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Speaker 1: Good evening, America, Happy Friday, and welcome to a very

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Speaker 1: special edition of Justin Who's No Noise? We've been talking

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Speaker 1: about this Tonight, we're going to address this subject China Syndrome,

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Speaker 1: Beijing's imminent threat, inside academia, and biolapse. I'm your host,

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Speaker 1: John Solomon, reporting his voice from the nation's capital. Tonight,

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Speaker 1: we're going to take a deep dive into some shocking

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Speaker 1: reporting about the extent to which Chinese Communist Party has

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Speaker 1: been infiltrating America's most prestigious universities, and will also attempt

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Speaker 1: to uncover how.

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Speaker 2: And why they're doing it. We already know the major reason.

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Speaker 1: They're looking to steal the intellectual property of the United

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Speaker 1: States and a number of different scientific fields, including a

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Speaker 1: bio a terrorist bio biology, and of course, our high technology.

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Speaker 1: We've got an incredible field of experts to break that

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Speaker 1: all out.

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Speaker 2: Now.

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Speaker 1: Before we get to that, I want to stop here

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Speaker 1: because there's one piece of breaking news I want to

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Speaker 1: make sure we acknowledge at the top of the show.

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Speaker 1: I don't want today to pass without this happening. It

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Speaker 1: was a little over thirteen years ago when a group

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Speaker 1: of terrorists attacked the Benghazi compound in Libya. They killed

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Speaker 1: our ambassador there, Chris Stevens, and three other Americans. Movies

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Speaker 1: like Thirteen Hours were made on that harrowing day. We

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Speaker 1: were lied to at the beginning of that episode. We

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Speaker 1: were told it was America's fault that attack occurred because

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Speaker 1: there was some anti Muslim video making the rounds in Libya.

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Speaker 1: That wasn't the reason. It turned out it was an

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Speaker 1: organized terror attack involving an offshoot of al Qaeda. This morning,

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Speaker 1: FBI Director Cash Mattel went out to a airfield here

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Speaker 1: in America and greeted one of the terrorists who carried

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Speaker 1: out that attack. He was arrested, detained, and then he

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Speaker 1: was extra guided to the United States justice finally for

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Speaker 1: the victims of that horrible attack nearly fourteen years ago.

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Speaker 1: All the details are over at justinews dot com. Go

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Speaker 1: check that out. I didn't want today to pass. Now

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Speaker 1: here's an amazing thing. Cash Hotel is going to kick

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Speaker 1: us off on the show in just a few minutes,

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Speaker 1: but first let me get back to you to the theme.

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Speaker 1: We've got new details to get to you tonight regarding

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Speaker 1: the FBI's rate of a Chinese linked biolab in Las Vegas.

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Speaker 2: The man who allegedly ran it.

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Speaker 1: Also was tied to another biolab, a legal biolab that

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Speaker 1: was discovered in California in twenty twenty three, right in

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Speaker 1: the aftermath of COVID. These stories should concern us all

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Speaker 1: dangerous pathogens right among us in suburban neighborhoods in California,

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Speaker 1: in Las Vegas. As I mentioned, we're going to talk

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Speaker 1: to FBI doctor Cash Btel about that particular story and

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Speaker 1: whether we were misled about these Chinese threats by its predecessor,

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Speaker 1: Chris Right, We're going to dive into that a lot

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Speaker 1: to go on tonight. All right, before we do that,

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Speaker 1: let me tell you who else is going to be

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Speaker 1: on the showtime.

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Speaker 2: We got a good one.

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Speaker 1: The Director of the National Institutes of Health, doctor.

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Speaker 2: J Batachara, is going to be.

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Speaker 1: You were going to ask him have they stopped that

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Speaker 1: dangerous gain of function? You're going to get an answer

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Speaker 1: tonight for the first time. Who also tell us what

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Speaker 1: he's doing to stop the infiltration of Chinese academics in

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Speaker 1: our prestigious universities. And then the chairman of the House

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Speaker 1: Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Congressman Rick Crawford of Arkansas,

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Speaker 1: I was going to join us.

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Speaker 2: He's going to talk.

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Speaker 1: About what they're learning at the intelligence level about China's

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Speaker 1: intentions with these things, and finally we'll bring it all

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Speaker 1: together with a group. They gave us some of the

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Speaker 1: data for some of our big stories at justin News

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Speaker 1: the last week. The head of the American Accountability Foundation

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Speaker 1: will be here with us to describe that bombshell report

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Speaker 1: about those card carrying members of the CCP, the Chinese

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Speaker 1: Communist Party who are inside our universities, in some cases

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Speaker 1: working on taxpayer funded projects. Tom Jones, the president of

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Speaker 1: that great group, will join us. So that's a great show.

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Speaker 1: Before I get to that incredible lineup, let me bring

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Speaker 1: in my amazing co host, Amanda Head. Amanda from Benghazi,

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Speaker 1: where we were denied truths for a long time, to

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Speaker 1: the Chinese set, which we were often denied truths on,

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Speaker 1: particularly during the Biden years.

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Speaker 2: We're starting to get a.

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Speaker 1: Sense of just how much truth we were denied and awesome,

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Speaker 1: how much opportunity we have now to fix very large

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Speaker 1: security vulnerabilities in America. I just want to get your

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Speaker 1: thoughts on what lies ahead in the show today.

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Speaker 3: Yeah, John incredible, incredible development on Benghazi to borrow and

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Speaker 3: twist the words of Hillary Clinton. This is why this

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Speaker 3: matters at this point.

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Speaker 4: This is this.

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Speaker 3: You know, we all remember what she said during that

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Speaker 3: hearing that was such a flippant remarket at this point,

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Speaker 3: what difference does it?

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Speaker 4: This is the difference that it.

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Speaker 3: Makes when you have an FBI who dives in and

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Speaker 3: tries to get answers and achieves those answers so that

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Speaker 3: those who lost loved ones on that fateful day in

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Speaker 3: Benghazi can rest a little bit easier. And then, you know,

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Speaker 3: shifting to this China conversation, John, I don't think that

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Speaker 3: there is any doubt within this administration that China is

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Speaker 3: our adversary. We know that that former President Joe Biden

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Speaker 3: repeatedly characterized it as a competition, not an adversarial relationship.

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Speaker 3: But you look at the local poisoning or terrorism via fentanyl,

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Speaker 3: the medical or viral poisoning via terrorism from COVID. I mean,

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Speaker 3: this is a country that is trying to work its

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Speaker 3: tentacles into every sector of our country and our country's society.

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Speaker 3: And I can't wait to dive into everything that we're

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Speaker 3: going to learn tonight.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, there's no doubt we're going to learn a lot.

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Speaker 1: The prior administration opened the border so that thousands of

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Speaker 1: military aged Chinese men came across the border, including people

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Speaker 1: like those who were running these labs, these illegal bio labs.

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Speaker 1: They shut down the FBI's primary counter intelligence program, called

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Speaker 1: the China Initiative, And of course they didn't bring justice

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Speaker 1: to the terrorists who carried out that Benghazi attack. In

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Speaker 1: one year, all that has changed under Cashptel, under President Trump,

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Speaker 1: under j Baticharab, under Vice President J.

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Speaker 2: D Vance, and so many others.

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Speaker 1: And earlier today you and I had a chance to

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Speaker 1: sit down and spend some time with Cash Brittel.

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Speaker 2: He had just gotten back from.

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Speaker 1: The airstrip where that terrorist had been brought to justice

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Speaker 1: an American back here in American soil, and he had

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Speaker 1: some bombshells to tell us, folks.

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Speaker 2: Take a watch to a cash.

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Speaker 1: Matel told us, all right, joining us now, the man

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Speaker 1: behind that extraordinary arrest and extradition today in the Benghazi case,

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Speaker 1: as well as that raid in Las Vegas this past

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Speaker 1: weekend on that Chinese bio lab. The director of the

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Speaker 1: Federal Bureau of Investigation, a good friend of our show, Cash Betel,

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Speaker 1: mister Director, good to have you back on.

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Speaker 4: Thanks so much for having me.

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Speaker 2: All right, we want to.

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Speaker 1: Be talking about China. That was a purpose to say show.

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Speaker 1: But this arrest, this extradition a decade in the make

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Speaker 1: and tell us how it came down.

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Speaker 4: Absolutely.

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Speaker 5: Look, President Trump has never forgotten been Ghazi, and President

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Speaker 5: Trump never forgets to provide for law enforcement and make

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Speaker 5: sure we use law enforcement to give the families a

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Speaker 5: modicum of peace and justice that they deserve. This administration

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Speaker 5: of the Attorney General was relentless and when then Deputy

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Speaker 5: Director Dan Mangino and I spearheaded the effort to go

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Speaker 5: get Bakush, an individual who's allegedly responsible for the two

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Speaker 5: attacks and Benghazi that took four American lives.

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Speaker 4: And over the last few days.

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Speaker 5: We were able to successfully execute a foreign transfer of

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Speaker 5: custody apprehend this individual overseas. And I was there on

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Speaker 5: the airfield at about one am this morning or two

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Speaker 5: am this morning when he landed at one of our

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Speaker 5: airfields and was taken into official custody to face prosecution.

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Speaker 4: Absolutely wow.

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Speaker 3: Yeah, great answers for the American people and those involved,

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Speaker 3: Cash Director, I want to move on to the issue

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Speaker 3: of this lab in Las Vegas. At one point during

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Speaker 3: the Biden administration, I believe there was a seven hundred

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Speaker 3: percent increase in Chinese nationals who had come into this

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Speaker 3: country via our very poorest, basically wide open southern border.

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Speaker 4: What tipped you off to this?

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Speaker 3: And do you anticipate that there are going to be

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Speaker 3: more facilities like this?

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Speaker 5: Look, this FBI, under this leadership has prioritized a threat

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Speaker 5: against it by the CCP against US.

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Speaker 4: And we've taken swift action.

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Speaker 5: Just last year in Michigan, we arrested three individual researchers

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Speaker 5: at the University of Michigan. We're not trying did import

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Speaker 5: illegally biohazardous materials and pathogens into the United States of

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Speaker 5: America to not only destroy our ability to successfully have

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Speaker 5: scientific labs that are pro America, but also attack our

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Speaker 5: agricultural and bio sed industry. And so we've been on

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Speaker 5: it since then, specifically to this one over in Las Vegas.

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Speaker 5: We knew about this information and worked with the state

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Speaker 5: law enforcement authorities there in Las Vegas to execute these

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Speaker 5: search warrants and collect over a thousand samples of material

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Speaker 5: that has now been sent back to the FBI Lab

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Speaker 5: for analysis, and this is something that we're keep continuing

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Speaker 5: to uncover because if you recall, a similar incident in Redley, California,

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Speaker 5: from a few years ago was evidently buried by the

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Speaker 5: prior administration and they said it had no connection to

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Speaker 5: the CCP. When we discovered that, we took swift action

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Speaker 5: to course correct the intelligence and figure out why the

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Speaker 5: American public was misled by individuals in this institution, including

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Speaker 5: my predecessor. We're going to get to the bottom of it.

