1 00:00:04,480 --> 00:00:12,440 Speaker 1: Welcome to Tech Stuff, a production from iHeartRadio. Hey thereon 2 00:00:12,600 --> 00:00:16,040 Speaker 1: Welcome to Tech Stuff. I'm your host, Jonathan Strickland. I'm 3 00:00:16,040 --> 00:00:19,599 Speaker 1: an executive producer with iHeart Podcasts and How the tech 4 00:00:19,640 --> 00:00:24,720 Speaker 1: are You? So I thought I would talk about hackers today, 5 00:00:25,280 --> 00:00:28,760 Speaker 1: and the word hacker these days is almost exclusively used 6 00:00:28,800 --> 00:00:33,159 Speaker 1: to describe people who, through one means or some other means, 7 00:00:33,240 --> 00:00:36,440 Speaker 1: find a way of infiltrating computer systems. But the term 8 00:00:36,520 --> 00:00:41,440 Speaker 1: hacker has a more broad definition. It really describes anyone 9 00:00:41,440 --> 00:00:45,839 Speaker 1: who's interested in taking stuff apart to learn how it works, 10 00:00:46,440 --> 00:00:50,000 Speaker 1: and maybe even putting it back together again so that 11 00:00:50,240 --> 00:00:53,640 Speaker 1: it does something it wasn't intended to do when it 12 00:00:53,720 --> 00:00:57,480 Speaker 1: was built originally. Now that thing might be a computer 13 00:00:58,000 --> 00:01:01,800 Speaker 1: or a mobile device, it might be a system. Hacking 14 00:01:02,200 --> 00:01:04,400 Speaker 1: can mean lots of different stuff. I mean, that's where 15 00:01:04,400 --> 00:01:07,520 Speaker 1: we get things like life hacks, which often end up 16 00:01:07,520 --> 00:01:10,040 Speaker 1: not being hacks at all. There's some life hacks out 17 00:01:10,080 --> 00:01:13,440 Speaker 1: there that I think we're just jokes that then were 18 00:01:13,520 --> 00:01:17,880 Speaker 1: spread sincerely by other people, because y'all, it doesn't make 19 00:01:17,920 --> 00:01:21,080 Speaker 1: any sense to just to take the top of a 20 00:01:21,080 --> 00:01:23,720 Speaker 1: squirt bottle off and invert it to turn it into 21 00:01:23,760 --> 00:01:26,520 Speaker 1: a funnel that that hole at the bottom is way 22 00:01:26,560 --> 00:01:28,920 Speaker 1: too small for that anyway, you know what I mean. 23 00:01:29,200 --> 00:01:33,280 Speaker 1: But sometimes people just want to figure out how something 24 00:01:33,319 --> 00:01:35,560 Speaker 1: works and taking it apart is the best way to 25 00:01:35,560 --> 00:01:37,160 Speaker 1: do it. Or maybe they want to figure out how 26 00:01:37,200 --> 00:01:40,920 Speaker 1: to manipulate whatever it is in order to unlock its 27 00:01:40,959 --> 00:01:45,319 Speaker 1: full potential. Like there are computers out there that have 28 00:01:45,560 --> 00:01:49,240 Speaker 1: certain clock speeds that's essentially how fast the processor is 29 00:01:49,280 --> 00:01:54,080 Speaker 1: able to complete operations per second, and often there are 30 00:01:54,280 --> 00:01:58,280 Speaker 1: limiters placed on the clock speed, and if you figure 31 00:01:58,320 --> 00:02:00,880 Speaker 1: out how to remove those limitters, you can make your 32 00:02:00,880 --> 00:02:05,480 Speaker 1: computer operate a lot faster. This has trade offs. It 33 00:02:05,760 --> 00:02:09,560 Speaker 1: usually means more power consumption and more heat generated and 34 00:02:09,600 --> 00:02:13,320 Speaker 1: potentially can actually damage your machine. But that's one example, right, 35 00:02:13,360 --> 00:02:17,560 Speaker 1: you can unlock the full potential of your computer something 36 00:02:17,560 --> 00:02:23,200 Speaker 1: that was intentionally restricted from operating at full capacity. Or 37 00:02:23,360 --> 00:02:25,760 Speaker 1: maybe you just want to figure out how to use 38 00:02:25,800 --> 00:02:29,440 Speaker 1: a paid service for free. The phone freakers of the 39 00:02:29,520 --> 00:02:32,440 Speaker 1: nineteen seventies fall into that category. These are folks who 40 00:02:32,440 --> 00:02:35,919 Speaker 1: found ways to manipulate the plain old telephone system or pots, 41 00:02:36,400 --> 00:02:38,520 Speaker 1: so that they could do stuff like make free long 42 00:02:38,560 --> 00:02:41,519 Speaker 1: distance phone calls. They did it with all sorts of 43 00:02:41,520 --> 00:02:46,960 Speaker 1: different ways, mostly by producing specific tones into a telephone 44 00:02:47,000 --> 00:02:49,839 Speaker 1: and then being able to make free phone calls. Good 45 00:02:49,840 --> 00:02:53,040 Speaker 1: old capt'n Crunch used to do that using a whistle 46 00:02:53,280 --> 00:02:56,640 Speaker 1: from a capt'n crunch box. But over time, the world 47 00:02:56,720 --> 00:02:59,000 Speaker 1: at large has started to use the word hacker to 48 00:02:59,080 --> 00:03:02,080 Speaker 1: mean someone attempt to gain a legal access to a 49 00:03:02,160 --> 00:03:05,919 Speaker 1: computer system, either in order to snoop around or create 50 00:03:05,960 --> 00:03:08,880 Speaker 1: a means to infiltrate the system whenever they want by 51 00:03:08,880 --> 00:03:12,760 Speaker 1: putting in a back door, or steal information from someone, 52 00:03:12,960 --> 00:03:15,960 Speaker 1: or inject malware into a system, or some combination of 53 00:03:16,000 --> 00:03:18,840 Speaker 1: all of these things. So today I thought we'd chat 54 00:03:18,880 --> 00:03:23,440 Speaker 1: about three notorious hackers. Actually that's not even true. Two 55 00:03:23,520 --> 00:03:27,880 Speaker 1: notorious hackers and one hacker conglomerate. So I decided to 56 00:03:27,960 --> 00:03:30,600 Speaker 1: raid a list that was created by Kasperski Labs. That's 57 00:03:30,639 --> 00:03:33,720 Speaker 1: a Russian computer security company that's had a pretty rough 58 00:03:33,760 --> 00:03:36,440 Speaker 1: go of it as of late due to being based 59 00:03:36,480 --> 00:03:39,520 Speaker 1: in Russia. Here in the United States, essentially they've been 60 00:03:39,880 --> 00:03:44,200 Speaker 1: banned from being used in various agencies and companies. But 61 00:03:44,480 --> 00:03:49,080 Speaker 1: Kaspersky has a very long history with cybersecurity, and I'm 62 00:03:49,120 --> 00:03:53,760 Speaker 1: going to start with number two on the Kaspersky list, 63 00:03:53,960 --> 00:03:56,440 Speaker 1: because it's not so much as a person as it 64 00:03:56,480 --> 00:03:59,560 Speaker 1: is a collective. This is that conglomeration I was talking 65 00:03:59,600 --> 00:04:03,160 Speaker 1: about now. It is not unusual for hackers to form 66 00:04:03,440 --> 00:04:07,280 Speaker 1: loose collectives. That happens a lot. Some hackers might belong 67 00:04:07,360 --> 00:04:12,040 Speaker 1: to more than one collective, and they might share resources 68 00:04:12,080 --> 00:04:17,039 Speaker 1: and motivations and goals. But one very very loose group, 69 00:04:17,480 --> 00:04:20,240 Speaker 1: and it's not just hackers, but hackers make up a 70 00:04:20,279 --> 00:04:22,960 Speaker 1: good number of them. It's a group that's caused headaches 71 00:04:23,000 --> 00:04:27,400 Speaker 1: for numerous targets for more than twenty years. Now. Is Anonymous, 72 00:04:27,800 --> 00:04:31,840 Speaker 1: as in that's what they're called big A Anonymous. I'm 73 00:04:31,880 --> 00:04:35,360 Speaker 1: not sure if the association is as strong as it 74 00:04:35,640 --> 00:04:39,920 Speaker 1: once was, like in the two thousand teens. But when 75 00:04:39,960 --> 00:04:42,200 Speaker 1: I think of Anonymous, the image that always comes to 76 00:04:42,240 --> 00:04:46,520 Speaker 1: my mind is a Guy Fawkes mask. That's really kind 77 00:04:46,560 --> 00:04:48,880 Speaker 1: of emerged in around two thousand and eight. Really, several 78 00:04:48,920 --> 00:04:53,320 Speaker 1: folks claiming to represent Anonymous have worn such masks, particularly 79 00:04:53,360 --> 00:04:55,360 Speaker 1: in the early days, like that became kind of a 80 00:04:55,400 --> 00:04:58,599 Speaker 1: symbol for the group. I don't know that it's as 81 00:04:58,800 --> 00:05:02,320 Speaker 1: strongly associated with them these days, honestly, but they grew 82 00:05:02,520 --> 00:05:07,000 Speaker 1: out of the online image based forum four Chan, which 83 00:05:07,560 --> 00:05:12,040 Speaker 1: has spawned many things terrible and otherwise over the years, 84 00:05:12,200 --> 00:05:15,520 Speaker 1: mostly terrible. If I'm being honest, A lot of terrible 85 00:05:15,520 --> 00:05:18,400 Speaker 1: stuff came out of four Chan. The origins of anonymous 86 00:05:18,440 --> 00:05:22,039 Speaker 1: were humble and juvenile. Some folks on four Chan would 87 00:05:22,120 --> 00:05:25,640 Speaker 1: meet in various virtual spaces in order to coordinate efforts 88 00:05:25,760 --> 00:05:30,520 Speaker 1: to torment various online communities through the age old practice 89 00:05:30,560 --> 00:05:35,200 Speaker 1: of trolling. So they were essentially just creating conflict online 90 00:05:35,440 --> 00:05:37,800 Speaker 1: for the lulls, and that was it, Like, that was 91 00:05:37,839 --> 00:05:42,400 Speaker 1: their goal, get some amusement by making other people really mad, 92 00:05:42,880 --> 00:05:46,120 Speaker 1: and they often like to aim at online communities that 93 00:05:46,160 --> 00:05:49,279 Speaker 1: were catering to kids. You know, some folks just like 94 00:05:49,320 --> 00:05:53,000 Speaker 1: to watch the world burn. Honestly, making people mad is 95 00:05:53,040 --> 00:05:56,760 Speaker 1: not hard to do, right, It's a pretty easy thing. 