> 00:25:54,320
Speaker 1: federal agents snatching people. It was the most warlike part

482
00:25:54,320 --> 00:25:57,840
Speaker 1: of the you you had for this brief period of

483
00:25:57,880 --> 00:26:01,040
Speaker 1: time a lot of folks because I took parts like

484
00:26:01,119 --> 00:26:04,560
Speaker 1: giving out advice on Twitter to respond to and handle

485
00:26:04,680 --> 00:26:08,480
Speaker 1: police munitions. Um. That when I think that certainly went

486
00:26:08,960 --> 00:26:12,760
Speaker 1: more viral than it would have gone in a different

487
00:26:12,760 --> 00:26:15,880
Speaker 1: sort of situation. Um, And I think you do have.

488
00:26:16,160 --> 00:26:17,679
Speaker 1: I think part of what you're seeing in Ukraine, and

489
00:26:17,680 --> 00:26:19,240
Speaker 1: this is just sort of a general thing that happens

490
00:26:19,280 --> 00:26:24,480
Speaker 1: online is when something a news moment, blows up in

491
00:26:24,520 --> 00:26:27,040
Speaker 1: a way that is like big enough it disrupts the

492
00:26:27,080 --> 00:26:29,600
Speaker 1: norms and suddenly, for a while you can talk about

493
00:26:29,640 --> 00:26:32,560
Speaker 1: things like how to disable government armored vehicles and fight

494
00:26:32,800 --> 00:26:35,919
Speaker 1: like you know, reality suddenly becomes to so much bigger

495
00:26:36,240 --> 00:26:40,320
Speaker 1: and what is what is acceptable? Discourse suddenly expands out

496
00:26:40,720 --> 00:26:42,919
Speaker 1: much bigger than what it usually tells. It becomes a

497
00:26:42,920 --> 00:26:45,360
Speaker 1: lot more permeable. And I do think broadly, like we're

498
00:26:45,359 --> 00:26:48,920
Speaker 1: shooting on Spencer here because he's frustrating to me. Um,

499
00:26:48,960 --> 00:26:52,240
Speaker 1: But I do think that, like, really really broadly. Um.

500
00:26:52,280 --> 00:26:54,159
Speaker 1: It's good when stuff like it's good for people to

501
00:26:54,240 --> 00:26:57,399
Speaker 1: think about. Even if I don't, I certainly don't. I

502
00:26:57,440 --> 00:26:59,920
Speaker 1: certainly do not want there to be I don't want

503
00:27:00,040 --> 00:27:03,000
Speaker 1: anyone listening to this who has not experienced urban warfare

504
00:27:03,000 --> 00:27:05,960
Speaker 1: to experienced urban warfare. I will absolutely, I will, I

505
00:27:05,960 --> 00:27:09,240
Speaker 1: will say that right now. But it is not bad

506
00:27:09,560 --> 00:27:12,040
Speaker 1: for people to be thinking about and talking about the

507
00:27:12,040 --> 00:27:15,199
Speaker 1: ways in which a civilian population can do damage to

508
00:27:15,280 --> 00:27:19,760
Speaker 1: an invading organized military force. That's not a bad discourse

509
00:27:19,800 --> 00:27:23,240
Speaker 1: to exist, and it's not bad for people to be

510
00:27:23,280 --> 00:27:27,560
Speaker 1: thinking in this way, and it's not bad for the

511
00:27:27,600 --> 00:27:31,800
Speaker 1: people who are potentially in power to have that in

512
00:27:31,880 --> 00:27:34,879
Speaker 1: the back of their heads. You know. Yeah. I mean, like,

513
00:27:35,000 --> 00:27:37,440
Speaker 1: the one of the first things you sent me when

514
00:27:37,440 --> 00:27:39,399
Speaker 1: I started working for it could happen here was the

515
00:27:40,200 --> 00:27:43,240
Speaker 1: was the city is not neutral peace? Um on Urban

516
00:27:43,520 --> 00:27:48,960
Speaker 1: combat is hard? Um. Yeah, it's definitely. It's the thing

517
00:27:49,000 --> 00:27:52,120
Speaker 1: that Yeah, it's it's always it's it's worth thinking about.

518
00:27:52,119 --> 00:27:54,160
Speaker 1: But you don't want to We're not trying to wish

519
00:27:54,119 --> 00:27:56,120
Speaker 1: it on anybody. And I think you can. You can

520
00:27:56,119 --> 00:27:59,160
Speaker 1: look at all of like the weirdos on the internet

521
00:27:59,400 --> 00:28:02,000
Speaker 1: who have like, you know this, you know this is

522
00:28:02,040 --> 00:28:03,679
Speaker 1: some degree of like Nazis who have done this, but

523
00:28:03,720 --> 00:28:06,359
Speaker 1: also just like random other people who have like flown

524
00:28:06,400 --> 00:28:09,760
Speaker 1: to Ukraine to help join fight off the Russians because

525
00:28:09,760 --> 00:28:11,159
Speaker 1: they think it's going to be cool and they'll be

526
00:28:11,200 --> 00:28:13,280
Speaker 1: able to work with the ASAF batalion or something, who

527
00:28:13,280 --> 00:28:16,160
Speaker 1: then get stationed to basically be cannon fodder because they're

528
00:28:16,200 --> 00:28:18,600
Speaker 1: this like twenty year old from America who has never

529
00:28:18,600 --> 00:28:21,800
Speaker 1: actually held a gun before. I hope that one's true.