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Speaker 5: We're just awaiting the lab results and we're going to

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Speaker 5: keep going.

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Speaker 1: So Director, during the Biden years, the border obviously was

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Speaker 1: opened up. As a man that said, but another thing happened.

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Speaker 1: The China Initiative, which was the FBI's number one counter

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Speaker 1: intelligence effort against Chinese espionage, particularly carried out through Academy,

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Speaker 1: it was shut down. Hundreds of more scientists came in.

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Speaker 1: There was a blindness for a series of years. Is

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Speaker 1: the China Initiative back in force or do you have

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Speaker 1: something new that's resulting in all these discoveries and all

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Speaker 1: these arrests that you're beginning to make.

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Speaker 5: Well, look, this is just another disasters example of failing

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Speaker 5: to protect national security by the Biden administration who takes

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Speaker 5: down an initiative against our number one adversary, the CCP,

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Speaker 5: when they are not only conducting counter espionage activities here

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Speaker 5: in the homeland against Americans, but also overseas and importing

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Speaker 5: a legal biopathogens to harm our way of life. That

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Speaker 5: is an intentional poor decision to the detriment of our

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Speaker 5: national security. President Trump came in and said, we're reversing course.

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Speaker 5: We don't necessarily need a new initiative. We just need

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Speaker 5: the FBI all in against the CCP, and that's what

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Speaker 5: we've done. You saw our success with Fendel and Mainland China,

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Speaker 5: and that extension of our abilities to locate individuals from

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Speaker 5: the CCP who are interfering and breaking the law has

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Speaker 5: never been a higher priority in this administration over the

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Speaker 5: last year than it is now.

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Speaker 3: Director, you mentioned your predecessor, Chris Ray, and I distinctially

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Speaker 3: remember when he was testifying to Congress. There was a

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Speaker 3: moment where he talked about how lights were blinking red,

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Speaker 3: and I think that was around the time that they

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Speaker 3: had bolos out for military age fighting males coming in.

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Speaker 4: From various countries.

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Speaker 3: But does it seem to you as you look at

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Speaker 3: the work, or maybe lack thereof from the previous administration,

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Speaker 3: that the lights blink, the lights blinking red. Maybe he

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Speaker 3: was just saying that, but did he ever do anything

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Speaker 3: about it?

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Speaker 4: Well, lights can blink whatever color they want.

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Speaker 5: You don't have to be the director of the FBI

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Speaker 5: to know the CCPs, their number one adversary, is going

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Speaker 5: to continually threaten our way of life. What we did

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Speaker 5: in the last year with the President and Trump and

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Speaker 5: the Attorney General Department of Justice is reprioritized our dynamic

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Speaker 5: threat landscape, going after and disrupting and criminal and looking

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Speaker 5: after the criminal activity from the CCP. We've arrested over

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Speaker 5: forty percent more individuals from the CCP for espionage alone

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Speaker 5: last year, forty percent increase in one year. And as

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Speaker 5: you guys brilliantly pointed out, that's because for four years

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Speaker 5: there was an open border policy that allowed them and

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Speaker 5: other adversaries to infiltrate America, not just through cyber warfare,

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Speaker 5: but personally come here, buy land, go to our universities,

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Speaker 5: and inject themselves illegally if not, and improperly into our

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Speaker 5: way of life. And this FBI has made it a

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Speaker 5: priority to continuously get after it, and you saw that

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Speaker 5: when we raided the lab with the state authorities in

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Speaker 5: Las Vegas. And once those test results are back, we'll

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Speaker 5: go public with what we found, and we'll also be

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Speaker 5: talking to our partners in Congress to say, hey, this

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Speaker 5: intelligence that you were given and this summer you were

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Speaker 5: given previously was dead wrong and I'm not going to

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Speaker 5: mix any words about that.

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Speaker 1: Yeah, Congress and the American public were misled about the

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Speaker 1: twenty three discovered.

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Speaker 2: There's no doubt.

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Speaker 1: All right, so you have you've corrected the intelligency. You're

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Speaker 1: helping us understand it. What's our best understanding of why

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Speaker 1: the Chinese government would have these freelancers with in a

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Speaker 1: garage with dangerous both biopathogens while having scientists sneak them

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Speaker 1: into the country. Is there any assessment what Trent is

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Speaker 1: trying to achieve When you have these sort of dangerous

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Speaker 1: things in the vacation home, a risk of a pandemic

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Speaker 1: is very high.

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Speaker 4: Yeah. Look, it's a couple of things.

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Speaker 5: One first and foremost, they want to disrupt our way

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Speaker 5: of life. They see us on these positions that we

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Speaker 5: take in agriculture and science and engineering to be the

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Speaker 5: world leaders because we are, and that leads us to

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Speaker 5: the second point.

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Speaker 4: What they want to do is steal it.

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Speaker 5: They want to come in and, if not steal the

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Speaker 5: very secrets that we have that feed our nation and

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Speaker 5: the food programs in our nation, our national security. As

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Speaker 5: the Secretary of Agriculture always pointed out, she's right. And

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Speaker 5: so what we have to do is continuously work the

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Speaker 5: interagency process to make sure that we are attacking every

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Speaker 5: point in which the sea coming into our country to

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Speaker 5: attack us, and we're not going to stop huge.

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Speaker 3: Director, I want to ask you about the FBI Most

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Speaker 3: Wanted List under Joe Biden and under Director Ray. I

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Speaker 3: think the number that sticks out to me is that

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Speaker 3: there were only two during the entire Biden administration. There

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Speaker 3: are obviously residuals from that last administration that are still

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Speaker 3: on it.

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Speaker 4: Or how many in what a.

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Speaker 3: Year or so of being on the job has the

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Speaker 3: FBI captured.

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Speaker 5: I believe they captured four in the totality of the

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Speaker 5: Biden administration, but in the first years, thanks for President

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Speaker 5: Trump's leadership and backing of law enforcement and resourcing of

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Speaker 5: law enforcement and our great partners at DOJ. In one

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Speaker 5: calendar or we captured six, so the FBI's most wanted

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Speaker 5: fugitives on planet Earth that include terrorists, murderers, rapist and

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Speaker 5: narco traffickers.

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Speaker 4: And I know you guys covered it just the other.

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Speaker 5: Week when I was down in Mexico and personally brought

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Speaker 5: back not one, but two of the most wanted fugitives

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Speaker 5: on our list in one spell swoop, including Ryan Wedding

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Speaker 5: the modern Dale Chapo. And we're able to do this

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Speaker 5: because President Trump has backed law enforcem has removed the

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Speaker 5: bureaucracy and handcuffs from law enforcement, and also has made

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Speaker 5: it a priority to safeguard our future in.

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Speaker 4: Our way of life.

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Speaker 5: And that's the job of this FBI to make sure

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Speaker 5: that we hold those accountable who wish to threaten us

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Speaker 5: and do in fact threaten us by pouring tons of

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Speaker 5: narcotics into our country, murdering innocent civilians, and jeopardizing the

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Speaker 5: safety of our children.

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Speaker 1: So important, mister Director. One quick last question before we

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Speaker 1: let you go. We know how busy you are. Your

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Speaker 1: work at the FBI has exposed the CCP trying to

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Speaker 1: steal our intel and our innovations that you've seen it

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Speaker 1: with the biolabs and putting us at physical risk with

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Speaker 1: these pathogens. Earlier this year, you released evidence that China

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Speaker 1: may have been trying to send fake driver's licenses into

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Speaker 1: the country to meddle with our election.

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Speaker 2: Is there a broader portrait starting to.

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Speaker 1: Emerge that China might have been also meddling in elections

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Speaker 1: and politics in America.

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Speaker 5: You know, we're working with our inneragency partners. The mandate

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Speaker 5: of the FBI is to see if there's any criminal

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Speaker 5: basis to launch an investigation, and a lot of other

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Speaker 5: of our other great Cabinet partners have a mandate on

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Speaker 5: election security and election fraud and working with them and

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Speaker 5: hopefully we'll be able to publicize that information together soon.

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Speaker 2: That's going to be a big moment.

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Speaker 1: Director of elections have consequences. That's one of the oldest

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Speaker 1: adages in politics. There's no better example of the consequence

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Speaker 1: of the twenty twenty four election than the very different

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Speaker 1: FBI you preside over today. It's a great honor to

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Speaker 1: have you on the show.

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Speaker 5: Thanks for joining us, Thanks so much, and thanks again

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Speaker 5: for all the men and women of the FBI who

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Speaker 5: brought us Pakoush and brought Benghazi to the forefront again.

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Speaker 5: Because there needs to be accountability, and we're not done yet.

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Speaker 1: It's a great agency and great people down in the

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Speaker 1: rank and file every day. Amazing stuff, Sarah, Thank you

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Speaker 1: so much, folks. More on this extraordinary TV special China syndrome.

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Speaker 1: Joining us next the director of the National Institutes of Help,

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Speaker 1: doctor Jay Beatichari. He had COVID nineteen right. He's also

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Speaker 1: on top of this China threat. He's going to tell

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Speaker 1: us how right after these messages. Hey, folks, I used

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Speaker 3: Welcome back, everybody to this special edition of justin News,

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Speaker 3: No Noise, China Syndrome, Beijing's imminent Threat, inside Academia, and biolabs. Now,

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Speaker 3: we just spoke to FBI Director Cash Battel about the

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Speaker 3: CCP linked biolabs that we have found, including the one

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Speaker 3: in Las.

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Speaker 4: Vegas that was rated just last week.

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Speaker 3: So what we also know through our recent reporting here

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Speaker 3: at just the News is that the CCP has sent

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Speaker 3: students to infiltrate America's talk universities where theft of US

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Speaker 3: technology obviously occurs. So joining us now to talk about

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Speaker 3: all of this and more is the director for the

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Speaker 3: National Institutes of Health, doctor j Bodicharia, Director, Thanks so

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Speaker 3: much for being here.

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Speaker 6: Thanks for having me on. So good to see you, Amanda,

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Speaker 6: So good to see you.

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Speaker 2: John.

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Speaker 3: Great to see you. And you know, during the Biden administration,

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Speaker 3: we spent a lot of time talking about our poorest

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Speaker 3: southern border and the diseases that were possibly coming through.

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Speaker 3: I remember there were cases of bubonic plague in Colorado,

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Speaker 3: in California, in New Mexico.

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Speaker 4: These were the cases that we had.

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Speaker 3: Not seen in decades. So now for you in this position,

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Speaker 3: not only do you have to worry about those instances

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Speaker 3: of diseases coming into our country, but now it's in

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Speaker 3: a more nefarious form with these biolabs. How do you

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Speaker 3: split time between all of this and is there enough

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Speaker 3: coverage of resources for all of it.