96 00:05:56,880 --> 00:06:00,000 Speaker 1: I guess the thrill was having, you know, this big 97 00:06:00,200 --> 00:06:04,080 Speaker 1: impact on someone's mentality, and that that was the thrill. 98 00:06:04,560 --> 00:06:06,240 Speaker 1: But I would argue you should just raise the bar 99 00:06:06,320 --> 00:06:09,479 Speaker 1: a little bit, like, yeah, you can make people angry, 100 00:06:09,520 --> 00:06:11,680 Speaker 1: but that's not very hard to do for most folks, 101 00:06:11,920 --> 00:06:15,200 Speaker 1: So why not set yourself a really challenging goal, like 102 00:06:15,279 --> 00:06:19,000 Speaker 1: make people happy. That's a lot harder to do. Anyway, 103 00:06:19,279 --> 00:06:22,320 Speaker 1: from about two thousand and three to two thousand and seven, 104 00:06:22,400 --> 00:06:24,880 Speaker 1: Anonymous wasn't really much more than just a bunch of 105 00:06:24,920 --> 00:06:29,360 Speaker 1: folks trying to get their kicks by ticking off other people. However, 106 00:06:29,800 --> 00:06:33,760 Speaker 1: starting in two thousand and seven, the group began to evolve, 107 00:06:34,080 --> 00:06:38,480 Speaker 1: partly due to a misapprehension the media had about the 108 00:06:38,680 --> 00:06:43,679 Speaker 1: very loose association of trolls. So media reports were starting 109 00:06:43,720 --> 00:06:46,919 Speaker 1: to suggest that Anonymous was far more organized than what 110 00:06:47,000 --> 00:06:51,080 Speaker 1: it was, and far more motivated, and most importantly, way 111 00:06:51,080 --> 00:06:56,680 Speaker 1: more capable of causing harm than the group actually was. 112 00:06:57,120 --> 00:07:00,720 Speaker 1: This included footage that would have like stock images of 113 00:07:00,920 --> 00:07:04,920 Speaker 1: cars exploding and stuff, implying that Anonymous was capable of 114 00:07:05,160 --> 00:07:08,960 Speaker 1: real world violence. And this is kind of like if 115 00:07:09,640 --> 00:07:12,480 Speaker 1: a reporter saw a bunch of kids playing cops and 116 00:07:12,560 --> 00:07:16,840 Speaker 1: robbers and then did a feature about how this dangerous 117 00:07:16,960 --> 00:07:20,000 Speaker 1: gang was taking over the city. It was a lot 118 00:07:20,000 --> 00:07:23,720 Speaker 1: of exaggeration. The pranksters at Anonymous found this to be 119 00:07:23,840 --> 00:07:27,520 Speaker 1: pretty darn amusing, and also it was stroking their egos right, Like, 120 00:07:27,800 --> 00:07:32,000 Speaker 1: if you are mostly a low level troublemaker, but you're 121 00:07:32,040 --> 00:07:35,440 Speaker 1: being portrayed as like some sort of mastermind, that's really 122 00:07:35,480 --> 00:07:39,040 Speaker 1: gonna stroke your ego. In another case, the Canadian Security 123 00:07:39,080 --> 00:07:42,200 Speaker 1: Intelligence Service reached out to one member of the group, 124 00:07:42,240 --> 00:07:45,240 Speaker 1: a guy named Aubrey Cottle, and they thought Coddle could 125 00:07:45,240 --> 00:07:50,880 Speaker 1: help disrupt online terrorist organizations, essentially infiltrate and then disrupt 126 00:07:51,160 --> 00:07:54,640 Speaker 1: these terrorist cells online. And Cottle was like, I don't 127 00:07:54,640 --> 00:07:57,000 Speaker 1: know where they got the idea that I could do this. 128 00:07:57,400 --> 00:08:02,360 Speaker 1: I mean, I'm just stirring up, you know, mess. We'll 129 00:08:02,360 --> 00:08:05,160 Speaker 1: say this is a family friendly show, after all, will 130 00:08:05,160 --> 00:08:08,680 Speaker 1: stir stuff up online. I'm not really here to break 131 00:08:08,760 --> 00:08:12,040 Speaker 1: up terrorist cells. But having folks think you're a much 132 00:08:12,080 --> 00:08:14,560 Speaker 1: bigger deal than you are can be kind of fun. 133 00:08:14,840 --> 00:08:17,880 Speaker 1: And it got some folks thinking about actually using their 134 00:08:17,960 --> 00:08:21,200 Speaker 1: perceived power to do something more than just riling folks 135 00:08:21,280 --> 00:08:23,600 Speaker 1: up on the Internet, so it kind of became a 136 00:08:23,640 --> 00:08:29,720 Speaker 1: bit of a self fulfilling prophecy. This grew into Project Chenology, 137 00:08:30,280 --> 00:08:34,360 Speaker 1: in which the group targeted the Church of Scientology. So 138 00:08:34,800 --> 00:08:38,160 Speaker 1: Church of Scientology, that's a whole topic that is beyond 139 00:08:38,280 --> 00:08:41,800 Speaker 1: the scope of tech stuff, but has a long history 140 00:08:42,000 --> 00:08:47,920 Speaker 1: of some really manipulative and oppressive policies that pull people 141 00:08:47,960 --> 00:08:52,800 Speaker 1: into the church, keep them there, and exploit them extensively. 142 00:08:53,400 --> 00:08:56,760 Speaker 1: So this is the time when the Guy Fawkes masks 143 00:08:56,880 --> 00:08:59,679 Speaker 1: started showing up. If you don't know who Guy Fawkes was, 144 00:09:00,400 --> 00:09:05,960 Speaker 1: he was one of several terrorists really in the seventeenth 145 00:09:05,960 --> 00:09:10,880 Speaker 1: century who planned to blow up Parliament and potentially assassinate 146 00:09:11,000 --> 00:09:15,680 Speaker 1: the King of England. But their plot was uncovered and 147 00:09:16,200 --> 00:09:20,280 Speaker 1: the members of the plot were put to death, including 148 00:09:20,520 --> 00:09:23,040 Speaker 1: Guy Fawx himself, who was not the leader of the group, 149 00:09:23,120 --> 00:09:26,160 Speaker 1: but was a member of it and has largely been 150 00:09:26,200 --> 00:09:30,839 Speaker 1: associated with that and then was appropriated by Alan Moore 151 00:09:31,000 --> 00:09:34,400 Speaker 1: in his v for Vendetta graphic novel, and so he's 152 00:09:34,400 --> 00:09:38,880 Speaker 1: sort of become a symbol of anti authoritarian practices, like 153 00:09:38,960 --> 00:09:43,000 Speaker 1: it's like a vigilante sort of thing. So members would 154 00:09:43,000 --> 00:09:46,040 Speaker 1: be wearing Guy Fawkes masks and show up in videos 155 00:09:46,280 --> 00:09:48,640 Speaker 1: and speak out against the church. Usually they would have 156 00:09:48,679 --> 00:09:52,040 Speaker 1: their voice distorted in the video as well. Members also 157 00:09:52,080 --> 00:09:54,640 Speaker 1: got access to web pages that belonged to the Church 158 00:09:54,640 --> 00:09:59,080 Speaker 1: of Scientology. They were able to get administrator access to 159 00:09:59,120 --> 00:10:02,360 Speaker 1: these pages and then defaced the web pages. They also 160 00:10:02,480 --> 00:10:05,840 Speaker 1: launched d DOS attacks on the organization, and they organized 161 00:10:05,920 --> 00:10:10,760 Speaker 1: in person protests outside of Scientology properties. Now in case 162 00:10:10,760 --> 00:10:13,720 Speaker 1: you're not familiar with the term d DOS, that stands 163 00:10:13,720 --> 00:10:17,640 Speaker 1: for distributed denial of service. Now, essentially a d DOS 164 00:10:17,679 --> 00:10:21,559 Speaker 1: attack is all about overwhelming a target. So typically we're 165 00:10:21,559 --> 00:10:25,240 Speaker 1: talking about a web server, so machines are programmed to 166 00:10:25,360 --> 00:10:29,400 Speaker 1: follow specific routines. The way web servers work is that 167 00:10:29,720 --> 00:10:33,720 Speaker 1: they receive requests from clients. A client is just someone 168 00:10:33,720 --> 00:10:37,960 Speaker 1: else's computer tech technically computer browser, and the server responds 169 00:10:38,000 --> 00:10:40,960 Speaker 1: by sending data to the client. So, if you want 170 00:10:40,960 --> 00:10:43,400 Speaker 1: to visit a web page and you type the URL 171 00:10:43,400 --> 00:10:46,160 Speaker 1: in your browser bar, your browser, which is the client 172 00:10:46,200 --> 00:10:49,040 Speaker 1: in this case, sends a request out over the internet. 