530
00:28:21,960 --> 00:28:24,440
Speaker 1: It is just like a post because if it's true,

531
00:28:24,440 --> 00:28:26,800
Speaker 1: then it means that someone in the Ukrainian government is

532
00:28:26,840 --> 00:28:29,240
Speaker 1: consciously making the choice to use one of the Azov

533
00:28:29,359 --> 00:28:33,239
Speaker 1: veterans as cannon fodder, which is funny, extremely funny. If

534
00:28:33,280 --> 00:28:37,120
Speaker 1: it's happening, right, we don't, that's not that's not confirmed. Certainly,

535
00:28:37,720 --> 00:28:40,680
Speaker 1: a percentage, probably not an insignificant percentage of dudes who

536
00:28:40,680 --> 00:28:42,680
Speaker 1: have done shown up to do this have like been like,

537
00:28:42,680 --> 00:28:45,280
Speaker 1: oh my god, what the fuck? Um. Some of them

538
00:28:45,360 --> 00:28:47,320
Speaker 1: I'm sure just didn't have much experience. I'm sure some

539
00:28:47,320 --> 00:28:49,840
Speaker 1: of them were dudes who had experience being on the

540
00:28:49,880 --> 00:28:53,640
Speaker 1: side with overwhelming air power um, and we're like, oh fuck,

541
00:28:54,040 --> 00:28:56,280
Speaker 1: but you also do It's fair to note like the

542
00:28:56,600 --> 00:29:00,560
Speaker 1: stories of people like having like freaking out go viral. Um.

543
00:29:00,600 --> 00:29:03,720
Speaker 1: There's plenty of videos of like mixed foreigner units in

544
00:29:03,840 --> 00:29:06,960
Speaker 1: heavy combat, including a bunch where you can hear US

545
00:29:07,040 --> 00:29:10,400
Speaker 1: and British dudes like because a lot. There's a lot

546
00:29:10,400 --> 00:29:13,800
Speaker 1: of people who have legitimate, like hard combat experience who

547
00:29:13,800 --> 00:29:16,200
Speaker 1: have have volunteered to go do this. Yeah. The one

548
00:29:16,200 --> 00:29:20,360
Speaker 1: thing I also do find kind of uncomfortable is I mean, no,

549
00:29:20,520 --> 00:29:22,240
Speaker 1: it's not super unlike what what what we're doing now

550
00:29:22,280 --> 00:29:23,600
Speaker 1: that we're trying to come at it from a more

551
00:29:24,440 --> 00:29:28,640
Speaker 1: uh like critical standpoint, but like Americans who maybe have

552
00:29:28,720 --> 00:29:32,280
Speaker 1: gone to a protest or two but no real experience,

553
00:29:32,400 --> 00:29:35,200
Speaker 1: just going on Twitter dot com and talking about how

554
00:29:35,280 --> 00:29:39,720
Speaker 1: they think beating an army is best done, how that works. Yeah. Well,

555
00:29:39,720 --> 00:29:41,440
Speaker 1: and like you know, if if you look at like

556
00:29:41,480 --> 00:29:45,880
Speaker 1: the okay, like the times that like the US has

557
00:29:45,920 --> 00:29:48,880
Speaker 1: actually attempted to fight its own army, right Like the

558
00:29:49,160 --> 00:29:51,960
Speaker 1: last time this happened was the l l A Riot

559
00:29:52,000 --> 00:29:55,560
Speaker 1: and ninety two and they got their ship pushed in

560
00:29:56,160 --> 00:30:00,480
Speaker 1: like it it went really really badly. The people on

561
00:30:00,480 --> 00:30:03,520
Speaker 1: this was really ugly. There was yeah, and like and

562
00:30:03,560 --> 00:30:05,200
Speaker 1: you know, and part part of what you know, and

563
00:30:05,200 --> 00:30:07,640
Speaker 1: I will say, like part of what's I guess you

564
00:30:07,760 --> 00:30:09,240
Speaker 1: still about this is like yeah, this is I mean,

565
00:30:09,240 --> 00:30:10,640
Speaker 1: this is the thing that is. I mean I wasn't

566
00:30:10,640 --> 00:30:13,719
Speaker 1: alive for it, but like at like Robert you were

567
00:30:13,760 --> 00:30:17,000
Speaker 1: alive for that, like like that that that is a

568
00:30:17,080 --> 00:30:19,800
Speaker 1: thing like in living memory, the army has been deployed

