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Speaker 1: up for Coast Insider. Now here's a highlight from Coast

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Speaker 1: to Coast AM on iHeart Radio and welcome back to

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Speaker 1: Coast to Coast George Nori with you. Brian Krim our

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Speaker 1: special guest for the next couple hours. He is the

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Speaker 1: John Mills Turner Distinguished Chair and the Humanities at Lynchburg

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Speaker 1: College in Virginia. Received his doctorate and Modern European History

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Speaker 1: from Reuter's University. His teaching and research interests include the Holocaust,

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Speaker 1: military history, modern Europe, and intelligence and national security studies.

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Speaker 1: Dr Krim was an intelligence analyst for the Departments of

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Speaker 1: Defense and Homeland Security between two thousand one and two

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Speaker 1: thousand five is work our Germans Project paper Clip in

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Speaker 1: the National Security State. Brian, welcome to the program, and

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Speaker 1: this is a fascinating subject for me. Thank you so much,

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Speaker 1: George at the real pleasure to be with you. And

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Speaker 1: I've been studying it off and on for about twenty

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Speaker 1: years now. So yeah, it is truly fascinating and touches

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Speaker 1: on so many different levels of scholarship as well. A

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Speaker 1: lot of our listeners know what Project paper Clip is,

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Speaker 1: but there are many that come on that don't. Could

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Speaker 1: you explain that for us? Sure? So paper Clip is

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Speaker 1: essentially a plan conceived in the final months of World

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Speaker 1: War Two but put into action in that summer of

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Speaker 1: to envision a long term exploitation of Germany's scientific and

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Speaker 1: technical infrastructure for the benefit of primarily defense but later

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Speaker 1: even uh commercial interest. So it's you know, a two

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Speaker 1: year program from seven but it will survive under different

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Speaker 1: names all the way up until the nineteen seventies. Honestly, now,

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Speaker 1: the Soviets had a similar type program at the same time,

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Speaker 1: did they not. They did all each ally planned to

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Speaker 1: exploit as they put it in the technical UH their

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Speaker 1: technical reports exploit German technology, but the Soviets were, you know,

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Speaker 1: had a different take on it. They were kind of

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Speaker 1: trying to catch up and would go for quantity over quality,

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Speaker 1: which I think was more just the fact that they

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Speaker 1: weren't able to attract UH the best minds the way

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Speaker 1: that the Western allies were. I was gonna say, how

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Speaker 1: did we get Verde von Braun and the Soviets did not. Well.

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Speaker 1: It's interesting because Penamundo, which was the complex that built

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Speaker 1: the V two initially and UM was on the Baltic

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Speaker 1: coast and firmly in Soviet territory. But the s S,

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Speaker 1: which was in control of the program in the final

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Speaker 1: year of the war, really after the assassination plot against Hitler,

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Speaker 1: the s S really took control of everything. UH. They

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Speaker 1: feared that this would be that they would be under

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Speaker 1: the control of the Soviets, and UH moved the German

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Speaker 1: scientists into the interior of the country, and somewhere along

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Speaker 1: the line in April May is everything is disintegrating. Vernavon

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Speaker 1: Brown took his brother Magnus and about a dozen other

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Speaker 1: of his trusted UH leading team leaders into the interior

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Speaker 1: of the country towards Bavaria, where they knew that they

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Speaker 1: would come into contact with American troops. So they deliberately

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Speaker 1: moved toward the advancing American army, knowing that that would

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Speaker 1: be their best shot to be able to continue their

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Speaker 1: work with all the resources they could ever imagine, the Germans,

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Speaker 1: under the guidance of on On and others, were launching

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Speaker 1: V two rockets into London and Britain. How far ahead,

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Speaker 1: Brian were the Germans with missile technology compared to the

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Speaker 1: United States, for example, Well, it's a good question, and

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Speaker 1: I think most historians of science technology would say that

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Speaker 1: they were about five years ahead when it came to rocketry.

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Speaker 1: That's amazing. I mean, even though we had the atomic

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Speaker 1: bomb and they were really close to getting it, in

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Speaker 1: terms of missile technology, there were five years ahead of us. Yeah.