173 00:10:49,040 --> 00:10:52,720 Speaker 1: This request eventually routes to the appropriate web server, which 174 00:10:52,760 --> 00:10:55,800 Speaker 1: then responds to the request and sends back a web 175 00:10:55,840 --> 00:10:58,040 Speaker 1: page so that you can view it in your browser. Well, 176 00:10:58,040 --> 00:10:59,880 Speaker 1: in order for this to work, the server can't just 177 00:11:00,120 --> 00:11:03,720 Speaker 1: ignore incoming requests. You know. Imagine you're on your browser 178 00:11:03,800 --> 00:11:06,080 Speaker 1: but you type in a URL for a web page 179 00:11:06,120 --> 00:11:08,960 Speaker 1: and nothing happens, or maybe you get an error message 180 00:11:09,000 --> 00:11:12,440 Speaker 1: because the server has decided to deny your request for 181 00:11:12,520 --> 00:11:15,520 Speaker 1: whatever reason. In most cases, the server is more or 182 00:11:15,600 --> 00:11:19,800 Speaker 1: less compelled to answer every single request. Well, you can 183 00:11:19,840 --> 00:11:22,640 Speaker 1: flip that and turn it into an attack because if 184 00:11:22,679 --> 00:11:26,040 Speaker 1: you send countless waves or requests to a web server, 185 00:11:26,520 --> 00:11:29,400 Speaker 1: then you can overwhelm that web server so it can't 186 00:11:29,400 --> 00:11:32,600 Speaker 1: do anything useful. Like other people who are just legitimately 187 00:11:32,640 --> 00:11:35,600 Speaker 1: trying to access the server get timed out or denied 188 00:11:35,880 --> 00:11:40,319 Speaker 1: because it's too busy responding to all these ridiculous requests 189 00:11:40,360 --> 00:11:43,600 Speaker 1: that are flooding in. That's a denial of service attack. Now, 190 00:11:43,760 --> 00:11:48,160 Speaker 1: what makes a distributed denial service attack is when hackers 191 00:11:48,679 --> 00:11:53,120 Speaker 1: compromise other machines. Some hackers might compromise machines in order 192 00:11:53,120 --> 00:11:56,000 Speaker 1: to access data on the affected devices, but others are 193 00:11:56,000 --> 00:11:58,240 Speaker 1: just happy to siphon away a little bit of computing 194 00:11:58,280 --> 00:12:02,679 Speaker 1: power and some connectivity, and they turned these affected computers 195 00:12:02,720 --> 00:12:06,000 Speaker 1: into bots. And then you get an army of these bots, 196 00:12:06,040 --> 00:12:09,400 Speaker 1: and you direct the army to send countless messages to 197 00:12:09,760 --> 00:12:14,079 Speaker 1: your target web server, and the hacker meanwhile remains shielded 198 00:12:14,160 --> 00:12:16,760 Speaker 1: because they're not the ones sending the messages to the 199 00:12:16,800 --> 00:12:19,640 Speaker 1: target server. Their army of bots is doing it. That 200 00:12:19,880 --> 00:12:23,040 Speaker 1: is a distributed denial of service attack. So Anonymous made 201 00:12:23,240 --> 00:12:26,560 Speaker 1: liberal use of that tactic, particularly in the early days, 202 00:12:26,559 --> 00:12:29,400 Speaker 1: but then throughout its history they've held de dos attacks 203 00:12:29,440 --> 00:12:33,000 Speaker 1: against different targets, and from that point forward, Anonymous became 204 00:12:33,040 --> 00:12:37,120 Speaker 1: more associated with hactivism than with trolling, though a lot 205 00:12:37,120 --> 00:12:40,720 Speaker 1: of the activist activity borrowed liberally from the trolling days, 206 00:12:40,760 --> 00:12:43,000 Speaker 1: and once in a while they would just engage in 207 00:12:43,000 --> 00:12:46,200 Speaker 1: trolling as well. The group has targeted numerous individuals and 208 00:12:46,360 --> 00:12:51,080 Speaker 1: organizations for lots of different reasons. Generally speaking, Anonymous tends 209 00:12:51,120 --> 00:12:56,120 Speaker 1: to follow a slightly leftist approach with very strong libertarian principles. Now, 210 00:12:56,160 --> 00:12:59,800 Speaker 1: not all of their targets have been large organized bastions 211 00:12:59,840 --> 00:13:04,840 Speaker 1: of authoritarianism. For example, McKay hatch wasn't exactly an institution. 212 00:13:05,000 --> 00:13:07,080 Speaker 1: McKay hatch was a kid who was running a website 213 00:13:07,120 --> 00:13:10,679 Speaker 1: called The No Cussing Club, and members of Anonymous doxed 214 00:13:10,720 --> 00:13:13,320 Speaker 1: him and launched a campaign of harassment. So I guess 215 00:13:13,320 --> 00:13:16,600 Speaker 1: their love of cussing was just too damn strong. But 216 00:13:16,760 --> 00:13:21,640 Speaker 1: other targets were definitely more high profile. Anonymous was generally 217 00:13:21,679 --> 00:13:24,400 Speaker 1: speaking on the side of wiki leaks and carried out 218 00:13:24,440 --> 00:13:27,680 Speaker 1: a few attacks on various government servers around the world 219 00:13:27,800 --> 00:13:31,880 Speaker 1: in protest of the persecution of people like whistleblower Chelsea Manning, 220 00:13:31,960 --> 00:13:35,720 Speaker 1: for example. Many members of Anonymous have supported social causes 221 00:13:35,840 --> 00:13:39,240 Speaker 1: like Occupy Wall Street and Black Lives Matter movement, but 222 00:13:39,320 --> 00:13:43,280 Speaker 1: the group is not formally organized, and generally anyone can 223 00:13:43,320 --> 00:13:46,040 Speaker 1: take action in the name of Anonymous, but the rest 224 00:13:46,040 --> 00:13:49,240 Speaker 1: of the group might distance themselves from those kinds of people. 225 00:13:49,440 --> 00:13:52,120 Speaker 1: For example, in the early days of anonymous activism, a 226 00:13:52,160 --> 00:13:55,760 Speaker 1: group claiming to be anonymous got access to the web 227 00:13:55,800 --> 00:14:01,319 Speaker 1: page for the SOHH or Support Online Hip Hop news website. 228 00:14:01,400 --> 00:14:04,440 Speaker 1: The hackers deface the website, and they included the use 229 00:14:04,480 --> 00:14:07,680 Speaker 1: of stuff like racial slurs and stereotypes, which is pretty 230 00:14:07,760 --> 00:14:11,400 Speaker 1: darn tacky. The attackers claim to be anonymous, though the 231 00:14:11,440 --> 00:14:13,480 Speaker 1: group as a whole, as far as I can tell, 232 00:14:13,559 --> 00:14:16,920 Speaker 1: made no such claim. And in other cases you might 233 00:14:17,000 --> 00:14:21,040 Speaker 1: have a member who convinces a subset of Anonymous the 234 00:14:21,120 --> 00:14:24,480 Speaker 1: anonymous community to work together towards some goal, and they 235 00:14:24,480 --> 00:14:27,360 Speaker 1: can create a little splinter group or spinoff group. It's 236 00:14:27,440 --> 00:14:31,440 Speaker 1: very loosey goosey. The hacking skills and anonymous also run 237 00:14:31,480 --> 00:14:35,680 Speaker 1: the spectrum. There are undoubtedly some accomplished hackers among the group, 238 00:14:36,040 --> 00:14:38,920 Speaker 1: while others fall more into the realm of script kitties. 239 00:14:38,960 --> 00:14:41,400 Speaker 1: These are folks who have downloaded tools that do most 240 00:14:41,440 --> 00:14:44,120 Speaker 1: of the work for them. But because membership is fluid 241 00:14:44,360 --> 00:14:48,520 Speaker 1: and you know Anonymous, I can't really give more specifics 242 00:14:48,560 --> 00:14:51,760 Speaker 1: than that. I can talk a bit more about Anonymous 243 00:14:51,760 --> 00:14:54,080 Speaker 1: before we move on to our next hacker. But before 244 00:14:54,120 --> 00:14:56,400 Speaker 1: we do that, let's take a quick break to thank 245 00:14:56,440 --> 00:15:07,920 Speaker 1: our sponsors. So we're back. I've got a little bit 246 00:15:07,920 --> 00:15:10,360 Speaker 1: more to say about Anonymous before we move on. Some 247 00:15:10,520 --> 00:15:13,880 Speaker 1: high profile operations that are at least suspected to be 248 00:15:13,920 --> 00:15:16,880 Speaker 1: the work of Anonymous, because again, the loose organization of 249 00:15:16,920 --> 00:15:19,680 Speaker 1: the group means that some operations could be the work 250 00:15:19,760 --> 00:15:22,680 Speaker 1: of a subset or a splinter group of the overall 251 00:15:22,720 --> 00:15:26,240 Speaker 1: group and not reflective of the group as a whole. 252 00:15:26,400 --> 00:15:30,520 Speaker 1: Because of its loose association, it's really hard to attribute 253 00:15:30,560 --> 00:15:33,880 Speaker 1: anything to the overall group, Like even something that might 254 00:15:33,960 --> 00:15:36,960 Speaker 1: have the support of most members of Anonymous might not 255 00:15:37,120 --> 00:15:41,880 Speaker 1: have total support. So the nature of Anonymous itself makes 256 00:15:41,920 --> 00:15:48,040 Speaker 1: it difficult to use any definitive phrases. But Operation Darknet 257 00:15:48,600 --> 00:15:52,640 Speaker 1: was one that Anonymous engaged in. Anonymous went after sites 258 00:15:52,640 --> 00:15:56,280 Speaker 1: that hosted child pornography. They infiltrated some of those sites. 