569
00:30:20,240 --> 00:30:22,480
Speaker 1: on American soil. And one of the things that went

570
00:30:22,520 --> 00:30:26,800
Speaker 1: wrong is that the people on the ground had basically

571
00:30:26,840 --> 00:30:28,680
Speaker 1: no time. And this is something you can read from

572
00:30:28,720 --> 00:30:31,600
Speaker 1: from like the armies accounts of this, is that like

573
00:30:31,680 --> 00:30:33,720
Speaker 1: the people that they were dealing with had no tactical

574
00:30:33,760 --> 00:30:35,640
Speaker 1: experience what wherever they did it, they had no conception

575
00:30:35,640 --> 00:30:38,440
Speaker 1: of tactics, and the army was able to very quickly

576
00:30:38,440 --> 00:30:41,400
Speaker 1: crush them. And you know, if if you don't want

577
00:30:41,440 --> 00:30:43,480
Speaker 1: that to happen to you, yeah, like that there there

578
00:30:43,560 --> 00:30:46,600
Speaker 1: there is a way, which is stuff is important to

579
00:30:46,640 --> 00:30:49,400
Speaker 1: be thinking about. But also like, dear God, that is

580
00:30:49,480 --> 00:30:54,400
Speaker 1: the worst ship, Like, yeah, you didn't want that. Here

581
00:30:54,520 --> 00:30:59,320
Speaker 1: here's what's what's important to understand about that. Anytime you

582
00:30:59,360 --> 00:31:06,200
Speaker 1: are dealing with any kind of conflict, like physical conflict

583
00:31:06,280 --> 00:31:09,280
Speaker 1: that involves violence, and and that can be as narrow

584
00:31:09,360 --> 00:31:12,360
Speaker 1: as like a protest, you know, where people are squaring

585
00:31:12,360 --> 00:31:15,320
Speaker 1: off with the cops, or an actual like full on

586
00:31:15,960 --> 00:31:20,800
Speaker 1: military conflict, the winner is the person who is most

587
00:31:20,880 --> 00:31:26,480
Speaker 1: disruptive to the enemies. Ode loop, right, um, observe, orient,

588
00:31:26,760 --> 00:31:29,600
Speaker 1: decide act. That's the loop that you go through when

589
00:31:29,600 --> 00:31:31,400
Speaker 1: you are trying to decide how to act in any

590
00:31:31,440 --> 00:31:34,680
Speaker 1: kind of a kinetic situation um on the streets and

591
00:31:34,720 --> 00:31:36,880
Speaker 1: a protest. One of the things where I where we

592
00:31:36,920 --> 00:31:41,080
Speaker 1: have all seen people be the most successful against cops

593
00:31:41,200 --> 00:31:43,480
Speaker 1: is when you change the rules on them. Is when

594
00:31:43,520 --> 00:31:46,160
Speaker 1: they are in a situation they did not anticipate being in,

595
00:31:46,320 --> 00:31:48,160
Speaker 1: because they tend to freak out and they tend to

596
00:31:48,160 --> 00:31:51,280
Speaker 1: respond and effectively, right, you do not want to if

597
00:31:51,280 --> 00:31:53,400
Speaker 1: you see them preparing to act in a certain way

598
00:31:53,480 --> 00:31:55,880
Speaker 1: because they believe you are doing a specific thing, you

599
00:31:56,240 --> 00:31:59,160
Speaker 1: ideally do not then do the thing they are preparing for,

600
00:31:59,240 --> 00:32:01,240
Speaker 1: because that is a situation which you're gonna mind a

601
00:32:01,280 --> 00:32:04,360
Speaker 1: battering yourself against a riot line. Right. Um, that's what

602
00:32:04,480 --> 00:32:07,000
Speaker 1: the that's the core of the move be like water

603
00:32:07,120 --> 00:32:09,480
Speaker 1: thing from Hong Kong is the idea that do not

604
00:32:09,680 --> 00:32:12,160
Speaker 1: engage them in a way they are prepared for, and

605
00:32:12,160 --> 00:32:14,120
Speaker 1: that that that is a that is a piece of advice.

606
00:32:14,160 --> 00:32:17,080
Speaker 1: Broadly speaking, that's just as true in a war as

607
00:32:17,120 --> 00:32:20,320
Speaker 1: it is in a protest situation. On their own terms.

608
00:32:20,320 --> 00:32:23,560
Speaker 1: What this also means is that you don't want to

609
00:32:23,560 --> 00:32:27,560
Speaker 1: be playing by a set of rules that are ineffective

610
00:32:27,560 --> 00:32:29,720
Speaker 1: in the situation you're getting into. So like when you

611
00:32:29,800 --> 00:32:33,480
Speaker 1: had protesters in in l a engaging with the military.

612
00:32:33,520 --> 00:32:35,440
Speaker 1: They were playing by the rules of how do you

613
00:32:35,480 --> 00:32:39,360
Speaker 1: deal with cops and suddenly they were dealing with soldiers,

614
00:32:39,760 --> 00:32:44,160
Speaker 1: and boy, howdy are the rules different? You know? Um?