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Speaker 1: And the and as you noted, with the unknown factor

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Speaker 1: of how close were the Germans to the atomic bomb,

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Speaker 1: the real fear that Eisenhower had and his technical adviser

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Speaker 1: was was what if they could marry an atomic device

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Speaker 1: to what they already knew or successful guided missiles. And

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Speaker 1: so that was what part of the urgency of getting

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Speaker 1: the team the rocket team under Allied control. Was that

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Speaker 1: if this not only would this um prevent some miracle

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Speaker 1: weapon that the Germans could launch at the last minute,

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Speaker 1: but also they're thinking ahead to the Soviets, what if

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Speaker 1: they also were able to marry a atomic device captured missile.

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Speaker 1: So on two levels there was this this great fear

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Speaker 1: um and that it was more of the unknown. It

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Speaker 1: wasn't so much that we knew they had these capabilities,

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Speaker 1: it was we don't know. And certainly we know that

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Speaker 1: they have a guided missile, but um, that unknown is

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Speaker 1: what really drove what was first called Operation Overcast and

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Speaker 1: then later paper Clip. Brian speculate, just for a moment

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Speaker 1: for me, what would have happened had Germany and Hitler

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Speaker 1: obtained atomic weapons with their missile technology, how far would

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Speaker 1: they have gone with using it? Well, yes, it's a

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Speaker 1: it's a it's a haunting question, and it's one that

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Speaker 1: I think. I think they would have annihilated everything. There

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Speaker 1: was no doubt, especially in that desperate moment. Now it's

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Speaker 1: a question is would they have used it on the

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Speaker 1: Eastern Front or the Western Front? Uh, clearly most of

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Speaker 1: the war for Germany light in the Eastern Front at

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Speaker 1: really even during d Day of their army was still

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Speaker 1: engaged in the East as opposed to the West, so

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Speaker 1: it's likely that the Soviets would have been the primary target.

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Speaker 1: But the idea of holding a city like London, uh,

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Speaker 1: and even Washington, they had plans or something called the

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Speaker 1: a pen um or, which is a V three might

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Speaker 1: call it was planned actually have a rocket that could

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Speaker 1: be transatlantic. Hold a city hostage like that would have

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Speaker 1: been crucial in whatever peace negotiations would have occurred. But

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Speaker 1: I think honestly the Eastern Front would have been an

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Speaker 1: actual target and that if he had hit simultaneously Moscow, Paris,

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Speaker 1: London with atomic weapons, he would have won the war.

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Speaker 1: It's oh absolutely, and it would have been a UM.

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Speaker 1: And that's certainly not the propaganda was promoting this idea

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Speaker 1: that there were these wonder weapons not only for their

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Speaker 1: own population but for the Allied audiences that you know this,

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Speaker 1: that there was perhaps a danger and UM pressing the

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Speaker 1: war to the point of completely annihilating Germany. I'd be

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Speaker 1: speaking this show in German with you, yes, and uh.

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Speaker 1: That would have been good for German departments around the country.

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Speaker 1: But that's about it. So so the operation paper clip occurs,

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Speaker 1: we get the cream of the crop. They come to

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Speaker 1: the United States. Von Braun, of course, as I remembered

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Speaker 1: during my youth, was very instrumental in developing the rockets,

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Speaker 1: the Saturn five, everything it took to get us to

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Speaker 1: the moon. Yes, I think that's yes and no. And

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Speaker 1: he's an excellent team leader. And one of the things

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Speaker 1: that I found this great quote from um A Caltex

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Speaker 1: saysitist name Fritz Vicky, who was one of the first

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Speaker 1: to really analy lies all the technical achievements of the

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Speaker 1: V two team and and had this very honest assessment

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Speaker 1: he called the V two uh. And you know, the

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Speaker 1: German rocket team generally quote a technical achievement of high

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Speaker 1: order due less to the activity of any individual genius

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Speaker 1: than to the determined and enthusiastic cooperation of a large