259 00:15:56,320 --> 00:16:01,400 Speaker 1: They skimmed user information and published user information online, essentially 260 00:16:01,440 --> 00:16:05,280 Speaker 1: revealing people who were frequently going to these child pornography sites, 261 00:16:05,320 --> 00:16:07,840 Speaker 1: and they called for law enforcement to take action against 262 00:16:07,880 --> 00:16:10,880 Speaker 1: the pornographers. So that was one of those cases where 263 00:16:10,920 --> 00:16:15,000 Speaker 1: Anonymous said it was taking up action to defend the 264 00:16:15,080 --> 00:16:19,600 Speaker 1: defenseless and to call for justice against people who were 265 00:16:19,840 --> 00:16:25,600 Speaker 1: committing really terrible acts against vulnerable folks, in this case children. 266 00:16:25,960 --> 00:16:30,600 Speaker 1: In twenty twelve, Operation Russia targeted several high profile Russian 267 00:16:30,600 --> 00:16:33,640 Speaker 1: officials and exposed a scheme in which these officials were 268 00:16:33,640 --> 00:16:37,400 Speaker 1: apparently paying bloggers to promote pro Kremlin and more to 269 00:16:37,440 --> 00:16:43,120 Speaker 1: the point, pro putin propaganda. Operation Bahrain was actually not 270 00:16:43,280 --> 00:16:48,200 Speaker 1: targeting Bahrain directly, but Formula one. So why do that? Well, 271 00:16:48,280 --> 00:16:51,480 Speaker 1: at the time, the Arab Spring was in full bloom. 272 00:16:51,640 --> 00:16:56,240 Speaker 1: That was a series of protests and movements throughout the 273 00:16:56,280 --> 00:17:00,000 Speaker 1: Arab world in which citizens were protesting against various authorities, 274 00:17:00,440 --> 00:17:05,199 Speaker 1: government officials and regimes and agencies, and Formula one was 275 00:17:05,240 --> 00:17:09,440 Speaker 1: preparing for the twenty twelve Bahrain Grand Prix in cooperation 276 00:17:09,640 --> 00:17:13,000 Speaker 1: with the government, and Anonymous was siting with the anti 277 00:17:13,040 --> 00:17:17,560 Speaker 1: government protesters and viewed Formula one as participating in sportswashing, 278 00:17:17,760 --> 00:17:21,600 Speaker 1: that is, using a sporting event to spread government propaganda. 279 00:17:22,040 --> 00:17:25,600 Speaker 1: During the operation, Anonymous carried out DIDOS attacks against Formula 280 00:17:25,640 --> 00:17:29,280 Speaker 1: one and leaked information gathered during a data breach on 281 00:17:29,359 --> 00:17:33,399 Speaker 1: Formula one systems. In more recent years, Anonymous members have 282 00:17:33,480 --> 00:17:38,320 Speaker 1: participated in operations against Israel in protests for that country's 283 00:17:38,320 --> 00:17:42,879 Speaker 1: ongoing conflict with Palestinians, as well as an operation targeting 284 00:17:42,960 --> 00:17:46,960 Speaker 1: Russia for its ongoing war against Ukraine. And it's been 285 00:17:47,000 --> 00:17:50,640 Speaker 1: more than twenty years since a group of Internet trolls 286 00:17:50,760 --> 00:17:54,120 Speaker 1: started just causing grief online, and the group is still 287 00:17:54,160 --> 00:17:58,080 Speaker 1: active today, possibly because it is so hard to define. 288 00:17:58,160 --> 00:18:00,560 Speaker 1: I don't know that you could call it the same group. 289 00:18:00,640 --> 00:18:03,000 Speaker 1: In fact, I don't know how many people who were 290 00:18:03,080 --> 00:18:06,320 Speaker 1: part of Anonymous in the earliest days are still active 291 00:18:06,320 --> 00:18:09,520 Speaker 1: in the community today. I do think if we're going 292 00:18:09,600 --> 00:18:12,800 Speaker 1: to talk about Anonymous, one place to start is just 293 00:18:12,880 --> 00:18:17,960 Speaker 1: the group's own slogan. We are Anonymous, we are legion. 294 00:18:18,520 --> 00:18:24,880 Speaker 1: We do not forgive, we do not forget, expect us. Okay, 295 00:18:25,040 --> 00:18:29,560 Speaker 1: with that cheerful message, let's swap on over to a 296 00:18:29,600 --> 00:18:33,480 Speaker 1: different hacker, someone who was very much identified, someone who 297 00:18:33,520 --> 00:18:37,320 Speaker 1: was responsible both for committing several high profile, high impact 298 00:18:37,480 --> 00:18:40,520 Speaker 1: acts of theft and wirefraud as well as a guy 299 00:18:40,640 --> 00:18:45,320 Speaker 1: who helped take down other hackers. His name is Albert Gonzalez, 300 00:18:45,520 --> 00:18:49,000 Speaker 1: and he sometimes went by handles that included soup Nazi 301 00:18:49,480 --> 00:18:54,000 Speaker 1: as a Seinfeld reference or Kumba Johnny So. Gonzalez was 302 00:18:54,000 --> 00:18:57,040 Speaker 1: born in nineteen eighty one in Cuba and brought up 303 00:18:57,080 --> 00:18:59,719 Speaker 1: in the United States, and he was interested in computers 304 00:19:00,000 --> 00:19:03,160 Speaker 1: at a young age. According to a piece written by 305 00:19:03,280 --> 00:19:06,240 Speaker 1: James Verini in The New York Times magazine back in 306 00:19:06,400 --> 00:19:11,080 Speaker 1: twenty ten, an early hint that the young Albert Gonzalez 307 00:19:11,240 --> 00:19:13,760 Speaker 1: was a potential thorn in the side of the law 308 00:19:14,040 --> 00:19:16,840 Speaker 1: came in the nineteen nineties when it was discovered that 309 00:19:16,920 --> 00:19:20,320 Speaker 1: he had penetrated NASA's computer systems when he was just 310 00:19:20,600 --> 00:19:24,440 Speaker 1: fourteen years old. The FBI paid him a little visit 311 00:19:24,480 --> 00:19:28,560 Speaker 1: at school about that. Apparently he had developed a rather 312 00:19:28,800 --> 00:19:33,040 Speaker 1: distinct disdain for authority, and meanwhile, he and some friends 313 00:19:33,040 --> 00:19:37,680 Speaker 1: were fascinated with learning how various systems worked. Now he 314 00:19:37,760 --> 00:19:42,119 Speaker 1: was more interested in systems than in programming. He liked 315 00:19:42,200 --> 00:19:46,320 Speaker 1: learning how networks worked, and not just computer networks, but 316 00:19:46,400 --> 00:19:50,359 Speaker 1: like networks of people. He would probe at these different systems, 317 00:19:50,480 --> 00:19:52,520 Speaker 1: and often it didn't take very long for him to 318 00:19:52,560 --> 00:19:56,080 Speaker 1: find a vulnerability. So back in the early days of 319 00:19:56,119 --> 00:19:59,679 Speaker 1: the Internet, security protocols were very much a work in 320 00:19:59,760 --> 00:20:02,879 Speaker 1: pro and not everyone was on the same page. A 321 00:20:02,960 --> 00:20:08,199 Speaker 1: lot of people and companies had incredibly lacks security practices, 322 00:20:08,560 --> 00:20:11,200 Speaker 1: and you could think of that as just being a 323 00:20:12,560 --> 00:20:16,240 Speaker 1: common feature in the Internet, kind of like how the 324 00:20:16,240 --> 00:20:19,359 Speaker 1: web pages at that time almost all had the obligatory 325 00:20:19,520 --> 00:20:24,280 Speaker 1: under construction graphic posted somewhere on their web page. Now, Gonzales, 326 00:20:24,320 --> 00:20:27,480 Speaker 1: like I said, he wasn't really a coder a programmer. 327 00:20:27,560 --> 00:20:32,240 Speaker 1: He would rely on other hackers for building code instead. 328 00:20:32,480 --> 00:20:35,920 Speaker 1: He was just really good at understanding how systems worked 329 00:20:35,920 --> 00:20:39,320 Speaker 1: and then navigating through those systems and finding the valuable 330 00:20:39,359 --> 00:20:43,880 Speaker 1: information stored within them. He was also really adept at 331 00:20:43,920 --> 00:20:47,200 Speaker 1: social engineering. He was great at manipulating people to get 332 00:20:47,240 --> 00:20:50,400 Speaker 1: what he needed, whether that was a login password or 333 00:20:50,560 --> 00:20:54,199 Speaker 1: information about Wi Fi networks or whatever. He also was 334 00:20:54,280 --> 00:20:59,080 Speaker 1: reportedly a pretty serious drug user. Typically he relied on 335 00:20:59,160 --> 00:21:02,960 Speaker 1: stimulants like cocaine when he was pulling long hours while 336 00:21:02,960 --> 00:21:07,560 Speaker 1: infiltrating systems, and that would become a pretty big issue 337 00:21:07,560 --> 00:21:11,200 Speaker 1: for him. Among his go to activities would be sniffing 338 00:21:11,200 --> 00:21:15,360 Speaker 1: out credit card numbers either by finding a database belonging 339 00:21:15,440 --> 00:21:18,560 Speaker 1: to say, a business like a retailer, and then just 340 00:21:18,640 --> 00:21:21,359 Speaker 1: siphoning off numbers that were stored in there, because not 341 00:21:21,480 --> 00:21:24,840 Speaker 1: everyone stored their numbers and encrypted formats, which meant if 342 00:21:24,920 --> 00:21:27,480 Speaker 1: you had access to the database, you had access to numbers. 