615
00:32:44,720 --> 00:32:49,680
Speaker 1: And likewise, the Russian military was trained and blooded to

616
00:32:49,800 --> 00:32:53,480
Speaker 1: a large extent in conflicts in places like Syria, where

617
00:32:53,680 --> 00:32:58,440
Speaker 1: again they had air supremacy, um, they had artillery supremacy,

618
00:32:58,480 --> 00:33:02,200
Speaker 1: they were backing the state was fighting against these insurgents. Uh.

619
00:33:02,200 --> 00:33:06,200
Speaker 1: And so their soldiers gained the combat experience they had

620
00:33:06,200 --> 00:33:10,760
Speaker 1: with every advantage in their pocket. Um. Meanwhile, the Ukrainian military,

621
00:33:10,880 --> 00:33:13,600
Speaker 1: if you're talking really about like because we've talked about

622
00:33:13,600 --> 00:33:15,520
Speaker 1: a lot of little things that have maybe had an

623
00:33:15,560 --> 00:33:17,200
Speaker 1: impact on the conflict here, and they're one of the

624
00:33:17,240 --> 00:33:19,800
Speaker 1: things that's had the biggest impact on how the Ukrainian

625
00:33:19,840 --> 00:33:23,960
Speaker 1: military has responded and and comported itself in this war

626
00:33:24,080 --> 00:33:27,680
Speaker 1: so far versus the Russian is for years, eight years

627
00:33:27,720 --> 00:33:31,440
Speaker 1: since this conflict started, the Ukrainian military has developed a

628
00:33:31,760 --> 00:33:35,760
Speaker 1: posture of having soldiers signed up for these brief contracts,

629
00:33:35,760 --> 00:33:39,080
Speaker 1: sending and rotating them through the battleground and the dawn

630
00:33:39,080 --> 00:33:41,920
Speaker 1: boss so that when this war started they had a

631
00:33:42,080 --> 00:33:44,760
Speaker 1: huge number more than anyone else in Europe of combat

632
00:33:44,840 --> 00:33:48,440
Speaker 1: veterans who got their experience fighting against a peer adversary

633
00:33:48,560 --> 00:33:51,400
Speaker 1: when they did not have supremacy and artillery or air

634
00:33:51,440 --> 00:33:55,040
Speaker 1: support when they engaged them. Um. And then the Ukrainian

635
00:33:55,080 --> 00:33:59,560
Speaker 1: military very intelligently spread these guys out amongst their their

636
00:33:59,600 --> 00:34:01,680
Speaker 1: their units, which is what you want to do. Any

637
00:34:01,680 --> 00:34:03,480
Speaker 1: military is going to want to like spread out your

638
00:34:03,560 --> 00:34:05,600
Speaker 1: veterans among units, because you're not everyone's not going to

639
00:34:05,640 --> 00:34:07,400
Speaker 1: be a combat veteran, but you want some guys who

640
00:34:07,440 --> 00:34:09,839
Speaker 1: know what it's like to be shot at and every

641
00:34:09,880 --> 00:34:11,640
Speaker 1: kind of unit that might get shot at because they

642
00:34:11,640 --> 00:34:14,200
Speaker 1: stiff in the back of everybody else. And this is

643
00:34:14,239 --> 00:34:16,719
Speaker 1: what So again, when when the war started to get

644
00:34:16,719 --> 00:34:20,080
Speaker 1: back to what I'm saying, the Russian military entered preparing

645
00:34:20,160 --> 00:34:22,759
Speaker 1: for a police action like the ones they carried out

646
00:34:22,760 --> 00:34:25,520
Speaker 1: in Czechnia, um like what they did have done for

647
00:34:25,600 --> 00:34:28,600
Speaker 1: Assad in Syria, and they got a war, and the

648
00:34:28,680 --> 00:34:31,680
Speaker 1: Ukrainians came into that fight prepared for a war. So

649
00:34:31,800 --> 00:34:34,840
Speaker 1: you you, I think one of the things that is

650
00:34:34,880 --> 00:34:38,000
Speaker 1: important when you look at consider any kind of possibility

651
00:34:38,040 --> 00:34:40,440
Speaker 1: of being involved in a conflict is you want to

652
00:34:40,480 --> 00:34:44,640
Speaker 1: know what are the rules your opponent is going in

653
00:34:45,239 --> 00:34:47,080
Speaker 1: ready to a bide by, Right, what are the things

654
00:34:47,120 --> 00:34:49,120
Speaker 1: they are expecting to happen? What is kind of the

655
00:34:49,200 --> 00:34:52,160
Speaker 1: rubric with which they are looking at what they expect

656
00:34:52,239 --> 00:34:55,680
Speaker 1: to occur in this conflict? And by god, you want

657
00:34:55,680 --> 00:34:59,160
Speaker 1: to be going in there with a different one, you know. Um.