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Speaker 7: Well, I mean, my job is primarily to run the NIH,

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Speaker 7: so you know, it's to do research for how to

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Speaker 7: treat those diseases and you know, hopefully prevent them. But

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Speaker 7: I do cooperate with the efforts of other parts of

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Speaker 7: government and provide technical advice. And unfortunately for me, there's

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Speaker 7: some amazing scientists here who are very talented in thinking

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Speaker 7: about about these threats and we're happy to help other

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Speaker 7: parts of government figure out how to manage it.

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Speaker 1: Yeah, and we're lucky to have that expertise. And also

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Speaker 1: under new leadership, I think it was craving new leadership. Doctor,

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Speaker 1: I want to talk a little bit about why China

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Speaker 1: would take the risk of having some of its people

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Speaker 1: open up a biolab and a garage and an airbnbam

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Speaker 1: or in a home in a suburban area, in very

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Speaker 1: populated areas, low containment, weird store or systems. That's all

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Speaker 1: what we see in the court records. What could their

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Speaker 1: possible motive be to take that level of risk on

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Speaker 1: our soil?

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Speaker 7: You know, John, I've been wondering that myself, because you know,

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Speaker 7: this is not the first this this Vegas story. There's

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Speaker 7: also a lab in Reedley, California. I think it was

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Speaker 7: twenty twenty four, and it had the same kind of provenance.

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Speaker 7: It would say, a very similar kind of kind kind

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Speaker 7: of a story.

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Speaker 2: And you know, I.

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Speaker 7: Can I can tell you various kinds of speculation, but

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Speaker 7: rather than do that, let.

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Speaker 6: Me just say it's very, very dangerous.

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Speaker 7: What defined the kinds of agents that have been reported

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Speaker 7: publicly about in a situation they're setting where you know

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Speaker 7: they're there, you're seeing, we're seeing men in space suits

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Speaker 7: like emptying them, but not usually men in space suits

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Speaker 7: actually doing the research in them, as we saw during

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Speaker 7: the pandemic. When you do research like this potentially in

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Speaker 7: a in a environment where there's very little biosecurity, you're

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Speaker 7: posing hazards to everyone around you. And the fact that

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Speaker 7: it's completely flying under the radar screen. It takes, like

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Speaker 7: you know, a chance encounters to figure out that this

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Speaker 7: is actually happening. We need a better system for detecting

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Speaker 7: and preventing these kinds of labs from popping up so

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Speaker 7: that they don't cause the kind of havoc that the

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Speaker 7: sort of the worst kinds of stories would lead you

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Speaker 7: to think might happen.

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Speaker 3: Director is perhaps one of the ways of detecting this early.

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Speaker 3: I mean, I've never been inside of a lab, whether

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Speaker 3: it was homegrown or in a medical facility, but I'm

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Speaker 3: assuming it requires a lot of different equipment that maybe

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Speaker 3: could be flagged early. If there's someone who's purchasing this

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Speaker 3: type of stuff, maybe that's a way of preventing it.

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Speaker 7: I mean, absolutely am I think. But also I think

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Speaker 7: there are like new systems because there's a lot of

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Speaker 7: data to track through and much of the much of

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Speaker 7: the equipment is used in other settings, so it's completely innocent.

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Speaker 7: So the question is how do you detect the signal

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Speaker 7: from the noise, and the good is that there's a

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Speaker 7: lot of effort that I've seen to be able to

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Speaker 7: do that, and so the American people should know that

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Speaker 7: this is something that that that the Trumpetinistration is working

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Speaker 7: very very hard on so that we can we can

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Speaker 7: we can detect the signals when when we find them,

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Speaker 7: but also not not like end up getting so many

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Speaker 7: false positives that that makes people so worried over nothing.

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Speaker 7: Something that's actively being worked on right now.

442
00:21:24,600 --> 00:21:25,520
Speaker 2: That's pretty exciting.

443
00:21:25,920 --> 00:21:28,480
Speaker 1: I mean, it's probably been a hole on our safety

444
00:21:28,520 --> 00:21:30,879
Speaker 1: net on that. When you came in, I think there

445
00:21:30,880 --> 00:21:34,520
Speaker 1: were more than a thousand scientists from foreign countries, mostly

446
00:21:34,560 --> 00:21:38,240
Speaker 1: from China, that were in various institutions that do research

447
00:21:38,240 --> 00:21:40,240
Speaker 1: in America. Some of those scientists are very talented and

448
00:21:40,359 --> 00:21:44,600
Speaker 1: very capable. Some of them, as the Foundation on American

449
00:21:44,640 --> 00:21:50,120
Speaker 1: Accountability showed, have strong allegiances to the Chinese Communist Party,

450
00:21:50,200 --> 00:21:53,000
Speaker 1: strong allegiances to companies that working with the Chinese military.

451
00:21:53,040 --> 00:21:53,520
Speaker 2: The PLA.

452
00:21:54,840 --> 00:21:57,440
Speaker 1: I know you and your colleagues and the other agencies

453
00:21:57,480 --> 00:22:02,560
Speaker 1: AHHS as a parent organization ag are looking and revetting

454
00:22:02,560 --> 00:22:05,400
Speaker 1: those scientists. Can you tell us what that what that

455
00:22:05,680 --> 00:22:07,800
Speaker 1: is looking like and how you you split the apple,

456
00:22:07,880 --> 00:22:09,920
Speaker 1: so you keep the good scientists and get the bad

457
00:22:09,960 --> 00:22:10,600
Speaker 1: actors out.

458
00:22:11,680 --> 00:22:12,000
Speaker 2: Yeah.

459
00:22:12,040 --> 00:22:14,320
Speaker 7: So, I mean so just to set context for this, John,

460
00:22:15,480 --> 00:22:18,480
Speaker 7: for the last several decades, the US has had a

461
00:22:19,119 --> 00:22:24,320
Speaker 7: close collaboration with Chinese scientists. So many of the top

462
00:22:24,400 --> 00:22:28,560
Speaker 7: science of biomedical uh research scientists in China were trained

463
00:22:28,560 --> 00:22:29,440
Speaker 7: in the United States.

464
00:22:29,840 --> 00:22:29,959
Speaker 2: Uh.

465
00:22:30,000 --> 00:22:31,639
Speaker 6: I mean, I don't think it's it's an.

466
00:22:31,480 --> 00:22:35,960
Speaker 7: Exaggeration to say that the US funded the the rise

467
00:22:36,119 --> 00:22:39,960
Speaker 7: in the US in the Chinese biomedical research enterprise, and

468
00:22:40,280 --> 00:22:45,720
Speaker 7: some of that involved essentially, uh, the Chinese authorities taking

469
00:22:45,760 --> 00:22:47,440
Speaker 7: advantage of that investment.

470
00:22:47,640 --> 00:22:47,920
Speaker 6: Uh.

471
00:22:48,359 --> 00:22:51,080
Speaker 7: You know, there are stories of foreign influence in in

472
00:22:51,080 --> 00:22:54,639
Speaker 7: in in in universities going back now a couple of decades.

473
00:22:54,640 --> 00:22:57,800
Speaker 7: I mean, I still think back to the Chinese scientist

474
00:22:58,240 --> 00:23:00,880
Speaker 7: I think his name was Charles lieber In at Harvard

475
00:23:00,920 --> 00:23:04,399
Speaker 7: that was identified as for and and Harvard got like

476
00:23:04,440 --> 00:23:06,600
Speaker 7: slapped down him. In fact, I think he was put under,

477
00:23:07,000 --> 00:23:09,560
Speaker 7: you know, under a criminal investigation as a result of it.

478
00:23:10,800 --> 00:23:14,200
Speaker 7: And so I think it's a real problem. But also,

479
00:23:14,240 --> 00:23:16,520
Speaker 7: as you say, John, it's also the case that there's

480
00:23:16,520 --> 00:23:21,000
Speaker 7: a lot of innocent uh, researchers from from from from

481
00:23:21,000 --> 00:23:23,400
Speaker 7: from China that have participated.

482
00:23:23,840 --> 00:23:23,959
Speaker 2: Uh.

483
00:23:24,600 --> 00:23:27,919
Speaker 7: Again, we're working on a policy that tries to distinguish that.

484
00:23:28,520 --> 00:23:32,399
Speaker 7: I think as a general matter, having the United States

485
00:23:32,440 --> 00:23:35,520
Speaker 7: invest more in American scientists makes the most sense to me.

486
00:23:35,920 --> 00:23:36,040
Speaker 8: Uh.

487
00:23:36,280 --> 00:23:38,480
Speaker 7: And so I think we're like trying to do this

488
00:23:38,520 --> 00:23:41,240
Speaker 7: sort of all of the above thing where we're we're

489
00:23:41,280 --> 00:23:44,600
Speaker 7: both trying to address the the the the the challenge

490
00:23:44,640 --> 00:23:48,520
Speaker 7: that you just identified while the same time investing more

491
00:23:48,600 --> 00:23:52,560
Speaker 7: in in in an an American scientists. Foreign collaboration is

492
00:23:52,600 --> 00:23:55,320
Speaker 7: going to be an important part of science. I mean,

493
00:23:55,359 --> 00:23:57,639
Speaker 7: this is just impossible not to have that kind of

494
00:23:57,640 --> 00:23:59,840
Speaker 7: corne collaboration. So many so muny scientific ideas come from

495
00:23:59,840 --> 00:24:03,680
Speaker 7: that collaboration. But we need safeguards that make sure that

496
00:24:03,760 --> 00:24:06,920
Speaker 7: what the American investments don't result in threats and harms

497
00:24:06,960 --> 00:24:10,040
Speaker 7: to America. And I think a lot of the investments

498
00:24:10,080 --> 00:24:13,960
Speaker 7: we made in China and other countries are concerned in retrospect,

499
00:24:14,080 --> 00:24:16,200
Speaker 7: probably they should have been much better safeguards in place,

500
00:24:16,520 --> 00:24:18,680
Speaker 7: And we're working very hard to put those safeguards in

501
00:24:18,760 --> 00:24:22,600
Speaker 7: place to allow there to be continuing foreign collaboration in

502
00:24:23,040 --> 00:24:26,040
Speaker 7: countries where there is they're not countries are concerned, so

503
00:24:26,040 --> 00:24:28,760
Speaker 7: that we make sure that, for instance, another Wuhan situation

504
00:24:28,840 --> 00:24:32,320
Speaker 7: never comes about where the NIH funds research and then

505
00:24:32,359 --> 00:24:34,760
Speaker 7: we can't go get the loud notebooks from Wuhan to

506
00:24:34,760 --> 00:24:37,720
Speaker 7: see what happened there. That's never gonna happen under my watch.

507
00:24:38,440 --> 00:24:40,439
Speaker 7: But at the same time, to allow us to have

508
00:24:40,680 --> 00:24:43,480
Speaker 7: American scientists collaborate with scientists in Europe and scientists and

509
00:24:43,680 --> 00:24:46,520
Speaker 7: all that parts of the world for ideas that can

510
00:24:46,560 --> 00:24:47,480
Speaker 7: benefit Americans.