343 00:21:27,720 --> 00:21:30,199 Speaker 1: He also made friends with other hackers who specialized in 344 00:21:30,240 --> 00:21:34,720 Speaker 1: building programs specifically to skim credit card numbers, one of 345 00:21:34,760 --> 00:21:38,400 Speaker 1: those being Stephen Watt, who was sometimes known by handles 346 00:21:38,480 --> 00:21:42,920 Speaker 1: like Jim Jones or sometimes the Unix Terrorist. And as 347 00:21:42,960 --> 00:21:46,040 Speaker 1: a young adult, Gonzales joined a group of like minded 348 00:21:46,080 --> 00:21:50,960 Speaker 1: hackers that would call themselves the Shadow Crew, and it 349 00:21:51,000 --> 00:21:53,480 Speaker 1: was kind of like a forum for hackers, but not 350 00:21:53,720 --> 00:21:56,320 Speaker 1: just that, it was also a trading place. At Shadow Crew, 351 00:21:56,359 --> 00:22:00,280 Speaker 1: people could buy and sell information like stolen credit card 352 00:22:00,359 --> 00:22:04,680 Speaker 1: or debit card numbers, and they also could find tutorials 353 00:22:04,720 --> 00:22:07,960 Speaker 1: about how to carry out various criminal activities and how 354 00:22:07,960 --> 00:22:11,719 Speaker 1: to do things like how to get blank cards and 355 00:22:11,760 --> 00:22:16,239 Speaker 1: then emboss them and print magnetic strips on them and 356 00:22:16,320 --> 00:22:21,080 Speaker 1: imprint the stolen card information you had onto card blanks 357 00:22:21,359 --> 00:22:24,239 Speaker 1: so that you could then take those cards to like 358 00:22:24,320 --> 00:22:28,280 Speaker 1: an ATM and potentially withdraw tons of cash in the process. 359 00:22:28,600 --> 00:22:31,760 Speaker 1: In fact, that's actually what Gonzales was doing when he 360 00:22:31,880 --> 00:22:35,280 Speaker 1: first got caught. Shadow crew had built up an enormous 361 00:22:35,400 --> 00:22:38,879 Speaker 1: database of stolen card numbers, and Gonzales had made a 362 00:22:38,920 --> 00:22:41,440 Speaker 1: bunch of fake cards, and he set out to hit 363 00:22:41,480 --> 00:22:45,520 Speaker 1: some ATMs in North Manhattan in New York City. By chance, 364 00:22:45,960 --> 00:22:50,640 Speaker 1: there was this plain clothes NYPD detective who just spotted 365 00:22:50,680 --> 00:22:55,440 Speaker 1: Gonzales and thought Gonzales looked an awful lot shady. Gonzalez 366 00:22:55,560 --> 00:22:58,400 Speaker 1: was wearing a woman's wig at the time and a 367 00:22:58,520 --> 00:23:01,800 Speaker 1: fake nose ring, and the detective was actually on the 368 00:23:01,800 --> 00:23:04,560 Speaker 1: lookout for a totally different kind of criminal because there 369 00:23:04,560 --> 00:23:06,960 Speaker 1: had been some car thieves who had been hitting some 370 00:23:07,000 --> 00:23:11,480 Speaker 1: neighborhoods in Upper Manhattan, and so this detective started following 371 00:23:11,520 --> 00:23:14,159 Speaker 1: Gonzalez thinking that maybe he found one of the people 372 00:23:14,440 --> 00:23:17,040 Speaker 1: who had been boosting cars in the area. But it 373 00:23:17,080 --> 00:23:21,760 Speaker 1: wasn't cars that Gonzalez had boosted. It was card numbers, 374 00:23:21,880 --> 00:23:25,960 Speaker 1: not cars. So the detective follows Gonzalez, sees Gonzalez go 375 00:23:26,040 --> 00:23:29,200 Speaker 1: up to an ATM notices that Gonzalez is very likely 376 00:23:29,240 --> 00:23:31,760 Speaker 1: in disguise, like he's wearing like a hoodie and everything, 377 00:23:31,800 --> 00:23:33,760 Speaker 1: but also, like I said, a wig and a nose ring, 378 00:23:34,160 --> 00:23:38,320 Speaker 1: and Gonzalez starts using cards to access an ATM and 379 00:23:38,359 --> 00:23:41,080 Speaker 1: withdraw cash, and then just switch to a different card 380 00:23:41,160 --> 00:23:45,240 Speaker 1: and withdraw more cash. So the detective figured that Gonzalez 381 00:23:45,320 --> 00:23:48,959 Speaker 1: wasn't stealing automobiles, but he was definitely doing something that 382 00:23:49,000 --> 00:23:53,840 Speaker 1: was questionable. And so Gonzales got picked up by the police, 383 00:23:54,200 --> 00:23:56,960 Speaker 1: not because the cybersecurity team figured out who he was, 384 00:23:57,080 --> 00:23:59,320 Speaker 1: but because someone in the real world spotted him and 385 00:23:59,359 --> 00:24:04,160 Speaker 1: suspected that something was pinky. So Gonzalez ended up turning 386 00:24:04,320 --> 00:24:08,200 Speaker 1: informant on the Shadow Crew. This was largely to protect 387 00:24:08,280 --> 00:24:10,600 Speaker 1: himself so he wouldn't have to go to prison, and 388 00:24:10,880 --> 00:24:15,400 Speaker 1: he thought, well, I can end up helping the law 389 00:24:15,440 --> 00:24:20,320 Speaker 1: enforcement identify and catch other hackers. Now, Gonzales didn't necessarily 390 00:24:20,359 --> 00:24:22,560 Speaker 1: know who everyone was in Shadow Crew. In fact, he 391 00:24:22,600 --> 00:24:24,600 Speaker 1: didn't know who most of them were. The whole point 392 00:24:24,920 --> 00:24:28,400 Speaker 1: of the hacker culture was to create these personas that 393 00:24:28,800 --> 00:24:31,520 Speaker 1: while you know it was connected to you, you couldn't 394 00:24:31,600 --> 00:24:35,560 Speaker 1: trace it back to a person easily. However, Gonzales had 395 00:24:35,560 --> 00:24:37,840 Speaker 1: built up a lot of trust in the community, so 396 00:24:38,480 --> 00:24:42,200 Speaker 1: he ended up helping the Secret Service identify various high 397 00:24:42,280 --> 00:24:45,000 Speaker 1: level members of Shadow crew. But even while he was 398 00:24:45,080 --> 00:24:49,680 Speaker 1: working with the authorities to put away his fellow hackers, 399 00:24:50,040 --> 00:24:53,439 Speaker 1: he also kept up his own criminal activities. In fact, 400 00:24:53,960 --> 00:24:58,560 Speaker 1: he really stepped it up. He targeted large retail organizations 401 00:24:58,960 --> 00:25:01,359 Speaker 1: and so one of the things he started to do 402 00:25:01,560 --> 00:25:06,159 Speaker 1: was tap into these businesses through their own Wi Fi networks. 403 00:25:06,240 --> 00:25:08,680 Speaker 1: He and his colleagues would engage in a practice called 404 00:25:08,880 --> 00:25:13,400 Speaker 1: war driving. So war driving just involves driving around, typically 405 00:25:13,480 --> 00:25:16,720 Speaker 1: with like a laptop, and you're searching for Wi Fi networks, 406 00:25:17,080 --> 00:25:19,400 Speaker 1: and once you find a Wi Fi network, the next 407 00:25:19,400 --> 00:25:21,680 Speaker 1: step is to prod the network and see if there's 408 00:25:21,680 --> 00:25:25,720 Speaker 1: any vulnerabilities you can exploit. Now, that doesn't necessarily involve 409 00:25:25,840 --> 00:25:28,840 Speaker 1: any high tech stuff like it can, but it doesn't 410 00:25:28,880 --> 00:25:31,479 Speaker 1: have to. Sometimes all it takes is just a working 411 00:25:31,520 --> 00:25:35,480 Speaker 1: knowledge of generic login and password credentials, you know Wi Fi. 412 00:25:35,760 --> 00:25:38,359 Speaker 1: Especially at the time when Gonzalez was doing this in 413 00:25:38,400 --> 00:25:41,919 Speaker 1: the mid two thousands, it was fairly new and not 414 00:25:42,000 --> 00:25:44,440 Speaker 1: everyone actually took the trouble to, you know, do things 415 00:25:44,440 --> 00:25:47,800 Speaker 1: like change the default settings on their Wi Fi networks, 416 00:25:47,960 --> 00:25:51,000 Speaker 1: which meant that it was trivial to infiltrate those systems. 417 00:25:51,040 --> 00:25:53,280 Speaker 1: You might as well not use any security at all. 418 00:25:53,320 --> 00:25:56,320 Speaker 1: If you're not changing things like the default password, right, 419 00:25:56,440 --> 00:25:58,720 Speaker 1: because then all you have to do is know which 420 00:25:58,800 --> 00:26:01,919 Speaker 1: companies use default words, you know which default passwords, and 421 00:26:02,000 --> 00:26:04,200 Speaker 1: just go through and start using those until you get 422 00:26:04,240 --> 00:26:06,919 Speaker 1: into the system. And that was a large part of 423 00:26:06,960 --> 00:26:09,919 Speaker 1: what Gonzales in his group was doing. So even in 424 00:26:10,040 --> 00:26:13,960 Speaker 1: cases where someone did think to make this change, where 425 00:26:14,000 --> 00:26:16,240 Speaker 1: they did go so far as to change the defaults, 426 00:26:16,440 --> 00:26:19,320 Speaker 1: sometimes just a little social engineering could go a long 427 00:26:19,359 --> 00:26:21,399 Speaker 1: way toward getting you what you wanted. You know, you 428 00:26:21,440 --> 00:26:24,600 Speaker 1: trick someone into sharing log in credentials and you're in 429 00:26:24,640 --> 00:26:27,199 Speaker 1: the game. You just tell them, oh, I'm here to 430 00:26:27,880 --> 00:26:31,639 Speaker 1: improve your internet connection, to speed things up or whatever, 431 00:26:32,040 --> 00:26:35,280 Speaker 1: or to fix a problem. And you get login information 432 00:26:35,359 --> 00:26:37,800 Speaker 1: from someone, a lot of people will just hand it 433 00:26:37,840 --> 00:26:40,240 Speaker 1: over because they're like, well, that's outside of my expertise, 434 00:26:40,560 --> 00:26:43,119 Speaker 1: I don't know what I'm doing. Sure, this person seems 435 00:26:43,119 --> 00:26:44,879 Speaker 1: like they're on the up and up. Here's my log 436 00:26:44,920 --> 00:26:47,399 Speaker 1: in information. And then you snoop around long enough in 437 00:26:47,440 --> 00:26:49,520 Speaker 1: a system, you might find a way to access higher 438 00:26:49,600 --> 00:26:52,840 Speaker 1: level files. Right, you might be able to get administrator 439 00:26:52,920 --> 00:26:57,000 Speaker 1: level access to a system. That's kind of what Gonzales 440 00:26:57,080 --> 00:26:59,840 Speaker 1: was really good at doing. And that's where the profit is, 441 00:27:00,160 --> 00:27:04,959 Speaker 1: because that's where you're able to access the most sensitive information. 