658
00:34:59,239 --> 00:35:01,759
Speaker 1: And that again, depending on how you do it, that

659
00:35:01,800 --> 00:35:03,960
Speaker 1: can go badly or that can go really well. Because

660
00:35:04,000 --> 00:35:05,840
Speaker 1: like I said, if you're if you're going and prepared

661
00:35:05,880 --> 00:35:08,320
Speaker 1: to fight cops and you wind up dealing with soldiers,

662
00:35:08,360 --> 00:35:13,839
Speaker 1: that's not great. Um. But if you have prepared, if

663
00:35:13,840 --> 00:35:15,879
Speaker 1: you are able to kind of lock your enemy into

664
00:35:15,880 --> 00:35:20,480
Speaker 1: the kind of conflict that they're not ready to face, um,

665
00:35:20,600 --> 00:35:23,440
Speaker 1: then generally speaking, you'll win. We have twenty years of

666
00:35:23,480 --> 00:35:25,759
Speaker 1: experience in the War on Terror of more or less

667
00:35:25,800 --> 00:35:28,560
Speaker 1: that going down. Yeah, there's a there's a there's a

668
00:35:28,560 --> 00:35:31,560
Speaker 1: good example of this also with the like with the

669
00:35:31,600 --> 00:35:34,080
Speaker 1: i d F s a war against hes blonds and

670
00:35:34,160 --> 00:35:36,520
Speaker 1: six where it's like the IDEF is a really good army,

671
00:35:37,040 --> 00:35:39,239
Speaker 1: but they'd spent like I don't know, like they spent

672
00:35:39,280 --> 00:35:42,839
Speaker 1: like forty years basically just sort of like, yeah, there's

673
00:35:42,840 --> 00:35:45,399
Speaker 1: been about forty years doing police actions. Yeah, and then

674
00:35:45,600 --> 00:35:47,799
Speaker 1: they run into Hesbla and they expect hes Blah is

675
00:35:47,840 --> 00:35:49,759
Speaker 1: going to just you know, they've made Lebanon jails and

676
00:35:49,800 --> 00:35:51,840
Speaker 1: six and their expectations that Hesblah is going to go

677
00:35:51,880 --> 00:35:54,080
Speaker 1: to ground, They're gonna do a guerrilla war and instead

678
00:35:54,120 --> 00:35:56,319
Speaker 1: has bela like when they go into bunkers where they

679
00:35:56,320 --> 00:35:59,319
Speaker 1: stand in fight and the IDEF gets smashed and like

680
00:35:59,480 --> 00:36:01,520
Speaker 1: you know, they they pull out and they spent much

681
00:36:01,560 --> 00:36:03,480
Speaker 1: time just like murdering people from the air, but like

682
00:36:03,520 --> 00:36:06,000
Speaker 1: they don't win the war and like like that. That

683
00:36:06,200 --> 00:36:09,160
Speaker 1: happens a lot, especially with these armies that are used

684
00:36:09,200 --> 00:36:11,319
Speaker 1: to dealing, used to doing these sort of police action things,

685
00:36:11,320 --> 00:36:14,759
Speaker 1: and they losed enemies that like the fact that the

686
00:36:14,760 --> 00:36:17,840
Speaker 1: id F lost award has blow is like by like

687
00:36:18,000 --> 00:36:20,879
Speaker 1: balance of forces. It's like this is inconceivable, like how

688
00:36:20,920 --> 00:36:22,799
Speaker 1: on earth did they possibly lose this? But it's like, yeah,

689
00:36:22,880 --> 00:36:26,560
Speaker 1: this stuff happens because they weren't like, yeah, they they

690
00:36:26,800 --> 00:36:28,319
Speaker 1: were they were doing they were doing this police action

691
00:36:28,360 --> 00:36:30,719
Speaker 1: thing and they weren't used to They hadn't fought an

692
00:36:30,840 --> 00:36:32,319
Speaker 1: enemy that was actually going to stick it and fight

693
00:36:32,400 --> 00:36:35,279
Speaker 1: them since like the seventies. Yeah, I mean a lot

694
00:36:35,320 --> 00:36:39,560
Speaker 1: of the great defeats in military history are because a

695
00:36:39,600 --> 00:36:43,480
Speaker 1: force came into a situation expecting a different kind of

696
00:36:43,480 --> 00:36:45,440
Speaker 1: fight than what they got. That was a part of

697
00:36:45,440 --> 00:36:47,880
Speaker 1: what happened to Napoleon when he invaded Russia, right, and

698
00:36:47,920 --> 00:36:50,640
Speaker 1: the Russians did not respond the way that he expected

699
00:36:50,640 --> 00:36:54,000
Speaker 1: a state to respond to having their capital occupied, um

700
00:36:54,040 --> 00:36:55,960
Speaker 1: and effectively kind of starved him out. There was other

701
00:36:55,960 --> 00:36:59,080
Speaker 1: ship going on there, Attrician had really depleted the French