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Speaker 1: number of only moderately technical individuals. And what I think

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Speaker 1: he means by that, and what was Von Brown's true

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Speaker 1: talent is that he could take something that was on

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Speaker 1: in a blueprint and turned it into an actual working

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Speaker 1: device and mass produce it. And that is something the

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Speaker 1: United States lacked when it came to rocketry at the

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Speaker 1: end of the war, and something that NASA wanted when

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Speaker 1: it was decided should be an army agency or be civilian,

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Speaker 1: Von Brown had already proven himself as someone who could take,

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Speaker 1: who could who was an organizational genius more so than

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Speaker 1: his own scientific prowess as a physicist. He was a

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Speaker 1: custom made for I think the the American military industrial

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Speaker 1: complex take the blueprint and turn it into a working device.

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Speaker 1: That's not a small accomplishment, but it's also not um

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Speaker 1: something that a if. You could also argue that a

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Speaker 1: number of American scientists could have done the same thing.

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Speaker 1: He just was given more authority in power than he

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Speaker 1: even could have imagined during the Third Reich. Our special

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Speaker 1: guest for the first half Brian Krim. His book is

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Speaker 1: called Our Germans Project paper Clip at the National Security State.

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Speaker 1: If you are of German heritage, this is not intended

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Speaker 1: to be an indictment of your heritage by any means.

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Speaker 1: We're talking about how we exploited Nazi technology after World

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Speaker 1: War Two? Brian, why didn't we take advantage of Japanese

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Speaker 1: scientists after we won that war. It's a good question,

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Speaker 1: and it's a and it's a complex one. They're the

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Speaker 1: first thing is we certainly we're concerned about their progression

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Speaker 1: within atomic weapon as we were with the Germans. Again

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Speaker 1: it was an unknowned factor, so we immediately sent similar

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Speaker 1: types of teams technical teams t force as they were

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Speaker 1: called in the in the UH in Europe, but the

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Speaker 1: similar idea to evaluate UH Japanese scientists. And they certainly

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Speaker 1: and they made major advances in aeronautics, long range bombers,

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Speaker 1: and but um, for one, we didn't need to extradite

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Speaker 1: them from Japan to the United States because we weren't

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Speaker 1: dealing with four power other you know, three other allied

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Speaker 1: powers including the Soviet Union, we could use. If there

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Speaker 1: was anything to exploit, we could exploit them in country. UM.

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Speaker 1: But there's also it has to be said, and certainly

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Speaker 1: the scholarship will prove this, that we had a very

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Speaker 1: racial attitude that considered the Japanese inferior on the same

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Speaker 1: level we assume that the Germans were superior. Both of

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Speaker 1: those were inaccurate. But there is a lot of discussion

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Speaker 1: about should we bring Japanese scientists to the United States,

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Speaker 1: And we did bring about thirty for something called Project

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Speaker 1: seventy seven UH, the deal with some boutique technology they created.

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Speaker 1: But the FBI and some other agencies said, do not

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Speaker 1: bring them to the United States. It will inflame racial passions,

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Speaker 1: it will be hard to cover. We can a German

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Speaker 1: can blend into into America pretty well, but a Japanese

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Speaker 1: scientists cannot. So it's a combination of both having complete

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Speaker 1: control of the Japanese islands and not having to worry

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Speaker 1: about the Soviets uh stealing them from us, but also

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Speaker 1: um racial animus that maybe they're not just as good

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Speaker 1: as the Germans. And so there was this uh um

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Speaker 1: debate that went on until um about whether we should

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Speaker 1: have a similar program. But given the problems paper Clip

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Speaker 1: provided a lot of bureaucrats, it was a hassle. It

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Speaker 1: was also publicly and once it was made public unpopular.

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Speaker 1: They decided, why why make that mistake twice with science,

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Speaker 1: with the race of people, as they called it, who

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Speaker 1: are more hated than the Germans were Listen to more

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Speaker 1: Coast to Coast a m every weeknight at one a m.

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Speaker 1: Eastern and go to Coast to Coast am dot com

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Speaker 1: for more