511
00:24:49,520 --> 00:24:53,240
Speaker 3: Considering the threat that China posed to us on the

512
00:24:53,240 --> 00:24:55,480
Speaker 3: heels of COVID and the threat that they would pose

513
00:24:55,560 --> 00:24:57,480
Speaker 3: to us in the future, are we prepared. Do we

514
00:24:57,520 --> 00:25:02,359
Speaker 3: have a pandemic preparedness protocol or system now that is

515
00:25:02,520 --> 00:25:04,360
Speaker 3: souped up more so than it was when we were

516
00:25:04,400 --> 00:25:05,159
Speaker 3: dealing with COVID?

517
00:25:06,600 --> 00:25:08,600
Speaker 7: Well, I think that that I think we still need

518
00:25:08,640 --> 00:25:11,359
Speaker 7: to like have another conversation about that. That's still not

519
00:25:11,600 --> 00:25:14,639
Speaker 7: in my view yet right in the right place for that.

520
00:25:14,720 --> 00:25:17,439
Speaker 7: I mean, I think I can tell you that the

521
00:25:17,480 --> 00:25:21,080
Speaker 7: appetite for lockdowns in this administration is basically zero, So

522
00:25:21,119 --> 00:25:22,720
Speaker 7: I don't think we would have the same kind of

523
00:25:23,359 --> 00:25:26,199
Speaker 7: same kind of approach, But we do need to have

524
00:25:26,240 --> 00:25:30,080
Speaker 7: a national conversation about what happened during during COVID, especially

525
00:25:30,119 --> 00:25:32,560
Speaker 7: during the by administration, with the vaccine mandates and the

526
00:25:33,040 --> 00:25:35,520
Speaker 7: and and all. That I think is really worth worth

527
00:25:35,560 --> 00:25:38,879
Speaker 7: a national conversation because it shouldn't just be some secret

528
00:25:38,880 --> 00:25:41,600
Speaker 7: plan sitting in the government, you know, vault that you

529
00:25:41,640 --> 00:25:45,240
Speaker 7: pull out if something terrible happens. We saw during COVID

530
00:25:45,840 --> 00:25:49,480
Speaker 7: every single person's life was affected in some some way,

531
00:25:49,960 --> 00:25:51,960
Speaker 7: mostly mostly for the worst, as a result of the

532
00:25:52,480 --> 00:25:54,720
Speaker 7: of of of of what happened. And so we need

533
00:25:54,760 --> 00:25:57,000
Speaker 7: to have a national conversation about what what we would

534
00:25:57,040 --> 00:25:59,000
Speaker 7: do again in that in that circumstance, so that it's

535
00:25:59,040 --> 00:26:02,359
Speaker 7: not just to say a plan that sits somewhere. But

536
00:26:02,520 --> 00:26:05,280
Speaker 7: I'll tell you, under my watch, I will never advocate

537
00:26:05,280 --> 00:26:07,680
Speaker 7: the NIH will not be advocating for lockdown's ever.

538
00:26:07,720 --> 00:26:11,879
Speaker 2: Again, that's an important important message.

539
00:26:12,000 --> 00:26:13,800
Speaker 1: So I want to ask about a couple of things

540
00:26:13,800 --> 00:26:16,119
Speaker 1: that come up a lot because they were realities for

541
00:26:16,119 --> 00:26:18,320
Speaker 1: a period of time, even though we were told they weren't.

542
00:26:19,040 --> 00:26:22,280
Speaker 1: First is, do we have any gain of function research

543
00:26:22,320 --> 00:26:24,639
Speaker 1: going on under the US auspices or have we stopped

544
00:26:24,680 --> 00:26:24,879
Speaker 1: at all?

545
00:26:26,240 --> 00:26:28,800
Speaker 7: Uh As far as the NIH is, we've we paused

546
00:26:28,840 --> 00:26:32,160
Speaker 7: every single project that even is anywhere within the vicinity

547
00:26:32,160 --> 00:26:36,760
Speaker 7: of something that could be gained a function. The White

548
00:26:36,760 --> 00:26:40,840
Speaker 7: House is working on a policy and you know, again

549
00:26:41,000 --> 00:26:44,040
Speaker 7: just tell you it's a it's the structure of the

550
00:26:44,080 --> 00:26:46,400
Speaker 7: policy will make it so that it never happens again

551
00:26:46,400 --> 00:26:48,199
Speaker 7: that the nowhere in the United States government will we

552
00:26:48,240 --> 00:26:52,600
Speaker 7: invest in a project that poses a risk of catastrophic

553
00:26:52,640 --> 00:26:53,680
Speaker 7: harm to the American people.

554
00:26:53,880 --> 00:26:54,080
Speaker 2: Ever.

555
00:26:54,160 --> 00:26:58,480
Speaker 7: Again, the key difference between what the Bid administration was

556
00:26:58,520 --> 00:27:01,680
Speaker 7: doing was the Bid administration had this like long complicated,

557
00:27:01,800 --> 00:27:04,720
Speaker 7: you like list of agents and you have to like

558
00:27:04,760 --> 00:27:07,760
Speaker 7: have some regulation about figuring out that. What happened even

559
00:27:07,800 --> 00:27:11,760
Speaker 7: before the Bide administration, under you know, Tony Fauci, in

560
00:27:11,760 --> 00:27:14,439
Speaker 7: this P three CEO process that you talked about, essentially

561
00:27:14,480 --> 00:27:18,320
Speaker 7: with almost no regulation, the projects were never assessed. The

562
00:27:18,600 --> 00:27:23,359
Speaker 7: Wuhan bat lab experiment had a virus that was not

563
00:27:23,440 --> 00:27:26,720
Speaker 7: on any list. Instead, now what we're doing is we're

564
00:27:26,720 --> 00:27:29,760
Speaker 7: saying there has to be a comprehensive risk assessment of

565
00:27:29,840 --> 00:27:32,919
Speaker 7: every single project that has anywhere close to the vicinity

566
00:27:32,960 --> 00:27:36,600
Speaker 7: of being dangerous gain of function. And if it's dangerous

567
00:27:36,600 --> 00:27:38,439
Speaker 7: gain of function, the answer is no, you can't do it.

568
00:27:39,000 --> 00:27:42,160
Speaker 7: So we're headed toward a comprehensive policy for the entire

569
00:27:42,200 --> 00:27:44,399
Speaker 7: federal government where that that's the case as far as

570
00:27:44,440 --> 00:27:46,800
Speaker 7: the ANI is concerned, I've already implemented a policy like

571
00:27:46,840 --> 00:27:49,600
Speaker 7: that where we've paused dozens of grants, and as soon

572
00:27:49,640 --> 00:27:51,399
Speaker 7: as the new policy comes up, we'll submit them to

573
00:27:51,400 --> 00:27:54,840
Speaker 7: the new independent board that's going to be looking at this.

574
00:27:55,480 --> 00:27:57,960
Speaker 7: The NIH and the other parts of government that fund

575
00:27:58,000 --> 00:28:00,320
Speaker 7: this this research shouldn't be doing our own homework. They

576
00:28:00,320 --> 00:28:03,920
Speaker 7: should be independent groups that have the responsibility to check it,

577
00:28:04,000 --> 00:28:06,399
Speaker 7: but we should have the responsibility to report it, and

578
00:28:06,560 --> 00:28:10,840
Speaker 7: institutions that report to do this kind of work. Researchers

579
00:28:10,880 --> 00:28:12,840
Speaker 7: do this kind of work will have an obligation to

580
00:28:12,840 --> 00:28:16,119
Speaker 7: report it, and if they don't, they could be severe consequences.

581
00:28:16,760 --> 00:28:18,879
Speaker 3: I know that people feel so much better about the

582
00:28:18,880 --> 00:28:24,080
Speaker 3: transparency at NIH and that balance between medicine and freedom

583
00:28:24,119 --> 00:28:27,439
Speaker 3: that we really did not see under former President Joe Biden. Director,

584
00:28:27,440 --> 00:28:29,000
Speaker 3: thanks so much for being with us tonight.

585
00:28:29,600 --> 00:28:30,360
Speaker 6: Thank you so much.

586
00:28:31,320 --> 00:28:33,600
Speaker 3: Absolutely all right, everybody, we're going to take a very

587
00:28:33,680 --> 00:28:35,520
Speaker 3: quick break that we have much more on this special

588
00:28:35,520 --> 00:28:43,960
Speaker 3: coming up on the other side.

589
00:28:48,440 --> 00:28:51,600
Speaker 1: Welcome back to everybody to our special report, China syndrome,

590
00:28:51,760 --> 00:28:57,640
Speaker 1: Beijing's immitted threat inside academia, and wayward biolads. We've been

591
00:28:57,640 --> 00:29:01,440
Speaker 1: talking to some pretty heavy hitters in the executive branch,

592
00:29:01,600 --> 00:29:04,880
Speaker 1: the FBI director Cash Bettel, the head of the NIH,

593
00:29:04,960 --> 00:29:06,840
Speaker 1: doctor j Batichar. Now I'm going to turn to Congress.

594
00:29:06,840 --> 00:29:08,840
Speaker 1: I'm really excited about this next guest. I've been in

595
00:29:08,920 --> 00:29:12,479
Speaker 1: Washington forty years, have been covering House Intelligence Committee. Sometimes

596
00:29:12,480 --> 00:29:14,760
Speaker 1: they do incredible work, like they did under Devin Duna.

597
00:29:14,880 --> 00:29:16,400
Speaker 2: Sometimes they do kind of mute at work.

598
00:29:16,720 --> 00:29:19,920
Speaker 1: This next guest has revived the House Permanent Select Committee

599
00:29:19,960 --> 00:29:23,040
Speaker 1: on Intelligence. It's doing some of the most important intelligence

600
00:29:23,080 --> 00:29:24,400
Speaker 1: oversight work in a long time.

601
00:29:24,600 --> 00:29:26,040
Speaker 2: He's the chairman of that committee.

602
00:29:26,040 --> 00:29:28,440
Speaker 1: He's also a member of Congress for the Great State

603
00:29:28,600 --> 00:29:32,680
Speaker 1: of Arkansas, Congressman Rick Crawford, mister chairman, great to have

604
00:29:32,760 --> 00:29:33,560
Speaker 1: you back on the show.

605
00:29:34,120 --> 00:29:37,040
Speaker 2: You bet, thanks for having me all right.

606
00:29:37,200 --> 00:29:40,200
Speaker 1: You know, and you've talked previously on the show about

607
00:29:40,280 --> 00:29:43,959
Speaker 1: the grave concerns we have about China, their intentions, their aggression.

608
00:29:44,520 --> 00:29:45,760
Speaker 2: When you hear these.