702
00:36:59,120 --> 00:37:03,120
Speaker 1: military before it got there. But but yeah, because yeah,

703
00:37:03,200 --> 00:37:04,600
Speaker 1: how how I went on, how I would want to

704
00:37:04,600 --> 00:37:07,480
Speaker 1: wrap up This is basically saying like and all of

705
00:37:07,520 --> 00:37:10,719
Speaker 1: that stuff regarding how this war has really prompted a

706
00:37:10,719 --> 00:37:15,239
Speaker 1: lot of things that were seemingly more unexpected and seemingly

707
00:37:15,280 --> 00:37:18,880
Speaker 1: thought to be previously more impossible. UM in terms of

708
00:37:18,920 --> 00:37:22,280
Speaker 1: how fast both rhetoric around these these types of conflicts

709
00:37:22,360 --> 00:37:25,279
Speaker 1: can spread and more and the role in which like

710
00:37:25,320 --> 00:37:29,080
Speaker 1: disinformation and misformation is used for you know, both both

711
00:37:29,080 --> 00:37:32,120
Speaker 1: sides to to gain digging ground on the other and

712
00:37:32,160 --> 00:37:34,879
Speaker 1: how you know, relating back to it could happen here

713
00:37:34,960 --> 00:37:37,719
Speaker 1: is MS in terms of like the urban crumbles or

714
00:37:37,760 --> 00:37:41,439
Speaker 1: like you know, the small, small like urban collapses, um,

715
00:37:41,560 --> 00:37:45,320
Speaker 1: and you know, escalating escalating like inter inter country conflict

716
00:37:45,960 --> 00:37:49,759
Speaker 1: in various places around the world. How fast certain things

717
00:37:50,000 --> 00:37:51,799
Speaker 1: can happen that we once thought are kind of more

718
00:37:51,840 --> 00:37:55,640
Speaker 1: impossible or improbable at the very least, you know, how

719
00:37:55,680 --> 00:37:58,759
Speaker 1: how fast you can get people giving advice on how

720
00:37:58,800 --> 00:38:01,359
Speaker 1: to take out ourmored vehicle on Twitter dot com. How

721
00:38:01,400 --> 00:38:03,719
Speaker 1: fast you can get you know, people like people who

722
00:38:03,719 --> 00:38:07,200
Speaker 1: are you know, seemingly are part you know, seemingly not

723
00:38:07,200 --> 00:38:10,160
Speaker 1: not tied to certain just certain like ideas or theologies,

724
00:38:10,680 --> 00:38:13,920
Speaker 1: giving out you know, information on types of types of

725
00:38:13,920 --> 00:38:18,719
Speaker 1: ways to resist invading or oppressing forces. It is, it

726
00:38:18,800 --> 00:38:22,560
Speaker 1: is an interesting kind of it's like case studies the

727
00:38:22,560 --> 00:38:25,320
Speaker 1: wrong word because it is it's it's obviously having horrible

728
00:38:25,400 --> 00:38:28,000
Speaker 1: effects with you know, thousands and thousands of people being

729
00:38:28,040 --> 00:38:31,840
Speaker 1: slaughtered um, but it it is it is intriguing to watch,

730
00:38:31,880 --> 00:38:34,279
Speaker 1: how you know, in terms of like the microcos of

731
00:38:34,320 --> 00:38:40,240
Speaker 1: macrocosm idea of of eventually you know, conflict, if conflict

732
00:38:40,239 --> 00:38:41,840
Speaker 1: breaks out in other places around the world, and the

733
00:38:41,880 --> 00:38:44,080
Speaker 1: next in the next few years, How are current like

734
00:38:44,160 --> 00:38:49,120
Speaker 1: social media landscape, how are kind of rules around like

735
00:38:49,239 --> 00:38:52,279
Speaker 1: urban conflict like urban conflict and all of these things

736
00:38:52,360 --> 00:38:55,040
Speaker 1: kind of interact with each other and how we view Yeah,

737
00:38:55,040 --> 00:38:58,080
Speaker 1: what is what is likely and what we you know

738
00:38:58,320 --> 00:39:00,360
Speaker 1: who who you're going to predict is gonna do X

739
00:39:00,400 --> 00:39:06,360
Speaker 1: thing based on people invading a city that it's not theirs? Yeah, Um,

740
00:39:06,400 --> 00:39:08,319
Speaker 1: I mean I think in terms of stuff that that

741
00:39:08,400 --> 00:39:12,759
Speaker 1: people can take out of this, you know, without necessarily

742
00:39:12,800 --> 00:39:15,560
Speaker 1: needing to prepare to fight in an urban insurgency. One

743
00:39:15,600 --> 00:39:19,920
Speaker 1: of them is that anytime big ship happens and and

744
00:39:19,960 --> 00:39:21,799
Speaker 1: more big ship is going to keep happening for us,

745
00:39:21,840 --> 00:39:24,600
Speaker 1: you have a window of opportunity through which you can