442 00:27:05,320 --> 00:27:09,640 Speaker 1: So Gonzales breached numerous databases that had pretty poor security 443 00:27:09,680 --> 00:27:12,800 Speaker 1: controls but lots of customer data, and so he got 444 00:27:12,840 --> 00:27:16,280 Speaker 1: access to even more credit and debit cards through major 445 00:27:16,359 --> 00:27:22,440 Speaker 1: retailers and consumer facing companies like TJ Max, OfficeMax, Barnes 446 00:27:22,480 --> 00:27:25,800 Speaker 1: and Noble Dave and Busters and lots more. He also 447 00:27:25,920 --> 00:27:29,200 Speaker 1: double crossed a few hackers in his community at this time. 448 00:27:29,400 --> 00:27:32,280 Speaker 1: In that New York Times magazine article, it's revealed that 449 00:27:32,480 --> 00:27:36,160 Speaker 1: while he was working with the Secret Service, Gonzales secretly 450 00:27:36,200 --> 00:27:40,040 Speaker 1: sold a junk database of stolen credentials. Those credentials were 451 00:27:40,080 --> 00:27:42,880 Speaker 1: no longer really active and so they weren't really useful. 452 00:27:43,320 --> 00:27:45,760 Speaker 1: It was just junk. But he sold this database to 453 00:27:45,800 --> 00:27:49,520 Speaker 1: a hacker because he knew that hacker was also under 454 00:27:49,960 --> 00:27:52,520 Speaker 1: the scrutiny of the Secret Service and they were closing 455 00:27:52,560 --> 00:27:56,320 Speaker 1: in on the hacker. So he makes money from this hacker. 456 00:27:56,520 --> 00:27:59,000 Speaker 1: The hacker gets caught and it looks like the hacker 457 00:27:59,119 --> 00:28:01,960 Speaker 1: is the one who actually stole the database of credentials 458 00:28:02,000 --> 00:28:05,560 Speaker 1: in the first place, so Gonzalez is able to offload 459 00:28:05,760 --> 00:28:11,639 Speaker 1: a worthless database of information onto someone who then takes 460 00:28:11,840 --> 00:28:14,439 Speaker 1: the fall for having stolen it in the first place. 461 00:28:14,720 --> 00:28:17,800 Speaker 1: By two thousand and seven, gonzalez Is working relationship with 462 00:28:17,840 --> 00:28:21,040 Speaker 1: the Secret Service was kind of falling apart, but he 463 00:28:21,160 --> 00:28:25,040 Speaker 1: was still really just getting started, and he had graduated 464 00:28:25,080 --> 00:28:30,440 Speaker 1: to SEQL injection attacks SQL. So essentially, a sequel injection 465 00:28:30,600 --> 00:28:34,880 Speaker 1: uses commands written in structured query language and it exploits 466 00:28:34,920 --> 00:28:37,280 Speaker 1: a vulnerability. It doesn't just work on its own. There 467 00:28:37,280 --> 00:28:41,800 Speaker 1: has to be a poorly designed system, and such systems 468 00:28:41,840 --> 00:28:45,600 Speaker 1: will sometimes accept commands that are in SQL without even 469 00:28:45,640 --> 00:28:49,280 Speaker 1: the formal logging in process. It's like you bypassed the 470 00:28:49,760 --> 00:28:53,000 Speaker 1: bit where the bouncer has to ask for your ID, 471 00:28:53,280 --> 00:28:55,680 Speaker 1: like you found a different way in, and it doesn't 472 00:28:55,680 --> 00:28:57,880 Speaker 1: give you full access to the building, but because you 473 00:28:57,960 --> 00:29:01,120 Speaker 1: happen to have like this one, you then can get 474 00:29:01,160 --> 00:29:05,400 Speaker 1: access to other stuff. That's essentially what sequel injection does. 475 00:29:05,720 --> 00:29:09,440 Speaker 1: It gives commands, and if the system is not hardened 476 00:29:09,480 --> 00:29:13,640 Speaker 1: against such attacks, the system's programmed to respond to those commands. 477 00:29:13,920 --> 00:29:17,920 Speaker 1: So this is one way that hackers would create backdoor 478 00:29:18,080 --> 00:29:21,120 Speaker 1: entry points into systems where they could come and go 479 00:29:21,200 --> 00:29:24,440 Speaker 1: as they pleased. So that's what Gonzales and his colleagues 480 00:29:24,440 --> 00:29:28,200 Speaker 1: were doing. Now, ultimately, he began to breach point of 481 00:29:28,440 --> 00:29:32,920 Speaker 1: sale machines like where cards were actually getting swiped. I 482 00:29:32,960 --> 00:29:36,880 Speaker 1: remember when this happened because news about how major retailers, 483 00:29:36,920 --> 00:29:39,280 Speaker 1: the big one being TJ Max as I recall, but 484 00:29:39,480 --> 00:29:41,840 Speaker 1: it was lots of them, not just TJ Max, but 485 00:29:41,960 --> 00:29:44,640 Speaker 1: all these different companies were starting to report these security 486 00:29:44,640 --> 00:29:47,920 Speaker 1: breaches in which someone had somehow managed to access credit 487 00:29:47,960 --> 00:29:51,200 Speaker 1: card numbers, sometimes credit card scanners right at the point 488 00:29:51,240 --> 00:29:54,280 Speaker 1: of sale and just grabbing numbers in real time. That's 489 00:29:54,280 --> 00:29:58,800 Speaker 1: someone was Gonzales and his crew. Okay, I've got more 490 00:29:58,800 --> 00:30:02,760 Speaker 1: to say about gonz and wrapping up his story. Plus 491 00:30:02,800 --> 00:30:05,320 Speaker 1: we have another hacker to talk about, but first let's 492 00:30:05,360 --> 00:30:18,160 Speaker 1: take another quick break. So we're back now. While Gonzalez 493 00:30:18,240 --> 00:30:21,680 Speaker 1: had a history of using stolen credit card and debit 494 00:30:21,720 --> 00:30:26,200 Speaker 1: card numbers personally, the really big money was in selling 495 00:30:26,320 --> 00:30:30,240 Speaker 1: databases filled with just hundreds of thousands of credit card 496 00:30:30,320 --> 00:30:34,560 Speaker 1: numbers to other people. And he had really accumulated tens 497 00:30:34,720 --> 00:30:39,000 Speaker 1: of millions of card numbers over his various exploits, and 498 00:30:39,040 --> 00:30:41,000 Speaker 1: he would sell them to people all over the world. 499 00:30:41,360 --> 00:30:44,200 Speaker 1: But one of his big buyers was a guy located 500 00:30:44,480 --> 00:30:49,040 Speaker 1: in Ukraine, and Gonzales felt comfortable working with this guy 501 00:30:49,240 --> 00:30:52,360 Speaker 1: because the extradition laws in Ukraine at the time weren't 502 00:30:52,480 --> 00:30:57,080 Speaker 1: very scary, so if his contact was picked up, then 503 00:30:57,120 --> 00:31:00,160 Speaker 1: he would probably just kind of get off without too 504 00:31:00,200 --> 00:31:03,360 Speaker 1: much trouble. He certainly wouldn't get extradited to the United States, 505 00:31:03,400 --> 00:31:07,000 Speaker 1: and Gonzalez himself would remain insulated, so he felt that 506 00:31:07,040 --> 00:31:10,600 Speaker 1: there was a lower risk working with criminals in Ukraine. 507 00:31:10,680 --> 00:31:13,200 Speaker 1: But then this contact took a little trip to Turkey 508 00:31:13,240 --> 00:31:15,840 Speaker 1: and got snatched up by authorities and things went south 509 00:31:15,880 --> 00:31:18,480 Speaker 1: in a hurry, so ultimately that did not work out 510 00:31:18,480 --> 00:31:22,120 Speaker 1: so well for Albert Gonzalez. Law enforcement was looking into 511 00:31:22,160 --> 00:31:25,200 Speaker 1: the various data breaches, and through tracking down people on 512 00:31:25,320 --> 00:31:29,520 Speaker 1: the outskirts of this crime, they were slowly circling in 513 00:31:29,760 --> 00:31:34,000 Speaker 1: on Albert Gonzalez himself. That also included some tailtale signs 514 00:31:34,040 --> 00:31:37,840 Speaker 1: at Dave and Busters, which played another part in kind 515 00:31:37,880 --> 00:31:42,320 Speaker 1: of narrowing down the search. See the program that Gonzalez's 516 00:31:42,800 --> 00:31:45,560 Speaker 1: crew was using to skim credit card numbers at the 517 00:31:45,640 --> 00:31:50,160 Speaker 1: daven Buster's locations had a limitation. It would not reset 518 00:31:50,600 --> 00:31:53,480 Speaker 1: if the computer systems had been shut down. And then 519 00:31:53,520 --> 00:31:56,320 Speaker 1: turned back on. So if the computer systems reset, the 520 00:31:56,480 --> 00:32:00,560 Speaker 1: skimming program did not reset with those comput systems that 521 00:32:00,640 --> 00:32:03,960 Speaker 1: needed to be reinitiated. So that meant that the hackers 522 00:32:04,000 --> 00:32:06,959 Speaker 1: would have to revisit Dave and Busters on a fairly 523 00:32:07,000 --> 00:32:09,920 Speaker 1: frequent basis. And then eventually David Busters starts to figure 524 00:32:09,920 --> 00:32:13,640 Speaker 1: out that these frequent customers are also shady customers and 525 00:32:13,720 --> 00:32:18,960 Speaker 1: suspicions raise. The investigation culminated in a May seventh, two 526 00:32:19,000 --> 00:32:23,160 Speaker 1: thousand and eight, raid on a hotel room near Miami Beach, Florida. 