609
00:29:45,600 --> 00:29:47,840
Speaker 1: Things like we saw in this last week, dozens of

610
00:29:48,280 --> 00:29:52,880
Speaker 1: Chinese academics who are card caring, China loving America hating

611
00:29:53,280 --> 00:29:56,520
Speaker 1: academics that got into our institutions, or a guy that

612
00:29:56,600 --> 00:29:59,920
Speaker 1: had two different biolabs, one in California one in Nevada.

613
00:30:00,080 --> 00:30:04,240
Speaker 1: Also a Chinese national dangerous pathogens right in our suburban neighborhoods.

614
00:30:04,440 --> 00:30:06,360
Speaker 1: Why are we to make of what China's up to?

615
00:30:07,640 --> 00:30:09,720
Speaker 8: You know, it's a really hard problem to assess in

616
00:30:09,800 --> 00:30:12,960
Speaker 8: terms of, you know, it's listening to the two interviews prior,

617
00:30:14,080 --> 00:30:17,680
Speaker 8: why would you have some illicit labs set up in

618
00:30:17,720 --> 00:30:20,800
Speaker 8: A B and B except for maybe you're trying to

619
00:30:20,840 --> 00:30:24,040
Speaker 8: create some sort of you know, patient zero scenario that

620
00:30:24,080 --> 00:30:27,960
Speaker 8: you might infect someone, that you might create another COVID

621
00:30:28,160 --> 00:30:31,640
Speaker 8: like scenario. And I you know, as reassured to hear

622
00:30:31,680 --> 00:30:33,880
Speaker 8: the NIH director talk about we're never gonna have another

623
00:30:33,920 --> 00:30:36,840
Speaker 8: lockdown that was that was not handled appropriately. But it

624
00:30:36,840 --> 00:30:39,760
Speaker 8: doesn't necessarily mean we couldn't have an attack that might

625
00:30:39,880 --> 00:30:43,400
Speaker 8: lead to some some you know, difficult circumstances for us

626
00:30:43,440 --> 00:30:46,200
Speaker 8: to have to deal with. But I have no clue.

627
00:30:46,240 --> 00:30:47,920
Speaker 8: I mean, we have to really got to figure out

628
00:30:48,320 --> 00:30:49,920
Speaker 8: I don't know how we get in their heads and

629
00:30:49,960 --> 00:30:52,440
Speaker 8: go why would you do this? Doesn't make any sense

630
00:30:52,880 --> 00:30:55,840
Speaker 8: if you're trying to do this in an illicit way.

631
00:30:55,920 --> 00:30:58,200
Speaker 8: Why would you put this in a B and B.

632
00:30:58,280 --> 00:31:01,000
Speaker 8: Why would you have such poor handling techniques, Why would

633
00:31:01,000 --> 00:31:04,840
Speaker 8: you do it in such a slipshod way if it

634
00:31:04,920 --> 00:31:08,320
Speaker 8: wasn't almost deliberately to try to maybe attract attention. Is

635
00:31:08,360 --> 00:31:10,320
Speaker 8: that what this is about? Are they trying to send

636
00:31:10,320 --> 00:31:13,320
Speaker 8: a message to us? And I'm not sure we're receiving

637
00:31:13,400 --> 00:31:16,920
Speaker 8: the message if they are, And we need to tune

638
00:31:16,960 --> 00:31:20,080
Speaker 8: in and pay close attention to what's taking place in

639
00:31:20,200 --> 00:31:23,480
Speaker 8: our country as it applies to foreign actors who are

640
00:31:23,560 --> 00:31:27,480
Speaker 8: exploiting our free and open society. And this requires us

641
00:31:27,520 --> 00:31:30,360
Speaker 8: to double down on our ci posture, which has not

642
00:31:30,520 --> 00:31:34,080
Speaker 8: evolved in kept pace with these threats that continue to

643
00:31:35,160 --> 00:31:38,280
Speaker 8: evolve and present challenges to us that I'm not sure

644
00:31:38,280 --> 00:31:39,640
Speaker 8: we're fully prepared for.

645
00:31:41,640 --> 00:31:46,280
Speaker 3: Mister Chairman, you know absolutely, And I hesitating and ask

646
00:31:46,360 --> 00:31:47,840
Speaker 3: this question, how do we end up here? Because I

647
00:31:47,880 --> 00:31:49,680
Speaker 3: know the obvious answer is because we had a poor

648
00:31:49,760 --> 00:31:53,240
Speaker 3: southern border and we had four years of basically unvetted

649
00:31:53,880 --> 00:31:57,440
Speaker 3: immigration into this country. Was it just that we opened

650
00:31:57,480 --> 00:32:00,960
Speaker 3: the door and invited them in? Is the simple answer.

651
00:32:01,960 --> 00:32:03,040
Speaker 2: No, it goes back years.

652
00:32:03,280 --> 00:32:06,040
Speaker 8: It goes back to programs like the EB five program

653
00:32:06,080 --> 00:32:10,920
Speaker 8: that were essentially the Chinese could buy citizenship for family members.

654
00:32:11,120 --> 00:32:14,680
Speaker 8: Those family members are not severing ties with their CCP relatives.

655
00:32:15,240 --> 00:32:18,240
Speaker 8: It's important to note that we have created this problem

656
00:32:18,280 --> 00:32:23,000
Speaker 8: by this sort of aeradyite thinking that we can have

657
00:32:23,120 --> 00:32:25,960
Speaker 8: this great sort of new world order where we don't

658
00:32:26,000 --> 00:32:28,880
Speaker 8: need borders and you know, we can just open up

659
00:32:29,080 --> 00:32:31,000
Speaker 8: our doors to anybody that wants to come and make

660
00:32:31,200 --> 00:32:35,960
Speaker 8: a contribution quote unquote to our economy. That's just to me,

661
00:32:36,040 --> 00:32:38,680
Speaker 8: that's wrong headed. And it goes back it's the poorest

662
00:32:38,680 --> 00:32:41,880
Speaker 8: border is Yes, that's when it was really accelerated, no

663
00:32:41,960 --> 00:32:45,040
Speaker 8: question about it. But the Chinese have been exploiting our

664
00:32:45,080 --> 00:32:49,120
Speaker 8: immigration system for decades and I've had misgivings about this

665
00:32:49,160 --> 00:32:51,320
Speaker 8: for a long long time. And then also they've been

666
00:32:52,160 --> 00:32:56,400
Speaker 8: really kind of practicing foe capitalism in a way that

667
00:32:56,440 --> 00:33:00,200
Speaker 8: they can help fund activities against the United States. What

668
00:33:00,240 --> 00:33:02,000
Speaker 8: they do they come in here to the United States,

669
00:33:02,440 --> 00:33:07,040
Speaker 8: they steal technology, whether it be national security technology or

670
00:33:07,080 --> 00:33:09,720
Speaker 8: any other kind of technology. They steal it and they

671
00:33:09,840 --> 00:33:13,040
Speaker 8: use that to either counterfeit a product or to use

672
00:33:13,080 --> 00:33:15,680
Speaker 8: it to help develop their own and compete in the marketplace.

673
00:33:16,160 --> 00:33:19,480
Speaker 8: And it gives them an unfair advantage, but it's also

674
00:33:19,680 --> 00:33:24,400
Speaker 8: about their long term goal to displace the United States

675
00:33:24,440 --> 00:33:27,640
Speaker 8: as the pre eminent economy, the pre eminent military, the

676
00:33:27,640 --> 00:33:33,200
Speaker 8: pre eminent political leader globally in every category. Their stated

677
00:33:33,240 --> 00:33:36,320
Speaker 8: goal is to displace the United States. And why for

678
00:33:36,400 --> 00:33:38,800
Speaker 8: the last I don't know, twenty five thirty forty years,

679
00:33:39,200 --> 00:33:41,800
Speaker 8: we have welcomed them with open arms, as if they're

680
00:33:41,800 --> 00:33:45,080
Speaker 8: here to improve economic outcomes for the United States. I

681
00:33:45,120 --> 00:33:48,000
Speaker 8: can't imagine. You know, We've had governors in the past

682
00:33:48,000 --> 00:33:49,240
Speaker 8: that say, we're going to go and we're going to

683
00:33:49,240 --> 00:33:52,240
Speaker 8: set up an office in Shanghai or in Beijing, and

684
00:33:52,280 --> 00:33:55,240
Speaker 8: we're going to welcome Chinese investment into our state because

685
00:33:55,360 --> 00:33:58,040
Speaker 8: they're convinced this is going to be good for economic development.

686
00:33:58,200 --> 00:34:00,760
Speaker 8: Oh sure, it's good for economic development, just not for

687
00:34:01,000 --> 00:34:03,920
Speaker 8: US economic development. It's good for the Chinese where they

688
00:34:03,960 --> 00:34:08,600
Speaker 8: can come and locate close to a strategic military assets,

689
00:34:08,640 --> 00:34:11,520
Speaker 8: for example, maybe close to a military base, maybe close

690
00:34:11,600 --> 00:34:14,799
Speaker 8: to I don't know, a great big steel mill that

691
00:34:14,920 --> 00:34:17,719
Speaker 8: is high tech, cutting edge steel mill. Maybe it's their

692
00:34:17,760 --> 00:34:21,640
Speaker 8: one of steel ag secrets. We've seen that happen. We

693
00:34:21,760 --> 00:34:25,560
Speaker 8: have got to shut the door and make some changes

694
00:34:25,600 --> 00:34:27,279
Speaker 8: in this country, or it's going to get a heck

695
00:34:27,320 --> 00:34:30,560
Speaker 8: of a lot worse for us because that's China's goal.

696
00:34:32,200 --> 00:34:35,240
Speaker 1: Yeah, so well said, and it's a wake up moment

697
00:34:35,239 --> 00:34:38,040
Speaker 1: in America. We can't be laissez fair anymore about this.

698
00:34:39,360 --> 00:34:43,560
Speaker 1: The lab in Las Vegas where it was located, it

699
00:34:43,600 --> 00:34:46,080
Speaker 1: was just a short way away from a military base.

700
00:34:46,480 --> 00:34:48,640
Speaker 1: You have been sounding the alarm for quite some time

701
00:34:48,680 --> 00:34:52,160
Speaker 1: that there is a lot of nefarious Chinese activity around

702
00:34:52,640 --> 00:34:56,240
Speaker 1: many of our military bases, whether it's land acquisitions, spying,

703
00:34:56,239 --> 00:34:59,720
Speaker 1: an espionage. The Biden administration seemed to have a blind

704
00:34:59,719 --> 00:35:01,920
Speaker 1: eye to it. They shut down the China Initiative at

705
00:35:01,920 --> 00:35:05,960
Speaker 1: the FBI. Tell us how bad the infiltrations around the

706
00:35:05,960 --> 00:35:08,680
Speaker 1: military bases are and why you think the Biden administration

707
00:35:09,000 --> 00:35:11,520
Speaker 1: shut down some of our eyes on operations.