746
00:39:24,640 --> 00:39:27,200
Speaker 1: get things across to people that they would not normally

747
00:39:27,280 --> 00:39:31,320
Speaker 1: listen to. Um. And that is a really important time,

748
00:39:31,880 --> 00:39:34,799
Speaker 1: and it helps to think about the kind of situations

749
00:39:34,840 --> 00:39:37,200
Speaker 1: that might occur and the kind of things that you

750
00:39:37,239 --> 00:39:39,560
Speaker 1: want to push out into the world. UM. Because this

751
00:39:39,640 --> 00:39:41,560
Speaker 1: is this is is true with climate change as it

752
00:39:41,640 --> 00:39:44,200
Speaker 1: is with war. Right, We're going to have more disasters,

753
00:39:44,239 --> 00:39:48,000
Speaker 1: and when those disasters hit, it will be easier to

754
00:39:48,160 --> 00:39:51,520
Speaker 1: get people to talk about radical solutions to things like

755
00:39:51,560 --> 00:39:54,440
Speaker 1: climate change, and it will be easier to do things

756
00:39:54,440 --> 00:39:57,040
Speaker 1: like get out in the fucking streets and get large

757
00:39:57,040 --> 00:40:00,560
Speaker 1: groups of people agitated. You know, we're we're at some point,

758
00:40:01,080 --> 00:40:05,120
Speaker 1: fucking God willing, we will have the climate change equivalent

759
00:40:05,239 --> 00:40:08,760
Speaker 1: to what happened in where something so terrible and fucked

760
00:40:08,800 --> 00:40:10,400
Speaker 1: up happens that a lot of people take to the

761
00:40:10,440 --> 00:40:15,160
Speaker 1: streets and hopefully we will succeed to a greater extent

762
00:40:15,280 --> 00:40:20,719
Speaker 1: in forcing actual change than maybe we did in But

763
00:40:20,880 --> 00:40:23,560
Speaker 1: but that's that's something like that could very well happen.

764
00:40:23,640 --> 00:40:25,160
Speaker 1: And so that's one of the lessons I think you

765
00:40:25,160 --> 00:40:27,560
Speaker 1: can take out of this again without sort of obsessing

766
00:40:27,600 --> 00:40:31,920
Speaker 1: over military technology or getting into gunfights with fucking soldiers.

767
00:40:32,080 --> 00:40:37,120
Speaker 1: Is Ukraine is hard evidence that that is the way

768
00:40:37,160 --> 00:40:40,160
Speaker 1: the media environment works. You get these moments where you

769
00:40:40,200 --> 00:40:43,799
Speaker 1: can really push some wild ship to people. That's that's

770
00:40:43,800 --> 00:40:47,279
Speaker 1: why I like the whole uprising or insurrection model more

771
00:40:47,320 --> 00:40:51,719
Speaker 1: than the revolution model, because the uprising model posits that basically,

772
00:40:51,880 --> 00:40:54,680
Speaker 1: you have you know, base base society based reality, you know,

773
00:40:54,760 --> 00:40:57,960
Speaker 1: always at like the baseline level, then uprising happens. It's

774
00:40:57,960 --> 00:41:00,279
Speaker 1: like it's like shooting up onto a graph sudden. So

775
00:41:00,360 --> 00:41:03,359
Speaker 1: many things that are just outside the normal way that

776
00:41:03,400 --> 00:41:06,560
Speaker 1: we view you know, systems, the governance systems of you know,

777
00:41:06,600 --> 00:41:09,040
Speaker 1: social control. So many things become so much more possible

778
00:41:09,040 --> 00:41:11,560
Speaker 1: in this like heightened place. Um. And that's what the

779
00:41:11,640 --> 00:41:14,759
Speaker 1: uprising does. It gets things that were suddenly that were

780
00:41:14,800 --> 00:41:17,520
Speaker 1: once so far away and once just only in the imagination.

781
00:41:17,840 --> 00:41:21,080
Speaker 1: It almost it makes them so much closer. Right, There's

782
00:41:21,080 --> 00:41:23,440
Speaker 1: this feeling in like July during the height of the

783
00:41:23,480 --> 00:41:26,279
Speaker 1: fed War, being like so many things feel possible in

784
00:41:26,320 --> 00:41:29,560
Speaker 1: this one moment, nothing is true and all is permitted,

785
00:41:29,760 --> 00:41:33,160
Speaker 1: like you can you can get away with some ship. Yeah,

786
00:41:33,280 --> 00:41:36,280
Speaker 1: And so using the uprising model, yeah, it can really

787
00:41:36,960 --> 00:41:39,200
Speaker 1: and or or the or the instruction model like it

788
00:41:39,239 --> 00:41:42,520
Speaker 1: can really, it can really make things feel so much

789
00:41:42,600 --> 00:41:45,600
Speaker 1: more possible than what they usually feel like. And that

790
00:41:45,760 --> 00:41:48,440
Speaker 1: there's you know, brief moments in time where massive social