527 00:32:23,240 --> 00:32:28,840 Speaker 1: So Miami was Gonzales' hometown. He moved there after he 528 00:32:28,880 --> 00:32:32,400 Speaker 1: worked with the Secret Service back in the earlier two 529 00:32:32,400 --> 00:32:37,640 Speaker 1: thousands and was helping them unveil and unmask and capture 530 00:32:37,720 --> 00:32:40,520 Speaker 1: various hackers. He moved to Miami and that's where he 531 00:32:40,760 --> 00:32:45,120 Speaker 1: operated for much of the mid to late two thousands. 532 00:32:45,120 --> 00:32:50,760 Speaker 1: Really and law enforcement arrested Gonzales in this raid, and 533 00:32:51,160 --> 00:32:55,240 Speaker 1: Gonzales eventually led authorities to dig up a barrel containing 534 00:32:55,280 --> 00:32:58,040 Speaker 1: more than a million dollars in cash that was buried 535 00:32:58,040 --> 00:33:02,000 Speaker 1: in his parents' backyard. Whether or not that was the 536 00:33:02,600 --> 00:33:05,400 Speaker 1: majority of his money or all of it, who knows. 537 00:33:05,840 --> 00:33:09,040 Speaker 1: Maybe it was just a bit to throw a bone 538 00:33:09,080 --> 00:33:12,760 Speaker 1: to the authorities and keep the rest secretly locked away. 539 00:33:13,240 --> 00:33:16,360 Speaker 1: But Gonzalez pled guilty to all the charges that were 540 00:33:16,400 --> 00:33:19,640 Speaker 1: filed against him. He was sentenced to two concurrent twenty 541 00:33:19,720 --> 00:33:22,520 Speaker 1: year prison sentences, meaning he was serving out both of 542 00:33:22,560 --> 00:33:26,120 Speaker 1: them at the same time. His buddy, Stephen Watt aka 543 00:33:26,600 --> 00:33:30,480 Speaker 1: Jim Jones, would get two years in prison and a 544 00:33:30,560 --> 00:33:33,360 Speaker 1: quarter of a million dollars in fines for having coded 545 00:33:33,520 --> 00:33:36,920 Speaker 1: the sniffer programs that Gonzalez was relying upon, though Wats 546 00:33:36,960 --> 00:33:40,720 Speaker 1: himself argued that he didn't know what Gonzalez was really 547 00:33:40,760 --> 00:33:43,200 Speaker 1: doing with the stuff he had built. I don't fully 548 00:33:43,680 --> 00:33:46,480 Speaker 1: know if that's believable, but he did say that he 549 00:33:46,840 --> 00:33:50,120 Speaker 1: definitely didn't agree with some of the targets that Gonzales 550 00:33:50,160 --> 00:33:52,600 Speaker 1: wanted to go after that Watt just felt that that 551 00:33:52,720 --> 00:33:57,520 Speaker 1: was not really appropriate. Another hacker named Damon Patrick Towey, 552 00:33:57,840 --> 00:34:00,479 Speaker 1: who did a lot of Gonzales' leg work, got hit 553 00:34:00,520 --> 00:34:03,600 Speaker 1: with a five year prison sentence, now equated to multiple articles. 554 00:34:03,680 --> 00:34:07,160 Speaker 1: Gonzales would be in prison till eligible for parole, which 555 00:34:07,160 --> 00:34:10,759 Speaker 1: wouldn't be until twenty twenty five, but apparently he was 556 00:34:10,800 --> 00:34:13,720 Speaker 1: released last year on September nineteenth according to the Bureau 557 00:34:13,800 --> 00:34:16,400 Speaker 1: of Prisons. If you do a research of him on 558 00:34:16,480 --> 00:34:18,720 Speaker 1: the Bureau of Prisons, it says he is no longer 559 00:34:18,760 --> 00:34:21,880 Speaker 1: in custody. Oddly enough, I couldn't find any articles about 560 00:34:21,920 --> 00:34:25,080 Speaker 1: his release. But if someone is in prison long enough, 561 00:34:25,120 --> 00:34:27,239 Speaker 1: I figure the folks who covered their crimes will have 562 00:34:27,320 --> 00:34:29,960 Speaker 1: moved on. So it's quite possible that no one just 563 00:34:30,200 --> 00:34:33,799 Speaker 1: noticed that he was released from prison. Assuming he's on 564 00:34:33,840 --> 00:34:36,520 Speaker 1: the outside now, the question is will he stay on 565 00:34:36,680 --> 00:34:43,040 Speaker 1: the straight and narrow or return to his system exploiting ways. Now, 566 00:34:43,120 --> 00:34:46,440 Speaker 1: our final hacker that we're covering in this episode is 567 00:34:46,480 --> 00:34:50,160 Speaker 1: a tragic story and it's also connected to Albert Gonzales, 568 00:34:50,560 --> 00:34:55,520 Speaker 1: so this guy has a relation to that story. It's 569 00:34:55,560 --> 00:34:59,320 Speaker 1: the story of Jonathan James. He was born in nineteen 570 00:34:59,360 --> 00:35:01,360 Speaker 1: eighty three, so he was just a couple of years 571 00:35:01,400 --> 00:35:04,800 Speaker 1: younger than Gonzales. His father was a computer systems analyst, 572 00:35:04,840 --> 00:35:08,160 Speaker 1: and young Jonathan James developed a keen interest in computers 573 00:35:08,200 --> 00:35:11,839 Speaker 1: as well, so keen that years later, when Jonathan James 574 00:35:11,880 --> 00:35:15,920 Speaker 1: would get picked up by authorities for breaching secure systems, 575 00:35:15,960 --> 00:35:18,960 Speaker 1: his father would claim, quote, I've been in computers for 576 00:35:19,040 --> 00:35:22,040 Speaker 1: twenty years, and I can't do what he was doing 577 00:35:22,360 --> 00:35:25,920 Speaker 1: end quote. Now, what he was doing was mainly snooping around. 578 00:35:26,200 --> 00:35:29,640 Speaker 1: He was using computers and the young Internet to explore 579 00:35:29,719 --> 00:35:33,400 Speaker 1: different computer systems, and like Gonzales, that included some systems 580 00:35:33,400 --> 00:35:37,480 Speaker 1: that he absolutely positively was not supposed to be able 581 00:35:37,520 --> 00:35:41,879 Speaker 1: to access. In nineteen ninety nine, Jonathan James allegedly infiltrated 582 00:35:41,880 --> 00:35:45,400 Speaker 1: more than a dozen computers belonging to the National Aeronautics 583 00:35:45,400 --> 00:35:49,440 Speaker 1: and Space Administration good old NASA, again just like Gonzales 584 00:35:49,440 --> 00:35:52,520 Speaker 1: had done when he was fourteen years old. The computers 585 00:35:52,520 --> 00:35:56,880 Speaker 1: were located at NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center in Alabama, 586 00:35:57,080 --> 00:36:00,000 Speaker 1: and the intrusion, once detected, prompted the agency to show 587 00:36:00,200 --> 00:36:02,520 Speaker 1: down some of those computers for the better part of 588 00:36:02,560 --> 00:36:06,360 Speaker 1: a month. James would later be accused of having stolen data, 589 00:36:06,400 --> 00:36:09,880 Speaker 1: including highly sensitive information about the International Space Station, and 590 00:36:09,960 --> 00:36:14,120 Speaker 1: that he had downloaded software from NASA during his unauthorized 591 00:36:14,280 --> 00:36:18,040 Speaker 1: tour of their computer systems, and authorities would later estimate 592 00:36:18,080 --> 00:36:21,160 Speaker 1: that his activities had cost the agency around forty thousand 593 00:36:21,280 --> 00:36:25,080 Speaker 1: bucks in various ways, from having to replace compromise systems 594 00:36:25,120 --> 00:36:28,560 Speaker 1: to paying folks to fix vulnerabilities though one could argue 595 00:36:28,560 --> 00:36:30,680 Speaker 1: that in that case, at least James had kind of 596 00:36:30,719 --> 00:36:34,319 Speaker 1: done NASA a service because James didn't have darker motivations 597 00:36:34,360 --> 00:36:37,480 Speaker 1: against the agency. And one could argue that if someone's 598 00:36:37,520 --> 00:36:40,000 Speaker 1: going to bust into your computer systems and reveal that 599 00:36:40,040 --> 00:36:42,680 Speaker 1: there's a big security vulnerability, you would rather it be 600 00:36:42,719 --> 00:36:45,799 Speaker 1: a sixteen year old kid than an actual terrorist. But 601 00:36:46,160 --> 00:36:49,560 Speaker 1: that's not to say that Jonathan James was a naive, innocent, 602 00:36:49,880 --> 00:36:54,160 Speaker 1: curious boy. He certainly was curious, that was definitely true. 603 00:36:54,440 --> 00:36:57,880 Speaker 1: But he really enjoyed the challenge of hacking into supposedly 604 00:36:57,960 --> 00:37:01,560 Speaker 1: secure systems, and he would claim that his motivation to 605 00:37:01,640 --> 00:37:03,520 Speaker 