708
00:35:12,880 --> 00:35:14,480
Speaker 8: You know, sadly, it comes down to money.

709
00:35:15,320 --> 00:35:15,480
Speaker 2: You know.

710
00:35:15,520 --> 00:35:17,359
Speaker 8: If you've got, as I mentioned, a couple of things.

711
00:35:17,360 --> 00:35:20,200
Speaker 8: One was the immigration thing. If you've got individuals that

712
00:35:20,239 --> 00:35:25,160
Speaker 8: are highly placed CCP politicians in China and they want

713
00:35:25,200 --> 00:35:27,400
Speaker 8: to get their children into the United States as a

714
00:35:27,400 --> 00:35:29,880
Speaker 8: way to not only an entree into the United States,

715
00:35:30,080 --> 00:35:32,600
Speaker 8: but now they become US citizens. That's a pathway to

716
00:35:32,680 --> 00:35:35,360
Speaker 8: citizenship when you get a green card, and they're essentially

717
00:35:35,400 --> 00:35:39,359
Speaker 8: purchasing a green card, but they retain those connections with

718
00:35:39,480 --> 00:35:41,879
Speaker 8: the Polyp Bureau with their families back in China. So now,

719
00:35:41,920 --> 00:35:45,240
Speaker 8: as a US citizen, I can go and buy property

720
00:35:45,640 --> 00:35:49,160
Speaker 8: and nobody really looks any you know, sideways about it,

721
00:35:49,200 --> 00:35:52,640
Speaker 8: because look, it's a US citizen making a purchase or transaction.

722
00:35:52,760 --> 00:35:54,840
Speaker 8: But what they're doing is buying that land so that

723
00:35:54,880 --> 00:35:58,080
Speaker 8: they can gain access to some sort of strategic asset,

724
00:35:58,080 --> 00:36:01,920
Speaker 8: maybe military, it, maybe reach, we don't know. Set that aside.

725
00:36:01,960 --> 00:36:04,080
Speaker 8: Go back even further and talk about the number of

726
00:36:04,160 --> 00:36:08,280
Speaker 8: Chinese students that gained entry into US universities. It's money.

727
00:36:08,480 --> 00:36:11,919
Speaker 8: They're paying full out of state tuition. That's what these

728
00:36:12,320 --> 00:36:15,560
Speaker 8: public universities were looking at was bottom line, how do

729
00:36:15,640 --> 00:36:20,759
Speaker 8: we cash flow and try to increase our endowments. Any

730
00:36:20,840 --> 00:36:25,040
Speaker 8: number of reasons they might have welcomed Chinese students in

731
00:36:25,200 --> 00:36:27,680
Speaker 8: mass and they have done. And they're not here to

732
00:36:28,520 --> 00:36:32,719
Speaker 8: study the arts or literature or whatever. They're here to

733
00:36:32,800 --> 00:36:38,799
Speaker 8: gain hard tech degrees engineering, physics, biochemistry, you name it.

734
00:36:39,280 --> 00:36:42,960
Speaker 8: And it's been to our detriment. And so yes, I'm

735
00:36:43,000 --> 00:36:45,479
Speaker 8: calling out the universities. I've done it before. I've talked

736
00:36:45,520 --> 00:36:48,560
Speaker 8: to university presidents and said this has to change. You

737
00:36:48,600 --> 00:36:51,799
Speaker 8: can't allow these Chinese students and to come in and

738
00:36:51,800 --> 00:36:54,000
Speaker 8: they'll say, okay, yeah, you're right, we probably need to

739
00:36:54,080 --> 00:36:57,120
Speaker 8: scale that back. We need Congress to make a law

740
00:36:57,160 --> 00:36:59,560
Speaker 8: that says we can't do it. So I go to

741
00:36:59,600 --> 00:37:02,279
Speaker 8: them and I say, you've got this problem. You can

742
00:37:02,320 --> 00:37:06,040
Speaker 8: fix it by not allowing them to come into your university.

743
00:37:06,239 --> 00:37:09,640
Speaker 8: We're giving you an intelligence picture here, and they're saying, well, no,

744
00:37:09,719 --> 00:37:13,480
Speaker 8: Congress has to make a law before we'll do it. Why,

745
00:37:14,120 --> 00:37:15,880
Speaker 8: I mean, why does it does Congress have to make

746
00:37:15,880 --> 00:37:18,399
Speaker 8: a law when a me as a congressman and right

747
00:37:18,440 --> 00:37:20,840
Speaker 8: now as chairman of the House Intel Committee, I'm bringing

748
00:37:20,840 --> 00:37:24,719
Speaker 8: you a problem, showing you the intel picture that's a

749
00:37:24,760 --> 00:37:27,319
Speaker 8: threat to the United States, and you're saying, no, you've

750
00:37:27,320 --> 00:37:29,279
Speaker 8: got to make a law before we'll act on it.

751
00:37:30,040 --> 00:37:32,680
Speaker 8: What does that tell you about how powerful money is

752
00:37:32,880 --> 00:37:37,319
Speaker 8: to not only universities, but other institutions that are more

753
00:37:37,360 --> 00:37:40,719
Speaker 8: consumed with their bottom line than they are with the

754
00:37:40,719 --> 00:37:44,720
Speaker 8: security of this nation. So what took place in Las Vegas?

755
00:37:44,800 --> 00:37:49,040
Speaker 8: I have no idea what the operational use for this

756
00:37:49,160 --> 00:37:52,640
Speaker 8: illicit lab was except that it's in close proximity to

757
00:37:53,480 --> 00:37:56,080
Speaker 8: a population center. It's also in close proximity to a

758
00:37:56,120 --> 00:37:57,560
Speaker 8: military installation.

759
00:37:57,239 --> 00:37:58,360
Speaker 2: Of high value.

760
00:37:59,080 --> 00:38:02,040
Speaker 8: I don't know if they were trying to create, as

761
00:38:02,080 --> 00:38:05,400
Speaker 8: I suggested before, possibly a patient zero scenario where they

762
00:38:05,400 --> 00:38:10,160
Speaker 8: can get out and create a potentially an epidemic or

763
00:38:10,480 --> 00:38:13,040
Speaker 8: having forbid a pandemic that makes it difficult for us

764
00:38:13,040 --> 00:38:16,440
Speaker 8: to function. I don't know what her motives were, but

765
00:38:16,640 --> 00:38:19,120
Speaker 8: I know that we can't continue to operate like this.

766
00:38:21,320 --> 00:38:23,520
Speaker 2: Mister Chairman, you laid out something really important.

767
00:38:23,719 --> 00:38:27,560
Speaker 1: China bought its way into our vulnerabilities. That's what this

768
00:38:27,640 --> 00:38:29,560
Speaker 1: last twenty years have been about. They use money to

769
00:38:29,600 --> 00:38:32,719
Speaker 1: buy into a better position to make us more vulnerable.

770
00:38:33,040 --> 00:38:35,280
Speaker 1: The work you're doing on your committee is so important.

771
00:38:35,320 --> 00:38:36,319
Speaker 1: It's a great honor to have.

772
00:38:36,320 --> 00:38:37,839
Speaker 2: You on the show. Tay, thank you for joining us,

773
00:38:38,239 --> 00:38:41,360
Speaker 2: Thanks for having me. Yeah, what a great conversation and

774
00:38:41,400 --> 00:38:42,480
Speaker 2: what great work he's doing.

775
00:38:42,480 --> 00:38:45,759
Speaker 1: All right, folks, after the break the group that we

776
00:38:45,840 --> 00:38:48,520
Speaker 1: worked with the American Accountability Foundation to do that series

777
00:38:48,560 --> 00:38:50,359
Speaker 1: of stories this week that iver he's been talking about

778
00:38:50,360 --> 00:38:53,520
Speaker 1: and reading about. The President even socialized one of them.

779
00:38:53,760 --> 00:38:56,640
Speaker 1: The President of AAF Tom Jones up next. He's going

780
00:38:56,680 --> 00:38:58,640
Speaker 1: to explain all the great work they did right after

781
00:38:58,640 --> 00:39:00,480
Speaker 1: these messages.

782
00:39:10,600 --> 00:39:14,239
Speaker 3: Welcome back everybody to our special report China Syndrome, Beijing's

783
00:39:14,280 --> 00:39:17,880
Speaker 3: Imminent Threat inside Academia and biolabs. Now, all throughout the

784
00:39:17,880 --> 00:39:20,520
Speaker 3: show tonight, we've been talking about the threat from China,

785
00:39:20,560 --> 00:39:25,680
Speaker 3: specifically around their infiltration into America's universities, stealing intellectual property,

786
00:39:26,000 --> 00:39:28,799
Speaker 3: and much more. And we couldn't have talked about any

787
00:39:28,840 --> 00:39:32,239
Speaker 3: of this and in much detail at all without our

788
00:39:32,320 --> 00:39:36,240
Speaker 3: guests tonight. They are the organization that put out this report,

789
00:39:36,280 --> 00:39:39,560
Speaker 3: the great work of the American Accountability Foundation. So joining

790
00:39:39,640 --> 00:39:42,800
Speaker 3: us now is the president of the American Accountability Foundation,

791
00:39:42,960 --> 00:39:45,120
Speaker 3: Tom Jones. Tom, thanks so much for being with us,

792
00:39:45,120 --> 00:39:46,400
Speaker 3: and thank you for this report.

793
00:39:47,080 --> 00:39:48,640
Speaker 9: Hey A, Manda, thanks for having me on. I really

794
00:39:48,640 --> 00:39:49,279
Speaker 9: appreciate it.

795
00:39:50,320 --> 00:39:51,680
Speaker 4: We are happy to have you here.

796
00:39:51,719 --> 00:39:52,880
Speaker 3: I want to get I want to start with the

797
00:39:52,960 --> 00:39:53,520
Speaker 3: nitty gritty.

798
00:39:53,560 --> 00:39:54,760
Speaker 4: What were the parameters?

799
00:39:55,080 --> 00:39:56,759
Speaker 3: I know that you guys spent a lot of time

800
00:39:56,800 --> 00:40:01,360
Speaker 3: doing investigative journalism looking into these twenty one one people

801
00:40:01,360 --> 00:40:04,879
Speaker 3: who are affiliated with universities, these researchers. How close did

802
00:40:04,880 --> 00:40:07,840
Speaker 3: someone have to be to the CCP. How many degrees

803
00:40:07,840 --> 00:40:10,359
Speaker 3: of separation did someone have to be for it to

804
00:40:10,440 --> 00:40:12,279
Speaker 3: flag their relationship.

805
00:40:13,120 --> 00:40:15,879
Speaker 9: Yeah, we kind of had two factors that we really

806
00:40:15,920 --> 00:40:18,800
Speaker 9: wanted to look at here. One the threat they posed

807
00:40:18,800 --> 00:40:21,000
Speaker 9: to the United States. So what were they doing. Look,

808
00:40:21,040 --> 00:40:24,560
Speaker 9: we didn't care about some journalism major, some fine arts professor.