791
00:41:48,520 --> 00:41:50,920
Speaker 1: change can happen, and you know you have to learn

792
00:41:50,920 --> 00:41:53,319
Speaker 1: how to recognize when this moment are happening and then

793
00:41:53,400 --> 00:41:59,879
Speaker 1: organize effectively when they do happen. Yeah. Yep, well I've

794
00:42:00,040 --> 00:42:03,360
Speaker 1: leave that does it for us today? Um? Yeah, we

795
00:42:03,440 --> 00:42:05,600
Speaker 1: when we've been wanting to talk about this topic for

796
00:42:05,600 --> 00:42:07,400
Speaker 1: a while in terms of you know, one of the

797
00:42:07,600 --> 00:42:11,680
Speaker 1: very first things that's not happening was various governments giving

798
00:42:11,719 --> 00:42:14,680
Speaker 1: guides out on where to attack armored vehicles with ball tops.

799
00:42:14,680 --> 00:42:16,799
Speaker 1: We're like, oh, wow, this is this is intriguing to

800
00:42:16,840 --> 00:42:20,120
Speaker 1: have a government giving out instructions. Um, this is probably

801
00:42:20,120 --> 00:42:22,799
Speaker 1: has some implications on how we view you know, uh,

802
00:42:23,400 --> 00:42:26,440
Speaker 1: collapse in the in a in a general concept. So yeah, Ever,

803
00:42:26,520 --> 00:42:28,359
Speaker 1: since that's not happening, we wanted to talk about it.

804
00:42:28,480 --> 00:42:31,200
Speaker 1: So yeah, it certainly leaves us with a lot to

805
00:42:31,239 --> 00:42:33,360
Speaker 1: think about. And I didn't get to go on my

806
00:42:33,480 --> 00:42:36,879
Speaker 1: rant about the structure of the Russian military VISAVI their

807
00:42:36,920 --> 00:42:38,640
Speaker 1: lack of an n c O core. But maybe we'll

808
00:42:38,680 --> 00:42:40,480
Speaker 1: talk about that in the future. I'm sure we'll have

809
00:42:40,600 --> 00:42:44,000
Speaker 1: enough time to talk without this in the future. Uh.

810
00:42:44,040 --> 00:42:48,799
Speaker 1: Well everyone, Uh, I don't know, do do something productive? Yeah,

811
00:42:48,880 --> 00:42:52,480
Speaker 1: do do something productive. I don't charge armored vehicles. Don't

812
00:42:52,560 --> 00:42:57,160
Speaker 1: charge armored vehicles with paint. Maybe think about the different

813
00:42:57,239 --> 00:43:00,440
Speaker 1: things you would like to get a bunch of people

814
00:43:00,520 --> 00:43:04,759
Speaker 1: suddenly radicalized on Twitter to do in the immediate wake

815
00:43:04,880 --> 00:43:07,640
Speaker 1: of a horrible climate disaster in which large numbers of

816
00:43:07,640 --> 00:43:10,520
Speaker 1: folks are suddenly willing to take to the streets seemingly overnight.

817
00:43:10,600 --> 00:43:14,640
Speaker 1: Maybe thinking about that and and trying to talking with

818
00:43:14,680 --> 00:43:17,280
Speaker 1: your buddies about it, and being like, hey, if everybody

819
00:43:17,280 --> 00:43:19,880
Speaker 1: gets out in the streets again, what kind of information

820
00:43:19,920 --> 00:43:21,840
Speaker 1: do I want to spread? What would be good to

821
00:43:21,840 --> 00:43:24,480
Speaker 1: get people talking about In that instance, when they're suddenly

822
00:43:24,520 --> 00:43:26,960
Speaker 1: listening for I don't know about two weeks. It feels

823
00:43:26,960 --> 00:43:32,080
Speaker 1: like you get about two weeks to honestly, yeah, well,

824
00:43:32,719 --> 00:43:35,360
Speaker 1: in the wake of the new I PCC report, we

825
00:43:35,360 --> 00:43:36,959
Speaker 1: have what we should certainly have a lot to think about.

826
00:43:37,920 --> 00:43:44,960
Speaker 1: All right, bye bye. It could happen here as a

827
00:43:44,960 --> 00:43:47,839
Speaker 1: production of cool Zone Media. For more podcasts from cool

828
00:43:47,880 --> 00:43:50,560
Speaker 1: zone Media, visit our website cool zone media dot com,

829
00:43:50,680 --> 00:43:52,399
Speaker 1: or check us out on the I Heart Radio app,

830
00:43:52,440 --> 00:43:55,799
Speaker 1: Apple Podcasts, or wherever you listen to podcasts. You can

831
00:43:55,800 --> 00:43:58,520
Speaker 1: find sources for It could Happen Here, updated monthly at

832
00:43:58,520 --> 00:44:01,800
Speaker 1: cool zone media dot COM's lash sources. Thanks for listening.