1: do this was mostly just to see if he could 606 00:37:03,560 --> 00:37:06,399 Speaker 1: do it, and also to brag about this to other 607 00:37:06,480 --> 00:37:08,960 Speaker 1: hackers so that he could get some, you know, kind 608 00:37:09,000 --> 00:37:12,800 Speaker 1: of clout in the hacker community. In the hacker community, 609 00:37:12,840 --> 00:37:15,800 Speaker 1: he took on the handle Comrade, with the O and 610 00:37:15,880 --> 00:37:19,480 Speaker 1: comrade being a zero instead of the letter O. That 611 00:37:19,560 --> 00:37:22,520 Speaker 1: might have been a little brash considering some of his targets, 612 00:37:22,600 --> 00:37:27,520 Speaker 1: Like to use a term that has its connections to Russia, 613 00:37:28,000 --> 00:37:30,440 Speaker 1: might have been a little brash because one of his 614 00:37:30,480 --> 00:37:34,400 Speaker 1: targets was the defense threat Reduction Agency, which itself is 615 00:37:34,480 --> 00:37:36,920 Speaker 1: part of the US Department of Defense. So this is 616 00:37:37,000 --> 00:37:39,880 Speaker 1: still in the summer of nineteen ninety nine, when James 617 00:37:39,920 --> 00:37:43,120 Speaker 1: was just sixteen years old. The agency in this case 618 00:37:43,200 --> 00:37:46,360 Speaker 1: was responsible for monitoring potential threats to the United States, 619 00:37:46,400 --> 00:37:51,360 Speaker 1: including stuff like nuclear or biologic weaponry, so this is 620 00:37:51,719 --> 00:37:56,360 Speaker 1: definitely highly classified information we're talking about. James uncovered a 621 00:37:56,360 --> 00:37:59,200 Speaker 1: ton of information while he was poking around. He intercepted 622 00:37:59,280 --> 00:38:03,200 Speaker 1: thousands of messages between different agency members and gained access 623 00:38:03,239 --> 00:38:06,640 Speaker 1: to nearly twenty different log in credentials. While he was 624 00:38:06,680 --> 00:38:10,360 Speaker 1: doing all this, the agency noticed that someone was snooping around, however, 625 00:38:10,520 --> 00:38:13,319 Speaker 1: and over the course of the next few months, law 626 00:38:13,360 --> 00:38:16,560 Speaker 1: enforcement was able to trace those intrusions back to Jonathan 627 00:38:16,680 --> 00:38:20,480 Speaker 1: James's home. Now, according to his dad, Jonathan's identity was 628 00:38:20,520 --> 00:38:25,600 Speaker 1: discovered largely through the cooperation with ISPs, so Internet service 629 00:38:25,640 --> 00:38:29,800 Speaker 1: providers worked with law enforcement to trace back the traffic 630 00:38:30,120 --> 00:38:33,320 Speaker 1: that was coming from Jonathan James's home and leading into 631 00:38:33,640 --> 00:38:36,840 Speaker 1: the Department of Defense. James was brought up on charges 632 00:38:36,960 --> 00:38:39,880 Speaker 1: as a juvenile, and he pled guilty to those charges. 633 00:38:40,000 --> 00:38:43,000 Speaker 1: If he had been an adult when he carried out 634 00:38:43,040 --> 00:38:46,240 Speaker 1: these hacking activities probably would have faced some pretty serious 635 00:38:46,360 --> 00:38:48,960 Speaker 1: jail time and some fines, but as it stood, he 636 00:38:49,040 --> 00:38:52,440 Speaker 1: was sentenced to six months of detention in a juvenile facility. 637 00:38:52,640 --> 00:38:54,920 Speaker 1: The Justice Department said he was the first juvenile to 638 00:38:54,960 --> 00:38:59,319 Speaker 1: actually serve time for hacking now. Unfortunately for James, the 639 00:38:59,400 --> 00:39:02,840 Speaker 1: consequence of his actions followed him well after his release 640 00:39:02,880 --> 00:39:06,799 Speaker 1: from juvenile detention. He found it difficult to secure employment. 641 00:39:07,000 --> 00:39:10,720 Speaker 1: While some hackers have leveraged their experiences into a job 642 00:39:10,840 --> 00:39:13,800 Speaker 1: in cybersecurity, James found it hard to do the same. 643 00:39:14,040 --> 00:39:16,800 Speaker 1: He also was still in touch with some other hackers, 644 00:39:17,000 --> 00:39:19,760 Speaker 1: and while he was determined to avoid a legal activity, 645 00:39:19,960 --> 00:39:24,359 Speaker 1: his circles included folks that were connected to Gonzalez, and 646 00:39:24,480 --> 00:39:29,360 Speaker 1: Gonzales showed far less concern about the legality of his actions. 647 00:39:29,600 --> 00:39:33,040 Speaker 1: So when Albert Gonzalez's crew started stealing thousands of credit 648 00:39:33,080 --> 00:39:36,280 Speaker 1: card numbers from around a dozen major companies, the Secret 649 00:39:36,320 --> 00:39:40,879 Speaker 1: Service decided to look in on James. They found references 650 00:39:40,920 --> 00:39:48,000 Speaker 1: to a j. J in those in those those hacker communications, 651 00:39:48,280 --> 00:39:52,000 Speaker 1: and Jonathan James couldn't that be JJ. As it turns out, 652 00:39:52,080 --> 00:39:56,759 Speaker 1: JJ may have meant Jim Jones aka Stephen Watt, who 653 00:39:56,800 --> 00:40:01,680 Speaker 1: was one of Gonzalez's colleagues, and the Secret Service was 654 00:40:01,719 --> 00:40:04,319 Speaker 1: looking at James. I mean, James had proven himself to 655 00:40:04,320 --> 00:40:08,600 Speaker 1: be an adept hacker, far capable of gaining access to 656 00:40:09,160 --> 00:40:12,240 Speaker 1: what were supposed to be secure systems. But Jonathan James 657 00:40:12,280 --> 00:40:17,440 Speaker 1: was already battling depression due to his struggles of getting 658 00:40:17,480 --> 00:40:22,359 Speaker 1: a stable life post detention, and the suspicion directed at 659 00:40:22,440 --> 00:40:26,520 Speaker 1: him probably exacerbated things. Not to say that it caused 660 00:40:26,680 --> 00:40:30,440 Speaker 1: what would follow to happen, but that it certainly was 661 00:40:30,600 --> 00:40:33,719 Speaker 1: another element on top of a lot of other stresses 662 00:40:33,760 --> 00:40:36,920 Speaker 1: that were already leading to some serious depression. Because on 663 00:40:37,000 --> 00:40:40,399 Speaker 1: May eighteenth, two thousand and eight, just eleven days after 664 00:40:40,480 --> 00:40:46,160 Speaker 1: authorities had brought Albert Gonzales into custody, Jonathan James committed suicide. 665 00:40:46,680 --> 00:40:49,080 Speaker 1: He left behind a note that claimed he had no 666 00:40:49,120 --> 00:40:52,600 Speaker 1: connection with the recent attacks against TJX and the other 667 00:40:52,680 --> 00:40:56,360 Speaker 1: companies that Gonzales had targeted, but he also had quote 668 00:40:56,719 --> 00:41:00,520 Speaker 1: no faith in the justice system end quote. Further, he 669 00:41:00,600 --> 00:41:03,759 Speaker 1: tragically revealed that he felt he had no control over 670 00:41:03,840 --> 00:41:07,120 Speaker 1: his own life and only by taking his life could 671 00:41:07,120 --> 00:41:12,040 Speaker 1: he regain control, which is an incredibly tragic ending. And 672 00:41:12,239 --> 00:41:14,759 Speaker 1: just a note here because I do think this is important. 673 00:41:15,120 --> 00:41:18,200 Speaker 1: If you are ever in a place where you're having 674 00:41:18,280 --> 00:41:22,359 Speaker 1: suicidal thoughts, please reach out to a crisis hotline. There 675 00:41:22,400 --> 00:41:25,080 Speaker 1: are many such lifelines around the world. Here in the 676 00:41:25,160 --> 00:41:28,640 Speaker 1: United States, the national lifeline is nine to eight eight, 677 00:41:29,120 --> 00:41:32,719 Speaker 1: and talking to someone can be a huge help. But 678 00:41:32,840 --> 00:41:36,759 Speaker 1: that's it for this episode about famous hackers. There are 679 00:41:36,760 --> 00:41:39,719 Speaker 1: lots more, and I'll probably do more episodes where I'll 680 00:41:39,719 --> 00:41:42,239 Speaker 1: talk about some others. You know, I didn't even mention 681 00:41:42,320 --> 00:41:44,320 Speaker 1: Kevin Mitnick in this one, and that's a big one, 682 00:41:44,400 --> 00:41:49,280 Speaker 1: so we'll come back to this topic. Obviously, there's seven 683 00:41:49,360 --> 00:41:52,040 Speaker 1: more on that Kaspersky list I could talk about, but 684 00:41:52,120 --> 00:41:57,640 Speaker 1: I felt that getting some insight into the motivations and 685 00:41:58,080 --> 00:42:01,279 Speaker 1: techniques used by some of these hackers would be kind 686 00:42:01,320 --> 00:42:05,319 Speaker 1: of interesting. I hope everyone out there is doing well. 687 00:42:05,520 --> 00:42:08,480 Speaker 1: Hope you're healthy and happy, and I will talk to 688 00:42:08,520 --> 00:42:18,520 Speaker 1: you again really soon. Tech Stuff is an iHeartRadio production. 689 00:42:18,840 --> 00:42:23,879 Speaker 1: For more podcasts from iHeartRadio, visit the iHeartRadio app, Apple Podcasts, 690 00:42:24,000 --> 00:42:26,000 Speaker 1: or wherever you listen to your favorite shows.