809
00:40:25,080 --> 00:40:27,279
Speaker 9: What we really cared about who were people who were

810
00:40:27,320 --> 00:40:30,160
Speaker 9: doing work in the United States that was in an

811
00:40:30,280 --> 00:40:33,400
Speaker 9: area that was in a critical and sensitive technology. And

812
00:40:33,440 --> 00:40:35,839
Speaker 9: then we have folks doing research in China who could

813
00:40:36,000 --> 00:40:40,440
Speaker 9: establish their connection with the Chinese Communist Party with the

814
00:40:41,440 --> 00:40:45,440
Speaker 9: military research apparatus in China, there's a number of universities

815
00:40:45,480 --> 00:40:49,359
Speaker 9: that the Chinese use to push folks through or with

816
00:40:49,560 --> 00:40:53,799
Speaker 9: kind of prohibited institutions in China that they had done

817
00:40:53,880 --> 00:40:56,200
Speaker 9: research there before they came to the United States. So

818
00:40:56,239 --> 00:40:59,360
Speaker 9: we really made sure that hey, this wasn't just some

819
00:40:59,520 --> 00:41:02,520
Speaker 9: random per and this was someone who had partnered with

820
00:41:02,640 --> 00:41:06,239
Speaker 9: kind of the Chinese Communist parties infrastructure, whether it's through

821
00:41:06,280 --> 00:41:11,160
Speaker 9: the party apparatus or through the pipelines that they used

822
00:41:11,239 --> 00:41:15,960
Speaker 9: to promote PLA research for the People's Liberation Army. So

823
00:41:16,000 --> 00:41:18,880
Speaker 9: we you know, look, these are folks who are closely connected,

824
00:41:19,640 --> 00:41:21,799
Speaker 9: whether they're active members of the party or part of

825
00:41:21,840 --> 00:41:25,879
Speaker 9: the defense research establishment in China before they came over

826
00:41:25,920 --> 00:41:27,000
Speaker 9: to our universities.

827
00:41:28,360 --> 00:41:30,240
Speaker 2: Yeah, huge stuff, important stuff.

828
00:41:31,480 --> 00:41:34,520
Speaker 1: Earlier in the show and over the last couple of days,

829
00:41:34,520 --> 00:41:37,680
Speaker 1: because we've been talking about this every night, Ron Johnson opined,

830
00:41:37,800 --> 00:41:41,839
Speaker 1: and also Chairman Rick Crawford of the House Intelligence can

831
00:41:41,880 --> 00:41:45,319
Speaker 1: be just opined that what China essentially did was use

832
00:41:45,400 --> 00:41:47,719
Speaker 1: money to buy their way into these universities. These universities

833
00:41:47,840 --> 00:41:50,200
Speaker 1: just want money for whatever their next big initiative is,

834
00:41:50,560 --> 00:41:54,120
Speaker 1: and they're willing to trade security and access for that cash.

835
00:41:54,200 --> 00:41:56,160
Speaker 1: Is it really that simple? Is what it looks like.

836
00:41:56,200 --> 00:41:59,080
Speaker 1: Why these universities. It's obvious China doesn't have our best interest.

837
00:41:59,120 --> 00:42:02,200
Speaker 1: Why would a university look finally just take their students.

838
00:42:03,040 --> 00:42:06,360
Speaker 9: Yeah, so there's two problems. You know. One, we focused

839
00:42:06,360 --> 00:42:08,759
Speaker 9: a lot on the research scholars, kind of the professors,

840
00:42:08,840 --> 00:42:11,880
Speaker 9: the elite researchers, and unfortunately it does come down to money.

841
00:42:11,960 --> 00:42:14,880
Speaker 9: These folks are cheaper to work at the universities than

842
00:42:14,920 --> 00:42:17,600
Speaker 9: American professors, and they're easy to easier to get into

843
00:42:17,640 --> 00:42:21,239
Speaker 9: the institutions. Now, what we saw happen was once these

844
00:42:21,280 --> 00:42:24,520
Speaker 9: folks get in, they stand up labs and they start

845
00:42:24,600 --> 00:42:26,680
Speaker 9: hiring their friends from China. So they get a grant

846
00:42:26,719 --> 00:42:29,880
Speaker 9: for research at an American university. They've got so many

847
00:42:30,000 --> 00:42:31,920
Speaker 9: FTEs that are going to be funded by that research,

848
00:42:32,160 --> 00:42:34,439
Speaker 9: and they go take these fts and they hire more

849
00:42:34,480 --> 00:42:37,359
Speaker 9: folks from China. So on that side, yet it's all

850
00:42:37,400 --> 00:42:40,600
Speaker 9: about money. And unfortunately, on the student side, it's all

851
00:42:40,640 --> 00:42:42,879
Speaker 9: about money. Like the chairman said a few minutes ago

852
00:42:42,880 --> 00:42:46,319
Speaker 9: in the last segment, these folks pay full freight. So

853
00:42:46,400 --> 00:42:49,719
Speaker 9: the universities are incredibly excited about it, and they just

854
00:42:49,800 --> 00:42:53,200
Speaker 9: bring these folks in now, you know, Chairman Crawford was

855
00:42:53,239 --> 00:42:56,120
Speaker 9: talking about, hey, we need you know, we need Congress

856
00:42:56,120 --> 00:42:58,320
Speaker 9: to fix this. The universities are telling me, hey, Congress

857
00:42:58,320 --> 00:43:00,680
Speaker 9: has got to fix this. I think are governors need

858
00:43:00,680 --> 00:43:02,759
Speaker 9: to get involved. When we looked at this, we saw

859
00:43:02,840 --> 00:43:06,319
Speaker 9: folks at many state universities. The guy that's on the

860
00:43:06,320 --> 00:43:09,360
Speaker 9: cover of our report, you know, posing next to a

861
00:43:09,400 --> 00:43:13,239
Speaker 9: hammer and sickle flag. This guy teaches at Indiana University.

862
00:43:13,520 --> 00:43:18,440
Speaker 9: Governor Brown bron needs to say, look this, IU Purdue,

863
00:43:18,719 --> 00:43:21,640
Speaker 9: you guys cannot be bringing in Chinese professors anymore. You've

864
00:43:21,640 --> 00:43:24,239
Speaker 9: got to bring in US nationals. Who are not a

865
00:43:24,280 --> 00:43:27,440
Speaker 9: security threat into our labs. But governors can put a

866
00:43:27,440 --> 00:43:30,160
Speaker 9: stop to this, whether it's Governor Abbott, whether it's Governor Desantants,

867
00:43:30,160 --> 00:43:34,000
Speaker 9: whether it's Governor Braun. This can really be stopped at

868
00:43:34,000 --> 00:43:36,319
Speaker 9: the state level. That's part of what we're excited about

869
00:43:36,360 --> 00:43:39,640
Speaker 9: in this report is this is an opportunity for good

870
00:43:39,680 --> 00:43:42,719
Speaker 9: governors to really put the brakes on some bad practices.

871
00:43:42,760 --> 00:43:45,239
Speaker 9: Because look, like I used to work in Congress, Like

872
00:43:45,320 --> 00:43:47,480
Speaker 9: if we were for Congress to get this right, we'll

873
00:43:47,520 --> 00:43:50,759
Speaker 9: all be old and grand dead. So some of our

874
00:43:50,800 --> 00:43:53,400
Speaker 9: friends in the states can really really step on the

875
00:43:53,440 --> 00:43:55,080
Speaker 9: gas and fix this problem quickly.

876
00:43:56,120 --> 00:43:57,359
Speaker 4: Yeah, all right, Tom.

877
00:43:57,400 --> 00:43:59,839
Speaker 3: So it's very clear that these universities are not going

878
00:43:59,840 --> 00:44:02,279
Speaker 3: to do anything until they are absolutely forced to. But

879
00:44:02,360 --> 00:44:05,640
Speaker 3: for these twenty one you've identified, have you gotten any

880
00:44:05,680 --> 00:44:09,799
Speaker 3: sense of any sense of remorse from these universities, any

881
00:44:09,800 --> 00:44:11,919
Speaker 3: sense that they're going to fire them, that they're going

882
00:44:11,960 --> 00:44:15,080
Speaker 3: to sanction them, within their you know, within the academic parameters,

883
00:44:15,080 --> 00:44:19,160
Speaker 3: that they have any any indication at all.

884
00:44:19,280 --> 00:44:21,520
Speaker 9: Unfortunately, No, Right now we're kind of in the make

885
00:44:21,560 --> 00:44:23,920
Speaker 9: and see the light, uh, you know, part of the

886
00:44:24,080 --> 00:44:27,600
Speaker 9: part of the process. Unfortunately, I think we're going to

887
00:44:27,680 --> 00:44:29,480
Speaker 9: go to have to go to the make them feel

888
00:44:29,520 --> 00:44:31,479
Speaker 9: the heat part of the process. And I think that's,

889
00:44:31,520 --> 00:44:33,480
Speaker 9: like I said, going to have to be outside pressure.

890
00:44:33,840 --> 00:44:36,880
Speaker 9: Right now, they're kind of running, taking down websites, hiding,

891
00:44:37,320 --> 00:44:40,399
Speaker 9: you know, not responding to media inquiries because I think

892
00:44:40,400 --> 00:44:41,960
Speaker 9: they know they got caught with their hand in the

893
00:44:41,960 --> 00:44:45,040
Speaker 9: cookie jar here. But if we don't keep up the pressure,

894
00:44:45,040 --> 00:44:47,840
Speaker 9: if we don't keep the attention on the specific people,

895
00:44:48,000 --> 00:44:50,480
Speaker 9: like that's what we did differently here. This wasn't a

896
00:44:50,480 --> 00:44:54,040
Speaker 9: discussion about some you know, efphemorable threat. This was name

897
00:44:54,080 --> 00:44:55,640
Speaker 9: and names and saying you've got these people at your

898
00:44:55,640 --> 00:44:58,520
Speaker 9: schools who are a threat. Unless we keep up the

899
00:44:58,520 --> 00:45:00,520
Speaker 9: pressure and keep our foot on the gap and keep

900
00:45:00,520 --> 00:45:03,359
Speaker 9: exposing these people, the universities are just going to kind

901
00:45:03,360 --> 00:45:05,160
Speaker 9: of move on, hope we don't pay attention to keep

902
00:45:05,160 --> 00:45:07,399
Speaker 9: doing the same old bad stuff that they've been doing

903
00:45:07,440 --> 00:45:09,399
Speaker 9: for decades. But look, at the end of the day,

904
00:45:09,440 --> 00:45:11,560
Speaker 9: this is a national security threat. The people that are

905
00:45:11,560 --> 00:45:14,000
Speaker 9: coming here are coming here to get the science and

906
00:45:14,080 --> 00:45:17,960
Speaker 9: technology to enrich the people's liberation army so that when

907
00:45:17,960 --> 00:45:20,359
Speaker 9: the PLA goes to war with the United States Navy,

908
00:45:20,360 --> 00:45:23,080
Speaker 9: the United States Army. They are better equipped than we

909
00:45:23,160 --> 00:45:26,080
Speaker 9: are and that's just unacceptable. We cannot let that happen.

910
00:45:27,000 --> 00:45:29,920
Speaker 3: Yeah, Tom, I mean, thank you so much for this

911
00:45:30,000 --> 00:45:32,640
Speaker 3: report and keep them coming because we have learned so

912
00:45:32,800 --> 00:45:35,160
Speaker 3: much from this and something's got to change.

913
00:45:35,160 --> 00:45:35,600
Speaker 4: Absolutely.

914
00:45:35,640 --> 00:45:38,840
Speaker 3: Tom Jones, President of the American Accountability Foundation, thanks so

915
00:45:38,920 --> 00:45:40,080
Speaker 3: much for being with us tonight.

916
00:45:40,239 --> 00:45:40,879
Speaker 9: Thanks so much.

917
00:45:41,960 --> 00:45:44,440
Speaker 3: Absolutely, all right, everybody, we're going to stay on China

918
00:45:44,520 --> 00:45:46,520
Speaker 3: for this last segment. We've got a few more items

919
00:45:46,520 --> 00:45:47,960
Speaker 3: that we want to break down before we head out

920
00:45:48,000 --> 00:46:01,440
Speaker 3: for the weekend. Welcome back, Everybody's to the last segment

921
00:46:01,480 --> 00:46:01,839
Speaker 3: of the show.

922
00:46:01,920 --> 00:46:02,160
Speaker 4: John.

923
00:46:02,320 --> 00:46:05,279
Speaker 3: Something that Chairman Crawford spoke about when he was talking

924
00:46:05,320 --> 00:46:07,400
Speaker 3: about these universities, saying that you have to make a

925
00:46:07,480 --> 00:46:10,359
Speaker 3: law for us to basically stop taking this money. And

926
00:46:10,440 --> 00:46:14,160
Speaker 3: I thought about this frequent criticism that you hear from

927
00:46:14,239 --> 00:46:17,279
Speaker 3: other countries about the United States, and frankly, they hate

928
00:46:17,360 --> 00:46:19,319
Speaker 3: us because they ain't us, because it's not true, but

929
00:46:19,360 --> 00:46:21,160
Speaker 3: they say that we're greedy. I think we were one

930
00:46:21,160 --> 00:46:23,560
Speaker 3: of the most benevolent, benevolent countries on the face of.

931
00:46:23,520 --> 00:46:25,280
Speaker 4: The earth, but they say that we're greedy.

932
00:46:25,520 --> 00:46:28,239
Speaker 3: This to me, this is the greed of America. It's

933
00:46:28,280 --> 00:46:31,120
Speaker 3: not the American people, it's not American values, it's not

934
00:46:31,160 --> 00:46:33,719
Speaker 3: our country as a whole. But you have systems like

935
00:46:33,760 --> 00:46:36,320
Speaker 3: academia that absolutely are greedy.

936
00:46:38,000 --> 00:46:38,480
Speaker 2: I listen.

937
00:46:38,560 --> 00:46:41,440
Speaker 1: But the good chairman revealed is that these universities aren't

938
00:46:41,440 --> 00:46:43,280
Speaker 1: willing to do something for the good of the country

939
00:46:43,360 --> 00:46:44,560
Speaker 1: unless they're forced to do it.

940
00:46:45,360 --> 00:46:47,239
Speaker 2: Money is more important than the good of the nation.

941
00:46:47,320 --> 00:46:50,640
Speaker 1: And we talk about America first, America first should also

942
00:46:50,680 --> 00:46:52,960
Speaker 1: be each of us making sure we put our country first.

943
00:46:53,000 --> 00:46:54,960
Speaker 1: But that's not what you heard say. I heard some

944
00:46:55,040 --> 00:46:58,720
Speaker 1: really important news tonight, though, Amanda. I thought four really

945
00:46:58,880 --> 00:47:01,120
Speaker 1: big things the ones that jumped out to me.

946
00:47:01,360 --> 00:47:02,480
Speaker 2: Let's start with Cashprotel.

947
00:47:02,960 --> 00:47:08,120
Speaker 1: Cashpertel said that the China Initiative, which had been shut

948
00:47:08,160 --> 00:47:11,960
Speaker 1: down by the Biden administration, the counter intelligence efforts to

949
00:47:11,960 --> 00:47:14,799
Speaker 1: fight China, is back and forth. That's really important. A

950
00:47:14,840 --> 00:47:17,799
Speaker 1: new version of it, more aggressive, more robust, I thought

951
00:47:17,920 --> 00:47:21,080
Speaker 1: was a really big deal. In the second block, doctor

952
00:47:21,120 --> 00:47:25,120
Speaker 1: j Botichar told us for the first time unequivocally all

953
00:47:25,200 --> 00:47:28,600
Speaker 1: gain of function research a dangerous reacher to Tony Fauci

954
00:47:28,680 --> 00:47:32,239
Speaker 1: was so excited about. That is probably at the heart

955
00:47:32,320 --> 00:47:35,719
Speaker 1: of the pandemic that it's been shut down, and both

956
00:47:35,719 --> 00:47:37,600
Speaker 1: of those men said they were really disturbed by what

957
00:47:37,719 --> 00:47:41,799
Speaker 1: chemicals were found in the two labs. The third thing

958
00:47:41,800 --> 00:47:45,400
Speaker 1: that jumped out to me was Chairman Rick Crawford saying

959
00:47:45,520 --> 00:47:49,320
Speaker 1: very unequivocally that he's fearful that China's intention in having

960
00:47:49,360 --> 00:47:51,520
Speaker 1: that lab in Vegas an the other one in California

961
00:47:51,600 --> 00:47:54,680
Speaker 1: was to create a ground zero patient for another pandemic

962
00:47:54,719 --> 00:47:58,280
Speaker 1: that would take down America. Pretty provocative, I think, pretty

963
00:47:58,280 --> 00:48:01,640
Speaker 1: scary stuff when you think about it. And then Cash

964
00:48:01,640 --> 00:48:05,040
Speaker 1: Prittel saying that his predecessor, Chris Ray, did not give

965
00:48:05,120 --> 00:48:08,360
Speaker 1: the American public or Congress the truth about the earlier

966
00:48:08,400 --> 00:48:11,839
Speaker 1: California allow those are four bombshell headlines that came out

967
00:48:11,880 --> 00:48:14,280
Speaker 1: of these interviews, and there's.

968
00:48:14,120 --> 00:48:15,960
Speaker 2: A lot to chew on, a lot of follow up

969
00:48:16,040 --> 00:48:18,080
Speaker 2: to go on here.

970
00:48:19,120 --> 00:48:21,880
Speaker 3: Absolutely well, and to what Chairman Crawford said about the

971
00:48:21,920 --> 00:48:24,600
Speaker 3: patient zero scenario, I mean, that was one of the

972
00:48:24,640 --> 00:48:29,839
Speaker 3: reasons that I asked the director Jay Boncharia about if

973
00:48:29,880 --> 00:48:32,440
Speaker 3: we were prepared for this type of scenario in the future,

974
00:48:32,480 --> 00:48:34,759
Speaker 3: and he admitted, he said, that's a whole nother conversation

975
00:48:34,880 --> 00:48:37,360
Speaker 3: because that's something that we've got to improve upon. But John,

976
00:48:37,560 --> 00:48:39,560
Speaker 3: I suppose I'm just grateful because we do have an

977
00:48:39,600 --> 00:48:42,839
Speaker 3: administration who recognizes the threat of China. And I said

978
00:48:42,840 --> 00:48:45,920
Speaker 3: this earlier. We have a president who sees China as

979
00:48:45,920 --> 00:48:49,799
Speaker 3: an adversary as he should, as opposed to just you know, competition.

980
00:48:49,880 --> 00:48:51,560
Speaker 3: And we had a clip that I don't think we

981
00:48:51,640 --> 00:48:55,480
Speaker 3: have time for, but Mark Kearney basically refusing to identify

982
00:48:55,640 --> 00:49:00,600
Speaker 3: China as a threat. And when you have these milk toast,

983
00:49:00,719 --> 00:49:05,239
Speaker 3: these wet noodle leaders of countries, then that's what That's

984
00:49:05,239 --> 00:49:08,520
Speaker 3: how you end up with threats like China in filtrating Vegas,

985
00:49:08,560 --> 00:49:10,919
Speaker 3: in filtrating California, and god knows where else.

986
00:49:12,160 --> 00:49:12,399
Speaker 2: Yeah.

987
00:49:12,719 --> 00:49:14,719
Speaker 1: The one thing I'm grateful for tonight the great work

988
00:49:14,760 --> 00:49:18,200
Speaker 1: of Tom Jones and the American Accountability Foundation. They did

989
00:49:18,280 --> 00:49:20,640
Speaker 1: such amazing work. They helped us do this reporting the

990
00:49:20,680 --> 00:49:23,799
Speaker 1: last week a great partner, and tonight you saw the

991
00:49:23,840 --> 00:49:27,200
Speaker 1: impact of that reporting with major players in both Congress

992
00:49:27,200 --> 00:49:28,239
Speaker 1: in the.

993
00:49:28,360 --> 00:49:30,120
Speaker 2: Administration getting us at the speed.

994
00:49:30,320 --> 00:49:32,560
Speaker 1: I think we began eight feet behind the eight ball

995
00:49:32,600 --> 00:49:34,759
Speaker 1: when Biden gave the keys to Donald Trump on this issue,

996
00:49:34,760 --> 00:49:36,680
Speaker 1: where it we're probably a few inches behind the eight

997
00:49:36,760 --> 00:49:38,719
Speaker 1: ball still, but we've made a lot of progress in

998
00:49:38,760 --> 00:49:39,319
Speaker 1: the last year.

999
00:49:40,360 --> 00:49:41,000
Speaker 4: Absolutely well.

1000
00:49:41,000 --> 00:49:42,520
Speaker 3: And someone who wasn't a part of tonight, but who

1001
00:49:42,520 --> 00:49:44,880
Speaker 3: has warned us about China repeatedly as much as you have,

1002
00:49:44,960 --> 00:49:48,280
Speaker 3: John Peter Schweitzer talking about these young Chinese who still

1003
00:49:48,320 --> 00:49:51,720
Speaker 3: have familiar relations growing up in this country. Yeah, another

1004
00:49:51,800 --> 00:49:52,799
Speaker 3: terrifying aspect that.

1005
00:49:52,719 --> 00:49:55,120
Speaker 2: We're going to have to first right citizenship.

1006
00:49:55,680 --> 00:49:57,480
Speaker 3: That's right, all right, everybody that's going to do it

1007
00:49:57,520 --> 00:49:58,800
Speaker 3: for us tonight, See you on Monday,